This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52013SC0008
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast)
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast)
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast)
/* SWD/2013/08 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast) /* SWD/2013/08 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for
Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast)
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
railway safety (Recast) TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction. 3 2 Procedural issues and consultation of
interested parties. 4 2.1.... Organisation and timing. 4 2.2.... Consultation and expertise. 4 2.3.... Consultation of the Impact Assessment Board
(IAB) 5 3 Problem definition. 6 3.1.... Description of the current framework. 6 3.2.... Description of the problem.. 8 3.3.... The problem drivers. 12 3.4.... The Most affected stakeholders and their
views on problem elements. 17 3.5.... Baseline scenario. 18 3.6.... Subsidiarity. 19 4 Objectives. 20 4.1.... General objective. 20 4.2.... Specific objectives. 20 4.3.... Operational objectives. 20 5 Policy options. 22 5.1.... Identification of possible policy measures. 22 5.2.... Description of the policy options. 22 5.3.... Interaction with legal acts and stakeholders'
views. 27 6 Assessment of impacts. 28 6.1.... Introduction and general methodological
approach. 28 6.2.... Approach to the calculation of costs and
benefits 28 6.3.... Identification of the magnitude of the main
impacts. 29 6.4.... Direct impacts on railway undertakings. 30 6.5.... Direct impacts on public authorities. 37 6.6.... Assessment of indirect impacts. 44 6.7.... Assessment of impacts on micro, small and
medium sized enterprises. 45 7 Comparison of Options. 45 7.1.... Comparison in terms of direct impacts. 45 7.2.... Comparison in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness. 47 8 Monitoring and Evaluation. 48 LIST
OF ANNEXES: ANNEX I ......... THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE – THE 'BIG
PICTURE' 50 ANNEX II ........ FUNCTIONING OF THE RAILWAY MARKET. 59 ANNEX III ...... FUNCTIONNING OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. 62 ANNEX IV ...... NATIONAL RAILWAY RULES. 70 ANNEX V ....... CONSULTATION of STAKEHOLDERS. 75 ANNEX VI ...... SCREENING OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES. 82 ANNEX VII ..... ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS – METHODOLOGICAL
ELEMENTS. 87 ANNEX VIII .... IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREFERRED OPTION.. 114 ANNEX IX ...... LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 118
1
Introduction
In its 2011 White Paper on transport policy
adopted on 28 March 2011 (hereinafter the 2011 White Paper), the Commission
announced its vision to establish a Single European Railway Area and clarified
that this objective implies creating an internal railway market where European
railway undertakings can provide services without unnecessary technical and
administrative barriers. [1]
Additionally, the European Council
conclusions of January 2012 highlight the importance of unleashing the
growth-creating potential of a fully integrated Single Market, including measures
with regard to network industries.[2]
Furthermore, the Commission Communication on Action for Stability, Growth and
Jobs adopted on 30 May 2012 stresses the importance of further reducing the
regulatory burden and barriers to entry in the rail sector, making country-specific
recommendations to that aim.[3]
In the same manner, on 6th June 2012 the Commission adopted the
Communication on strengthening the governance of the single market, which also
stresses the importance of the transport sector.[4]
The EU railway market has seen massive
changes in the recent decade. They were gradually introduced by three
legislative "railway packages" (with some accompanying acts) intended
to open up national markets and make railways more competitive and
interoperable at the EU level, while maintaining a high level of safety. The
most recent development is the adoption (passed 2nd reading in
Parliament in July, to be adopted by the Council in December 2012) of the
recast of the 1st Railway Package, which, in addition to legislative
simplification and consolidation, clarifies certain provisions on competition
issues, regulatory oversight and financial architecture of railway operations[5]. Despite the
considerable development of the 'EU acquis' establishing an internal market for
rail transport services, the modal share of rail in intra-EU transport has
remained modest. Therefore the Commission has planned to put forward with the 4th
Railway Package (cf. Annex I for further details) in order to enhance the
quality and efficiency of rail services by removing the remaining obstacles of
different natures, and fostering thereby the performance and competitiveness of
the railway sector. As announced by the 2011 White Paper, these issues will be
addressed by different initiatives: ·
removing remaining administrative and
technical barriers, in particular by establishing a
common approach to safety and interoperability rules to increase economies of
scale for railway undertakings active across the EU, decreasing administrative
costs and accelerating administrative procedures, as well as to avoiding
disguised discrimination; ·
opening the domestic rail passenger market, providing open access to lines, including those under public
service obligations (PSOs)[6]
to competition (completing the process of market opening); ·
optimising the governance of infrastructure
management, in particular by ensuring that the
infrastructure manager performs a consistent set of functions that optimises
the use of infrastructure capacity and guarantees non-discriminatory access to
the infrastructure and rail related services. This impact assessment focuses on the first
point. However at the same time expected synergies from other elements of the 4th
Railway Package would reinforce the overall outcome, for example the initiative
on infrastructure governance will help to reduce discrimination in relation to
access to infrastructure, thus the access barriers for new entrants would be
lowered.
2
Procedural issues and consultation of interested
parties
This impact assessment (IA) has been
prepared by DG MOVE to support legislative proposals on improving efficiency
and competitiveness of the Single European Railway Area in the field of interoperability
and safety, namely revision of the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC[7], Interoperability Directive 2008/57/EC[8] and ERA
regulation (EC) No 881/2004[9] (Agenda Planning numbers 2011/MOVE/011, 2012/MOVE/031,
2012/MOVE/033). The impact assessment road map has been published at the
website of the Commission[10]. 2.1 Organisation and timing An Impact
Assessment Steering Group (IASG) was created in June 2011. All DGs were invited
to participate, however the main interested services are DGs ENTR, EMPL, SG,
SJ, HR, RTD, BUDG, REGIO, ENER and ELARG. The IASG met six times.[11] Last IASG meeting was held on
13 July 2012 and the IASG members were given the opportunity to make final
comments until 20 July. 2.2 Consultation and expertise The Commission services have discussed the
developments of the Single European Railway Area with sector representatives on
an on-going basis. In 2010-2011 it conducted also an ex post evaluation of Regulation
881/2004 establishing the Agency and its functioning[12]. In order to support the Commission in the IA process, an
external consultant was tasked to prepare an IA support study[13]
and to undertake a targeted consultation of stakeholders. The targeted
consultation of interested parties started on 18 November 2011 with an internet
survey which finished on 30 December 2011. It was followed by interviews with
the most significant stakeholders[14] and a stakeholder workshop in February 2012. Given the technical nature of the
initiative, no open public consultation was carried out. However, the
Commission has taken care that all interested parties and Member States have
been consulted in due time and that discussions have covered all the key
elements of the initiative. Therefore the minimum consultation standards of the
Commission have been met. Summary of
main conclusions In
general stakeholders agreed with the initial set of problems as proposed by the
Commission[15].
The results of the consultation show that there is partial consensus on the
objectives and possible new roles of the Agency. It seems evident that
currently there is no support for ERA's involvement in the market access
sphere, thus transfer of competences from the Regulatory Bodies to the Agency
is excluded at this stage and will not be analysed in this impact assessment. On
the other hand, there is support for higher involvement of ERA in the
functioning of the NSAs and, to lesser extent, also of the Notified Bodies. In
particular, the engagement of the Agency in the processes of granting of safety
certificates and vehicle authorisations – currently performed by the NSAs – was
supported. All
the top-up measures complementing the options on the institutional role of ERA
(such as dissemination of railway-related information and training, support in
implementing the EU legislation and migrating from national systems to the
system of EU rules) were evaluated positively by the stakeholders. Annex
V provides more information on stakeholder consultation. 2.3 Consultation of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) This
impact assessment was reviewed by the Commission IAB on 5 September 2012. Based
on the Board's recommendations, the impact assessment has been revised
according to the following lines: -
more
concrete evidence and statistical data supporting the argument that the
existing system works in a sub-optimal manner were added or moved from the
Annexes into the body of the text (e.g. costs and timescales of procedures in
different Member States, comparative statistics per MS relating to penetration
by new entrants, number of persons working in different national institutions,
number of national rules, limited monitoring responsibilities of ERA); -
expected
synergies from other elements of the 4th Railway Package were added
and indirect impacts clarified; -
the
core measures common to options 2-5 were described in more detail and clarified
regarding their differentiation; option 6, its individual measures and the link
with other options were better explained; -
likely
implementation problems of the preferred option were assessed and added (in Annex
VIII); -
the
methodology regarding the assessment of impacts was clarified and better explained;
its logic was reinforced by better cross-referencing; -
calculation
regarding staffing needs for the institutions concerned under different options
was explained; -
better
distinction between administrative costs for economic actors (railway
operators) and the cost of public administration (national authorities, ERA and
the Commission) was made; -
the
summary and overview tables in section 7 were explained and cross-references
with previous sections added; -
the
relevant monitoring indicators were added by linking them with existing targets
for operational objectives (number of national rules, cost and duration of
certification and authorisation procedures); -
indication
that the founding ERA Regulation will be revised to include an obligation to
undertake regular evaluations of the functioning and delivery of the Agency by
the Commission was added; -
information
on stakeholders' consultation was improved by adding specific views of
different stakeholder groups, including national authorities.
3
Problem definition
3.1 Description of the current framework The legal framework Over the years national rail networks have
developed different technical specifications for infrastructure and rolling
stock[16]
making it more difficult and more costly to run a train from one country to
another. Also different national rules – often overly complicated and not
transparent – act as a major hindrance for new railway companies looking to
establish themselves on the market, or indeed for any company wanting to use
rail infrastructure in different countries. The creation of an integrated European
railway area, which intensified with the adoption of the second railway package
in 2004, called for harmonised safety rules and improved
"interoperability”[17]
– or technical compatibility – of infrastructure, rolling stock, signalling and
other part of the rail system, as well as less complex procedures for approving
rolling stock for use across the European rail network. Specific EU legislation
exists to promote consistent approach to interoperability and safety and overcome
national differences. The main legislative act in force in the
field of safety is the railway Safety Directive and in the field of interoperability
- a recast of the Interoperability Directive. The Safety Directive applies to the railway
system of Member States and covers safety requirements for the system as a
whole, including infrastructure and traffic management, and the interaction between
railway undertakings and infrastructure managers. In this respect, the
Directive focuses on four major aspects: ·
setting up, in each Member State, of an
authority responsible for supervising safety; ·
safety certificates delivered in Member States
that are necessary for railway undertakings to be granted access to railway
infrastructure; ·
establishment of common safety indicators (CSIs)
in order to assess that the system complies with the common safety targets
(CSTs) and facilitate the monitoring of railway safety performance; ·
definition of common rules for safety
investigations. The Interoperability Directive aims at
accelerating integration of the EU rail network through increased technical
harmonisation, guaranteeing a high level of safety. It establishes conditions
to be fulfilled to achieve interoperability within the EU rail system at the
design, construction, placing into service, upgrading, renewal, operation and
maintenance stages. The gradual implementation of interoperability of the rail
system is pursued through the harmonisation of technical standards. Thus this
directive covers: ·
essential requirements with regard to safety,
reliability, human health, environmental protection and technical compatibility
of the system; ·
the technical specifications for
interoperability (TSIs) adopted for each subsystem or part of subsystem
pursuant to this directive; ·
the corresponding European specifications. The institutional
framework In order to
ensure a safe and interoperable EU railway sector, the second railway package
has created a decentralised system of railway authorities covering a number of
railway institutions with different roles and responsibilities. It includes
today:[18] ·
the National Safety Authorities (NSAs),
responsible, inter alia, for granting safety certificates for railway
undertakings and safety authorisations for infrastructure managers, and
authorising the placing in service of railway vehicles and subsystems[19]; ·
the Notified Bodies (NoBos), responsible mainly
for conformity assessment of rail vehicles and subsystems, after having
verified their compliance with the relevant Technical Specifications for
Interoperability (TSIs); ·
the Designated Bodies (DeBos), responsible for
conformity assessment in the case of national rules which are still applicable
(TSI open points, specific cases, derogations); ·
the National Investigation Bodies (NIB),
responsible for investigating serious railway accidents; ·
the Regulatory Bodies, responsible for ensuring
a fair and non-discriminatory access to the rail network and services. In addition, the ERA Regulation has
established the European Railway Agency ('ERA' or the 'Agency'), which plays a
central role in promoting interoperability and safety and harmonising technical
specifications, a process in which cooperation between the above-mentioned
institutions of EU Member States and rail stakeholders is essential. To this
end, the activities performed by ERA aim at: –
developing, promoting and monitoring a common EU
approach to safety management and governance across the Agency stakeholders. –
improving the interoperability of the European
rail system by developing the conditions for the free and uninterrupted
movement of trains through technical and operational harmonisation, including
conditions for mutual acceptance of railway vehicles. To this end, ERA develops
common technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) and common safety
methods and targets (CSMs and CSTs), working closely with stakeholders from the
rail sector, national authorities, the EU institutions and other interested
parties; organising and facilitating the exchange of
information within the railway sector by networking with national bodies,
providing registers and databases, issuing reports and giving guidance on the
implementation of the regulatory framework. Notwithstanding its important role in
creation of the European railway interoperability and safety legislation, it
is, however, evident that currently ERA does not have any major control and
oversight powers with regard to national railway authorities, infrastructure
managers or market players. Its monitoring responsibilities are practically limited
to monitoring of safety performance (through collecting and publishing common
safety indicators and facilitating cooperation between the NSAs and NIBs) and of
interoperability (through publication of regular reports on progress with
interoperability in the EU). 3.2 Description
of the problem It must be stressed that, following the
introduction of the respective railway packages, the level of railway safety
(measured by indicators like number of accidents and fatalities) has gradually
increased. Therefore, safety levels, as such, are not addressed by this IA. However, the Commission has received
frequent complaints that the system of railway authorities described above,
while intended to cater for the still remaining technical differences between
national railway systems, incorporates barriers of different natures that contribute,
among other reasons, to the low degree of efficiency and competitiveness of
rail sector as illustrated by the problem tree of the 4th Railway Package. While
in some Member States the national authorities function in general efficiently,
in others the procedures which they manage are long and costly; this is partly
linked with their inadequate resources. At the same time, the interoperability
and safety requirements, which in principle should have been aligned by common
EU rules, still diverge significantly at the national level. The latter
obstacles hamper in particular the processes leading to the delivery by NSAs of
the safety certificates and the vehicle authorisations (see in this respect
Annex III). During evaluation of ERA and its founding
Regulation (2010-2011), stakeholders expressed, in general, their support in relation
to extension of competences of the Agency at the expense of existing national
institutions[20]; this stemmed largely from their perception of ineffective
functioning of the current model of the EU internal railway market. Therefore, it can be claimed that the
existing system works in a sub-optimal manner, and there is a room for
improvement in particular regarding the operating conditions and administrative
costs for railway undertakings; more evidence will be provided in the sections
below. The above is especially relevant for the
freight transport. The rail freight market has been opened for a number of
years[21], and therefore the continuous relatively low level of competition, higher
prices and market distortions could stem (together with other factors targeted
by other 4th Package initiatives) also from technical and administrative
barriers. Additionally, the new entrants are relatively more vulnerable to
complexity and delays in procedures, since their human and financial resources
are often limited. As indicated in section 1 above, the
present IA report will focus on optimising administrative procedures and
tackling various barriers, while ensuring that existing safety levels will not
be altered. 3.2.1 Long and costly procedures As illustrated in the box below, the
stakeholders complained that the procedures foreseen under the current
institutional set up, especially to obtain authorisation for a railway vehicle
and safety certificate for railway undertaking, are costly and long. This
constitutes an important factor hindering the development of the EU railway
market and its efficient functioning. Besides being complicated and slow, these
procedures do not guarantee sufficient level of mutual recognition of safety certificates
and vehicle authorisations. This negatively affects particularly new companies
wishing to enter into the market, thus contributing to a low level of
competition and lasting market distortions. Additionally, the range of fees
differs significantly among Member States and can be very costly: -
a cost of a safety certificate may be from 0€ up
to 70 000€[22]; -
total costs for an additional vehicle authorisation
can vary between 900 000€ up to 2 €M per locomotive type[23]. EXAMPLES: The procedure to receive an authorisation
for a railway vehicle can last up to 2 years and cost up to €6 million (in case
of new locomotive authorisation in its first country). One stakeholder provided
figures regarding the second authorisation of a locomotive equipped with ETCS
(European Train Control System): procedural authorisation costs are equal to
about 10% of costs of the locomotive per country; in the case where a
locomotive is to be used in three Member States, the overall costs would
increase by about 30% (without taking into account the costs of different ETCS
systems to be installed). [source: IA support study of SDG, 2012] The Safety Directive requires railway
undertakings from January 1st 2011 to hold a safety certificate in order to be
granted access to the railway infrastructure; the NSAs are responsible for
issuing them. In one EU Member State, on December 1st 2010, an NSA handled only
114 out of 348 outstanding requests. Due to this delay a transitional
arrangement had to be introduced that allows railway undertakings (RUs) to
continue their operations if they had requested the new safety certificate
before January 1st 2011. Additionally, RUs are required to pay the NSA for the
cost of the approval process. Some RUs had to invest 2 man-years and to pay up
to €70,000 for administrative and advisory costs. Representatives of RUs
reported that these costs created a high market entry barrier in particular for
small RUs. Stakeholders have also mentioned problems of the approach adopted by
this NSA (very judicial in nature and not sufficiently focused on understanding
whether technical details can be overcome in a simple manner) which is common
in relation to vehicle authorisation process. In addition, many stakeholders
have mentioned that they have not launched an appeal against the decisions of the
NSSA for fear of problems in future with other authorisations/certificates.
[source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] An operator from one EU Member State has
stated that it would have cost them approximately €30 million to get its high
speed trains approved in another Member State, and so decided to abandon the
authorisation process (one can assume, however, that this amount would probably
include retrofitting of locomotives not compliant with the present TSIs).
[source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] 3.2.2 Access barriers, especially
for new entrants Besides the issue of inefficient
administrative procedures, stakeholders complained that national railway
authorities may use technical arguments and a legacy of diverging and not
always transparent national rules as an access barrier for companies wishing to
enter the railway market (new entrants). In this broad "new entrants"
category the most potential can be unleashed from expected new cross-border
operations, i.e. starting new railway operating in another Member State by a company already established elsewhere in the EU. Currently (2010), in case of
rail freight the level of penetration by new entrants varies in Member States
from 0 to 55%[24].
According to the results of the targeted
consultation, new entrants may inter alia face discrimination from NSAs when
applying for safety certificate or during vehicle authorisation processes.[25] Stakeholders reported more
specifically that the processes leading to the delivery of safety certificate
and vehicle authorisation are not sufficiently harmonised and transparent to
prevent arbitrary and discriminative decisions by NSAs. This situation poses a significant problem
for those who would like to start offering railway services, either as a newly
established company or as an existing company wishing to start its operation in
another Member State. EXAMPLES: The bureaucracy involved in the market
entry process in one EU Member State was identified by a study of the Finnish
Rail Administration (2009) as the main barrier for entry for new railway
undertakings; this is also often the case in other Member States. The network
statement[26]
proves not helpful for new entrants, and the process for acquiring the
necessary licences and permits requires a great deal of effort. It was reported
that legally set periods for issuing certificates and authorisations are
systematically circumvented by the NSA of this Member State through requests for
additional documentations and tests. This can be at least partly attributed to
budget constraints and understaffing of the NSA. In order to perform its duties
more effectively, the NSA considers that it would need twice as many staff as is
currently employed. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] Moreover, poor quality of national law and
unclear system of rules act as barriers for new entrants. In one Member State, both the NSA and the railway undertaking indicated this was an issue, as the
translation of EU legislation is generally poor and leaves substantial gaps.
The railway undertaking also stated that there are diverging interpretations of
the same rule from different institutions, and that they incur loss of time and
money, due to the lack of clarity and consistency of rules and interpretations
generated by the lack of clarity and gaps left in domestic legislation.
[source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] In 2010-2011 a well-known case arose
concerning authorisation of rolling stock of a new entrant in one Member State. A new company wanted to enter the market using spare Class 66 locomotives
from their operations elsewhere. The NSA of the Member State in question
refused to accept the locomotives on the basis of a safety rule which required
the driver's seat to be on the right side of the cab (the UK 66s have the
driver's seat on the left). The railway undertaking resorted to a complaint to
the European Commission. The NSA abandoned its position after the European
Commission, following a technical opinion from ERA, issued a decision refusing
the draft safety rule and instructing the NSA to accept the locomotives. The
Commission pointed out that, since the class 66 locomotive was already approved
for use in the UK and in France, then, per Directive 2008/57/EC on
Interoperability, there should be no reason to decline approval for its use in another
Member State. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012; minutes
of the Railway Safety and Interoperability Committee ] 3.3 The problem drivers The problem
tree below shows the root causes of problems described above. Figure 3‑1:
Problems and drivers 3.3.1 Ineffective
functioning of national railway institutions This concerns predominantly the NSAs and
NoBos. As described in the ERA Interoperability
Report[27],
differences in size of NSAs may reflect their different responsibilities, and
the size of the respective railways. Number of staff involved in
interoperability issues varies from 1 person in case of some smaller Member
States up to 162 in Germany (data from 2010). However, the sheer size of the
railway market in a given country cannot alone explain these huge differences;
in some cases the NSAs seem not to effectively perform their tasks due to
insufficient staffing. Other issues of concern for NSAs are the
independence of decision making staff and their level of technical capability.
Sometimes large part of technical staff is on secondment from incumbent
operator and some stakeholders have questioned whether this can compromise
their independence. Similar observations can be found
in a study commissioned by the European Railway Agency[28]: different NSAs
have different approaches regarding two crucial processes, the issuing of
safety certificates and vehicle authorisations. This is determined either by:
divergent interpretation of EU legislation or by different operating
approaches, technical capabilities and the amount of resources dedicated to
these activities. The IA support study has found that some of
the authorities described in section 3.1, and the NSAs in particular, may not
be properly equipped to face the growing tasks. This includes insufficient
human and financial resources and, occasionally, lack of enforcement powers. The NoBos are the first level of checking
technical compliance of interoperability constituents and railway sub-systems,
especially crucial in the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)[29] field. NoBos are not present
in all Member States and competition between them is on a regional rather than
a European scale. Even if Directive 2008/57 defines minimum criteria for
Members States when notifying the NoBos, their operation and functioning differ
due to diverging national backgrounds and a lack of detailed accreditation
criteria. Given that the quality of work of some
NoBos has been questioned by NSAs, the validity of their certificates is not
recognised; this is especially problematic in relation to ERTMS. As a
consequence the NSAs require the verifications to be repeated, contrary to
Articles 11 and 16 of Directive 2008/57/EC. During stakeholder consultation, 23%
respondents indicated that NSAs operate 'very or rather ineffectively' and
around 40% rated them as ‘neither efficient nor inefficient’. Furthermore, 63%
agreed that that there is a lack of sufficient financial or human resources in
case of NSAs, and 34% in case of NoBos. In addition, 43% agreed that the NSAs
are insufficiently independent of infrastructure managers, the incumbent
railway undertaking, the ministry and/or other actors, which can have a
negative impact on the efficiency and impartiality of these authorities. Sub-optimal operation of the national
authorities has a direct negative impact on the smooth functioning of the
integrated EU railway system resulting in: ·
longer times to obtain vehicle authorisations
and safety certificates, which drives up the costs for the sector, including
the lost opportunity costs; ·
access barriers. EXAMPLES: Capital costs immobilised due to long
authorisation processes are very significant for the railway industry. One of
the leading European train manufacturers estimates that these costs amount to
more than €100 million per year for the concerned company. This can be
attributed largely to ineffective functioning of national institutions, namely
the NSAs. [source: information provided at UNIFE General Assembly in Copenhagen, 14 June 2012[30]]
The NSA and Regulatory Body (one
institution) of one EU Member State is heavily under-resourced
financially, making it unable to attract sufficient staff with the right qualifications. This has a negative impact on its performance. As of 23/01/2012, its website showed 36
job adverts (out of a total of 180
Full Time Equivalent posts -
20% of the current workforce). Moreover,
the poor situation of the NSA is even more apparent when figures on staff
numbers and budget are compared with those of other regulatory bodies in this Member State. They show that, despite other regulatory bodies having similar remits in
terms of scope (they are either market regulators or safety authorities, or
both), their budgets are much higher than the one of the NSA. The most
meaningful comparison can be made with the aviation market and safety regulator:
its 2011 budget was almost 80% higher than the NSA's, with the aviation
regulator employing 2.3 times as many employees as its railway counterpart in
2009. It must be noted that railway transport has a higher modal share than air
transport in this Member State. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG,
2012] 3.3.2 Discrimination against new
entrants by national institutions This problem driver predominantly concerns
the NSAs. The current approach to safety certification and vehicle authorisation
should in principle allow the free provision of rail services and circulation
of trains across the EU. It is based on the principle of mutual acceptance of the
Part A certificate[31]
regarding the safety management system, granted by individual NSAs to railway
undertakings, and requires that NSAs work at similar level of performance. The
effectiveness of this approach has recently been questioned by many
stakeholders (especially new entrants) given the de facto reluctance of
NSAs to accept Part A certificates granted by other NSAs. This leads to
additional checks and increases time and cost burdens for rail operators. The problem of possible discrimination can
have both a national and cross border dimension when NSAs are sometimes more
reluctant to grant the safety certificates and vehicle authorisations to new
national or foreign entrants in comparison with granting them to a national
incumbent railway company. In addition, stakeholders claim that some
NSAs adopt and impose on all operators the technical standards (rules) used by
the incumbent and fail to consult all railway undertakings when making key
decisions. They are also reported to lack independence. The latter is
particularly the case for NSAs that are part of wider transport or railway
authorities, which also include the Regulatory Body. In these circumstances, launching
appeals against perceived misconducts and discriminations can be difficult and
ineffective. 50% of the association representatives questioned
during the stakeholder consultation responded that there is discrimination by
NSAs, suggesting that this is an issue of concern. A similar, but not such a common, situation
may occur in relation to NoBos discriminating against some actors when it comes
to the conformity assessment. Such discrimination can take a form of prolonging
the procedure and/or refusing to issue the certificate without legitimate
grounds. EXAMPLES: A new entrant on the market of an EU Member
State has been seeking authorisation for passenger rolling stock for services
that will commence in 2012. Following initial testing, the new entrant asked the
NSA to be able to start carrying out authorisation testing for its new rolling
stock. The NSA instructed the national infrastructure manager (IM) to provide the
new entrant with appropriate paths to be able to carry out its testing
programme. After a number of attempts at arranging these paths the IM formally
refused to allow testing on its network. Subsequently the new entrant asked the
Ministry of Transport to intervene, which lead to the Ministry directing the IM
to allow the new entrant to reserve and use paths on its network. It should be
noted that many staff members of the NSA in this country are seconded and paid
by the IM. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] In the NSA of an EU Member State about 50% of their technical staff (40 persons) are (in the 1st half of 2012) on secondment from the incumbent rail operator. This might give rise to concern about staff loyalties and impartiality. It should be also added that, according to
a national law from 1997, the principal state railway undertaking has the role
of a "delegated infrastructure manager" in relation to most functions
of infrastructure management and maintenance. [source: Case studies, IA support
study of SDG, 2012] The European Rail Freight Association
(ERFA), in an open letter to the UK Parliament concerning the consultation
process that preceded the Recast of the First Railway Directive raised the
issue of possible discrimination against new entrants. It reported that “in
some Member States, safety certification is abused as an instrument to
foreclose the national market” (quoting the Poland Class 66 example) and that
often “there is no appeal body to prevent Member States and their public authorities
to abuse safety for anti-competitive purposes”. According to ERFA “in some
Member States, the national flag carrier is even tolerated to operate without a
valid safety certificate (e.g. Hungary) whilst new entrants are forced to go
through lengthy and unclear safety certification processes”. Another issue
claimed by this organisation is “the restriction of the safety certification
for RUs to single or a restricted number of lines of the network (as it is the
case with Belgium and France)”. [source: letter from ERFA to the House of
Lords, 2009[32]] 3.3.3 Patchwork of national regulatory regimes and rules Railway undertakings operating in EU still
face a patchwork of divergent national regulations and rules. On the one hand
this stems from the legacy of historical national laws and rules, but on the
other hand from divergent interpretation and transposition of the EU railway acquis. Legacy of divergent national rail
systems Various national rail networks have grown
and evolved heterogeneously over the past century and relevant national
technical and safety rules were put in place when no relevant EU rules existed.
Recital 21 of Directive 2008/57/EC states that “steps should be taken to avoid
a situation where Member States adopt new national rules or undertake projects
that increase the diversity of the present system.” However, experience
demonstrates that national rules still represent an obstacle to
interoperability within the Single European Railway Area as well as a
complication for new entrants, especially from other Member States. In that
sense, some of those rules can be regarded as discriminatory practice, leading
to distortion of competition. As already mentioned it also happens that
national authorities (predominantly NSAs) take decisions and introduce new
technical and safety rules without proper consultation with all interested
parties, especially without the participation of new entrants. According to the
calculations of ERA, there are currently over 11 000 national rules in the EU[33]. In addition, as far as the vehicle authorisations issued by the
NSAs are concerned, in a large majority of cases national legislations require
additional authorisations.[34]
In result, as the ERA “Report on Railway Vehicle Authorisation” (2011)[35]
indicates, the total additional authorisation costs amount to around €1.6 million
per vehicle.[36] The Commission has been alerted many times
by stakeholders, especially by recently established private companies, that
action at EU level is needed in that regard[37]. This
is confirmed by the results of stakeholder consultation, where the majority of
respondents agreed that "national technical and safety rules sometimes
pose transparency and/or discrimination problems to new entrants". EXAMPLES: Following a major rail accident in 2009, the
NSA of the country involved took a decision to introduce tougher inspections
for the transport of dangerous goods; in particular, the decision required
extraordinary checks on wagons fitted with wheel sets having the same
characteristics of the ones involved in the accident, before allowing them to
run on the network of the Member State in question. A railway undertaking from
another Member State applied against this decision to a regional administrative
court, being the imposition of an unplanned and unjust national rule, but the
appeal was rejected. The NSA insisted that these norms were urgent and
temporary, that they were not National Safety Rules and therefore there was no
obligation of notification and consultation according to Directive 2004/49. [source:
Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] A joint working group, including
representatives from industry, operators and authorities, was created in a Member State to address problems with train authorisation and, as a result, a “Manual on
Rolling Stock” was produced. However, this manual covers neither the entire
national legal framework of the rolling stock authorisation process nor the
entire framework of the European directive on interoperability on this issue
(2008/57/EC) and hence is not compliant with it. For example, according to the
manual, 16 different actors are involved in the authorisation process, although
the interoperability directive envisages only 5 actors. Another difference is
the project-based approach described in the manual, which involves the RU as a
main actor in the authorisation process. In contrast, the Interoperability
Directive describes a product–based approach, in which the manufacturer may
place on the market already authorised design types. Even though the transparency
of the whole process has increased with the manual, it is evident that
different rules and regulatory regimes still overlap. [source: Case studies, IA
support study of SDG, 2012] Divergent
interpretation of EU railway legislation by national authorities The directives leave Member States with a
room of manoeuvre to adapt EU laws to national circumstances. However,
sometimes transposition and implementation deviates too much from what has been
provided by EU law, and thus become counterproductive to the objectives of the
common legislation. There are also cases where EU legislation has been applied erroneously.
This makes the regulatory system of EU railways unnecessarily complex leading
to negative market consequences, such as higher costs for manufacturers of
equipment and railway undertakings, and fragmentation of markets. According to the majority of stakeholders
(62% of those expressing a view on this point) the divergent interpretation of
EU railway directives hinders their proper implementation. The main victims of
this situation are usually new entrants, both national and foreign, who can be
confronted with unknown situations in each of the Member States where they wish
to operate. Moreover, the
current level of monitoring and control of implementation of the
interoperability and safety legislation by Member States is not sufficient.
This is due to unwillingness of railway undertakings, especially new entrants,
to lodge formal complaints against national authorities for fear of possible
future retaliatory actions. This in turn leads to the Commission lacking a
sufficient formal basis and/or evidence, and combined with the limited
resources available, results in a sub-optimal level of European control. Finally, the Member States themselves admit
that there are sometimes problems with the implementation of the EU railway
legislation, and have called the Commission to provide more assistance and
support. Those problems of implementation may stem from lack of sufficient
resources, defence of vested national interests by some companies and
institutions, or the highly complex nature of some EU rules. EXAMPLES: Stakeholders have indicated (in a survey
from late 2011 – beginning 2012) that railway laws in one Member State have been known to favour the incumbent undertakings. They have also indicated that their
point of view is not taken into account during the consultation phase of the
drafting of new legislation. Moreover, the NSA has indicated that the Ministry
of Transport does not often take into account its opinions, as the procedure
for drafting new laws does not require it to do so. This is despite the fact
that the NSA is at the same time the regulatory body responsible for upholding
and executing the law drafted by the Ministry. On top of this, the NSA is aware
of many examples where the EU law was incorrectly transposed into national law
or the national laws passed had unnecessarily strict regulations; it is,
however, unable to revert this situation which is in hands of the competent
Ministry. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] The Safety Directive of 2004 was transposed
to national law of an EU Member State by a legal measure of 2007. This national
legal measure excludes railway undertakings that are exclusively operating on
regional networks from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate and de
facto derogates regional lines from the scope of the Directive. Such
interpretation is in contradiction with the letter and the spirit of the
Directive; it might have arisen, though, due to erroneous translation of the
Directive into national language. [source: Case studies, IA support study of
SDG, 2012] In a Member State, one railway undertaking
signalled (during a survey from late 2011 – beginning 2012) major delays in
gaining approval of a new locomotive class. Following contact between two of
these locomotives and station platforms, the NSA refused to permit further test
runs. However, the undertaking informed that survey work ascertained that the
platforms did not comply with TSIs, despite the route being declared to be
TSI-compliant. Furthermore, 90% of such platforms were allegedly found to be
non-compliant. The issue of platform gauging was also reported to have been
raised in an international forum by the locomotive manufacturer as being its
biggest issue in getting approvals in this Member State. [source: Case studies,
IA support study of SDG, 2012] 3.4 The Most affected stakeholders and their views on problem elements This initiative affects the ERA, the
Commission, national authorities (NSAs and NoBos) and railway stakeholders
(predominantly railway undertakings, but also infrastructure managers and
railway manufacturers). It indirectly impacts rail users, i.e. passengers and
clients of freight services. In general, the stakeholder consultation
confirmed the elements of the problem drivers described above, as illustrated
in the figure below. Figure 3‑2:
Stakeholder views on different problem elements. 3.5 Baseline
scenario The baseline developments could affect the
problem drivers identified above in following ways: Inefficient
functioning of national authorities and discrimination of new entrants ·
the recent adoption of the recast of the 1st
Rail Package will have a direct (although not immediate) positive effect on the
independence and powers of Regulatory Bodies and should also decrease some
barriers to access to rail related services for operators. ·
improved staff resources in the NSAs, as at
least 2 NSAs are currently addressing this issue through more vigorous
recruitment. Other NSAs are likely to take similar measures in the coming years;
this should have an impact on the time to market of operators as a result of
relieving the bottlenecks at NSAs relating to staffing. Patchwork of national legislative regimes ·
the possibility of extension of the scope of the
technical specification of interoperability (TSI) to the lines beyond the TEN-T
network (but with no retroactive clauses) would lead to further harmonisation
of technical rules applying to networks and rail equipment; this in turn would
mean that manufacturers will have less opportunity to customise their equipment,
and costs for rail undertakings and local authorities can be assumed to decrease. ·
an improved understanding of railway directives
and regulations through the publication of Commission recommendations and
guidelines e.g. the Commission Recommendation 2011/217/EU on the authorisation
for the placing in service of structural subsystems and vehicles and its
follow-up (which is currently being prepared by the Agency). These documents cover
in greater detail the manner in which Member States should implement
legislation. ·
improved coherence of EU rail market as a result
of continuing implementation of the Railway Directives. Some Member States have
so far failed to properly implement the Safety and Interoperability Directives.
For example, Germany has not yet transposed the Interoperability Directive of
2008, and is thus subject to an infringement proceeding. As part of this
baseline scenario, the impact assessment calculations have assumed that all
Member States will have implemented these Directives by 2015. ·
the on-going process of reducing existing national
rules should provide limited progress, especially in relation to vehicle authorisation
rules. The Agency, based on the input from Member States, is identifying
and classifying these rules with a view to their reduction within the EU-wide
cross-acceptance process. A similar process, albeit at an early stage of
development and of a non-binding character, is taking place in relation to
national safety rules[38]. The above developments should provide some
overall positive results. It is estimated that by 2025 the measures in place
will close the gap between average authorisation costs and presumed
minimum achievable authorisation costs[39]
by over 30%[40].
However the Commission is ready to consider further action to achieve even
quicker and more profound progress, following the request of the stakeholders
and the needs of railway sector. 3.6 Subsidiarity 3.6.1 Legal basis Articles 58,
90 and 100 of the Treaty extend to railways the objectives of a genuine
internal market in the context of a Common EU Transport Policy. 3.6.2 Necessity and EU added
value Actions by Member States alone cannot
ensure the coherence of EU railway market and address the divergent
interpretation of the legislation. The continuing application of national rules
and sub-optimal functioning of national institutions, acting as barriers to the
internal market, is in fact at the centre of the problem. Action at EU level aims to ensure
consistent implementation of the EU rail acquis, which should lead to
creation of the Single European Railway Area with no unnecessary administrative
and technical barriers. The aim is to enable railway undertakings to benefit
from a single consolidated legislative framework and to face predictable
business conditions throughout the EU.
4
Objectives
4.1 General objective Eliminate existing administrative and
technical barriers thereby enhancing
the competitiveness of rail sector vis-à-vis other modes and developing further the Single European Rail
Area. The 2011 White
Paper foresees progressive modal shift from the air and road sectors, so that
by 2050 the majority of medium-distance passenger transport would be carried by
rail. Similar goals are set for rail freight. This modal shift will contribute
to the 20% reduction of GHG emissions foreseen in the Europe 2020 Agenda for
smart, sustainable and innovative growth, and to the objective of reducing
transport CO2 emissions by 60% (compared to 1990 baseline) by 2050. Together with
the other initiatives of the 4th rail package, the present impact
assessment shall identify the most suitable policy option(s) needed to reach
the above-described general objective. To this aim, the general objective has
been split down into specific and operational objectives. 4.2 Specific objectives SO1: Facilitate entrance of new operators into market SO2: Reduce
administrative costs of railway undertakings 4.3 Operational objectives OO1: Increase the efficiency of the safety certification and
vehicle authorisation processes OO2: Ensure non-discrimination in the
granting and recognition of safety certificates and interoperability
authorisations across the EU OO3: Increase the
coherence of the national legal frameworks, notably related to the safety and
interoperability aspects of the internal market for railways The operational objectives seek to tackle the problems created by the
barriers in three areas: ·
economically - by
increasing efficiency of the processes; ·
institutionally - by
ensuring non-discrimination; and ·
legally - by ensuring
that the framework is correct. The specific
objectives have been confirmed by the views of the stakeholders: ·
OO1: 84% agreed
that it is relevant; ·
OO2: 88% agreed
that it is relevant; ·
OO3: 83% agreed
that it is relevant. The specific and
operational objectives are linked to the identified problems and drivers as
follows: Figure 4-1: Links between the problems
and objectives The following
targets have been set for the operational objectives: ·
(a) to achieve, by
2025, the removal of all unnecessary national rules (cf. OO3) ·
(b) to achieve, by
2025, a 20% reduction in the time to market for new railway undertakings above
the baseline situation in 2025 (cf. OO1 and OO2) ·
(c) to achieve, by
2025, a 20% reduction in the cost and duration of the authorisation of rolling
stock above the baseline situation in 2025 (cf. OO1 and OO2) The
chosen target date of 2025 would be challenging but potentially achievable. Based
on experiences with the recast of the first Railway Package, a target date of 2020
was discarded. The legislative process would take several years. The new
provisions could enter into force in 2015 at the earliest, which if the 2020
target was used would effectively leave only 5 years for the provisions to be
applied and to start having an effect on the market. As a result, a timeframe
of 10 years from the entry into law date (2015 to 2025) seems more appropriate.
The
targets to the operational objectives have been subject to consultation with
the stakeholders[41]: ·
58% agreed that
target (b) is relevant and 54% that it is achievable; ·
71% agreed that
target (c) is relevant and 59% that it is achievable. Stakeholders
were originally also consulted on target "To achieve, by 2025, a 25%
market share by new entrants in the rail freight market", but this target
was removed due to inconclusive support and its indirect link to the core
problems. It was subsequently replaced by the current target (a) which became
apparent during the interviews with stakeholders and is of high relevance to
the problems identified.
5
Policy options
5.1 Identification of possible policy measures The analysis of the Commission, the
external consultants and the stakeholder consultation has enabled the identification
of a broad set of measures having the potential to address the problem drivers
described above. As the first step, stakeholders have assessed the individual
policy measures. Subsequently, the measures underwent a qualitative review and
assessment. In effect, a number of individual measures were discarded because: -
either they have received a decisively negative
response from stakeholders, -
they are not implementable, or -
they can be/are being covered by other EU
legislation. The discarded measures include, inter alia,
any extension of competences of ERA in the field of market oversight (task of
Regulatory Bodies) and taking over the competences of the notified bodies. At the end, any additional measures that
were not foreseen in the survey, but that have been identified as result of
stakeholder feedback, were added, and the measures that would be more
appropriately considered collectively were combined. The full list of measures and the details
of the screening process are provided in Annex VI. 5.2 Description of the policy
options 5.2.1 Construction and content of
the policy options Based on the screening of individual
measures, the Commission has identified five policy packages (options 2-6),
besides the baseline scenario. By construction, options 2-5 primarily concern
the level of interaction between ERA and national authorities, and are all
capable of tackling the three operational objectives set out in section 4.
Option 6 is a set of horizontal measures, which are mostly independent of the
interactions between ERA and national authorities, and can be applied on top of
any of the options 2-5, with expected reinforcement of the overall final
impact. Impacts of the policy options are expected
to be further reinforced by synergies with the other initiatives in the 4th
Rail Package. The policy options identified are the
following: Option 1: Baseline scenario (do nothing) – continuing on the path that is currently set out for
the sector, including developments described in section 3.5 Option 2: Greater coordination role for
the Agency in ensuring a consistent approach to
certification of railway undertakings and vehicle authorisation Option 3: ERA as a one-stop-shop, where the final decision on certification and authorisation
remains with the NSAs, but ERA performs entry and exit checks of applications
and of the decisions taken. Option 4: ERA & NSAs share
competencies, where the final decision on
certification and authorisation is taken by the Agency. Option 5: ERA takes over activities of
NSAs in relation to certification of railway
undertakings and vehicle authorisation. Option 6: Horizontal measures, which includes other legislative and soft measures (beyond sharing
the responsibilities between national authorities and ERA) that could be
implemented in the domain of interoperability and safety to improve the
competitiveness of the rail sector. A table showing all the policy options
together with individual policy measures is given below. Table 5-1:
Summary of policy options Option 1 || Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination” over NSAs || Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop || Option 4: ERA & NSAs share competencies || Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs Baseline || Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NSAs regarding granting of vehicle authorisations & safety certificates including ensuring their mutual recognition by national authorities. || ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of safety certificates to the railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations ("one stop shop" concept): the decision is taken by NSA, ERA performs "entry and exit" checks of the application. || ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of safety certificates & vehicle authorisations: a "one stop shop" concept with the NSAs (acting as regional offices of ERA) contributing but the final decision rests with ERA. || ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations. ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of NSAs Migration to a single (common) safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): national authorities issue single safety certificates & single vehicle authorisations (mutually recognised by definition) || Migration to a single (common) safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): ERA issues single safety certificates and single vehicle authorisations (Appeals to ERA decisions are sent to a separate appeal body) Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (e.g. developing guidelines & auditing adherence to them). Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of NoBos. Option 6: horizontal measures (independent of the level of interaction ERA/national authorities) || Strengthened action by the Commission outside infringement procedure, notably on non-discrimination in the railway market Amendment of the interoperability and safety directives to enable the adoption of implementing acts setting out common principles & practices for national authorities Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring and control of implementation of national safety and interoperability legislation Migrating from national technical & safety rules to a system of EU rules (requirement for national authorities to remove unnecessary rules and limiting their possibility of adopting new rules). Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training. Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice & support for Member States & other stakeholders in implementing legislation on safety & interoperability Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws & decisions (including TSIs) Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area 5.2.2 Core measures for options
2-5 Options 2-5 contain a number of core
measures which concern similar issues, although with a differentiation
according to magnitude of involvement of ERA. These measures address the
challenges which were identified in the impact assessment process as crucial
for the internal railway market and for the stakeholders, and at the same time
have the biggest potential for cost savings. The core measures are: ·
An enhanced role of ERA in the safety certification
process, varying from ensuring mutual recognition of safety certificates by
national authorities (option 2) up to issuing single safety certificates
entirely by ERA (option 5); the overall aim is to ensure that a railway
undertaking is certified, it is allowed to operate in all Member States without
additional administrative hurdles. ·
An enhanced role of ERA in the vehicle
authorisation process, varying from ensuring mutual recognition of vehicle
authorisations by national authorities (option 2) up to issuing single vehicle
authorisations (European passports for vehicles) entirely by ERA (option 5);
the overall aim is to ensure that once authorised, a railway vehicle does not
need further authorisations to be placed in service in other Member States and
can circulate freely in the EU (provided that technical compatibility is
assured). ·
Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs
(e.g. developing guidelines & auditing their adherence to them); this could
also include the verification of whether sufficient resources are assigned to
interoperability and safety tasks at NSAs; common to options 2-5, however at a
different level of magnitude as the level of control will have to be greater in
option 2 and lower in option 5, due to taking over of part of the NSAs'
responsibilities by ERA. ·
An enhanced “coordination” and supervision role
of ERA (including the right to audit) with respect to NoBos, regarding type
approval, rail vehicle and ERTMS certification, and accreditation of NoBos (this
measure is especially relevant to the ERTMS deployment); common to options 2-5. The importance of these four measures was
confirmed by the stakeholders and, following further analysis, they have been
incorporated to each of the policy packages 2-5.[42] They are of major importance
to tackle three crucial challenges in the EU Railway Area: migration to both
single safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (European passport
for vehicles), and improving the inefficient functioning of national
authorities (NSAs and NoBos). 5.2.3 Short description of
options Option 1:
Baseline scenario (Do nothing) This option sets out the baseline scenario
for the analysis going forward. All other options will be measured against this
option; its elements are described in section 3.5. Option 2:
Greater coordination role for the Agency This first incremental option looks at a
more enhanced role for the Agency which foresees the Agency getting more
involved in the activities of the national authorities, but without affecting
their decision making process. This option assumes that all aspects of option 1
are taking place and adds the measures relating to enhanced coordination of ERA
over NSAs regarding granting of vehicle authorisations & safety
certificates, including ensuring their mutual recognition by national authorities.
At the same time, the functioning of NSAs and NoBos will be subject to
supervision of the Agency, with the possibility to audit them and to set the
accreditation conditions for NoBos. This option also assumes mutual recognition
of both vehicle authorisations and safety certificates. Option 3: ERA as a one-stop-shop This
intermediate option builds on option 1 and incorporates some elements of
option 2 (measures relating to coordination of national authorities
activities by ERA), but assigns more power to the Agency in relation to the
manner in which NSAs undertake their activities. In particular this option
assumes that ERA acts as a "one stop shop" for safety certificates
and vehicle authorisation (with NSAs still responsible for issuing the decisions
and the Agency checking the applications and decisions), at the same time being
an appeal body for some decisions of national authorities. This option also
assumes migration to a single (common) safety certificate and single common
vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles),
with the decision-making powers staying at national level. Option 4: ERA and NSAs share competencies The basis of this option is that the Agency
would be the central body receiving and processing any requests for safety
certification and vehicle/ERTMS subsystems authorisation. It would not hold the
majority of the required competencies in ERA, but would continue to rely on NSA
staff to carry out the relevant activities within Member States where the part
of the NSA's staff would be subordinate to the decisions and direction of the
Agency. In this case, this staff would report to an EU body, the Agency, rather
than to national authorities. The NSAs would still be tasked with issuing
the authorisations for placing into service fixed installations and vehicle
authorisations (vehicle passports) for domestic services. The existence of
national rules would decrease at a greater rate than the approach adopted in
the previous options, since the Agency would have an additional overarching
goal of monitoring, and eventually requesting the removal of national rules.
The following elements would be key to this option: ·
ERA granting safety certificates to railway
undertakings and vehicle authorisations (passports) to applicants (a "one
stop shop" for safety certificates and vehicle authorisation), on the
basis of competences shared with the NSAs; ·
Migration to a single safety certificate and
single vehicle authorisation (passport), with the formal decision-making powers
transferred to ERA. Option 5: ERA
takes over all activities of the NSAs This option is the most ambitious in terms
of extending the future role of the Agency. It assumes that the Agency would
take over all safety certification and authorisation tasks currently undertaken
by the NSAs. This would involve the Agency expanding its facilities and
establishing local offices in each Member State (or at least in the larger Member States or regional hubs). All staff involved in these activities would be employed
by the Agency. It is assumed that the Agency would continue to be subject to
the same European Commission administration and employment procedures for all
of its activities. The key measures in this option are: ·
ERA completely takes over the competences of the
NSAs regarding granting certificates to railway undertakings and authorisations
for placing into service; ·
Migration to a single common safety certificate
and single vehicle authorisation, with the formal decision-making powers
transferred to ERA. Option 6: Horizontal measures This option
is made up of a number of measures that have a wide reaching impact on the administrative
procedures of NSAs, ERA and industry as a whole, but do not relate directly to the
role of the Agency vis-á vis NSAs or NoBos. This includes, inter alia: ·
amending the railway directives to enable the
adoption by the Commission of implementing/delegated acts setting out common
principles and practices for the national authorities; ·
enhancing the role of ERA in the dissemination
of railway-related information and training; ·
migrating from national technical and safety
rules to a system of EU rules (through the identification of unnecessary rules
by ERA and NSAs and then the requirement for national authorities to remove those
rules, as well as strictly limiting the possibility of adopting new rules). It is a self-standing option, as it would,
in principle, lead on its own to certain improvements in all problem areas. It
is therefore, and for the sake of transparency and due to positive outcome of
stakeholders' consultation and early start of likely effects (2015), assessed
separately. However, at the same time option 6 has
amplificatory effect on other options, hence it was deemed useful and
appropriate to combine the measures in option 6 with options 2-5 to produce the
most optimal approach in terms of changes to the sector, leading to improved
competitiveness. Therefore option 6 is also assessed in combination with
options 2-5; it should be noted that the impact of individual measures of
option 6 was differentiated in relation to each of options 2-5, as shown in
Table VII-15 in Annex VII. 5.3 Interaction with legal acts and stakeholders' views All options apply in principle to the three
legislative acts in question (the Interoperability and Safety Directives and
ERA Regulation); implementation of each option would require amendments to each
legislative act. Stakeholders, in general, largely supported
the measures in all options relating to enhanced coordination and control of
NSAs by ERA (including audit), as well as ERA acting as an appeal body to some
decisions of national authorities. The measures on developing a single safety
certificate and setting up a European passport for vehicles (single vehicle
authorisation) were also supported. Respondents were divided on sharing
competences between ERA and NSAs and rather unfavourable to a complete
take-over of all functions of NSAs by ERA. The enhanced role of ERA in relation
to NoBos (increased coordination and supervision) was also supported decisively.
All individual measures from option 6 received high support from stakeholders
and were perceived as beneficial for railways; this was one of the reasons why
option 6 was finally combined with the preferred option. The level of support was differentiated
according to the group of respondents. Not surprisingly, the respondents
representing the NSAs were in general against ERA sharing/taking over their
responsibilities (measures from options 3-5: "ERA shares/takes over the
competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway
undertakings and vehicle authorisations"), while the opinion of other
respondents was more balanced. A similar pattern could be observed in relation
to the Notified Bodies. To sum up, all final options (i.e. options
2-5 combined with option 6) were supported by stakeholders, with option 2 and 3
having the highest level of support and option 5 the lowest.
6
Assessment of impacts
6.1 Introduction and general methodological approach This section details the impact assessment
of different options[43].
Given the strong focus on operational efficiency, the core impacts of this
initiative are economic, while social and environmental impacts are mostly
indirect and sometimes negligible. Direct impacts are quantified, while
indirect impacts are assessed in qualitative terms. The section is comprised of the following
sections: i) identification of the magnitude
of the main impacts; ii) quantitative assessment of direct
impacts on: ·
railway undertakings (vehicle authorisation
timescales and costs, certification timescales and costs and opportunity cost
savings resulting from a reduced time to market for railway vehicles) ·
Cost of administration of ERA and NSAs; iii) qualitative assessment of indirect
impacts. 6.2 Approach
to the calculation of costs and benefits The report assesses the costs and benefits
related to the different institutional setup as foreseen in options 1-5 and
horizontal measures included in option 6. In principle, assessment consists of
three major blocks: ·
calculation of savings in costs and timescales of
certification and authorisation processes (including savings of administrative
costs for operators); ·
calculation of opportunity cost savings for
operators resulting from a reduced time to market for railway vehicles and ·
calculation of the changes in the cost of administration of
ERA and national authorities. Results of these calculations are presented in separate
sections below. Each section starts with a short overview of the methodology
applied. Furthermore, the impacts of different policy options were
considered to differ according to the current industry context in any given
country. In these terms the impacts were differentiated according to following
country groups: ·
Average – encompasses the majority of
countries. ·
Challenging – Germany and France since these countries have both been identified as having specific issues. Measures
that enforce greater conformity with EU law are likely to have the greatest
impact in these countries . ·
Low resource – a number of countries
having very small numbers of NSA staff available to deal with authorisation and
certification, with the result that some measures are likely to particularly
impact on authorisation and certification in these countries. The countries
included in this category are: Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia. For all categories, indicator values have been produced for
a ten year future period (2015 to 2025). Impacts of different measures are
phased to be commensurate with their anticipated time of implementation – i.e.
soft measures have earlier impacts (as from 2015), while legislative measures
are considered to have effect not earlier than 2017. Where the metric is a
monetary value, it is presented in net present value (NPV) terms using a
discount factor of 4%, with values discounted to 2012. Annex VII provides more information on the impact assessment
methodology, including baseline and forecasted values and reasoning supporting
the assumptions. Interim results at detailed level can be found in Appendix D
of the IA support study[44].
6.3 Identification of the magnitude of the main impacts The table below provides a summary of an initial qualitative
assessment of key characteristics and phasing in of impact of measures included
in each option. 'Impact magnitude' relates to the potential of each option to
reduce the authorisation costs and timescales, which constitute core elements
of expected impacts[45].
This initial assessment provided a framework for further detailed calculations
as well as reference point for a 'sense check' of the results. Table 6-1: Preliminary assessment of main impacts of options 1 to 6 Measure || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Likely phasing of main impact Baseline || The Baseline encompasses a wide range of impacts, a number of which (e.g. work on national rules) are likely to have a significant effect on authorisation costs and timescales. || Medium || 2011-2025 Option 2 Greater coordination role for the Agency || The impact of this option is relatively low with additional powers of the Agency limited. Main impact is on additional authorisations. || Low* || 2017-2022 Option 3 ERA as a one stop shop || Whilst ERA has more powers in this option primarily through entry and exit checks of applications, it is likely that additional benefits over option 2 will be limited with division of labour between NSAs and the Agency being an issue. || Low/Medium* || 2017-2022 Option 4 ERA and NSAs share competences || Provided ERA has sufficient powers to act as a strong central office this option is likely to have a significant impact on authorisation and certification costs and timescales. || Medium/High* || 2017-2023 Option 5 ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation and certification || This option would have a high impact on authorisation costs and timescales and would also enable additional efficiencies over the current arrangements through economies of scale. || High* || 2017-2023 Option 6 Horizontal measures || This option contains some measures that can be implemented relatively quickly and as such has an earlier benefit than any other option. However, most of the measures have a medium or low impact and therefore the overall impact is similar to options 2 and 3. || Medium* || 2015-2025 6.4 Direct impacts on railway undertakings 6.4.1 Benefits of reduced time
and costs of authorisation and certification processes. Method of assessment The three key
input data sets for calculations are as follows: ·
current
costs, timescales and levels of authorisation and certification by country ·
future
trends in levels of authorisation and certification by
authorisation/certification category (where significant change anticipated) ·
expected
effect of individual measures on the costs and timescales of authorisation and
certification of the different options. The
input data for Current costs,
timescales and levels of authorisation and certification include: · Agency Report
on railway vehicle authorisation[46]
· Agency Report
on migration towards the single safety certificate[47] · Data from the
presentations given at the vehicle authorisation Task Force[48] · Data from
interviews with industry stakeholders · Some
(minimal) data provided within the stakeholder survey Inputs are differentiated by 20 different authorisation
categories (see Table VII-1, Annex 7) and 4 certification categories
(Table VII-2, Annex 7). Future trends in levels
of authorisation and certification are calculated on the basis of following
assumptions: ·
number
of authorisations in 2008 (i.e. before the dramatic impacts of the
economic downturn) is used as a baseline, but (very conservatively compared to
what would be needed to achieve the expected higher modal share for rail) it is
assumed that there would be no growth compared to 2008 level until 2025; ·
the
UNIFE estimate of savings from Cross-Acceptance assumes additional
authorisations for each new locomotive and multiple unit type in ten countries,
it has been assumed that this ratio holds true for all new authorisations; ·
the number of
authorisations related to ERTMS is considered being proportional to the share
of the network covered by ERTMS[49]. ·
it
is anticipated that market consolidation and changes induced by the TSIs will
reduce the number of vehicle types, in these terms estimates quoted in the
Cross-Acceptance report have been used[50]. The impacts of the
different options are expressed in terms of potential reductions in costs and
timescales of authorisation and certification achieved by different options. To
this end each measure was individually assessed and attributed an 'impact
value' expressed as a percentage reduction of the gap between (a) the current
costs and timescales (in each country type) and (b) the minimum (or ‘ideal’)
achievable cost and timescale. The minimum possible authorisation costs and
timescales are set out in Tables VII-5 to VII-8 in Annex VII. Once each measure was assessed an overall assessment at option level
was carried out to translate reductions in costs and timescales into monetary
values. This amalgamated the impacts at an option level, applying adjustments
to avoid double-counting of impacts when measures were added together. Results of individual options 1
to 6 The summary of expected
savings in authorisation costs in 2015-2025 (incremental on the baseline) of
options 2-6 is given below: Figure 6-1: Total authorisation cost
savings 2015-2025 of options 2-6 Real, undiscounted || Discounted savings over 2015-2025 (€ m NPV) 45 62 130 212 156 Consistent with the qualitative analysis in section 6.3,
option 5 is significantly more effective than other options, with efficiencies
that can only be achieved through complete centralisation. Option
6 has an earlier impact than the other options, again consistent with the
qualitative analysis, and reflecting measures that can be put in place
relatively quickly. The significantly larger impact of option 6 compared with
options 2 and 3 can be explained be the following reasons: ·
Early
start of measures (in option 6, a majority of the measures can be implemented
by 2015) ·
Large
number of measures (six) in option 6 with medium impact (see Table VII-9 in
Annex VII) ·
Limited
‘power’ of option 2 and 3 measures resulting in low impacts of many measures
(see Tables VII-10 and VII-11 in Annex VII). The
certification savings, as indicated in Figure 6-2, are much smaller reflecting
both a lower volume and lower costs of safety certifications compared with
authorisation. There are also fewer differentials between options 3 and 4. Also
the benefits of the horizontal measures (option 6) are significantly smaller
than those for options 3-5. Figure 6-2: Total certification cost
savings 2015-2025 of options 2-6 Real, undiscounted || Discounted savings over 2015-2025 (€ m NPV) 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.0 1.1 Results
of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 In addition to the analysis of the
individual policy options, a further set of policy options was created by
combining the impacts of the horizontal measures (Option 6) with the impacts of
the other policy options. It should be noted that assessment has not meant
simple addition of the impacts, since the horizontal measures have different
combined impacts with options 2 to 5. The matrix providing detailed information
on the extent of assumed overlap is provided in Table VII-15 in Annex
VII. The figure below shows the impacts of each
option 2-5 in combination with option 6. Figure 6-3: Total authorisation costs
2012-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 Real, undiscounted || Discounted savings over 2015-2025 (€ m NPV) 201 217 235 276 It appears that the combined options have
significantly higher impacts on the cost of authorisation, with options 4 and 5
when applied along with the horizontal measures reaching at least a 20%
improvement over their individual impact. Figure 6-4: Total certification cost
savings 2015-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 Real, undiscounted || Discounted savings over 2015-2025 (€ m NPV) 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.6 The
difference between options 4 and 5 for certification costs narrows less than
for authorisation costs, partly due to the dominating influence of bringing
forward the impacts of the single safety certificate both in options 4 and 5.
However, options 3 and 4 now have a virtually identical level
of benefit. 6.4.2 Opportunity cost savings Method of assessment More effective authorisation procedures[51] would, in addition to cost
savings, also result in quicker time to market. Savings in time are assessed in
similar manner as the savings in authorisation costs, as described above.
Results are shown in the figure below, with options 5 and 4 being the most
effective resulting in saving of time of about 25%. Figure 6-5: Average reduction in
authorisation timescales by combined options There will be a number of savings arising
directly from shorter rolling stock authorisation timescales. These include: ·
reduction
in operating costs accrued as a result of needing to cover delayed stock with
alternative stock; ·
reduction in loss of
revenue, where the introduction of new services is delayed/existing services
are cut back when rolling stock is not available to cover for delayed stock; ·
reduced storage
costs. The key assumptions regarding the estimates
are: ·
Cost
of alternative rolling stock is assumed to be cost of leasing additional
rolling stock. For locomotives a value of approx. €30k per month has been used
and for multiple unit vehicles, €15k. Both these values are approximately 1% of
typical average new vehicle values. ·
Using
UIC (International Union of Railways) data, average revenue per locomotive and passenger vehicle was
calculated as a percentage of new vehicle value. For locomotives this is 3.8%
on a monthly basis and for passenger vehicles 1.9% on a monthly basis. As exact quantification is challenging,
three scenarios were developed to construct an assessment of the possible range
of opportunity cost savings. The scenarios are: ·
All
affected services are
covered by alternative rolling stock (lower bound); ·
Half
of affected freight
services and half of affected passenger services are not able to run with
resultant revenue loss (central case); ·
None
of the affected
services are able to run (upper bound). Results
of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 The table below shows the discounted
opportunity cost savings that could be achieved over the period 2015 – 2025,
with option 2 being the least and option 5 the most effective. Table 6-2: Discounted opportunity cost
savings 2015-2025 (discounted, € m NPV) of options 2-5 in combination with
option 6 Option || Central Case || Lower bound || Upper bound Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination”+ horizontal measures || 237 || 71 || 402 Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || 255 || 77 || 433 Option 4+6: ERA and NSAs share competences + horizontal measures || 265 || 81 || 450 Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation and certification + horizontal measures || 295 || 90 || 499 The figure below illustrating
savings by year for the central case further shows that savings per option are
between €30 million and €40 million per year by the end of the evaluation
period. Figure 6-6: Total opportunity cost
savings 2015-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6
(€m, central case, real, undiscounted) 6.4.3 Total cost savings for rail
undertakings Combining the above mentioned authorisation,
certification and opportunity cost (central case) savings demonstrates
substantial benefits over the evaluation period with benefits of over €0.5 bn
for options 3-5 even in discounted terms. Summary of quantified benefits for
rail undertakings by each combined option are presented in the table below.
These include also savings of administrative costs, which are an intrinsic part
of certification and authorisations costs. Table 6-3: Total quantified benefits for rail undertakings 2015-2025
of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 (discounted, € m NPV) Option || Authorisation cost savings (Figure 6-3) || Certification cost savings (Figure 6-4) || Opportunity cost savings (central case) (Table 6-2) || Total benefits || Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” + horizontal measures || 201 || 2 || 237 || 440 || Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop+ horizontal measures || 217 || 2 || 255 || 474 || Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies+ horizontal measures || 235 || 2 || 265 || 502 || Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification+ horizontal measures || 276 || 3 || 295 || 574 || 6.5 Direct
impacts on public authorities Some of proposed measures entail a
variation in the staff needed by ERA to perform additional tasks, and, in some
cases, reductions of staff at NSAs, due to competences transferred at the
central level. These changes will affect respectively cost of administration at
EU and national level. Method of assessment For each policy option, the impacts have
been disaggregated in order to identify variations in costs of each: i)
the Agency (and the Commission, particularly in
relation to option 6); and ii)
national institutions (in particular NSAs). For the purpose of this analysis, all costs
are indexed to a base year of 2012 and are computed in real terms over the
period 2012-2025 using the Net Present Value (NPV) at 4% discount rate. For the different options the net costs of administration
are estimated by computing: ·
the variation in gross costs of administration
for ERA and the Commission (namely variation in ERA costs and in the “separate
appeal body” to be created in options 4 and 5), and for national administrations
(variation in NSAs costs); ·
the variation of potential revenues collected by
levying charges for the activities carried out by the NSAs and ERA for safety
certificates and vehicle authorisations. The difference between the EU15 and EU12
Member States has been taken into account in terms of average salaries, average
fees charged by NSAs, and average cost of NSAs’ staff in order to correctly
identify the magnitude of impact of any potential changes. More detailed
description of calculations of cost of administration are provided in section 9
of Annex VII. 6.5.1 Direct impacts on the ERA Method of assessment For each of the selected policy options,
the number of additional staff needed by ERA has been estimated on the basis of
the assessment of the individual measures included in each option. The
starting point for this analysis was the preliminary impact assessment work
already undertaken to date by the Agency in relation to its future role, though
applying a more conservative approach. Subsequently, the following steps were
taken: ·
As a first step, the measures evaluated in the
original ERA preliminary impact assessment were compared with the measures
included in the options. ·
Then, the analogies between the original and the
new set of measures were identified. This way it was possible to associate to
each of the new measures assessed a number of extra staff consistent with the
considerations made by the ERA in their preliminary impact assessment. ·
Finally, when considering the policy options,
the potential synergies between the different measures included in each option
were identified. This way, the number of extra staff required by ERA for each
policy option was estimated. ·
In addition, further considerations were made when
merging option 6 with each of the other options, taking into account further
synergies between measures and economies of scale. The estimated total variation in staff
members were distributed across years to take into account the fact that the
recruitment process needs a number of years to be finalised (it was estimated
that by 2020 all staff member variations would have occurred). The following were also included in the
figures of ERA staff variation: ·
two additional human resources needed in option
4 and 5 to set up the “separate appeal body” at the European level (though this
is clearly a cost that is not attributable to the Agency, but will be borne by
the sector at the European level). ·
two additional human resources needed at the
European Commission to take forward horizontal measures envisaged in option 6. Based on the current salary levels and the
number of staff, the Agency estimates roughly €100k gross cost for each
additional staff member. Lower average staff costs were assumed where larger
numbers of staff are required, as more junior staff will be required when
numbers increase. Overhead costs were assumed to amount to
25% of direct staff costs. Further costs for other activities related to the
individual measures, such as the costs of carrying out tests in laboratories
for single components or travel costs for the training options, have also been
taken into account, as well as costs related to ERA being able to obtain
revenue. The starting point was the Agency calculations but, as for the staff
costs, efficiencies were identified, where possible, in the grouped options. No
additional costs were identified as a result of the baseline activities. Full
set of assumptions is provided in Figure VII-7 in Annex VII. Results of individual
options 1 to 6 The table below sets out the results, and
the consequential impacts, on the Agency of the individual options, with option
5 clearly standing out as the most costly. Table 6-4: Additional cost of
administration on the ERA of options 2-6 (€m) || Total ERA staff (2011) || Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in) || Total costs, NPV (2015-2025) Option || Total additional staff by 2020 || Total additional staff cost || Overhead || Other costs || Total gross cost increase || % of current ERA budget Option 1: Baseline || 154 || - || No impacts on cost of administration || Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination” || 20 || (1.9)[52] || (0.5) || (0.5) || (3) || 14% || (20) Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop || 25 || (2.4) || (0. 6) || (0.5) || (4) || 17% || (23) Option 4: ERA & NSAs share competencies || 37 || (3.4) || (0.9) || (0.3) || (5) || 23% || (30) Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification || 302 || (23.2) || (5.8) || (2.0) || (31) || 154% || (221) Option 6: Horizontal measures || 27 || (2.5) || (0.6) || (0.9) || (4) || 20% || (28) Note: These options also contain the
potential impact on the Commission that arises particularly in option 6.
Options 4 and 5 contain the effects of the creation of the separate appeal
body. Results
of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 Four of the measures included in option 6
entail specific tasks for ERA, which may require additional staff involved and
other extra costs, therefore implementing these horizontal measures on their
own would imply 27 extra staff (as indicated in Table 6-4 above). However,
when merged with other options, the impact on ERA in terms of cost of
administration is likely to be rather small. It is estimated that about 18 of
additional staff members would be needed by ERA to implement Option 6 in
combination with option 2, 3 and 4 respectively. As regards option 5, given the
large number of additional staff required, the impact of merging it with option
6 would be negligible. The estimate of the cost of administration for ERA after
this merging is given in the table below, with again option 5 being by far the
most costly. Table 6-5: Additional cost of
administration on the ERA of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 (€m) || Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in) || Total costs, NPV (2015-2025) Option || Total additional staff || Total additional staff cost || Overhead || Other costs || Total gross cost increase || % of current ERA budget Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination"+ horizontal measures || 38 || (3.5) || (0.9) || (0.5) || (4.9) || 24% || (37) Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop+ horizontal measures || 42 || (3.9) || (1.0) || (0.5) || (5.4) || 27% || (39) Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies+ horizontal measures || 55 || (5.0) || (1.3) || (0.3) || (6.6) || 33% || (44) Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification+ horizontal measures || 302 || (23.2) || (5.8) || (2.0) || (31) || 154% || (221) It can be seen from the table that the
impact on the costs of the Agency for combined options 2 to 6 lead to a change
in the yearly costs for the Agency of between €5 m and €31 m. Option 5 has
the largest impact in terms of benefits for the industry, but also has the
largest cost for the Agency, with the other four options having significantly
lower additional costs. 6.5.2 Impacts on national institutions Method of assessment In order to estimate the variations in
costs determined by a reduction of staff at NSAs, the average cost of one staff
member in EU12 NSAs and EU15 NSAs was calculated on the basis of 5 case study
countries (Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Hungary). This was then compared
with the average cost of labour in the two groups of countries. It was assumed
that a reduction of 10 staff from an NSA would lead on average to a cost saving
of €600k in a ‘generic’ NSA[53]. It has been difficult to estimate the impact
in terms of cost of administration on NSAs of the application of the horizontal
measures (option 6). On the one hand, NSAs could face increased costs due to
the need to implement the EU rules, requiring tougher standards and the
supervision. On the other hand, the enhanced role of ERA in disseminating
common rules and advising on their implementation could help to smooth the
workload of NSAs. In addition a clearer legislative framework (e.g. migration
from national technical and safety rules to a system of EU rules) should reduce
burden on NSAs. By estimating the effects of the single measures within this
option, the second effect was considered to have a higher impact than the
first, leading to a net reduction in staff members per NSA. Results
of individual options 1 to 6 The table below reports the impacts on the
cost of administration sustained by NSAs of each policy option. Table 6-6: Savings of the cost of
administration in NSAs of options 2-6 (€m) Option || Total NSA staff* (estimate 2011) || Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in), per NSA || Total NPV in the EU (2015-2025) Total staff variation || Total staff costs saving || Overhead || Total gross cost saving Option 1: Baseline || 500 || || No impacts on cost of administration || Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination” || || Marginal impacts on cost of administration || 0 Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop || -2 || EU12 || 0.08 || 0.02 || 0.1 || 26 EU15 || 0.17 || 0.04 || 0.2 Option 4: ERA & NSAs share competencies || -3 || EU12 || 0.11 || 0.03 || 0.1 || 42 EU15 || 0.26 || 0.07 || 0.3 Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification || -10 || EU12 || 0.38 || 0.09 || 0.5 || 151 EU15 || 0.87 || 0.22 || 1. Option 6: Horizontal measures || -2 || EU12 || 0.08 || 0.02 || 0. || 37 EU15 || 0.17 || 0.04 || 0.2 *
Only those working on certification & authorisation. An estimated value
based on the Interoperability and Safety Reports of the Agency. Assuming that
EBA (German NSA) staff in regional offices is not counted as certification and
authorisation staff, but is being an inspection and auditing staff. The
impact on the costs of the Agency for incremental options 3 to 6 leads to a
change in the yearly costs for the single NSAs of between € 0.1 m and €0.4 m in
EU12 countries, and between €0.2 m and €1.1 m in EU15 countries. Clearly,
option 5 has the largest benefit to the national public purse in terms of the
impact on the NSAs, with the other four options leading to lower cost savings. Results
of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 The cost of administration on NSAs arising
from combined options is presented in the table below, with option 5 having
again the highest potential impact on reducing the costs. Table 6-7: Savings of the cost of
administration in NSAs of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 (€m) Option || Total NSA staff* (estimate 2011) || Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in), per NSA || Total NPV in the EU (2015-2025) Total staff variation || Total staff costs saving || Overhead || Total gross cost saving Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” + horizontal measures || 500 || -2 || EU12 || 0.08 || 0.02 || 0.1 || 37 EU15 || 0.17 || 0.04 || 0.2 Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || -4 || EU12 || 0.09 || 0.02 || 0.1 || 55 EU15 || 0.35 || 0.09 || 0.4 Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal measures || -5 || EU12 || 0.11 || 0.03 || 0.1 || 68 EU15 || 0.44 || 0.11 || 0.6 Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification + horizontal measures || -11 || EU12 || 0.24 || 0.06 || 0.3 || 152 EU15 || 0.96 || 0.24 || 1.2 *
Only those working on certification & authorisation. An estimated value
based on the Interoperability and Safety Reports of the Agency. Assuming that
EBA (German NSA) staff in regional offices is not counted as certification and
authorisation staff, but is being an inspection and auditing staff Impact on
employment level and working conditions in national institutions The implementation of different policy
measures would have an effect on the employees of NSAs and NoBos. In numerical
terms, however, the effect would be rather limited, with staffing variations in
the NSAs likely to change in average by between 2 and 10 staff members on
average, depending on the policy option implemented. The effects on NoBos would
be assumingly negligible, as they would be marginally affected by the policy
measures in terms of staff requirements. As far as possible staff reduction in NSAs
is concerned, its negative impact on employment is likely to be offset and/or
minimised by the following: ·
Linked increase in the staffing of ERA as a
result of the implementation of policy measures, with a probable trend of (an at
least partial) transfer of interoperability experts from national to EU level; ·
Changes to be introduced at national level by
the recast of the first railway package which include, inter alia,
strengthening of national Regulatory Bodies (which in practice infers more
staff); in many Member States, the NSA and the Regulatory Body is the same
institution. ·
The general, well-known difficulties surrounding
recruitment of railway experts in the EU also include national authorities. All
NSAs in the EU, except in Denmark and the UK, experience problems in this area[54]. Therefore there is a strong
basis for assumption that even if affected by staff reductions, a railway
expert would find a new job relatively quickly (however probably not at
national level). ·
The transfer of certain competences from the
NSAs to ERA (safety certification and vehicle authorisation) would in general
enable the national authorities to better concentrate on other current
important tasks such as monitoring and enforcement; corresponding staff
reductions could be then limited. ·
The nature of work in national administrations
(including in the NSAs) is usually linked with an "official" status
for the employees; it means that there are possibilities –and sometimes
obligations – for the states to ensure their constant employment. Finally, assuming that majority of former
NSAs employees find their new jobs at ERA, their working conditions should
normally improve, given higher salaries and benefits offered at the EU level in
comparison with many national administrations (especially from the EU-12). 6.5.3 Total changes in the cost
of administration for the Agency and NSAs The following table shows the estimated
impacts on the cost of administration for ERA and NSAs respectively for each
of the policy options analysed. For all options, except for option 5, an
overall reduction in the cost of administration was estimated. Table 6-8: Change in Agency and NSA costs
and the net impact on cost of administration of options 2-5 in combination with
option 6 (Total costs, NPV, 2015-2025, € m) Option || Estimated cost increase for ERA (Table 6-5) || Estimated cost decrease for NSAs (Table 6-7) || Total saving in the cost of administration (ERA+NSAs) Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination"+ horizontal measures || (37) || 37 || 0 Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || (39) || 55 || 16 Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal measures || (44) || 68 || 24 Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification + horizontal measures || (221) || 152 || (69) The table above shows that option 4 leads
to the highest potential cost savings of €24 m, while the implementation of
option 5 is expected to impose an increase in cost of administration of about
€69m. 6.5.4 Cost recovery through fees To complete the analysis of the cost of administration, an
assessment was made of how potential fee revenues from certification and
authorisation could be distributed between the institutions in case of
different policy options. The input data for this analysis has been the forecast
of total number of safety certificates issued and vehicle authorisations granted
as described in Section 6.4.1, the average fees for these two activities and
how the fee revenues would be shared between the Agency and NSAs. Method of assessment It has been assumed that: ·
Average
safety certificate fees were derived from the stakeholder consultation - €20k
for EU 15 MS and €3 k for EU 12 MS. Future fees have been set equal to € 10k
across all the EU to take into account of a standardisation of payments and
procedures. ·
Revenue
sharing: different criteria for sharing revenues between the Agency and NSAs
have been identified for the different options. In the case of options 2 and 3
safety certificate revenues have been entirely assigned to NSAs (as in the
current situation); in the case of option 4, different hypotheses have been
made to test the impacts of the consequences of changing the distribution of revenues
between ERA and NSAs. ·
over
time there will be a gradual reduction in the total number of vehicle type
authorisations as discussed earlier, which will lead to a reduction in total
fees across the EU of about €29 m. Further details on calculations are in Section 9 of Annex
VII. Results
of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 The table below illustrates the extent to
which future revenues collected by the Agency for its part of issuing of safety
certificates and vehicle authorisation can cover the additional cost of
administration. Table 6-9: Cost coverage of incremental
agency costs & additional call on EU budget of options 2-5 in combination
with option 6 (Total costs, NPV, 2015-2025, € m) Option || Revenue sharing criteria || Additional cost of administration for Agency* (Table 6-5) || Estimated Agency revenue increase || Coverage of additional Agency costs (%) || Additional call on EU budget Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” + horizontal measures || 100% NSAs || (37) || 0 || 0% || (37) Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || 100% NSAs || (39) || 0 || 0% || (39) Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal measures || a. 25% NSAs 75% ERA || (44) || 56 || 127% || 0 b. 50% NSAs 50% ERA || (44) || 38 || 86% || (6) c. 75% NSAs 25% ERA || (44) || 19 || 43% || (25) Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification + horizontal measures || 100% ERA || (221) || 75 || 34% || (146) * Represents the amount of EU-wide revenue
foregone by the NSAs. The last column shows the additional call
on the EU budget from the various options. In options 4 and 5 ERA is able to
cover a significant part of its incremental costs related to safety
certification and vehicle authorisation. In particular, option 4a, with the
assignment of 75% of revenues to ERA, is the one that grants the highest
coverage (127%) of additional Agency costs related to safety certification and
authorisation activities. However, given the amount of work that will still
need to be done by NSA technical experts in option 4, it would probably not be
justifiable to give the NSA only 25% of the revenue. Conversely, option 5 shows the least
coverage of costs. Although the Agency is assumed to keep all potential fees
generated by these activities, they would not be sufficient to cover the
incremental costs of the substantial increase in Agency staff. 6.6 Assessment of indirect impacts Section 10 in Annex
VII gives an overview of the assessment of indirect impact. The indirect impact
on rail demand, passenger fares and industry revenues, as well as any
environmental impacts (GHG emissions, air quality and noise) is expected to be
low, and it reality would be difficult to establish to what extent these were
originated by this initiative rather than other 4th Railway Package
initiatives and/or external factors such as changes in demand of other
transport modes. However, options 4 and 5, especially when combined with the
horizontal measures of option 6, are expected to have positive impacts on rail
freight prices, service levels and rail investments triggered by the changes in
rail market structure, especially in those countries where the interoperability
and safety procedures are currently the longest and most costly. Rail safety
levels under each option remain the same given that the principal
responsibilities of each main actor in the safety chain (predominantly RU and
IM) will not be changed, or could improve slightly as a result of more
harmonised national legislation. 6.7 Assessment of impacts on
micro, small and medium sized enterprises The key company groups
(following the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 defining
micro, small and medium sizes enterprises)
impacted by the proposed options are: ·
Passenger
Railway Undertakings ·
Freight
Railway Undertakings ·
NoBos ·
ROSCOs
(Rolling stock leasing companies) ·
Rolling
stock suppliers For these groups, the effects of the
proposed options will be primarily positive with reductions in authorisation
costs and timescales benefiting both passenger and freight railway
undertakings, ROSCOs and rolling stock suppliers. In addition benefits are
likely to be proportionately larger for smaller type sizes which would be
anticipated to disproportionately benefit SMEs. Finally, benefits are likely to
be most significant for new entrants currently facing discriminatory
authorisation processes, a higher proportion of which will be SMEs than current
incumbents. The one company group where the options could result in
additional costs is NoBos, however not all of them, as small/medium companies
they are often part of a bigger company or a group. This will result from the
measure proposing coordination and supervision of NoBos in options 2 to 5.
However, apart from complying with guidance, the main cost for NoBos will be
facilitating audits by the Agency (which should represent small cost). Micro
enterprises need to be included in the scope
of the legislation in order to ensure the principle goals of the legislation,
which is safety and interoperability of EU railways. It
would be in any case recommended
that: 1.
Levels
of NoBo audit are proportional to the volume of work carried about by each
NoBo; 2.
Guidance
to NoBos from ERA should avoid the creation of administrative costs not
directly related to the frontline services of NoBos.
7
Comparison of Options
7.1 Comparison in terms of direct impacts The overall
results of the assessment of different impacts are summarised in the table
below. Although option 6 could be pursued as a self-standing option, the
analysis has shown the strong benefits of combining it with institutional
options 2-5. Therefore, in this final section the report will focus only on the
impacts of combined options – i.e options 2-5 each combined with horizontal
measures of option 6. Table 7-1: Summary table of discounted cost
savings for rail undertakings and public authorities 2015-2025 of options 2-5
in combination with option 6 (NPV, € m) Option || Savings to rail undertakings (including in administrative costs) || Change in cost of administration || ERA/NSA authorisation fee revenue loss[55] || Total net benefit || Additional funds necessary from EU budget to cover ERA costs (Table 6-9) Authorisation (Figure 6-3) || Safety certification (Figure 6-4) || Opportunity costs (central case) (Table 6-2) || Total benefits for operators || For ERA (Table 6-5) || For NSAs (Table 6-2) || Total change in cost of administration Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” +horizontal measures || 201 || 2 || 237 || 440 || (37) || 37 || 0 || (29) || 411 || (37) Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || 217 || 2 || 255 || 474 || (39) || 55 || 16 || (29) || 461 || (39) Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal measures || 235 || 2 || 265 || 502 || (44) || 68 || 24 || (29) || 497 || a: 0 b: (6) c: (25) Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification + horizontal measures || 276 || 3 || 295 || 574 || (221) || 152 || (69) || (29) || 476 || (146) Taking into account the direct impacts,
option 4 is the most beneficial, i.e. it has the best cost/benefit ratio.
Moreover, it can also be cost-neutral to the EU budget (a minimal cost under
scenario (b) and neutral under scenario (a)), given the proposed coverage of
additional costs of ERA through industry fees. 7.2 Comparison in terms of efficiency and effectiveness The net cost and benefits have to be
compared with the expected effectiveness of each option in terms of the operational
objectives as out in section 4. The table below show the results of the combined
options in achieving the relevant targets. Table 7-2: Estimated changes in
authorisation and certification costs and timescales by 2025 by the options 2-5
in combination with option 6 (incremental to the baseline developments) Option || Reduction in cost of authorisation || Reduction in time of authorisation || Reduction in average time to market || || Reduction in cost of certification || Reduction in timescale of certification Target: 20% reduction by 2025 Option 1: Baseline || 0% || 0% || 0% || 0% || 0% Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination”+ horizontal measures || 19% || 17% || 19% || 16% || 25% Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || 20% || 18% || 22% || 19% || 30% Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal measures || 24% || 22% || 25% || 19% || 33% Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification + horizontal measures || 24% || 22% || 30% || 20% || 46% For total authorisation costs and
timescales the target requiring a reduction of 20% in 2025 is only achieved in
options 4 and 5. There have been no targets set for the reduction in safety
certification costs (as these are less material), but for completeness the
table also presents the estimated reductions in this category. For the target
relating to average time to market (RU safety certification plus vehicle authorisation
timescale) the objective of a reduction is also achieved in option 3. Finally,
the target relating to national rules is achieved through the measures
contained in option 6, and, given that option 6 has now been joined to each
option 2 to 5, this target is achieved through all combined options. The effectiveness and efficiency of
different options is summarised in the table below. Table 7-3: Efficiency and effectiveness
of the options Option || Efficiency (Total Net Benefit € m) (Table 7-1) || Effectiveness (number of operational objectives met) Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” + horizontal measures || 411 || 1 Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures || 461 || 2 Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal measures || 497 || 3 Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification + horizontal measures || 476 || 3 This table shows that by combining the net
benefits with effectiveness in terms of operational objectives, option 4
remains the favoured option – all objectives will be achieved with a highest
net benefit. While the benefits of option 3 are relatively close to those of
option 4, this option would compare unfavourably in terms of effectiveness as
the target for reduction in authorisation costs will not be achieved. In conclusion, option 4 would be a
coherent, effective and efficient solution to the problems identified, as it provides
the best balance of outcomes in relation to: ·
the industry, in terms of reduced costs and
timescales for safety certification and vehicle, and other sub-system,
authorisation; ·
cost implications for the EU budget in terms of
incremental costs of the Agency; ·
the cost impacts on national institutions; ·
respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality
principles; ·
addressing the problems identified in section 3;
and ·
meeting the objectives outlined in section 4. Furthermore, it can be noted these
activities are in line with the type of role that EASA (European Air Safety
Agency) and EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency) have within their respective
sectors, which allow for direction of the sector without impacting on the
subsidiarity of Member States' institutions. Option 4 in combination with option 6 should
be therefore pursued in the preparation of the legislative proposal. Annex VIII
gives more information on how the preferred option is planned to be
implemented, both in terms of resources and planned policy measures.
8
Monitoring and Evaluation
Regarding evaluation, it is planned that in 2025 the Commission will
evaluate whether the objectives of the initiative were achieved, and if not,
consider which additional steps need to be taken in order to complete them by
2030, an important date set in the White Paper on Transport for many initiatives.
Progress in terms of reaching the objectives could be monitored by relevant
monitoring indicators. For this purpose, the existing targets for operational
objectives could be used and transformed in the following indicators: ·
number of national
rules, ·
cost and duration of safety
certification procedure, and ·
cost and duration of vehicle
authorisation procedure. The indicators could be verified by the following tools: ·
Interviews (and,
where possible, a questionnaire) with an appropriate selection of stakeholders
who should provide their own assessment of time and costs related to
certification and vehicle authorisation. Such a survey of key stakeholders
could be carried out on the initiative of the Commission in 2020 and 2025 as an
adequate basis to evaluate whether the foreseen time and cost savings have been
achieved. This would be subsequently reported by the Agency in the framework of
their regular Interoperability Report; ·
Developments in
relation to the number of published (notified to the Commission) national
safety and technical rules, measured in the Commission Notif-IT database. Additionally, it might be also useful to monitor the position of
stakeholders with respect to the specific objectives through a consultation
process in the coming years, to understand if the following is being achieved: ·
Non-discrimination; ·
An increase the
coherence of the national legal framework. This consultation could be named “Rail administrative barriers
barometer” and tied to the existing Eurobarometer survey in the area of rail. ANNEX I
THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE – THE 'BIG PICTURE' Caveat: The
content of this Annex will be further refined and updated as the policy
preparation processes for the different initiatives within the Fourth Package progress 1.
Introduction In its White
Paper "Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive
and resource efficient transport system" adopted on 28 March 2011 ('2011
White Paper'), the Commission unveiled its vision to establish a genuine Single
European Transport Area and it clarified that this objective implies creating
the true Single European railway Area. A crucial condition to meet this goal is
the removal of all obstacles of administrative, technical or regulatory nature
still holding back the rail sector. As announced in the 2011 White Paper, the
Commission has prepared a set of proposals, to be adopted sequentially within
the Fourth Railway Package. Additionally,
the European Council conclusions of January 2012 highlight the importance of
releasing the growth-creating potential of a fully integrated Single Market,
including as regards network industries.[56]
More precisely, the Commission Communication on Action for Stability, Growth
and Jobs adopted on 30 May 2012[57] stresses the importance of reducing further the regulatory burden
and barriers to entry in the rail sector, making therefore country specific
recommendations in that direction. In the same vein, the Commission adopted on
6 June 2012 the Communication on strengthening the governance of the single market,
which stresses the importance of the transport sector with a special attention
to rail.[58] This Annex
gives a brief background of the development of EU railway acquis and
clarifies the necessity and objectives of the Fourth Railway Package within this
context. It presents all the elements included in the Package (a chapeau
communication and seven legislative proposals accompanied by three impact
assessments) and explains how different pieces fit together.[59] 2.
Development
of EU railways acquis In the past
decade, the European legislator has considerably developed the EU acquis
encouraging competitiveness and market opening. The overarching
idea has been that greater competition makes for a more efficient and
customer-responsive industry. In parallel measures have been taken to improve
the interoperability and safety of national networks; and
encourage the development of well integrated rail system leading to 'European',
rather than 'national', railways. Rail
legislation in the early nineties introduced some limited degree of market
opening and prompted the railways to improve efficiency by introducing
management independence of railway undertakings from the state and separation
of accounts between infrastructure management and transport operations. Since 2000,
however, the European Commission has put forward further initiatives in the
shape of packages of legislative measures. The First
Railway Package, adopted
in 2001, was designed to: ·
open the international rail freight market, ·
establish a general framework for the
development of European railways, and clarify the relationship between (a) the
state and the infrastructure manager; (b) the state and railway
undertakings and (c) the infrastructure manager and railway undertakings
(Directive 2001/12/EC); ·
set out the conditions that freight operators
must meet in order to be granted a licence to operate services on the European
rail network (Directive 2001/13/EC); and ·
define policy for capacity allocation and
infrastructure charging (Directive 2001/14/EC). The Second
Railway Package was adopted in 2004. Its aim was to
determine: ·
a common approach to rail safety (Directive 2004/49/EC) ·
requirements for interoperability of the
European high speed and conventional rail systems (Directive 2004/50/EC) ·
the opening of national and international rail
freight markets on the entire European network (Directive 2004/51/EC) ·
the establishment of the European Railway Agency
(Regulation (EC) 881/2004, amended by Regulation 1335/2008). The Third
Railway Package was adopted in 2007, to open up
international passenger services to competition. The objective of the package
was: ·
opening the market for international passenger
services to competition (Directive 2007/58/EC) ·
setting the conditions and procedures for the
certification of train crews operating locomotives and trains (Directive 2007/59/EC); and ·
ensuring basic rights for rail passengers
(Regulation 1371/2007), for example, with regard to insurance, ticketing, and for
passengers with reduced mobility.
The Recast
of the First Railway Package was proposed by the
Commission in 2010. Following a final vote of approval in the European
Parliament on 3 July 2012, the new EU rules should come into force by the end
of 2012. The recast aims to simplify and consolidate the rules by merging three
directives and their amendments into a single text. Importantly, the Recast
also seeks to clarify existing provisions and tackle key problem areas which
have been identified in the market over the last ten years. In particular, the
new legislation will strengthen the power of national regulators, improve the
framework for investment in rail, and ensure fairer access to rail
infrastructure and rail related services. 3.
developments
in EU rail market Despite the
considerable development of the EU acquis and rail markets, the modal
share of passenger rail in intra-EU transport has in average remained more or
less constant since 2000, at around 6%. The latest Euro-barometer survey
suggests that only 6% of Europeans uses the train at least once per week.[60] It should be noted that there are marked differences between Member
States, but in overall rail loses out in terms of modal share compared to other
modes, reflecting a (real or perceived) lower level of efficiency, service
levels and quality compared to other transport modes. In the Consumer
Scoreboard 2011[61], train services score worst of all transport services and four in
ten consumers consider the choices in that service category to be inadequate. Improvements
will be necessary in all rail segments As
demonstrated by the EVERIS study[62], to improve the overall modal split in favour of rail, improvement
will be necessary in all rail segments, including conventional long-distance
and urban train services. The 6% modal
share for rail in the EU has remained fairly stable in spite of the impressive
development of high-speed train networks. The latter have managed to
gain some markets at the expense of air transport services, but at the same
time air transport has maintained important flows of passenger traffic on
routes competing with rail[63]. Since the mid-nineties, local and regional passenger train
services in most Member States that did not open up their market have
fallen in a downward spiral of continuous operational losses and subsequent
reduced service offer. This decline has been exacerbated in the EU12 Member
States by the decay of old infrastructure and rolling stock on the one hand,
and wealth driven high-growth of car ownership, on the other hand. Although commuter
transport around urban agglomerations experiences growth in some Member
States, cars still secure an important share of urban transport – 59% of
Europeans never use suburban trains. This situation contrasts with the 75%
urbanisation rate of the EU27 and therefore indicates a huge market development
potential for suburban and regional passenger rail transport, especially given
the raising congestions on roads. The rail
freight markets within the EU have been opened for a number of years, and
the industry’s stagnation cannot therefore be simply explained by the existence
of legal barriers of the kind that continue to restrict competition in domestic
passenger services. The problem to be addressed therefore also needs to be
defined in terms of technical, physical capacity and institutional barriers,
which have frustrated action to open markets taken at the EU level. 4.
What are
the problems necessitating another rail package? According to
available studies, the modest development of the rail sector, as explained
above, can be attributed to the presence of several administrative, technical,
institutional and legal obstacles, which still hamper market access and
operational efficiency of service providers. Domestic
passenger market opening Whereas
markets for rail freight services have been fully opened to competition since
January 2007[64] and those for international passenger transport services as of 1
January 2010[65], national domestic passenger markets remain largely closed[66]. However, by removing the legal barrier by allowing open access to
infrastructure for domestic passenger services, would have rather limited
effects given that major part of the domestic rail market is covered by public
service contracts (PSC). The rules on the provision of transport services under
public service obligations (PSO) are laid down in Regulation 1370/2007[67] which gives the possibility to competent authorities to exclude
rail transport services from the obligation to award PSCs through an open tendering
procedure. This means that most local and regional services, and certain
long-distance services, are operated under PSO and attributed to operators
through direct award. In addition, the actual impact of market opening depends
on the specific requirements imposed for and within PSCs, making the call
either attractive or disguisedly non-attractive for new entrants in tendering
procedures (e.g. with the aim to protect the incumbent railway undertaking). Infrastructure
governance The First
Railway Package established a distinction between infrastructure managers (IM),
who run the network, and railway undertakings (RUs), that use it for
transporting passengers or goods. The legislation requires that infrastructure
charging and capacity allocation, being key factors in opening up the market,
must be performed independently of the incumbent RU so as to ensure fair and
non-discriminatory access of all operators to infrastructure. Independence of
essential functions of infrastructure management has to be ensured in legal,
organisational and decision-making terms as to allow for all railway
undertakings an equal access to infrastructure and related services. Member
States must also have independent regulatory bodies in place to monitor railway
markets and to act as an appeal body for rail companies if they believe they
have been unfairly treated. There are,
however, problems with the transposition and enforcement of these requirements
and the Commission has initiated several infringement procedures, on which it
expects the Court of Justice of the EU to express its view by the spring 2013. The
interactions between railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, where
these independence rules have not been implemented, have created conflicts of
interest still resulting in access barriers and market distortions at the
expense of new entrants, such as access denials to infrastructure and
discriminatory charges. However, even
where the existing legislation has been respected, there remain certain
problems related to the use of infrastructure and related services. Partially
these issues are expected to be solved through the more precise provisions
provided in the Recast of the First Package, especially through the
strengthened role of rail regulators. However, certain issues appear to require
further legislative intervention. For instance, according to the structure and
economics of the railway sector, it could be necessary for the purpose of
efficient infrastructure management to keep certain IM functions together, rather
than allowing them to be performed by separate (though independent) bodies
(e.g. it could be useful to couple traffic management with planning of
maintenance works). Furthermore, today the independence requirements apply only
to the essential functions (infrastructure charging and capacity allocation),
but it might be necessary to extend these requirements also to certain other
activities of the IM crucial for competition, such as infrastructure
investments planning, financing and maintenance. The optimal governance
structure has also led to reflections on the degree of institutional separation
between infrastructure management and service provision. Interoperability
and safety Specific EU
legislation exists to promote interoperability in order to overcome national
historic differences in the field of technical specifications for
infrastructure (gauge widths, electrification standards and safety and
signalling systems[68]). EU legislation also sets the framework for a harmonised approach
to rail safety in the EU[69]. Furthermore, it obliges the Member States to set up the system of
national authorities, consisting of national safety authorities, notified
bodies, national investigation bodies and regulatory bodies. The European
Railway Agency (ERA)[70], established by the Second Railway Package, plays a central role in
promoting interoperability, harmonising technical standards, and developing
common approach to safety, all requiring close interaction with the Member States and rail sector stakeholders. While the level of safety on EU railways
has gradually increased, and therefore safety levels as such are not an issue,
stakeholders have drawn the Commission's attention to the fact that certain technical and administrative hurdles still persist, creating
excessive administrative costs and market access barriers, especially for new
entrants. This suggests that the highly decentralised
system of railway authorities in place may not have fully coped with the
European dimension of the rail services. Firstly,
existence of largely non-transparent national technical and safety rules, which
overlap and/or are in conflict with the EU legislation, creates unnecessary
complexities for RUs. Secondly, there are marked discrepancies in how the
national safety authorities (NSAs) conduct vehicle authorisation and safety
certifications processes, some NSAs being less efficient and effective than
others. This has led to reflections on how to further enhance the role of the
ERA in the integration processes. 5.
Rationale
of the Fourth Railway Package The main
objective of the Fourth Railway Package is to enhance the quality and
efficiency of rail services by removing remaining legal, institutional and
technical obstacles, fostering the performance of the railway sector and its
competitiveness. As announced by the 2011 White Paper, these issues will be
addressed by the different initiatives in three main domains: -
Domestic passenger market opening – opening domestic rail passenger market to competition, including
open access lines as well as the routes under PSOs; -
Infrastructure governance - ensuring that the infrastructure manager performs a consistent set
of functions that optimises the use of infrastructure capacity, and its
organisation guarantees non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure and
rail related services. -
Interoperability and safety - removing remaining administrative and technical barriers, in
particular by establishing a common approach to safety and interoperability
rules to decrease administrative costs, to accelerate procedures, to increase
economies of scale for RUs and to avoid disguised discrimination. What
about infrastructure? Obviously, to
contribute to the growth of the modal share of rail, new rail infrastructures
need to be built across Europe. The 2011 White Paper calls for completing the
European high-speed rail network by 2050, so that it would be fully connected
to airports enabling the majority of medium-distance passenger transport to be
performed by rail. Future EU strategy for infrastructure development has been
already set out in the Commission proposals for Connecting Europe Facility[71] and the new TEN-T Guidelines[72] and therefore remains out of the scope of the Fourth Package. 6.
Content
of the Fourth Railway Package The package
consists of following elements in the three domains: Domestic
passenger market opening: amendments to: -
Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development
of the Community's railways as amended [or alternatively recast of the first
railway package, when adopted] -
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public
passenger transport services by rail and by road The initiatives will be accompanied by the
[IA on access to domestic passenger rail
markets]. Infrastructure
governance: amendments to: -
Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development
of the Community’s railways as amended and Directive 2001/14/EC on the
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for
the use of railway infrastructure [or alternatively Recast of the first Railway
Package, when adopted] The initiatives will be accompanied by the
[IA on
the governance of railway infrastructure in the Single European Railway Area]. Interoperability
and safety: amendments to: -
Directive
2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
safety on the Community's railways -
Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system
within the Community -
Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European Railway
Agency The initiatives will be accompanied by the
IA on improving
interoperability of the Single European Railway Area. In addition
the Fourth Package contains: -
a chapeau Communication, providing overall context and justifications for the package of proposals; -
an ancillary initiative repealing Regulation
(EEC) 1192/69 on common rules for the normalisation of the accounts of
railway undertakings, which has become obsolete and is inconsistent with EU law
in force today. 7.
objectives
of the Fourth Railway package The analysis
conducted by the Commission shows, that the operational inefficiencies and
quality issues of rail services are mainly caused by low degree of competition,
remaining market distortions and suboptimal structure of EU rail market.
Underlying reasons – long and costly procedures, access barriers for new
entrants and different market access rules in Member States – will be addressed
from different angles by all the Fourth Package initiatives. Given that,
the initiatives in the Fourth Package are complementary, they all contribute to
the same general objective of improving the competitiveness of rail
sector vis-à-vis other modes. In addition, some specific objectives are also similar
of the initiatives, e.g. facilitating entrance of new operators into the market. The operational
objectives are unique for each domain of action. The table below demonstrates
how the different elements fit together. Figure
I-2: Summary table of the objectives of the Fourth
Railway package initiatives. || Domestic passenger market opening || Infrastructure governance || Interoperability and safety General objective || Improve the quality of rail passenger services and enhance its operational efficiency … || Improve the operational efficiency of infrastructure and the access to infrastructure || Eliminate existing administrative and technical barriers … … thereby enhancing the competitiveness of rail sector vis-à-vis other modes and developing further the Single European Rail Area. Specific objectives || SO1: Ensure freedom of entry into domestic rail passenger markets || SO1: Improve the IM ability to manage efficiently the infrastructure to the benefit of the users || SO1: Facilitate entrance of new operators into market SO2: Create more uniform business conditions || SO2: Eliminate conflict of interest and discrimination in decisions and operations of the IMs || SO2: Reduce administrative costs of railway undertakings SO3: Better value for public money spent on public transport services || || 8.
Options
and main impacts To achieve
these objectives, all IAs will consider a range of different options, which
ultimately should improve the operational efficiency and quality of rail
services. The IA for
the domestic passenger market opening would propose
and assess options on how the interaction of access conditions between open
access services and services under PSC should be arranged. The IA would also
discuss different criteria for the design of PSC and analyse a possibility of
introducing mandatory competitive tendering for PSC. The aim of these options
would be to open the domestic rail market to competition, which should lead
more passenger friendly services and better use of public money. In order to
enhance the positive effects of market opening, the IA would analyse also
additional options for 'framework conditions', such as access to rolling stock,
through-ticketing and inter-availability of train tickets of different RUs. The IA for
the infrastructure governance initiative would study two dimensions of options: on the one hand, what functions should
be included in the portfolio of an 'ideal IM' in order to optimise its
operational and in investment decisions, and on the other hand, how should the
separation between the IM and RUs to be enhanced in order to ensure equal level
playing field for the access to infrastructure and the related services. As a
result, new-entrant RUs should get a better access to infrastructure and
related services, at the same time the efficiency of infrastructure utilisation
at national and EU level should increase. The IA
under the interoperability and safety pillar would assess several 'institutional' options on the level of interaction between
ERA and national authorities with the aim to (a) enhance the effectiveness and
efficiency of safety certification and rolling stock authorisation processes
and (b) reduce complexity caused by excessive national railway rules. As a
separate option, a set of additional horizontal measures would be considered,
which on their own could achieve the mentioned objectives, but could also be
applied on top of the institutional options to reinforce the overall impact of
reduced administrative costs/less fragmented markets. These policy
options and their impacts will be presented and assessed in detail in the
respective IAs. 9.
Expected
synergies of the package The idea of
the proposed package approach is that there are synergies to be achieved via
the combined effects of the individual initiatives. Some examples of such
synergies are provided below. -
Effectiveness of de jure market opening
depends on allowing for certain 'framework conditions', such as access to
infrastructure, rolling stock, stations, train path allocation, etc. Some of
these framework conditions will be addressed within the domestic passenger market
opening initiatives, while the others via the proposal on infrastructure
governance. -
One way to improve rolling stock availability is
to support development of rolling stock leasing market (as considered under in
the domestic passenger market opening IA). However, a necessary condition for
that is more standardised equipment and the on-going standardisation process[73] is expected to be enhanced by the European "passport" for
vehicles, considered within the interoperability and safety initiatives. -
All initiatives would, in their own terms,
contribute to a more predictable business models for RUs operating across the
borders of EU Member States: o
interoperability initiative by harmonising approach to safety certification and
authorisation of rolling stock, o
market access initiative by
introducing universal licence for provision of passenger services throughout
the EU and setting common principles for PSO definition, and o
infrastructure governance initiative by
proposing a more harmonised institutional setup of infrastructure
managers in different Member States. -
Better infrastructure governance should improve
the operational efficiency of railways and possibly allow an improvement in
travel times for passengers and freight. Overall, the
different operational gains expected as a result of each initiative should
allow a better value for public money, on which the functioning of railways is
still heavily reliant. ANNEX II
FUNCTIONING OF THE RAILWAY MARKET Over the past decade, the European rail market has witnessed
a range of changes to its structure, with the aim of improving services to
passengers through the creation of an internal market. The market for freight
and for international passenger trains has now been opened. Moreover, some
countries have opened their domestic services to competition, either through
the introduction of open access operators, or through the competitive tendering
of public sector contracts. Despite this progress, the performance of
the rail sector compared to other transport modes is not yet satisfactory. In
the rail passenger sector, the quality of rail services does not always keep
pace with the evolving needs of passengers in terms of reliability, comfort,
speed, resilience to delays and the environment. The Commission’s annual Consumer
Markets Scoreboards show that the market for train services is perceived by EU
consumers as one of the poorest performing service sectors. In 2012, the market
ranks 27th out of 30 services markets (for comparison airline services and
local public transport have the 5th and 13th place in the
ranking, respectively)[74]. In many circumstances the
price/quality ratio of the services offered by railway undertakings is
perceived by passengers as insufficient and they opt for alternative modes of
transport, in particular road transport for short distance and commuting
journeys, air transport for long distance services. As a result, the share of
rail in the EU passenger transport market has remained low and relatively
unchanged. This trend is illustrated in the figure below, where rail’s
share of the overall market (in terms of passenger km) amounted to only 6% in
2009, while the private car accounted for some 73%, the same shares registered
back in 2000. Figure II‑1: Road
and rail passenger volumes in the EU-27 Source: Eurostat, International Transport Forum, Union
Internationale des Chemins de Fer, national statistics These overall trends mask significant differences between
Member States. Rail passenger traffic in the EU-15 increased by 16% between
2000 and 2009, with countries such as the UK, Sweden and Belgium experiencing growth in excess of 30%. This contrasts with a fall in traffic of 25% in the
EU-12 as a whole and falls of more than 35% in Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria. The wide divergence in consumers’ assessment of railway services across EU
countries is confirmed by the most recent Consumer Markets Scoreboard[75], which shows that
the market performs better in the EU-15 than in the EU-12, with the lowest
scores in Italy, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Sweden. A wide range of external
factors have contributed to these diverging trends, including economic growth,
trends in oil and petrol prices, demographic trends, structural adjustments in
many of the EU-12 countries (notably increased car ownership in response to
rising living standards) and on-going difficulties in securing public funding
for rail services. Nevertheless, rail’s inability to compete with road reflects
widely perceived shortcomings in a number of aspects of the service provided on
many routes, including journey times, service frequency and reliability and
other aspects of service quality. Inadequate investment has also meant that
many rail services have failed to keep pace with passenger expectations of service
quality, for example in terms of the application of new ticketing and
information technology and the quality of the environment at stations and on
trains. In the freight sector, rail accounts for a little over 10%
of tonne-kilometres transported. The figure below shows that freight volumes
transported by rail grew by little more than 10% between 2000 and 2007,
declining thereafter along with other types of freight transport as a result of
the global recession. Figure II‑2: Changes in freight transport volumes and
GDP in the EU-27 Source: Eurostat, International Transport Forum, Union
Internationale des Chemins de Fer, national statistics Again, the relative performance of rail in EU freight
markets has varied significantly between different Member States. Across the EU
as a whole, road-based freight accounted for over 75% of freight volumes
transported by land in 2009. However, while the corresponding mode share in the
EU-15 remained broadly constant at 80%, over the ten years to 2009 the share in
the EU-12 increased from 14% to 40%. Moreover, rail freight movements in the
EU-12 fell by 15% over the same period, with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia, all experiencing falls in freight volumes by
rail well in excess of 20%. These trends support the view that both rail passenger and
freight services have failed to respond effectively to competition in road
transport. Passenger rail services in some countries have benefited from
economic trends encouraging greater rail use, yet, as a whole, the sector has
failed to compete with the greater flexibility offered by car travel,
notwithstanding greater congestion, increased motoring costs and other factors
that might have been expected to improve rail’s competitive position. In the EU-15, rail freight has established a market niche,
maintaining its share of overall freight movements over a sustained period but
failing to capitalise on the opportunities presented by strong economic growth
and increasing road congestion over the last decade. In the EU-12, the high
share of rail freight at the beginning of the decade has been steadily eroded
by the growth of road freight, which offers freight customers greater
flexibility as well as competitive journey times and prices. In principle, rail freight markets within the EU have been
opened for a number of years, and the industry’s lack of competitiveness cannot
therefore be simply explained by the existence of legal barriers of the kind
that continue to restrict competition in domestic passenger services. The
problem to be addressed therefore also needs to be defined in terms of
technical, physical capacity and institutional barriers, which have frustrated
action to open markets taken at the EU level. Such barriers will also need to
be reduced if the benefits of liberalisation of passenger markets are to be
addressed. To complete the picture, it is useful to provide information
on market share of new entrants. In 2010 the situation was the following[76]: AT 14,6%, BE
11,82%, BG 21,6%, CZ 13,16%, DE 25%, DK 25%, EE 45%, ES 8,08%, FI 0%, HU
19,47%, IE 0%, LT 0%, LU 0%, LV 23,3%, NL 40%, PL 35,82%, RO 54,7%, SE 40%, SI
0%, SK 2,03%, UK 51,4%. ANNEX III
FUNCTIONNING OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1. National Safety Authorities National Safety Authorities (NSA) are defined by Directive
2004/49/EC on safety on the Community’s railways as : “the national
body entrusted with the tasks regarding railway safety in accordance with this
Directive or any bi-national body entrusted by Member States with these tasks
in order to ensure a unified safety regime for specialised cross-border
infrastructures” (Article 3 of Directive 2004/49/EC). NSAs need to be independent from railway undertakings,
infrastructure managers, applicants for certificates and procurement entities
(Article 16 Directive 2004/49/EC). Role of National Safety
Authorities The main tasks of NSAs are set out in Article 16 of
Directive 2004/49/EC (as amended by Directive 2008/57/EC, Directive 2008/110/EC
and Directive 2009/149/EC), also referred to as “the Safety Directive”. In
summary, these tasks comprise: 1.
authorising the bringing into service of the structural subsystems
constituting the trans-European high-speed rail system in accordance with
Article 15 of Directive 2008/57/EC and checking that they are operated and
maintained in accordance with the relevant essential requirements; 2.
authorising the bringing into service of the structural subsystems
constituting the trans-European conventional rail system, in accordance with Article
15 of Directive 2008/57/EC and checking that they are operated and maintained
in accordance with the relevant essential requirements; 3.
supervising that the interoperability constituents are in
compliance with the essential requirements as required by Article 19 of
Directives 2008/57/EC; 4.
authorising the placing in service of new and substantially
altered rolling stock that is not yet covered by a TSI; 5.
the issue, renewal, amendments and revocation of relevant parts of
safety certificates and of safety authorisations granted in accordance with
Articles 10 and 11 and checking that conditions and requirements laid down in
them are met and that infrastructure managers and railway undertakings are
operating under the requirements of Community or national law; 6.
monitoring, promoting, and, where appropriate, enforcing and
developing the safety regulatory framework including the system of national
safety rules; 7.
supervising that rolling stock is duly registered and that
safety-related information in the national register, established in accordance
with Article 15 of Directive 2008/57/EC, is accurate and kept up-to-date. Article 17 of the Safety Directive (and subsequent
amendments) establishes that NSAs shall carry out their tasks in an open,
non-discriminatory and transparent way. They should promptly respond to
requests and applications and communicate its requests for information without
delay and adopt all its decisions within four months after all requested
information has been provided. Moreover, NSAs shall be free to carry out all
inspections and investigations that are needed for the accomplishment of its
tasks and be granted access to all relevant documents and to premises,
installations and equipment of infrastructure managers and railway
undertakings. Article 18 of the Safety Directive requires that NSAs
publish an annual report concerning their activities in the preceding year and
send it to the ERA by 30 September at the latest. NSAs in EU Member States Different Member States have adopted different solutions
regarding the establishment of the NSA. The table below summarises the role of
each NSA in the five case studies performed for the impact assessment support
study. The majority of the analysis and evidence for this Annex is drawn from
the case studies conducted by the external consultant. The case studies illustrate that in some Member States, NSAs
are integrated with Transport Ministries (e.g. Germany) or are a separate body
under the control of the Transport Ministry (e.g. Italy). While in other cases
they are part of an independent authority with responsibility for, amongst
other things, the regulation of the sector (e.g. Hungary and Poland). All these arrangements are compliant with the Safety Directive, which requires the
independence of NSAs from railway undertakings, infrastructure managers,
applicants for certificates and procurement entities only. However, when NSAs
are part of a wider institution that encompasses Regulatory Bodies (RB), as
with the Hungarian and Polish authorities, some stakeholders raised concerns.
In Hungary some operators noted that they do not make recourse to the RB in
case of problems with the NSA, as these are part of the same organisation,
hence their mutual independence is questionable. A similar concern was raised
in Poland, where the NSA and the Regulatory Body are integrated within the same
authority, the UTK. It should be noted that no such concern was raised in the UK which has a similar structure. Table III-1: Case
Study NSAs: staff and budget || Germany || Hungary || Poland || Italy || France Staff headcount || 1,050 || 54 || 180 (*) || 100 || 101 Budget (m) || Revenue (2010) || €53.0 || €1.6 || €4.4 (*) || €11.9 || €13 Cost (2010) || €81.4 || €2 || Note: (*) Total for UTK, which is both RB and NSA. No figures available for NSA activities only NSA organisation The case studies reveal that the number of staff and budget
of NSAs varies significantly across Member States and in a number of interviews
NSAs claimed to be understaffed. Recent data published by ERA on NSA staff
involved with interoperability (see below) confirms the heterogeneity of the
amount of human resources across NSAs in EU Member States. The data highlights
that, in view of the complexity and workload of interoperability related
activities, countries with fewer than five people working in this area may face
challenges. As described in the ERA Interoperability Report[77], differences in
size of NSAs may reflect their different responsibilities, and the size of the
respective railways. For example, the German NSA may require more staff to
process authorisations due to the specific Länder system of regional government
as well as the presence of a high number of passenger and freight RUs. Figure III‑1: Numbers of NSA staff directly involved with interoperability Source:
ERA Interoperability Report, 2011 Other issues of concern for NSAs are the independence of
decision making staff and their level of technical capability. In the case of
the French EPSF, around 50% of its technical staff are on secondment from SNCF.
Some stakeholders have questioned whether this can compromise their
independence, although the NSA itself strongly disputes allegations of
partiality by seconded staff. The technical capability of staff is a separate issue. Again
in France it was noted that many expert EPSF specialists are approaching
retirement and are likely to be replaced with staff with less relevant experience
or understanding of the rail sector. Similarly, the Hungarian NKH is concerned
that at present it is not able to attract suitably qualified staff, due to the
low salaries which it is able to offer. The
difficulties surrounding NSA staff recruitment is mentioned in the ERA
Interoperability Report 2011. All NSAs in the EU, except in Denmark and the UK, experience problems in this area. The report indicates that the most problematic
issues are less attractive NSA salaries and the limited number of rail experts
in the labour market. The latter is related either to the specifics of the
national educational system, which does not supply sufficient numbers of
graduates with technical railway knowledge, or to the competition for qualified
staff from the rail industry, which may provide better salaries. NSA operations Safety certificates From the 1st January 2011, the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC
(and subsequent amendments) required RUs to hold a safety certificate in order
to be granted access to railway infrastructure. The responsible authorities for
issuing these certificates are the NSAs. The safety certificate has two parts: A
Part A: the acceptance of a Railway Undertaking’s Safety
Management System as described in Article 9 and Annex III of Directive
2005/49/EC. The Part A certificate is valid throughout Europe providing the
type and extent of the operation is unchanged. NSAs are therefore required to
accept Part A certificates issued by other Member State NSAs should the RU
request to operate on a different network within Europe. B
Part B: the acceptance of provisions adopted by the RU to meet
requirements necessary for safe operation, as described in Annex IV of
Directive 2004/49/EC. These cover compliance with network specific requirements
for staff competence and management of rolling stock. The Part B certificate
states the ability of the RU to comply with network specific rules applied in
the Member State in which the RU operates. Therefore an RU can have a single
Part A certificate but as many Part B certificates as the Member States in
which it provides services. As indicated by a study commissioned by the European Railway
Agency, different NSAs have different approaches regarding the issuing of
safety certificates. This is determined either by: divergent interpretation of
EU legislation or by different operating approaches, technical capabilities and
the amount of resources dedicated to these activities. One of the key findings from the ERA 2010 study on migration
towards single safety certificate[78]
was that different approaches are used by NSAs for the release of safety
certificates. In particular: ·
There was no consistent assessment process to ensure that NSA
decisions were harmonised, or at least followed similar approaches; ·
NSA resources and activities were not always targeted on those
areas or operators who created the biggest risks; and ·
The NSA processes or procedures were not always found to be
transparent, making it difficult for RUs to understand what was expected of
them; ·
There were problems in the transparency and application of
National Safety Rules. For example one stakeholder, representing different RUs, pointed
out in a recent workshop that there are examples of NSAs not accepting Part A
certificates released in other Member States and tend to “overregulate” Part B
to cover national rules from part A. The 2010 Interfleet report also indicated
that a small number of NSAs did not conform to the process and timelines set
out by the EU Safety Directive, of issuing certificates within four months.
This was also confirmed in the case studies. Interestingly, the Interfleet
report claims that even for those NSAs who state they meet the four month
deadline, there is scope for them to extend this period artificially by
“procrastinating” over advising the RU on what documentation to submit and how. There is great variation in the fees charged to RUs for the
issuing of safety certificates with countries that issue it for free (Sweden and Great Britain) and others charging up to €70,000 in some circumstances. The following
table shows the comparative fees charged for the release of safety certificates
based on the information provided by The Rail Liberalisation Index 2011 and
those collected in the undertaken case studies for this Impact Assessment. Table III-2: Comparative fees of safety certificates Country || Cost of safety certificate (€) || Source (*) Sweden || 0 || A UK || 0 || A Czech Republic || 40 || A Slovakia || 100 || A Estonia || 639 || A Romania || 1,000 || A Slovenia || 1,418 || A Bulgaria || 3,270 || A Denmark || 3,700. . The total sum varies depending on the work required || A Poland || 5,000 (Part A); 2,100 (Part B) || B Portugal || 5,000 || A Hungary || In the range of 3,600 – 6,900 according to the amount of vehicles of the RUs. || B Austria || 10,000 || A Spain || 10,000 || A Belgium || 7,000-15,000 || B Greece || 30,000 || A Italy || 30,000 || A/B Netherlands || 30,000 || A Finland || The fees for issuing the safety certificate are calculated according to the workload involved. . The hourly rate currently charged is €140 per hour || A Germany || The fees for issuing the safety certificate are calculated according to the workload involved. The German case study indicates up to €70,000. || B Note: (*) A:
IBM (2011) Rail Liberalisation Index 2011[79];
B: Steer Davies Gleave case studies Authorisation of rolling
stock The authorisations for placing in service of vehicles (including
also authorisations for types of vehicles) are issues by the NSAs. A
distinction can be made between the first and additional authorisations, as
well as authorisations for TSI-conform and non-TSI-conform vehicles. In theory,
the first authorisation shall be valid in all Member States without further
checks for fully TSI-compliant vehicles running on TSI-confirm networks; additionally,
these TSIs must be without specific cases and open points relating top
technical compatibility between vehicle and the network. Therefore in practice
additional authorisations are needed in a large majority of cases. As a consequence – and as with safety certificates – there is
great variation in both the time required and cost charged by NSAs, to issue vehicle
authorisations. In this case, however, in addition to the administrative fees
charged by NSAs, the cost is impacted by the significance of tests and
documentation involved which makes it difficult to identify the exact amount of
authorisation costs. The Rail IBM Liberalisation Index provides a variety of
data which is often difficult to compare: for some countries it reports the
cost of the overall procedure of homologation (understood to mean vehicle
authorisation), for other countries the figure provided is the administrative
fee only (leaving out costs of tests and documentation to produce). The ERA “Report on Vehicle Authorisation” (2011) indicates total
additional authorisation costs of around €1.6 m per vehicle, however
significant variation across Member States and type of authorisation were
encountered. 2. Notified Bodies The role of NoBos According to article 2j of the Interoperability Directive
(2008/57/EC), Notified Bodies (NoBos) are: “The bodies which are responsible
for assessing the conformity or suitability for use of the interoperability
constituents, or for appraising the EC procedure for verification of the
subsystems”. This verification, based on Technical Standards for
Interoperability (TSIs) must enable the authorities responsible for authorising
the putting into service of subsystems to be certain that at the design,
construction and putting into service stages, the result is in line with the
regulations, technical and operational provisions. It must also enable
manufacturers to be assured of equality of treatment, whatever the country.
According to Article 13 of the Interoperability Directive “where the
corresponding TSI so requires, assessment of the conformity or suitability for
use of an interoperability constituent shall be carried out by the notified
body with which the manufacturer or his authorised representative established
in the Community has lodged the application”. As set out by Article 18 of Directive 2008/57/EC, the task of the
Notified Body responsible for the “EC” verification of a subsystem begins at
the design stage and covers the entire manufacturing period through to the
acceptance stage, before the subsystem is put into service. It also covers
verification of the interfaces of the subsystem in question with the system
into which it is incorporated, based on the information available in the
relevant TSI and in the national registers of infrastructure and of rolling
stock. Notified Bodies are required to meet the assessment criteria provided in
the relevant European standards, and are selected by Member States by applying
the criteria provided in Annex VIII of Directive 2008/57/EC. A Member State can withdraw approval from a body which no longer meets the criteria referred
to in Annex VIII, which sets out the minimum criteria which must be taken into
account by the Member States when notifying bodies. The Directive 2008/57/EC establishes that the Notified Body
responsible for checking production must have permanent access to: ·
building sites, production workshops, storage areas; ·
where appropriate, prefabrication or testing facilities; and ·
more generally, to all premises which it considers necessary for
its task. In addition, the Notified Body may pay unexpected visits to the
worksite or to the production workshops of the manufacturer/relevant applicant.
At the time of such visits the Notified Body may conduct complete or partial
audits. The Notified Body must be independent of the applicants and ensure
the independence of the staff responsible for the checks. NoBos organization and
operation in the EU Member States According to
the ERA Interoperability Report 2011, the total number of Notified Bodies as of
1 January 2010 was 49, an increase of 4.3% compared with the situation on 1
January 2009. Figure III‑2: Number of Notified Bodies under Directive 2008/57/EC by Member State Source:
ERA Interoperability Report, 2011 NoBos are not present in all of the relevant EU Member States. As
of 1st January 2010, 18 Member States and Norway have established at least one
Notified Body. With a total of 11 established Notified Bodies, the UK takes the lead in the EU, followed by The Netherlands and Slovenia with five and four notified
bodies respectively. As discussed in the Interoperability Report, competition between
the Notified Bodies is on a regional rather than a European scale, as language
is a key asset to the business. The few examples of competition are present
only in those countries which use the same language. For example both Belgian
and French Notified Bodies have successful contracts with French and Belgium companies respectively in both Member States. Of the 49 Notified Bodies across the Member States, 42 operate
under both the High Speed and Conventional Directives, one only under the High
Speed Directive, and six only under the Conventional Network legislation. The number
of Notified Bodies competent to carry out conformity assessment against the PRM
TSI and TSI relating to Safety in Tunnels appears to be relatively low, as
shown in the figure below. According to the Interoperability Report, in the
last two years only four countries, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and The Netherlands, notified conformity assessment bodies with a specific indication of
their competence for TSIs PRM and SRT. During the IA support study the
consultant was informed that, following the publication of the Interoperability
Report, a further NoBo for these aspects has been authorised in France. The number of Notified Bodies competent for TSIs PRM and SRT is expected to
increase considerably with the re-notification of the Notified Bodies required
by Directive 2008/57/EC. Figure III‑3: Number of Notified Bodies under Directive 2008/57/EC by
subsystem/TSI Source:
ERA Interoperability Report, 2011 The case studies undertaken have provided a more detailed picture
of the organisation and operation of Notified Bodies. In Germany, the tasks of the Notified Body (NoBo) are carried out
by EISENBAHN-CERT (EBC). EBC is an autonomous organisation under public law and
acts as a financially and legally independent department of the EBA. The main
tasks of EBC are to assess the conformity or suitability for use of the
interoperability constituents and to carry out EC-verification of subsystems.
The close connection between the German NoBo and the NSA does not ensure a
smooth authorisation process. Some stakeholders expressed concern that on
occasions the documents that have been provided by the German NoBo have not
been automatically accepted by the NSA and they have been rechecked leading to
an increase in costs and timescales for authorisations. French Notified Bodies have been recognized as having a good
technical knowledge but some stakeholders have had some difficulties with their
work. In the UK, stakeholders pointed out that the pricing by some NoBos for
the same work can be highly variable, perhaps on the grounds of available
capacity at the time. One stakeholder claimed that some Notified Bodies try to avoid
their obligations and reduce prices in order to win calls for tenders or just
to simplify processes for their usual customers from whom they are not truly
independent. As a result, the quality of work of some NoBos has been questioned
by NSAs, and the validity of their certificates is not recognised. As a
consequence the NSAs require repeat verifications, contrary to Article 11 &
16 of Directive 2008/57/EC. ANNEX IV
NATIONAL RAILWAY RULES The railways across Europe have developed as
islands over the past century with each Member State choosing to adopt their
own national standards (or in some cases multiple, competing, national
standards) with little thought for the effects of integration across borders.
These rules act as a barrier for the growth of the rail sector in terms of: ·
Availability of rolling
stock that can cross borders; and ·
Getting vehicles and
equipment authorised to operate in a number of Member States. National rules can be
divided into National Technical Rules (NTRs) and National Safety Rules (NSRs).
The Agency is currently facilitating the process of notification of NTRs by the
MS with the ultimate goal of removing the majority, if not all, NTRs. However,
the process is slow with substantive progress restricted to a subset of NTRs.
Given this, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of what NTRs exist in
different Member States, let alone understand which ones are no longer relevant
and can therefore be removed. There is also a substantial number of NSRs. There
is a more advanced process in place for the notification of national safety
rules (relative to NTRs) and a NSR task force is currently working on further
progress in this area. 1. Scope of national technical and safety rules National technical rules NTRs are covered by (i.e. will be replaced by) TSIs except where
there is non-TSI conforming rolling stock and non-TSI conforming
infrastructure. The complete scope of national technical rules is illustrated
in the figure below with more detail illustrated for those rules relevant to
vehicle authorisation. The key categories of technical rules are design rules
(i.e. rules covering structural sub-systems), maintenance rules (i.e.
functional sub-system maintenance) and operating rules (i.e. functional
sub-system operations). Within each
of these categories there are rules for networks and vehicles and a further
division into rules that have been superseded by TSIs and national rules that
are required whilst non-TSI compliant rolling stock and non-TSI compliant
networks are in place. Figure IV‑1: National technical rules schematic National safety rules Safety Rules
are covered by Annex 2 of Directive 2004/49/EC (and subsequent amendments),
with some overlap of technical and safety rules in the operational rules area. 2. Current number of national rules (both
explicit and implicit) National technical rules ERA has calculated that there are approximately 320 parameters
required to describe all aspects to be checked for vehicle authorisation based
on TSIs and NTRs currently in place. Of these 320 parameters, approximately 120
relate to network compatibility. Using this as a basis (i.e. that there is a
rule for each parameter) it is possible to calculate the number of vehicle
technical rules and network technical rules relevant to the movement and
operation of trains, both explicit and implicit. There is no clear picture
available for the number of maintenance and operational rules. National safety rules The majority of NSRs have been notified and therefore there is a
reasonable understanding of the quantity of rules notified as national safety
rules. Due to variations in understanding, it is likely that not all of these
rules actually qualify as NSRs and that some may not be legitimate, if, for
example, they prohibit free movement of goods and services. In addition, many
of the NSRs notified by Member States are actually Safety Management System
(SMS) rules. The Agency has expressed the view that the majority of the 1,200
NSRs that have been notified are actually SMS rules and therefore can be
removed. However, there are no robust estimates available of the size of the
residual. The number
of NTRs and NSRs in each category where information is available is set out in
the table below. Table IV-1: Total number of national rules Category of rules || Number of rules Safety rules || 1,200 Vehicle design technical rules – to be covered in future by TSI (when scope is extended) || 7500 (300 x 25) Vehicle design technical rules to be covered in future by TSI (currently open points) || 2000 (80 open points x 25) Vehicle design technical rules – non-TSI required for compatibility with non-TSI conform networks || 3000 (120 x 25) Network design technical rules (relevant for vehicle-network interface) || 3000 (120 x 25) Total National Rules currently quantified || 11,700 Technical operational rules || 400 (very high level estimate provided by Agency) Technical rules for Maintenance || 400 (very high level estimate provided by Agency) Other Network rules || Unknown 3. National
Rule Datasets and the process of transparency and elimination The current status of information that is available at the EU
level on national rules is as follows: ·
The DG Enterprise and Industry TRIS database contains draft
product rules captured under the Directive 98/34 procedure. This should have
been used to notify draft national technical rules for design. At the moment it
contains a small portion of national rules. ·
The NOTIF-IT database held by DG MOVE contains most national
safety rules (largely complete for 20 out of 25 Member States). Virtually no
national technical rules are currently notified in this database. ·
The Agency holds National reference documents which contain all
national vehicle design rules for all Member States (except Germany, which is expected very shortly). 4. Timescales
for removal of national rules Based on the current interoperability and safety legislation, the
Agency has been internally considering the process for removal of unnecessary
national rules in parallel with this report. This meant that whilst a formally
documented process for removal did not exist in time to support the analysis of
this IA, the process and timescales for removal of national rules have been
discussed with the Agency. The requirements for the complete removal of NTRs are: ·
All TSIs are complete (all open points closed and Member State specific points removed) ·
TSIs implemented in all MSs for all lines (extension of scope) ·
All railway networks and vehicles conform to TSIs. The removal process for NSRs is more advanced than for NTRs with
the majority of notification having already taken place as already noted.
However, identification of appropriate extent of NSRs still needs to be
determined and the NSR taskforce is still in process. Therefore, for NSRs some
clean-up of rules will be required in the future. The envisaged process for the
removal of all unnecessary national rules is illustrated in figures below; it
should be noted that smooth cooperation with Member States would be
indispensable. Figure IV‑2: Process for removing national technical rules Figure IV‑3: Process for removing
national safety rules ANNEX V
CONSULTATION of STAKEHOLDERS 1. List
of stakeholders consulted The
following organisations/persons have been consulted: · Representative bodies at the
European level (referred to in Article 3of the ERA Regulation) representing:
the manufacturing companies, the railway undertakings (the operators), the
infrastructure managers, the wagons owners/keepers, the freight customers, and
workers and passengers: ALE (Autonome Lokomotivführer-Gewerkschaften Europa),
CER (Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Companies), EIM
(European Infrastructure Managers), EPTTOLA (European Passengers Train and
Traction Operating Lessors' Association), ERFA (European Rail Freight
Association), ETF (European Transport Workers' Federation), UIP (International
Union of Private Wagons), UIRR (International Union of Combined Road-Rail
Transport Companies), UITP (International Association of Public Transport),
UNIFE (Union of the European Railway Industries); additionally, the
International Union of Railways (UIC) · National
railway authorities: National Safety Authorities, Notified Bodies and
Regulatory Bodies · Member
States: responsible Ministries and members of Administrative Board of ERA · Selection
of Members of the TRAN Committee of the European Parliament · The
European Railway Agency 2. Coverage
of consultation Size The on-line survey request was sent to a
total of 119 individual institutions; 68 responses were received which
represents a 57% response rate and is comparable with previous studies of this
nature. In addition to this a further 10 written responses from stakeholders
who preferred to respond in writing to the survey rather than complete the
survey on-line were received. Type of respondent The largest
stakeholder group was the NSAs closely followed Member State representatives
and railway undertakings. Figure V‑1: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group Figure V‑2: Relative share of different responses Member States covered The following figure represents the
breakdown of respondents to the survey by Member State. The UK is the MS that shows higher representation, with 7 respondents, followed by Germany, France, Poland and EU-wide organisations (4 respondents each). Figure V‑3: Breakdown of respondents by Member State Note:
The “other” category groups all MS with a single respondent, i.e. (Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Norway, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus) 3. Main
findings from the consultation Figure V‑4: Discrimination from National Safety Authorities Figure V‑5: Existence of divergent interpretation of EU legislation || Figure V‑6: Relevance of problem elements Figure V‑7: Lack of financial and human resources of
national bodies: overview of stakeholder responses || || National Safety Authorities || Notified Bodies || Regulatory Bodies Figure V‑8: Insufficient independence of national bodies: overview of
stakeholder responses || || National Safety Authorities || Notified Bodies || Regulatory Bodies Figure V‑9: Member States mentioned during the stakeholder consultation as regards existence of different problem elements ANNEX VI
SCREENING OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES The most appropriate measures have been
chosen in the process, which involved the following steps: · Initially exclude those measures that have received a negative
response from stakeholders, that are not implementable or that can be/are being
covered by other EU legislation; · Add any additional measures that were not foreseen in the survey,
but that have been identified as result of stakeholder feedback; and · Combine any measures that would be more appropriately considered
collectively. These steps are described in more detail
below. 1. Stakeholder
responses for individual measures The replies of stakeholders served as a
basis for exclusion of certain measures that received a negative opinion. Table VI-2:
Stakeholder responses for individual measures Measure || Score Enhanced role of ERA in certification through the setting of an appropriate framework and developing the single European railway certificate. || ++ Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NSAs regarding the granting of authorisations of placing into service. || ++ Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies regarding type approval and rail vehicle certification. || ++ Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies regarding type approval and ERTMS certification. || ++ Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Regulatory Bodies (depending on developments in the rail recast. || - Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (for example by developing guidelines and auditing adherence to them. || ++ ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway undertakings || - ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of authorisations of placing into service of rail vehicles and other sub-systems || - ERA takes over the competences of the Notified Bodies regarding checking the conformity with the TSIs of the rail sub-systems (including ERTMS equipment) || -- ERA takes over the competences of the Regulatory Bodies regarding supervision over infrastructure managers, in particular as far as cross-border traffic is concerned (subject to the discussion on the recast of the first railway package) || -- ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway undertakings (a "one stop shop" for safety certificates") || 0 ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of authorisations of placing into service of rail vehicles and other sub-systems (a "one stop shop" for interoperability authorisations): an application is sent to ERA, relevant NSAs are consulted, ERA takes the decision || 0 ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the NSAs relating to placing into service || + ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the NSAs relating to safety certification || ++ ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the Notified Bodies || + ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the Regulatory Bodies || - Strengthened action by the Commission outside infringement procedures, notably on non-discrimination in the railway market || + Change of the railway directive into regulations || + Amendment of the railway directives to enable the adoption by the Commission of implementing measures setting out common principles and practices for the national authorities || + Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring and control of implementation of national safety and interoperability legislation || ++ Enhanced role of ERA in migration from national technical & safety rules to a system of EU rules || ++ Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training || ++ Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in implementing EU legislation on safety and interoperability || ++ Enhanced role of an EU body in providing advice in building capacities in Member States to design, implement and manage relevant investment projects || 0 Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in deploying and operating telematics applications || + Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws and decisions (including Technical Specifications for Interoperability) || + Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area || + Modify the directive with a view to limit/remove the possibility for MS to adopt new national rules || + Setting up European passport for locomotives (this passport would contain a summary of the main technical parameters - it would facilitate route acceptance through comparison with the infrastructure register) || 0 Note: ++
indicates more than 60% of respondents gave positive view, + indicates more
than 50% gave a positive view, -- more than 60% gave a negative view, - more
than 50% gave a negative view, 0 denotes where there was no outright majority.
Shaded rows indicate new measures that were inserted or split into multiple
questions in the survey. 2. Criteria
for initial qualitative assessment Subsequently, the measures underwent a
qualitative review/assessment in the following way: Table VI-3: Qualitative evaluation criteria Criteria || Description Effectiveness || What impact does each measure have on the three specific objectives? · Increase the efficiency of the safety certification, vehicle authorisation and access granting processes; · Ensure non-discrimination in the granting and recognition of safety certificates, interoperability authorisations and in the granting of access to the rail network and services across the EU; and · Increase the coherence of the national legal frameworks, notably related to the safety and interoperability aspects of the internal market for railways Classified as High/Medium/Low/None. If all three objectives get “None” then that measure is excluded. Time to full effectiveness || What are the timescales for the achievement of the three specific objectives set out above? Classified as Short/Medium/Long/Very long – the last of these leads to an automatic exclusion Impact on national institutions || What is the impact on national institutions within the rail sector? Classified as High/Medium/Low/None Consistency with the national framework || Are there significant issues of subsidiarity or proportionality? Classified as Yes/No – A ‘No’ answer excludes the measure The table below presents the initial
qualitative evaluation of measures. Table VI-4:
Results of qualitative evaluation 3. Selection of the measures The following measures were, inter alia,
dropped: ·
Measures
related to Regulatory Bodies: although the
operation of Regulatory Bodies was confirmed as a problem by the stakeholders,
the measures that related to a greater role for the Agency in the areas of
capacity allocation and regulatory activities received a negative evaluation. Another reason was the approaching agreement on the
Recast of the First Railway Package where the role, activities and independence
of the Regulatory Bodies are being addressed, which will have a positive impact
on the sector and the problems raised by stakeholders should be addressed. ·
Measures
related to the Agency taking over all activities of the NoBos: this received a
negative evaluation by the stakeholders. In addition, it would be difficult to
justify the Agency taking over all the
activities of bodies which are, to a large extent, operating on a competitive
market and where part of them is private. The problems identified in relation
to NoBos can be addressed by greater monitoring and coordination by the Agency
which is more appropriate from the proportionality perspective. ·
Measure
considering changing
railway directives into regulations: the Commission concluded that this measure
is not consistent with the principle of proportionality. While the effects of
the problems with vehicle authorisation and safety certification are important,
they are only a part of the overall railway legislative environment. Changing
both Interoperability and Safety Directives just to address these problem areas
seems excessive and may result in a substantial, one-off, administrative burden
that could cancel out some of the benefits of having Regulations and therefore
call into question the efficiency of the measure. Moreover, the political
process of adopting them would be much longer and cumbersome, with Member
States in strong opposition. Finally, it was assessed that other measures will
address the problems related to vehicle authorisation and safety certification
(as well as the role of national rules) in a sufficiently efficient and timely
manner. The final set of measures is provided in
the main text, Table 5-1: Summary of policy options. ANNEX VII
ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS – METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 1. Current costs and timescales of certification
and authorisation The assessment of impacts has allowed
for considerable disaggregating of authorisation inputs to capture the wide
spread of costs and timescales that arise from the authorisation of different
types of vehicles in different contexts. The different authorisation categories
together with the average assumed costs and timescales are set out in the table
below. Table VII-1: Authorisation categories used in the assessment Authorisation Category || Average cost (000€s) || Average timescale (months/Type) New locomotive type authorisation (1st country) || 6,000 || 24 New wagon type authorisation (1st country) || 100 || 2 New Multiple Unit type authorisation (1st country) || 600 || 24 New Coach type authorisation (1st country) || 100 || 24 New locomotive type authorisation (additional country) || 916 || 11 New wagon type authorisation (additional country) || 0 || 0 New Multiple Unit type authorisation (additional country) || 120 || 7 New Coach type authorisation (additional country) || 0 || 0 Locomotive type re-authorisation without ERTMS (1st country) || 750 || 12 Locomotive type re-authorisation with ERTMS (1st country) || 1,500 || 12 Number of wagon type re-authorisations (1st country) || 100 || 1 Multiple Unit type re-authorisation without ERTMS (1st country) || 600 || 24 Multiple Unit type re-authorisation with ERTMS (1st country) || 6,000 || 27 Coach type re-authorisation (1st country) || 100 || 24 Locomotive type re-authorisation without ERTMS (additional country) || 0 || 0 Locomotive type re-authorisation with ERTMS (additional country) || 750 || 8 Number of wagon type re-authorisations (additional country) || 0 || 0 Multiple Unit type re-authorisation without signalling (additional country) || 0 || 0 Multiple Unit type re-authorisation with ERTMS (additional country) || 2,000 || 6 Coach type re-authorisation (additional country) || 0 || 0 Note: zero values relate to where there no
reauthorisation is necessary. A risk with the data used is the incentive
for data providers to share data on their worst-case experiences whilst not
providing data from authorisation examples where the process has worked better.
Therefore the available data has been used with caution and in one particular
example the raw data have been adjusted to reflect the impact of exceptional
circumstances unlikely to be repeated for the majority of authorisations in the
relevant category. However, it is impossible to completely eliminate this
possible bias and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. Certification cost and timescale inputs
require less disaggregating since scope for variation other than between
country and passenger and freight RUs is limited (leaving aside discriminatory
practices against non-incumbents). The different certification categories
together with the average assumed costs and timescales are set out the table
below. It should be noted that the data available for safety certification
costs is very limited. Data on fees is available at a country level for some
countries, but fees are excluded in this analysis since they are captured in
the calculation costs of administration discussed below. Likewise, data on
timescales is available but the majority of data reflects only NSA response
times and does not include RU/IM preparation time. As such, the cost impacts
calculated for the options primarily reflect the faster implementation of the
single safety certificate reducing the costs of additional country
authorisation and the reduction of costs in Germany where there is evidence of
a particularly long certification process. Calculated reductions in timescales
reflect improvements in NSA response times and do not capture additional time
savings on RU/IM preparation times. Table VII-2: Certification categories in the assessment of impacts Certification Category || Average cost (000€s) || Average timescale (months) Safety Certification (1st Country) – Freight || 21 || 5 Safety Certification (additional Country) – Freight || 20 || 5 Safety Certification (1st Country) – Passenger || 20 || 5 Safety Certification (additional Country) – Passenger || 24 || 6 2. Future levels of authorisation and
certification The total number of vehicle
authorisations for each vehicle category that has been used for the baseline
position, are shown in the figure below. Figure VII-1: Base year Authorisations (2007/2008 adjusted) ·
The
breakdown by authorisation category is the table below. Table VII-3: Base Year number of authorisations used for calculations Vehicle Category || New (1st Country) || New (additional country) || Re-authorisation (1st country) || Re-authorisation (additional country) Wagons || 8,190 || 01 || 11,600 || 02 Locomotives || 40 || 390 || 1,760 || 60 Coaches || 340 || 03 || 2,090 || 04 Multiple Units || 50 || 460 || 1,410 || 50 §
1,2,3,4 Data on
authorisation numbers did not distinguish between first and additional
authorisations and therefore some assumptions have been made as to the
proportions of each. It has been assumed that there will be zero wagon and
coach additional authorisations. In practice there will be a small number but
at with the data available zero was the most appropriate (and robust)
assumption. ·
The
base year for authorisation numbers is 2008. The reasons for this are: ·
The
period 2009-2011 has seen very atypical patterns of authorisation due to the
severe economic downturn experienced during this period. For example the Agency
estimated in the Cross-Acceptance report on vehicle authorisation that the
number of vehicle authorisations in 2009 dropped nearly 10% compared to 2008. ·
More
recent data at the disaggregated level available in the Cross-Acceptance report
on vehicle authorisation is not readily available. 3. Type size reduction A key issue for the number of type
authorisations is the number of vehicles per type. It can be anticipated over
time that market consolidation and market changes induced by the TSIs will
reduce the number of vehicle types on the market. This is consistent with the
Agency’s analysis of the impacts of TSI scope extension. The estimates quoted in the
Cross-Acceptance report on vehicle authorisation from UNIFE have been used to
derive the evolution of type size over the period 2007/2008 – 2025 for
locomotives and multiple units. For wagons and coaches it has been assumed that
type size for new vehicles reaches that of existing vehicles by 2015 and remains
constant thereafter. The assumed type size changes are shown in the table
below. Table VII-4: Type size changes assumed in the assessment Vehicle Category || Type Size 2007/2008 || 2025 New Wagons || 105 || 148 Existing Wagons || 148 || 148 New Locomotives || 5 || 32 Existing Locomotives || 13 || 13 New Coaches || 22 || 22 Existing Coaches || 22 || 22 New Multiple Units || 16 || 87 Existing Multiple Units || 35 || 35 4 Forecast authorisation and certification
costs (baseline) The forecast evolution of total
authorisation costs in the baseline scenario between 2012 and 2025 is shown in
the table below. This shows that in the baseline, even without major extensions
of the Agency’s role, total authorisation costs are anticipated to fall by over
a third by 2020 as Cross-Acceptance, reduction of National Rules, TSI scope
extension and other measures impact authorisation costs. The total level of
authorisation costs does however, demonstrate the scope for cost savings with
estimated total authorisation costs of over a quarter of a billion euros in
2012. The increase in authorisation costs post 2020 is caused by growth in
ERTMS deployment creating a higher volume of (expensive) ERTMS related vehicle
authorisations. This is an area of considerable uncertainty in the total level
of authorisation costs but the impact on the incremental option benefits is
small. The main external reference point for the
quantitative outputs in this study is the Agency’s evaluation of the benefits
of TSI Scope extension. A direct comparison of absolute authorisation costs is
difficult since the Agency’s analysis (which deals solely with locomotives)
includes an estimate of the economic costs of locomotives stored in sidings as
well as the direct costs of vehicle authorisation. However, what can be
ascertained is that, whilst the Agency has estimated an approximate 50%
reduction in authorisation costs (including economic costs of locomotives
stored in sidings) by 2020. For the IA calculation a more cautious view was
taken, estimating a reduction of around a third by 2020. Figure VII-2: Forecast Authorisation costs all vehicle types 2012-2025 (real,
undiscounted) The forecast evolution of average
authorisation timescales in the baseline scenario between 2012 and 2025 is
shown in the figure below. Consistent with the reduction in costs a reduction
in timescales is forecast although not as large as the proportional reduction
in costs. Figure VII-3: Forecast authorisation timescales 2012-2025 In the baseline certification costs and
timescales are forecast to remain virtually constant with little improvement as
illustrated in the figure below. Figure VII-4: Forecast Certification costs 2012-2025 (real, undiscounted) 5. Impact on costs and timescales of
authorisation and certification of the different options Explanation on the assumptions is given in Section
6. The minimum costs and timescales used are set out in the tables below. These
are based on the range of costs and timescales assessed as part of the study. Table VII-5: Minimum possible costs of authorisation (€000) Vehicle Category || New (1st Country) || New (additional country) || Re-authorisation (1st country) || Re-authorisation (additional country) Wagons || 100 || n/a1 || 100 || n/a Locomotives || 5,000 || 500 || 375 (without ERTMS) 750 (with ERTMS) || n/a (without ERTMS) 500 (with ERTMS) Coaches || 100 || 100 || 100 || n/a Multiple Units || 480 || 200 || 480 (without ERTMS) 4,800 (with ERTMS) || n/a (without ERTMS) 2,000 (with ERTMS) 1
Note that where costs are ‘n/a’ this reflects the assumption that there are no
authorisations (at least at a significant level) for this authorisation
category. Table VII-6
Minimum possible timescales of authorisation (months/type) Vehicle Category || New (1st Country) || New (additional country) || Re-authorisation (1st country) || Re-authorisation (additional country) Wagons || 1 || n/a1 || 1 || n/a Locomotives || 18 || 6 || 6 (without ERTMS) 8 (with ERTMS) || n/a (without ERTMS) 8 (with ERTMS) Coaches || 18 || n/a || 18 || n/a Multiple Units || 18 || 12 || 18 (without ERTMS) 20 (with ERTMS) || n/a (without ERTMS) 6 (with ERTMS) 1 Note
that where timescales are ‘n/a’ this reflects the assumption that there are no
authorisations (at least at a significant level) for this authorisation
category. Table VII-7: Minimum possible costs of certification (€000) Market || 1st Country || Additional country Passenger || 18 || 0 Freight || 18 || 0 Table VII-8: Minimum possible timescales of certification (months/type) Vehicle Category || 1st Country || Additional country Wagons || 3 || 0 Locomotives || 3 || 0 It should be noted that a particular issue
is the treatment of Germany where there currently exists a fundamental conflict
between German and EU law. It has been assumed that this is cancelled out
through a positive outcome (for the Commission) of the infringement proceedings
currently in process and hence a portion of the benefits from reduction of
authorisation costs and timescales are included in the baseline. Calculating the impact of options on
authorisation costs and timescales Calculation of impacts of options on
authorisation costs and timescales is fundamental to the impact assessment.
However, whilst the consultant acquired data from a number of sources for a
number of countries as to the costs and timescales of authorisation which
indicates the size of the difference between efficient and non-efficient
authorisation, there is no data that directly tells how far any given option
will reduce the cost and timescales towards the most efficient level of
authorisation. To increase the robustness of the estimates
the possible impacts of measures were assessed as systematically as possible
based on the following criteria: Authorisation i) Does the measure address issues specific to a particular
vehicle type? ii) Is the measure relevant for both 1st authorisation and
additional authorisation? iii) Which elements of the authorisation process does the
measure impact? iv) What other measures are interrelated? v) What are the timescales for implementation of the measure? vi) What are the timescales for the impact of the measure once
implemented? vii) Will the impact be different in different countries? Certification i) Does the measure address issues specific to freight or
passenger Railway Undertakings? ii) Is the measure relevant for both 1st certification and
additional certification? iii) Which elements of the certification process does the
measure impact? iv) What other measures are interrelated? v) What are the timescales for implementation of the measure? vi) What are the timescales for the impact of the measure once
implemented? vii) Will the impact be different in different countries? Based on these questions it has been
identified what is the likely scope of impacts, which authorisation and
certification categories are likely to be impacted most significantly, the timescales
over which impacts will arise and whether impacts are likely to differ significantly
between countries. Measures have been categorised as having a low, medium or
high effect where a low effect corresponds to a reduction of the gap between
current average authorisation costs and ‘perfect’ authorisation costs of
between 0 and 5%, medium 5-15% and high, greater than 15%. Once each measure was assessed an overall
assessment at option level was carried out to translate reductions in costs and
timescales into monetary values. This amalgamated the impacts at an option
level, applying adjustments to avoid double-counting of impacts when measures
were added together. Each option has been assessed as having a low, medium or
high effect where low corresponds to a reduction of the gap between current
average authorisation costs and ‘perfect’ authorisation costs of between 0-20%,
medium with an impact of 20-50% and high with an impact of 50-100%. It should be noted that the qualitative
assessment of options 2 to 6 has been carried out on an incremental basis
relative to the baseline. This means, for example, that whilst the baseline has
been assessed overall as having a medium impact, option 2 has a low to medium
impact. This does not mean that option 2 is worse performing than the baseline,
rather that the incremental improvement in option 2 compared to the baseline is
relatively small. The baseline is assessed as medium impact since it represents
a substantial reduction in authorisation costs and timescales compared to the
current position. Results of assessment of each option are
provided below. Table VII-9: Impact analysis of baseline factors Factor || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list) || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Measure in place || Likely phasing of main impact DV29 is commonly followed || Impacts should be felt across authorisation categories. Impact will be most significant in ‘challenging’ countries || Medium || 2011 || 2011-2014 Entering into force of CR RST and LOC&PAS TSIs || The entering into force of these additional TSIs will increase the burden of applicable TSIs. In the short term this has the potential to further slow the authorisation process || Low || 2011 || 2011-2018 Progressive elimination of open points || The elimination of open points should have a significant impact on authorisation over time but is a lengthy process || Medium || Benefits already being felt || 2011-2020 Improved staffing levels at NSAs || Impacts should be felt across authorisation categories. Effects limited to countries where there is evidence of plans for improved staffing in the future (e.g. Italy and Poland) || Low (geographically limited || 2013 || 2013-2014 Cross-Acceptance & tidy up of national rules || This primarily benefits additional authorisation costs and is likely to be particularly significant for locomotive and multiple unit authorisations since these are the vehicle types for which the number of Cross-Acceptance agreements currently is most limited. Impacts are highly related to the number of open points. Tidy up of national rules will also impact 1st country authorisations. || High || Benefits already beginning to be felt || 2011-2018 TSI scope extension || TSI scope extension will reduce the need to assess vehicles against national rules over time and also encourage migration to TSI compliant networks and vehicles || High || 2014 || 2014-2017 main effect 2017-onwards continuing effect Improved ‘self-regulation’ || Impacts likely to be patchy given dependence on self-enforcement || Low || Some measures already in place || On-going Complete Baseline || The Baseline encompasses a wide range of impacts, a number of which (e.g. work on national rules) are likely to have a significant effect on authorisation costs and timescales. It is estimated that by 2025 the measures in place will close the gap between average authorisation costs and minimum achievable authorisation costs by over 30%. The impact on certification costs is however, much smaller with no significant initiatives to reduce certification costs. || Medium || 2011 || 2011-2025 Table VII-10: Impact analysis of option 2 measures Measure || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Measure in place || Likely phasing of main impact Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NSAs regarding granting vehicle of authorisations and safety certificates, including ensuring their mutual recognition by national authorities. || This is a general measure affecting all authorisations and certifications. Ensuring mutual recognition of safety certificates should have a high impact. Significant benefits from mutual recognition of vehicle authorisation not likely to be realised without implementation of other measures. || Low (authorisations and 1st country certification) High (additional country certification) || 2017 || 2017-2025 2020-2025 (mutual recognition of authorisations) Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of NoBos. || This is likely to particularly impact additional authorisations by giving additional countries confidence in NoBo outputs. Will also particularly impact vehicle authorisations involving ERTMS sub-systems || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2020 Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (for example by developing guidelines and auditing adherence to them). || This is a general measure affecting all authorisations and certifications || Low || 2017 || 2017-2022 Complete Option || The impact of this option is relatively low with additional powers of the Agency limited. Main impact is on additional authorisations. || Low || 2017 || 2017-2022 Table VII-11: Impact Analysis of option 3 measures Measure || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Measure in place || Likely phasing of main impact Migration to a single (common) safety certificate: national authorities issue single safety certificates (mutually recognised by definition) || The key impact of the single safety certificate is the eventual removal of the need for additional Part B authorisations. || High || 2017 || 2017-2021 ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of safety certificates to the railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations placing into service (a "one stop shop" for safety certificates and vehicle authorisation concept): the decision is taken by the NSA, ERA performs "entry and exit" checks of the application and of the decision. || This is a general measure affecting all authorisations and certifications || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2021 ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of NSAs || Likely to impact all authorisations & certifications. Assume that prospect of appeal has immediate effect on NSA behaviour. However, impact is likely to decrease with reduction in open points and national rules. || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2019 Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification & accreditation of NoBos. || This is likely to particularly impact additional authorisations by giving additional countries confidence in NoBo outputs. Will also particularly impact vehicle authorisations involving ERTMS sub-systems || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2020 Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (e.g. by developing guidelines & auditing adherence to them). || This is a general measure affecting all authorisations and certifications || Low || 2017 || 2017-2022 Migration to a single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): national authorities issue single vehicle authorisations (mutually recognised by definition) || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation categories but mainly additional authorisations. Full benefits not likely to be realised without implementation of other measures e.g. improved infrastructure registers. || Low || 2020 || 2020-2025 Complete Option || Whilst ERA has more powers in this option primarily through measure on safety certificate it is likely that additional benefits over option 2 will be limited with division of labour between NSAs and the Agency being an issue. || Low/Medium || 2017 || 2017-2022 Table VII-12: Impact analysis of option 4 measures Measure || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Measure in place || Likely phasing of main impact ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of safety certificates to RUs & vehicle authorisations to applicants: a "one stop shop" concept with the NSAs (acting as regional offices of ERA) contributing in the process but the final decision rests with ERA. || This is a general measure affecting all authorisations and certifications. || High || 2017 || 2017-2022 Migration to a single (common) safety certificate: ERA issues single safety certificates || The key impact of the single safety certificate is the eventual removal of the need for additional Part B authorisations. || High || 2018 || 2018-2023 Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of NoBos. || This is likely to particularly impact additional authorisations by giving additional countries confidence in NoBo outputs. Will also particularly impact vehicle authorisations involving ERTMS sub-systems || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2020 Migration to a single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): ERA issues single vehicle authorisations || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation categories but mainly additional authorisations. Full benefits not likely to be realised without implementation of other measures e.g. improved infrastructure registers. || Medium || 2020 || 2020-2025 Complete Option || Provided ERA has sufficient powers to act as a strong central office this option is likely to have a significant impact on authorisation and certification costs and timescales. || Medium/High || 2017 || 2017-2023 Table VII-13: Impact analysis of option 5 measures Measure || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Measure in place || Likely phasing of main impact ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to RUs & vehicle authorisations || This is a general measure affecting all authorisations and certifications. || High || 2017 || 2017-2023 Measure will take some time to bed in Migration to a single (common) safety certificate: ERA issues single safety certificates || The key impact of the single safety certificate is the eventual removal of the need for additional Part B authorisations. || High || 2017 || 2017-2022 Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of NoBos. || This is likely to particularly impact additional authorisations by giving additional countries confidence in NoBo outputs. Will also particularly impact vehicle authorisations involving ERTMS sub-systems || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2020 Migration to a single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): ERA issues single vehicle authorisations || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation categories but mainly additional authorisations. Full benefits not likely to be realised without implementation of other measures e.g. improved infrastructure registers. || Medium || 2020 || 2020-2025 Complete Option || This option would have a high impact on authorisation costs and timescales and would also enable additional efficiencies over the current arrangements through economies of scale. || High || 2017 || 2017-2023 Table VII-14: Impact analysis of option 6 measures Measure || Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list || Impact magnitude (low/ medium/high) || Measure in place || Likely phasing of main impact 3.1: Strengthened action by the Commission in implementing the legislation || This will impact all authorisations and certifications. Impact will be greatest in ‘challenging’ countries. || Medium || 2015 || 2015-2018 Amendment of the railway directives to enable the adoption by the Commission of implementing measures setting out common principles & practices for the national authorities || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation and certification categories. Impact will be most significant in ‘challenging’ countries || Medium || 2017 || 2017-2022 Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring & control of implementation of national safety & interoperability legislation || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation and certification categories. Impact will be most significant in ‘challenging’ countries. || Low || 2016 || 2016-2018 Migrating from national technical & safety rules to EU rules through clear indication of what national rules need to be removed by national authorities with the national authorities tasked with the role of removing them. Also modify the directive with a view to limit/remove the possibility for MS to adopt new national rules || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation categories although particularly for additional authorisations. It has been assumed that this measure does have an impact on the number of national rules in existence at the end of the evaluation period, not just a speeding up of the process of removal. || Medium || 2015 || 2015-2020 Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training. || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation and certification categories. || Low || 2015 || 2015-2017 Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in implementing EU legislation on safety & interoperability || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation and certification categories. || Medium || 2015 || 2015-2018 Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws & decisions (including TSIs) || Impacts should be felt across all authorisation and certification categories. Impact will be most significant in ‘challenging’ countries. || Medium || 2015 || 2016-2018 Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area || Impact of spare parts component evaluated qualitatively – see Maintenance costs indicator. || Low || 2016 || 2016-2025 Complete Option || This option contains some measures that can be implemented relatively quickly and as such has an earlier benefit than any other option. However, most of the measures have a medium or low impact and therefore the overall impact is similar to options 2 and 3. || Medium || 2015 || 2015-2025 6. Horizontal measures impacts matrix Individual measures included in option 6,
when combined with options 2-5, will have different effect. The matrix shows the
extent of differentiation of horizontal measures' impact on options 2 to 5.
Where the impact is the same for the combined option as for the stand-alone
horizontal option, this is denoted by ‘100%’. Where it is less, a
correspondingly smaller percentage is included. The key feature is that a
number of horizontal measures have a smaller impact in options 4 and 5 since
the core measures for these options negate the need for some of the horizontal
measures. Option level adjustments have also been included to keep the combined
effects to a feasible level (i.e. reduction of gap between average and
‘perfect’ authorisation/certification cannot be more than 100%). Table VII-15: Horizontal measures impacts matrix Option || Horizontal option measure A || B || C || D || E || F || G || H Option 2 || 100% || 100% || 100% || 100% || 100% || 100% || 100% || 100% Option 3 || 100% || 100% 50% (additional country certification) || 75% || 100% || 100% || 100% || 75% || 100% Option 4 || 25% || 50% || 50% || 100% || 100% || 75% || 50% || 100% Option 5 || 0% || 0% || 25% || 100% || 75% || 50% || 25% || 100% A. Strengthened action by the Commission in implementing the legislation; B. Amendment of the railway directives to enable the adoption by the Commission of implementing measures setting out common principles and practices for the national authorities; C. Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring & control of implementation of national safety and interoperability legislation; D. Enhanced role of ERA in migrating from national technical and safety rules to a system of EU rules; E. Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training; F. Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in implementing EU legislation on safety and interoperability; G. Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws and decisions (including Technical Specifications for Interoperability); H. Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area. Note: percentages reflect the relative impact of measures when combined with options 2-5 compared to impact in option 6. I.e. if impact of measure in option 6 is 10% and percentage in table is 50% this implies a 5% impact. 7. Standardisation of fees Within the analysis of the cost of
administration it was investigated how potential revenues could vary for the
institutions involved in the different options and to what extent the extra
calls to EU budget could be covered. The input data for this analysis has been
the total number of safety certificates issued and vehicle authorisations
granted in recent years, the average fees for these two activities and how the
fee revenues would be shared between the Agency and NSAs. To facilitate this analysis a
standardisation of the fees was assumed in different Member States for all the cumulative
options (2 to 5) above the baseline, which has been set equal to €10k per
safety certificate and €17k per vehicle authorisation. This implies a reduction
in the fees per safety certificate collected by EU15 NSAs (from an
average of €20k to €10k) and an increase in those raised by EU12 NSAs (from an
average of €3k to €10k). It also implies a reduction in the fees per vehicle authorisation
collected by EU15 NSAs (from an average of €28k to €17k) and an increase in
those raised by EU12 NSAs (from an average of €11k to €17k). The variation in
fee revenues for NSAs and the Agency in options 2 to 5 is set out in the table
below. Table VII-16: Impacts of options on NSAs and agency revenues (€ m) Option || Revenue sharing criteria || NSAs Revenue Increase (Decrease) – NPV across the EU (2015-2025) || Agency Revenue Increase (Decrease) – NPV (2015-2025) || Net change in revenues (NSAs + ERA) - NPV Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination” || 100% NSAs || (29.42) || - || (29.42) Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop || 100% NSAs || (29.42) || - || (29.42) Option 4: ERA & NSAs share competencies || a. 25% NSAs 75% ERA || (85.84) || 56.43 || (29.42) b. 50% NSAs 50% ERA || (67.04) || 37.62 || (29.42) c. 75% NSAs 25% ERA || (48.23) || 18.81 || (29.42) Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation & certification || 100% ERA || (104.65) || 75.23 || (29.42) In case of option 4 the total amount of
potential revenues was distributed between NSAs and ERA with the criteria
(percentages) of different revenue sharing scenarios. 8. Opportunity cost savings from reduced
authorisation timescales There will be a number
of savings arising directly from shorter rolling stock authorisation timescales. These
include: ·
reduction in operating costs
accrued as a result of needing to cover delayed stock with alternative stock; ·
reduction in loss of revenue
where the introduction of new services is delayed/existing services are cut back
where rolling stock is not available to cover for delayed stock; ·
reduced storage costs. Whilst the impacts are significant, quantification is
challenging. For example, the balance of cost savings versus reductions in lost
revenue is highly dependent on the precise nature of services involved.
Further, the magnitude of cost savings and reductions in revenue loss will also
be dependent on a number of other factors. For example, an incumbent might be
able to cover affected services with existing rolling stock and therefore only
incur storage costs, but a new entrant might forgo significant revenue if it is
unable to obtain covering rolling stock. Therefore three scenarios were developed to
construct an assessment of the possible range of opportunity cost savings. The
scenarios are: i) All affected services are
covered by alternative rolling stock (lower bound) ii) Half of affected freight
services and half of affected passenger services are not able to run with
resultant revenue loss (central case) iii) None of the affected
services are able to run (upper bound). The key parameters for
assumptions were: ·
Cost of alternative rolling
stock is assumed to be cost of leasing additional rolling stock. For
locomotives a value of approx. €30k per month has been used and for multiple
unit vehicles, €15k. Both these values are approximately 1% of typical average
new vehicle values. ·
Using UIC data, average
revenue per loco and passenger vehicle have been calculated as a percentage of
new vehicle value. For locomotives this is 3.8% on a monthly basis and for
passenger vehicles 1.9% on a monthly basis. Using these parameters together with the current value of
delayed rolling stock in sidings derived from data collected by the Agency it
has been possible to construct estimates of the savings arising from reduced
authorisation timescales. It has been assumed that reductions in authorisation
timescales are reflected one for one in reductions in average delays.
Reductions in certification timescales have not been included in the delay
reduction since evidence suggests it is vehicle authorisation that is the
primary binding constraint. Average reductions in
authorisation timescales by option are shown in Figure VII-5. Figure VII-5: Average reduction in authorisation
timescales by combined options The analysis only
covers locomotives and multiple units since the Agency has stated that its
studies show
that coaches and wagons usually achieve their due dates and they only have data
for locomotives and multiple units. In addition, costs of storage are not
incorporated since available data suggests that these costs are relatively
small compared to the costs of leasing stock or forgone revenue. Table VII-17 shows the
discounted opportunity cost savings that could be achieved over the period 2015
– 2025. The inclusion of the three different scenarios illustrates the large
degree of uncertainty but suggests that savings could be at least €100m for
option 5. Figure VII-6 illustrating savings by year for the central
case further shows that savings per option are between €30 and €40m per year by
the end of the evaluation period. Table VII-17: discounted
opportunity cost savings 2015-2025 (€ m) Option || Central Case || Lower bound || Upper bound Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination” || 237 || 71 || 402 Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop || 255 || 77 || 433 Option 4: ERA and NSAs share competences || 265 || 81 || 450 Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation and certification || 295 || 90 || 499 Figure VII-6: Total
opportunity cost savings 2015-2025 with horizontal measures ((€ m, central
case, real, undiscounted) 9. Calculations
of the impacts on the cost of administration for the ERA and national
authorities Introduction The policy options considered
have a significant impact on the cost of administration of EU and national institutions
and, as such, need to be investigated in detail. This analysis has been carried
out on the basis that some of proposed measures entail a variation in the staff
needed by ERA to perform additional tasks, and, in some cases, possible
reductions of staff at NSAs due to competences transferred at central level. The aim of this analysis is to
assess the difference in the cost of administration determined by the
implementation of the selected policy options against a baseline scenario in
which none of the measures are adopted. Although it is acknowledged that in the
actual baseline scenario there could be administrative cost variations over
time (e.g. due by NSAs or ERA staff growth for better implementation of current
rules), in this analysis the aim was to point out the difference in costs
between adopting the policy options or doing nothing. The only assumption
regarding the baseline scenario which differs from the present situation is the
fact that the different fees currently applied by the NSAs for the release of
the safety certificate, were assumed to converge toward a single fee whose
value is fixed across the EU. For
each Policy Option, impacts were disaggregated in order to identify variations
in costs on each specific stakeholder groupings, i.e.: ·
the Agency
(and the Commission particularly in relation to the Horizontal Measures); and ·
national institutions
(in particular NSAs). For the purpose of this
analysis, all costs are indexed to a base year of 2012 and are computed in real
terms over the period 2012-2025 using as indicator the Net Present Value at 4%
discount rate, which is consistent with the assumption made for the IA model
presented above. For the different options the net administrative cost has
been estimated by computing: ·
the
variation in gross administrative costs at Community level (namely variation in
ERA costs, in the "separate appeal body" to be created in Options 4
and 5 and in the Commission staff), at national level (variation in NSAs costs)
and at the EU level (sum of variation in ERA and NSAs costs); and ·
the
variation of potential revenues collected by levying charges for the activities
carried out by the NSAs and ERA in relation to the release of safety
certificates. Assumptions The following inputs have been used for the
estimation of the cost of administration: Agency costs: ·
Variation
of number of staff in the different options: estimated on the basis of the
assessment of the individual measures included in each option; see Table VII-18
below. In addition, the estimated total variation in staff members was
distributed across years to take into account the fact that the recruitment
process needs a number of years to be finalised (it was assumed that by 2020
all staff member variation have occurred). ·
Gross
cost of Agency staff members: estimated on the basis of the average staff cost
indicated by the Agency, i.e. €100k. This value was converted into a range of
costs varying with staff number increase in line with expected lower average
cost of staff where larger numbers of staff are required (as more junior staff
will be required when numbers increase). ·
Overhead
costs: computed at 25% of staff costs. ·
Other
costs: values estimated on a case by case basis looking at individual measures.
These costs include, for example, travelling costs to attend conferences,
outsourcing costs for evaluation studies/technical support. The work already undertaken to date by the
Agency in relation to its future role has informed this assessment but the
approach used to these calculations differs from those used by the Agency as the
synergies have been identified through the implementation of different measures
within a single “option” package. Table VII-18: Summary of policy options with relevant number of staff attributed
to each measure Option 1 || Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination” over NSAs || Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop || Option 4: ERA & NSAs share competencies || Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs Baseline || Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NSAs regarding granting of vehicle authorisations & safety certificates including ensuring their mutual recognition by national authorities. (13) || ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of safety certificates to the railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations ("one stop shop" concept): the decision is taken by NSA, ERA performs "entry and exit" checks of the application. (15) || ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of safety certificates & vehicle authorisations: a "one stop shop" concept with the NSAs (acting as regional offices of ERA) contributing but the final decision rests with ERA. (30) || ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations. (275) ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of NSAs (3) Migration to a single (common) safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): national authorities issue single safety certificates & single vehicle authorisations (mutually recognised by definition) || Migration to a single (common) safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for vehicles): ERA issues single safety certificates and single vehicle authorisations (Appeals to ERA decisions are sent to a separate appeal body) Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (e.g. developing guidelines & auditing adherence to them). (4) Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of NoBos. (3) Option 6: horizontal measures (independent of the level of interaction ERA/national authorities) || Strengthened action by the Commission outside infringement procedure, notably on non-discrimination in the railway market (1 EC) Amendment of the interoperability and safety directives to enable the adoption of implementing acts setting out common principles & practices for national authorities (1 EC) Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring and control of implementation of national safety and interoperability legislation (6) Migrating from national technical & safety rules to a system of EU rules (requirement for national authorities to remove unnecessary rules and limiting their possibility of adopting new rules). (9) Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training. (5) Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice & support for Member States & other stakeholders in implementing legislation on safety & interoperability (3) Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws & decisions (including TSIs) Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area (2) NSAs costs: ·
Variation
of number of staff in the different options: for each option at first an average
variation in NSAs staff members in the EU was estimated, taking into account
the current structure of NSAs in the EU, which have different size and tasks. Aggregated
variations in EU 12 and EU 15 MS were then computed, taking into account that
only 25 out of the 27 MS currently have railway infrastructure and related
institutions. In addition, as was done for the Agency, the estimated total
variation in staff members were distributed across years assuming in any case
that by 2020 all staff member variations have occurred. ·
Gross
cost of NSA staff members: estimated on the basis of the average staff cost
resulting for EU 12 and EU 15 MS from the case studies undertaken. It was also
assumed that there is no growth for EU 15 MS salaries over the period of
analysis, while a 7% yearly growth rate for EU 12 salaries was used to close
the existing gap with EU 15 ones. ·
Overhead
costs: computed at 25% of staff costs as for the Agency. ·
Other
costs: no cost additions were considered for NSAs. Safety certificate revenues and cost coverage: ·
Number
of safety certificates: the numbers of forecasted safety certificates issued
yearly in the EU in the 2015-2025 period was used (calculations explained
above). Data have been disaggregated by EU 12 and EU 15 MS. ·
Safety
certificate fees: average current fees have been estimated on the basis of the
data collected during the stakeholder consultation (a fee of €20k for EU 15 MS
and €3 k for EU 12 MS). Future fees have been set equal to € 10k across all the
EU to take into account of a standardisation of payments and procedures. ·
Revenue
sharing: different criteria for sharing revenues between the Agency and NSAs
have been identified for the different options analysed on the basis of the various
contribution given by these institutions to this process. In the case of
options 2 and 3 safety certificate revenues have been entirely assigned to NSAs
(as in the current situation); in the case of option 4, different hypotheses
have been made to test the impacts of the consequences of changing the
distribution of revenues between ERA and NSAs, i.e.: option 4.a where ERA keeps
75% of revenues and NSAs 25%, option 4.b where revenues are equally split
between ERA and the NSAs and option 4.c where ERA collects 25% of revenues and
NSAs 75%. ·
Distribution
of Agency costs between safety and authorisation activities: to compute the
extent that the share of safety certificates revenues can contribute to the
coverage of additional Agency’s cost in this area, the amount of additional
Agency costs was estimated which could be attributable to the issuing of safety
certificates. This has been set equal to 30% and 50% of total additional costs
for the period 2015-2020 and 2020-2025 respectively. The percentage is assumed
to increase from 30% of 2015 to 50% of 2020 because the forecasted reduction
over time of the work related to type authorisation (due to a standardisation
of vehicle fleets in the EU). Figure
VII-7: Key assumptions for calculations of cost of administration 10. Assessment of indirect impacts Quantification of the indirect impacts set has not been
carried out for a number of reasons: ·
Considerable
time and effort has been expended quantifying the direct impacts on costs and
timescales of vehicle authorisation and railway undertaking safety
certification. However, the complexity and multi-faceted nature of
authorisation, in particular, means that precise estimation is not possible.
Estimation of indirect impacts would therefore have been built off a base
already containing a significant degree of uncertainty. ·
One
of the key links in the chain of causality between direct and indirect impacts
is the impact of changes in vehicle authorisation costs and timescales on new
entrant levels. Whilst there clearly is an impact, authorisation costs are only
one component of a large set of costs and barriers which will affect new entry
into the rail market and any quantification of this link would necessarily have
been tenuous at best. ·
Relative
to authorisation cost savings most of the indirect impacts are anticipated to
be small. Therefore the quantification of impacts is
restricted to direct impacts only. In this context it is very difficult to
identify a range of impact with the low/medium/high categorisation due to the
level of uncertainty. However, ‘low’ means an impact hardly noticeable even at
a country/market sector level, whilst ‘medium’ might be noticed in some
countries and market sectors. Only ‘high’ impacts would be detectable at the EU
level. Finally, for some categories impacts were assessed as zero where being
so small as to be negligible. Table VII-17 below presents the qualitative
assessment summary; additional explanations follow. It is clear, and is
discussed further below, that the global impacts are low across all options due
to the very technical and sector specific impacts of the provisions within this
initiative. Table VII-19: Qualitative assessment
summary Impact || Key indicator(s) || Magnitude of impact (High/Medium/Low) Option 2 || Option 3 || Option 4 || Option 5 || Option 6 Effect on freight transport demand || Total rail freight tonne km || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on rail freight prices || Price per tonne km || Low || Low || Medium || Medium || Low Modal shift (freight) || Rail freight mode share || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on passenger transport demand || Rail passenger km || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Change in service levels || Train km || Low || Low || Medium || Medium || Low Modal shift (passenger) || Rail passenger mode share || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on operational costs (beyond direct effects) || Total industry operational costs || Low || Low || Medium || Medium || Medium Effect on fares for passengers || Average fares for passengers || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on rail investment || Total capital expenditure on rolling stock || Low || Low || Medium || Medium || Low Effect on industry revenue (beyond direct effects) || Total rail industry revenue || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on public funding || Total rail subsidy || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on market structure || New entrant market share || Low || Low || Medium || Medium || Low Effect on employment levels and working conditions || Total rail employment Average wage || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Effect on GHG emissions || Total CO2 emissions (tonnes) || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Noise emissions || Total noise emissions (in dB(A) || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Local air quality || Concentration of atmospheric pollutants || Low || Low || Low || Low || Low Rail safety || Number of fatalities || Zero || Zero || Zero || Zero || Zero Passenger security || Number of crimes on rail network || Zero || Zero || Zero || Zero || Zero Maintenance costs || Total maintenance costs || Zero || Zero || Zero || Zero || Low Global qualitative impact evaluation || Low || Low || Low/ Medium || Low/ Medium || Low Additional explanation of qualitative
assessment Effect
on operational costs: the dominant impact on
operational costs will be the fall in vehicle authorisation timescales reducing
the need to cover services using alternative rolling stock (either via lease or
sub-contract) whilst waiting for delayed authorisations. This has been measured
separately as part of the ‘opportunity cost’ indicator. The other key impact of
improved vehicle authorisation will be the removal of a significant barrier to
entry for new entrants. It can be anticipated that an increase in new entrants
will result in lower average costs in the industry. Effect
on rail freight prices: Rail freight prices will be
impacted through two mechanisms: ·
Reduction in prices through incumbent freight operators
passing through a proportion of cost savings from cheaper authorisation to
customers ·
New entrants entering the market due to lower authorisation
and certification costs reducing the barriers to entry It is likely that the overall impact on
prices will be low or medium at best in all options for three reasons: 1.
Authorisation changes, though, substantial in absolute terms
are only one component of railway undertaking costs 2.
Since in many cases a large proportion of cost savings accrue
to manufacturers and lessors of rolling stock as well as railway undertakings
i.e. another step removed from customers some of the savings are likely to be
taken in increased margin further up the supply chain 3.
The majority of cost savings will still be for incumbent
freight operators often operating in markets with little competition with low
incentives to reduce prices Effect
on fares for passengers: As for freight prices it is
likely that the impact on passenger fares will be low for all options. Given
that the key impacts are for locomotives which overwhelmingly affect the
freight sector, the impact on passenger fares is likely to be very small. Change
in service levels: Reduced authorisation costs
could result in additional new entry into the market, stimulating increased
service levels and also stimulate an improved service offer from incumbent
operators. Impacts, however, are likely to be isolated to a limited number of
specific cases, even in the highest impact options. Effect
on freight transport demand: Reduced authorisation costs
could result in additional freight demand through lower prices and improved
service offer. However, impact will be very small. Effect
on passenger transport demand: Reduced authorisation
costs could result in additional passenger demand through lower prices and
improved service offer. However, impact will be very small. Modal
shift (freight): A proportion of the additional rail
freight demand will be abstracted from competing modes of freight transport.
The key competitor mode for rail freight is road and therefore the majority of
abstracted demand will be drawn from road haulage. However, with only a very
small anticipated increase in rail demand, mode shift will be correspondingly
very small. Modal
shift (passenger): A proportion of the additional
rail passenger demand will be abstracted from competing modes of passenger
transport. However, with only a very small anticipated increase in rail demand,
mode shift will be correspondingly very small. Effect
on rail investment: Most railway investment,
particularly at an infrastructure level is funded by public investment and as
such is politically driven and likely to be independent of vehicle
authorisation. There will be some impact on investment through faster
authorisation enabling new investments to be brought forward in some instances
although this is hard to quantify. Also, both authorisation and opportunity
cost savings could be used to finance additional investment but again this is
difficult to quantify since these savings could also simply be used to reduce
public subsidy requirements. Finally, increased new entry could generate
additional investment. However, given the relatively small size of the combined
opportunity cost and authorisation cost savings compared to total rolling stock
investment (<3% in central case) and an uncertain link between cost savings
and additional investment, effects on investment are not likely to be large. Effect
on industry revenue: Impact on industry revenue
beyond any direct effects captured in the opportunity cost indicator will be
low, reflecting the small changes in demand. Effect
on non-operational costs: The key cost change other than
reductions in operational cost changes induced by new entrants will be a
reduction in authorisation costs. Whilst the changes are substantial, as a
proportion of non-operational costs they will be relatively low. Effect
on public funding: The impact on public funding
will be composed of two key components: ·
Change in costs and revenues of publicly funded RUs due to
new entrants ·
Reduction in authorisation costs borne by publicly funded RUs Compared
to the total level of public funding the effects will be low in all options. Effect
on market structure: The key impact of improved
vehicle authorisation will be the removal of a significant barrier to entry for
new entrants which will encourage more new entrants to the market. This will be
most significant in countries where discrimination against new entrants is
currently an issue. For options 4 and 5 this could have a noticeable impact in
some countries. Effect
on employment levels and working conditions: There
will be some impact on employment levels where additional staff are required to
run additional services that become viable. However, in some instances it is
likely that a portion of authorisation cost savings could be reflected in job
reductions. Total impacts are hard to quantify but overall impacts are likely
to be small. The implementation of different policy
measures would also have effects on the employees of NSAs and NoBos. The
numeric terms, however, the effect would be rather limited, with staffing
variations in the NSAs likely to change between 2 and 10 staff members on
average, depending on the policy option implemented. The effects on NoBos would
be assumingly negligible, as they would be marginally affected by the policy
measure in terms of staff requirements. Effect
on GHG emissions, Noise emissions and Local air quality:
Impact on these three indicators will be driven by three effects: §
Increased train service levels §
Faster introduction of more efficient, quieter locomotives §
Reduced travel on other modes (primarily road haulage and car
use) However, these effects will all be small
with the most significant impact being from the introduction of more efficient
locomotives. Rail
safety: Impact on safety standards will be very limited especially
since safety standards are regulated by external authorities and therefore the
key driver of safety standards is the effectiveness of those external bodies
rather than the operators themselves. Additionally, the basic responsibilities
of main actors as regards safety (RU, IM) will not be affected. Passenger security:
Very limited effect with none of the main drivers directly impacting passenger
security. Maintenance
Costs: the measure on enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential
spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this
area has a potential impact on maintenance costs by substantially reducing the
cost of and number of spare parts required to be maintained.[80] Whilst the potential savings from
standardisation are large it is not clear whether the measure is likely to
realise a significant portion of these savings. Interested parties (i.e.
manufacturers) have a strong interest in maintaining the status quo where they
retain a position as monopoly supplier for many products. Therefore some form
of legal requirement (e.g. inclusion of standardised parts in TSIs) would be
required to achieve significant changes beyond the current voluntary
arrangements. However, the Agency carried out a study into the
interchangeability of spare parts in 2011[81]
which suggested that TSIs were not the appropriate mechanism with questions as
to the feasibility of defining interchangeability in a TSI in a manner that was
‘transparent and non-discriminatory’. ANNEX VIII
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREFERRED OPTION This annex gives an overview of how the
preferred option – combination of options 4 and 6 – is planned to be
implemented, both in terms of resources and planned policy measures. Individual
measures contained in these options respond to the three main administrative
challenges identified: safety certification, vehicle authorisation and the
functioning of national railway regimes (inefficient national authorities and
diverging rules). 1. Resources required As Table 6-5 in Section 6.5.1 shows,
implementation of option 4 combined with option 6 will require 55 additional
staff (by 2020). The planned additional personnel would cover the following
categories: ·
Technical experts (45 persons), to deal
predominantly with issuing of authorisations for placing on the market of
vehicles and vehicles types, authorisations for placing in service of trackside
control-command and signalling sub-systems and safety certificates; ·
Linked administrative staff (10), including two
accountants to deal with management of a planned system of external fees and
charges, and accountancy with national authorities; Regarding the planned costs increase, out
of the gross cost increase estimated at €6.6 m, €5 m can be attributed to the
direct staff cost and €1.6 m to overhead and other costs. It must be noted that
the overhead costs are estimated at a sufficient level to cover the following
important activities of the Agency: ·
Translation of decisions issued by ERA into
national languages; ·
IT system needed for accountancy purposes
(external fees and charges, accountancy with national authorities). Finally, as Table 6-9 in Section 6.5.4
demonstrates, there is a high probability that implementation of the preferred
option will not have any, or a minimal, impact on the EU budget. This is due to
the possibility of charging the applicants for issuing of safety certificates
and vehicle authorizations by ERA. As this work will be to some extent
performed together with the NSAs, three general scenarios were constructed to
illustrate how the fee revenues would be shared between the Agency and the NSAs.
In case of scenario (a) (25% of planned external revenues attributed to the
NSAs and 75% to ERA) the additional call on the EU budget will be zero as the
coverage of additional costs of the Agency will be 127%. In case of scenario (b)
(50% NSAs, 50% ERA), the additional call on the EU budget will be €6 M (over
2015-2025), as the coverage of additional costs of the Agency will be 86%. In
case of scenario (c) (75% NSAs, 25% ERA) there would be a more substantial
additional impact on the EU budget (€25 m over 2015-2025). 2. Single safety certificate The concept of a single
safety certificate for railway undertakings, already indicated as a target in
the original safety directive of 2004, should be implemented in the following
way: 1)
ERA would issue all single EU safety
certificates requested by the railway undertakings using knowledge and
experience of the NSAs; such a certificate will be valid in all EU Member
States. 2)
To this end the railway safety directive needs
to be modified in order to remove the requirement of part B certificate and the
certification process will consists of following elements: (a)
The applicant submits his request to ERA. (b)
As appropriate, ERA requests one or more the
NSA(s) to carry on an audit of the RU. (c)
Taking into account the results of the audit(s)
ERA takes the decision for issuing the certificate. (d)
As already provided by the legislation in force,
each NSA performs supervision of all RUs operating in its country. A report
will be produced for each inspection/audit. Once a year, all reports are
transmitted to ERA and to the NSA(s) of the MS(s) where the same RUs are
operating. 3. Single rail vehicle authorisation The current process should be simplified and modified in such a way
that there is no longer any need for an additional authorisation for each Member State where the vehicle is being used. The proposed new process would be the
following: 1)
The first authorisation is issued by ERA and
consists of a “vehicle passport” which would in principle be an extract of the
future ERATV (European Register of Authorised Vehicle Types – to be implemented
by ERA in accordance with Commission implementing decision N° 2011/665/EU). The
"vehicle passport" would attest the values of the parameters
specified in the TSIs as being relevant to check the technical compatibility
between the vehicle and the network. The values themselves can be compliant
with the TSIs or, in some justified cases, with the national rules. The
"vehicle passport" may stipulate conditions for use and other
restrictions. 2)
The vehicle passport would not include anymore
the aspect of compatibility with the national network. The compatibility with
any specific network is already, according to the railway safety directive, a
responsibility of the railway undertaking and will be checked by the railway
undertaking with the help of the future RINF (Register of Infrastructure – to
be implemented by Member States and ERA in accordance with Commission
implementing decision N° 2011/633/EU). 3)
The TSIs will have to be modified in order to include
not only the procedures to verify conformity with the TSI (which exist
already), but also the procedure for checking the compatibility between vehicle
and the network and the roles of all actors involved. The results of the checks
would lead to individual decisions by the railway undertaking to place a
vehicle in service, and this would replace the additional authorisation(s). 4. Functioning of national railway
regimes In order to improve the (often inefficient) functioning of national
authorities, ERA would have the duty to monitor the performance and decision
making of the NSAs, including the right to audit: 1.
capacities (staffing, financial resources) of
NSAs to execute tasks related with railway safety and interoperability, and 2.
effectiveness of their operations as regards
monitoring of safety management systems of railway undertakings, infrastructure
managers and entities in charge of maintenance. In parallel, ERA would also play a greater role in the certification
process by supervising and coordinating the Notified Bodies, especially to
ensure that they perform in a more harmonised way; this is of particular
importance in relation to ERTMS. It means that ERA would: ·
check that the NoBos meet the criteria provided
for in annex VIII to the Interoperability Directive, and to recommend any
change necessary for the NoBo to retain the status conferred upon it
(accreditation criteria); ·
define guidelines and templates for the
assessment of conformity or suitability for use of an interoperability constituent
and for the EC verification procedure (e.g. templates for the certificate, for
the technical file, test report template, checklist); ·
check that application files to be submitted to
the NoBo are adequately documented (including product/component test reports,
on-site/in-vehicle/in-labs integration test reports) before the EC verification
procedure of individual ERTMS (on-board or trackside) subsystems is launched; ·
check that the NoBos perform the EC verification
procedure in a common (high quality) manner and report as less as possible
"reservations" in the certificates they deliver; ·
check that the technical files are adequately
documented before the authorisation of individual ERTMS subsystems are
requested; ·
guide all NoBos in ERA ad-hoc ERTMS coordination
group. In addition ERA should check that calls for tenders published in the
case of individual deployment projects are in line with the ERTMS
specifications (stemming from measure "Enhanced role of ERA in providing
advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in implementing
legislation on safety and interoperability" (option 6)) . Regarding the migration from the system of national rules to the
common EU rules, the possibility of adopting new national rules by Member
States will be limited to strictly defined cases. In this context, ERA would: (a)
Continue the work of cataloguing and evaluating
national rules; (b)
Identify (in consultation with relevant national
authorities) of which of the national rules can be removed; (c)
Request the national authorities the removal of
unnecessary and obsolete national rules. In case the national authorities disagree, they could refer to the
Commission which will take a final decision whether to reverse the decision of
ERA or to pursue it, including launching the infringement procedure against a
Member State in question, if necessary. 5. Possible implementation problems
linked with the preferred option Besides possible political difficulties to
have the proposed changes agreed (especially in relation to giving up a part of
power by national authorities), the implementation of the preferred option
could pose problems, including: 1.
Legal inconsistency: There is a risk that the interoperability
and safety part of the 4th Railway Package (the Interoperability and
Safety Directives, and ERA Regulation) will not be adopted at the same time
and/or important provisions of the three acts dealing with the same issue will
differ. Similarly, it might happen that the Directives are implemented later
than the effects of the Regulation take place. Another possible risk is linked
with eventual delay of adoption of implementing measures setting out details of
cooperation of ERA and the national authorities and fees and charges
modalities. All this could lead to delays in effective phasing-in of the
impacts of the preferred option and/or reduce its benefits. 2.
Preparedness of the
main actors: There is a risk that implementation of the
preferred option could be delayed by low degree of preparedness of the main
actors (ERA, national authorities) to undertake new tasks. At the national
level this could be linked with political/vested interests' opposition to the
changes, while at the level of ERA a possible opposition to a partial
restructuration of the Agency and the change of operational methods could be
the main reasons. Similarly, the maturity of the overall railway system must be
sufficient in order to move towards issuing single safety certificates and
vehicle passports; without these prerequisites, the target dates envisaged in
the impact assessment might not be attained. 3.
Financial
difficulties: There is a risk that there will be not
enough financial resources (at the EU level) to sufficiently cover the needs of
the enhanced Agency. It is not impossible that after the legal act is adopted,
the following establishment plans for staff and annual budgets will be cut down
by the Budgetary Authority. 4.
Cooperation between
ERA and national authorities: It is not excluded that following adoption
of the legal act the relations between ERA and national authorities, especially
the NSAs, will deteriorate. Currently the Agency is a "partner" to
national authorities and stakeholders, while in the future it will have more
control functions, which can have a negative effect on the quality of their cooperation.
Moreover, there might be problems with problematic cooperation between ERA and
the NSAs regarding issuing of vehicle passports and safety certificates. This
is supposed to be a shared work, however the exact extent and scope of this
cooperation is still to be established by the implementing acts, to be adopted
later. There is a risk that these implementing acts will not cover sufficiently
well all the necessary details of cooperation and/or this cooperation will not
be smooth due to other reasons, mainly political or linked with the defence of
vested interests. Also, the issue of responsibility for the decisions to be
taken might come up. Another potential source of conflict may be the level of
external fees and charges, and their division by ERA and the NSAs. 5.
Relations with
stakeholders: There is a risk that railway stakeholders,
especially the main railway undertakings, could start exerting pressure on ERA,
for example with a view to adapt the future level of charges for issuing of
vehicle passports and safety certificates to their needs or to follow their
policy line. It will probably be easier for them to put pressure on a single EU
body that has to work in a transparent way and should in principle listen to
the needs of stakeholders. The evolving role of ERA towards an authority
charging for some of its services could be also a possible source of problems,
as far as relations with stakeholders are concerned. ANNEX IX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CER || Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Companies CSMs || Common Safety Methods CSTs || Common Safety Targets EASA || European Aviation Safety Agency EBA || Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (German NSA) EBC || EISENBAHN-CERT (German NoBo and certification and inspection body) EMSA || European Maritime Safety Agency ERA (or the Agency) || European Railway Agency ERATV || European Register of Authorised Vehicle Types ERTMS || European Rail Traffic Management System ETCS || European Train Control System EU-12 || Member States accessed the EU since 2004 EU-15 || EU Member States before 2004 IM || Infrastructure Manager NIBs || National Investigation Bodies NoBos || Notified Bodies NPV || Net Present Value NSAs || National Safety Authorities NSRs || National Safety Rules NTRs || National Technical Rules PRM || Persons with Reduced Mobility (a TSI) RB || Regulatory Body RINF || Register of Infrastructure ROSCOs || Rolling stock leasing companies RU || Railway Undertaking SDG || Steer Davies Gleave SMS || Safety Management System SRT || Safety in Railway Tunnels (a TSI) TSIs || Technical Specifications for Interoperability UIC || International Union of Railways UNIFE || Association of the European Rail Industry [1] White Paper Roadmap to a Single
European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient
transport system (COM/2011/0144 final) [2] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127599.pdf [3] COM (2012) 299 final [4] COM(2012) 259 final [5]
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/520&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [6] List of abbreviations with explanations is provided in
Annex IX. [7] Directive 2008/110/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending Directive
2004/49/EC on safety on the Community’s railways (Railway Safety Directive) [8] Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within
the Community (Recast) [9] Regulation (EC) No 1335/2008 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 establishing
a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation) [10] http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_move_011_railway_agency_en.pdf [11] 5 July 2011, 13 October 2011, 28 November 2011, 28
February 2012, 27 April 2012, 13 July 2012 [12] http://ec.europa.eu/transport/evaluations/doc/2011_era-evaluation-881-2004.pdf [13] [ reference will be added after publication] [14] For the list of stakeholders consulted – see Annex V. [15] For further details see Figure 2‑2: Stakeholder
views on different problem elements. [16] Resulting, inter alia, in different gauge widths,
electrification standards, and safety and signalling systems [17] Interoperability is the ability of a rail system to allow
the safe and uninterrupted movement of trains which accomplish the required
levels of performance for these lines. [18] A detailed description of the functioning of national
institutions is provided in Annex III. [19] The system constituting the rail system may be broken down
into the following subsystems, either: (a) structural areas (infrastructure,
energy, control, command and signalling, rolling stock); (b) functional areas
(traffic operation and management, maintenance, telematics applications for
passenger and freight services). [20] Figure 9.1, page 136, ERA
evaluation
(http://ec.europa.eu/transport/evaluations/doc/2011_era-evaluation-881-2004.pdf) [21] In case of passenger railway market, for the time being
only international traffic (relatively small in comparison with domestic
traffic) is open to competition. [22] See Table III-2 in Annex III [23] 2011 ERA Report on vehicle authorisation, p. 47
(www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20%28part%201%29.pdf) [24] For full statistics see Annex II [25] The most common problems in relation to safety
certificates and vehicle authorisations include: not harmonised and
transparent methods of delivery in order to avoid arbitrary decisions, lengthy
procedures and discrimination, reluctance to accept authorisations given by the
NSAs of other Member States [26] Directive 2001/14/EC describes the obligation for each
rail Infrastructure Manager to publish a Network Statement. It presents
information on rail network's infrastructure, in particular on commercial and
legal access conditions. Network Statements aim to provide all train operators
wishing to operate services on a given rail network with comprehensive,
up-to-date and relevant information on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. [27] European Railway Agency Interoperability Report 2011 http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20%28part%201%29.pdf
[28] http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/development_of_a_migration_strategy_towards_a_single_safety_certificate.doc [29] EU initiative to enhance cross-border interoperability and
the procurement of signalling equipment by creating a single Europe-wide
standard for train control and command systems; it comprises European Train
Control System (ETCS), a standard for in-cab train control, and GSM-R, the GSM
mobile communications standard for railway operations. [30] http://www.railwaygazette.com/nc/news/single-view/view/rolling-stock-acceptance-delays-the-centre-of-debate.html [31] The safety certificate has two parts: Part A: valid throughout Europe providing the type and extent of the operation is unchanged. NSAs are therefore
required to accept Part A certificates issued by other Member State. Part B: states the ability of the RU to
comply with network rules applied in specific Member State. Therefore a RU can
have a single Part A certificate but as many Part B certificates as the Member
States in which it provides services. [32] Available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/90/9032305.htm [33] Please see Annex IV for more details [34] In this respect, a distinction can be made between the
first and additional authorisations, as well as authorisations for TSI-conform
and non-TSI-conform vehicles. In theory, the first authorisation shall be valid
in all Member States without further checks for fully TSI-compliant vehicles
running on TSI-confirm networks. However, in practice very often additional
authorisations are required, as allowed by the directive in force. [35] http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20%28part%201%29.pdf [36] However significant variation
across Member States and type of authorisation were encountered. [37] For example, the problem was discussed by Rail Forum
Europe’s in its event on 5 July 2011, where policy action was called in order
to enforce cross-acceptance of national rules with the final objective to
eliminate them to the benefit of European rules. [38] See Annex IV for more information regarding national rules [39] See tables VII-5 – VII-8 in Annex VII [40] See Section 4 in Annex VII [41] Initially the targets were set at
the level of 25% improvement to ensure they were challenging but achievable. Following
the analysis, it became evident that the impact of the baseline is already quite
significant in terms of the cost to market for railway undertakings and more
specifically the cost and timescales for vehicle authorisation. Therefore the
second and third targets were modified and now they would achieve a 20%
reduction over the baseline. [42] Regarding single vehicle authorisation, subsequent to the
stakeholder consultation and following analysis the original name of the
measure ("Setting up a European passport for locomotives") was
changed and widened to become single vehicle authorisation, in order to create
a harmonised and structured approach to vehicle authorisation that seeks to
minimise the necessity of having differentiated authorisation processes. [43] Analysis of impacts is based on the work of the
consultant. For full details, see the IA support study, especially its Appendix
D [add link after publication] [44] [add link after publication of the study] [45] Undelying detailed analysis at the level of individual
measures is provided in Tables VII-9 to VII-14 in Annex 7. * On top of the baseline [46] http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20(part%201).pdf [47] http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/development_of_a_migration_strategy_towards_a_single_safety_certificate.doc [48] The Task Force was set up primarily following the
stakeholders' request and in relation to the process of authorisation of
placing into service of rail vehicles. It included approx. 35 persons
representing Member States, National Safety Authorities, Notified Bodies,
manufacturers, operators and associations (CER, EIM, ERFA, UNIFE, UITP, UIP,
EPTTOLA, Keolis, Mitsui, Veolia, Alstom, AnsaldoBreda, Siemens, SNCF,
Trenitalia), the European Railway Agency and DG MOVE. [49] Including routes for which ERTMS has been contracted but
not yet implemented [50] Table VII-4 in Annex VII presents the type size changes
assumptions in detail. [51] Reductions in
certification timescales have not been included in the delay reduction since
evidence suggests it is vehicle authorisation that is the primary binding
constraint. [52] All cost figures or negative numbers in tables are presented in
brackets – (). [53] Taking into account the cost differences between NSAs in
the EU12 and EU15 -approximately €220k for EU12 NSAs and about €875k for EU15
NSAs. The fact that the number of NSAs in the EU15 group is higher has also
been factored in. [54] As indicated in the ERA Interoperability Report 2011, the
most problematic issues are less attractive NSA salaries and the limited number
of rail experts in the labour market. The latter is related either to the
specifics of the national educational system, which does not supply sufficient
numbers of graduates with technical railway knowledge, or to the competition
for qualified staff from the rail industry, which may provide better salaries. [55] As explained in Section 6.4.8, over time there will be a
gradual reduction in the total number of vehicle type authorisations, which
will lead to a reduction in total fees across the EU of about €29 m. [56] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127599.pdf [57] COM (2012) 299 final. [58] COM(2012) 259 final [59] The intention is to add this (identical) background Annex
to each of the 3 rail package IAs. [60] http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_326_en.pdf [61] http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/cms_en.htm [62] http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/studies/doc/2010_09_09_study_on_regulatory_options_on_furt
her_market_opening_in_rail_passenger_transport.pdf [63] 27 out of the 40 largest intra-EU air routes in the EU
were within the reach of competing long-distance (high-speed) railway services
and yet attracted some 50 million passengers a year - i.e. as much as the 4th
largest EU airport, Madrid-Barajas. [64] Directive 2004/51/EC, amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC. [65] Council Directive 91/440/EEC, as amended inter alia by
Directive 2007/58/EC. [66] Some Member States, such as United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden or Italy, have unilaterally opened their domestic markets. [67] Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport
services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC)
Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 [68] Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the
Community (Recast) [69] Directive 2004/49/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004on safety on the Community's
railways (Railway Safety Directive). [70] Regulation (EC) No 1335/2008 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2004
establishing a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation) [71] Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, COM(2011) 665
final – 2011/0302 (COD) [72] Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on union guidelines
for the development of the
Trans-European Transport network, COM/2011/0650 final/2 - 2011/0294 (COD). [73] As the result of the changes induced by the Technical
Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) decision. [74] The Consumer Markets Scoreboard ranks 21 goods and 30 services
markets based on how well they are functioning for consumers in terms of (1)
ease of comparing offers, (2) consumer trust in retailers/providers to
comply with consumer protection rules, (3) experience of problems and the
degree to which they have led to complaints and (4) overall consumer
satisfaction. See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/cms_en.htm. [75] 8th Consumer Markets Scoreboard, 2012, Commission, DG SANCO [76] Data from 2012 Report from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on monitoring development of the rail market [77] European Railway Agency Interoperability Report 2011 [78] http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/development_of_a_migration_strategy_towards_a_single_safety_certificate.doc [79] http://www.deutschebahn.com/site/shared/en/file__attachements/position__papers/study__rail__liberalisation__index__2011__complete__version.pdf [80] Evidence presented by Deutsche Bahn AG and SNCF to a
European Parliamentary Lunch on the 8th February 2012 highlighted the substantial
cost savings that could be generated by reducing the huge variety of
non-standardised spare parts currently in existence. Spare parts represent a
large cost to the rail industry with Deutsche Bahn AG and SNCF alone spending up
to €500m a year on spare parts, representing up to 30% of their entire rolling
stock purchase budget. Deutsche Bahn AG estimates that standardisation of the
rail wheels they use could reduce the number of wheel types they currently
stock from 190 to just 15 with an associated cost saving of 60% on their circa
€50m annual wheel budget. Wheels represent only one area of potential savings
with other items for potential standardisation identified by Deutsche Bahn AG
and SNCF. In total there is the potential to save hundreds of millions of euros
annually with the widespread standardisation of spare parts. [81] http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/Report%20on%20study%20on%20interchangeable%20spare%20parts.pdf