Case C‑453/20

CityRail a.s.

v

Správa železnic, státní organizace

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře)

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 3 May 2022

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 267 TFUE – Concept of ‘court or tribunal’– Criteria relating to the body’s constitution and function – Exercise of judicial or administrative functions – Directive 2012/34/EU – Articles 55 and 56 – Single national regulatory body for the railway sector – Independent regulatory authority for the sector – Entitlement to act on an ex-officio basis – Power to impose penalties – Decisions that are open to challenge before the courts – Inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Reference to the Court – National court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU – Meaning – To be determined on the basis of criteria relating to the body’s constitution and function – Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře (Transport infrastructure access authority, Czech Republic) – Body exercising not judicial but administrative functions – Not included

(Art. 267 TFEU)

(see paragraphs 41-50, 53, 60-63, 67-69, 71, operative part)

Résumé

Správa železnic, a public body established by law, is responsible for the management, in the Czech Republic, of a railway network and the associated service facilities. It drew up and published a network statement, within the meaning of Directive 2012/34 establishing a single European railway area, ( 1 ) which sets out, inter alia, the conditions governing access to certain installations as from 1 April 2020.

On the basis of the Law on railways, ( 2 ) CityRail, a railway undertaking, challenged those conditions before the Transport infrastructure access authority (‘the Authority’) ( 3 ) in its capacity as a national regulatory body for the railway sector, on the ground that they are contrary to the rules laid down by Directive 2012/34.

Since it is uncertain whether those conditions are compatible with Directive 2012/34 or whether the national law applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings is compatible with that directive, the Authority decided to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

Ruling as the Grand Chamber, the Court dismisses as inadmissible the request for a preliminary ruling made by the Authority on the ground that, in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings, that body exercises functions not of a judicial but of an administrative nature. Consequently, the Authority cannot be regarded as being a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

Findings of the Court

The Court begins by recalling its settled case-law on the matter, ( 4 ) under which, in order to determine whether the body making the reference at issue is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether that body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent. Moreover, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature. ( 5 )

The question whether a body is entitled to refer a question to the Court is therefore determined on the basis of criteria relating both to the constitution of that body and to its function. Thus, a national body may be classified as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU when it is performing judicial functions, but not when exercising other functions, inter alia functions of an administrative nature. According to the Court, it follows that, in order to establish whether a national body, entrusted by law with different categories of function, must be classified as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, it is necessary to ascertain the specific nature of the functions which it exercises in the particular legal context in which it is called upon to make a reference to the Court. ( 6 )

The Court points out that that verification is of particular importance in the case of administrative authorities whose independence is a direct consequence of the requirements arising from provisions of EU law which confer on them powers of scrutiny in the sector and powers to supervise markets. Although those authorities may satisfy the criteria set out above, stemming from the judgment in Vaassen-Göbbels, the activity of scrutiny in the sector and supervision of the markets is essentially administrative in nature, in that it involves the exercise of powers which are unrelated to those conferred on the courts.

However, in Westbahn Management, ( 7 ) relied on by the Authority, the Court, when hearing a request for a preliminary ruling made by the Schienen-Control Kommission (Railway Supervisory Commission, Austria), examined only the criteria arising from the judgment in Vaassen-Göbbels and thus did not examine whether that body exercised functions of a judicial nature in the context of the proceedings which gave rise to that request.

In that regard, the Court states that the power to initiate proceedings ex officio and to impose, also ex officio, penalties in matters within its jurisdiction constitute evidence that the body in question exercises not judicial but administrative functions. Moreover, the question whether the proceedings which gave rise to a request for a preliminary ruling were initiated on the initiative of an interested party is not of decisive importance when those proceedings could have been initiated ex officio. The Court further states that the role and place of a body in the national legal system are also relevant for the purposes of assessing the nature of its functions.

In the present case, the Court first of all examines, in essence, the nature and function of a regulatory body, such as the Authority, in the system for managing and regulating rail activities established by Directive 2012/34. ( 8 )

It thus follows from the relevant provisions of Directive 2012/34 ( 9 ) that the efficient management and fair and non-discriminatory use of railway infrastructure, provided for by that directive, require the establishment of an authority which is responsible, at the same time, for overseeing, on its own initiative, the application by the stakeholders in the railway sector of the rules laid down by that directive and for acting as an appeal body. That combination of functions means that, where an action is brought before a regulatory body, ( 10 ) that fact is without prejudice to the competence of that body to take, if necessary ex officio, appropriate measures to remedy any infringement of the applicable rules and to enforce its decisions with penalties, if it deems this necessary, which confirms the administrative nature of its functions. Furthermore, Directive 2012/34 ( 11 ) provides that Member States are to ensure that decisions taken by the regulatory body are open to judicial review, which is also indicative of the administrative nature of such decisions.

In the light of those considerations, the Court next examines whether, notwithstanding the administrative nature of a supervisory body such as the Authority, it must be regarded, in the specific context of the functions which it carries out in the main proceedings, as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

To that end, the Court points out that the Authority’s power to initiate the proceedings which gave rise to the present request for a preliminary ruling, also ex officio, like its power to investigate irregularities discovered during those proceedings on its own initiative, are particularly relevant indications, capable of supporting the finding that that body, in the main proceedings, exercises not judicial but administrative functions.

Furthermore, it is apparent from the information provided by the Authority that the decisions of that body may be subject to judicial review. Where, in accordance with the rules on the division of powers which are set out in the Codes of Civil Procedure and Administrative Justice, the administrative courts have jurisdiction to hear an action against a decision of the Authority, the latter has the status of defendant. In addition, it is apparent from the Code of Civil Procedure ( 12 ) that, before the civil courts which, according to the Authority, have jurisdiction inter alia to hear actions against decisions adopted in the procedure referred to in Article 34e of the Law on railways, as is the case in the main proceedings, the Authority has the right to submit observations, without being a party to the proceedings. Such participation by the Authority in review proceedings, calling into question its own decision, is evidence that, where it adopts that decision, the Authority does not have the status of a third party in relation to the interests involved and thus does not exercise judicial functions.

In the light of those factors, the Court finds that, in the dispute in the main proceedings, the Authority carries out functions which are not judicial, but administrative in nature. Consequently, it cannot be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, so that the request for a preliminary ruling which it has made is inadmissible.

( 1 ) Article 3(26) of Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area (OJ 2012 L 343, p. 32), as amended by Directive (EU) 2016/2370 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 (OJ 2016 L 352, p. 1).

( 2 ) Article 34e of Law No 266/1994 on railways.

( 3 ) In the Czech Republic, the Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře (Transport infrastructure access authority) forms part of the central authorities of the administration of the State. It was established by Law No 320/2016 on the Transport infrastructure access authority.

( 4 ) See, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 1966, Vaassen-Göbbels (61/65, EU:C:1966:39, p. 273; ‘the judgment in Vaassen-Göbbels’).

( 5 ) Order of 26 November 1999, ANAS (C‑192/98, EU:C:1999:589, paragraph 21), and judgment of 31 January 2013, Belov (C‑394/11, EU:C:2013:48, paragraph 39).

( 6 ) Order of 26 November 1999, ANAS (C‑192/98, EU:C:1999:589, paragraphs 22 and 23), and judgment of 31 January 2013, Belov (C‑394/11, EU:C:2013:48, paragraphs 40 and 41).

( 7 ) Judgment of 22 November 2012, Westbahn Management (C‑136/11, EU:C:2012:740).

( 8 ) Articles 55 and 56 of Directive 2012/34 make provision for the existence, in all the Member States, of national regulatory bodies in the railway sector, lay down the principles governing their organisation and determine the powers conferred on them.

( 9 ) Articles 55 and 56 of Directive 2012/34, read in the light of recital 76 thereof.

( 10 ) Established under Article 55 of Directive 2012/34.

( 11 ) Article 56(10) of Directive 2012/34.

( 12 ) Article 250c(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.