Keywords
Summary

Keywords

1. Actions for annulment – Actionable measures – Meaning – Measures producing binding legal effects

(Art. 230, fourth para.,EC; Council Regulation No 659/1999, Arts 4(2), 10(1), 20 and 25)

2. State aid – Concept – Grant of advantages imputable to the State

(Art. 87(1) EC; Council Directive 92/81, Art. 8(1)(b))

3. State aid – Examination of complaints

(Art. 253 EC; Council Directive 92/81)

4. Transport – Air transport – Directive 92/81

(Council Directive 92/81, Art. 8(1)(b))

Summary

1. Only measures which produce binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of an applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 230 EC. Thus, an action for annulment is available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects.

That applies to a letter sent to a complainant undertaking by the Commission where the Commission, having received information regarding alleged unlawful aid and being therefore required to examine it without delay in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation No 659/1999, does not, as is possible under Article 20 of that regulation, merely inform the interested party that there are insufficient grounds for taking a view on the case, but takes a clear, reasoned and definitive position by stating that the measure at issue does not constitute aid because, in so doing, the Commission can only be adopting a decision under Article 4(2) of that regulation. The Commission is not therefore entitled to exclude it from the review of the Community judicature by declaring that it did not take such a decision, by trying to withdraw it, or by deciding not to address the decision to the Member State concerned, contrary to Article 25 of Regulation No 659/1999.

The Commission’s ground for concluding that there is no State aid and the fact that the preliminary examination did not require an in-depth and extensive analysis by it of the information forming the subject-matter of the complaint are irrelevant in that regard.

It is also irrelevant that that letter at issue does not stem from the adoption of a definitive decision on the complaint by the college of Commissioners as such a decision can be adopted only if a proposal to that end has been submitted by the Member of the Commission responsible.

Moreover, it is of little significance that the Commission’s letter was not published; a measure does not have to be published in order to be the object of an action for annulment.

(see paras 35, 41, 43, 49, 51-52, 58-59)

2. Article 87(1) EC refers to the decisions of Member States by which, in pursuit of their own economic and social objectives, they give, by unilateral and autonomous decisions, resources to undertakings or other persons or procure for them advantages intended to encourage the attainment of the economic or social objectives sought. Therefore, for advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, they must, inter alia, be imputable to the State.

That does not apply to a tax exemption provided for by national legislation which only implements Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 92/81 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils as the latter provision imposes on Member States a clear and precise obligation not to levy the harmonised excise duty on fuel used for the purpose of commercial air navigation. In transposing the exemption into national law, Member States are only implementing Community provisions in accordance with their obligations stemming from the Treaty. Therefore, the national provision at issue is not imputable to the Member State, but in actual fact stems from an act of the Community legislature. It is of little significance in that regard that the exemption was granted through State resources as the imputability of aid to a State is separate from the question whether aid was granted through State resources. It is a matter of separate and cumulative conditions. As some of the conditions which are fundamental to the application of Article 87 EC are not satisfied, such an exemption does not fall within the scope of that article.

(see paras 99-104)

3. The statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirements of a statement of reasons must be appraised by reference to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question.

Such a requirement is satisfied by the Commission’s decision rejecting a complaint on the ground that the tax exemption complained of constitutes an implementation of Directive 92/81 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils and not an attempt to grant aid as such a statement of reasons, although brief, is sufficiently clear and comprehensible.

(see paras 119-120)

4. The principle of equal treatment prohibits comparable cases from being treated differently, thereby subjecting some to disadvantages as opposed to others, unless such treatment can be objectively justified.

The tax exemption for aviation fuel based on Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 92/81 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils and on the provision transposing that provision into national law does not infringe the principle of equal treatment because the situation of air transport undertakings is clearly different from that of rail transport undertakings. As regards their operational characteristics, their costs structure and the regulations to which they are subject, air and rail transport services are very different and are not comparable for the purpose of the principle of equal treatment. However, in any event, that difference in treatment is objectively justified, having regard to the wide discretion of the Council as regards the objective justification of any differentiating treatment. In the light of the international practice of exempting aviation fuel from excise duties, which is enshrined in the Chicago Convention of 7 December 1944 on International Civil Aviation and in international agreements concluded between States, competition between Community air transport operators and operators in non-member countries would be distorted if the Community legislature unilaterally imposed excise duties on that fuel.

(see paras 137-139)