Rapporteur:

Javier DOZ ORRIT

Rapporteur:

Luca JAHIER

Rapporteur:

Wautier ROBYNS DE SCHNEIDAUER

Referral	Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU/Belgian Federal Government, 10.7.2023
Legal basis	Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Section responsible	Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion
Adopted in section	29.2.2024
Adopted at plenary	21.3.2024
Plenary session No	586
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	149/1/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Belgian Presidency’s initiative on social investment and on how to strengthen the social dimension of the European Semester, in particular through the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), and hopes it will achieve strong results and success. This exploratory opinion – together with earlier input in the Spanish Presidency initiative on a possible Social Imbalances Procedure (1) – is the EESC contribution to this process.

1.2.

The EESC expects that the reform of the European Semester will improve coordination among Member States, enhance transparency and ensure the proper monitoring of the implementation of national fiscal and structural plans (FSPs). With price stability and sound public finance, such reforms should provide more space for needed reforms and investments, and measures to make existing welfare systems more resilient.

1.3.

The EESC calls for existing financial resources to be efficiently and effectively employed, also through public-private collaboration and by leveraging financial instruments via the European Investment Bank (EIB) and InvestEU, with maximum flexibility and rigorous evaluation systems.

1.4.

The EESC believes it urgent to discuss on the feasibility of EU financial capacity needed by 2026 to meet investment needs for common priorities. Members States should strive to provide fiscal space for social investment, promoting cyclical stabilisation and the supply of European public goods, ensuring sustainable growth in the medium and long term, and supported by both common guidelines at EU level and EU financial support. Economic and social challenges are interlinked. They must be addressed in a coherent way, recognising that economic progress is the basis for social well-being.

1.5.

Creating inclusive growth and strengthening Europe’s social base by improving people’s well-being, health and skill set and their access to affordable and energy-efficient housing, addressing serious demographic challenges and growing imbalances between citizens, and supporting social innovations in all sectors challenged by major transitions requires a large amount of investments. The growing market of socially certified financial products and support for private investments in social projects can significantly increase the leverage of such policies. The EESC shares the view (2) that, if well designed, social investment policies can have a positive impact on economic growth, productivity and competitiveness, which is key to keep good jobs in Europe, as stated in the Antwerp Declaration, ‘an urgent call to revitalise Europe’s industrial landscape’ (3). At the same time, a good balance between financial viability and adequacy must be ensured. National governments need to review and make sure that their social protection systems are focusing available resources on social support in the areas where it is most needed. The final objective is to improve Europe’s competitive sustainability and, at the same time, the lives of people of all ages.

1.6.

While social infrastructure is generally built and maintained at the national, regional and local levels, the existing gaps and challenges imply that neither national nor sub-national bodies have enough financial resources. As the principle of subsidiarity needs to be respected, investment needs in social infrastructure should be coherent, receive EU financial support and be planned with a long-term view.

1.7.

The EESC calls for reforms and investments in key social areas (particularly those that foster human capital), as social policies and social investments (also through more innovative tools and by promoting appropriate reforms and including all concerned actors) can become a productive factor, providing significant economic returns in terms of pro-growth potential and reduced future major costs.

1.8.

The EESC recommends further strengthening the monitoring of the EPSR implementation in the European Semester, as the Semester is one of the main mechanisms for overseeing broad economic, fiscal and social policy-making. The Semester should be used for better coordination and for monitoring progress across the full spectrum of EU objectives. EU funding rules could be made more flexible in order to support meeting these targets.

1.9.

The EESC reiterates its call for the proper involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in all phases of this process, through structured formal consultation procedures.

2.   Background

2.1.

The Belgian EU Presidency has asked the EESC to draw up an exploratory opinion on how to foster upwards social convergence and cohesion, in an economic governance framework defined around debt sustainability, productive investments and reforms. This opinion will also focus on the implications of such a framework for the European Semester and on further strengthening the monitoring and implementation of the EPSR.

2.2.

There are various definitions of social investment. This opinion intends to use the broadest definition, i.e. one that, in addition to encompassing investment in systems and policies aimed at protecting the health, well-being and rights of individuals and groups, ‘includes policies aimed at raising and upkeeping the quality of the “stock” of human capital and capabilities, as well as easing and improving the “flow” of contemporary labour-market and (gendered) life-course transitions (4)’.

2.3.

Following a post-pandemic recovery process using European fiscal instruments, such as the SURE mechanism and NextGenerationEU and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) (which have strengthened political integration), the EU economy is facing an accelerated transition from a highly expansionary monetary policy to a restrictive one, with a very rapid increase in interest rates to cope with high inflation. This has contributed to the current low economic growth forecast. In this context, the EESC considers it crucial that the reform of fiscal rules take into account national specificities and give Member States that need to improve their debt or deficit ratio – through smart and credible reforms – more means for social investment, with these reforms helping to lower borrowing costs.

2.4.

The reform of the European Semester (which should take place in parallel with the review of EU economic governance) has also been of great interest to the Committee, which has adopted two opinions on both of these topics (5). Based on its positions expressed on the reform of the EU economic governance rules, and without going into the content of the provisional political agreement on the reform here, the EESC reiterates its call to ensure that the implementation of the new rules, once definitively approved by co-legislators, in addition to guaranteeing the medium and long-term sustainability of Member States’ public debts, preserve the conditions for sustainable growth of the EU economies, and in particular, the capacity to make the necessary social investments and the investments needed for the twin double transitions.

2.5.

The EU and its Member States are engaged in important projects in a troubled geopolitical context. Defence, security, cooperation policies and a new major enlargement (including Ukraine) pose high political and financial challenges on top of the investment needs of just and fair green and digital transitions and a more voluntary industrial policy that current EU financial capacities would have difficulties to cover. Strengthening social and territorial cohesion through the fight against poverty and inequalities and the effective implementation of the EPSR action plan, as well as boosting investment in social infrastructure, must be among the EU’s political priorities.

2.6.

The EESC has defended the concept of ‘competitive sustainability’ (6) in several opinions. This concept, proposed in the Commission’s three latest Annual Sustainable Growth Surveys (ASGS), includes environmental sustainability, productivity, fairness and macroeconomic stability.

2.7.

It is extremely difficult to obtain sufficient European and national funding for these major EU policy objectives and programmes in a context of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The risk is that these restrictive policies may not allow for the structural investments needed for the necessary transitions, which are productive in the medium and long term and will promote prosperity.

3.   General comments

3.1.

Resilient societies depend significantly on well-functioning and inclusive welfare states, which in turn depend on healthy economies. The experiences from the latest financial crisis and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic have underlined the critical value of strongly financed and responsive welfare states. They serve as essential prerequisites for effectively absorbing systemic shocks, highlighting the close correlation between robust social protection systems (in the form well-designed and inclusive measures such as unemployment benefits and short-time working schemes), public and social services, and their resilience in the face of unforeseen challenges, as well as temporary support for impacted economic sectors.

3.2.

Experience shows that austerity measures do not automatically lead to an increase in the economic competitiveness and wealth of societies. The provisions necessary for welfare protection have been viewed only as cost factors and not as investments needed in socially resilient societies so Member States can manage their public finances in a prudent but balanced way.

3.3.

Public finance consolidation has sharply reduced the means for public investment in some regions and countries. Some EU countries, where investment in small and medium-sized public works for social infrastructure is carried out at sub-national level, have seen a dramatic decrease in spending on social infrastructure. It remains a challenge to align state intervention or strengthening welfare protection provisions with competitiveness and growth.

3.4.

In such a constricted environment, European welfare states have been hard-pressed to adapt to megatrends such as demographic changes (resulting in an ageing population and a shrinking workforce), digitalisation and technological changes, a changing world of work and developments in the labour market, climate change and the social implications of the green transition (7). These megatrends require Member States to take action to adapt their public policies accordingly.

3.5.

While the EUR 800 bn RRF is intended to help EU countries mitigate the economic and social impacts of the pandemic, only a minority of funds have actually been absorbed. The full implementation of the national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) is progressing at a slow pace (8). The full implementation of national RRPs in all Member States is crucial for filling essential gaps.

3.6.

Social cohesion and the robustness of the welfare state play pivotal roles in enhancing productivity and prosperity, and fostering economic growth. Well-designed reforms and investments based on a social investment approach, in particular those that foster human capital, can yield productivity gains and higher economic growth while advancing social objectives (9).

3.7.

Resilient welfare states balance social investment and protection policies. Social protection policies, on the one hand, aim to maintain strong universal safety nets to ensure macro-economic stabilisation and protection against the financial implications of social risks (such as sickness and disability, poverty, accidents at work and job loss). Social investment policies, on the other hand, aim to increase and maintain the quality of human capital and skills, while improving the ‘flow’ of transitions on the labour market and in the life course. This also includes the necessary investment in policies for integrating migrants at a time of demographic change and for an ageing European society. Likewise, it creates inclusive work environments, particularly for people with disabilities.

3.8.

Under the social investment approach, social policy can provide a significant economic return, reconciling social and financial objectives through employment opportunities, well-being, gender equality and the mitigation of intra- and intergenerational poverty, better than most short-term reactions in times of crisis. Social investment should help prevent social divergence in the EU that results from sluggish growth and the urgent transitions. It is also of utmost importance that a new impetus be given to investments towards social objectives while maintaining and fostering competitive economies that support such policies.

3.9.

Two rationales support a social investment approach in balance with sound economic and public finance policies. The first concerns the recognised medium- and long-term social and economic returns that social investments can generate. At the microeconomic level of individuals and households, the ‘life-course multiplier’ suggests that social investments, from early childhood onwards, improve the material well-being of households through employment and income opportunities, and help to mitigate social risks later in life through upskilling and reskilling programmes and by facilitating transitions in the labour market. The development of socially responsible financial products (such as bonds) and State support for private investments in social projects (such as those offered by France for energy-efficient social housing) can significantly increase the leverage of such policies.

3.10.

Secondly, the economic return of such investments has also proved to have a strong pro-growth potential, as high-quality social infrastructure benefits individuals and communities and improves social cohesion. Appropriate access to social infrastructure generates more ‘hired, housed, healthy and happy’ people, which has positive spill-over effects on society and on economic activities (10), while low-quality social infrastructure can limit social and economic opportunities, lead to markets operating less efficiently, marginalise some groups, prolong existing inequalities and lead to lower growth in living standards and further divisions of our societies.

3.11.

Investing in policies focused on childhood brings significant economic and social benefits. High-quality early childhood education is correlated with improved educational attainment, increased labour market participation and reduced inequality, especially for children from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. Female employment is highest in countries where the number of children in formal childcare and pre-school services is equally high, and employers could be encouraged to provide childcare facilities.

3.12.

Adequate family allowances and childcare services play a crucial role in smoothing the EU’s demographic trends, helping to stop the decline in fertility rates and yielding a spill-over effect on growth projections. To close the fertility gap it is essential to encourage a balance between parenting and work/training for all genders.

3.13.

Moreover, education and training are recognised as fundamental for stimulating economic growth. At the macroeconomic level, a well-educated workforce is a key factor in achieving higher aggregate productivity, innovation and long-term economic growth.

3.14.

Improving training must be linked to better labour market integration procedures and services. In agreement with the social partners, access to the labour market should be facilitated for under-represented groups (young people, women, migrants, minorities) to promote labour mobility and integration, to enable older workers to continue working under decent conditions and to fully recognise qualifications at EU level.

3.15.

The EESC considers that the value of social investment for growth and competitiveness, as well as the economic and budgetary cost of social non-investment in the medium and long term, is sufficiently substantiated. However, efforts to secure the long-term benefits of social investment should not clash with the structural need for sound public finances. As their returns are often long-term, such efforts are not prioritised when there is an urgent need to reach fiscal adjustment targets. Past experiences show that the austerity imposed by the Commission, ECB and IMF in the Eurozone countries most exposed to public finance imbalances and the sovereign debt crisis deepened the recessions in these countries.

3.16.

The social investment deficit occurs in a context of general public and private investment deficit in the EU. The EESC has already expressed its concern (11) about the terms agreed for the review of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the freezing of the European Sovereignty Fund proposed in the Green Deal Industrial Plan, and the under-provision of resources for the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) that was supposed to replace it. Proposing new objectives related to the strategic autonomy of industrial policy should aim to maintain a level playing field within the single market and prevent fragmentation through nationally-funded State aid. Productivity-enhancing investment is an essential factor for the sustainable competitiveness of the European economy, which also requires a framework of price stability and sustainable public finances in the medium to long term.

3.17.

The use of EU funds in the field of social policy should carefully follow existing policy coordination frameworks such as the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) issued as part of the European Semester and the national RRPs.

3.18.

The EESC considers it vital to facilitate and promote private investments. To this end, the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union must be completed as a matter of urgency; public-private partnerships must be boosted through the EIB and other instruments, in particular venture capital. Solvency requirements should be reviewed to free up capital for productive long-term investments, which might be discouraged if priority were given to a short-term view of these assets. The EU and its Member States need to address aggressive and unfair tax planning and promote a level playing field between Member States. The EESC welcomes the OECD proposals in this area to ensure that international tax rules are coherent.

3.19.

Furthermore, the EESC believes that sustainable investment in critical infrastructure for public, health and care services, as well as social housing, is essential in order to align with the objective of social cohesion. The development of socially responsible financial products (such as bonds) and State support for private investment in social projects can significantly increase the leverage of such policies.

3.20.

The review of EU economic governance is therefore a crucial opportunity to ‘future-proof’ the fiscal framework, to address the significant challenges that have emerged over the last decade and to strengthen European integration and strategic autonomy. It should establish the credibility of the Member States’ fiscal trajectories, as financial markets could sanction irresponsible or vague commitments. At the same time, the sustainability of public debt in the medium and long term should be made compatible with maintaining levels of investment that guarantee growth and the achievement of just transitions, notably through national FSPs.

3.21.

Current European instruments are not sufficiently focused on positive social outcomes. The rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) regarding social investment and infrastructure need to evolve towards long-term investments, and financial instruments need to become less fragmented and more blended and bundled (12). It is crucial to establish effective synergies among all European funds to strengthen the overall impact and effectiveness of the recovery efforts, in order to keep up with sustainable growth objectives.

3.22.

Moreover, given the gap (especially in public investment) that several Member States experienced in the 2010s, and the importance of public investment for building up a stock of productive capital that supports output growth in the medium term, some Member States could become trapped in a vicious circle whereby their net public expenditure, which includes investment, grows more slowly as a result of their previous investment gap. This situation will be of greater concern once NextGenerationEU comes to its end. As a lesson learnt from the past, a reformed European Semester must prioritise social outcomes, alongside public finance and administration reforms. Monitoring this would need a fully integrated scoreboard integrating economic, social and environmental outcome indicators, meaning also a reform of accounting for return of investment, prioritising longer-term social infrastructure investments and crowding in private investments.

3.23.

The State should ensure universal and equal access to high-quality social benefits for all citizens, especially through public pension and health systems. However, complementary systems based on a fruitful public-private partnership can enhance these benefits and spread the financial burden across generations. The EESC considers it very important that the obligations and rights of complementary systems be regulated through social dialogue and collective bargaining. As regards self-employed people and workers with a low level of complementary benefits, measures are recommended to facilitate individual efforts to improve their level of protection, with guaranteed health benefits even after retirement age.

3.24.

We also need to consider and encourage the growing role of the social economy and social services of general interest (SSGI) that can also deliver effective responses to social demands and as a key catalyst for social innovation and creating new jobs and opportunities for sustainable growth (13).

4.   Specific comments

4.1.

The EESC reiterates its call to the European institutions to deepen the debate on creating ‘own fiscal capacity’ and increasing budgetary resources beyond the current 1,1 % of GDP, in order to boost investment in social areas and social infrastructure, to foster an inclusive economic growth and to strengthen the objectives of the digital and green transitions, as has been well conceptualised in the last three ASGSs. The EESC believes that in due course (and no later than 2026), an agreement should be reached on possibly establishing an EU financial capacity to meet at least part of the investment needs for common priorities.

4.2.

The European Commission’s Strategic Foresight Report (14), which identifies the main intersections between the challenges of social and economic sustainability, has clearly indicated some key trends and deficits that call for a strong and structured action to reconcile well-being and prosperity. These include the increasing cracks in social and territorial cohesion, with disproportionate impacts and key risks for existing social contracts and threats to democracy, to the fact that education and training systems are not yet adapted to the scale and speed of the transformations.

4.3.

A permanent financial capacity at EU level could be beneficial for strengthening social investments and could focus on three functions: cyclical stabilisation, support for the implementation of FSPs, and the provision of European public goods (EPGs) (15). Public goods and services must benefit third parties, citizens, workers, companies and the environment. The production of bundles of integrated, place-tailored public goods and services can have a positive spill-over effect on Members States’ overall welfare systems and on the environment (16).

4.4.

Given that the cost for social protection should essentially remain in the remit of the EU Member States’ budget, when supported by adequate means in the implementation of the revised EU economic governance framework, we should reflect on the creation of new forms of European support for the necessary investments in crucial social infrastructures, which are essential for the success of the transitions and can be considered EPGs.

4.5.

The report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe (17) made a clear call to boost investment to close the social infrastructure investment gap. The report estimated the gap between current investment in social infrastructure in the EU and the minimum social infrastructure investment gap at between EUR 100 bn and EUR 150 bn per year, representing a total gap of more than EUR 1,5 tn between 2018 and 2030. Since the global economic and financial crisis, the EU has been suffering from low levels of investment. The infrastructure investments in 2016 were 20 % below the level experienced in 2007, with investment in social infrastructure lagging even more behind investment in traditional infrastructure. Moreover, the gap differs considerably across regions. Local authorities, who should have a leading role in investment in social infrastructure, are sometimes subject to even tighter budget constraints. Regional levels of development therefore do not converge, nor does investment in social infrastructure. The report examines several concrete proposals aimed at bridging this gap.

4.6.

The EESC suggests the following five priorities, with due respect to the roles of Member States and regions in implementing a policy coordinated at EU level: — Ageing societies and clear demographic trends: Whether talking about labour market shortages, the pressures on investment needs for care and for adapting infrastructure in our societies (living spaces, transport, etc.), or the demands for goods and services of a different future society, including the opportunity of the silver economy, these require major and specific plans, as well as appropriate investments to reduce risks and shortages (including an appropriate and well-designed migration policy). These investments should become a driving force behind the EU's future competitiveness and wealth. — Energy efficiency: Energy and housing poverty figures (18) have been high in many countries (mostly those in the most disadvantaged and rural areas). Energy efficiency is a core priority for the EU and will require massive investments over the coming years. This is unaffordable for at least a quarter of EU citizens, and very difficult to sustain for many others. Appropriate EU funding is a lever for private funding of such a priority. Giving access to affordable housing, in particular for young people and low-income families, is a social investment with a clear economic result in terms of growth. — The need to adapt our healthcare infrastructure across Europe: This was highlighted during the pandemic. The healthcare sector should also become a key priority in the planning of the next MFF, either as part of the EU’s ordinary cohesion and social funds or through specific new EU instruments. Actions need to emphasise prevention, both in general health and in the field of occupational health and safety. For instance, marking the difference between safe and healthy work environments and those that are less so (according to employer track records), and making less healthy work environments pay more social contributions (bonus-malus), could reduce injuries and burnouts and the costs they cause. — The important need for education, training and learning, at all levels: These are essential for ensuring that our society is ready for the necessary transitions and for providing an adequately skilled workforce for our enterprises and for promoting new jobs through professionals and business start-ups. This should be considered a core priority for EU investments as a crucial EPG. — Assessing the feasibility of making SURE permanent or creating a similar instrument: SURE was a successful instrument for protecting workers during the pandemic. The EESC proposes that consideration be given to a permanent SURE (or similar) instrument to protect workers in all economic sectors exposed to risks associated with the green and digital transitions, in order to reinforce social security and confidence in these huge transformations of EU economy and to guarantee social support in this respect. This could become a strong instrument for linking work and transitions in a positive way.

4.7.

The EESC proposes that the social partners and civil society organisations be involved through a structured formal consultation procedure, both at European and national level, covering the drafting, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. In order to strengthen the social dimension of the European Semester, in line with the objectives of the EU’s economic and fiscal policy, we need organised civil society participation, the effective use of appropriate social indicators, greater involvement of representatives of national and European political institutions and close coordination between the Commission, EPSCO and ECOFIN, and to conclude the work on the social convergence framework proposed by the Spanish and Belgian presidencies of the Council.

4.8.

The 2025 review of the EPSR action plan provides an opportunity to more clearly and concretely define the outcomes of the reform, to review existing funds, to streamline social investment and to reinforce the monitoring of the EPSR implementation within the European Semester – the main mechanism for overseeing wider economic and social policy-making. The European Semester should be used for better coordination and for monitoring progress across the full spectrum of EU objectives. EU funding rules could be made more flexible in order to support achieving these objectives. This would also ensure policy coherence. This proposal is consistent with the European Commission’s Communication on a revised EU economic governance framework, and will facilitate the processes of national ownership and participation of organised civil society. Compliance with the CSRs makes it possible to assess the validity and effectiveness of the European Semester. The EESC therefore believes that the most appropriate incentive is to link the implementation of CSRs to the EU budget and to receive part of the funds from it, along the same lines as the RRF (19). Given that a significant part of the investment and management of social protection systems (and implementation of their reforms) takes place at local and regional level, the Committee stresses the importance of involving their democratic institutions in drafting future national fiscal and structural plans and in the main European Semester processes.

4.9.

Achieving the EU’s social objectives and those of the twin and just transitions, and financing other EPGs requires the most effective use of limited financial resources. The EESC therefore proposes: a) reviewing the Structural and Cohesion Funds and coordinating their objectives, projects and flows with those of the last phase of NRP implementation; b) re-aligning the financial and policy instruments for social policy towards reform, reducing the fragmentation of existing instruments, and so increasing absorption rates; c) finalising financial incentives attached to reforms and identifying clear targets and a multiannual scope, with due regard to country ownership and specificity; d) studying the possibility of using ESM funds to finance investment programmes; e) strengthening and optimising existing public-private investment partnership instruments, in particular those of the EIB and InvestEU; and f) facilitating and attracting private investment with social value.

4.10.

The EESC believes that a priority objective for all countries should be to maximise the return-on-investment processes, including through linking financing to structural reforms as previously successfully implemented in the national RRPs. This requires maximum flexibility and streamlining in the implementation of programmes, and the implementation of rigorous evaluation and monitoring systems to ensure efficiency when spending existing EU funds. Civil society involvement can make this process more transparent and effective. The best return on investment also depends on the quality and effectiveness of social protection systems and of the reforms carried out in them.

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(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Imbalances Procedure (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency) ( OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 58).

(2)  Opinion of EMCO and SPC on Social Investment, Brussels, 17 November 2023, 15418/23.

(3)  The Antwerp Declaration for a European Industrial Deal (antwerp-declaration.eu).

(4)   Social Investment for resilient economies, Informal Working Group Social Investment, draft final working document; 14 November 2023.

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the EESC’s recommendations for a solid reform of the European Semester (own-initiative opinion) ( OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 1), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (COM(2023) 240 final – 2023/0138 (COD)), the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (COM(2023) 241 final – 2023/0137 (CNS)) and the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (COM(2023) 242 final – 2023/0136 (NLE)) (OJ C, C/2023/880, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/880/oj).

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on additional considerations on the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2023 (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/871, 6.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/871/oj), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank: Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2023 (COM(2022) 780 final) ( OJ C 146, 27.4.2023, p. 59), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee — Additional considerations on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2022 (COM(2021) 740 final) (own-initiative opinion) ( OJ C 75, 28.2.2023, p. 35), and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank – Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2022 [COM(2021) 740 final] ( OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 50).

(7)  Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Social Protection and of the Welfare State in the EU.

(8)  EESC evaluation report on the Mid-term evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility .

(9)  OECD, https://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.

(10)  Fransen, L., Del Bufalo, G., and Reviglio, E., (2018) Boosting Investment in Social Infrastructure in Europe, Report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe.

(11)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on additional considerations on the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2023 (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/871, 6.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/871/oj), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Mid-term revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (COM(2023) 336 final) (OJ C, C/2023/867, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/867/oj), and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age’ (COM(2023) 62 final) and ‘b) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act)’ (COM(2023) 161 final — 2023/0081 (COD)) ( OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 179).

(12)  European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, The future of social protection and of the welfare state in the EU, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/35425.

(13)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council Recommendation on developing social economy framework conditions (COM(2023) 316 final — 2023/0179 (NLE)) (OJ C, C/2024/882, 6.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/882/oj), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Combatting poverty and social exclusion: harnessing the power of the social economy and socio-economic innovations (exploratory opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/2097, 26.3.2024, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2097/oj), and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Developing a new European Strategy for the Internal Market: helping our companies face the technological, social, environmental and competition challenges’ (exploratory opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/2096, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2096/oj).

(14)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 2023 Strategic Foresight Report – Sustainability and people's wellbeing at the heart of Europe’s Open Strategic Autonomy, COM(2023) 376 final, July 2023.

(15)  Buti, M., and Messori, M., (2021) ‘Euro area policy mix: From horizontal to vertical coordination’, CEPR Policy Insight, No. 113.

(16)  Barca, F., (2009) An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy: A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations, European Commission.

(17)   Boosting Investment in Social Infrastructure in Europe , Report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe, chaired by Romano Prodi and Christian Sautter, 2018.

(18)  At least 9,3 % of the EU population (or 42 million Europeans) are highly affected, and over 22 % of the European population have serious problems: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733583/EPRS_BRI(2022)733583_EN.pdf.

(19)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the EESC’s recommendations for a solid reform of the European Semester (own-initiative opinion) ( OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 1).