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Document 52013SC0138
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
/* SWD/2013/0138 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change /* SWD/2013/0138 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Climate change, environmental degradation,
and migration Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to
climate change 1........... Introduction. 3 1.1........ Focus and Thematic Scope
of the Paper 3 1.2........ The state of the
reflection at international level 4 1.3........ The EU Context 6 2........... Understanding
migration in the context of environmental change. 7 2.1........ Environmental change as a
driver of migration. 7 2.2........ Vulnerable areas and
possible migration outcomes. 8 2.3........ Improving the knowledge
base. 12 3........... Terminology. 14 4........... Policy responses. 15 4.1........ Existing legal framework. 16 4.1.1..... International human rights
law.. 16 4.1.2..... Environmental law.. 16 4.1.3..... International refugee law.. 17 4.1.4..... Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement 17 4.1.5..... Complementary forms of
protection. 18 4.1.6..... Temporary protection. 19 4.1.7..... Regional Free movement
agreements. 20 4.1.8..... Towards a coherent legal
framework for environmentally induced migrants. 20 4.2........ Adaptation as a Means to
Reduce Displacement 21 4.2.1..... Increasing resilience to
natural hazards. 22 4.2.2..... Increasing resilience to
climate change and environmental degradation. 23 4.3........ Responding to the
challenges and opportunities posed by migration in the context of environmental
degradation and climate change. 25 4.3.1..... Improving emergency
responses. 25 4.3.2..... Promoting and facilitating
migration as an adaptation strategy. 26 4.3.3..... Providing durable solutions,
including planning for relocation as a last resort solution. 29 4.3.4..... Addressing the needs of
receiving areas and hosting communities in EU partner countries. 32 5........... Financial aspects. 33 6........... Conclusions and
recommendations. 34 1. Introduction 1.1. Focus and Thematic Scope of the Paper Environmental factors have always acted as a driver of human
mobility. However, with emerging awareness of the rate and magnitude of climate
change, interest in the question of how environmental change is likely to
affect population movements in the future has grown significantly over the last
decade. And though debate between researchers and within the policy world is
continuing, there is growing evidence that climate change, climate-induced
events and environmental disruptions are likely to assume greater importance in
influencing migration, particularly within the developing world. This Staff Working Paper aims to provide
an overview of the research and data currently available on the inter-linkages
between migration, environmental degradation and climate change. It also
provides an overview of the many initiatives of relevance for the topic which are
already being taken by the EU in various policy fields, and analyses on-going
debates on policy responses at EU and international level. The paper is
produced as a response to a request made by the European Council to the
Commission in the Stockholm Programme for 'an analysis of the effects of
climate change on international migration, including its potential effects on
immigration to the European Union’[1].
However, given the strong evidence that most migration which is primarily
driven by environmental change is likely to occur within the Global South, much
of the analysis of the paper and many of its recommendations are of specific
relevance for EU policies with an external focus, including on development,
foreign policy and humanitarian aid. The specific focus
of this paper is on human mobility due to climate related disasters and environmental
degradation, including such caused by climate change[2] (e.g. land degradation,
drought, desertification, rising sea level or climate induced disasters such as
drought, floods, extreme weather events, winter storms and heat waves) [3]. At present, most
environmental disasters or degradation can be exacerbated by (if not certainly
attributed to) climate change[4].
As a result, seeking to isolate climate change as the sole driver of migration
or displacement would complicate identification of the persons affected. Though
the primary focus of the paper is on international migration, internal
migration trends within the developing world are also considered, as research
suggests that a significant proportion of migration driven by environmental
factors will occur within national borders. This paper does not
address the impact of environmental degradation and climate change on intra-EU
movements, which are regulated by different legal bases, policies and
instruments. Nor does it address displacement caused by industrial accidents,
conflicts or development projects (including designation of protected areas).
It will not address displacements resulting from earthquakes, tsunamis or
volcanic eruptions, although they might have similar consequences with regard
to temporary and permanent displacement. Such cases trigger specific and
relatively well established responses that differ to some extent from those
required to address migration and displacement caused by climate change,
climate-related disasters and environmental degradation. Nevertheless, they can
serve as a source of inspiration for designing responses to these movements. This Staff Working
Paper will first provide a brief summary of major initiatives of relevance for
environmental change and migration at international and EU level. Section 2
continues with an overview of the main research findings on the likely impact
of climate change on future migration trends, and the broader interrelations
between migration and adaptation strategies. Section 3 briefly acknowledges the
complexity of terminology. Section 4 then looks at policy responses which are
currently being taken at EU and international level, and formulates preliminary
recommendations for future action. The paper then concludes with considerations
on future funding. 1.2. The state of the reflection at international level In the past few
years a number of stakeholders, including UN bodies and agencies, governments,
international organisations and NGOs have been reflecting on how to adjust
their humanitarian and development cooperation and/or their adaptation
strategies in light of the link between migration and climate change. The
latest assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), presented in 2007, highlighted that the increases in drought, intense
tropical cyclone activity and extremely high sea levels are likely to lead to
increased population movements[5].
In addition, the recent Special Report 'Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) highlights the link
between climate change and migration.[6]
Given the growing importance of this issue, the next assessment report (to be
completed in 2014) will include for the first time a chapter dedicated to the
link between climate change and security that will examine the ability of
States to address climate change, conflict and migration. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has long been
advocating in various fora for actions to address environmentally-induced
migration[7].
On 30 November 2012, the IOM Council resolution on the Migration Crisis
Operational Framework was adopted to reinforce IOM's role in dealing with
migration-related aspects of conflict or natural disaster-induced displacement.
Within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee framework (IASC), an informal group
on migration, displacement and climate change has been set up[8]. Given its particular refugee protection
mandate, the UN Refugees Agency (UNHCR) is the lead agency for the Humanitarian
Protection Cluster in emergencies. In June 2011, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees António Guterres described the issue as 'the defining challenge of our
times', and urged countries to adopt new measures to cope with climate-induced
displacement within and across borders[9]. In March 2009, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 10/4
which stated that climate change-related impacts have a range of implications,
both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights. It also
stressed that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those
segments of the population who are already in a vulnerable situation and
affirmed that human rights obligations and commitments have the potential to
inform and strengthen international and national policy-making in the area of
climate change[10]. Migration is also mentioned in the Cancun Agreements reached at the
16th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2010 that invite all Parties to take 'measures
to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate
change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation'[11]. In addition, the decision on
loss and damage to the adverse impacts of climate change at COP 18[12] also addresses this issue when
acknowledging the 'further work to advance the understanding of and
expertise on loss and damage, which includes, …, How impacts of climate change
are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility'. Climate change is also increasingly integrated in the global
migration dialogue, in particular in the Global Forum for Migration and
Development (GFMD), which held a specific roundtable on this topic during its
2010 meeting in Mexico[13].
Among its main recommendations, the GFMD has been calling for improvement of data collection processes and exchanges of analyses to
strengthen the dialogue at all levels on the interconnections between climate
change, migration and development, and to 'recognize the need for all
concerned stakeholders to begin discussions on an appropriate legal and
institutional framework to address these important issues, including in the
context of the UNFCCC'. At the 2012 GFMD, the roundtable on “Addressing
South-South Migration and Development Policies” also covered the issue of
environmentally-induced migration. 1.3. The EU Context The EU is gradually moving from supporting research to also
identifying policies and strategies for responding to the impact of
environmental change on migration. The European Parliament was the first institution to mention this
topic in its resolution on ”The Environment, Security and Foreign Policy”
passed on January 1999[14].
In the past years, MEPs have organised several seminars on this subject[15]. In 2011, at the request of the
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs the International Centre
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) has produced a study on legal and
policy responses to environmentally induced migration[16]. The European
Commission has been one of the first to sponsor multi-country comparative
research on environmental change and different kinds of human mobility
worldwide, the "Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios"
(EACH-FOR) project[17]. In 2008, the paper on 'Climate Change and International Security'
prepared by the High Representative and the European Commission drew attention
to the fact that climate change could act as a 'threat-multiplier',
exacerbating trends, tensions and instabilities which would already have an
influence on migration patterns[18]. The Council
Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy[19]
adopted in July 2011 highlighted that climate change is a global environmental
and development challenge with significant implications related to security and
migratory pressures. It also acknowledged the Joint Reflection Paper from the
High Representative and the Commission 'Towards a renewed and strengthened
European Union Climate Diplomacy', which sets out three strands for action
on EU climate diplomacy: strengthening engagement with key partners, supporting
developing countries and mitigating security risks. In
May 2012, the Council of the EU adopted conclusions on the EU Global Approach
to Migration and Mobility in which it 'recognises the
need to further explore the linkages between climate change, migration and
development, including the potential impact of climate change on migration and
displacement'. Some Member States have also given attention to the topic. The Foresight
Programme of the UK Government Office for Science, for example, has invested
significant resources into a two-year research project, exploring global
patterns and impact of migration arising from environmental change and the
challenges that could result from changing migration patterns over the next
fifty years. This Staff Working Paper draws heavily on the final project report
published in October 2011[20]. In order to
gather recent evidence and the latest thinking on the effects of climate change
on migration and displacement and to share ideas for addressing this challenge,
particularly at EU level, a consultation of experts on 'Climate Change and
Migration' was organised by the European Commission on 6 May 2011. It
brought together representatives of EU Member States, partner countries,
non-State actors and other stakeholders who provided valuable input for this
paper. Furthermore, in July and September 2012 respectively, the European
Commission organised two roundtables (with the support of ICMPD and Foresight) on
the specific topics of migration as a strategy of adaptation to climate change
and the development impacts of forced and environmental migration. Conclusions
of these events fed directly into this paper. In addition, the Commission
funded a FP7 project CLICO working on climate change, water conflicts and human
security in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel (2010-2012). CLICO explored
whether the effects of climate change in terms of water scarcity, droughts and
floods in the region present a threat to human security, not least by
exacerbating social tensions and intra- and inter-state conflicts[21]. 2. Understanding migration in the context of environmental
change 2.1. Environmental change as a driver of migration Decisions to migrate are usually the result
of multiple considerations that reflect a complex combination of environmental,
economic, social, security and political factors[22]. Economic and social factors are in most cases considered
both by social scientists and migrants to be the most important drivers of
migration.[23]
Early analyses of the impact of climate change and migration were
based on an overly deterministic understanding of the relationship between the
risk of environmental degradation faced by populations and the likelihood that
they would migrate. In contrast, more recent research such as the UK government's Foresight study has taken a more sophisticated approach, paying greater
attention to both the adaptive capacity of persons in low income countries, and
the factors behind decisions to migrate. The diagramme from the Foresight study
which is reproduced below offers a conceptual framework to capture the drivers
of migration and the influence of environmental change on those drivers[24]. It demonstrates that while
environmental degradation does indeed affect migration decisions, it does so
not only directly through 'environmental drivers' of migration, but also
indirectly via its impact on other drivers, especially economic ones. Foresight:
Migration and Global Environmental Change (2011) Final Project Report, the
Government office of Science This demonstrates that with the exception of certain clear-cut cases
such as small island states affected by sea level rise, it is very difficult
to establish straightforward links between migration and environmental
degradation. The complex relationship between environmental factors and
other processes at work in regions of origin and destination which may drive
migration (e.g. economic restructuring) make it extremely difficult to clearly
pinpoint the role of climate change and other environmental factors in
individuals' decision to migrate. The diagramme also highlights the importance of individual
characteristics and available resources in determining whether persons are both
willing and able to migrate. The role of financial resources (of either the
individual or the family) and social capital (e.g. migrant networks) in
facilitating migration has long been recognised. Indeed, the Foresight study
has highlighted that because of the significant resources which are required to
migrate, persons in the poorest sectors of societies at risk from environmental
degradation may be 'trapped' and unable to move. Moreover, due to the potential
for environmental changes to erode households' financial resources, Foresight
goes so far as to argue that 'environmental change is equally likely to prevent
migration as it is to cause migration'[25].
2.2. Vulnerable areas and possible migration outcomes Available studies and recent events show that some regions of the
world are and will continue to be disproportionately affected by climate and
environmental changes. Many of these regions are in the developing world, where
environmental factors are most likely to directly impact food security,
livelihoods and the safety of populations due to the limited resources
available to cope with the consequences of natural disasters and to adapt to
the adverse effects of climate change[26].
Persons in the poorest segments of such societies who already face multiple
stressors to livelihoods are likely to be the most vulnerable to environmental
degradation. The most vulnerable ecological regions in the developing world
include the following[27]: –
Drylands are
likely to be affected by drought, and progressive land degradation. These will
have a particularly strong impact on agricultural activities and pastoralists.
Increases in drought are foreseen in particular for dryland regions of sub-Saharan
Africa (e.g. the Horn of Africa), Central Asia, and parts of the Mediterranean. –
Low-elevation coastal zones in several global regions will be at risk from a variety of threats
such as rising sea levels, soil salinisation, the degradation of marine
ecosystems, more frequent flooding and extreme weather events. Particularly vulnerable
areas include highly populated urban centres in mega-deltas of rivers such as
the Nile, the Mekong and the Ganges and low-lying island states. –
Mountains regions
have faced above-average warming in recent decades, and this trend is likely to
continue, posing significant challenges for their populations, which are in
most regions largely dependent on agricultural activities. Significant changes
in mountain ecosystems are expected, which may lead to glacier melting and
related problems of water supply and flooding, extreme rainfalls leading to
landslides, and the possibility of more frequent landslides. Vulnerable areas
include the Himalayas, the Andes, and the East African highlands. All of these areas are hosts to major urban
centres which are likely to experience continued population growth in line with
the global trend towards urbanisation. This is in particular the case for low elevation
coastal areas in Asia, where several cities face particular risks of flooding (Bangkok, Dhaka etc.) Cities in mountain regions such as the Andes are however also at risk
from problems such as water shortages. The challenges which such cities face in
effectively adapting to climate change whilst managing population growth should
therefore be considered in designing responses to migration in the context of
environmental change. Possible Migration Outcomes As explained above, vulnerability to climate change may significantly
impact migration drivers, but does not automatically imply that migration will
occur. For this reason, it remains challenging to make reliable forecasts
of population movements which are likely to result from climate change and
related environmental degradation. Though a number of studies have proposed
possible figures, most have subsequently been criticised due to methodological
concerns. A serious lack of reliable quantitative data persists, mainly because
estimates depend on a large number of parameters[28], including the way
the data are recorded (e.g. forecasting models used, definitions and sources)
and human and natural factors (such as the vulnerability of populations to
natural disasters, the number, severity and impact of disasters, population
growth, climate change and disaster trends and the quantity of future
emissions). Most importantly, the vast majority of those who will be affected
by a negative change in their environment, and who decide to move, will not be
easily identifiable as such, as many other drivers contribute to their
individual decisions. This makes any numerical estimation highly questionable. A number of steps have been taken to help fill the knowledge gaps
and monitor displacements after sudden events (led, in particular, by the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the UN Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Nevertheless, knowledge of
displacement in response to slow-onset events is still very scarce. According
to the IDMC, in 2010 over 38 million people were forcibly displaced by
climate-related events (mainly floods and storms), Asia being by far the
continent worst affected[29].
The IDMC adds that drought, the main category of slow-onset disaster, affected
about 108 million people in 2010, but acknowledges that it is not known how
many were forced to move[30]. Despite continuing uncertainty on figures, experts have reached some
agreement on the ways in which environmental change is likely to interact with
migration drivers, and the main patterns of migration which will occur. These
are set out in the box below: Box 1. Expected patterns of migration in the context of environmental
change The diverse potential effects of climate and
environmental change will combine with other drivers to cause different
patterns of migration, which may require different policy and operational responses.
The nature of the environmental disruption will evidently be an
important determining criterion, in particular as the needs and types of flows
generated by sudden-onset events are likely to differ from those generated by
slow-onset processes[31].
Despite the difficulties inherent in identifying
the role of environmental drivers in decisions to migrate, several studies
(including Foresight) have proposed a distinction between two broad categories
of migration outcomes: - Migration undertaken primarily to secure
livelihoods. In cases where environmental change increases economic and
social hardship or influences other drivers, persons with sufficient resources
may migrate to diversify income streams. This migration may be temporary or
permanent, and generally follows pre-established patterns of internal (e.g.
rural-urban) or international mobility. It can result from either slow-onset or
sudden-onset events, and will be highly influenced by migrant's perception of
economic opportunities in destination areas. The potential impact of this form
of migration on strengthening resilience of communities to climate change is
further considered in 4.3.2. - Displacement as a last resort
solution to the adverse effects of environmental change, such as when
catastrophic climatic events or extreme environmental degradation leave no
option for persons to remain. Much displacement is likely to be only temporary,
in particular when it is linked to sudden-onset events such as hurricanes.
However, in certain cases such as for small island states affected by sea level
rise, environmental change may result in permanent displacement. Both temporary
and permanent displacement may pose significant challenges for hosting areas
and expose migrants to vulnerabilities during their journeys and at destination,
and they should therefore be prevented wherever possible. While this distinction is far from clear-cut and
will be difficult to apply to individual cases, it has been argued that it
provides a useful basis for identifying different challenges which may be posed
by migration in the context of climate change and different types of policy
responses. In this regard, additional parameters may include the scale
of migration (large v. small scale displacements), the duration of
migration (permanent v. temporary), the destination of migrants (inside
their State of origin or at regional or international level) and local
circumstances (scale of impact, level of exposure, vulnerability and
resilience). In addition, as mentioned above, the Foresight
study has drawn attention to the fact that certain populations may be
'trapped' by the effects of environmental change, facing extreme vulnerability
but lacking the resources to move. Such persons may become displaced if they
are not assisted. Climate change is highly likely to impact on population movements.
However, current evidence strongly suggests that most migration and
displacement will take place in an intra-State context, or within
developing regions. International migration requires substantial
resources, in particular if it is inter-regional, and is likely to be a
feasible option only for persons who are less likely to be seriously affected
by environmental change (as they typically live in better protected areas of
cities)[32].
This suggests that the impact of climate change and environmental
degradation on migration flows to the EU is unlikely to be substantial. On the other hand, urban
centres in the developing world are likely to receive large number of
migrants moving in the context of environmental change, including both persons
in search of livelihood opportunities and the displaced. As noted above, many
of these cities are themselves also vulnerable to the effects of climate change
and already face difficulties in meeting the challenges of urbanisation. Box 2. The impact of environmental degradation in the Southern Mediterranean region on migration[33][1] The Southern Mediterranean
region[34][2] comprises drylands, coastal zones and
mountains. A large proportion of the population is exposed to the effects of
environmental change. Indeed, 33 million persons reside in vulnerable low
elevation coastal areas, and the great majority of the region's population
reside in dryland areas which are at risk from increased drought and land
degradation. Though the situation varies across the region, a key shared
challenge is the scarcity of water resources. Accurate household-level data
on how environmental change will be perceived is lacking. However, it is clear
that despite the profound impact which climate change may have on the Southern Mediterranean region, exposure to its effects will not necessarily result in
migration. Economic factors are and will remain the key determinants of
migration in the region, with environmental drivers primarily being felt
through their impact on livelihoods. The relationship between environmental
stressors and migration is far from deterministic, as demonstrated, for
example, by the so far limited impact of severe water shortages in the Occupied Palestinian Territories on emigration. Migrants moving primarily due to the
effects of climate change or environmental degradation will therefore be
extremely difficult to distinguish. Climate change and
environmental degradation are likely to exert an influence primarily on existing patterns of internal
mobility. For example, past experience suggests that where environmental
stressors impact on agricultural productivity in rural areas, temporary
short-distance circulatory migration has past been used to diversify income in
order to sustain livelihoods, and this phenomenon is likely to continue. Migration will be an option
available only to those with sufficient resources. These will be unavailable to
many of those affected by the potential negative impact of climate change on
agriculture in drylands. Research on rural Egypt conducted under the EACH-FOR
study showed that in general, affected populations 'would leave their home and move to another place only if
there are absolutely no more livelihood possibilities for them'. The
possibility of having “trapped populations” is therefore very real, as people
may be unable to move due to lack of assets linked to the impact of
environmental change on household resources. For the same financial
reasons, options for longer-distance and international migration within the Southern Mediterranean countries and beyond are likely to be reduced by the effect of
environmental change and its interaction with other migration drivers, in
particular for the poorest groups in society. Therefore, persons migrating may
not be the most vulnerable or the most affected by environmental change. Destinations will be selected
by migrants primarily due to the economic opportunities they offer, meaning
that migration to regions of environmental vulnerability is likely. The
EACH-FOR report has found that 'in
the case of the Morocco-ruled Western Saharan territory, today immigration
clearly surpasses out-migration flows. It seems that the economic
attractiveness of the region… is exceeding any possible negative consequence of
the extreme environmental conditions of the region”. Due to their role as economic
centres, much temporary and permanent migration will be directed to cities,
accentuating current urbanisation trends in the region. Urban centres will also
face vulnerabilities, in particular as many are located in coastal floodplains
or low elevation coastal zones. 2.3. Improving the knowledge base A number of themes
need to be better considered in order to develop a comprehensive understanding
of the impact of environmental change on migration and design appropriate
policy responses. At conceptual
level Clear gaps in
conceptualising environmentally-induced migration hamper policy-making. They
relate to four areas: ·
DEFINITIONS. The effects of environmental change
on migration are so diverse that it is hard to encompass all scenarios under
one single concept and definition. However, definitions are paramount in
guiding policy-making to assign roles and responsibilities. They are also
crucial in the generation of statistics. ·
ESTIMATES. While it shall be acknowledged that
producing accurate predictions is difficult (especially in the case of
slow-onset events) and that existing statistics are based on little evidence,
policy-makers need to know the magnitude of environmentally-induced migration
to be convinced of the importance of the phenomenon and to design action. ·
DRIVERS. The role of the environment as a
migration driver and the ways in which it may interplay with other social,
economic and political factors should be better understood to develop adequate
policy responses. The specific local aspects such as the pre-existing migration
patterns are central in this regard. ·
MIGRATION IMPACTS, particularly in urban areas
and at internal level. The following research questions should be addressed to
better understand the migration impacts of environmental degradation: who
migrates, where, why and how? Much information is also needed about the
obstacles that prevent migration and the adaptive capacities of local
communities. Ecological tipping points that trigger migration should be
identified. From an EU perspective, research on the link of migration and
climate change in the immediate European neighbourhood and/or traditional
‘migrant sending regions’ should be especially improved. Finally, the migration
impacts of environmental change on different groups of people (including the
ones left behind) should be better documented as their policy implications may
vary. Evidence on
policy options The development of a
typology of policy alternatives for the various kinds of environmentally
induced migration from prevention, adaptation, resettlement to managing future
flows should be supported. Greater focus should be placed on responses to
slow-onset environmental degradation as the bulk of current research has been
on sudden onset events so far. Studies should focus on: ·
HUMANITARIAN AID. Existing humanitarian
responses with regard to disasters need to be assessed to identify gaps and
better grasp the needs of those affected. ·
ADAPTATION AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES. Adaptation and disaster risk management mechanisms that can avoid
or reduce the need for migration should be identified. In addition, how and
where to frame migration as an adaptation mode needs to be better documented to
inform sound decision-making. More research on the potential positive effects
of migration on adaptation is also needed. ·
RELOCATION. Future research should help
policy-makers in assessing the costs and benefits of relocation programmes based
on an evaluation of past experiences and, when relevant, preparing pro-active relocation
processes, including over the long term, to monitor what happens to relocated
communities. ·
MIGRATION MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION. The extent
to which existing legal frameworks are useful in the context of environmentally
induced migration should be better analysed and protection gaps such as
statelessness and cross-border movement should be clarified. Governments’
capacity to implement existing and/or new frameworks or policies should also be
evaluated. Generally, looking
at other forms of forced migration and policy responses can help inform
policies in all the above-mentioned fields. At the same time, further
investigation is required to determine the nature of the specific measures to
develop to address environmentally induced migration compared to other forms of
forced migration. 3. Terminology Though the impact of environmental change on migration will be
highly complex and context-specific, as demonstrated above (see Box 1), several
useful distinctions have been proposed to capture different patterns of
mobility that may at least in part be driven by biophysical processes. Linking
these distinctions to terminology can help to produce comparable data and inform
measures to develop differentiated and appropriate policy response. However, notwithstanding the more fundamental debate on whether it
is possible to attribute migration processes to climate change, views differ on
the appropriate terminology and definitions applicable to persons migrating or
displaced as a result of environmental drivers. Though numerous different terms
have been proposed, researchers, lawyers and policymakers cannot agree on
whether those concepts are legally viable or appropriate for the scientific or
political agenda. International organisations, civil society organisations and
media use the term that is the most appropriate to their particular agenda.
Recognition of any of the proposed concepts has implications, inter alia,
on how solutions and responses are shaped and on the division of tasks between
different organisations. Box 3 Some commonly used definitions The term ‘environmental refugee’ has been
used in position papers presented by various NGOs, in the media and in some
academic literature. The term is especially associated with the early stages of
reflection on the topic, before differentiation between types of environmental
change and forms of mobility started[35].
It was used to raise awareness and focused on the forced nature of
displacement. However, use of the term and status of ‘refugee’ has subsequently
been criticised, primarily because the term has a specific legal meaning in the
context of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
international refugee law[36].
Relevant UN agencies and the IOM considered that the use of the term “refugee”
would be inappropriate in that context, and that it would not be opportune or
feasible to widen the 1951 UN Convention' definition of refugees to include
additional categories of persons[37]. The term "environmental
migrant" is widely used, including by the IOM[38]. Nevertheless, the term
'migrant' might not always be considered appropriate, as it suggests a degree
of volition in the decision to move. Lastly, one of the most recent terms is "environmental/climate
displaced person". This term is descriptive - at least of one part
of the mobility spectrum (displacement) - and does not necessarily imply
governance responsibility[39].
Although there is no internationally accepted legal definition of ‘displaced person’,
the concept of ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) is relevant when
displacements occur internally (see below). For the purposes of
this paper, the broad term ‘environmentally induced migrant’ is used
provisionally as a broad category encompassing all types of migrants moving
internally and crossing international borders for reasons related to climate
change or environmental degradation. The term 'environmentally induced
displaced person' is also used when referring specifically to migrants who
move as a 'last resort response' to the effects of environmental change (see
Box 2). However, the choice of these terms in no way prejudges the need to
analyse further whether a range of terms describing the variety of
environment-related movements would not cover better the various migration and
displacement patterns that might result from environmental degradation and
climate change[40].
4. Policy responses Migration in the
context of environmental change is a complex issue that requires comprehensive
responses involving a broad range of issues and policies: climate change
mitigation, disaster risk reduction, urban planning, education, social policy,
asylum and migration policies, development policies and humanitarian and civil
protection policies. Due to the broad
variety of patterns of migration and the diverse environmental pressures and
capacity in non-EU countries, responses have to be tailored to local needs and
conditions. Even during massive inflows, people’s needs vary, depending on
their age, health, gender and socio-economic status. Any adopted measures or
policies should be in line with existing policies, in particular on climate
change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, and also with ongoing global
efforts[41]. This chapter
outlines the responses addressing challenges and opportunities posed by
migration in the context of climate change, which is a main driver for an
increased number and severity of natural disasters and environmental
degradation. First it looks at the existing legal framework for the protection
of migrants moving in the context of climate change and the efforts to make it
more coherent. Next, it analyses adaptation and disaster risk reduction as
means to reduce displacement Finally, it focuses on addressing migration and
displacement occurring in the context of climate change or environmental
degradation, including emergency responses, facilitating the use of migration
as adaptation, addressing the needs of displaced persons and hosting
communities and the potential of resettlement and relocation of trapped
populations. The chapter aims to provide an overview of the many measures which
the EU has already taken in each of the areas covered, in order to support
future efforts to build a more coordinated and strategic response to the
challenges posed by climate change and migration. 4.1. Existing legal framework No legal framework specifically addressing environmentally induced
migrants exists. However, a number of instruments, both at the international
and national level, legally binding and soft-law, might offer some form of
status and/or protection to some types of environmentally induced migrants
and/or displaced persons. 4.1.1. International human rights law Human rights law
applies to environmentally induced migrants, as to all other persons. The
effects of climate change may undermine the enjoyment of several human rights,
including: the right to life (Art 6, ICCPR; Art 6 UNCRC); right to adequate
food (Art 11 ICESCR; Art 14 CEDAW; Art 5 CERD), the right to water (Arts 11 and
12 ICESCR[42];
Art 14 CEDAW; Art 28 CRPD; Art 24 CRC), the right to health (Art 12 ICESCR), and
the right to adequate housing (Art 11 ICESCR). 4.1.2. Environmental law The UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol provide the international framework to address climate change
issues. Although the Treaties do not mention environmentally induced migration
and displacement, they do contain a number of guiding principles that are
relevant to climate-induced migration. The precautionary principle, found both
in the UNFCCC and the Lisbon Treaty[43],
requires action to be taken ahead of full scientific certainty. Thus, although
it is not possible to wholly attribute the cause of population displacement to
climate change, in the face of scientific evidence on the impact of climate change
and the link to migration, it is necessary to take a precautionary approach. A
second principle, known as ‘common but differentiated
responsibility’ (CBDR), is also relevant because least developed countries and
small island developing countries are the most vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change and have the least capacity to respond. The CBDR
principle recognises that while climate change is a common problem, developed
nations have a responsibility to assume a leading role in global efforts to
promote climate change mitigation and adaptation. 4.1.3. International refugee law The 1951 United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
provide the international definition of ‘refugee’: ‘a refugee is a
person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country’. As explained in Box 3 (page 13), this definition is not applicable to environmentally induced migrants.
Firstly, it would be difficult to deem environmental degradation as
'persecution' in the sense envisaged in the convention. It would also be
necessary to link such persecution to one of the grounds set out in the
Convention[44].
Therefore, environmentally induced displacement falls outside the scope of the
1951 Convention and its additional protocol. 4.1.4. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Given that a high proportion of the environmental or climate-related
movements are expected to be internal and some may occur after a sudden natural
disaster, the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
provide a framework for protecting victims of natural disasters who do not
cross an international border[45]. They offer a valuable set of legal standards for protection and
have the advantage of leaving governments wide room for manoeuvre when it comes
to implementation, which allows them to take into account various scenarios in
a way that is flexible and adapted to local circumstances. However, even if the
list of persons covered by the principles is not exhaustive, it is not
clear whether those who migrate due to gradual processes of degradation can be
included. Despite their focus on internal displacement, it has also been
suggested by the Council of Europe that the principles could be taken as a
model to develop a global guiding framework for the protection of displaced
persons crossing international borders as a result of climate change and
natural disasters[46].
There are nonetheless a number of gaps and grey areas in this
framework that need to be addressed. The guiding principles are not legally
binding and are far from being correctly implemented, even if they have been
incorporated by governments in domestic policy and law and also in
international agreements. Most recently, they were used for drafting the
Kampala Convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in Africa[47].
This convention, which was adopted by the African Union in October 2009 and
entered into force on 6 December 2012, is the first legally binding regional
instrument in the world to impose an obligation on States to protect and assist
IDPs, including persons displaced by natural or man-made disasters and
development projects. 4.1.5. Complementary forms of protection Complementary forms of protection allow States to provide protection
against being returned on human rights grounds, in cases not addressed by the
1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. They are subsidiary to recognition as a
refugee under the 1951 Convention. However, complementary protection remains a
generic term, given that it is not defined in any international instrument. As
a result, the nature of the protection, the eligibility criteria and even the
terminology used to describe such forms of protection vary from one
jurisdiction to another. It has been
argued that complementary forms of protection might be relevant for some of the
people who are forced to move on a long-term basis or permanently, i.e. when
there is no prospect of return in the long term. This could include slow-onset
processes at an advanced stage leading to gradual displacement (such as
desertification), persons affected by rising sea-level or certain cases of
natural disasters. In practice,
the need for refugee-type protection is not clear in the context of
environmentally induced migration and displacement. In cases of slow-onset
environmental degradation, people tend to seek support for finding an
alternative livelihood and earning a living rather than seeking refugee-type protection.
Neither the aim nor the content of refugee-type protection appears to be
appropriate in order to fulfil the needs that result from gradual movements of
this kind. On the other hand, because of its long-term character, such
protection would also not be appropriate in case of rapid-onset events leading
to temporary displacement. At the EU
level, an example of complementary protection is subsidiary protection granted
under the Qualification Directive[48],
which however, does not include environmental degradation nor climate change
amongst the types of serious harm which can lead to granting such protection.
However, some EU MS have included in their legislation on refugee-type
protection provisions concerning those who may be unable to return home owing
to a natural disaster. For example, under the Swedish
law, a person ‘unable to return to the country of origin because of an
environmental disaster’ may also qualify for asylum[49].
However, this provision has never been applied. Furthermore, the preparatory
papers make it clear that slow-onset processes are not covered[50]. Another
example is the Finnish humanitarian protection framework, under which ‘An
alien residing in Finland is issued with a residence permit on the basis of
humanitarian protection, if (…) he or she cannot return to his or her country
of origin or country of former habitual residence as a result of an
environmental catastrophe’[51].
The preparatory papers state that both natural and human-induced disasters fall
within its scope. This provision is less restrictive than the Swedish law, but
has not yet been used either. Many States provide the possibility of issuing a residence permit on
a discretionary basis to a non-national in cases where essential considerations
of a humanitarian nature conclusively make it appropriate to grant the
application. Such residence permits are issued rarely and only upon a specific
assessment of the individual circumstances. In this regard, Denmark has proceeded with an
interesting application of the provisions on humanitarian protection[52] and
issued residence permits on humanitarian grounds to families with minor
children from certain areas in Afghanistan, where the drought is particularly
bad, and also to destitute Afghans without land coming from areas suffering
from drought and food insecurity and who would be in a particularly vulnerable
situation upon return[53]. 4.1.6. Temporary protection Temporary protection
takes different forms worldwide, but it is generally described as an
exceptional measure and specific provisional protection response to situations
of mass influx, aimed at providing immediate emergency protection from refoulement. Temporary protection
status might be appropriate after severe rapid-onset disasters (such as
floods), when masses flee from the area affected but when the possibility of
them returning in the short or medium term remains open. Therefore, those
persons have an immediate and temporary need for protection. An example of such
status is the one granted under the EU Temporary Protection Directive[54], which has been
designed in particular for persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or
endemic violence and persons at serious risk of, or who have been victims of,
systematic or generalised violations of their human rights. Nevertheless, the Directive leaves wide room for manoeuvre, in the form of open
definitions of key words, such as ‘mass influx’[55]. At the national level, Finland is the only EU Member State offering an institutionalised mechanism that grants
temporary protection in the event of an ‘environmental catastrophe’, without
defining the concept[56].
Even if this provision seems flexible, it has never been applied so far. Other countries grant temporary
protection on an ad hoc basis after natural disasters. Examples of such
systems can be found in the UK response to the Montserrat volcanic eruption in
1995/1997[57].
Equally interesting are the special immigration concessions granted by several
governments worldwide for the victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.
Governments have either suspended the return of people to the countries
affected or taken measures concerning resettlement of victims[58]. The US Immigration Act of 1990 provides
for discretionary granting of temporary protection status when ‘there has
been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster
in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living
conditions in the area affected’ and when ‘the foreign state is unable,
temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens who are
nationals of the state’[59].
It is important to underline that this protection applies only to persons who
are already in the US at the time of the disaster. The status allows a
six-month stay which can be extended to eighteen months. During their stay,
residents may work but cannot apply for admission of spouses or family members.
This status has been granted in a few cases, when disasters occurred in Central America (e.g. for 90 000 Hondurans and 60 000 Nicaraguans after Hurricane
Mitch in 1998). However, the system has been criticised due to the limited
group which it covers (persons already present on US territory), and because it
frequently results in permanent settlement via systematic extensions of the
status. These national
examples show some of the weaknesses of ad hoc measures, particularly in
cases when the underlying environmental process or event is not temporary -
such as if an area is declared unfit for habitation. This has been the case in
some non-climatic events such as the Monserrat volcano explosion in 1997 which
left thousands of people without protection once the disaster was declared
permanent and thus temporary protection measures were no longer valid. They do not provide a clear and secure way of obtaining protection
(especially because granting of protection is discretionary). Furthermore, they
can be an answer for only a limited proportion of environmentally induced
migrants, given that, after rapid-onset disasters, people tend not to move far
away from their home. 4.1.7. Regional Free movement agreements Existing regional
agreements on the free movement of people, including for the purpose of work,
in particular those adopted through regional integration organisations such as
the Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS) or MERCOSUR, might, if
properly implemented, also serve as frameworks for environmentally induced
migration. Although they do not target specifically environmentally-induced
migrants, they might be used by them to move temporarily or permanently to
other countries in the region. For example, evidence suggests that the ECOWAS
Free Movement Protocol has increased access to protection for refugees in West Africa by allowing the displaced to move as labour migrants to neighbouring countries[60]. However, many regional
organisations in the developing world have made only limited progress on
promoting regional mobility, and for those that have (such as ECOWAS),
implementation of agreed provisions is frequently ineffective. 4.1.8. Towards a coherent legal framework for environmentally
induced migrants A piecemeal approach
persists with regard to regulating the legal status of environmentally induced
migrants, which clearly reflects the problems with definitions of who such
migrants are and the extent to which their movement can be attributed to
climate change and environmental degradation. However, as demonstrated above,
several states have made attempts to address certain aspects of
environmentally-induced migration and displacement through national
legislation. Potentially useful frameworks also exist at regional and
international levels. It therefore remains to be seen whether a new specific
legal framework is both necessary and feasible, or if persons moving in the
context of environmental change can be adequately assisted and protected under
existing frameworks. At any rate, the complexities of the topic and its
comparative novelty as a subject of international policy dialogue between
states means that the wider political consensus which would be necessary to
establish international rules remains lacking, including at regional levels. Nevertheless, as indicated above, some States will face important
challenges linked to environmentally induced migration, and those most affected
should be encouraged and assisted in developing an appropriate legal framework.
Existing legal frameworks could be applied more effectively and build consensus
at the international level on basic guiding principles governing
environmentally induced migration and displacement. In that respect, work initiated at the Nansen Conference on Climate
Change and Displacement in Norway in June 2011 is an important step forward.
Participants of the conference devised 10 Principles on Climate Change and
Cross-Border Displacement, primarily in the context of sudden onset events.
Those principles set the grounds for responses, based on humanity, human
dignity, human rights and international cooperation and on the primary
necessity for states to ensure a proper level of protection of their own
nationals. The role of other actors, including civil society, regional
integration processes and international cooperation is also recognized. Those
principles call for strengthening prevention, resilience and disaster
preparedness. While acknowledging the importance of the Guiding Principles for
Internal Displacement, they also identify a normative gap for the protection of
"externally displaced populations", victims of sudden onset events
and encourage the development of a guiding framework or instrument in that
regard. Building on the Nansen Conference, the Nansen Initiative has been
launched in October 2012 by Norway and Switzerland, with the support of UNHCR
and the Norwegian Refugee Council, and co-funding of the European Commission.
It aims to build consensus on how to address potential legal and protection gaps
for people displaced across borders owing to environmental change and extreme
weather events. 4.2. Adaptation as a Means to Reduce Displacement The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as “any adjustment in natural or human systems
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of
adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive
adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned
adaptation” (IPCC TAR, 2001 a). In other words, adaptation means anticipating
the adverse effects of climate change and taking appropriate action to prevent
or minimise the damage they can cause. Examples of adaptation measures include
using scarce water resources more efficiently, adapting building codes to
future climate conditions and extreme weather events, building flood defences
and raising the levels of dykes, developing drought-tolerant crops and choosing
tree species and forestry practices less vulnerable to storms and fires. There
is a close link between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction
policies and actions. The Cancun UNFCCC Conference established the Cancun
Adaptation Framework, which invites parties to strengthen adaptation action in
nine areas including “enhancing climate change-related disaster risk reduction
strategies” and considers disaster risk reduction as an effective way of
climate change adaptation. Adaptation to the adverse effects of
climate change and effective disaster risk reduction of natural hazards are
both very important for minimising the need for displacement. Preventive action brings clear economic,
environmental and social benefits. The costs of taking
action to address climate change are known to be much lower than the costs of
inaction over the medium to long term[61]. Adaptation and risk reduction measures
addressing displacement should be targeted towards allowing persons who wish
to remain in communities affected by environmental change to do so, by for
example providing alternatives to threatened livelihoods. They should be based
on a recognition that some level of migration or displacement may be necessary
or inevitable where the impact of environmental stressors on communities is extreme.
Indeed, measures which aim to constrain movement at all costs rather than
adequately planning for this can represent forms of maladaptation which risk
failure and may increase the likelihood of later irregular movements or
unplanned displacement[62]. The distinction between disaster risk
reduction and adaptation to slow-onset and fast-onset events is important here.
As will be demonstrated below, the Commission supports numerous measures
throughout the developing world in both of these areas. 4.2.1. Increasing resilience to natural hazards Investing in disaster risk reduction (DRR) aims to strengthen the
resilience and coping capacities in disaster-prone regions, minimising the need
for environmentally-induced displacement when disasters occur. This support
mainly takes the form of capacity-building (strengthening local and national
capacity for DRR, early warning systems, global monitoring systems[63], mainstreaming of adaptation
into development strategies) and specific adaptation projects such as reinforcement
of sea defences, watershed projects, mangrove rehabilitation to provide wind
barriers and improve the resilience of agricultural systems thereby increasing food
security, etc. A range of measures can contribute to this, including raising
awareness of the population, improved mechanisms for risk communication,
improving the knowledge base on hazards and their impacts, developing risk
mapping, risk assessments and disaster risk management plans, updating National
Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPA) and move towards National Adaptation Planning
processes (NAPs) and/or funding allocations. Operational responses imply not
only increasing the investments in disaster risk reduction, but also making
humanitarian and development action more efficient (by improving the speed of
deployment and appropriateness of action) and coherent (at operational and
political levels). At international
level, the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action’ (HFA), a global blueprint for disaster
risk reduction efforts for the period 2005-2015, is already coherent with the
Cancun Agreement[64].
At EU level, Disaster Risk Reduction is an
increasing priority for the Union to address the alarming disaster trends and
reduce vulnerability to disasters. A cross-sectoral EU Disaster Risk Management
framework is being developed which promotes a holistic approach for all natural
and man-made risks throughout all sectors based on risk assessments and
planning, sharing of good practices between countries, improving the knowledge
base, early warning systems and strengthening capacities through training and
other preparedness actions. Furthermore, an increasing share of
EU financial support (both internal and external) is being directed to support
disaster risk reduction via various channels, including
humanitarian aid and development instruments, climate change initiatives,
support for endemic surveillance capacity and grants for research projects. Implementation is continuing of the 2009 Strategy for Supporting DRR
in Developing Countries for 2011-2014, which places a specific focus on
promoting coherence between DRR and adaptation to climate change. The EU also seeks a common humanitarian aid and development
resilience strategy fostering an effective and inclusive approach, maximizing
comparative advantages, strengthening capacity building in the long-term
engagement, in line with country-owned and country-led resilience agenda, using
flexible financing, enhancing risk assessments and financing, and developing
innovative financing mechanisms. In this respect, the Commission has already
increased synergies between Development and Humanitarian policies and an
important step has been the adoption of the Communication "The EU approach
to Resilience: learning from Food Security Crises"[65], which reaffirms the role of
DRR as a driver of resilience and sustainable development. In this context, special attention is paid to disaster-prone regions
and to least developed and highly vulnerable countries and groups. In order to
respond efficiently to the multiple causes of disasters that has hit the Horn
of Africa and the Sahel, the Commission has produced two targeted initiatives:
the SHARE initiative (Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience) and the AGIR
Sahel initiative (Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Resilience Sahel) to
strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable populations as a joint
humanitarian and development approach covering short-term response and
long-term development needs. DRR and resilience to climate change are also increasingly
integrated into EU regional strategies (for example, the Northern Dimension,
European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-Africa Strategy, Barcelona Process, Black Sea
Synergy, EU-Central Asia Strategy and the Middle East Action Plan). Under its aid cooperation programmes, the EU provided developing
countries with support of around € 355 million for climate change
adaptation and DRR between 2007 and 2010, from both its humanitarian and
development budgets. Under its humanitarian budget, the Commission funding for
DRR and adaptation has significantly increased (i.e. funding under the
Disaster Preparedness by ECHO (DIPECHO) Programme has increased from € 6
million in 1996 to € 35 million in 2012). In more general terms, the
annual direct investment by EU humanitarian action in DRR, which includes but
is not limited to the DIPECHO Programme, accounts for around 15 to 20% of its
budget (2012 estimate). 4.2.2. Increasing resilience to climate change and environmental
degradation Disaster
risk reduction and adaptation measures aim to mitigate the impacts of climate
change and environmental degradation and minimize instances of migration
related to these phenomena. Adaptation options include for instance: ·
Behavioural change at the individual level, such
as the sparing use of water in times of drought or the adoption of drought
tolerant breeds and species of livestock ·
Protective actions, such as the replenishment of
sand and the construction of sea walls in coastal areas affected by sea level
rise ·
Promotion of ecosystem management practices, including
biodiversity conservation to reduce the impacts of climate change on people ·
The enactment of appropriate policies, the
creation and/or strengthening of appropriate institutions to implement these
policies such as re-building restrictions in areas affected by sea level rise Sustainable
development, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation are closely integrated
as required by the outcome from the Rio+20 Summit and the required follow-up.
The environment and climate change should also be fully integrated in country
profiles, migration profiles and sectoral strategies, paying special attention
to the most vulnerable regions and potential climate security hotspots, and
should prepare the ground for further examination of the security implications
of climate change for partner countries. Moreover, environmental
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of EU policies and activities, in particular with a view to
promoting sustainable development[66].
Substantial
contribution to disaster risk reduction and adaptation to slow environmental
degradation can be made via actions in water management (the EU Water
Initiative and the EU-ACP Water Facility), agriculture, biodiversity, forests,
desertification energy, health, social policy (including gender issues),
research and coastal erosion. In relation to its
external aid cooperation, since 2001 the Commission has been implementing its
environmental integration strategy, updated in 2009 to better take into account
climate change, which outlines how the EU can best help developing countries to
respond to environmental challenges whilst reducing poverty. Based on this
strategy, the Commission has developed methods and practical tools to improve
mainstreaming of the environment and climate change in projects and programmes
with developing countries. A training programme for Commission and Member
States’ staff and for staff from the ministries concerned in developing
countries has backed up these efforts. A set of guidelines on mainstreaming the
environment and climate change is available on-line[67]. At operational level, it
is important to build on past experience in areas already affected by climate
change (Sahel, Bangladesh, etc.) Adaptation programmes like Advancing
Capacity to Support Climate Change Adaptation (ACCCA)[68], based on the experienced gained in pilot schemes implemented in 12
affected countries, appear to be very useful tools, which are designed to
communicate climate risk information to decision-makers in clear terms, to
address climate risks and adaptation in an integrated, multidisciplinary way
and to engage stakeholders from scientific and policy communities. The Global Climate
Change Alliance launched in 2008 between the EU and the most vulnerable
developing countries can also be mentioned as a major initiative. Based on two
pillars: policy dialogue and implementation, the GCCA has already led to three
regional conferences, over 20 international training seminars and over 35
country or regional programmes, implemented or under preparation. This valuable
experience, including programmes merging DDR and adaptation strategies, should
be built upon. 4.3. Responding to the challenges and opportunities posed by migration
in the context of environmental degradation and climate change Migration will
continue in the context of climate change and environmental degradation, posing
challenges and opportunities for receiving and sending countries. On the one
hand, this chapter argues that migration has the potential to contribute to
adaptation in a number of ways. This potential should be fully exploited,
including through measures to promote well-managed legal mobility, and support
migrants in strengthening the resilience of their communities of origin. On the
other hand, the fact that the environmentally induced displacement linked to
both sudden-onset and slow-onset environmental changes will inevitably continue
must be recognised. Measures will therefore be required to assist the
displaced, including through emergency responses in cases of sudden-onset
disasters, and to find durable solutions. This chapter
considers challenges and possible measures in each of these areas. It begins by
looking into emergency responses to sudden-onset events, and continues by
addressing measures to promote and facilitate migration as a strategy to
promote adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Thereafter, initiatives to
provide durable solutions for the displaced are addressed, including the
potential of relocation measures to assist 'trapped populations' and reduce the
potential for unplanned displacement or irregular migration. Finally, the needs
and challenges facing host communities receiving migration in the context of
environmental change are considered. 4.3.1. Improving emergency responses Under its humanitarian budget, the Commission provides significant
humanitarian aid to persons displaced by natural disasters. Even though
prevention is better than cure, in many cases emergency response is needed to
assist and protect victims of natural disasters. The success of humanitarian
aid also depends on response and delivery capacity. In order to be better
prepared to address large-scale, sudden-onset disasters, humanitarian and civil
protection actors should invest more in planning and pre-positioning key relief
supplies, improving humanitarian logistics and better training and deployment
of staff. In addition, a Civil Protection Mechanism was established in 2001[69] to support and facilitate the
preparation and deployment of Member States' in-kind assistance (teams, experts
and equipment) to countries requesting international civil protection
assistance in major emergencies of all kinds, natural and man-made, within and
outside the Union. Since extreme weather events are likely to become more frequent and
will displace people more frequently, better emergency response capacities are
needed. Steps have already been undertaken in this regard. The Commission’s
2010 Communication ‘Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role
of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’ proposes a strategy for
reinforcing the EU disaster-response capacity on the basis of the two main
instruments for EU relief: civil protection and humanitarian aid. In December 2011, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal on
EU civil protection[70]
which puts increased emphasis on prevention and preparedness in addition to
emergency response and introduces a number of voluntary instruments that Member
States can make use of in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of
civil protection. The system is based on exchange of information and planning,
which in turn allows for pre-commitment of assets enabling targeted, speedy
response, and the identification of gaps, which the Commission proposes the EU
to co-finance, where such assets justify burden-sharing between Participating
States. An Emergency Response Center is being set up in order to better fulfil
the requirements following the increasing trend in disasters and interventions. Capacity-building to prepare for and cope with displacements
resulting from sudden-onset events in high-risk areas (especially at local
level) will also need to be stepped up. 4.3.2. Promoting and facilitating migration as an adaptation
strategy Although migration
has often been portrayed as a failure to adapt, it is now increasingly also
recognised as a legitimate adaptation strategy in its own right. Evidence
clearly suggests that migration has the potential to contribute to adaptation
in regions of origin by, for example, diversifying income sources and thereby
strengthening resilience. Furthermore,
facilitating well-managed mobility and labour migration from environmentally
degraded areas can represent an effective strategy to reduce
environmentally-induced displacement, which is more likely to produce negative
outcomes for migrants and host communities[71].
Where persons in communities affected by environmental degradation have the
freedom to migrate to areas where economic opportunities are available, the
likelihood to remain 'trapped' in a highly vulnerable situation or ending up
displaced in regions with no hosting capacity is reduced. When environmentally
induced migration is undertaken voluntarily, it is far more likely to produce
benefits for both receiving and sending communities than displacement. This section begins
by exploring in greater depth the potential of migration to strengthen
adaptation to climate change and environmental degradation in regions of
origin, and possible concrete measures to exploit this potential. Thereafter,
the issue of fostering greater mobility as a means of promoting migration as
adaptation is addressed. Migration as a
Coping Mechanism for Communities of Origin An increasing number
of studies specifically document the potential of migration to contribute to
the resilience of communities of origin. Remittances have frequently been cited
as a useful source of capital which can diversify sources of family income,
hence reducing vulnerability in a number of ways. For example, in the aftermath
of natural disasters such as hurricanes, evidence suggests that remittance
transfers to affected areas often increase substantially, hence reducing the
need for displacement[72].
Remittances can also be used to strengthen ex ante preparedness in
disaster-prone regions, or invested into other resilience strategies such as
livelihoods diversification away from actives which are threatened due to
environmental stressors. Other frequently
cited examples of the potential of migration to serve as a coping strategy
include the role of both temporary and permanent migration in reducing
pressures on limited environmental resources in communities of origin, and to
allow access to social networks which can provide other resources such as
information. Indeed, diaspora groups can play a valuable role in supporting
adaptation measures through transfers of financial, social or technical
resources to communities of origin. In particular, those migrants who decide to
return to their country or origin can substantially contribute to increasing
both personal and community resilience, through applying skills acquired during
the period of migration and investing the resources earned. Nevertheless,
understanding of the relationship between migration and adaptation in
communities of origin remains limited, and should be subject to further
research. This should assess issues such as if and how the beneficial impacts
of migration spread from households to the wider
community, the ways in which migration contributes to structural modes of
adaptation (e.g. through productive investment of remittances) and the
potential risks of migration for those involved. The
cost-effectiveness of migration as an adaptation strategy should also be
compared with other modes. Both future research
and policy measures in this field must also factor in the well-documented potential
negative social consequences of migration for communities. These include the
negative impact on family members such as children or elderly persons left
behind by migrants, and the potential for communities of origin to develop a
dependency on remittances. Reflection is also
required on the policy measures which can be supported to promote the links
between migration and adaptation. In this area, clear synergies exist with the
experience gained by the EU since 2005 through implementing the migration and
development pillar of the Global Approach to Migration, and since 2011 the
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) [73]. Through the GAMM the EU fully
recognises that the human, social and financial capital which migrants transfer
to their countries of origin can exert a positive impact on development. The
Commission and EU Member States have gained significant experience in
maximising the development impact of migration for countries of origin through
measures such as facilitating remittance transfers, supporting the diaspora
groups in becoming more effective development actors, and promoting the
developmental benefits of return migration. Measures are also under development
to mitigate the potential negative social consequences of migration. However, until now
limited attention has been paid under the EU migration and development agenda
to the links between migration and resilience to climate change. Ways should be
explored to promote these links in future migration and development
initiatives. For example, the Commission will consider how to ensure that
future initiatives to facilitate remittance transfers better take into account
the needs of regions suffering environmental degradation, including in the
aftermath of sudden-onset disasters. Measures to promote the development impact
of remittances should also address the objective of ensuring that remittances
are invested into adaptation strategies, by for example providing information
to receiving communities on ways of using financial transfers to increase
resilience. The same goes for EU and Member State measures to support the
engagement of diasporas in development activities, and to promote return, which
could be more targeted towards migrants and diaspora groups that possess skills
and resources which could strengthen adaptation in their communities of origin.
This potential of
migration to serve as a coping strategy could also be highlighted to partner
countries through on-going political dialogue initiatives on both migration and
climate change adaptation. Under the GAMM, the EU is engaged in a number of
bilateral and regional migration dialogues with key partners throughout the
developing world. The relevance of climate change and migration for the GAMM
framework has already been recognised and measures to facilitate migration as
an adaptation strategy could therefore receive greater attention under GAMM
dialogues with countries or regions which are particularly vulnerable to
climate change. At global level, measures to facilitate 'adaptive migration'
could also be further considered in broad migration and development fora such
as the GFMD. The EU could also
consider how to further integrate migration-as-adaptation into broader efforts
to promote climate change adaptation, by for example supporting partners in
introducing a migration dimension to their national adaptation planning. Fostering Greater Mobility to Promote
Migration as Adaptation As noted above, fostering
mobility and facilitating labour migration can greatly contribute both to
creating opportunities for individuals to take advantage of the potential of
migration to boost adaptation, and to reducing environmentally induced
displacement. Though each context is different, this statement applies both to
the promotion of mobility within states (e.g. rural-urban migration), and to
international migration, in particular between developing countries in the same
region. Given the
similarities between environmentally induced migration and other types of
migration flows, current experiences indicate that there is no need to 'brand'
measures to promote mobility as specifically targeting a certain type of
migrant for them to facilitate the use of migration as adaptation. Indeed, as
demonstrated below, some of the most successful examples of schemes which have
promoted migration as adaptation have been set up as 'ordinary' labour
migration schemes. Regarding internal
mobility, measures to facilitate existing migration trends and promote their
development impact may prove beneficial. These may include supporting
developing countries in planning for increased mobility, strengthening
infrastructure or transport links, and supporting host communities (see 4.3.4
on the latter). As regards the facilitation
of international population movements, the Commission has already implemented
numerous relevant measures as fostering well-managed international mobility and
better organising legal migration are recognised as one of the four 'pillars'
of the GAMM. Many of these have focused on promoting circular migration
schemes. In addition, both the GAMM and the 2011 Agenda for Change on
Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy[74]
call on EU to promote inter- and intra-regional mobility in developing regions.
The Commission therefore aims to significantly step up its efforts to promote
the development impact of South-South migration in the coming years through EU
development cooperation. For example, a 26 million EUR initiative to promote
implementation of the ECOWAS 1980 Free Movement Protocol was recently launched
(for further consideration of ECOWAS see section 4.1.7.) In light of these
synergies, the Commission will explore how future initiatives on labour
migration and mobility could be more specifically targeted towards regions at
risk of climate change or environmental degradation. Such measures
should build on the experience gained with a number of relevant labour
migration schemes which have already been implemented both by the EU and its Member States and by non-EU countries. They have been developed in different contexts which
demonstrate that greater mobility can promote the use of migration as
adaptation in a vast range of scenarios. In this
regard, the EU-funded Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM)
agreement between Spain and Colombia can serve as a model. It had a strong
migration and development component and targeted communities affected by
recurring environmental disruptions (such as volcanic eruptions, drought and
floods). The programme was initiated by a federation of employers from the
region of Catalonia in 2001 to fill gaps in the agricultural sector. The IOM
implemented a project from 2006 to 2009, funded under the EU AENEAS programme[75], which sought to
strengthen the model, notably the development effects for the migrant workers’
communities of origin. One of the criteria for selecting communities of origin
was their vulnerability to natural disasters. Equally interesting is the New Zealander labour migration policy for
Pacific islands. Since 2007, the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE)
Programme permits short-term migration to solve a labour shortage in the
agricultural sector. It includes a development component. In addition, the Pacific
Access Category (PAC) allows limited permanent labour migration. This
agreement, concluded in 2001, allows up to 75 citizens of Kiribati, 75 citizens
of Tuvalu and 250 citizens of Tonga (including their partners and dependent
children) to be granted residence in New Zealand each year[76]. However, although
targeting countries seriously affected by sea-level rise and extreme weather
events, these schemes do not make any mention of the threat of climate change. The specific case of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa is
also worth mentioning, as for this group of persons limits on cross-border
mobility can increase their vulnerability to environmental change, with
negative security implications. In this context the Security
in Mobility Initiative (SIM) launched in 2009 by a consortium of
international organizations (OCHA, UNEP, IOM and ISS) is a best practice
example for intra-regional cooperation. The project acknowledges mobility of
pastoralist communities in the Horn and East Africa as an adaption strategy to
climate change and advocates for regional cooperation to facilitate peaceful
cross-border movements seeking to reduce and prevent localised conflicts[77]. The development of
such migration schemes often requires the adoption of 'flanking measures'
to support mobility, such as: ·
equipping younger rural generations with mobile
skills, ·
improving access to markets and transport
systems, ·
harmonising laws at regional level to address
inconsistencies and inadequacies in the land tenure systems, ·
involving civil society organisations and local
governments in discussions on migration and climate change or ·
addressing migration governance issues (at
local, national, regional and international levels) . 4.3.3. Providing durable solutions, including planning for
relocation as a last resort solution Environmentally induced displacement can take a broad variety of
shapes. Frequently displacement will be linked to sudden-onset disasters such
as hurricanes, in which case it will be spontaneous and will trigger emergency
responses which should focus on allowing persons to return home as soon as
possible. For other cases, especially following slow-onset environmental
degradation, more gradual forms of displacement may occur which can be
longer-term or permanent. Where displacement occurs, it is essential to provide
assistance to the displaced, safeguard their rights, promote efforts to find
durable solutions and, in particular in cases of protracted displacement,
consider the needs of host communities (see point 4.3.4 on the latter point). Policy and operational responses will significantly differ depending
on the causes of displacement, the intentions of affected communities, the
national policy frameworks, the coping capacities of hosting regions/countries
and the likelihood of return. Where environmentally induced displacement
remains internal, states have a clear responsibility to assist migrants and
address their long-term needs. As mentioned above in section 4.1, for cases of
international displacement, there is much scope for action under existing
migration-related frameworks. The revised Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced
Persons, endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in December 2009[78], establishes that
a durable solution is achieved when migrants no longer need specific assistance
and protection linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights
without discrimination resulting from their displacement. The Framework
underlines that a durable solution can be achieved by any of three settlement
options: sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (return); sustainable
integration in areas where IDPs have taken refuge (local integration); or
sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere).
The Framework outlines eight criteria to be considered in determining the
extent to which a durable solution has been achieved. None of them explicitly
refers to environmentally induced displacement, but three of the eight relate
indirectly to such migrants. These are:
long-term safety, security and freedom of movement;
adequate standard of living, including at least access to
adequate food, water, housing, healthcare and basic education;
land and property or adequate compensation.
These three criteria are useful and might serve as a preliminary
checklist for durable solutions for environmentally induced migrants. However,
another two criteria are also essential: ·
sufficient carrying capacity of the ecosystems
that the migrants now rely on (in terms of food and water supply and of land
and natural resource degradation over the long term); ·
vulnerability of the new location considering
previous, and possible future, climate-change-related natural disasters. Although not specifically targeting environmentally induced
migrants, the EU has been active in helping communities to find sustainable
solutions for displaced people, in particular refugees. Some of these
initiatives, if adequately adapted, might serve as a useful model to apply to
environmentally induced displacement. One such initiative targeting refugees
are the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) that comprise two main
components: measures to enhance the protection capacity of non-EU countries
where refugees are hosted as well as support to offer durable solutions to
refugees, such as local integration, voluntary return and resettlement
(including towards the EU). Such an RPP has been launched, amongst other
places, in the Great Lakes Region. The EU has also provided support to
displaced populations in the Caucasus, Asia (Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Philippines) or Latin America (Colombia) with the aim, amongst other things, of
building up the capacity of local authorities to integrate refugees and
displaced populations. Lessons learned from projects implemented in that
framework clearly highlight the need for a comprehensive response to the needs
of long-term displaced people. One of the main challenges is to find
integration solutions for these populations, without affecting the livelihoods
of host communities or creating imbalances between each group’s living conditions. Planned relocation as a last resort solution Within on-going debates on climate change and migration, significant
attention is often given to planned relocation measures as potential durable
solution for communities which are particularly at risk from environmental
degradation. The Foresight study has defined relocation as 'the movement of
people, typically in groups or whole communities, as part of a process led by
the state or other organisation, to a predefined location'[79]. Prior experience shows that relocation schemes frequently have a
high human cost, and few successful examples exist. They therefore represent a
last resort solution, and must be implemented on a voluntary basis (i.e.
persons in targeted communities must be free to refuse participation in the
schemes), based on careful planning. Relocation may nevertheless become a
necessity in certain scenarios. For example, for 'trapped populations', or persons in communities
severely affected by environmental degradation but lacking the resources to
either adapt or migrate, facilitating relocation may prove vital in removing
persons from vulnerable situations and preventing potential unorganised
displacement. Planned relocation can also be considered an option in itself for
countries facing the risk of parts of their territory being inundated by sea
water or becoming environmentally unsustainable due to desertification. Some
researchers have pointed out that the most vulnerable and poorest populations,
especially if geographically isolated, are less likely to find a way to move
out of an environment where a survival livelihood is no longer guaranteed[80]. Relocation could also be considered following cases of
environmentally induced displacement to host communities which lack the
capacity to provide a durable solution for some or all of the displaced.
Similarly to resettlement of refugees, this may be a way to lighten the burden
on host communities and to increase the commitment of local authorities to
protecting persons at risks who are not selected for relocation. This might
also be the only sustainable solution in some contexts, especially for host
communities where resources are already scarce. The EU should therefore consider supporting countries severely
exposed to environmental stressors to assess the path of degradation and design
specific preventive internal, or where necessary, international relocation
measures when adaptation strategies can no longer be implemented. Consultations
with authorities at not only national but also regional and international
levels are required in order to assess the most viable and sustainable solution
for relocation. The experience amassed by the EU and its Member States in the
process of supporting and implementing their own resettlement programmes could prove
useful and enable the EU to play a role in supporting non-EU countries’ efforts
to use relocation in managing environmentally induced migration. Planned relocation of populations has been used in the past also to
allow implementation of development programmes, such as dams or urban
reorganisation. But it might take on larger proportions in the future.
Guidelines for resettlement, such as those prepared by the World Bank[81], could be useful
to avoid weakening the displaced communities even more. The Cancun Adaptation
framework also specifically mentions planned relocation as a means to ensure
that populations exposed to risks can be brought to safety. This must imply
careful evaluation of the socio-economic, demographic and environmental
situation, consultations with local communities and national authorities as
well as compensation and assistance schemes. Designing an appropriate and durable relocation strategy has to take
into account a number of issues. The case study carried out on Mozambique in the ‘EACH-FOR’ project illustrates some of the challenges, such as the need
to provide not only housing but also alternative sources of income in
destination areas. It reported that people relocated after regular flooding in
the area of the River Zambezi often had to go back to their homes temporarily,
as cultivating their fields was the only way they could support themselves.
Moreover, attention needs to be paid to social, cultural and religious aspects,
as for multi-generational families moving out of an open village to a confined
space can have a deep impact on the relocated persons and the host communities.
The impact of the relocated persons on the local environment should not be
underestimated, as often the host communities also suffer from difficult
conditions. In Mozambique relocated migrants were placed in dry areas, often
suffering from excessive droughts. 4.3.4. Addressing the needs of receiving areas and hosting
communities in EU partner countries Measures to address environmentally induced migration and displacement
must adequately factor in the situation and needs of host communities if they
are to be sustainable. As noted in Section 2, research suggests that many
environmentally induced migrants may head to destination areas which are
themselves at risk from the adverse effects of climate change. Therefore, in
designing schemes to improve mobility or promote relocation or in the context
of climate change, it is necessary to take into account the environmental
sustainability of potential locations to which migrants might move. Furthermore, it is necessary to ensure that, where possible,
migration produces benefits for the host communities, which will also allow
migrants to accumulate financial and social capital which can be shared with
communities of origin. Where this cannot be achieved, such as in cases of
environmentally induced displacement to regions facing economic or social
hardship, measures may be necessary to reduce potential tensions between the
displaced and host communities, who may resent increased pressure on scarce
resources. It appears that environmentally induced migration flows do not
present any real specificities compared to other forms of migration or
displacement in terms of their impact on host communities. Therefore,
current best practice measures in promoting the economic and social integration
of migrants and supporting receiving communities in managing challenges related
to population inflows such as urbanisation are likely to be effective. As part of its migration and development agenda, the Commission aims
to support integration measures for migrants in countries of destination in the
Global South, including by sharing EU best practice[82]. Integration measures and
development strategies of hosting countries could aim to maximise the
development potential of all persons moving in the context of climate change,
including the displaced, for whom economic livelihood opportunities may not be
immediately available. Migration to urban centres Migration in the context of climate change will exacerbate the
existing challenges in urban areas in low-income
countries as they will most likely be the destination of environmentally
induced migrants. Cities will face a double problem as they are both growing in
terms of population and are extremely vulnerable to environmental change. The
EU should therefore consider how cities can be assisted in planning for
increased migration in order to meet the needs of all current and future
residents. Providing infrastructures and services (e.g. health, education…) in
urban centres will become an even more challenging issue in the future.
Effective urban planning and land use will be crucial. In addition, it will be
even more important to address the social protection needs of migrants in cities.
The role of civil society will be essential in this regard. 5. Financial aspects This paper has
identified a large number of practical measures which may contribute to
effectively meeting the challenges posed by the nexus between climate change,
environmental degradation, disaster risk reduction and migration. Given that
many of the most affected states will be low- and middle-income countries with
limited resources to meet these challenges, the financial resources to
implement necessary measures will frequently be lacking. Therefore a need
exists to consider possible funding sources. The existing EU
financial framework already allows support to partner countries in many of the
areas addressed by this paper, including strengthening adaptation and DRR, and
promoting more effective international migration governance. So far, only a
limited number of EU-funded initiatives have been explicitly labelled as
targeting challenges posed by climate change and migration. Nevertheless,
numerous initiatives which the Commission has already financed can be
considered as relevant, in particular in the area of promoting adaptation to
reduce displacement. Relevant funding sources include the EU's research
programme[83],
the EU budget for humanitarian aid, and the various thematic and geographic
instruments for external cooperation, which are the main potential sources for
initiatives on partner countries on migration. Addressing the
social and development impacts of climate change is a rising issue in bilateral
dialogues between the EU and some of the most exposed countries in the world,
especially in southern Asia, Africa and the Pacific region. A number of
measures to promote DRR and strengthen adaptation have been funded under both
the EU humanitarian budget, and its development funds. The EU's bilateral
development assistance under geographic funds (the
European Development Fund, the Development Cooperation Instrument and the
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument) is programmed in close coordination
with partner countries on the basis of joint priorities identified through political
dialogue, in line with EU commitments to aid effectiveness principles. The
climate change and migration nexus is not yet specifically mentioned in EU
Country Strategy Papers, which are the basis for the disbursement of EU
geographical funds, though relevant adaptation-related projects have been
financed[84].
The growing relevance of this topic for the EU’s relations with some non-EU
countries may lead to the topic being integrated as a priority in future
programming, especially if partner countries request this in their bilateral
dialogue with the EU. Regarding the
Commission's thematic development funding, the Global Climate Change Alliance is
the key EU instrument for engagement with partner countries on climate change,
in particular least developed countries and small island developing States. The
total funding for the period 2008-2011 amounted to 200 million EUR, including
74 million Fast Start Financing from Commission and MS. GCCA combines (i)
A platform for dialogue to raise awareness of issues and identify areas of
cooperation at global, regional and national level and (ii) Technical and
financial support. Particularly relevant areas of funding include: - Adaptation:
Water, agriculture, reducing vulnerability of populations to climate change - Disaster risk reduction (DRR): The GCCA
seeks to help developing countries to prepare for climate-related natural
disasters, reduce their risks and limit their impacts. - Mainstreaming climate change into
poverty reduction and development efforts Under the DCI, the
Thematic Programme for Migration and Asylum is dedicated to cooperation with
non-EU countries in the area of migration, complementing the geographical
programmes. The strategy for this programme for 2011-2013 includes migration
and climate change as one of the priority areas for action, and the topic was
included as a priority in the call for proposals launched in October 2011[85]. A
particular focus on research to strengthen evidence
base and assistance to Asia and Pacific countries to plan and manage migration
caused by sea-level rises was included. Given the wide range
of relevant financial instruments at EU level, the Commission will explore how
relevant funds can be used to address the complex issues underlying migration
and climate change in a more coherent and coordinated manner, including under
the future financial perspectives for 2014-2020. 6. Conclusions and recommendations The complex interplay between drivers of
migration and the difficulty of isolating climate and other environmental changes
as such make it difficult to make precise estimations regarding migration in
the context of climate change. Nevertheless, existing evidence clearly suggests
that where environmental change impacts on migration, its effects will be felt
primarily in the developing world, with migrants moving either internally or to
countries in the same region. New large-scale international population
movements to developed regions such as the EU are therefore unlikely to occur. As shown in this paper, migration in the
context of environmental change will present both major challenges and
opportunities. Different types of environmentally induced migration and
displacement call for different approaches and policy responses. The Commission
already possesses many of the tools necessary to meet challenges such as
promoting adaptation to reduce the need for migration and assisting those
displaced by sudden- or slow-onset environmental events. The EU also has
experience in implementing measures which could promote the use of migration as
a climate change adaptation strategy and an opportunity for migrants, their
families and countries of origin. The Commission and Member States should therefore reflect how existing measures identified in this paper could be better
coordinated and targeted to form a comprehensive response to the challenges
posed by climate change and migration. Joint reflection on the need for
possible new measures should also continue together with partner countries and
other international actors. The following
steps seem important for building a policy to address environmentally induced
migration: Knowledge:
More EU
research on all aspects of environmentally
induced migration and displacement, focusing on the priorities addressed
in section 2.3. This should include support to the research capacities in
regions of origin.
Integration of
data relevant to migration in the context of climate change into relevant EU
instruments, such as migration and environmental profiles.
Moreover, development of global information systems that not only generate
and process data, but also communicate relevant data to
policy-makers and politicians at all levels in such ways that the data can
be incorporated into EU, Member States’ and non-EU countries’ development
plans could help to bridge the gap between current needs, current
knowledge and the action required to mitigate and adapt to the effects of environmental
change on migration.
Dialogue:
Environmentally induced migration can be more frequently put on
the agenda of EU dialogue with the partner countries affected or likely to
be affected, including under the Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility. In this vein, the EU might contribute to enhancing coherence
within the EU climate diplomacy mechanism.
Further
discussions in international fora on an appropriate legal and
institutional framework, based on the principle that responses are
flexible, individualised and tailor-made, especially at regional level.
Cooperation:
While addressing
environmentally induced migration is principally a matter for the EU
development and humanitarian aid policies, there is also a need to
strengthen policy coherence at the EU level.
The remit and
scope of EU action on climate-change and disaster risk reduction need
to be widened in order to include environmentally induced migration from a
longer-term perspective
It is important to
integrate climate change adaptation (and, where appropriate, mitigation)
deeper into national sustainable development strategies, linking disaster
risk reduction, disaster risk management and climate change adaptation
strategies, and to consider including migration dimensions into existing
tools such as the National Adaptation Programmes of Action, Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers and the United Nations Development Assistance
Framework.
A number of tools
developed under the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
could be better targeted to more directly address the challenges of
migration in the context of environmental change. This includes, in
particular, measures under the GAMM and Agenda for Change to promote
well-managed South-South migration and regional mobility, and measures to
provide assistance and durable solutions to displaced persons. Moreover,
action under the GAMM migration and development pillar, in
particular with regard to relations with the diaspora and facilitating
remittances, could, where relevant, be refocused to better promote
migration as adaptation.
·
The EU should promote the involvement of
multiple stakeholders, particularly the diaspora, social organisations,
local authorities and the private sector in order to ensure addressing the
challenge of environmentally induced migration in a comprehensive and
sustainable way. [1] Council of the European Union: The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and
protecting the citizens, 2009, Doc 17024/09 [2] ‘Climate change’ means shifts in average climatic
parameters and/or in the magnitude of climate variability that are observed and
persist over extended periods of time (typically decades or longer). Like
climate variability, it can be induced by both natural and anthropogenic
factors. In this paper, ‘climate change’ is used to mean long-term changes in
climate directly and indirectly caused by human activities combined with those
originating from natural climate evolution and variability. This is in line
with the definition provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). [3] Climate change has been a driving force for some more
extreme and more frequent natural disasters. Therefore, dealing with climate
change separately from other environmental aspects makes little sense from a
theoretical or practical point of view. A similar line has been followed by the
EU when addressing other issues, such as environmental integration in
development cooperation. [4] For example, Climate change — Human Impact Report.
The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis, Global Humanitarian Forum, Geneva, June 2009,
p. 81: ‘Most low-elevation territory is reclaimed through a combination of
sea-level rise and ordinary geological subsidence, although climate change
greatly accelerates this process. So if a cyclone hits, it would be impossible
to say if one particular individual is a climate-displaced person or not’. [5] Climate Change 2007 – Synthesis report, Contribution
of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K.
and Reisinger, A. (Eds.) IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland., pp 104, p. 53. Already in
1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that "the
greatest single impact of climate change might be on human migration",
with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and
agricultural disruption; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), First
Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 20. [6] IPCC, 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, A Special Report of Working
Groups I and II of the IPCC [7] IOM undertakes extensive research on the nexus
between climate change, the environment and migration. It also implements a
number of operational activities. More info at:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/2068 [8] The IOM and the UNHCR are the co-chairs. Other
agencies participating include the NRC/IDMC, UNEP, UNU-EHS, WFP, WHO, OHCHR,
IFRC, OCHA, UNDP, IASC Secretariat, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHABITAT. In parallel, an
informal 'Climate change, Environment and Migration Alliance' (CCEMA), has been
put in place to bring together global stakeholders, including UN agencies,
research institutions and the private sector. For further information see: http://www.ccema-portal.org/ [9] Speech at the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and
Displacement in the 21st Century convened by the Norwegian Government, 6-7 June
2011, Oslo. [10] Human Rights Council, Resolution 10/4 on Human Rights
and Climate Change, Adopted without a vote at the 41st Meeting, 25 March
2009, available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf
[11] The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention,
1/CP.16, chapter on 'Enhanced action on adaptation', paragraph 14 (f). [12] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/l04r01.pdf [13] http://www.gfmd.org/en/recommendations/mexico-2010.html. [14] European Parliament, Resolution on The Environment,
Security and Foreign Policy, passed on January 29, 1999, A4-0005/99, JO C
128/92 of 7 May 1999. See also the EP resolution of 6 May 2010 on the White
Paper 'Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action', INI/2009/2152. [15] For example, a seminar on 'climate refugees' took place
at the European Parliament on 11 June 2008, which aimed at drawing attention to
environmentally induced migration through the adoption of a declaration that
invites European and international institutions to “organize legal
protection for the victims of climate disruptions and of possible displaced
persons who do not benefit today from any recognition”. In June 2008, at
the Agora on climate change held by the European Parliament, representatives of
European civil society expressed their concern over environmental migration.
The workshop “Solidarity” called upon European institutions to develop a
European strategy on climate forced migration and to launch a debate within the
UN on the status of climate migrants and on a protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change on climate forced migration. On 2 March
2011, the S&D group hosted a seminar entitled "Climate Refugees - A
New Arena for Human Rights”. Green Party MEPs have also organised a number
of hearings on the climate change and migration. [16] International Centre for Migration Policy Development
(ICMPD): “Climate Refugees” Legal and policy responses to environmentally
induced migration, Study commissioned by the European Parliament,
Directorate General for internal policies, Policy Department C: Citizens'
rights and constitutional affairs, civil liberties, justice and home affairs,
Brussels, 2011, PE 462.422 [17] More information at http://www.each-for.eu [18] Joint Paper from the High Representative and the
European Commission to the European Council: Climate change and
international security, S113/08, 14 March 2008. A background paper was
prepared on the topic: Martin, S., Warner, K. (2010) 'Climate Change,
Migration, and Development'. Paper for the Global Forum on Migration and
Development, Civil Society Days. Presented at the GFMD in Puerto Viarte Mexico 8-9 November 2010 [19] Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy, 3106th
Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 18 July 2011. Joint Reflection Paper
by the High Representative and the Commission 'Towards a renewed and
strengthened European Union Climate Diplomacy', 9 July 2011 [20] Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change
(2011), Final Project Report, The Government Office for Science, London [21] Project website: http://www.clico.org/
and policy brief: http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy-briefs-clico-112012_en.pdf [22] The IPCC noted that disentangling the environment from
other drivers is likely to be difficult because ‘reasons for migration are
often multiple and complex, and do not relate straightforwardly to climate
variability’, IPCC, 2007, Op. Cit., p. 365. [23] Foresight (2011), p. 46 [24] Foresight (2011), p. 33 [25] Foresight (2011), p. 12 [26] See, for example, Warner, K., Ehrhart, C., de
Sherbinin, A., Adamo, S.B., Onn, T.C. 2009. “'In search of Shelter: Mapping the
effects of climate change on human migration and displacement.' A policy paper
prepared for the 2009 Climate Negotiations. Bonn, Germany: United Nations University, CARE, and CIESIN-Columbia University and in close collaboration with the
European Commission 'Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios
Project', the UNHCR, and the World Bank. [27] See,
for example, Warner, K., Ehrhart, C., de Sherbinin, A., Adamo, S.B., Onn, T.C.
2009. “'In search of Shelter: Mapping the effects of climate change on human
migration and displacement.' A policy paper prepared for the 2009 Climate
Negotiations. Bonn, Germany: United Nations University, CARE, and CIESIN-Columbia University and in close collaboration with the European Commission
'Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project', the UNHCR, and
the World Bank. [28] IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. et al.
(Eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 365. [29] IDMC/NRC: Displacement due to natural hazard-induced
disasters. Oslo: IDMC/NRC, June 2011, p. 4. The findings indicate that
about 77 % of those displacements occurred in Asia in 2010. [30] IDMC/NRC: Displacement due to natural hazard-induced
disasters. Oslo: IDMC/NRC, June 2011, p. 20. [31] This distinction appears in many research papers, e.g.
IDMC/NRC: Displacement due to natural hazard-induced disasters. Oslo:
IDMC/NRC, June 2011; OCHA: OCHA and slow-onset emergencies, Occasional
Policy Briefing Series, Brief No 6, April 2011; UNHCR: Summary of
Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement, Expert roundtable held in
Bellagio (Italy), April 2011; IOM: Migration, Environment and Climate
Change: Assessing the evidence, Geneva, December 2009; Warner et al.:
Human security, climate change and environmentally induced migration,
UNU-EHS Report, June 2008. [32] See Climate change — Human Impact Report. The Anatomy
of a Silent Crisis, Global Humanitarian Forum; Ehrhart, C.: ‘Humanitarian
implications of climate change mapping, emerging trends and risk hotspots’;
CARE, ‘In search of shelter: mapping the effects of climate change on human
migration and displacement’. See also Foresight (2011), p. 96 [33][1] This
case study draws on a policy brief prepared by Professor Andrew Geddes. The
brief draws directly from the evidence base and final report of the Foresight
project “Migration and Global Environmental change: Challenges and
Opportunities”, 2011. It also draws on the findings of the EACH-FOR Project in
Northern Africa and the Middle East, EACH-FOR -
Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios: Final Synthesis Report,
044468, 2009. [34][2] Defined
as including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), Syria and Tunisia. [35] The nexus between the environment and migration has
been popularised by the frequently quoted paper written by El Hinnawi in 1985 for
UNEP that employed the concept of ‘environmental refugee’. Environmental
refugees are defined by El Hinnawi as: ‘those people who have been forced to
leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a
marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that
jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life’,
El Hinnawi Essam: Environmental Refugees, Nairobi: UNEP, 1985, p. 4. [36] The 1951 United Nations Convention and 1967 Protocol
relating to the status of refugees provide the international definition of
‘refugee’: ‘a refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country’. [37] Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be
affected?, Working paper submitted to the UNFCCC
Secretariat by the informal group on migration/ displacement and climate change
of the IASC, 31 October 2008. [38] The IOM uses the following definition: ‘environmental
migrants [are]. . . persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of
sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or
choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within
their country or abroad’, IOM, Discussion note: Migration and the
Environment, Ninety-fourth session, MC/INF/288, 2007, pp. 1-2. The IOM’s
definition is quite broad as it includes persons forced to move and persons for
whom leaving is a choice. [39] 'Environmentally-displaced persons' have been defined as 'individuals, families and populations
confronted with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that inexorably
impacts their living conditions and results in their forced displacement, at
the outset or throughout, from their habitual residence and requires their
relocation and resettlement', Draft Convention prepared by CRIDEAU (the
Interdisciplinary Centre of Research on Environmental Planning and Urban Law)
and the CRDP (Centre of Research on Persons’ Rights), thematic teams of the
OMIJ (Institutional and Judicial Mutations Observatory), from the Faculty of
Law and Economic Science, University of Limoges, with the support of the CIDCE
(International Centre of Comparative Environmental Law). This draft
Convention has been published in the Revue européenne de droit de
l’environnement (Francophone European Environmental Law Review), No 4-2008,
p. 381. [40] See,
for example, Renaud, F.G., Dun, O., Warner, K., Bogardi, J.J.: A Decision
Framework for Environmentally Induced Migration, International Migration,
Volume 49, Supplement 1, June 2011, p. 5-29. Also see Renaud, F.G.; Bogardi,
J.J., Warner, K., Dun, O. (2007): Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face
Environmental Migration?,UNU-EHS InterSections No. 5/2007 [41] Articles 13 and 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) and Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) in conjunction with specific coherence clauses such as Article 208(1) of
the TFEU (on poverty reduction) and Article 11 of the TFUE (on environment). [42] See also the General Comment no. 15 by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. [43] Article 191(3) of the TFEU. [44] In some cases, refugee status might apply, for example,
to cross-border movements of a particular social group (such as an indigenous
people) after a government fails to protect them against the adverse effects of
climate change or in a conflict over access to environmental resources; Cf
Zetter Roger: Protecting environmentally displaced people: Developing the
capacity of legal and normative frameworks, Research Report, Refugee
Studies Centre, University of Oxford, February 2011, p. 19. [45] ‘Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations
of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognised State border’ (Guiding Principles, Introduction,
paragraph 2). [46] See Resolution 1862 (2009) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, point 6.5. [47] African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention),
adopted by the Special Summit of the Union held in Kampala, Uganda, 23 October
2009. [48] Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals
or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted ,Official Journal L 304 ,
30/09/2004 P. 0012 - 0023 [49] Swedish Aliens Act, Chapter 4,
Section 2a. [50] Preparatory work, prop. 1996/97:25 s. 101,
p. 100. [51] Finnish Aliens Act, Chapter 6, Section 88a(1). [52] Danish Aliens Act, Section 9b. [53] See Comparative Study on the Existence and
Application of Categorised Protection in Selected European Countries,
prepared by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna,
commissioned and funded by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs (ACVZ), The
Netherlands, January 2006, p. 35. [54] Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum
standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member
States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L
212, 7.8.2001, p. 12. [55] The term ‘mass influx’, which
is the heart of the system, means ‘arrival in the
Union of a large number of displaced persons, who come from a specific country
or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Union was spontaneous or
aided, for example through an evacuation programme’
(Article 2d). [56] Finnish Aliens Act, Section 109. [57] See Memorandum from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Baroness Symons, 9 February
1998. See also CLAY Edward (Team Leader): An Evaluation of HMG’s Response to
the Montserrat Volcanic Emergency, Volumes I and II, ODI (Overseas Development
Institute), London, published by the DFID (Department for International
Development) as ‘Evaluation Report EV635’, December 1999. [58] For example, Canada expedites immigration paperwork
from victims who have relatives in Canada if their applications were already in
the system. [59] INA (§244 of INA (8 U.S.C. §1254a). [60] Long, K., 'Extending Protection? Labour Migration and
Durable Solutions for Refugees', New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper
No. 176, October 2009 [61] The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (HM
Treasury, 2006) and the World Bank and the United Nations study on 'UnNatural
Disasters, The Economics of Effective Prevention', 2010. [62] Foresight(2011), p.133 [63] For further information global monitoring see: http://copernicus.eu/
[64] The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)
was adopted by 168 United Nations Member States in 2005 at the World Disaster
Reduction Conference. There is an ongoing consultation process which should
lead to a new HFA framework in 2015 where one of the key issues to be addressed
are the strengthened links between disaster risk reduction, climate change
adaptation, sustainable development and resilience. The current priorities of
the HFA (2005–2015) are:
ensure that disaster
risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong
institutional basis for implementation;
identify, assess and
monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;
use knowledge,
innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at
all levels;
reduce the underlying
risk factors;
strengthen disaster
preparedness for effective response at all levels.
[65] COM(2012) 586 final [66] Article 11 of the TFEU. [67] http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=316&id_type=9. [68] For further information, see: http://www.acccaproject.org/accca/?q=node/1. [69] It was created by a Council Decision 2001/792 which was
later repealed by Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8 November 2007
establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast). There is an
ongoing reform of the Civil protection legislation which aims to further
strengthen and improve the Mechanism. [70] Proposal for a Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism,
20.12.2011, COM(211) 934. [71] Foresight (2011) [72] For example, a World Bank study demonstrated that
following a 2003 hurricane in Jamaica, remittance-receiving households
recuperated up to a quarter of their hurricane-related losses through increased
remittance transfers. See Clarke, G., and Wallsten, S., Do Remittances Act
Like Insurance? Evidence from a Natural Disaster in Jamaica. World Bank
Development Research Group, January 2003 [73] COM(2011)743 final [74] COM(2011)637final [75] MIGR/2006/120-237 [76] Some criteria need to be fulfilled. The registration form for the Pacific Access Category (http://www.immigration.govt.nz)
requires that: ‘applicants possess citizenship status for Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Tonga or Fiji; are aged between 18 and 45; have an acceptable (permanent,
full-time, genuine, and paid by a salary or wages) offer of employment in New
Zealand; have a minimum level of skills in English language; have a minimum
income requirement if the applicant has a dependant; exhibit certain health and
character requirements; and have no history of unlawful entry into New Zealand since July 1, 2002’, [77] OCHA & al, Security In Mobility: “Advocating for
Safe Movement as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Pastoralists in the
Horn and East Africa”, June 2010 [79] Foresight(2011), p. 176 [80] Jäger et al. 2009. EACH-FOR
Synthesis Report. www.each-for.eu. [81]
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/toolkits/highways/pdf/91.pdf. [82] EC Staff Working Paper on Migration and Development,
18.11.2011. SEC(2011) 1353 final [83] Several relevant research initiatives have been funded
under the 7th Framework Programme for Research and its predecessor, [84] Example: Country Strategy Paper for Bangladesh. -
EU is fifth biggest donor. Country allocation
2008-13: 410 million EUR -
Identifies priorities on health, human rights,
private sector etc. -
Identifies indicative allocation of 12% of
funding for environment, disaster risk reduction and climate change [85] The Temporary and Circular Labour Migration Project
mentioned above was funded under the predecessor of TPMA