(a)

TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.

(b)

SECRET UE/EU SECRET: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.

(c)

CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.

(d)

RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.

—

classified information EEAS receives; and

—

source material included in classified information originated by the EEAS.

—

a need-to-know;

—

for access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above, been security cleared to the relevant level, or are otherwise duly authorised by virtue of their functions in accordance with national laws and regulations; and

—

been briefed on their responsibilities.

(a)

as a general rule, EUCI shall be transmitted by electronic means protected by cryptographic products approved in accordance with Article 7(5) of this Decision and according to clearly defined Security Operational Procedures (SecOPs);

(b)

when the means referred to in point (a) are not used, EUCI shall be carried either:

(a)

an IA Authority (IAA);

(b)

a TEMPEST Authority (TA);

(c)

a Crypto Approval Authority (CAA);

(d)

a Crypto Distribution Authority (CDA).

(a)

a Security Accreditation Authority (SAA);

(b)

an IA Operational Authority.

(a)

a security of information agreement between the EU and that third State or international organisation, concluded in accordance with Article 37 TEU and Article 218 TFEU, is in force; or

(b)

an administrative arrangement between the HR and the competent security authorities of that third State or international organisation, for the exchange of information classified, in principle, no higher than RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, concluded in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 14(5) of this Decision, has taken effect; or

(c)

a framework or ad-hoc participation agreement between the EU and that third State in the context of a CSDP crisis management operation, concluded in accordance with Article 37 TEU and Article 218 TFEU, is applicable,

(a)

assess the potential damage caused to the interests of the EU or of the Member States;

(b)

take appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence;

(c)

safeguard evidence;

(d)

ensure that the case is investigated by personnel not immediately concerned with the breach in order to establish the facts;

(e)

notify the appropriate authorities of the effects of the event and of the action taken; and

(f)

inform the originator.

1.

This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 5 of Annex A. It lays down in particular the criteria that the EEAS shall apply for determining whether an individual, taking into account his loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability, may be authorised to have access to EUCI, and the investigative and administrative procedures to be followed to that effect.

2.

The "Personnel Security Clearance" (PSC) for access to EUCI is a statement by a competent authority of a Member State which is made following completion of a security investigation conducted by the competent authorities of a Member State and which certifies that an individual may, provided his "need-to-know" has been determined, be granted access to EUCI up to a specified level (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above) until a specified date; the individual thus described is said to be "security cleared".

3.

The "Personnel Security Clearance Certificate" (PSCC) is a certificate issued by the EEAS Security authority establishing that an individual is security cleared, and which shows the level of EUCI to which that individual may be granted access, the date of validity of the relevant PSC and the date of the expiry of the certificate itself.

4.

The "Authorisation to access EUCI" is an authorisation by the EEAS Security Authority which is taken in accordance with this Decision after a PSC has been issued by the competent authorities of a Member State, and which certifies that an individual may, provided his "need-to-know" has been determined, be granted access to EUCI up to a specified level (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above) until a specified date; the individual thus described is said to be "security cleared".

5.

Access to information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED does not require a security clearance and is granted after:

6.

An individual shall only be authorised to access information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above after:

7.

EEAS shall identify the positions in its structures which require access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above and therefore require a PSC to the relevant level, as referred to in Article 4 above.

8.

EEAS Staff shall declare whether they hold the citizenship of more than one country.

9.

For EEAS Staff, the appointing EEAS Authority shall forward the completed personnel security questionnaire to the NSA of the Member State of which the individual is a national requesting that a security investigation be undertaken for the level of EUCI to which the individual will require access.

10.

Where an individual holds citizenship of more than one country, the vetting request will be addressed to the NSA of the country under whose nationality the person has been recruited.

11.

Where information relevant for a security investigation becomes known to the EEAS concerning an individual who has applied for a PSC, the EEAS, acting in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations, shall notify the relevant NSA thereof.

12.

Following completion of the security investigation, the relevant NSA shall notify the EEAS Security Directorate of the outcome of such an investigation.

13.

The security investigation together with the results obtained, on which the EEAS bases its decision on whether or not to grant an authorisation to access EUCI, shall be subject to the relevant laws and regulations in force in the Member State concerned, including those concerning appeals. Decisions by the EEAS Security Authority shall be subject to appeals in accordance with the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, laid down in Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (1) (hereinafter referred to as "the Staff Regulations").

14.

The assurance on which a PSC is based, provided it remains valid, shall cover any assignment by the individual concerned within the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Council or the Commission.

15.

If an individual's period of service does not commence within 12 months of the notification of the outcome of the security investigation to the EEAS Security Authority, or if there is a break of 12 months or more in an individual's service, during which time he has not been employed in the EEAS, in other EU Institutions, agencies or bodies, or in a position with a national administration of a Member State, which requires access to classified information, this outcome shall be referred to the relevant NSA for confirmation that it remains valid and appropriate.

16.

Where information becomes known to the EEAS concerning a security risk posed by an individual who holds a valid PSC, the EEAS, acting in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations, shall notify the relevant NSA thereof. Where an NSA notifies the EEAS of withdrawal of an assurance given in accordance with paragraph 12(a) for an individual who holds a valid Authorisation to access EUCI, the EEAS Security Authority may ask for any clarification the NSA can provide according to its national laws and regulations. If the adverse information is confirmed, the aforementioned Authorisation shall be withdrawn and the individual shall be excluded from access to EUCI and from positions where such access is possible or where he might endanger security.

17.

Any decision to withdraw an Authorisation to access EUCI from an EEAS staff member and, where appropriate, the reasons for doing so shall be notified to the individual concerned, who may ask to be heard by the EEAS Security Authority. Information provided by an NSA shall be subject to the relevant laws and regulations in force in the Member State concerned, including those concerning appeals. Decisions by the EEAS Security Authority shall be subject to appeals in accordance with the Staff Regulations.

18.

National experts seconded to the EEAS for a position requiring access to classified information CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above shall present a valid PSC for access to EUCI to the relevant level to the EEAS Security Authority prior to taking up their assignment. The above process shall be managed by the sending Member State.

19.

A database on the security clearance status of all staff placed under the responsibility of the EEAS and of EEAS contractors' personnel shall be maintained by the EEAS. These records shall include the level of EUCI to which the individual may be granted access (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above), the date the PSC was granted and its period of validity.

20.

Appropriate coordination procedures shall be put in place with Member States and other EU Institutions, agencies and bodies to ensure that the EEAS holds an accurate and comprehensive record of security clearance status of all Staff placed under the responsibility of the EEAS and of EEAS contractors' personnel.

21.

The EEAS Security Authority may issue a Personnel Security Clearance Certificate (PSCC) showing the level of EUCI to which the individual may be granted access (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above), the date of validity of the relevant PSC and the date of expiry of the certificate itself.

22.

Individuals duly authorised to access EUCI by virtue of their functions in accordance with national laws and regulations shall be briefed, as appropriate, by the EEAS Security Directorate on their security obligations in respect of protecting EUCI.

23.

Prior to being authorised to access EUCI, all individuals shall acknowledge in writing that they have understood their obligations in respect of protecting EUCI and the consequences if EUCI is compromised. A record of such a written acknowledgement shall be kept by the EEAS.

24.

All individuals who are authorised to have access to, or required to handle EUCI, shall initially be made aware of, and periodically briefed on the threats to security and must report immediately to the appropriate security authorities any approach or activity that they consider suspicious or unusual.

25.

All individuals granted access to EUCI must be subject to ongoing personnel security measures (i.e. aftercare) for the duration that they handle EUCI. Ongoing personnel security is the responsibility of:

26.

All individuals who cease to be employed on duties requiring access to EUCI shall be made aware of, and where appropriate acknowledge in writing, their obligations in respect of the continued protection of EUCI.

27.

For reasons of urgency, where duly justified in the interests of the EEAS and pending completion of a full security investigation, the EEAS Security Authority may, after consulting the NSA of the Member State of which the individual is a national and subject to the outcome of preliminary checks to verify that no adverse information is known, grant a temporary authorisation for EEAS officials and other servants to access EUCI for a specific function. A full security investigation should be completed as soon as possible. Such temporary authorisations shall be valid for a period not exceeding six months and shall not permit access to information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET. All individuals who have been granted a temporary authorisation shall acknowledge in writing that they have understood their obligations in respect of protecting EUCI and the consequences if EUCI is compromised. A record of such a written acknowledgement shall be kept by the EEAS.

28.

When an individual is to be assigned to a position that requires a PSC at one level higher than that currently possessed by the individual, the assignment may be made on a provisional basis, provided that:

29.

The above procedure shall be used for one-time access to EUCI at one level higher than that to which the individual has been security cleared. Recourse to this procedure shall not be made on a recurring basis.

30.

In very exceptional circumstances, such as missions in hostile environments or during periods of mounting international tension when emergency measures require it, in particular for the purposes of saving lives, HR, Executive Secretary General or Chief Operating Officer may grant, where possible in writing, access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET UE/EU SECRET to individuals who do not possess the requisite PSC, provided that such permission is absolutely necessary and there are no reasonable doubts as to the loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability of the individual concerned. A record shall be kept of this permission describing the information to which access was approved.

31.

In the case of information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, this emergency access shall be confined to EU nationals who have been authorised access to either the national equivalent of TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET or information classified SECRET UE/EU SECRET.

32.

The EEAS Security Committee shall be informed of cases when recourse is made to the procedure set out in paragraphs 29 and 30.

33.

The EEAS Security Committee shall receive an annual report on recourse to the procedures set out in this section.

34.

Individuals assigned to participate in meetings in the EEAS Headquarters and Union Delegations at which information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above is discussed may only do so upon confirmation of the individual's PSC status. For Member States' representatives, officials from the GSC and Commission, a PSCC or other proof of PSC shall be forwarded by the appropriate authorities to the EEAS Security Directorate, the Union Delegation Security Coordinator, or exceptionally be presented by the person concerned. Where applicable, a consolidated list of names may be used, giving the relevant proof of PSC.

35.

Where a PSC for access to EUCI is withdrawn from an individual whose duties require attendance at meetings in the EEAS Headquarters or Union Delegation at which information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above is discussed, the EEAS shall be informed by the competent authority thereof.

36.

When individuals are to be employed in circumstances in which they may potentially have access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above, they shall be appropriately security cleared or escorted at all times.

37.

Couriers, guards and escorts shall be security cleared to the relevant level or otherwise appropriately investigated in accordance with national laws and regulations, be briefed at regular intervals on security procedures for protecting EUCI and on their duties for protecting such information entrusted to them or to which they may inadvertently have access.

1.

This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 6 of Annex A. It lays down minimum requirements for the physical protection of premises, buildings, offices, rooms and other areas where EUCI is handled and stored, including areas housing CIS.

2.

Physical security measures shall be designed to prevent unauthorised access to EUCI by:

3.

The EEAS shall apply a risk management process for protecting EUCI on their premises to ensure that a commensurate level of physical protection is afforded against the assessed risk. The risk management process shall take account of all relevant factors, in particular:

4.

The EEAS security authority, applying the concept of defence in depth, shall determine the appropriate combination of physical security measures to be implemented. These can include one or more of the following:

5.

The EEAS Security Directorate may conduct entry and exit searches to act as a deterrent to the unauthorised introduction of material or the unauthorised removal of EUCI from premises or buildings.

6.

When EUCI is at risk from overlooking, even accidentally, appropriate measures shall be taken to counter this risk.

7.

For new facilities, physical security requirements and their functional specifications shall be defined as part of the planning and design of the facilities. For existing facilities, physical security requirements shall be implemented to the maximum extent possible.

8.

When acquiring equipment (such as security containers, shredding machines, door locks, electronic access control systems, IDS, alarm systems) for the physical protection of EUCI, the EEAS security authority shall ensure that the equipment meets approved technical standards and minimum requirements.

9.

The technical specifications of equipment to be used for the physical protection of EUCI shall be set out in security guidelines to be approved by the EEAS Security Committee.

10.

Security systems shall be inspected at regular intervals and equipment shall be maintained regularly. Maintenance work shall take account of the outcome of inspections to ensure that equipment continues to operate at optimum performance.

11.

The effectiveness of individual security measures and of the overall security system shall be re-evaluated during each inspection.

12.

Two types of physically protected areas, or the national equivalents thereof, shall be established for the physical protection of EUCI:

13.

The EEAS security authority shall establish that an area meets the requirements to be designated as an Administrative Area, a Secured Area or a technically Secured Area.

14.

For Administrative Areas:

15.

For Secured Areas:

16.

Where entry into a Secured Area constitutes, for all practical purposes, direct access to the classified information contained in it, the following additional requirements shall apply:

17.

Secured Areas protected against eavesdropping shall be designated technically Secured Areas. The following additional requirements shall apply:

18.

Notwithstanding point (d) of paragraph 17, before being used in areas where meetings are held or work is being performed involving information classified SECRET UE/EU SECRET and above, and where the threat to EUCI is assessed as high, any communications devices and electrical or electronic equipment shall first be examined by the EEAS security authority to ensure that no intelligible information can be inadvertently or illicitly transmitted by such equipment beyond the perimeter of the Secured Area.

19.

Secured Areas which are not occupied by duty personnel on a 24-hour basis shall, where appropriate, be inspected at the end of normal working hours and at random intervals outside normal working hours, unless an IDS is in place.

20.

Secured Areas and technically Secured Areas may be set up temporarily within an Administrative Area for a classified meeting or any other similar purpose.

21.

Security operating procedures shall be drawn up for each Secured Area stipulating:

22.

Strong rooms shall be constructed within Secured Areas. The walls, floors, ceilings, windows and lockable doors shall be approved by the EEAS security authority and afford protection equivalent to a security container approved for the storage of EUCI of the same classification level.

23.

EUCI which is classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED may be handled:

24.

EUCI which is classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED shall be stored in suitable locked office furniture in an Administrative Area or a Secured Area. It may temporarily be stored outside a Secured Area or an Administrative Area provided the holder has undertaken to comply with compensatory measures laid down in security instructions issued by the EEAS security authority.

25.

EUCI which is classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET UE/EU SECRET may be handled:

26.

EUCI which is classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET UE/EU SECRET shall be stored within a Secured Area, in a security container or strong room.

27.

EUCI which is classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET shall be handled in a Secured Area.

28.

EUCI which is classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET shall be stored in a Secured Area at the Headquarters under one of the following conditions:

29.

Rules governing the carriage of EUCI outside physically protected areas are set out in Annex A III.

30.

The EEAS security authority shall define procedures for managing keys and combination settings for offices, rooms, strong rooms and security containers. Such procedures shall protect against unauthorised access.

31.

Combination settings shall be committed to memory by the smallest possible number of individuals needing to know them. Combination settings for security containers and strong rooms storing EUCI shall be changed:

1.

This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 7 of Annex A. It lays down the administrative measures for controlling EUCI throughout its life-cycle in order to help deter, detect and recover from deliberate or accidental compromise or loss of such information.

2.

Information shall be classified where it requires protection with regard to its confidentiality.

3.

The originator of EUCI shall be responsible for determining the security classification level, in accordance with the relevant classification guidelines, and for the dissemination of the information.

4.

The classification level of EUCI shall be determined in accordance with Article 2(2) of Annex A and by reference to the security policy to be approved in accordance with Article 3(3) of Annex A.

5.

Classified information of the Member States exchanged with the EEAS shall be awarded the same level of protection as EUCI bearing the equivalent classification. A table of equivalence can be found in Appendix B to Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information.

6.

The security classification and, where applicable, the date or specific event after which it may be downgraded or declassified, shall be clearly and correctly indicated, regardless of whether the EUCI is in paper, oral, electronic or any other form.

7.

Individual parts of a given document (i.e. pages, paragraphs, sections, annexes, appendices, attachments and enclosures) may require different classifications and shall be marked accordingly, including when stored in electronic form.

8.

To the extent possible, documents containing parts with different classification levels shall be structured so that parts with a different classification level may be easily identified and detached if necessary.

9.

The overall classification level of a document or file shall be at least as high as that of its most highly classified component. When information from various sources is collated, the final product shall be reviewed to determine its overall security classification level, since it may warrant a higher classification than its component parts.

10.

The classification of a letter or note covering enclosures shall be as high as the highest classification of its enclosures. The originator shall indicate clearly at which level it is classified when detached from its enclosures by means of an appropriate marking, e.g.:

CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL

Without attachment(s) RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

11.

In addition to one of the security classification markings set out in Article 2(2) of Annex A, EUCI may bear additional markings, such as:

12.

Following a decision to release EUCI to a third State of International Organization, the EEAS Security Directorate shall forward the classified information concerned, which shall bear a releasability marking indicating the third State or international organisation to which it is to be released.

13.

A list of authorised markings will be adopted by the EEAS Security Authority.

14.

Standardised abbreviated classification markings may be used to indicate the classification level of individual paragraphs of a text. Abbreviations shall not replace the full classification markings.

15.

The following standard abbreviations may be used within EU classified documents to indicate the classification level of sections or blocks of text of less than a single page:

16.

When creating an EU classified document:

17.

Where it is not possible to apply paragraph 15 to EUCI, other appropriate measures shall be taken in accordance with security guidelines to be established pursuant to this Decision.

18.

At the time of its creation, the originator shall indicate, where possible, and in particular for information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, whether EUCI can be downgraded or declassified on a given date or following a specific event.

19.

The EEAS shall regularly review EUCI held by it to ascertain whether the classification level still applies. The EEAS shall establish a system to review the classification level of registered EUCI that it has originated no less frequently than every five years. Such a review shall not be necessary where the originator has indicated from the outset a specific time when the information will automatically be downgraded or declassified and the information has been marked accordingly.

20.

A central registry shall be established in Headquarters. For every organisational entity within the EEAS in which EUCI is handled, a responsible registry shall be established, subordinated to the central registry, to ensure that EUCI is handled in accordance with this Decision. Registries shall be established as Secured Areas as defined in Annex A.

Each Union Delegation establishes its own EUCI registry.

The EEAS security authority shall designate a Chief Registry Officer for these registries.

21.

For the purposes of this Decision, registration for security purposes (hereinafter referred to as "registration") means the application of procedures that record the life-cycle of information, including its dissemination and destruction. In the case of a CIS, registration procedures may be performed by processes within the CIS itself.

22.

All material classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and above shall be registered when it arrives at or leaves an organisational entity including Union Delegations. Information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET shall be registered in designated registries.

23.

The Central Registry shall be, in EEAS Headquarters, the main point of entry and exit for classified information exchanges with third States and international organisations. It shall keep a record of all these exchanges.

24.

The HR shall approve a security policy on the registration of EUCI for security purposes, in accordance with article 14 of this Decision.

25.

The Central Registry shall be designated in the EEAS Headquarters to act as the central receiving and dispatching authority for information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET. Where necessary, subordinate registries may be designated to handle such information for registration purposes.

26.

Such subordinate registries may not transmit TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents directly to other subordinate registries of the same central TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registry or externally without the express written approval of the latter.

27.

TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents shall not be copied or translated without the prior written consent of the originator.

28.

Where the originator of documents classified SECRET UE/EU SECRET and below has not imposed caveats on their copying or translation, such documents may be copied or translated on instruction from the holder.

29.

The security measures applicable to the original document shall apply to copies and translations thereof. The copies of CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above shall be created only by a relevant (sub) registry with a secured copy-machine. The copies must be registered.

30.

Carriage of EUCI shall be subject to the protective measures set out in paragraphs 31 to 41. When EUCI is carried on electronic media, and notwithstanding Article 7(4) of Annex A, the protective measures set out below may be supplemented by appropriate technical countermeasures prescribed by the EEAS security authority so as to minimise the risk of loss or compromise.

31.

The EEAS security authority shall issue instructions on the carriage of EUCI in accordance with this Decision.

32.

EUCI carried within a building or self-contained group of buildings shall be covered in order to prevent observation of its contents.

33.

Within a building or self-contained group of buildings, information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET shall be carried by appropriately security cleared individuals, in a secured envelope bearing only the addressee's name.

34.

EUCI carried between buildings or premises within the EU shall be packaged so that it is protected from unauthorised disclosure.

35.

The carriage of information classified up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET within the EU shall be by one of the following means:

In the case of carriage from one Member State to another, the provisions of point (c) shall be limited to information classified up to CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL.

36.

Material classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET UE/EU SECRET (e.g. equipment or machinery) which cannot be carried by the means referred to in paragraph 34 shall be transported as freight by commercial carrier companies in accordance with Annex A V.

37.

The carriage of information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET between buildings or premises within the EU shall be by military, government or diplomatic courier, as appropriate.

38.

EUCI carried from within the EU to the territory of a third State, or between EU entities in third States, shall be packaged in such a way that it is protected from unauthorised disclosure.

39.

The carriage of information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET UE/EU SECRET from within the EU to the territory of a third State, and the carriage of any EUCI classified up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET between EU entities in third States, shall be by one of the following means:

40.

The carriage of information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET UE/EU SECRET released by the EU to a third State or international organisation shall comply with the relevant provisions under a security of information Agreement or an administrative arrangement in accordance with Article 10(2) of Annex A.

41.

Information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED may also be carried from within the EU to the territory of a third State by postal services or commercial courier services.

42.

The carriage of information classified TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET from within the EU to the territory of a third State, or between EU entities in third States, shall be by military or diplomatic courier.

43.

EU classified documents that are no longer required may be destroyed, without prejudice to the relevant rules and regulations on archiving.

44.

Documents subject to registration in accordance with Article 7(2) of Annex A shall be destroyed by the responsible registry on instruction from the holder or from a competent authority. The logbooks and other registration information shall be updated accordingly.

45.

For documents classified SECRET UE/EU SECRET or TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, destruction shall be performed in the presence of a witness who shall be cleared to at least the classification level of the document being destroyed.

46.

The registrar and the witness, where the presence of the latter is required shall sign a destruction certificate, which shall be filed in the registry. The registry shall keep destruction certificates of TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents for a period of at least ten years and of documents CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET UE/EU SECRET for a period of at least five years.

47.

Classified documents, including those classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, shall be destroyed by methods which meet relevant EU or equivalent standards or which have been approved by Member States in accordance with national technical standards so as to prevent reconstruction in whole or in part.

48.

The destruction of computer storage media used for EUCI shall be in accordance with paragraph 36 of Annex A IV.

49.

In accordance with Article 15 of this Decision, the EEAS security inspections encompass:

50.

EEAS Security inspections shall be conducted by an inspection team of the EEAS Security Directorate and, when necessary, with the support of security experts of other EU Institutions or Member States.

The inspection team shall have access to any location where EUCI is handled, in particular registries and CIS points of presence.

51.

EEAS Security inspections in Union Delegations can be conducted, whenever necessary, with the support of the Security Officers of the Member States' embassies located in the third countries.

52.

Before the end of each calendar year, the EEAS security authority shall adopt a security inspection programme for EEAS for the following year.

53.

Whenever necessary, security inspections that are not foreseen in the programme above can be arranged by the EEAS Security Authority.

54.

At the end of the security inspection, the main conclusions and recommendations shall be presented to the inspected entity. Thereafter, a report on the inspection shall be drawn up by the inspection team. Where corrective actions and recommendations have been proposed, sufficient details shall be included in the report to support the conclusions reached. The report shall be forwarded to the EEAS security authority and to the head of the inspected entity.

A regular report shall be prepared under the responsibility of the EEAS Security Directorate to highlight the lessons learned from the inspections conducted over a specified period and examined by the EEAS Security Committee.

55.

The EEAS Security Directorate may, where appropriate, designate contributing experts to participate in joint EU inspection teams carrying out inspections in EU agencies and bodies established under Title V, Chapter 2 of the TEU.

56.

The EEAS Security Directorate shall draw up and update a security inspection checklist of items to be verified in the course of a EEAS security inspection. This checklist shall be forwarded to the EEAS Security Committee.

57.

The information to complete the checklist shall be obtained in particular during the inspection from the security management of the entity being inspected. Once completed with the detailed responses, the checklist shall be classified by agreement with the inspected entity. It shall not form part of the inspection report.

1.

This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 8 of Annex A.

2.

The following Information Assurance (IA) properties and concepts are essential for the security and correct functioning of operations on Communication and Information Systems (CIS):

3.

The provisions set out below shall form the baseline for the security of any CIS handling EUCI. Detailed requirements for implementing these provisions shall be defined in IA security policies and security guidelines.

4.

Security risk management shall be an integral part of defining, developing, operating and maintaining CIS. Risk management (assessment, treatment, acceptance and communication) shall be conducted as an iterative process jointly by representatives of the system owners, project authorities, operating authorities and security approval authorities, using a proven, transparent and fully understandable risk assessment process. The scope of the CIS and its assets shall be clearly defined at the outset of the risk management process.

5.

The EEAS competent authorities shall review the potential threats to CIS and shall maintain up-to-date and accurate threat assessments which reflect the current operational environment. They shall constantly update their knowledge of vulnerability issues and periodically review the vulnerability assessment to keep up with the changing information technology (IT) environment.

6.

The aim of security risk management shall be to apply a set of security measures which results in a satisfactory balance between user requirements and residual security risk.

7.

The specific requirements, scale and the degree of detail determined by the relevant Security Accreditation Authority (SAA) for accrediting a CIS shall be commensurate with the assessed risk, taking account of all relevant factors, including the classification level of the EUCI handled in the CIS. Accreditation shall include a formal residual risk statement and acceptance of the residual risk by a responsible authority.

8.

Ensuring security shall be a requirement throughout the entire CIS life-cycle from initiation to withdrawal from service.

9.

The role and interaction of each actor involved in a CIS with regard to its security shall be identified for each phase of the life-cycle.

10.

Any CIS, including its technical and non-technical security measures, shall be subject to security testing during the accreditation process to ensure that the appropriate level of assurance of the implemented security measures is obtained and to verify that they are correctly implemented, integrated and configured.

11.

Security assessments, inspections and reviews shall be performed periodically during the operation and maintenance of a CIS and when exceptional circumstances arise.

12.

Security documentation for a CIS shall evolve over its life-cycle as an integral part of the process of change and configuration management.

13.

The EEAS shall cooperate with GSC, Commission and Member States to develop best practice for protecting EUCI handled on CIS. Best practice guidelines shall set out technical, physical, organisational and procedural security measures for CIS with proven effectiveness in countering given threats and vulnerabilities.

14.

The protection of EUCI handled on CIS shall draw on lessons learned by entities involved in IA within and outside the EU.

15.

The dissemination and subsequent implementation of best practice shall help achieve an equivalent level of assurance for the various CIS operated by the EEAS which handle EUCI.

16.

To mitigate risk to CIS, a range of technical and non-technical security measures, organised as multiple layers of defence, shall be implemented. These layers shall include:

(a)   Deterrence: security measures aimed at dissuading any adversary planning to attack the CIS;

(b)   Prevention: security measures aimed at impeding or blocking an attack on the CIS;

(c)   Detection: security measures aimed at discovering the occurrence of an attack on the CIS;

(d)   Resilience: security measures aimed at limiting impact of an attack to a minimum set of information or CIS assets and preventing further damage; and

(e)   Recovery: security measures aimed at regaining a secure situation for the CIS.

The degree of stringency and applicability of such security measures shall be determined following a risk assessment.

17.

The EEAS competent authorities shall ensure that they can respond to incidents which may transcend organisational and national boundaries to coordinate responses and share information about these incidents and the related risk (computer emergency response capabilities).

18.

Only the functionalities, devices and services to meet operational requirements shall be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary risk.

19.

CIS users and automated processes shall be given only the access, privileges or authorisations they require to perform their tasks in order to limit any damage resulting from accidents, errors, or unauthorised use of CIS resources.

20.

Registration procedures performed by a CIS, where required, shall be verified as part of the accreditation process.

21.

Awareness of the risks and available security measures is the first line of defence for the security of CIS. In particular all personnel involved in the life-cycle of CIS, including users, shall understand:

22.

To ensure that security responsibilities are understood, IA education and awareness training shall be mandatory for all personnel involved, including senior management and CIS users.

23.

The required degree of confidence in the security measures, defined as a level of assurance, shall be determined following the outcome of the risk management process and in line with the relevant security policies and security guidelines.

24.

The level of assurance shall be verified by using internationally recognised or nationally approved processes and methodologies. This includes primarily evaluation, controls and auditing.

25.

Cryptographic products for protecting EUCI shall be evaluated and approved by a national Crypto Approval Authority (CAA) of a Member State.

26.

Prior to being recommended for approval by the EEAS CAA in accordance with Article 7(5) of this Decision, such cryptographic products shall have undergone a successful second party evaluation by an Appropriately Qualified Authority (AQUA) of a Member State not involved in the design or manufacture of the equipment. The degree of detail required in a second party evaluation shall depend on the envisaged maximum classification level of EUCI to be protected by these products.

27.

Where warranted on specific operational grounds, the EEAS CAA may, upon recommendation by the Council Security Committee, waive the requirements under paragraphs 25 or 26 and grant an interim approval for a specific period in accordance with Article 7(5) of this Decision.

28.

An AQUA shall be a CAA of a Member State that has been accredited on the basis of criteria laid down by the Council to undertake the second evaluation of cryptographic products for protecting EUCI.

29.

The High Representative shall approve a security policy on the qualifications and approval of non-cryptographic IT security products.

30.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Decision, when transmission of EUCI is confined within Secured Areas, unencrypted distribution or encryption at a lower level may be used based on the outcome of a risk management process and subject to the approval of the SAA.

31.

For the purposes of this Decision, an interconnection shall mean the direct connection of two or more IT systems for the purpose of sharing data and other information resources (e.g. communication) in a unidirectional or multidirectional way.

32.

A CIS shall treat any interconnected IT system as untrusted and shall implement protective measures to control the exchange of classified information.

33.

For all interconnections of CIS with another IT system the following basic requirements shall be met:

34.

There shall be no interconnection between an accredited CIS and an unprotected or public network, except where the CIS has approved BPS installed for such a purpose between the CIS and the unprotected or public network. The security measures for such interconnections shall be reviewed by the competent Information Assurance Authority (IAA) and approved by the competent SAA.

When the unprotected or public network is used solely as a carrier and the data is encrypted by a cryptographic product approved in accordance with Article 7(5) of this Decision, such a connection shall not be deemed to be an interconnection.

35.

The direct or cascaded interconnection of a CIS accredited to handle TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET to an unprotected or public network shall be prohibited.

36.

Computer storage media shall be destroyed in accordance with procedures approved by the EEAS security authority.

37.

Computer storage media shall be reused, downgraded or declassified in accordance with a security policy to be established pursuant to Article 7(2) of this Decision.

38.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Decision, the specific procedures described below may be applied for a limited period of time in an emergency, such as during impending or actual crisis, conflict, war situations or in exceptional operational circumstances.

39.

EUCI may be transmitted using cryptographic products which have been approved for a lower classification level or without encryption with the consent of the competent authority if any delay would cause harm clearly outweighing the harm entailed by any disclosure of the classified material and if:

40.

Classified information transmitted under the circumstances set out in paragraph 39 shall not bear any markings or indications distinguishing it from information which is unclassified or which can be protected by an available cryptographic product. Recipients shall be notified of the classification level, without delay, by other means.

41.

Should recourse be made to paragraph 39, a subsequent report shall be made to the EEAS Security Directorate and, by it, to the EEAS Security Committee. This report will at least state the sender, the recipient and the originator of each piece of EUCI.

42.

The following IA functions shall be established in the EEAS. These functions do not require single organisational entities. They shall have separate mandates. However, these functions, and their accompanying responsibilities, may be combined or integrated in the same organisational entity or split into different organisational entities, provided that internal conflicts of interests or tasks are avoided.

43.

The IAA shall be responsible for:

44.

The TEMPEST Authority (TA) shall be responsible for ensuring compliance of CIS with TEMPEST policies and guidelines. It shall approve TEMPEST countermeasures for installations and products to protect EUCI to a defined level of classification in its operational environment.

45.

The CAA shall be responsible for ensuring that cryptographic products comply with respective cryptographic policy. It shall approve a cryptographic product to protect EUCI to a defined level of classification in its operational environment.

46.

The CDA shall be responsible for:

47.

The SAA for each system shall be responsible for:

48.

The EEAS SAA shall be responsible for accrediting all CIS operating within the remit of the EEAS.

49.

A joint SAB shall be responsible for accrediting CIS within the remit of both the EEAS SAA and Member States' SAAs. It shall be composed of an SAA representative from each Member State and be attended by an SAA representative of the GSC and Commission. Other entities with nodes on a CIS shall be invited to attend when that system is under discussion.

The SAB shall be chaired by a representative of the EEAS SAA. It shall act by consensus of SAA representatives of institutions, Member States and other entities with nodes on the CIS. It shall make periodic reports on its activities to the EEAS Security Committee and shall notify it of all accreditation statements.

50.

The IA Operational Authority for each system shall be responsible for:

1.

This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 9 of Annex A. It lays down general security provisions applicable to industrial or other entities in pre-contract negotiations and throughout the life-cycle of classified contracts let by the EEAS.

2.

The High Representative shall approve a policy on industrial security outlining in particular detailed requirements regarding Facility Security Clearances (FSCs), Security Aspects Letters (SALs), visits, transmission and carriage of EUCI.

3.

Prior to launching an invitation to tender or letting a classified contract, the EEAS, as the contracting authority, shall determine the security classification of any information to be provided to bidders and contractors, as well as the security classification of any information to be created by the contractor. For that purpose, the EEAS shall prepare a SCG to be used for the performance of the contract.

4.

In order to determine the security classification of the various elements of a classified contract, the following principles shall apply:

5.

The contract-specific security requirements shall be described in an SAL. The SAL shall, where appropriate, contain the SCG and shall be an integral part of a classified contract or sub-contract.

6.

The SAL shall contain provisions requiring the contractor and/or subcontractor to comply with the minimum standards laid down in this Decision. Non-compliance with these minimum standards may constitute sufficient grounds for the contract to be terminated.

7.

Depending on the scope of programmes or projects involving access to or handling or storage of EUCI, specific Programme/Project Security Instructions (PSI) may be prepared by the contracting authority designated to manage the programme or project. The PSI shall require the approval of the Member States' NSAs/DSAs or any other competent security authority participating in the programme/project and may contain additional security requirements.

8.

The EEAS Security Directorate shall request the NSA or DSA or other competent security authority of the Member State concerned to grant an FSC to indicate, in accordance with national laws and regulations, that an industrial or other entity can protect EUCI at the appropriate classification level (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET UE/EU SECRET) within its facilities. A contractor, subcontractor, or potential contractor or subcontractor shall not be provided with or granted access to EUCI, until proof of FSC has been transmitted to the EEAS.

9.

Where relevant, the EEAS, as the contracting authority, shall notify the appropriate NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority that an FSC is required in the pre-contractual stage or for performing the contract. An FSC or PSC shall be required in the pre-contractual stage where EUCI classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET UE/EU SECRET has to be provided in the course of the bidding process.

10.

The EEAS as contracting authority shall not award a classified contract with a preferred bidder before having received confirmation from the NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority of the Member State in which the contractor or subcontractor concerned is registered that, where required, an appropriate FSC has been issued.

11.

The EEAS as contracting authority shall request the NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority which has issued an FSC to notify it of any adverse information affecting the FSC. In the case of a sub-contract, the NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority shall be informed accordingly.

12.

Withdrawal of an FSC by the relevant NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority shall constitute sufficient grounds for the EEAS, as the contracting authority, to terminate a classified contract or exclude a bidder from the competition.

13.

All personnel working for contractors requiring access to EUCI classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above shall have been appropriately security cleared and have a need-to-know to access the information. Although a PSC is not required for access to EUCI at the level of RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, the need-to-know for such access shall exist.

14.

Applications for the PSCs for contractor personnel shall be made to the NSA/DSA responsible for the entity.

15.

The EEAS shall point out to contractors wishing to employ a national of a third State in a position that requires access to EUCI, that it is the responsibility of the NSA/DSA of the Member State in which the hiring entity is located and incorporated to determine whether the individual can be granted access to such information, in accordance with this Decision, and to confirm that the originator’s consent must have been provided before such access is given.

16.

Where EUCI is provided to a bidder at the pre-contractual stage, the invitation to tender shall contain a provision obliging a bidder which fails to submit a bid or which is not selected to return all classified documents within a specified period of time.

17.

Once a classified contract or sub-contract has been awarded, the EEAS, as the contracting authority, shall notify the contractor's or subcontractor's NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority about the security provisions of the classified contract.

18.

When such contracts are terminated or they end, the EEAS, as the contracting authority (and/or the NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority, as appropriate, in the case of a sub-contract) shall promptly notify the NSA/DSA or any other competent security authority of the Member State in which the contractor or subcontractor is registered.

19.

As a general rule, the contractor or subcontractor shall be required to return to the contracting authority, upon termination or ending of the classified contract or sub-contract, any EUCI held by it.

20.

Specific provisions for the disposal of EUCI during the performance of the contract or upon its termination or ending shall be laid down in the SAL.

21.

Where the contractor or subcontractor is authorised to retain EUCI after termination or ending of a contract, the minimum standards contained in this Decision shall continue to be complied with and the confidentiality of EUCI shall be protected by the contractor or subcontractor.

22.

The conditions under which the contractor may subcontract shall be defined in the invitation to tender and in the contract.

23.

A contractor shall obtain permission from the EEAS, as the contracting authority, before sub-contracting any parts of a classified contract. No subcontract may be awarded to industrial or other entities registered in a non-EU Member State which has not concluded a security of information Agreement with the EU.

24.

The contractor shall be responsible for ensuring that all sub-contracting activities are undertaken in accordance with the minimum standards laid down in this Decision and shall not provide EUCI to a subcontractor without the prior written consent of the contracting authority.

25.

With regard to EUCI created or handled by the contractor or subcontractor, the rights incumbent on the originator shall be exercised by the contracting authority.

26.

Where the EEAS, contractors or subcontractors require access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET UE/EU SECRET in each other's premises for the performance of a classified contract, visits shall be arranged by liaison with the NSAs/DSAs or any other competent security authority concerned. This is without prejudice to the prerogative of the NSAs/DSAs, in the context of specific projects, to agree on a procedure whereby such visits can be arranged directly.

27.

All visitors shall hold an appropriate PSC and have a "need-to-know" for access to the EUCI related to the EEAS contract.

28.

Visitors shall be given access only to EUCI related to the purpose of the visit.

29.

With regard to the transmission of EUCI by electronic means, the relevant provisions of Article 8 of Annex A, and of Annex A IV shall apply.

30.

With regard to the carriage of EUCI, the relevant provisions of Annex A III shall apply, in accordance with national laws and regulations.

31.

For the transport of classified material as freight, the following principles shall be applied when determining security arrangements:

32.

EUCI shall be transferred to contractors and subcontractors located in third States that have a valid security agreement with the EU in accordance with security measures agreed between the EEAS, as the contracting authority, and the NSA/DSA of the third State concerned where the contractor is registered.

33.

In liaison, as appropriate, with the NSA/DSA of the Member State the EEAS, as the contracting authority, shall be entitled to conduct visits to contractors'/subcontractors' facilities on the basis of contractual provisions in order to verify that the relevant security measures for the protection of EUCI at the level RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED as required under the contract have been put in place.

34.

To the extent necessary under national laws and regulations, NSAs/DSAs or any other competent security authority shall be notified by the EEAS as the contracting authority of contracts or sub-contracts containing information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED.

35.

An FSC or a PSC for contractors or subcontractors and their personnel shall not be required for contracts let by the EEAS containing information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED.

36.

The EEAS, as the contracting authority, shall examine the responses to invitations to tender for contracts which require access to information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, notwithstanding any requirement relating to FSC or PSC which may exist under national laws and regulations.

37.

The conditions under which the contractor may subcontract shall be in accordance with paragraphs 22-24.

38.

Where a contract involves handling information classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED in a CIS operated by a contractor, the EEAS as contracting authority shall ensure that the contract or any sub-contract specifies the necessary technical and administrative requirements regarding accreditation of the CIS commensurate with the assessed risk, taking account of all relevant factors. The scope of accreditation of such CIS shall be agreed between the contracting authority and the relevant NSA/DSA.

1.

This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 10 of Annex A.

2.

The EEAS may exchange EUCI with third States or international organisations in accordance with Article 10(1) of Annex A.

To support the HR in performing the responsibilities set out in Article 218 TFEU:

3.

Where security of information agreements provide for technical implementing arrangements to be agreed between the EEAS Security Directorate - in coordination with the Security Directorate of the Directorate General for Human Resources and Security of the Commission and the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council - and the competent security authority of the third State or international organisation in question, such arrangements shall take account of the level of protection provided by the security regulations, structures and procedures in place in the third State or international organisation concerned.

4.

Where a long-term need exists for the EEAS to exchange information classified no higher than RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED with a third State or international organisation, and where it has been established that the party in question does not have a sufficiently developed security system for it to be possible to enter into a security of information agreement, the HR may, after having obtained the unanimous favourable opinion of the EEAS Security Committee in accordance with Article 14(5) of this Decision, enter into an administrative arrangement with the competent security authorities of the third State or international organisation in question.

5.

No EUCI shall be exchanged by electronic means with a third State or international organisation unless explicitly provided for in the security of information agreement or administrative arrangement.

6.

Under an administrative arrangement on the exchange of classified information, the EEAS and the third State or international organisation shall each designate a registry as the main point of entry and exit for classified information exchanged. For the EEAS, this will be the EEAS central registry.

7.

Administrative arrangements shall as a general rule take the form of an exchange of letters.

8.

Assessment visits referred to in Article 16 of this Decision shall be conducted by mutual agreement with the third State or international organisation concerned, and shall evaluate:

9.

No EUCI shall be exchanged before an assessment visit has been conducted and the level at which classified information may be exchanged between the parties has been determined, based on the equivalency of the level of protection that will be afforded to it.

If, pending such assessment visit, the HR is made aware of any exceptional or urgent reasons for exchanging classified information, the EEAS shall:

If the EEAS cannot establish the originator, the EEAS security authority shall assume the originator's responsibility after having obtained the unanimous favourable opinion of the EEAS Security Committee.

10.

Where a framework exists in accordance with Article 10(1) of Annex A for exchanging classified information with a third State or international organisation, the decision to release EUCI by the EEAS to a third State or international organisation shall be taken by the EEAS security authority, which may delegate such authorisation to senior EEAS officials or other persons under its authority.

11.

If the originator of the classified information to be released, including the originators of source material it may contain, is not the EEAS, the EEAS shall first seek the originator's written consent to establish that there are no objections to release. If the EEAS cannot establish the originator, the EEAS security authority shall assume the originator's responsibility after having obtained the unanimous favourable opinion of the Member States as represented in the EEAS Security Committee.

12.

In the absence of one of the frameworks referred to in Article 10(1) of Annex A, and when the interests of the EU or of one or more of its Member States require the release of EUCI for political, operational or urgent reasons, EUCI may exceptionally be released to a third State or international organisation once the following actions have been taken.

The EEAS Security Directorate shall, after ensuring that conditions referred to in Paragraph 11 above are met:

13.

In the absence of one of the frameworks referred to in Article 10(1) of Annex A, the third party in question shall undertake in writing to protect the EUCI appropriately.

"Accreditation" means the process leading to a formal statement by the Security Accreditation Authority (SAA) that a system is approved to operate with a defined level of classification, in a particular security mode in its operational environment and at an acceptable level of risk, based on the premise that an approved set of technical, physical, organisational and procedural security measures has been implemented;

"Asset" means anything that is of value to an organisation, its business operations and their continuity, including information resources that support the organisation’s mission;

"Authorization to access EUCI" means an authorisation by the EEAS Security Authority, which is taken in accordance with this Decision after a PSC has been issued by the competent authorities of a Member State, and which certifies that an individual may, provided his "need-to-know" has been determined, be granted access to EUCI up to a specified level (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above) until a specified date — see Article 2 of Annex A I;

"Breach" is an act or omission by an individual which is contrary to the security rules laid down in this Decision and/or to the security policies or guidelines setting out any measures necessary for its implementation;

"CIS life-cycle" means the entire duration of existence of a CIS, which includes initiation, conception, planning, requirements analysis, design, development, testing, implementation, operation, maintenance and decommissioning;

"Classified contract" means a contract entered into by the EEAS with a contractor for the supply of goods, execution of works or provision of services, the performance of which requires or involves access to or the creation of EUCI;

"Classified subcontract" means a contract entered into by a contractor of the EEAS with another contractor (i.e. the subcontractor) for the supply of goods, execution of works or provision of services, the performance of which requires or involves access to or the creation of EUCI;

"Communication and information system" (CIS) means any system enabling the handling of information in electronic form. A communication and information system shall comprise the entire assets required for it to operate, including the infrastructure, organisation, personnel and information resources; — see Article 8 (2) of Annex A;

"Compromise of EUCI" means the total or partial disclosure of EUCI to unauthorised persons or entities — see Article 8(2);

"Contractor" means an individual or legal entity possessing the legal capacity to undertake contracts;

"Cryptographic (Crypto) products" are cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic hardware and software modules, and products including implementation details and associated documentation and keying material;

"CSDP operation" means a military or civilian crisis management operation under Title V, Chapter 2, of the TEU;

"Declassification" means the removal of any security classification;

"Defence in depth" means the application of a range of security measures organised as multiple layers of defence;

"Designated Security Authority" (DSA) means an authority responsible to the National Security Authority (NSA) of a Member State which is responsible for communicating to industrial or other entities national policy on all matters of industrial security and for providing direction and assistance in its implementation. The function of DSA may be carried out by the NSA or by any other competent authority;

"Document" means any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics;

"Downgrading" means a reduction in the level of security classification;

"EU classified information" (EUCI) means any information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of prejudice to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States, designated by an EU security classification — see Article 2 (f);

"Facility Security Clearance" (FSC) means an administrative determination by an NSA or DSA that, from the security viewpoint, a facility can afford an adequate level of protection to EUCI of a specified security classification level and its personnel who require access to EUCI have been appropriately security cleared and briefed on the relevant security requirements necessary to access and protect EUCI;

"Handling" of EUCI means all possible actions to which EUCI may be subject throughout its life-cycle. It comprises its creation, processing, carriage, downgrading, declassification and destruction. In relation to CIS it also comprises its collection, display, transmission and storage;

"Holder" means a duly authorised individual with an established need-to-know who is in possession of an item of EUCI and is accordingly responsible for protecting it;

"Industrial or other entity" means an entity involved in supplying goods, executing works or providing services; this may be an industrial, commercial, service, scientific, research, educational or development entity or a self-employed individual;

"Industrial security" is the application of measures to ensure the protection of EUCI by contractors or subcontractors in pre-contract negotiations and throughout the life-cycle of classified contracts. — see Article 9 (1) of Annex A;

"Information Assurance" in the field of communication and information systems is the confidence that such systems will protect the information they handle and will function as they need to, when they need to, under the control of legitimate users. Effective IA shall ensure appropriate levels of confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation and authenticity. IA shall be based on a risk management process — see Article 8(1) of Annex A;

"Interconnection" means, for the purposes of this Decision, the direct connection of two or more IT systems for the purpose of sharing data and other information resources (e.g. communication) in a unidirectional or multidirectional way — see Annex A IV, paragraph 31;

"Management of classified information" is the application of administrative measures for controlling EUCI throughout its life-cycle to supplement the measures provided for in Articles 5, 6 and 8 and thereby help deter, detect and recover from deliberate or accidental compromise or loss of such information. Such measures relate in particular to the creation, registration, copying, translation, carriage, handling, storage and destruction of EUCI — see Article 7(1) of Annex A;

"Material" means any document or item of machinery or equipment, either manufactured or in the process of manufacture;

"Originator" means the EU institution, agency or body, Member State, third state or international organisation under whose authority classified information has been created and/or introduced into the EU’s structures;

"Personnel security" is the application of measures to ensure that access to EUCI is granted only to individuals who have:

see Article 5 (1) of Annex A;

"Personnel Security Clearance" (PSC) for access to EUCI means a statement by a competent authority of a Member State which is made following completion of a security investigation conducted by the competent authorities of a Member State and which certifies that an individual may, provided his "need-to-know" has been determined, be granted access to EUCI up to a specified level (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above) until a specified date; the individual thus described is said to be "security cleared";

"Personnel Security Clearance Certificate" (PSCC) means a certificate issued by a competent authority establishing that an individual is security cleared and holds a valid PSC, and which shows the level of EUCI to which that individual may be granted access (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above), the date of validity of the relevant PSC and the date of expiry of the certificate itself;

"Physical security" is the application of physical and technical protective measures to deter unauthorised access to EUCI — see Article 6 of Annex A;

"Programme/Project Security Instruction" (PSI) means a list of security procedures which are applied to a specific programme/project in order to standardise security procedures. It may be revised throughout the programme/project;

"Registration" means the application of procedures that record the life-cycle of information, including its dissemination and destruction. see Annex A III, paragraph 21;

"Residual risk" means the risk which remains after security measures have been implemented, given that not all threats are countered and not all vulnerabilities can be eliminated;

"Risk" means the potential that a given threat will exploit internal and external vulnerabilities of an organisation or of any of the systems it uses and thereby cause harm to the organisation and to its tangible or intangible assets. It is measured as a combination of the likelihood of threats occurring and their impact;

"Risk acceptance" is the decision to agree to the further existence of a residual risk after risk treatment.

"Risk assessment" consists of identifying threats and vulnerabilities and conducting the related risk analysis, i.e. the analysis of probability and impact.

"Risk communication" consists of developing awareness of risks among CIS user communities, informing approval authorities such risks and reporting them to operating authorities.

"Risk management process" means the entire process of identifying, controlling and minimising uncertain events that may affect the security of an organisation or of any of the systems it uses. It covers the entirety of risk-related activities, including assessment, treatment, acceptance and communication;

"Risk treatment" consists of mitigating, removing, reducing (through an appropriate combination of technical, physical, organisational or procedural measures), transferring or monitoring the risk.

"Security Aspects Letter" (SAL) means a set of special contractual conditions issued by the contracting authority which forms an integral part of any classified contract involving access to or the creation of EUCI, that identifies the security requirements or those elements of the contract requiring security protection — see Annex A V, Section II;

"Security Classification Guide" (SCG) means a document which describes the elements of a programme or contract which are classified, specifying the applicable security classification levels. The SCG may be expanded throughout the life of the programme or contract and the elements of information may be re-classified or downgraded; where an SCG exists it shall be part of the SAL — see Annex A V, Section II;

"Security investigation" means the investigative procedures conducted by the competent authority of a Member State in accordance with its national laws and regulations in order to obtain an assurance that nothing adverse is known which would prevent an individual from being granted a national or EU PSC for access to EUCI up to a specified level (CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above);

"Security Operating Procedures" (SecOPs) means a description of the security policy implementation to be adopted, of the operating procedures to be followed and of the personnel responsibilities;

"Specific Security Requirement Statement" (SSRS) means a binding set of security principles to be observed and of detailed security requirements to be implemented, underlying the process of certification and accreditation of CIS;

"TEMPEST" means the investigation, study and control of compromising electromagnetic emanations and the measures to suppress them;

"Threat" means a potential cause of an unwanted incident which may result in harm to an organisation or any of the systems it uses; such threats may be accidental or deliberate (malicious) and are characterised by threatening elements, potential targets and attack methods;

"Vulnerability" means a weakness of any nature that can be exploited by one or more threats. Vulnerability may be an omission or it may relate to a weakness in controls in terms of their strength, completeness or consistency and may be of a technical, procedural, physical, organisational or operational nature.