(1a)

Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that, in defining and implementing its policies and actions, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact, in particular Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, designed to secure budgetary discipline across the Union, sets out the framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits. It has been further strengthened by Regulation No …/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and Regulation (EU) No …/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Regulation (EC) No …/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area added a system of effective, preventive and gradual enforcement mechanisms in the form of financial sanctions for the Member States whose currency is the euro.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact, in particular Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, aiming at secure budgetary discipline across the Union, sets out the framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits. Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and 1467/97 have been amended and the Stability and Growth Pact has been further strengthened, by Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and by Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) . Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (4) added a system of effective, preventive and gradual enforcement mechanisms in the form of financial sanctions for the Member States whose currency is the euro. Article 2-a of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, moreover, lays down the elements that constitute the European Semester for economic policy coordination.

(2a)

Pursuant to Article 2-a of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the European Semester includes the formulation, and the surveillance of the implementation, of the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union (broad economic policy guidelines) in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU; the formulation, and the examination of the implementation, of the employment guidelines that must be taken into account by Member States in accordance with Article 148(2) TFEU (employment guidelines); the submission and assessment of Member States' stability or convergence programmes under that Regulation; the submission and assessment of Member States' national reform programmes supporting the Union strategy for growth and jobs and established in line with the broad economic guidelines, with the employment guidelines and with the general guidance to Member States issued by the Commission and the European Council at the beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance; the surveillance to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (5).

(3)

The amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact increase both the guidance, and, for the Member States whose currency is the euro, incentives for the setting and the implementation of a prudent budgetary policy, while avoiding excessive government deficits. These provisions have created a more robust framework at the level of the Union for the surveillance of national economic policies.

(3)

The amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact increase both the guidance, and, for the Member States whose currency is the euro, reinforced and more automatic sanctions for non-compliance with a prudent budgetary policy, while avoiding excessive government deficits. These provisions have created a more robust framework at the level of the Union for the surveillance of national economic policies but deeper coordination of economic policy and incentives for compliance are needed .

(3a)

The revised Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for sustainable growth and jobs.

(3b)

The European Council, meeting on 17 June 2010, adopted a new Union strategy for growth and jobs, to enable the Union to emerge stronger from the crisis, and to turn its economy towards smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, accompanied by a high level of quality employment, productivity and social cohesion. The Union strategy for growth and jobs also contains objectives in the fields of poverty, education, innovation and the environment.

(3c)

Due attention should be paid to the Union strategy for growth and jobs and how it is implemented by Member States via their national reform programmes.

(4)

The Treaty allows the adoption of specific measures in the euro area which go beyond the provisions applicable to all Member States in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union.

(4)

The TFEU allows the adoption of specific measures in the euro area which go beyond the provisions applicable to all Member States in order to ensure , and to avoid policies in the Member States that jeopardise, the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union. More active use, where appropriate and necessary, should be made of specific measures provided for in Article 136 TFEU in order to create the necessary conditions for a deeper and more resilient integration which should go hand in hand with enhanced democratic legitimacy of the economic and monetary union.

(4a)

Sound public finances and balanced budgets are a prerequisite for economic and financial stability as clearly demonstrated by the sovereign debt crisis, underlining the need for strong and solid fiscal frameworks. Furthermore, the deficits of today, associated with stagnated economies, highlight the need for reforms rather than increased spending.

(4b)

Member States should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic and monetary union, in particular the practice of accumulating debts outside the general government accounts.

(5)

Strong public finances are best ensured at the planning stage and gross errors should be identified as early as possible. Member States should benefit not just from the setting of guiding principles and budgetary targets but also from a synchronised monitoring of their budgetary policies.

(5)

Strong public finances and coordinated economic policies are best ensured at the planning stage and gross errors should be identified as early as possible. Member States should benefit not just from the setting of guiding principles and budgetary targets but also from a synchronised monitoring of their budgetary and macroeconomic policies and public debt issuances . With a view to better coordinating the planning of national debt issuances, Member States need to report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans .

(5a)

The aim of this Regulation is to put in place further Union mechanisms for the coordination and surveillance of Member States' budgetary and economic policies. Nevertheless, prudence should be shown at all stages, and, for this reason, no matters related to the Member States' debt issuance plans, the renewal of outstanding debt or other relevant operations should be made public, and they should be used for internal coordination only. This need arises from the risk that a Member State may be subject to by making its financial needs known in advance to the financial markets.

(6)

Setting-up a common budgetary timeline for Member States whose currency is the euro should better synchronize the key steps in the preparation of national budgets, thus contributing to the effectiveness of the European semester for budgetary policy coordination. Adopting a common budgetary timeline should lead to stronger synergies by facilitating policy coordination among Member States whose currency is the euro and ensure that the Council and Commission recommendations are appropriately integrated in the national process for budget adoption.

(6)

Setting-up a common budgetary timeline for Member States whose currency is the euro should better synchronize the key steps in the preparation of national budgets, thus contributing to the effectiveness of the European semester for economic and budgetary policy coordination. Adopting a common budgetary timeline should lead to stronger synergies by facilitating policy coordination among Member States whose currency is the euro and ensure that the country-specific policy recommendations and the national reform programmes and stability and convergence programmes, as well as the recommendations based on the macroeconomic imbalances analysis are appropriately integrated in the national process for budget adoption.

(6a)

It is essential that the common budgetary plan timeline is coherent with the Member States' budgetary timeframes. If it is not, any Commission opinion regarding a Member State's draft budgetary plan has the risk of lacking democratic legitimacy in that Member State's parliament.

(6b)

Where the budget is not adopted by 31 December as provided for by this Regulation, reversionary budget procedures should be in place to ensure that the government remains able to discharge its essential duties.

(7)

There is strong evidence showing the effectiveness of rules-based fiscal frameworks in supporting sound and sustainable fiscal policies. The introduction of national fiscal rules that are consistent with the budgetary objectives set at Union level should be a crucial element to ensure the respect of the Stability and Growth Pact provisions. In particular, Member States should put in place structural balanced budget rules which transpose into national legislation the main principles of the Union fiscal framework. This transposition should be effective through binding rules preferably of a constitutional nature so as to demonstrate the strongest commitment of national authorities in relation to the Stability and Growth Pact.

(7)

Effective rules-based fiscal frameworks can be important in supporting sound and sustainable fiscal policies. The introduction of national fiscal rules that are consistent with the economic and budgetary objectives set at Union level , and which include the definition of exceptional circumstances and severe economic downturns, should be a crucial element to ensure the sustainable respect of the Stability and Growth Pact provisions. In particular, Member States should put in place a mechanism to be triggered in the case of a significant deviation from the medium-term budgetary objective or the adjustment path towards it aiming at ensuring a timely return to the medium-term objective. It is essential that those rules cover the general government as a whole and be of binding force or otherwise guaranteed to be fully complied with throughout the national budgetary processes.

(7a)

The extent of sovereign indebtedness in the Union is a paramount challenge which should be addressed if the economy is to return to a stable and resilient growth trend in the short as well as the long term. A significant time span will elapse before the average level of indebtedness among Member States returns to the 60 % trajectory stipulated by the Stability and Growth Pact. Fulfilment of the medium-term budgetary objectives is a fundamental precondition in this regard while deviating from them could trigger soaring interest rates and thereby threaten growth and recovery.

(8)

Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts can considerably hamper the effectiveness of budgetary planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline. Forecasts from independent bodies can provide unbiased and realistic macroeconomic forecasts.

(8)

Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts can considerably hamper the effectiveness of budgetary planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline. Forecasts from independent and technically competent bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the budgetary authorities of the Member State which comply with minimum requirements, as laid down in Annex I, can provide unbiased and realistic macroeconomic forecasts , once their comparability and coherence have been established .

(9)

This gradually strengthened surveillance will further complement the existing provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact and strengthen the surveillance of budgetary discipline in Member States whose currency is the euro. A gradually enhanced monitoring procedure should contribute to better budgetary outcomes to the benefit of all Member States whose currency is the euro. As part of a gradually strengthened procedure, a closer monitoring is particularly valuable to Member States that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure.

(9)

This gradually strengthened surveillance and coordination will further complete the European Semester for economic policy coordination, complement the existing provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact and strengthen the surveillance of budgetary and macro-financial soundness and economic convergence in Member States whose currency is the euro. A gradually enhanced monitoring procedure should contribute to better budgetary and economic outcomes to the benefit of all Member States whose currency is the euro , without creating unnecessary bureaucracy . As part of a gradually strengthened procedure, a closer monitoring is particularly valuable to Member States that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure.

(10)

As demonstrated by the sovereign debt crisis, and in particular by the need to put in place common financial backstops, Member States whose currency is the euro share enhanced spill-overs from their budgetary policy . Each of the Member States whose currency is the euro should consult the Commission and other Member States whose currency is the euro before the adoption of any major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects, so as to give the possibility for an assessment of possible impact for the euro area as a whole. They should consider their budgetary plans to be of common concern and submit them to the Commission for monitoring purposes in advance of the plans becoming binding. The Commission should be in a position, if necessary, to adopt an opinion on the draft budgetary plan, that the Member State and in particular budgetary authorities should be invited to take into account in the process of the budget law adoption. Such an opinion should ensure that Union's policy guidance in the budgetary area is appropriately integrated in the national budgetary preparations. In particular, this opinion should include an assessment of whether or not the budgetary plans appropriately address the recommendations issued in the context of the European semester in the budgetary area. The Commission should stand ready to present this opinion to the Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request. The extent to which this opinion has been taken into account should be part of the assessment, if and when the conditions are met, leading to the decision to place the concerned Member State in excessive deficit procedure, where no follow-up to the early guidance from the Commission should be considered as an aggravating factor. Also, based on an overall assessment of the plans by the Commission, the Eurogroup should discuss the budgetary situation and prospects for the euro area.

(10)

Member States whose currency is the euro generate or are affected by spill-over effects from their budgetary and macroeconomic policies . Spill-over effects should therefore be identified and addressed within the framework of country-specific surveillance procedures as well as in the overall assessment of the budgetary situation and prospects in the euro area as a whole. That assessment should identify, on a country-by-country basis, potential negative spill-over effects on the sustainability of public finances of the Member States generated by their private sector or by other Member States. The sovereign debt crisis has also demonstrated the interlinkage between sovereign debt, financial stability and bank solvency. Each of the Member States whose currency is the euro should consult the Commission and other Member States whose currency is the euro before the adoption of any major economic and fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects, so as to give the possibility for an assessment of possible impact for the euro area as a whole. They should consider their budgetary and economic plans to be of common concern and submit them to the Commission for monitoring purposes in advance of the plans becoming binding. The Commission should be in a position to adopt , as soon as possible and no later than 15 November, an opinion on the draft budgetary plan, that the Member State should be invited to take into account in the process of the budget law adoption. Such an opinion should ensure that Union's policy guidance in the economic and budgetary area is appropriately integrated in the national budgetary preparations. In particular, this opinion should include an assessment of whether or not the budgetary plans appropriately address the recommendations issued in the context of the European semester in the economic and budgetary area (country-specific policy recommendations). In the same context, it should ensure that Member State commitments in the framework of their national reform programmes as well as any commitments made by them within the framework of economic partnership programmes and Council recommendations within the macroeconomic imbalances procedure are appropriately reflected in the draft national budget. The Commission should stand ready to present this opinion to the Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request. The extent to which this opinion has been taken into account should be part of the assessment, if and when the conditions are met, leading to the decision to place the concerned Member State in excessive deficit procedure, where no follow-up to the early guidance from the Commission should be considered as an aggravating factor. Also, based on an overall assessment of the plans by the Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament should discuss the budgetary situation and prospects for the euro area.

(10a)

In the event of particularly serious non-compliance of the draft budgetary plan with the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective, the Commission, in its opinion on the draft budgetary plan, should request, after consultation with the Member State concerned, a revised draft budgetary plan, in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation. This will be the case in particular where the implementation of the initial budgetary plan would put at risk the financial stability of the Member State concerned or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union or where the implementation of the initial budgetary plan would entail an obvious significant violation of the recommendations formulated by the Council under the Stability and Growth Pact.

(10b)

In the context of better coordination and ex ante discussions among Member States of any major economic and fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects, the Commission should put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, with a detailed plan setting out how such coordination and ex ante discussions are to operate, what form such coordination and discussions are to take, what policies are envisaged, and the likely political consequences - to the Member States and, in particular, to the national parliaments - of decisions arising from such coordination and ex ante discussions. That Commission opinion should, at least, ensure that the coordination is integrated into the European Semester framework.

(10c)

Furthermore, strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council decision imposing an interest-bearing deposit or an annual fine in accordance with this Regulation. The Member State's participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.

(11)

Member States whose currency is the euro and which are subject to an excessive deficit procedure should be monitored more closely to secure a full and timely correction of the excessive deficit. A closer monitoring should ensure early correction of any deviations from the Council recommendations to correct the excessive deficit. Such monitoring should complement the provisions set out in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. The modalities of this closer monitoring should be graduated depending on the stage of the procedure the Member State is subject to, as provided for in Article 126 of the Treaty.

(11)

Member States whose currency is the euro and which are subject to an excessive deficit procedure should be monitored more closely to secure a coherent, sustainable and timely correction of the excessive deficit. A closer monitoring should ensure early prevention and correction of any deviations from the Council recommendations to correct the excessive deficit or from the country-specific recommendations. Such monitoring should complement the provisions set out in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. The modalities of this closer monitoring should be graduated depending on the stage of the procedure the Member State is subject to, as provided for in Article 126 TFEU. Member States that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure should present an economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms. It is essential that such structural reforms be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. Where appropriate, the social partners should be involved in accordance with national law and practices.

(12)

The closer monitoring for Member States subject to an excessive deficit procedure should allow the identification of risks in the compliance of a Member State's deadline to correct the excessive deficit. In the event of such risks being identified, the Commission should issue a recommendation to the Member State for measures to be taken within a given timeframe that should be presented to the Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request. This assessment should allow rapid correction of any developments putting at risk the correction of the excessive deficit within the established deadline. Assessment of compliance with this Commission recommendation should be part of the continuous assessment made by the Commission of effective action to correct an excessive deficit. When deciding whether effective action to correct the excessive deficit has been taken, the Council should also base its decision on whether or not the Member State complied with the Commission recommendation .

(12)

It is essential that closer monitoring for Member States subject to an excessive deficit procedure be undertaken in the context of an economic partnership programme. In that context, the Commission should invite the Member State to carry out a comprehensive assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the general government and its sub-sectors and to report regularly to the Commission and to the Economic and Financial Committee, for the general government and its sub-sectors, the in-year budgetary execution, the budgetary impact of discretionary measures taken on both the expenditure and the revenue side, targets for the government expenditure and revenues, as well as information on the measures adopted and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets .

(12a)

In order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union and respect for budgetary discipline, it is indispensable to safeguard the stability in the euro area as a whole and therefore to strengthen the efficiency and the resilience of the euro area financial system to adverse shocks, to address liquidity constraints as well as negative externalities related to the fragmentation of the sovereign bond markets and to reduce marginal funding costs for Member States facing funding pressures. For that overarching purpose, it is necessary to adopt a roadmap towards euro area common sovereign debt instruments including the establishment of an enhanced economic policy coordination framework. As a first step for the coordinated and common issuance of euro area sovereign debt instruments, it is essential that a redemption fund be established over a period of approximately 25 years together with the coordination of euro area Member State debt issuance. This first step is without prejudice to the implementation of further steps in the roadmap before the end of that period.

(12b)

In applying this Regulation, the Council and the Commission should fully respect the role of the social partners, as well as differences between national systems, such as those relating to wage formation.

(13)

In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by a Commission recommendation to participate in an exchange of views ,

(13)

In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by a Commission recommendation to participate in an exchange of views . Rules should also be provided for strengthening accountability , transparency and scrutiny of budgetary and more broadly euro area economic policy surveillance and coordination, in accordance with democratic principles. To that end, specific provisions should be provided for, in accordance with national practices for involving national parliaments, the social partners and civil society organisations.

(13a)

Budgetary plans and structural reforms should be consistent with the protection of social rights and should avoid increasing inequalities. Therefore budgetary discipline should not be implemented to the detriment of medium and long-term means required for a sustainable and environmentally friendly transformation of the economy in line with the Union strategy for jobs and growth and the 2050 climate change objectives.

(13b)

Tax policy plays a crucial role for enhancing the effectiveness and fairness of budgetary plans while contributing to sustainable growth. A comprehensive set of measures and legislative initiatives such as a European financial transaction tax and a common consolidated corporate tax base should be swiftly adopted at the Union and at the national level in order to remove unjustified exceptions, broaden the tax base, improve the efficiency of tax collection, tackle tax evasion and apply comprehensively the 'polluter pays' principle.

(aa)

complementing the procedure for prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances as established by Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011;

(ca)

guaranteeing the compatibility between budgetary policies and the procedure for prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances as established by Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011, through a closer monitoring of Member States' national reform programmes and any economic partnership programmes, in order to ensure sustainable compliance and convergence within the euro area.

(1)

" independent fiscal council" means a body endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member State in charge of monitoring the implementation of national fiscal rules;

(1)

"fiscal council" means an independent and technically competent body endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the budgetary authorities of the Member State in charge of monitoring the implementation of national fiscal rules;

(2)

"independent macroeconomic forecasts" means the macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts produced by an independent body or a body endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member State;

(2)

"independent macroeconomic forecasts" means the macroeconomic forecasts produced or endorsed by an independent and technically competent body endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the budgetary authorities of the Member State which complies with the minimum requirements laid down in Annex I. The Commission shall ensure the comparability and coherence of the independent forecasts across Member States ;

(5)

‘government’ and ‘deficit’have the meaning' set out in Article 2 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

(5)

‘government’ , ‘deficit’ and 'debt' mean, respectively, ‘government’, ‘deficit’ and 'debt' as defined in Article 2 of the Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU;

(5a)

"Stability and Growth Pact" means the multilateral surveillance system laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 and the procedure for the avoidance of Member States' excessive deficit laid down in Article 126 TFEU and in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97;

(5b)

"a particularly serious non-compliance with the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective" means a deviation in the figures presented in the draft budget which is at least 1 % of GDP in a single year or at least 0,5 % of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years and that cannot be justified by exceptional circumstances or a severe economic downturn, after taking into account mitigating factors and spill-over effects, as described in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.

(a)

the Spring European Council policy orientations to individual Member States, based on the Annual Growth Survey, including the Commission's draft Joint Employment Report, and the annual reports under Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011; such policy orientations will provide guidance to Member States in the drafting of their national reform programmes and their stability or convergence programmes, to be presented by Member States in April in accordance with Article 4(1) and Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97;

(b)

the Summer European Council endorsement of the country-specific policy recommendations, according to the Commission opinions on the adequacy of Member States' national reform programmes and stability or convergence programmes, presented in accordance with Articles 121 and 148 TFEU.

(b)

the projections at unchanged policies for expenditure and revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general government and their main components.;

(b)

the projections at unchanged policies for expenditure and revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general government and their main components; those projections shall cover both current expenditure and investment expenditure and, to that end, clear budgetary targets on current and investment expenditure shall be set and, in the case of investment expenditure, an evaluation of its economic returns shall be published;

(ca)

details of the expenditure directly linked to the achievement of the Union strategy for growth and jobs, including public investment, together with details of the link with the achievement of the budgetary objectives in the long term as well as a social impact assessment of the measures provided for in the budgetary plan;

(d)

a detailed description and a well-documented quantification of the measures to be included in the budget for the year to come in order to bridge the gap between the targets referred to in point (c) and the projections at unchanged policies provided in accordance with point (b). The description may be less detailed for measures with a budgetary impact estimated to be lower than 0,1 % of GDP. Particular attention shall be paid to major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spillover effects for other Member States whose currency is the euro.

(d)

a detailed description and a well-documented quantification of the measures to be included in the budget for the year to come in order to bridge the gap between the targets referred to in points (c) and (ca) and the projections at unchanged policies provided in accordance with point (b). The description may be less detailed for measures with a budgetary impact estimated to be lower than 0,1 % of GDP. Particular and explicit attention shall be paid to major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects for other Member States whose currency is the euro;

(e)

the main assumptions about expected economic developments and important economic variables which are relevant to the achievement of the budgetary targets. These assumptions shall be based on independent macroeconomic growth forecast ;

(e)

the main assumptions about expected economic developments and important economic variables which are relevant to the achievement of the budgetary targets set in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 2011/85/EU . The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall include an estimation of the assumed impact on potential output and macroeconomic multiplier effects. The methodology, the economic and econometric underlying models and assumptions, as well as any other relevant parameter underpinning independent macroeconomic forecast shall be annexed to the annual medium-term fiscal plans ;

(f)

where applicable, additional indications on how the current recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty in the budgetary area will be met .

(f)

where applicable, additional indications on how the current recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 121 and 148 TFEU will be met in accordance with points (a) to (ca);

(fa)

a quantification of the public investment needs and, as appropriate, of the budgetary impact together with an evaluation of the economic returns of the measures foreseen in the national reform programmes;

(fb)

an analysis of the contribution of reforms and investments included in the national reform programmes to the achievement of the objectives of stability programmes including a cost-benefit analysis of the reforms from a budgetary point of view.

(a)

transfer debt amounts above 60 % of GDP to the ERF over a roll-in period of five years;

(b)

have in place numerical fiscal rules that implement in the national budgetary processes their medium-term budgetary objective as described in Article 2a of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97;

(c)

implement a fiscal consolidation strategy and a structural reform agenda;

(d)

lodge guarantees to adequately cover loans provided by the ERF;

(e)

reduce their structural deficit during the roll-in period to comply with the budget rule in point (b).

(a)

carry out and report on a comprehensive independent audit of the accounts of the general government conducted in coordination with national supreme audit institutions, aiming at assessing the reliability, completeness and accuracy of these public accounts for the purposes of the excessive deficit procedure. In this context, the Commission (Eurostat) shall assess the quality of data reported by the Member State concerned in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 679/2010;

(a)

carry out and report on a comprehensive independent audit of the accounts of the general government conducted in coordination with national supreme audit institutions, aiming at assessing the reliability, completeness and accuracy of these public accounts for the purposes of the excessive deficit procedure. In this context, the Commission (Eurostat) shall assess the quality of data reported by the Member State concerned in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, as regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure;

(ba)

the contribution of this Regulation to the achievement of the Union strategy for growth and jobs.

—

Ownership: without prejudice to the principles set out below, the characteristics of IFIs should be consistent with the Member State's legal framework and political and administrative system. Design choices may have to take into account capacity constraints in smaller Member States.

—

Mandate: the mandate of IFIs should be clearly defined in legislation to prevent unwarranted interference from fiscal authorities or unwarranted extension of its mandate at the expense of fiscal authorities' powers or the prerogatives of national parliaments.

—

Resources: the resources allocated to IFIs should be commensurate with their mandate in order to fulfil it in a credible manner.

—

Accountability: statutory mechanisms should be put in place to encourage appropriate accountability to the legislature. The reports and analyses of IFIs should be published and made available free of charge.

—

Leadership: senior appointments should be selected on the basis of merit, experience and technical competence, in particular as regards the budget process. The appointment process may involve several institutions, for instance through a parliamentary confirmation procedure or whereby several institutions designate each one or several members. Term lengths that the leadership of IFIs serve should be clearly specified in legislation, should be non-renewable, and should preferably extend beyond the parliamentary term. Termination of contracts should be strictly limited to cases where members are guilty of serious misconduct.

—

Staff: staff of IFIs should be selected through open competition based on merit and technical competence. Conditions of employment should be along the lines of that of the civil service.

—

Access to information, transparency and communication policy: as a rule, IFIs should be guaranteed full access in legislation to all relevant information needed to discharge effectively their mandate in a timely manner. Any restrictions to the rule should also be clearly defined. Without prejudice to that legislation, the capability of IFIs to communicate in a timely manner through available media channels should not be impeded. If housed in another entity, it should be made clear that opinions only commit IFIs and not the host institution.