This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52015JC0009
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014
/* JOIN/2015/0009 final */
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 /* JOIN/2015/0009 final */
1.
Introduction Since
its launch in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been a crucial
aspect of the EU’s foreign policy. It addresses issues of strategic importance,
such as security, stability, justice, freedom and prosperity in our Neighbourhood,
by aiming to foster sustainable and resilient economies and free and inclusive
societies. It is a policy of long-term engagement, based on mutually beneficial
integration and cooperation. However,
in the light of the multiple crises and growing challenges in the
neighbourhood, awareness of the need to adapt the ENP and its approach has
grown. There have been calls for a major overhaul of the ENP’s toolbox, to
enable the EU to respond better to partners' differing aspirations, and more
quickly to a fast-changing neighbourhood and broader global trends. 2014
has been a year of major challenges in the EU’s neighbourhood. Events in
Ukraine, as well as increasing Russian pressure on other eastern partners, put
Europe’s political realities into focus. Inside and outside Syria, millions of
people fled because of the actions of the
Assad regime and Da’esh, and remain in dire need of
assistance. Atrocities and human rights violations
and abuses were perpetrated as well by Da’esh, Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist
groups in the region. Renewed hostilities in
Gaza shattered livelihoods and devastated already fragile infrastructures.
Libya’s statehood remained at risk, and the absence of functioning public
authorities, the increase of violence and the lack of control of migratory
flows to and from the country created favourable conditions for criminal
networks engaged in irregular migration and trafficking in human beings to
Europe. Poverty in the neighbourhood was on the rise, affecting children in
particular and other vulnerable groups in society. At
the same time 2014 saw some positive developments, with the signature of three
Association Agreements with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. This
new generation of agreements includes provisions on a Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (AAs/DCFTAs), putting in place the most ambitious contractual
relations so far established with neighbourhood partners. In addition,
relations with Morocco and Tunisia were strengthened and continue to reflect
the depth and breadth of reform efforts in these countries. The democratic
transition in Tunisia has been particularly positive. On migration and
mobility, the Republic of Moldova successfully implemented all the benchmarks
set in its Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP), which allowed Moldovan
citizens to enjoy visa-free travel to the Schengen countries as of spring 2014.
Tunisia and Jordan also signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU in 2014. In
2014 the EU maintained a high level of engagement with partners, in which the
instruments offered by the ENP played a central part. The new European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), adopted in 2014, provides EUR 15.4 billion for
the period 2014-20. Financial assistance is more focused than before; civil
society organisations (CSOs) and local authorities are better and more closely
involved in preparing, implementing and monitoring EU support. This
Joint Communication and the accompanying progress reports examine how the EU
and partner countries have implemented jointly agreed reform objectives and
addressed particular challenges in 2014. In recognition of the changing situation in the
Neighbourhood, partners’ differing aspirations for their relations with the EU
under the ENP, and the difficulty for the ENP to respond to some of these
changes, a Joint Consultation Paper was adopted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the
European Commission on 4 March 2015, launching a formal consultation process
for the review of the ENP. The character of the EU's annual reporting forms
will be examined as part of that review. 2.
The implementation of the ENP in 2014 Democratisation
and, in a broader sense, transition must be first and foremost home-grown
processes. The success of a transition depends on a multitude of factors, from
political will to the improvement of the rule of law, from economic
circumstances to education, from improved social equality and human empowerment
to active civil society. It requires a broad national consensus on basic
political practices. It is in this respect that the EU has supported the
drivers of positive political change in the neighbourhood. While
the ENP forms part of the EU’s efforts to support successful transitions, these
processes vary widely due to historical and societal circumstances specific to
each country. As such, eastern and southern partners face individual challenges
and opportunities in terms of their path towards reform. Transitions which lack
inclusiveness and which are characterised by a ‘winner-takes-all’ approach have
proved to be unsustainable in terms of a country’s overall stability and
prosperity. The success of a transition demands that government, civil society,
and economic actors cooperate actively on ongoing democratisation efforts. This
feature of positive political change is common to both eastern and southern
partners that are undergoing transition. The ENP continued to support relevant
developments in 2014. 2.1.
Democracy and good governance The
EU is committed to promoting democracy and good governance in the
Neighbourhood. While the EU remains convinced that work in this important area
is key for its foreign policy, the realities in the Neighbourhood paint a very
nuanced picture of developments in democratisation and good governance. On
a positive note, Tunisia demonstrated that inclusive and domestically driven democratic
transition in the southern Neighbourhood can work, namely through the
commendable steps taken by holding legislative and presidential elections and
the adoption of a new Constitution. These marked a milestone in terms of
establishing fundamental rights and allowing further democratic reforms to take
place. Morocco also continued its democratisation and modernisation process, as
shown by its progress in ongoing reforms in the areas of justice,
regionalisation and the media. Democratisation processes in the Republic of
Moldova and in Georgia also continued steadily. The Republic of Moldova held
parliamentary elections, which were generally considered free and fair by the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election observer mission, although the
exclusion of one electoral contestant a few days before the day of elections
raised concerns. The Republic of Moldova made further progress on its European
agenda, including through the signature of the AA/DCFTA. Georgia also continued
its democratisation process, not least through the signature of the AA/DCFTA.
Local elections in June and July 2014 were considered overall to be in
compliance with international standards. The
EU helped Ukraine by mobilising an unprecedented financial package of over
EUR 11 billion for the period 2014-20. Restrictive measures against
individuals and entities responsible for the crisis, for misappropriations and
for the violation of fundamental rights, as well as relevant Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) tools, were deployed. But the political situation
remained overshadowed by an ongoing military crisis in the eastern part of the
country and the Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of Crimea and
Sevastopol, where Russian and de facto local authorities significantly
reduced human rights protection since February 2014. Ukrainian citizens
residing in Crimea and Sevastopol were compelled to become Russian citizens or,
if they refused, to be deemed foreigners. Intimidation and harassment of
Crimean citizens who opposed the actions of the Russian Federation on the
peninsula increased, directed in particular at Crimean Tatars and journalists.
The media could not operate freely. Similar trends were also recorded in
eastern Ukraine, in addition to the dire humanitarian impact of the conflict
and the rising number of people affected. These
developments had a negative impact on the reform process in Ukraine.
Constitutional reform was delayed and the Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe assessed draft proposals on the reform as not being fully in line with
international standards. The fight against corruption started slowly.
Preparations for a single national reform programme were slow and fragmented,
even though the new government has a clear reform orientation. Urgent and
sustained action will be required to deliver results in the near term and to
maintain the impetus for reform in the years to come, and to ensure AA/DCFTA
implementation. The EU set up a Support Group for Ukraine to help the country
in implementing its reform programme. Other
parts of the neighbourhood were characterised by stagnation in terms of
democratisation. In Egypt, the
space for debate in general — and activities by CSOs in particular — was
narrowed through enhanced controls. The democratisation and
human rights environment in Azerbaijan worsened over the past year, with systematic
restrictions on the space for public discourse and civil society. In Belarus,
the lack of progress on human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles
persisted. Political
developments in Israel and Palestine[1] were significantly influenced by the
regional situation, a more conflictual political atmosphere, and hostilities in
Gaza. The State of Israel is based on the values of democracy, respect for
human rights and the rule of law and basic freedoms. Nevertheless, there were
concerns in 2014 as regards the protection of minority rights, including of
Bedouins. In Palestine, key legislation on democratic structures, such as
legislation outlining the responsibilities
of judicial institutions, still needs to be adopted. Concerns about the respect for human
rights remained to be addressed, in particular with regard to the death
sentence: it continued to be carried out in Gaza by the de facto
authorities and executions were resumed in Egypt and Jordan after moratoria had
applied in both countries in the years before. Ongoing
armed conflicts, sectarian or ethnic polarisation and external factors, such as
terrorism, impeded progress on the ENP agenda. In Libya, the poor security
situation even put the country’s statehood in jeopardy. The Syria crisis has
become the largest humanitarian and security disaster in the world. Lebanon and
Jordan, on the other hand, showed remarkable resilience faced with regional
refugee flows and political and security spill-over effects from the Syrian
crisis, also putting additional strain on already scarce natural resources.
Despite these challenges, both countries contributed to stability and security
in the region, striving for further progress on the ENP agenda. Some
positive developments were observed on elections. Presidential and
parliamentary elections in Tunisia and in Ukraine, presidential elections in
Israel and parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova were generally
well administered. As regards Ukraine, elections could not be held in Crimea
and Sevastopol; most of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk remained under the
control of illegal armed groups and were prevented from participating in
elections in Ukraine. The local elections carried out by the de facto
authorities of both regions are considered illegal and illegitimate, and are
therefore not recognised by the EU. The EU took good note of the overall
peaceful and orderly conduct of presidential elections in Egypt, although there
were some misgivings about the conduct of the electoral campaign, which saw an
ever-narrowing space for dissent and debate. Developments
were mixed regarding freedom of expression, freedom of press and
media, freedom of association and freedom of religion or belief,
rights of people belonging to a minority and fight against discrimination.
Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco and the Republic of Moldova partly put in place
relevant legislation, but no major development was recorded in Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Egypt and Palestine. The
rights of women and children remained problematic in most partner
countries. Child labour, the recruitment of child soldiers, the use of children
for terrorist activities or trafficking, underage marriages and ill-treatment
in the youth justice system continued to be issues of grave concern. Children
were particularly affected by poverty that is growing across the whole region.
Tunisia's new Constitution granted women equal socio-economic and political
rights, in addition to requiring measures against discrimination and
gender-based violence. There
were encouraging signs on justice sector reform, with an improvement of
the independence and effectiveness of the sector in Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon
and Jordan. The new Constitution in Tunisia established a base for many
fundamental rights and will allow justice reform to move forward. A strategic
document on justice reform was adopted in May and a related action plan for
2015-19 was being discussed. Ukraine's parliament adopted a 'Law on the
Restoration of Trust in the Judiciary'. The Republic of Moldova implemented
laws on judicial reform. Significant challenges on the lack of judicial
independence remained in Azerbaijan and in Egypt. Uneven
and limited developments were noted in partner countries on penitentiary
facilities and related conditions. Torture and ill-treatment
continued in several countries and it remained often linked to the
problem of poor detention conditions and deficiencies in penitentiary systems.
Some improvements were noted in Jordan and Tunisia, for instance the establishment
of a national prevention mechanism against torture in Tunisia. Substantial
efforts were made in the Republic of Moldova, which has launched new
penitentiary facilities and reforms concerning young offenders. The
role of civil society and of social partners in the transition
and reform processes is crucial. CSOs play an important role in monitoring and
giving advice to parliaments, governments and political parties on human rights
issues, including holding authorities account for their actions. They are often
well connected at international level, allowing lessons learnt to be easily
transferred and shared. CSOs encountered rather negative trends in 2014 across
the region. Some countries took measures to limit their activities by passing
laws or introducing costly administrative procedures, such as heavy tax
burdens, leading in some cases to CSOs ceasing their activities. In Azerbaijan
and Egypt, CSO activity was particularly affected by such developments. Civil
society developed positively and quickly in Ukraine and Tunisia. While CSOs
generally operated freely in the Republic of Moldova, they were severely
restricted in the Transnistrian region. CSOs were able to operate in the West
Bank with fewer restrictions than in Gaza, where their work continued to be
impeded. Work on EU Country Roadmaps for engagement with civil society
continued throughout 2014. These Roadmaps set out a strategic framework for
engagement with civil society on a country-by-country basis. EU Delegations led
the process of developing the roadmaps, working with local authorities and
CSOs, to identify long-term objectives on dialogue and operational support. By
the end of 2014, most of these roadmaps had been adopted by the partner
countries. 2.2.
Political and security cooperation Successful
transitions need security for societies and economies to develop. In 2014,
however, security-related challenges in the neighbourhood rose exponentially.
Threats emanating from terrorist groups such as Da'esh, protracted conflicts,
organised crime, and crises arising from the redrawing of borders by force cast
a shadow over Europe’s neighbourhood. The level of instability of some partner
countries contributed to irregular migratory flows and security threats with a
direct impact on the EU. In
spite of these negative developments, the EU worked to provide security and
stability in the neighbourhood. The EU assisted partners in addressing their
political, security and economic challenges by drawing on a number of EU
instruments and mechanisms such as political and human rights dialogues, CSDP
missions, and related financial assistance aiming, amongst others, at
strengthening the rule of law and supporting justice reform. Currently the EU
is present in the neighbourhood with several missions, namely the monitoring
mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), a police mission in Palestine (EUPOL COPPS),
border assistance missions (EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine[2], in
Libya (EUBAM Libya[3]),
at the Rafah (Gaza) Crossing Point (EUBAM RAFAH), and the EU advisory mission
for civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). Developments
in the eastern Neighbourhood were particularly affected by the situation in
Ukraine. The EU strongly condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea and
Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the destabilising crisis in Ukraine's
eastern regions, which had a significant humanitarian impact on the civilian
population. The EU called upon Russian authorities to prevent any movement of
military equipment, weapons or fighters from its territory into Ukraine and to
exercise their influence over the separatists and illegal armed groups in order
to de-escalate the situation. To this aim, the EU supported the work of
multilateral fora, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE). In addition to its efforts made in 2014 to contribute to a
solution of the crisis in eastern Ukraine, the EU has now called on all parties
to build on the positive momentum behind the Minsk agreements of 12 February
2015 and to fully implement them. In
addition to its diplomatic engagement, the EU assisted Ukraine on the path to
reform of its security sector by launching a civilian advisory mission
(EUAM Ukraine). The mission will provide strategic advice to Ukraine on developing
effective, sustainable and accountable security services to help strengthen the
rule of law in Ukraine. Large
parts of the neighbourhood continued to be affected by armed conflict or
crises. In the eastern Neighbourhood, the EU continued to promote confidence-building
measures in Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia’s engagement policy towards its breakaway
regions was challenged by the Russian Federation’s signing of a 'Treaty on
Alliance and Strategic Partnership' with the breakaway region of Abkhazia. A
political settlement on Transnistria was hampered by Tiraspol reasserting its
ambitions for greater autonomy, in spite of calls for territorial reintegration
in the context of the ‘5+2’ process of the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the settlement of the Transnistria conflict.[4] In
the southern Neighbourhood, the situation in Syria remained a major source of
instability, heavily affecting neighbouring countries, in particular Jordan and
Lebanon. The EU and its Member States mobilised nearly EUR 3 billion in
assistance for the people affected in Syria and neighbouring host countries,
which is the biggest humanitarian effort ever undertaken by the EU. It is a
comprehensive regional response that includes humanitarian aid, structural support
and other assistance to countries that host refugees and displaced persons. The
worsening security and political situation in Libya had repercussions beyond
its immediate neighbours, including making irregular migration one of the major
new international challenges. Renewed hostilities in Gaza shattered livelihoods
and devastated already fragile infrastructure and scarce natural resources,
adding to the overall instability of the region. The
region continued to be subject to the threat of terrorism, including
atrocities and human rights violations committed by Da'esh,
Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist groups.
The EU remained committed to tackling this issue, in coordination with regional
and international partners.[5]
On
a positive note, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine continued to
contribute to EU-led CSDP operations (EUTM operation in Mali, EUNAVFOR
Atalanta and EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic). Such engagement
exemplifies these partners’ awareness of the importance of contributing to
regional security efforts. The EU will examine further ways of how to reflect
such important engagement in CSDP operations in an ENP context. EU
support for security sector reform (SSR) in the Neighbourhood
contributes for the creation of accountable security services in partner
countries, respecting democratic controls and the rule of law. EU activities
support capacity building, institutional support, training, advisory activities
and enhancing border management. In 2014, the EU supported civilian cooperation
in the framework of SSR in Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia. In Ukraine, the EU
launched a civilian advisory mission (EUAM Ukraine) to provide strategic advice
for the development of effective, sustainable and accountable security services
that contribute to strengthen the rule of law in Ukraine. In Lebanon and in the
Republic of Moldova, the EU focused on enhancing border and custom management
capacities to address the cross-border challenges of these partner countries.
Such a task proved more challenging when it came to Libya. Against
the backdrop of global trends and increasing threats to security and stability
in the neighbourhood, the EU's actions in the region require further attention.
As a possible way of addressing challenges in a long-term and sustainable way,
and in addition to complementary efforts led under CSDP proper and other fora,
security-related components of the ENP could be further reinforced. The EU has
an interest in helping neighbouring countries to become stronger and more
resilient states, increasing security in the region and protecting people and
their fundamental rights and freedoms. 2.3.
Economic integration with the EU The
EU is the main economic and trading partner for most of the ENP countries. Its
economic and social model remains attractive for some partners, as their
continued efforts towards political association and economic integration have
shown. The
Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas
(AAs/DCFTAs) with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine were signed in
2014. The AAs/DCFTAs are the ENP’s core achievements and represent a milestone
in the EU’s relations with some of its closest partners, upgrading these ties
to a significantly higher level. The AAs/DCFTAs are expected to have a positive
effect on growth and employment in partner countries, creating welfare and
making their economies more sustainable and resilient. Provisional
application of major parts of the AAs/DCFTAs began in Georgia and the Republic
of Moldova on 1 September 2014. These countries started to implement the
agreements: import duties were reduced or abolished,
and the commitments to approximate to the EU acquis began to gradually
apply. As far as Ukraine is
concerned, 2014 showed some improvement in bilateral trade relations, as
previous trade irritants were removed or were being phased out. However, the
Ukrainian authorities reacted to the critical macroeconomic situation by
adopting new trade restrictions and other measures which risk reversing the improvements
in trade relations and worsening the business climate. The Autonomous Trade
Measures (ATMs), adopted in April 2014, eliminated 94.7 % of current
EU tariffs on imports of industrial goods from Ukraine and all EU tariffs on
Ukraine’s agricultural exports to the EU, while reducing tariffs on certain
chemicals and other products originating in Ukraine. Following the decision to
delay the provisional application of the DCFTA part of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement until 1 January 2016, the ATMs were prolonged until that
date. Ukrainian authorities are preparing the implementation of the DCFTA in
close cooperation with the EU. While
the EU continued to be Armenia’s main trading partner in 2014, on 10 October
2014 Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed a treaty with a view to
include Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union starting from 2015. The
EU respects choices made by sovereign states. Armenia continued to benefit from
the EU’s GSP+ tariff preferences and exploratory talks were initiated in
November 2014 on a new possible contractual relationship between the EU and
Armenia. Trade
relations were also under intensified discussion with southern partners.
Regulatory reforms continued to address economic development in terms of job
creation, support to sustainable growth, and prosperity. Furthermore, the
opportunities of enhanced regional cooperation loom large. The EU remained
ready to support such efforts, if and when partners have been ready to do so. Negotiations
of a DCFTA continued with Morocco. An agreement on geographical indications was
being negotiated. First fishing activities under the agreement on a Protocol to
the Fisheries Partnership Agreement for the years 2014-18 started, in addition
to EU financial support to the sector in Morocco providing direct and tangible
benefits to economic actors. The preparatory process for the DCFTA negotiations
with Tunisia advanced, including consultations with civil society and between
experts and concluding that there are no technical obstacles to the launch of
negotiations. Preparatory talks on a DCFTA with Jordan also progressed and
sustainability impact assessments on possible DCFTAs with Egypt and Jordan were
carried out. However,
economic integration with the EU is broader than trade relations per se. The
ENP connects the EU with its neighbours through creating transport and
energy networks, and these measures go hand in hand with increasing trade
flows. Regulatory approximation and the provision of relevant infrastructure
are crucial for establishing and maintaining efficient connections between the
EU and partner countries, and amongst themselves. Yet
the overall picture for 2014 is mixed in both areas. Some countries carried out
regulatory approximation with EU rules and standards in the area of transport,
such as Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine. Despite the conflicts, some countries
(e.g. Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine) pursued their reform efforts in the area
of transport. As
regards energy, the integration of neighbouring countries into
the EU internal energy market continued. Some policy decisions were also taken
to promote renewable energy, including solar energy in Morocco. Ukraine and
Jordan had a worrying accumulation of debts as a result of importing energy
from third countries, in particular gas and petroleum products. In this
respect, the trilateral gas accord of 30 October 2014, mediated by the European
Commission, with Ukraine and the Russian Federation was a major achievement. In
parallel, the progressive integration of the Ukrainian energy market with the
EU market continued. There
were other positive developments regarding energy infrastructure measures and
projects. On 20 September 2014, the Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan to
South-East Europe was launched, to supply the EU with gas from Azerbaijan
starting in 2020. On 27 August 2014, the inauguration of the Iasi-Ungheni gas
interconnector between Romania and the Republic of Moldova took place. Work on
this project needs to continue, based on support and cooperation with the EU,
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Romania. Cooperation with
neighbouring countries in the field of nuclear safety continued to
produce tangible results. Ukraine updated its National Action Plan for the
follow up of the stress tests carried out in cooperation with the European
Commission. The Commission also received Armenia's stress test report on the
Medzamor nuclear power plant, with a view to it being peer reviewed. This is in
line with EU objectives in this policy area, which is the promotion of the
highest nuclear safety standards and safety culture worldwide. Regional
projects such as the ones to reinforce electricity interconnection in South
Caucasus are helpful in creating more interconnectivity, initially within the
neighbourhood and then between partner countries and the EU. The link between
Georgia and Turkey was completed, while the strengthening of the
Georgia-Armenia interconnection is in the planning phase. The
evaluation and training performed in 2014 based on the Small Business Act
for Europe mobilised hundreds of stakeholders from Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises (SMEs) in the southern Neighbourhood. This helped partner countries
align their SME policies with EU policies and to strengthen economic
integration. Cooperation
in the area of environment contributed to improve the quality of life of
citizens in partner countries by providing access to basic environmental
services such as water supply, wastewater treatment or solid waste management.
Environmental cooperation remained a tool for civil society empowerment. The
development of a Common Knowledge and Innovation Space (CKIS) advanced
in 2014, linking up the EU and partner countries through policy dialogue and
cooperation on research and innovation. By the end of 2014, Israel and
the Republic of Moldova signed with the EU association agreements for 'Horizon
2020', the EU's Framework Programme for Research and Innovation. 2.4.
People-to-people contacts, migration and mobility Enhancing
mobility in a secure and well-managed environment and strengthening the human
dimension through increased people-to-people contacts have become guiding
principles of the ENP. Mobility fosters trade ties and economic growth,
encourages cultural and social developments and promotes fundamental rights and
the rule of law. Passenger and migration flows between the ENP region and the
EU have consistently increased. In 2014, increasing flows of legal migration
into the EU originated mostly from Morocco and Ukraine. To
set up a solid basis for a successful transition and economy, countries need to
invest in future generations. The implementation of a well performing and
efficient education system is therefore highly relevant to medium to
long-term development. Overall, neighbourhood countries’ cooperation with the
EU on education increased and even continued with countries directly affected
by armed conflicts. Several Tempus, Erasmus Mundus and eTwinning projects were
launched and implemented. Several ENP countries (Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova,
Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia) adopted in 2014 reforms to improve the
quality of education at all levels. Some countries set up policy frameworks or
strategies specifically focused on young people, e.g. Ukraine's '2016-20
State Programme for Youth'. A
strong cultural sector also contributes to political reforms and
socio-economic development. Some countries adopted a national strategy for
culture, such as the Republic of Moldova's 'Culture 2020' Strategy. The influx of refugees from Syria continued to
be a challenge for the education systems in Jordan and Lebanon. There were
approximately 390 000 Syrian children of school age (5-17 years old) in Lebanon
among the Syrian refugees registered by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) by the end of 2014 as well as an estimated 10 000 school
age Palestinian refugees from Syria, of which around 7 000 were enrolled in
schools of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in
the near east (UNRWA). Cooperation
on migration and mobility was a major element in the EU’s relations with
partner countries in 2014. Mobility Partnerships were key elements of
these discussions. In line with the EU's Global Approach on Migration and
Mobility, these partnerships aimed to strengthen cooperation in this important
policy area. At the end of 2014, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Jordan, the
Republic of Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia had signed Mobility Partnerships with
the EU. Negotiations continued with Belarus on a Visa Facilitation and
Readmission Agreement. The EU-Lebanon Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and
Security was launched in December 2014. With
some eastern partners work concentrated on the perspective of
establishing visa-free regimes. Moldovan citizens – following a successful
conclusion of the visa liberalisation dialogue - have been able to travel visa-free
to the Schengen area since 28 April 2014, if they hold biometric passports.
Other partner countries have stepped up their efforts to reach the same goal,
in particular Georgia, and also Ukraine. In
the southern neighbourhood, Morocco ensured better integration of regular
migrants. The Moroccan and Tunisian governments are also in the process of
adopting a legal and institutional framework for asylum and to fight against
trafficking in human beings. In January 2015, the EU and Morocco started the
negotiations on a Visa Facilitation Agreement and a Readmission Agreement. The
EU is ready to start such negotiations with Tunisia in 2015 following the
adoption of its negotiating directives for both agreements in December 2014. However,
increasing flows of irregular migration continued following a general
trend primarily related to political developments in the southern Neighbourhood
since 2011. In 2014, more than 277 000 irregular migrants entered the EU.
Trafficking in human beings also increased. The
terrible loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea during 2014 showed that
coordinated policy formulation of the EU with its partner countries in the
South and beyond is indispensable. As ENP partner countries are mostly
transit countries for irregular migration, the EU includes the ‘neighbours of
neighbours’ in relevant discussions, e.g. authorities from West and Central
Africa in the framework of the 'Rabat Process'. Similarly,
a regional dialogue process was launched in November with countries along the
East African migratory route ('Khartoum Process').
Most of the EU’s southern partner countries lack a comprehensive, sustainable
legal and administrative system to deal with this issue. Libya, in particular,
was very vulnerable to flows of asylum-seekers, irregular migration and human
trafficking following the deteriorating security situation and the conflict in
the country. EU
assistance to the region focused on strengthening partners’ criminal justice
systems in their fight against smuggling and trafficking through capacity
building for border controls. Such assistance has had some positive effects in
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. EU assistance was granted to Jordan to carry
out a survey of migration, covering also conditions for refugees. Plans are in
place to carry out similar surveys in other countries in the region. 2.5. Financial
cooperation The
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the main vehicle for supporting EU
political priorities in the neighbourhood. The ENI has a budget of EUR 15.4
billion for 2014-20.The ENI provides a predictable, long-term envelope to
support the reform priorities agreed in each country. Countries where
substantial democratic reforms are being introduced may also receive additional
funding under an umbrella programme worth up to 10 % of the value of the
ENI. Substantial support for regional and cross-border initiatives is also
provided through the ENI. Blending of EU funding with IFIs plays an increasing
role, though the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). The
NIF supports projects in the areas of energy and transport interconnections,
climate change and environment and for SMEs. A DCFTA Facility has been
prepared in order to support the adaptation and reorientation of businesses, so
as to increase the access to benefits foreseen by the agreements. With this
facility, the EU aims to mobilise EUR 150 million of grants from 2015 to 2017
through the NIF to leverage up to EUR 1.5 billion of investment from IFIs in
the three countries, i.e. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Funding
for civil society has also substantially increased. The EU continued to support
civil society through the Civil Society Facility (CSF) covering regional
and national level with the aim to strengthen and promote the role of civil
society in processes related to reform and democratic change. The
current dynamic situation in the neighbourhood requires a flexible approach to
planning and implementation and the EU has used all the flexibility available
to it. The EU moved with unprecedented speed and fast tracked approval
processes to meet crisis needs in Ukraine, combining major ENI support,
Macro-Financial Assistance and technical support from the Ukraine Support
Group. An EU Regional Trust Fund was created in December 2014 to provide
a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional
scale. The Trust Fund will focus on current priority needs and may also be
adapted to reconstruction needs in a future post-conflict scenario. But
the ENI is not suitable or sufficient for all needs, especially where a crisis
response requires substantial additional funding at short notice. ENI funding
is therefore complemented by support from other instruments, such as the
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EU humanitarian funding
(ECHO) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
Additional funds may need to be mobilised, through these or other instruments,
as required by the evolving situation in the region — the responses in Syria
and Ukraine are examples of this. 2.6.
The ENP beyond bilateral cooperation Many
of the security, economic and social challenges in the Neighbourhood are
directly linked to low levels of regional integration. Regional cooperation is
essential in tackling complex common challenges such as irregular migration,
terrorism and arms trafficking, or cross-border pollution, which require a
coordinated response. The strengthening of regional cooperation in the region
therefore remains high on the ENP’s agenda. This applies to both the eastern
dimension of the ENP, as embodied by the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the
southern dimension as conducted through the Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity as well as in the context of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The
overall political climate in the southern Neighbourhood remained tense,
affecting the possibilities for regional cooperation. While southern partner
countries continued to develop their bilateral relations with the EU, the
region as such remained one of the least integrated in the world. Parts of it
continued to experience severe political, economic and humanitarian crises,
along with armed conflicts and significant deteriorations in the security
situation. The implementation of reforms and regional integration proved to be
difficult in such circumstances. To
address potential spill-over effects of the Syrian conflict and the associated
foreign fighters' phenomenon, the EU stepped up its cooperation with southern
partners on counter-terrorism. A project on counter-terrorism with Arab
partners, funded by the ENI, started in March 2014, implemented by the UN
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate (UNCTED), with participation of EU institutions and
Member States. The
EU and southern partner countries continued to address the critical need for
closer integration. Partners were eager to engage in regional activities with
the EU, especially through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the League
of Arab States (LAS). The efforts for further cooperation of the EU with the
Maghreb countries and with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
continued. On
the Eastern Partnership, significant progress was made on engaging relevant
partner countries through the AA/DCFTAs, which involve ambitious reform agendas
in political, economic and social areas. The
four Eastern Partnership thematic platforms have continued to meet twice a year
to review and discuss next steps in the policy dialogue between the EU and EaP
countries. The Eastern Partnership Summit in 2015 is expected to review
implementation of agreed commitments and progress achieved. In
2014, against the background of the Ukrainian crisis, the EU initiated
unprecedented support programmes to help stabilise Ukraine’s economic and
financial situation, assist with transition, encourage political and economic
reforms and support inclusive development. Support was also stepped up in a
number of ways for the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, in light of the
pressures they have been subject to as a result of their decision to sign the
Association Agreements. 3.
Conclusion President
Juncker has made reviewing the ENP a priority for the first year of his
mandate. The
Joint Consultation Paper ‘Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy’,
adopted on 4 March 2015, outlines the major questions and issues that the EU
and its partner countries are currently facing. Stakeholders are invited to
react to this Paper, which launches a thorough consultation procedure on the
ENP. The results of this consultation will be announced in autumn 2015, through
the adoption of a Joint Communication on a renewed ENP. [1] This designation
shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without
prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. [2] Not a CSDP mission. [3] Deterioration of the
political and security situation in Libya in July 2014 required temporary relocation
of the mission to Tunis. The future direction of the mission is the subject of
a strategic review to be considered shortly by the EU Member States. [4] Ministerial
Statement of 5 December 2014 on the Negotiations on the Transnistrian
Settlement Process in the ‘5+2’ format. [5] In
February 2015, the Joint Communication on the Syria/Iraq and the Da’esh threat
was adopted. It proposes a strategy in response to the crisis and includes a
mix of political and practical measures including diplomatic engagement,
anti-radicalisation programmes, fight against terrorist financing and better
border controls.