Case C‑559/14

Rudolfs Meroni

v

Recoletos Limited

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākās tiesas Civillietu departaments)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 — Recognition and enforcement of provisional and protective measures — Concept of ‘public policy’’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 25 May 2016

1. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 44/2001 — Recognition and enforcement of judgments — Grounds for refusing enforcement — Infringement of the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought — Conditions — Judicial review by the Court

   (Council Regulation No 44/2001, Arts 34(1), 36 and 45(2))

2. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 44/2001 — Recognition and enforcement of judgments — Grounds for refusing enforcement — Infringement of the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought — Decision of a court or tribunal of the Member State of origin which may affect the rights of a third person who did not have a hearing but who has the possibly of asserting his rights before that court or tribunal — No breach of public policy

   (Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Council Regulation No 44/2001, Arts 34(1), 36 and 45(2))

1.  Article 34(1), which concerns public policy, of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of that regulation and may be relied upon only in exceptional cases.

   While it is not for the Court to define the content of the public policy of a Member State, it is nonetheless required to review the limits within which the courts of a Member State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition of a judgment emanating from a court in another Member State.

   In that connection, by not allowing any review of a foreign judgment as to its substance, Articles 36 and 45(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 prohibit the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought from refusing to recognise or enforce that judgment solely on the ground that there is a discrepancy between the legal rule applied by the court of the State of origin and that which would have been applied by the court of the State in which enforcement is sought had it been seised of the dispute. Similarly, the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought may not review the accuracy of the findings of law or fact made by the court of the Member State of origin.

   Accordingly, recourse to the public-policy exception provided for by Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 can be envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment given in another Member State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the Member State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it would infringe a fundamental principle. In order for the prohibition of any review of the substance of a foreign judgment of another Member State to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the Member State in which recognition is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order.

   (see paras 38, 40-42, 46)

2.  Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, considered in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that the recognition and enforcement of an order issued by a court of a Member State, without a prior hearing of a third person whose rights may be affected by that order, cannot be regarded as manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which enforcement is sought or manifestly contrary to the right to a fair trial within the meaning of those provisions, in so far as that third person is entitled to assert his rights before that court.

   In the first place, Regulation No 44/2001, based on mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union, is based on the fundamental idea that individuals are required, in principle, to use all the legal remedies made available by the law of the Member State of origin. Save where specific circumstances make it too difficult or impossible to make use of the legal remedies in the Member State of origin, the individuals concerned must avail themselves of all the legal remedies available in that Member State with a view to preventing a breach of public policy before it occurs.

   In that context, to satisfy the requirements concerning procedural guarantees giving any third persons concerned a genuine opportunity of challenging a measure adopted by a court of the Member State of origin, the system of judicial protection resulting from legislation of that State, under which a third person, who is given notice of an order although he was not party to the proceedings before the court of the State of origin has been notified of the order, is entitled to challenge that order before that court and request that it be varied or set aside. Such a system cannot be regarded as a breach of Article 47 of the Charter.

   In the second place, if the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought could assess the existence of rights which a third person, who is not involved in the proceedings brought before the court of the State of origin, attempts to rely upon to challenge the recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment, that court might find it necessary to assess the merits of the judgment. Such an assessment would be manifestly contrary to Articles 36 and 45(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, which provide that under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.

   (see paras 47-50, 52-54, operative part)