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Document 62007CN0542

Case C-542/07 P: Appeal brought on 30 November 2007 by Imagination Technologies Ltd against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) delivered on 20 September 2007 in Case T-461/04: Imagination Technologies Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

OJ C 37, 9.2.2008, p. 18–18 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

9.2.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/18


Appeal brought on 30 November 2007 by Imagination Technologies Ltd against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) delivered on 20 September 2007 in Case T-461/04: Imagination Technologies Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

(Case C-542/07 P)

(2008/C 37/25)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Imagination Technologies Ltd (represented by: M. Edenborough, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance.

make an order for costs of and associated with this appeal before the Court of Justice and its appeal before the Court of First Instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appellant submits that the Community trade mark application No 2396075 for the word mark PURE DIGITAL (the ‘Application’) does not offend against either Article 7(1)(b) or 7(1)(c) of Council Regulation No 40/94 as it has acquired a distinctive character since the Application was filed. It is submitted that the Court of First Instance erred in its analysis of the relevant law; in particular, it erred when it failed to hold that use after the filing date was relevant when considering the issue of acquired distinctiveness.

Accordingly, the Court of First Instance was wrong to dismiss the appeal before it. Hence, it is submitted that this appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance ought to be allowed and its Judgment set aside. The Appellant also seeks its costs in these appeal proceedings and in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance.


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