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having regard to the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2020,

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having regard to Article 10(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

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having regard to Articles 15, 24(3), 228 and 298(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

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having regard to Articles 11, 41, 42 and 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’),

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having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCPRD),

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having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/1163 of the European Parliament of 24 June 2021 laying down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman) and repealing Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom (1),

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having regard to the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour adopted by Parliament on 6 September 2001,

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having regard to the Framework Agreement on Cooperation concluded between Parliament and the European Ombudsman on 15 March 2006, which entered into force on 1 April 2006,

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having regard to its previous resolutions on the European Ombudsman’s activities,

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having regard to Rules 54 and 142(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A9-0342/2021),

A.

whereas the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2020 was formally submitted to the President of Parliament on 6 September 2021 and whereas the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, presented the report to the Committee on Petitions in Brussels on 14 July 2021;

B.

whereas Articles 20, 24 and 228 TFEU and Article 43 of the Charter empower the European Ombudsman to receive complaints concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acting in its judicial role;

C.

whereas Article 10(3) TEU establishes that ‘every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union’ and that ‘decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen’;

D.

whereas Article 15 TFEU states that ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’ and that ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’; whereas ensuring that high-quality services are provided to EU citizens and that the EU administration is responsive to their needs and concerns is crucial in protecting citizens’ rights and fundamental freedoms;

E.

whereas Article 41 of the Charter, on the right to good administration, states, inter alia, that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’;

F.

whereas Article 43 of the Charter states that ‘any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the CJEU acting in its judicial role’;

G.

whereas Article 298(1) TFEU establishes that ‘in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration’;

H.

whereas in 2020 the Ombudsman opened 370 inquiries, of which 365 were complaint-based and 5 own-initiative, while closing 394 inquiries (392 complaint-based and 2 own-initiative); whereas most of the inquiries concerned the Commission (210 inquiries or 56,8 %), followed by the EU agencies (34 inquiries or 9,2 %), the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) (30 inquiries or 8,1 %), the European External Action Service (EEAS) (14 inquiries or 3,8 %), the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (12 inquiries or 3,2 %), the Parliament (11 inquiries or 3 %) the European Central Bank (9 inquiries or 2,4 %), the European Investment Bank (9 inquiries or 2,4 %), and other institutions (41 inquiries or 11,1 %);

I.

whereas the top three concerns in the inquiries closed by the Ombudsman in 2020 were transparency, accountability (access to information and documents) (25 %), culture of service (24 %) and proper use of discretionary powers, including in infringement procedures (17 %); whereas other concerns include ethical issues in the EU administration, respect for fundamental rights, sound financial management, whistleblowing, respect for procedural rights, recruitment and good management of EU personnel issues;

J.

whereas the Ombudsman plays a key role in ensuring the full transparency, democratic accountability and integrity of the EU decision-making processes;

K.

whereas the Ombudsman’s main priority is to ensure that citizens’ rights are fully respected and that the right to good administration by EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies reflects the highest standards;

L.

whereas the Ombudsman carried out a considerable amount of work, following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, to make sure that all EU institutions comply with the highest standards of good administration in order to protect citizens’ rights and enhance public trust;

M.

whereas the Ombudsman examined the work of the Commission during the COVID-19 crisis and requested information, inter alia, on the transparency of the Commission’s interaction with interest representatives, on its decision-making related to emergency public procurement and on the transparency and independence of scientific advice concerning the pandemic;

N.

whereas following an inquiry into the performance of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) during the COVID-19 crisis, the Ombudsman found gaps in the ECDC’s transparency practices, including on the data underlying its risk assessments and interactions with international partners, and made proposals aimed at improving the public scrutiny of the ECDC’s activities related to the COVID-19 vaccines;

O.

whereas publicity and transparency are the main principles underlying the EU legislative process, as confirmed by the case-law of the CJEU, which provided clear legal guidance on the way to ensure their full and consistent respect; whereas the CJEU stated that the lack of transparency and information weakens citizens’ trust in the legitimacy of the EU legislative process as a whole; whereas, contrary to these principles, the Commission was not transparent in the negotiation, purchase and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines;

P.

whereas the EU citizens’ right to know and the EU institutions’ obligation to ensure full transparency, especially when it comes to COVID-19 vaccine contracts between the EU institutions and pharmaceutical companies, prevail over any alleged right of pharmaceutical companies or the EU institutions either to hide or not fully disclose any or some information related to these contracts or COVID-19 vaccines;

Q.

whereas the EU has planned a period of unprecedented levels of spending and investment under NextGenerationEU, which will also create significant links with the private sector, therefore making it even more crucial for the EU institutions to have a decision-making process founded on full transparency and on the most stringent ethical rules in order to prevent conflicts of interest and corruption cases;

R.

whereas the Council did not follow the Ombudsman’s final recommendations, refusing to provide public and timely access to legislative documents concerning the adoption of the annual regulations setting fishing quotas, which contained fundamental environmental information within the meaning of the Aarhus Regulation, thereby undermining the transparency of its decision-making process; whereas the Ombudsman found that the Council’s decision constituted maladministration, stressing that it is still failing to fully understand the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

S.

whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry into the refusal by the Council to address the issue of corporate sponsorships of the Presidency of the Council of the EU; whereas the Ombudsman found maladministration in the Council’s inaction in relation to eliminating the reputational risks that such commercial sponsorships entail to the impartiality of its Presidency and for the image of the EU as a whole;

T.

whereas the Ombudsman raised concerns about the Commission’s current practices for the approval of the ‘active substances’ used in pesticides and about the fact that, according to the Commission’s system for verifying conflicts of interest, external scientific experts who advise it do not have to declare financial interests below a threshold of EUR 10 000;

U.

whereas the Ombudsman found that the Commission should have carried out a more critical scrutiny of all risks of conflicts of interest before awarding a contract to carry out a study on integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) objectives into EU banking rules to BlackRock Investment Management, a company managing investments in the fossil fuel and banking sectors, which are areas that fall within the scope of the new rules on ESG; whereas the Ombudsman underlined that the EU rules on public procurement are not robust and clear enough to prevent conflicts of interest;

V.

whereas the former European Investment Bank (EIB) Vice-President left the EIB Management Committee in November 2020 and, after less than three months, joined the board of the Spanish multinational utility company Iberdrola; whereas the former EIB Vice-President was in charge of overseeing the EIB’s lending operations in Spain, including Iberdrola; whereas from 2019 onwards Iberdrola benefited from massive loans worth EUR 1,39 billion in total, making it one of the top clients of the EIB in recent years; whereas this case illustrates the unresolved controversial practice at the EIB of allowing its Vice-Presidents, nominated by the Member States, to be put in charge of overseeing EIB lending in their countries of origin, thereby running the risk of giving rise to conflicts of interest;

W.

whereas according to the Ombudsman, the Commission’s failure to finalise a ‘sustainability impact assessment’ (SIA) before concluding the negotiations on a trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur constituted maladministration; whereas the Ombudsman’s findings underlined that the Commission had disregarded its own guidelines on the use of SIAs before the conclusion of the trade negotiations;

X.

whereas the Ombudsman found instances of maladministration in the decision by the European Banking Authority (EBA) to approve the job move of its then Executive Director as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), a lobby organisation for the financial industry, failing to mitigate the risks of conflicts of interest, as well as continuing to give him access to confidential information; whereas the EBA has begun implementing the Ombudsman’s recommendations, enabling the Ombudsman to close the case;

Y.

whereas the Commission’s strategy in dealing with petitions refers to its 2016 Communication entitled ‘EU law: Better results through better application’, whose rules establish no administrative procedure or practice concerning petitions; whereas the Commission’s approach, resulting in its systematic refusal to take action on individual petition issues and on petitions concerning areas under Article 6 TFEU is at odds with the provisions of Article 227 TFEU and is creating frustration and disappointment among citizens, while at the same time undermining the possibility to identify systematic shortcomings in relation to EU law occurring in Member States;

Z.

whereas many petitions received by the Committee on Petitions are related to the Commission’s lack of transparency and request that the full details of the COVID-19 vaccine contracts signed between the Commission, the Member States and the pharmaceutical industry, as well as data on patient-level clinical trials, be published;

AA.

whereas the Ombudsman is a redress mechanism for citizens facing problems in gaining access to documents held by the EU institutions; whereas a significant number of the Ombudsman’s inquiries in 2020 resulted in access being granted to documents of wider public interest, in spite of the fact that the applicable EU legislation is structurally inadequate, as it is outdated and no longer reflects the current practices adopted by the EU institutions;

AB.

whereas the Ombudsman put in place a set of actions aimed at promoting better and more consistent implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) within the overall EU administration and launched a strategic initiative on the way the Commission accommodated the special needs of staff members with disabilities in the context of the COVID-19 emergency;

AC.

whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry into how the Commission ensures that Hungary and Portugal’s use of European structural and investment funds (ESI Funds) for care facilities for persons with disabilities is in line with the legal obligations stemming from the Charter, the ESI Funds Regulation and the UNCRPD;

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