Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

29 July 2024 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – European arrest warrant – Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA – Surrender of requested persons to issuing judicial authorities – Respect for fundamental rights – Systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the judiciary of the issuing Member State – Deficiencies concerning the absence of proof of the taking of an oath by judges – Prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment – Detention conditions in the issuing Member State – Assessment undertaken by the executing judicial authority – Refusal by the executing judicial authority to execute the European arrest warrant – Effects of that refusal for the executing judicial authority of another Member State )

In Case C‑318/24 PPU [Breian], (i)

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Curtea de Apel Braşov (Court of Appeal, Braşov, Romania), made by decision of 30 April 2024, received at the Court on 30 April 2024, in the proceedings relating to the execution of the European arrest warrant issued against

P.P.R.,

other parties:

Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie – Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie – Serviciul Teritorial Braşov,

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of E. Regan, President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as a Judge of the Fifth Chamber, Z. Csehi, I. Jarukaitis and D. Gratsias (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: J. Kokott,

Registrar: R. Şereş, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 24 June 2024,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        P.P.R., by J. Azzopardi, avukat, and M. Laïchi, lawyer,

–        Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie – Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie – Serviciul Teritorial Braşov, by M. Voineag, acting as Agent,

–        the Romanian Government, by M. Chicu, E. Gane and A. Rotăreanu, acting as Agents,

–        Ireland, by G. Mullan, Barrister-at-Law,

–        the French Government, by R. Bénard and B. Dourthe, acting as Agents,

–        the Maltese Government, by A. Buhagiar, acting as Agent,

–        the European Commission, by A. Biolan, H. Leupold and J. Vondung, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 11 July 2024,

gives the following

Judgment

1        The request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 4(3) and Article 17(1) TEU, Article 4 and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and Article 1(2) and (3) and Articles 15 to 19 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24) (‘Framework Decision 2002/584’).

2        That request was made in the proceedings relating to the execution of the European arrest warrant issued against P.P.R. by the Curtea de Apel Braşov – Biroul executări penale (Court of Appeal, Braşov – Office for Criminal Enforcement, Romania).

 Legal background

 International law

3        Article 2(1) of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), adopted in Vienna (Austria) by the General Assembly of Interpol on 13 June 1956 at its 25th session, and last amended at its 91st session in 2023 (‘Interpol’s Constitution’), provides that one of Interpol’s aims is ‘to ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”’.

4        Article 5 of Interpol’s Constitution refers to the Commission for the Control of Files (CCF) as part of Interpol.

5        In accordance with the first and third paragraphs of Article 36 of Interpol’s Constitution, the CCF is an independent body which is to ensure that the processing of personal data by Interpol is in compliance with the applicable regulations, and must, inter alia, decide on any complaint in that regard.

6        The CCF has its own statute, which specifies its functions and powers more precisely. Under Article 3(1)(c) of that statute, it may, inter alia, order the deletion of personal data from the Interpol information system.

 Framework Decision 2002/584

7        Article 1 of Framework Decision 2002/584, entitled ‘Definition of the European arrest warrant and obligation to execute it’ provides:

‘1.      The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.

2.      Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision.

3.      This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 [TEU].’

8        Article 3 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Grounds for mandatory non-execution of the European arrest warrant’ provides:

‘The judicial authority of the Member State of execution (hereinafter “executing judicial authority”) shall refuse to execute the European arrest warrant in the following cases:

1.      if the offence on which the arrest warrant is based is covered by amnesty in the executing Member State, where that State had jurisdiction to prosecute the offence under its own criminal law;

2.      if the executing judicial authority is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a Member State in respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing Member State;

3.      if the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant may not, owing to his age, be held criminally responsible for the acts on which the arrest warrant is based under the law of the executing State.’

9        Article 8 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Content and form of the European arrest warrant’ provides:

‘1.      The European arrest warrant shall contain the following information set out in accordance with the form contained in the Annex:

(a)      the identity and nationality of the requested person;

(b)      the name, address, telephone and fax numbers and e-mail address of the issuing judicial authority;

(c)      evidence of an enforceable judgment, an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect, coming within the scope of Articles 1 and 2;

(d)      the nature and legal classification of the offence, particularly in respect of Article 2;

(e)      a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested person;

(f)      the penalty imposed, if there is a final judgment, or the prescribed scale of penalties for the offence under the law of the issuing Member State;

(g)      if possible, other consequences of the offence.

2.      The European arrest warrant must be translated into the official language or one of the official languages of the executing Member State. Any Member State may, when this Framework Decision is adopted or at a later date, state in a declaration deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council [of the European Union] that it will accept a translation in one or more other official languages of the Institutions of the European [Union].’

10      Under Article 15 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Surrender decision’:

‘1.      The executing judicial authority shall decide, within the time limits and under the conditions defined in this Framework Decision, whether the person is to be surrendered.

2.      If the executing judicial authority finds the information communicated by the issuing Member State to be insufficient to allow it to decide on surrender, it shall request that the necessary supplementary information … be furnished as a matter of urgency […].

3.      The issuing judicial authority may at any time forward any additional useful information to the executing judicial authority.’

11      Article 19 of Framework Decision 2002/584, entitled ‘Hearing the person pending the decision’ provides:

‘1.      The requested person shall be heard by a judicial authority, assisted by another person designated in accordance with the law of the Member State of the requesting court.

2.      The requested person shall be heard in accordance with the law of the executing Member State and with the conditions determined by mutual agreement between the issuing and executing judicial authorities.

3.      The competent executing judicial authority may assign another judicial authority of its Member State to take part in the hearing of the requested person in order to ensure the proper application of this Article and of the conditions laid down.’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

12      On 17 December 2020, the Curtea de Apel Braşov (Court of Appeal, Braşov, Romania) issued a European arrest warrant against P.P.R., for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence imposed on P.P.R. by a judgment of its Criminal Division, dated 27 June 2019, which became final following the delivery of a judgment of the Criminal Division of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), dated 17 December 2020.

13      Following the final conviction of 17 December 2020, the Office for Criminal Enforcement of the Curtea de Apel Brașov (Court of Appeal, Brașov) issued, on the same day, a European arrest warrant against P.P.R. for the purpose of executing the sentence which had been imposed.

14      It is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that, on 28 June 2022, P.P.R. was arrested in Paris (France) and became subject to a surrender procedure. That procedure was concluded by a judgment of the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris, France) of 29 November 2023, which has become final, that court having refused to execute the European arrest warrant issued by the Romanian authorities against P.P.R.

15      According to the referring court, the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) based its refusal on the existence of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. First, that court considered that there were systemic and generalised deficiencies in the Romanian judicial system, in so far as the place where the records of the oath of office taken by judges are kept is uncertain, which gives rise to doubts regarding the proper composition of the courts in that Member State. Secondly, it considered that that systemic deficiency had an impact on the criminal proceedings against P.P.R. before the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice), since the record of the oath taken by one of the three judges of the formation that heard the case in question cannot be found, and another judge of that formation took an oath only as a public prosecutor, while it is not clear from the applicable provisions of Romanian law that public prosecutors do not have to re-take the oath if they are appointed as judges.

16      Furthermore, the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) also took into consideration the decision of the CCF’s Requests Chamber, adopted at its 123rd session held from 30 January to 3 February 2023 (CCF/123/R1358.21), which ordered the deletion from the Interpol database of the international wanted persons notice in respect of P.P.R. on the ground that the data concerning P.P.R. did not comply with Interpol’s rules on the processing of personal data. The cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) considered that that decision raised serious concerns regarding political elements in the general context and regarding respect for the principles of fundamental rights in the proceedings against P.P.R. in Romania.

17      The referring court also notes that, on 29 April 2024, P.P.R. was arrested in Malta on the basis of the European arrest warrant issued against him. On the same day, the Maltese executing judicial authority requested further information from the referring court, stating that P.P.R. had relied on the judgment of the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) referred to in paragraph 14 of the present judgment.

18      In those circumstances, the Curtea de Apel Brașov (Court of Appeal, Brașov) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      May Article 15(1) of [Framework Decision 2002/584] be interpreted as meaning that the final judgment regarding the decision of an executing judicial authority to refuse to surrender a requested person has the authority of res judicata with regard to another executing judicial authority of another Member State or must it be interpreted as not precluding the repetition of a request for surrender on the basis of the same European Arrest Warrant, where the factors which prevented the execution of a previous European Arrest Warrant have been ruled out, or where the decision refusing to execute that European Arrest Warrant was not consistent with EU law, in so far as the execution of a new European Arrest Warrant would not result in an infringement of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, and the repetition of the request for surrender would be proportionate, in accordance with the interpretation of Framework Decision 2002/584 given in the [judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others (C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 141 and paragraph 5 of the operative part)]?

(2)      May Article 1(3) of [Framework Decision 2002/584], read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the [Charter], be interpreted as meaning that an executing judicial authority may not refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant issued for the purpose of executing a sentence where, when reviewing the obligation to respect human rights in proceedings for the execution of a European Arrest Warrant, as regards the right to a fair trial, from the point of view of the requirement of a tribunal established by law, provided for in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, irregularities have been found regarding the taking of an oath by members of the adjudicating panel of the court which delivered the conviction, without the interference by other public authorities in the process of appointing judges being called into question?

(3)      May Article 1(3) of [Framework Decision 2002/584], read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the [Charter], be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which a person who is the subject of a European Arrest Warrant claims that his or her surrender to the issuing Member State would result in an infringement of his or her right to a fair trial, the existence of a decision of the [CCF], which refers directly to that person’s situation, cannot per se justify a refusal by the executing judicial authority to execute the European Arrest Warrant in question? By contrast, may such a decision be taken into consideration by that judicial authority, among other factors, in order to assess whether there are systemic or generalised deficiencies in the functioning of the judicial system of that Member State or deficiencies affecting the judicial protection of an objectively identifiable group of persons to which that person belongs?

(4)      May [Framework Decision 2002/584] be interpreted as not precluding the repetition of a request for surrender of a requested person on the basis of the same European Arrest Warrant the execution of which was initially refused by an executing court of one Member State, before another executing court of another Member State, where the issuing judicial authority itself finds that the earlier decision to refuse to execute the European Arrest Warrant was not consistent with EU law, in the light of the existing judicial practice of the Court of Justice or solely due to the fact that a question on the interpretation of EU law applicable in that case has been referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling?

(5)      Do the principle of mutual recognition, provided for in Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, and the principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation, provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, in conjunction with the need to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights of the persons involved in the proceedings, and also in the light of Articles 15 and 19 of Framework Decision 2002/584, permit the judicial authorities of the issuing Member State (the issuing court being represented by a direct representative or, at the request of that court, by other judicial bodies such as a liaison magistrate, the national member of [the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust)] or the public prosecutor of the issuing Member State), to participate directly – by making requests, offering evidence and participating in legal discussions – in the judicial proceedings for the execution of the European Arrest Warrant conducted by the executing judicial authority, and to use a remedy against the decision regarding the refusal to surrender – under the conditions laid down in the domestic law of the executing Member State for the use of that remedy, in so far as such a remedy is provided for in that law – on the basis of and in accordance with the principle of equivalence?

(6)      May Article 17(1) TEU, relating to the tasks of the [European] Commission, read in the light of Framework Decision 2002/584, be interpreted as meaning that the tasks of the Commission concerning the promotion of the general interest of the Union through the taking of appropriate initiatives to that end and the tasks relating to ensuring the overseeing of the application of Union law can be performed in relation to a European Arrest Warrant, also at the request of the judicial authority which issued the European Arrest Warrant, where that judicial authority considers that the executing judicial authority’s refusal to execute the European Arrest Warrant seriously undermines the principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation, so that the Commission may take the measures it deems necessary in the light of those tasks and fully independently?’

19      On 16 May 2024, the Court sent the referring court a request for clarification regarding the nature of the proceedings in the context of which it made its request for a preliminary ruling, the subject matter of those proceedings and the content of the decisions which it might be required to take at the end of those proceedings. The referring court responded to that request on 22 May 2024. In its reply, it stated, inter alia, that on 20 May 2024 the competent Maltese court, in its capacity as the judicial authority executing the European arrest warrant issued against P.P.R., had decided not to surrender P.P.R. to the Romanian authorities, considering that it was unable to conclude, on the basis of the information on the detention conditions in Romania available to it, that the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, provided for in Article 4 of the Charter, would be complied with in respect of P.P.R. if P.P.R. were to be surrendered to the Romanian authorities.

20      According to the referring court, in order to reach that conclusion, the Maltese executing judicial authority, first, based itself on information which was accessible, inter alia, on the website of the Romanian prison administration. Secondly, it took into consideration the fact that, in order to convey that the referring court had accepted the assurances given by the Romanian competent authorities that P.P.R. would not be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment on account of the detention conditions, the English translation of the referring court’s communication to the Maltese executing judicial authority used the term ‘approved’, and not the term ‘endorsed’, the latter being the term used in paragraph 68 of the English version of the judgment of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu (C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857).

21      In those circumstances the Curtea de Apel Brașov (Court of Appeal, Brașov) referred the following seventh question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Must Article 1(3) of [Framework Decision 2002/584], in conjunction with Article 4 of the [Charter], relating to the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, be interpreted as meaning that, when examining detention conditions in the issuing Member State, first, the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to execute the European Arrest Warrant on the basis of information which has not been brought to the attention of the issuing judicial authority and in respect of which the latter has not had the opportunity to provide supplementary information as referred to in Article 15(2) and (3) of [Framework Decision 2002/584] and, second, the executing judicial authority cannot apply a higher standard than that provided for by the Charter and without clarifying precisely the rules to which it refers, in particular as regards the requirements in matters of detention such as the drawing up of a “precise plan for … execution of the sentence”, the establishment of “precise criteria for determining a particular regime of execution” and guarantees in relation to non-discrimination on account of a “particularly unique and delicate position”’?

 The request for the urgent preliminary ruling procedure to be applied

22      The referring court requested that the reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in the first paragraph of Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.

23      In support of its request, the referring court stated, in essence, that P.P.R. is currently being held in custody in Malta in the context of the procedure for the execution of the European arrest warrant issued by the Romanian authorities, and that whether that detention should continue depends on the outcome of the main proceedings, it being understood that P.P.R. relied, before the Maltese executing judicial authority, on the refusal by the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) to execute the European arrest warrant issued by the Romanian authorities.

24      Under Article 107(1) of the Rules of Procedure, a reference for a preliminary ruling which raises one or more questions in the areas covered by Title V (relating to the area of freedom, security and justice) of Part Three of the FEU Treaty may, at the request of the referring court or tribunal or, exceptionally, of the Court’s own motion, be dealt with under an urgent preliminary ruling procedure, as provided for in Chapter 3 of Title III of the Rules of Procedure, which comprises Articles 107 to 114 of those Rules of Procedure.

25      It should be noted, in the first place, that the reference for a preliminary ruling concerns, in particular, the interpretation of Framework Decision 2002/584, which falls within the areas covered by Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, relating to the area of freedom, security and justice. Consequently, it can be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, in accordance with Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure.

26      In the second place, as regards the condition relating to urgency, that condition is satisfied, in particular, where the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his or her liberty and when his or her continued detention turns on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings, it being specified that the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when consideration was given to whether the reference for a preliminary ruling should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (judgment of 14 May 2024, Stachev, C‑15/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:399, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

27      In the present case, it is true that the reference for a preliminary ruling has not been made by the court which, as the judicial authority executing the European arrest warrant at issue in the main proceedings, is ultimately called upon to decide on the surrender of the person in respect of whom that arrest warrant was issued, but by the judicial authority which issued it.

28      The fact remains that, as the referring court confirmed in response to the request for clarification referred to in paragraph 19 of this judgment, it could decide, depending on the answers to the questions asked, to withdraw the European arrest warrant issued against P.P.R. Since P.P.R. is being detained only on the basis of the European arrest warrant, the immediate consequence of withdrawing that arrest warrant would be P.P.R.’s release.

29      In those circumstances, the Fifth Chamber of the Court, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decided, on 15 May 2024, to grant the referring court’s request that the reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.

 The questions referred for a preliminary ruling

 Preliminary observations

30      As stated in paragraph 27 of the present judgment, the reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the judicial authority which issued the European arrest warrant on the basis of which P.P.R. was detained in Malta. It is apparent from the explanations provided by the referring court that the purpose of the request for a preliminary ruling is, inter alia, to enable that court to determine whether it may issue a new European arrest warrant against P.P.R., or whether it must withdraw the European arrest warrant already issued against P.P.R., should it follow from the Court’s answer that the refusal to execute the previous warrant was not compatible with EU law.

31      Those considerations justify that court being able, as the issuing judicial authority, to refer questions to the Court concerning the conditions for the execution of a European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 53).

32      The observance of fundamental rights in the context of proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State. Therefore, and given that the issuance of such a warrant may result in the arrest of the person subject to it, an issuing judicial authority must, in order to ensure observance of those rights, be able to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling in order to determine whether to maintain or withdraw a European arrest warrant or whether it may issue such a warrant (judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

33      It follows that, as the Advocate General stated, in essence, in points 24 to 26 of her Opinion, the reference for a preliminary ruling is admissible in its entirety, without prejudice to the possibility of assessing the admissibility of each of the questions referred.

 The first question

34      By the first part of its first question, the court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(3) and Article 15(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State must refuse to execute a European arrest warrant where the executing authority of another Member State has previously refused to execute that warrant on the ground that the surrender of the person concerned may infringe the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.

35      By the second part of its first question, that court asks whether, in the same circumstances, those provisions must be interpreted as precluding the issuing judicial authority from maintaining the European arrest warrant in question.

36      In that regard, it is clear from settled case-law that both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter, are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. More specifically, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

37      According to settled case-law, the existence of a risk of infringement of the fundamental rights recognised by EU law is capable of permitting the executing judicial authority to refrain, exceptionally and following an appropriate examination, from giving effect to a European arrest warrant on the basis of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 72).

38      In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that, where the executing judicial authority called upon to decide on the surrender of a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued has evidence indicating that there is a real risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the operation of the judicial system of the issuing Member State, that authority must verify, specifically and precisely, whether, in the light of that person’s personal situation, the nature of the offence for which he or she is sought and the factual context in which the European arrest warrant was issued, there are substantial grounds for believing that that person will run such a risk in the event of being surrendered to that Member State (judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 97).

39      That being so, no provision of Framework Decision 2002/584 provides for the possibility, or obligation, for an executing authority of a Member State to refuse to execute an arrest warrant solely on the ground that the executing authority of another Member State has refused to execute it, without examining itself whether there are any grounds for non-execution of that arrest warrant (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants), C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 51).

40      In particular, even where the decision of an executing authority of a Member State to refuse the execution of an arrest warrant has the authority of res judicata under national law, it cannot be assimilated to having been ‘finally judged’, within the meaning of Article 3(2)of Framework Decision 2002/584, the only ground capable of preventing criminal proceedings from being brought for the same acts, against that person, in the issuing State, or from being instituted in any other Member State (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants), C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 52).

41      A requested person is considered to have been finally judged in respect of the same acts within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584 where, following criminal proceedings, further prosecution is definitively barred or where the judicial authorities of a Member State have adopted a decision by which the accused is finally acquitted in respect of the alleged acts (judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraph 45).

42      The examination of a request for surrender does not imply the initiation of criminal proceedings by the executing State against the person whose surrender is requested and does not involve an assessment of the merits of the case (judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants), C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 54).

43      It follows that an executing authority of a Member State cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant solely on the ground that the executing authority of another Member State has refused to execute it, without examining itself whether there are any grounds for non-execution (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants), C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 61).

44      Although it follows from the foregoing that the principle of mutual recognition, as implemented by Framework Decision 2002/584, does not extend to decisions not to execute European arrest warrants, it is nevertheless necessary to specify how an executing authority of a Member State may be affected by the fact that an executing authority of another Member State has previously refused to execute such an arrest warrant on the ground of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial by a tribunal established by law, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.

45      In accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 34 above, the principle of mutual trust requires each Member State, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised that law.

46      In the present case, as set out in essence by the Advocate General in points 37 to 44 of her Opinion, in accordance with the principle of mutual trust, where one Member State has adopted a non-execution decision on the ground of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47, of the Charter, the executing authority of a Member State to which a new request for surrender of the person concerned is made must give due consideration to the reasons underlying that decision, within the framework of its own examination of the existence of a ground for non-execution (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 June 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Effect of a decision granting refugee status), C‑753/22, EU:C:2024:524, paragraph 80).

47      The foregoing considerations hold true, mutatis mutandis, as regards the issuing judicial authority whose European arrest warrant has not been executed on the ground of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.

48      Nothing in Framework Decision 2002/584 prevents the issuing authority from maintaining the request for surrender under a European arrest warrant where the executing authority of a Member State has refused to execute that arrest warrant.

49      Thus, while the existence of a decision by the executing authority of a Member State to refuse the execution of an arrest warrant does not, in itself, impose an obligation on the judicial authority which issued that arrest warrant to withdraw it, it must, nonetheless, prompt the latter authority to exercise vigilance (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants), C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 55).

50      In the judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, (C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57), the Court was asked whether it was possible to issue several successive European arrest warrants in circumstances similar to those in the main proceedings. The principles set out by the Court in paragraphs 139 to 143 of that judgment are applicable, by analogy, to the present case.

51      In particular, it may prove necessary for the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant to maintain it, in particular after the factors which led to the previous request for surrender have been ruled out, or where the decision refusing to execute that European arrest warrant was not consistent with EU law, in order to conduct the procedure for the surrender of a requested person to its conclusion and thus to promote the attainment of the objective of combating impunity pursued by that framework decision (see, by analogy, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 141).

52      That being so, as observed in paragraph 32 of this judgment, the observance of fundamental rights in the context of proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State.

53      Accordingly, an issuing judicial authority cannot, in the absence of a change in circumstances, maintain a European arrest warrant where an executing judicial authority has legitimately refused, in accordance with Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, to give effect to that arrest warrant on the ground of a real risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 143). Conversely, if there is no such risk, following in particular a change in circumstances, the mere fact that the executing authority has refused to execute that arrest warrant cannot as such prevent the issuing judicial authority from maintaining that warrant.

54      Furthermore, since maintaining a European arrest warrant which another Member State has refused to execute may result in the arrest of the person in respect of whom it has been issued in another Member State and, therefore, may prejudice that person’s individual freedom, it is for the issuing judicial authority to examine whether, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, it is proportionate to maintain that warrant. In the context of such an examination, it is for that authority, inter alia, to take into account the nature and gravity of the offence for which the requested person is being prosecuted, the consequences for that person of the maintenance of that European arrest warrant issued against him or her and the prospects of execution of that arrest warrant (see, by analogy, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 144 and 145).

55      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first part of the first question is that Article 1(3) and Article 15(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State is not obliged to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant where the executing authority of another Member State has previously refused to execute that arrest warrant on the ground that the surrender of the person concerned may infringe the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. Nevertheless, within the framework of its own examination of the existence of a ground for non-execution, that authority must give due consideration to the reasons underlying the refusal decision adopted by the first executing authority. Those provisions do not preclude, in the same circumstances, the issuing judicial authority from maintaining the European arrest warrant in question, provided that, according to its own assessment, execution of that arrest warrant should not be refused on the ground of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, and that it is proportionate to maintain that warrant.

 The third question

56      By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued claims that his or her surrender to the issuing Member State would result in an infringement of his or her right to a fair trial, the existence of a decision of the CCF concerning that person’s situation may, in itself, justify a refusal by the executing judicial authority to execute that arrest warrant or, failing that, may be taken into account by that judicial authority in order to decide whether it is appropriate to refuse to execute that European arrest warrant on the ground alleged by that person.

57      According to the referring court’s explanations, the CCF’s Requests Chamber decided to delete from the Interpol database the international wanted persons notice in respect of P.P.R. on the ground that the data concerning P.P.R. did not comply with Interpol’s rules on the processing of personal data. That decision of the CCF was taken into account by the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) in its judgment of 29 November 2023, by which that court refused to execute the European arrest warrant issued by the Romanian authorities against P.P.R.

58      In the judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, (C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57), the Court was asked a similar question concerning the taking into account, by the executing authority, of a report by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, a body operating under the supervision of the United Nations Human Rights Council. The principles set out by the Court in paragraphs 121 to 126 of that judgment are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the taking into account, by the executing authority, of a decision of the CCF concerning the situation of a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued.

59      Since the two-step examination referred to in paragraph 38 of the present judgment must be based both on objective, reliable, specific and properly updated information relating to the operation of the judicial system of the issuing Member State and on a specific and precise analysis of the individual situation of the requested person, a decision of the CCF ordering the deletion of the international wanted persons notice in respect of the person against whom an arrest warrant has been issued, on the ground of an infringement of Interpol’s rules on the processing of personal data, cannot suffice to justify a refusal to execute that arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 123).

60      Provided that the executing authority has been able to establish the existence of systemic or generalised deficiencies (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 135), that authority must, in the context of the second step, assess specifically and precisely whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the requested person will run a real risk of infringement of his or her fundamental right to a fair trial once he or she has been surrendered to the issuing Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 92, and of 17 December 2020, Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority), C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:1033, paragraph 61). A decision of the CCF may be one of the factors that can be taken into account in the second step of that examination, although the executing judicial authority is not bound by it.

61      Consequently, the answer to the third question is that Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued claims that his or her surrender to the issuing Member State would result in an infringement of his or her right to a fair trial, the existence of a decision of the CCF concerning that person’s situation cannot, in itself, justify a refusal by the executing judicial authority to execute that arrest warrant. However, such a decision may be taken into account by that judicial authority in order to decide whether it is appropriate to refuse to execute that arrest warrant.

 The fourth question

62      By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant is obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court before deciding, in the light of the grounds on the basis of which the executing judicial authority refused to execute that arrest warrant, whether to withdraw or maintain that warrant.

63      Under the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, where a question concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union is raised before a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.

64      In accordance with the third paragraph of that article, where any such question is raised in a case pending before a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal must bring the matter before the Court.

65      It follows that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant is not obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court before deciding, in the light of the grounds on the basis of which the executing judicial authority refused to execute that arrest warrant, whether to withdraw that warrant, in accordance with EU law, or to maintain it, unless there is no judicial remedy under national law against its decision.

66      In the latter scenario, the issuing judicial authority is in principle obliged to make a reference to the Court within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question concerning the interpretation of EU law is raised before it. According to the Court’s settled case-law, it cannot be relieved of that obligation unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has been interpreted by the Court or that the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (judgment of 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C‑561/19, EU:C:2021:799, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited).

67      The question whether such a possibility exists must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of EU law, the particular difficulties to which the interpretation of the latter gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (judgment of 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C‑561/19, EU:C:2021:799, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

68      Furthermore, if a judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, takes the view, because the case before it involves one of the three situations mentioned in paragraph 67 above, that it is relieved of its obligation to make a reference to the Court under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the statement of reasons for its decision must show either that the question of EU law raised is irrelevant for the resolution of the dispute, or that the interpretation of the EU law provision concerned is based on case-law or, in the absence of such case-law, that the interpretation of EU law was so obvious to the national court or tribunal of last instance as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C‑561/19, EU:C:2021:799, paragraph 51).

69      In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the fourth question is that Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant is not obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court before deciding, in the light of the grounds on the basis of which the executing judicial authority refused to execute that arrest warrant, whether to withdraw or maintain that warrant, unless there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision it will be called upon to make, in which case it is, in principle, obliged to make a reference to the Court.

 The second question

70      As a preliminary point, although the national court refers, in the wording of the second question, to ‘irregularities … regarding the taking of an oath’, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that, in this case, those ‘irregularities’ consist, more specifically, of uncertainty concerning the place where the records of the oath taken by judges in Romania are kept, as a result of which, for one of the three judges of the formation of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice), which heard P.P.R.’s case, no record of the oath taken could be found, and for another judge of that formation, only a record of the oath she took as a public prosecutor could be found.

71      In those circumstances, it must be held that, by its second question, the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority executing a European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence may refuse to execute that arrest warrant, on the basis of uncertainty as to the place where the records of the oath taken by judges of the issuing Member State are kept, of the fact that the record of one judge of the formation which imposed that sentence has not been found, or of the fact that another judge of that formation has taken an oath only as a public prosecutor.

72      In that regard, it should be recalled that while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 21 December 2023, GN (Ground for refusal based on the best interests of the child), C‑261/22, EU:C:2023:1017, paragraph 37).

73      Moreover, under the principle of mutual trust, it is incumbent on the Member States to presume that all the other Member States are complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraphs 93 and 94).

74      In particular, the high level of trust between Member States on which the European arrest warrant mechanism is based is thus founded on the premiss that the criminal courts of the issuing Member State which, following execution of a European arrest warrant, will have to conduct the criminal procedure for the purpose of prosecution, or of enforcement of a custodial sentence or detention order, and the substantive criminal proceedings, meet the requirements inherent in the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter (judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 95).

75      Having regard to the considerations set out in paragraphs 73 to 75 of this judgment, a refusal by the executing authority to execute a European arrest warrant on the ground of a risk of infringement of that fundamental right may be justified only in exceptional circumstances.

76      According to the case-law of the Court, while it is primarily for each Member State, in order to ensure the full application of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition which underpin the operation of the European arrest warrant mechanism, to ensure, subject to final review by the Court, that the requirements inherent in the fundamental right to a fair trial – enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter – are safeguarded by refraining from any measure capable of undermining it, the existence of a real risk that the person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued would, if surrendered to the issuing judicial authority, suffer a breach of that fundamental right, if not the materialisation of such a risk, is capable of permitting the executing judicial authority to refrain, exceptionally, from giving effect to that European arrest warrant on the basis of Article 1(3) of that framework decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal established by law in the issuing Member State), C‑562/21 PPU and C‑563/21 PPU, EU:C:2022:100, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

77      In that context, before refusing, on the basis of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, to surrender a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence, the executing judicial authority of a Member State must carry out a two-step examination.

78      As a first step, that authority must determine whether there is objective, reliable, specific and duly updated material indicating that there is a real risk of infringement, in the issuing Member State, of the fundamental right to a fair trial before a tribunal previously established by law, guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies so far as concerns the independence and impartiality of that Member State’s judiciary (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal established by law in the issuing Member State), C‑562/21 PPU and C‑563/21 PPU, EU:C:2022:100, paragraphs 52 and 66 and the case-law cited).

79      If that is the case, the competent authority of the executing Member State must, as a second step, determine, specifically and precisely, to what extent the deficiencies identified in the first step may have had an impact on the functioning of the courts of the issuing Member State which have jurisdiction over the proceedings brought against the person concerned and whether, having regard to that person’s personal situation, the nature of the offence for which he or she was tried, and the factual context of the sentence in respect of which recognition and enforcement are requested, and, where appropriate, to supplementary information provided by that Member State pursuant to that framework decision, there are substantial grounds for believing that such a risk has actually materialised in the present case (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal established by law in the issuing Member State), C‑562/21 PPU and C‑563/21 PPU, EU:C:2022:100, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

80      Among the requirements inherent in the fundamental right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, is the right of every person to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Those requirements encompass, by their very nature, not only the judicial appointment procedure, but also the conditions under which judges take up office.

81      Consequently, it is necessary for the substantive conditions and detailed procedural rules relating to the appointment of judges and their taking-up of office to be such that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the appointed judges to external factors and their neutrality with respect to the interests before them (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2020, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraph 71).

82      However, not every error that takes place during the procedure for the appointment of a judge, or when a judge takes up office, is of such a nature as to cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of that judge and, accordingly, on whether a formation which includes that judge can be considered to be an ‘independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ within the meaning of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2022, Getin Noble Bank, C‑132/20, EU:C:2022:235, paragraph 123).

83      It follows from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, which is relevant since, under the first sentence of Article 52(3) of the Charter, the latter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, that only those breaches that relate to the fundamental rules on the procedure for appointing judges and for judges to take up office are such as to infringe Article 6(1) of the ECHR (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 1 December 2020, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland (CE:ECHR:2020:1201JUD002637418, § 246 and 247).

84      Thus, the fact that the domestic law of a Member State may provide that a public prosecutor who has taken the oath on taking up office does not have to re-take the oath in the event of subsequently taking up the office of judge cannot constitute a systemic or generalised deficiency as regards the independence of the judiciary for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraph 79 of this judgment.

85      Such a provision of domestic law, justified by the fact that, in that Member State, the status of public prosecutors is comparable to that of judges, and that both are required to take the same oath on taking up office, is not capable of giving rise to doubt as to the propriety of the appointment of judges and, consequently, as to their independence and impartiality.

86      Furthermore, uncertainty as to the place where the records of the oath taken by the judges of a Member State are kept or the fact that those records cannot be located, in particular if several years have elapsed since the judge concerned took the oath, are not, in themselves and in the absence of other relevant evidence, capable of establishing that the judges concerned were performing their duties without ever having taken the required oath.

87      In any event, uncertainty as to whether the judges of a Member State have, before taking up office, taken the oath provided for by national law cannot be regarded as constituting a systemic or generalised deficiency as regards the independence of the judiciary in that Member State, if national law provides effective legal remedies which make it possible to invoke a possible failure to take the oath by the judges who have delivered a particular judgment, and thus to obtain the annulment of that judgment. It will be for the referring court to ascertain whether such remedies exist under Romanian law.

88      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority executing a European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence cannot refuse to execute that arrest warrant on the ground that the record of the oath taken by one of the judges who imposed that sentence cannot be found, or that another judge of the same formation has taken an oath only as a public prosecutor.

 The fifth question

89      By its fifth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant has the right to participate, as a party, in the proceedings for the execution of that arrest warrant before the executing judicial authority.

90      In that regard, it should be noted that neither Article 15 nor Article 19 of Framework Decision 2002/584, referred to by the referring court, nor any other provision of that framework decision provides that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant must participate directly in the proceedings for the execution of that arrest warrant before the executing judicial authority. The principles of mutual recognition and sincere cooperation do not require such participation to be made obligatory.

91      While it is true that Framework Decision 2002/584 cannot be interpreted as precluding such participation, which may be provided for by the domestic procedural rules of the executing Member State, the fact remains that that framework decision provides for other means of facilitating the necessary cooperation and exchange of information between the issuing judicial authority and the executing judicial authority.

92      Thus, Article 8(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 lists the relevant information which must be included in a European arrest warrant. In addition, under Article 15(2) of that framework decision, if the executing judicial authority finds the information communicated by the issuing Member State to be insufficient to allow it to decide on surrender, it is to request that the necessary supplementary information be furnished as a matter of urgency. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 15(3) of the Framework Decision, the issuing judicial authority may at any time forward any additional useful information to the executing judicial authority.

93      In that regard, it follows from the case-law that, in order, in particular, to ensure that the operation of the European arrest warrant is not brought to a standstill, the duty of sincere cooperation must inform the dialogue between the executing judicial authorities and the issuing ones. It follows from the principle of sincere cooperation, inter alia, that the Member States are, in full mutual respect, to assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties (judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 131 and the case-law cited).

94      From that perspective, the issuing and executing judicial authorities must, in order to ensure effective cooperation in criminal matters, make full use of the instruments provided for, inter alia, in Article 8(1) and Article 15 of Framework Decision 2002/584 in order to foster the mutual trust on which that cooperation is based (judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 132 and the case-law cited).

95      Consequently, it cannot be considered that the participation of the issuing judicial authority as a party to the proceedings before the executing judicial authority is essential in order to ensure compliance with the principles of mutual recognition and sincere cooperation which underpin the operation of the European arrest warrant mechanism.

96      In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the fifth question is that Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant does not have the right to participate, as a party, in the proceedings for the execution of that arrest warrant before the executing judicial authority.

 The sixth question

97      The sixth question concerns the possibility for the Commission, at the request of the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant, to take the measures it deems necessary following the executing judicial authority’s refusal to execute that arrest warrant.

98      However, such a question clearly has no bearing on the subject matter of the dispute before the referring court, which, as observed in paragraph 28 of this judgment, seeks to determine whether the European arrest warrant issued against P.P.R. should be withdrawn or maintained.

99      It follows that the sixth question is inadmissible.

 The seventh question

100    By its seventh question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(3) and Article 15(2) and (3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, when examining detention conditions in the issuing Member State, first, the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the basis of information concerning the detention conditions in prisons in the issuing Member State without having first requested supplementary information from the issuing judicial authority and, secondly, it cannot apply a higher standard as regards detention conditions than that guaranteed by Article 4.

101    In that regard, it is important to recall that the Court has stated that, subject to certain conditions, the judicial authority executing a European arrest warrant has an obligation to bring the surrender procedure established by Framework Decision 2002/584 to an end where surrender may result in the requested person being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter (judgment of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu, C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

102    Accordingly, where the judicial authority of the executing Member State is in possession of information showing there to be a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals detained in the issuing Member State, in the light of the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the Charter, that judicial authority is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the individual concerned by a European arrest warrant. The consequence of the execution of such a warrant must not be that that individual suffers inhuman or degrading treatment (judgment of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu, C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

103    To that end, the executing judicial authority must, initially, rely on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated concerning the detention conditions within the prisons of the issuing Member State and that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, judgments of courts of the issuing Member State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

104    Nonetheless, a finding that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of general conditions of detention in the issuing Member State cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal to execute a European arrest warrant. The mere existence of evidence that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people or certain places of detention, with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member State does not necessarily imply that, in a specific case, the individual concerned will be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in the event that he or she is surrendered to the authorities of that Member State (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

105    Thus, in order to ensure observance of Article 4 of the Charter in the particular circumstances of a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued, the executing judicial authority, when faced with evidence of the existence of such deficiencies that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated, is then bound to determine, specifically and precisely, whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for believing that, following the surrender of that person to the issuing Member State, he or she will run a real risk of being subject in that Member State to inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4, because of the conditions for his or her detention envisaged in the issuing Member State (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

106    To that end, that authority must, pursuant to Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, request of the judicial authority of the issuing Member State that there be provided as a matter of urgency all necessary supplementary information on the conditions in which it is envisaged that the individual concerned will be detained in that Member State. That request may also relate to the existence, in the issuing Member State, of any national or international procedures and mechanisms for monitoring detention conditions, linked, for example, to visits to prisons, which make it possible to assess the current state of detention conditions in those prisons (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

107    The issuing judicial authority is obliged to provide that information to the executing judicial authority (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

108    It is only if, in the light of the information provided pursuant to Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, and of any other information that may be available to the executing judicial authority, that authority finds that there exists, for the individual in respect of whom the European arrest warrant has been issued, a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, that the execution of that warrant must be postponed, without, however, being abandoned. By contrast, in the event that the information received by the executing judicial authority from the issuing judicial authority leads it to rule out the existence of a real risk that the individual concerned will be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment in the issuing Member State, the executing judicial authority must adopt, within the time limits prescribed by Framework Decision 2002/584, its decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraphs 65 and 66 and the case-law cited).

109    In that regard, as observed in paragraph 93 above, Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision expressly provides that, if the executing judicial authority finds the information communicated by the issuing Member State to be insufficient to allow it to decide on surrender, it is to request that the necessary supplementary information be furnished as a matter of urgency. In addition, in accordance with Article 15(3) of that framework decision, the issuing judicial authority may at any time forward any additional useful information to the executing judicial authority.

110    Furthermore, it is observed in paragraph 94 above that, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, the Member States are, in full mutual respect, to assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited).

111    In accordance with those provisions, the executing judicial authority and the issuing judicial authority may, respectively, request information or give assurances concerning the actual and precise conditions in which the person concerned will be detained in the issuing Member State (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 110).

112    It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 107 to 112 of this judgment that the executing judicial authority cannot conclude that there are substantial grounds for believing that, following his or her surrender to the issuing Member State, the individual in respect of whom the European arrest warrant has been issued will run a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, without first having submitted a request for information to the issuing judicial authority under Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584.

113    In the present case, the referring court states that it provided information on the conditions of detention of P.P.R. in the event of being surrendered to the Romanian authorities, but that the Maltese executing judicial authority, on the basis of information which it was able to find on the internet, refused to surrender P.P.R.

114    It should be recalled in that regard that the assurance provided by the competent authorities of the issuing Member State that the person concerned, irrespective of the prison he or she is detained in in the issuing Member State, will not suffer inhuman or degrading treatment on account of the actual and precise conditions of his or her detention is a factor which the executing judicial authority cannot disregard. A failure to give effect to such an assurance, in so far as it may bind the entity that has given it, may be relied on as against that entity before the courts of the issuing Member State (judgment of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 111).

115    The Court has thus held that, when that assurance has been given, or at least endorsed, by the issuing judicial authority, if need be after requesting the assistance of the central authority, or one of the central authorities, of the issuing Member State, the executing judicial authority, in view of the mutual trust which must exist between the judicial authorities of the Member States and on which the European arrest warrant system is based, must rely on that assurance, at least in the absence of any specific indications that the detention conditions in a particular detention centre are in breach of Article 4 of the Charter (judgments of 25 July 2018, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions of detention in Hungary), C‑220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 112, and of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu, C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 68].

116    It follows from the foregoing considerations that the executing judicial authority cannot disregard the information provided by the issuing judicial authority solely on the basis of information which the executing judicial authority has obtained itself from publicly available sources, without requesting supplementary information and explanations from the issuing judicial authority, pursuant to Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584.

117    Furthermore, since the referring court states that, in order to refuse to execute the European arrest warrant at issue in the main proceedings, the Maltese executing judicial authority took into consideration the fact that the referring court’s acceptance of an assurance such as that referred to in paragraph 115 above was conveyed using a term which is different from that used in the English-language version of the relevant case-law, it should be noted that it is not necessary to use a particular term or phrase to convey such acceptance. It is necessary only for it to be sufficiently clear from the communication sent by the issuing judicial authority to the executing judicial authority that the former has accepted that assurance, whatever the specific terms used.

118    Lastly, it is important to point out that the mere absence of a ‘precise plan for … execution of the sentence’ or ‘precise criteria for determining a particular regime of execution’, referred to by the national court in its seventh question, does not fall within the concept of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.

119    Even if the drawing up of such a plan or establishment of such criteria were required in the executing Member State, it should be recalled that, referring to the principle of mutual trust which, as is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 36 above, is of fundamental importance in EU law, the Court has repeatedly held that the Member States may be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that they cannot, in particular, demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law (judgment of 15 October 2019, Dorobantu, C‑128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

120    Therefore, the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to surrender the requested person solely on the ground that the issuing judicial authority has not communicated to it a ‘precise plan for … execution of the sentence’ or ‘precise criteria for determining a particular regime of execution’.

121    As regards the referring court’s reference to a ‘particularly unique and delicate position’ of the requested person, which requires ‘guarantees in relation to non-discrimination’, it should be noted that compliance with Article 4 of the Charter in the case of a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued requires, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 106 above, a specific and precise assessment of the circumstances of the case.

122    Consequently, the answer to the seventh question must be that Article 1(3) and Article 15(2) and (3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter and the principle of mutual trust, must be interpreted as meaning that, when examining detention conditions in the issuing Member State, the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the basis of information concerning the detention conditions in prisons in the issuing Member State which it has obtained itself, and in respect of which it has not requested supplementary information from the issuing judicial authority. The executing judicial authority cannot apply a higher standard as regards detention conditions than that guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter.

 Costs

123    Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 1(3) and Article 15(1) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009,

must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State is not obliged to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant where the executing authority of another Member State has previously refused to execute that arrest warrant on the ground that the surrender of the person concerned may infringe the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Nevertheless, within the framework of its own examination of the existence of a ground for non-execution, that authority must give due consideration to the reasons underlying the refusal decision adopted by the first executing authority. Those provisions do not preclude, in the same circumstances, the issuing judicial authority from maintaining the European arrest warrant in question, provided that, according to its own assessment, execution of that arrest warrant should not be refused on the ground of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and that it is proportionate to maintain that warrant.

2.      Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,

must be interpreted as meaning that in a situation in which a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued claims that his or her surrender to the issuing Member State would result in an infringement of his or her right to a fair trial, the existence of a decision of the Interpol Commission for the Control of Files (CCF) concerning that person’s situation cannot, in itself, justify a refusal by the executing judicial authority to execute that arrest warrant. However, such a decision may be taken into account by that judicial authority in order to decide whether it is appropriate to refuse to execute that arrest warrant.

3.      Article 267 TFEU

must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant is not obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court before deciding, in the light of the grounds on the basis of which the executing judicial authority refused to execute that arrest warrant, whether to withdraw or maintain that warrant, unless there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision it will be called upon to make, in which case it is, in principle, obliged to make a reference to the Court.

4.      Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299,

must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority executing a European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence cannot refuse to execute that arrest warrant on the ground that the record of the oath taken by one of the judges who imposed that sentence cannot be found, or that another judge of the same formation has taken an oath only as a public prosecutor.

5.      Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299,

must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant does not have the right to participate, as a party, in the proceedings for the execution of that arrest warrant before the executing judicial authority.

6.      Article 1(3) and Article 15(2) and (3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principle of mutual trust,

must be interpreted as meaning that when examining detention conditions in the issuing Member State, the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the basis of information concerning the detention conditions in prisons in the issuing Member State which it has obtained itself, and in respect of which it has not requested supplementary information from the issuing judicial authority. The executing judicial authority cannot apply a higher standard as regards detention conditions than that guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter.

[Signatures]

*      Language of the case: Romanian.

i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.