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Document 52018IP0227
European Parliament recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2018/2017(INI))
European Parliament recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2018/2017(INI))
European Parliament recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2018/2017(INI))
IO C 76, 9.3.2020, p. 206–214
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
9.3.2020 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 76/206 |
P8_TA(2018)0227
Libya
European Parliament recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2018/2017(INI))
(2020/C 76/25)
The European Parliament,
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having regard to UN Security Council resolution 2259 (2015) and subsequent resolutions, |
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having regard to the Libyan Political Agreement, |
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having regard to the report of the Secretary-General on the UN Support Mission in Libya, of 22 August 2017, |
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having regard to UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) and all subsequent UNSC resolutions concerning Libya, including 2380 (2017), |
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having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2312 (2016), |
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having regard to the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 14 November 2017 on the suffering of migrants in Libya which is an outrage to conscience of humanity, |
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having regard to the Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of April 2018 entitled ‘Abuse Behind Bars: Arbitrary and unlawful detention in Libya’, |
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having regard to its resolutions of 18 September 2014 (1), 15 January 2015 (2) and 4 February 2016 (3) on the situation in Libya, |
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having regard to the Declaration of the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the situation of migrants in Libya, of 20 December 2017, |
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having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, |
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having regard to the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 January 2017 entitled ‘Migration on the Central Mediterranean route – Managing flows, saving lives’ (JOIN(2017)0004), |
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having regard to the Malta Declaration of 3 February 2017, |
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having regard to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its action plan, |
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having regard to the Joint Statement on the Migrant Situation in Libya, agreed at the African Union - European Union Summit 2017 and the establishment of the high-level trilateral AU-EU-UN Task Force, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions on Libya of 17 July 2017, |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 October 2017, |
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having regard to Rule 113 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0159/2018), |
A. |
whereas the situation in Libya is highly fragile and the country is facing a number of complex, interrelated challenges regarding political stability, economic development, and security; |
B. |
whereas the crisis in Libya has an enormous impact on the people of Libya and also affects the whole surrounding region and the EU, and it is therefore crucial, for the sake of the Libyan population as well as neighbouring countries and the Sub-Saharan and Mediterranean regions, to ensure political stability in Libya, as a fundamental prerequisite for improving the country’s economic and social situation; |
C. |
whereas stability in the south of Libya is a particular concern given the fragile state of its neighbouring countries, with a potential jihadist insurgency threatening weakened governments in the Sahel-Sahara region; |
D. |
whereas the EU should communicate more proactively on its diplomatic efforts and its large financial contribution towards consolidating the security and socio-economic situation in Libya; |
E. |
whereas the conflict in Libya can only be solved through a coherent, comprehensive and inclusive approach involving all international actors and stakeholders, including representatives of the various local communities, the tribal chiefs and civil society activists, and by ensuring Libyan ownership of and inclusiveness in the peace process; |
F. |
whereas the Libyan Political Agreement and the UN Action Plan for Libya currently constitute the only viable framework for a solution to the crisis; |
G. |
whereas, through diplomatic action and concrete support, the EU is assisting Libya’s political transition towards a stable, functioning country and is supporting the UN-led mediation efforts in this regard; |
H. |
whereas it is of the utmost importance that all Member States speak with one voice, strengthening EU mediation efforts and emphasising the central role of the UN and of the UN action plan; whereas individual initiatives by Member States are in all cases to be welcomed only if they are taken within the European framework and are fully in line with EU foreign policy; |
I. |
whereas EU action is showing results on the migration front, given that the figures fell by one third at the end of 2017 compared to 2016 and for the early months of 2018 the figures are 50 % down on those for the same period last year; |
J. |
whereas Libya is a key point of transit and departure for migrants attempting to reach Europe, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa; whereas thousands of migrants and refugees fleeing the violence in Libya have lost their lives in attempting to cross the Mediterranean in order to reach Europe; |
K. |
whereas migrants are among those suffering the most as a result of the security problems in Libya, as they are often the victims of arbitrary violence, arrest and detention by non-state operators, and experience extortion, kidnapping with the aim of obtaining a ransom, and exploitation; |
L. |
whereas many migrants, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa, have been subjected to arbitrary detention by various armed groups in the country; |
M. |
whereas the forced return to Libya by Niger of at least 132 Sudanese who were receiving assistance from the UNHCR is a source of great concern; |
N. |
whereas the problem of internally displaced persons remains a topical one; whereas such persons find themselves facing critical threats such as crossing conflict zones, the presence of landmines and unexploded devices, and the violence of the various militias; |
O. |
whereas Libya has become a transit country for human trafficking; whereas Libya continues to host hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers of different nationalities, many of whom are living in tragic conditions and thus constitute a target for smugglers; whereas there have been allegations of slavery in Libya; |
P. |
whereas the daily life of ordinary Libyans is characterised by ever more difficult living circumstances, further complicated by a cash crisis, water cuts and frequent power outages, and the generally catastrophic state of the country’s healthcare system; |
Q. |
whereas the political climate in Libya is characterised by deep mistrust between the main political and military actors from different regions; |
R. |
whereas the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) increasingly relies on several militias for its own security; whereas these militias have acquired an unprecedented degree of influence over state institutions in Tripoli, thus threatening the UN’s ongoing attempts to create a more viable political framework in the country; |
S. |
whereas countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE have a significant influence on various groups of the warring factions; |
T. |
whereas the subnational identities of the various Libyan communities, tribes and ethnic groups have always constituted the underlying socio-cultural fabric of Libya and play a key role in the social and political dynamics and security issues of the country; whereas Libyan society has strong traditions of informal dispute resolution processes between cities, tribes and ethnic communities; |
U. |
whereas currently the country does not have a clear and widely accepted legislative framework with regard to the electoral system; whereas no constitution has been adopted, thus leaving the country without the necessary legal framework to hold new elections; whereas the prevalence of the current climate of impunity, widespread unlawfulness, corruption and the role of the armed groups and tribal and regional tensions in Libya are contributing to a further decrease in trust in the already weak public and government institutions; |
V. |
whereas Libya has seen a continued increase in extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detention and indiscriminate attacks on residential areas and infrastructure, as well as an increase in hate speech and incitement to violence; |
W. |
whereas the Madkhalist Salafist extremist group is becoming stronger and more relevant in the east as well as in the west of Libya; whereas Madkhalists oppose elections, are eager to maintain the status quo, completely reject any model of democracy and are heavily armed, and thus represent a concrete risk of further extremism and violence in the country; |
X. |
whereas the collapse of the criminal justice system enhances impunity in the country, narrowing avenues for victims to seek protection and remedy; whereas in several regions, even in cases where police reports have been filed after a crime, little action has followed to open prompt, thorough, effective, impartial and independent investigations and to bring perpetrators to justice; whereas no perpetrator of a crime who belongs to an armed group has been convicted in Libya since 2011; |
Y. |
whereas the cycle of violence in Libya has been continuously fed by overarching impunity for serious human rights violations; whereas, unless this is properly addressed, the continued absence of the rule of law will make the narrative of peaceful coexistence and fighting violent extremism meaningless for the population; |
Z. |
whereas dozens of political and human rights activists, media professionals and other public figures have been abducted or threatened; whereas the UN has received reports of arbitrary detention and torture and ill-treatment by both sides; |
AA. |
whereas escalating attacks on members of the judiciary, local civil society organisations, human rights defenders and media workers – as well as refugees and migrants – have been accelerating the deterioration of the human rights situation for all civilians on Libyan territory; whereas the absence of the rule of law and impunity for grave human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and infrastructure, continue to fuel the cycle of violence in the country; |
AB. |
whereas the porosity of Libya’s borders encourages unlawful cross-border traffic; whereas the proliferation of armed groups in the border areas has recently exacerbated the conflict between rival traffickers for control of and access to cross-border resources; whereas the so-called foreign fighters who arrive in the country and the various criminal networks are continuing to benefit from the unchecked proliferation of arms; |
AC. |
whereas political insecurity and instability have made Libya a fertile ground for the activities of extremist groups; whereas the Fezzan region is structurally unstable and has historically been a place of transit to Europe for refugees and migrants, and for the smuggling of oil, gold, arms, drugs and for human trafficking; whereas the region has been suffering from increased ethnic and tribal tensions since the fall of Colonel Gaddafi and the struggle for control of the country’s resources; whereas stabilising Fezzan is key in stabilising the country as a whole; |
AD. |
whereas local Libyan authorities play a key role in preventing conflicts and providing essential public services to residents; |
AE. |
whereas the city of Derna has been subject to escalating ground, air and artillery assault since 7 May 2018; whereas numerous civilians have been killed, while aid and medical access have been severely limited and the humanitarian situation is dramatic; |
AF. |
whereas an official Parliament delegation carried out a mission to Libya on 20-23 May 2018; |
1. |
Recommends the following to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:
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2. |
Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the Libyan Government of National Accord. |
(1) OJ C 234, 28.6.2016, p. 30.