Case C-71/07 P

Franco Campoli

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Appeal — Officials — Remuneration — Pension — Application of the correction coefficient calculated on the basis of the average cost of living in the country of residence — Transitional arrangements established by the regulation amending the Staff Regulations — Objection of illegality’

Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 8 April 2008   I - 5890

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 17 July 2008   I - 5913

Summary of the Judgment

1. Appeals — Cross-appeal — Subject-matter — Declaration that the principal appeal is inadmissible — Inadmissibility

   (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 56, second para., and 61)

2. Officials — Pensions — Weighting

   (Staff Regulations, Art. 82(1) and (3); Annex XIII, Arts 20(1) and 24(2); Council Regulation No 723/2004)

3. Officials — Pensions — Weighting

   (Staff Regulations, Art. 83(1), first para.; Annex XIII, Art. 20; Council Regulation No 723/2004)

1.  It is clear from Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that all appeals must seek the setting-aside in whole or in part of a judgment of the Court of First Instance, since the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for judgment.

   Accordingly, a cross-appeal is inadmissible where it does not seek to have the judgment under appeal set aside, but rather a declaration that the principal appeal lodged by the appellant is inadmissible.

   (see paras 40-43)

2.  A single correction coefficient per country applied to the pensions of officials can constitute an appropriate indicator to reflect, in a necessarily approximate way, the cost of living in a Member State.

   Given the necessarily approximate nature of a single correction coefficient per country, it must be considered that the goal of ensuring a certain parity of purchasing power among former officials residing in the various Member States has been attained, to the extent that the single correction coefficient is determined according to criteria which ensure that it is representative. The method of calculating the correction coefficients on the basis of the relationship between the cost of living in the Member State of residence and that in Belgium (‘the country method’) reflects the cost of living in a State in a manner that is at least as representative as the calculation of the calculation of coefficients on the basis of the relationship between the cost of living in the capital of the country of residence and that in Brussels (‘the ‘the capital method’’).

   Since the ‘country method’ is therefore an appropriate method of calculation for the purpose of ensuring, as far as possible, equality of purchasing power for all pensioners, the Community legislature did not infringe the principle of equal treatment when, in drawing up Regulation No 723/2004 amending the Staff Regulations of officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants, it substituted the ‘country method’ for the ‘capital method’ for the purpose of determining correction coefficients in the transitional pension arrangements.

   (see paras 52, 54, 55)

3.  The decision of the Community legislature to reform the pension scheme by abolishing the correction coefficients applicable to pension rights acquired after 1 May 2004, implemented by Regulation No 723/2004 amending the Staff Regulations of officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants, is not incompatible with the principle of equal treatment. Although the former pension scheme, based on a system of correction coefficients and, consequently, on a certain compensation for loss of purchasing power according to the Member State in which the pensioner resided, constituted an appropriate way of implementing that principle, it cannot be inferred from this that any other system is incompatible with that principle.

   A pension scheme intended to create equality of purchasing power is just one possible way of ensuring compliance with the principle of equal treatment. That principle is just as equally complied with by a scheme under which pensioners receive, for an equivalent contribution, the same nominal pension.

   The introduction, as part of the transitional arrangements, of a minimum correction coefficient of 100% simply anticipates the abolition of correction coefficients for certain pensioners provided for under the definitive rules.

   Since the definitive pension scheme under the new Staff Regulations, inasmuch as it no longer pursues the objective of guaranteeing a certain equality of purchasing power among officials, regardless of their place of residence, is therefore compatible with the principle of equal treatment, the transitional arrangements, which simply anticipate the principle whereby a ‘single’ amount pension is paid to pensioners for whom that principle is favourable, cannot constitute discrimination.

   (see paras 65-68)