This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 62015CJ0395
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 December 2016.
Mohamed Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL and Others.
Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2000/78/EC — Equal treatment in employment and occupation — Articles 1 to 3 — Prohibition of all discrimination based on a disability — Whether a ‘disability’ exists — Concept of ‘long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments’ — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Articles 3, 15, 21, 30, 31, 34 and 35 — Dismissal of a worker who is temporarily unable to work, within the definition of national law, for an indeterminate period of time.
Case C-395/15.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 December 2016.
Mohamed Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL and Others.
Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2000/78/EC — Equal treatment in employment and occupation — Articles 1 to 3 — Prohibition of all discrimination based on a disability — Whether a ‘disability’ exists — Concept of ‘long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments’ — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Articles 3, 15, 21, 30, 31, 34 and 35 — Dismissal of a worker who is temporarily unable to work, within the definition of national law, for an indeterminate period of time.
Case C-395/15.
Court reports – general
Case C‑395/15
Mohamed Daouidi
v
Bootes Plus SL and Others
(Request for a preliminary ruling
from the Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Barcelona)
(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2000/78/EC — Equal treatment in employment and occupation — Articles 1 to 3 — Prohibition of all discrimination based on a disability — Whether a ‘disability’ exists — Concept of ‘long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments’ — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Articles 3, 15, 21, 30, 31, 34 and 35 — Dismissal of a worker who is temporarily unable to work, within the definition of national law, for an indeterminate period of time)
Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 1 December 2016
Social policy—Equal treatment in employment and occupation—Directive 2000/78—Prohibition of discrimination based on disability as regards dismissal—Concept of disability—Scope—‘Long-term’ limitation of a person’s capacity for the purposes of that concept—Independent and uniform interpretation—Criteria—Applicability to a person finding himself or herself in a situation of temporary incapacity for work, of uncertain duration, as a result of an accident at work—Verification by the national court
(Council Directive 2000/78, Art. 1)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Jurisdiction of the Court—Limits—Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—Legal situation falling outside the scope of EU law—Lack of jurisdiction of the Court
(Art. 6(1) TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1) and (2); Council Directive 2000/78)
Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that:
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the fact that the person concerned finds himself or herself in a situation of temporary incapacity for work, as defined in national law, for an indeterminate amount of time, as the result of an accident at work, does not mean, in itself, that the limitation of that person’s capacity can be classified as being ‘long-term’, within the meaning of the definition of ‘disability’ laid down by that directive, read in the light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN Convention); |
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the evidence which makes it possible to find that such a limitation is ‘long-term’ includes the fact that, at the time of the allegedly discriminatory act, the incapacity of the person concerned does not display a clearly defined prognosis as regards short-term progress or the fact that that incapacity is likely to be significantly prolonged before that person has recovered; and |
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in the context of the verification of that ‘long-term’ nature, the referring court must base its decision on all of the objective evidence in its possession, in particular on documents and certificates relating to that person’s condition, established on the basis of current medical and scientific knowledge and data. |
That directive covers, inter alia, disabilities caused by an accident. Therefore, if an accident entails a limitation resulting in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and if that limitation is long-term, it may come within the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78.
The UN Convention does not define ‘long-term’ as regards a physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment. Directive 2000/78 does not define ‘disability’, nor does it clarify the concept of a ‘long-term’ limitation of a person’s capacity for the purposes of that concept.
In the absence of an express reference to the law of the Member States, the concept of a ‘long-term’ limitation of a person’s capacity, within the meaning of the concept of ‘disability’ referred to by Directive 2000/78, must therefore be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation.
Moreover, the ‘long-term’ nature of the limitation must be assessed in relation to the condition of incapacity, as such, of the person concerned at the time of the alleged discriminatory act adopted against him.
Finally, with regard to the notion of the ‘long-term’ nature of a limitation in the context of Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 and of the objective pursued by that directive, the importance which the EU legislature attaches to measures for adapting the workplace to the disability demonstrates that it envisaged situations in which participation in professional life is hindered over a long period of time.
(see paras 44, 45, 49, 51, 53, 54, 59, operative part)
See the text of the decision.
(see paras 61-64, 67, 68)