This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 61975CC0040
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 9 December 1975. # Société des produits Bertrand SA v Commission of the European Communities. # Case 40-75.
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 9 December 1975.
Société des produits Bertrand SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Case 40-75.
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 9 December 1975.
Société des produits Bertrand SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Case 40-75.
European Court Reports 1976 -00001
ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1975:168
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL REISCHL
DELIVERED ON 9 DECEMBER 1975 ( 1 )
Mr President,
Members of the Court,
To counteract rising prices on the domestic market the Italian Government on 24 July 1973 issued Decree-law No 427 which on 4 August 1973 became Law No 496. As a result the prices of producers, wholesalers and retailers of certain important foods, including pasta products from durum wheat, were temporarily frozen at the level at which they were on 16 July 1973 and increases were allowed only in December 1973 and September 1974. On the other hand the said Law provided that the Italian State intervention agency for agricultural products, the AIMA, could with ministerial consent intervene to control the Italian cereal market by purchases, storing and sale, the conditions for the sale on the domestic market being determined by an interministerial committee.
In application of these provisions the AIMA purchased on the world market as from September 1973 considerable quantities of durum wheat at an average price of 18500 lire per 50 kg. The greater part of this durum wheat was sold with the consent of the Interministerial Committee in various stages between September 1973 and April 1975 to Italian manufacturers of semolina and pasta. The prices lay between Lit. 11000, 13000 and 13600 per 50 kg, whereas the price on the Italian market at the period in question lay between Lit. 11500, 18500 or even 20000 per 50 kg.
These facts gave rise to criticism from competitors of the Italian manufacturers of pasta in other Member States. Thus the French association of pasta manufacturers, which took the view that the Italian action to keep prices down was to be regarded as an unlawful aid under the EEC Treaty, sent a telegram to this effect in September 1973 to the departments of the Commission. This protest was repeated in a telegram in October 1973.
Although the Italian measures were not notified in accordance with Article 93 of the Treaty, the Commission nevertheless, as it said in the proceedings, had already initiated a review in September 1973. In this connexion there were discussions between departments of the Commission and a delegation of the semolina manufacturers; the Management Committee for Cereals was involved as well as the Working Party on Questions of Competition in Agriculture; there were explanations by the Italian Government and repeated talks between the officials of the Commission and the officials of the Italian Government.
The Commission came to the view that there was no distortion of competition and no prejudice to trade between Member States, that the contested measure could not be regarded as incompatible with Article 92 and that therefore there was no cause to start proceedings under Article 93 of the EEC Treaty, because the nature of the Italian rules was such that only pasta which was intended for domestic consumption was affected by the action to keep prices down.
The undertaking Bertrand, a French manufacturer of pasta with its registered office in Grigny (Rhone), considers this view to be wrong. In its opinion the Italian measures to keep the price of durum wheat down benefited exported products also and there was therefore an aid incompatible with Article 92 of the EEC Treaty since trade between the States was affected and there was distortion of competition to the prejudice of producers in other countries. The plaintiff argues that the Italian exports of pasta to France had increased during the period in question while French consumption had remained the same. In particular it was shown that in January 1974 Italian manufacturers of pasta had effected sales in France at prices which were below the French selling prices. In this way Bertrand had lost a share of the marked of some 670 metric tons and had been compelled to approximate its prices to the Italian prices and thus suffer loss of profit. Up to 1 August 1974 there had been in total damage which could be set at FF 250000.
The applicant brought an action before the Court on 22 April 1974 on the grounds that the Commission ought to have intervened against the Italian measures and required their abolition, failure to do so being a breach of official duty and claimed that the Commission should pay the sum of FF 250000 together with interest at the discount rate of the Bank of France from the bringing of the action as compensation for the alleged damage. Alternatively it is claimed that the Commission should pay FF 1 as provisional damages and that an expert should be appointed to establish the amount of the damage suffered by the applicant. My opinion on these claims, which the Commission asks you to reject, is as follows:
1. |
Because the defendant has expressed doubts, having regard in particular to Article 38 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, that is, to the necessity of stating the grounds of the claim for damages, it is necessary first to consider whether there are objections to the admissibility of the application. There are good grounds for such objections. It is to be observed first of all that the applicant has mentioned only a sum by way of damages. It is true it explains that having regard to the fact that its narrow profit margins did not allow greater price reductions, it has suffered market losses of some 670 metric tons and that it had to reduce its profit margin in the cause of adjusting to the Italian selling prices. There are, however, no particulars in the application of how the sum is calculated and it is not explained to what extent and for what periods reductions in the normal selling prices had to be made. Further the allegation is made in the application that the said losses were due to Italian competition. On the other hand nothing is said as to why other influences, such as those arising from the domestic market, should not come into consideration and on what grounds, such as those based on long-standing business relations, it should be accepted that the applicant's expectations with regard to the maintenance of the extent of its business were justified. Finally, particulars are also missing in relation to the claim that the Italian import prices are due to the fact that as a result of the Italian action to reduce prices the costs of the manufacture of exported pasta products were reduced. On this point it would surely have been appropriate to show that other factors (more rational production methods used by the Italian manufacturers, use of common wheat and such like) could not provide the explanation. It would also have been appropriate for the purpose of giving sound reasons on this subject to make a comparison of prices. This would have had to refer to the price level of pasta products on the Italian domestic market and how they compared with export prices. It ought, moreover, to have covered the movement of prices in the past, that is, it would have had to be shown that, on the assumption that the market prices for durum wheat and manufacturing costs were unchanged, the Italian prices dropped during the relevant period or it should have been shown that, on the assumption of rising market prices for durum wheat in the 1973/74 marketing year, the Italian prices had not risen to the extent that would have been expected if artificially low-priced durum wheat had not been used. There is nothing of this nature in the application. In my opinion it is accordingly not surprising that the Commission has raised the question in its defence whether the application can be regarded as admissible. If the relevant provisions were strictly applied one could well conclude that it is not. If I do not propose that the Court should so decide, it is only because I do not wish to lay myself open to the criticism of exaggerated regard to formalities in the interpretation of Article 38 (1) of the Rules of Procedure. Therefore I shall still deal with the substance of the case. |
2. |
So far as the grounds of the claim are concerned, the applicant has argued that it has suffered damage by reason of a wrongful omission on the part of the Commission. The contested Italian measures aimed at reducing the prices of durum wheat (sale at prices below the market level, and partly at a loss) must be regarded as an unlawful aid under Article 92 of the EEC Treaty. The Commission was therefore obliged to procure their abolition. If the Commission had in good time discharged this obligation, the object of which was to protect economic undertakings, which were in competition with those favoured, it would have seen to it that the Italian manufacturing costs for pasta were based on the market prices and therefore the low-priced offers in France would not have been possible and the applicant would not have suffered a decrease in sales and a narrowing of its profit margins. Proceeding from these grounds several questions arise in relation to the Community law on liability for wrongful acts or omission as frequently encountered in the case-law:
In this examination I shall first deal with the second question since it appears to me to give rise to the least problems. Moreover, it may possibly make it unnecessary to deal with the whole substance of the case.
If, however, this assessment is regarded as not being fully valid, it remains finally to inquire whether a complaint can lie against the Commission on the ground of its failure to act. In this connexion I do not base my argument on the assumption that the Italian system may perhaps not have functioned quite reliably and that there was therefore the possibility that reduced-price durum wheat was used in the manufacture of exported pasta, for there are no compelling reasons for such an assumption. I have in mind rather a fact, which is apparent from Case 60/75 (Russo v AIMA), that the Italian action to reduce prices had effects solely on the Italian durum wheat market and the prices on that market. The prices were below the level that would have been reached without the intervention measures, that is, they were below the level in the Community. Every manufacturer of pasta could benefit from these effects, even in so far as sales were effected on the markets of other Member States. In view of this the question may be raised whether action ought not to have been taken under Article 92 since effects were associated with the support action which distorted competition and could affect trade between Member States. The answer to this question in my view turns essentially on the extent of the said effects and whether they affected the market generally or only particular cases. It is important in addition to know whether the Commission should have taken account of such effects and had regard to them in its evaluation. It seems to me — let me anticipate my conclusion — that from both points of view it is scarcely possible to justify any complaint against the Commission. In my view it may be said that the Commission, in judging a system which was basically designed to compensate Italian manufacturers of pasta for losses involved in domestic sales, and in view of a shortage in the durum wheat market in the Community, could not be expected to anticipate the said effects. In addition the effects, if there were any, on inter-State trade, as an analysis of the statistics show, were so minimal that they could be disregarded in the context of Article 92. In view of my main observations on the question of the proof of causality I can limit myself now to these brief adumbrations which are naturally based only upon a cursory examination. In view of this — other factors in the claim for damages need not be gone into — I think it may be conclusively held that in any event there are no sufficient grounds for finding that the claim based on liability for a wrongful act or omission is justified. |
3. |
To summarize I propose that the Court should not accede to the applicant's request for a report by an expert which would only be limited to a consideration of its books, that is, to assessing the fall in sales and profit, and that it should dismiss the application, if not as inadmissible under Article 38 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, then as unfounded, in view of the absence of any indication of further evidence. The costs of the proceedings in this event must be borne by the applicant. |
( 1 ) Translated from the German.