Case C‑530/16

European Commission

v

Republic of Poland

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Railway safety — Directive 2004/49/EC — Failure to adopt to provisions necessary to ensure the independence of the investigating body)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 13 June 2018

1. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations—Application initiating proceedings—Statement of subject matter and pleas in law—Formal requirements—Obligation to present a coherent and detailed statement of the pleas in law

   (Art. 258 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 120(c))

2. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations—Subject matter of the dispute—Determination during the pre-litigation procedure—Different wording of the complaints without amending or extending the subject matter of the dispute—Lawfulness

   (Art. 258 TFEU)

3. Transport—Rail transport—Safety on the Community’s railways—Directive 2004/49—Accident and incident investigations—Investigating body—Requirement to be independent—Lack or inadequacy of the legal framework—Failure to fulfil obligations

   (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/49, Art. 21(1))

4. Transport—Rail transport—Safety on the Community’s railways—Directive 2004/49—Accident and incident investigations—Investigating body—Requirement to be independent—National legislation authorising an authority which controls infrastructure managers and railway undertakings to appoint and dismiss members of the investigating body—Unlawful

   (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/49, Art. 21(1))

5. Transport—Rail transport—Safety on the Community’s railways—Directive 2004/49—Accident and incident investigations—Investigating body—Requirement to be independent—Integration of the investigating body into the ministry responsible for transport matters—Lawfulness

   (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/49, Art. 21(1))

6. Transport—Rail transport—Safety on the Community’s railways—Directive 2004/49—Accident and incident investigations—Investigating body—Requirement to be independent—Limits—Staff and budget of the body

   (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/49, Art. 21(1))

7. Transport—Rail transport—Safety on the Community’s railways—Directive 2004/49—Accident and incident investigations—Investigating body—Requirement to be independent—National legislation authorising an authority which controls infrastructure managers and railway undertakings to prevent the publication of decisions of the investigating body—Unlawful

   (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/49, Art. 21(1))

1.  See the text of the decision.

   (see para. 28)

2.  See the text of the decision.

   (see para. 30)

3.  The Commission may bring infringement proceedings before the Court contesting the lack of independence of the investigating body referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2004/49 on safety on the Community’s railways without having to allege a specific situation in which that independence has actually been undermined. The Member States are required to guarantee the independence of the investigating body through the adoption of a body of rules that ensure that it is able to carry out its tasks without risking being subject to the orders or influence of inter alia the infrastructure manager or a railway undertaking. The lack or inadequacy of such a legal framework suffices by itself to establish an infringement of Article 21(1) of Directive 2004/49.

   (see para. 32)

4.  As regards public bodies, independence usually refers to a status that ensures that the body in question is able to act completely freely in relation to those bodies in respect of which its independence is to be ensured, shielded from any instructions or pressure.

   As regards the independence of the investigating body referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2004/49 on safety on the Community’s railways, although no provision of Directive 2004/49 prohibits the Minister for Transport from appointing and dismissing all of the members of the investigating body, Article 21(1) thereof, inasmuch as it requires that it have organisational independence vis-à-vis in particular any infrastructure manager and any railway undertaking, precludes the authority that controls the infrastructure manager and a railway undertaking from appointing and dismissing all of the members of the investigating body, where that power is not regulated strictly by legislation, with the result that that authority is bound to take decisions on the basis of objective criteria which are clearly and exhaustively set out and verifiable.

   More specifically, in so far as the Minister for Transport controls a railway undertaking and an infrastructure manager, the fact that he has broad discretion in selecting the persons to take part, as ad hoc members of the investigating body, in investigations into railway accidents and incidents, and in preventing other persons from doing so, is not compatible with the requirement of organisational independence of the investigating body.

   (see paras 67, 86, 93)

5.  As regards the independence of the investigating body referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2004/49 on safety on the Community’s railways, that directive does not prohibit the integration per se of the investigating body into the ministry responsible for transport matters.

   (see para. 76)

6.  The requirement of organisational independence imposed on the investigating body referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2004/49 on safety on the Community’s railways does not go as far as prohibiting the services and staff of the ministry responsible for transport matters from being made available to that body. It is nevertheless imperative that access to such resources be guaranteed to it under clear rules that may not be amended by the Minister for Transport alone. Similarly, that requirement does not mean that it must have a separate budget. Thus, the Member States may provide that, from a budgetary point of view, the body comes under a given ministerial department, provided that independent access for that body to the financial resources that must be granted to it for carrying out its tasks are guaranteed.

   (see paras 99, 100)

7.  Given that the publicity of decisions of the investigating body referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2004/49 on safety on the Community’s railways is one of the fundamental purposes of the investigation procedure conducted on railway accidents and incidents, it is incompatible with the decision-making independence required of the investigating body vis-à-vis the railway infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking for an authority that controls both of those bodies to be in a position to prevent the official publication of reports which may call into question the liability of those bodies in the railway accident or incident concerned.

   (see para. 109)