This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52012SC0282
JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU support for sustainable change in transition societies
JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU support for sustainable change in transition societies
JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU support for sustainable change in transition societies
/* SWD/2012/0282 final */
JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU support for sustainable change in transition societies /* SWD/2012/0282 final */
Contents 1. KEY CHALLENGES TO BE
ADDRESSED IN TRANSITION SOCIETIES. 4 1.1. Building national
consensus on a new "social contract" 5 1.2. Designing democratic
institutions and processes. 5 1.3. Security, justice and the
rule of law.. 6 1.4. Socio-economic
transformation challenges. 7 2. EXAMPLES OF RELEVANT EU
INSTRUMENTS AND TOOLS. 8 2.1. Actions under geographic
programmes. 8 2.1.1..... Comprehensive democracy
support 8 2.1.2..... EU support for economic and
social transformation accompanying democratic
transition. 10 2.1.3..... Supporting civil society. 11 2.1.4..... Application of incentives and
conditionalities. 13 2.1.1..... Actions through innovative
financial instruments and partnerships. 16 2.2. Actions through various thematic
instruments. 17 2.2.1..... European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights. 17 2.2.2..... Humanitarian Aid. 18 2.2.3..... Instrument for Stability. 18 2.2.4..... The thematic programme Non
State Actors and Local authorities. 19 3. RELEVANT TRANSITION
EXPERIENCE OF EU MEMBER STATES. 19 3.1. The Political Dimension
of Transition. 20 3.1.1..... Set up of a new
constitutional framework. 20 3.1.2..... Set up of political
pluralism.. 20 3.1.3..... Decentralization of power towards
regional and local governments. 21 3.1.4..... Set up of a Rule of Law
framework: Reform of Legal Systems and the Judiciary. 22 3.1.5..... Public Administration Reform.. 23 3.1.6..... E-governance. 24 3.1.7..... Human Rights. 25 3.1.8..... Gender Equality and Women's
Rights. 26 3.2. The Economic Dimension of
Transition. 27 3.2.1..... Private Sector Development 27 3.2.2..... Reform of Public Finances. 29 3.3. The Social Level 29 3.3.1..... The development of Civil
Society Organisations. 29 3.3.2..... Education. 30 3.3.3..... Health. 31 3.3.4..... Employment 32 3.3.5..... Social Dialogue. 33 3.3.6..... Reforms of Pension Systems. 33 Sharing 'transition management expertise' with partner
countries. 33 This Staff Working Paper intends to provide
more details on the relevant policies, instruments and examples referred to in
the Communication on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies.
It also gives a more in depth view of key challenges to be addressed in a
context of democratic transition and collects illustrative relevant examples
from the European Transition Compendium setting forth the transition experience
of EU Member States. 1. KEY
CHALLENGES TO BE ADDRESSED IN TRANSITION SOCIETIES Shifting away from authoritarian,
clientelist and corrupted regimes and moving towards democratic and more
equitable systems is a difficult and uncertain process. Social, political and
economic changes have to occur if the country is to engage irreversibly towards
a more democratic and equitable society. A lot of challenges are at stake which
all have to be tackled, even if at different stages, for a long lasting change
in the lives of the people. The relative
importance of the challenges faced by emerging democracies may vary according
to the specific context that has led to the change in the political power.
These include typically restoring security, building national consensus on
future values to which the country will adhere, setting up national
institutions and processes guaranteeing that these fundamental values will be
respected and creating the socio-economic conditions allowing social justice
among citizens. It can indeed be assumed that where the root causes for
people's calls for societal changes concern not only to the political situation
but also the socio-economic situation (lack of decent employment and
economic opportunities, inequalities), the prospects for successful political
reforms are unlikely to be good without improvements in the latter. These challenges are most of the time
intertwined. There is no magic recipe to explain which one should be dealt with
first or given greater importance at a certain time of the transition process.
The sequencing of the reforms is highly context-dependent, but given the high
expectation of the people after years of authoritarian rule, a balance has to
be sought between quick-win reforms helping to keep the momentum and the
adhesion of the people to the whole process and longer terms more difficult
reforms. The European Union has longstanding
experience in successfully assisting countries in their transition process. The
EU's enlargement policy has proven to be a powerful tool to foster societal
transformation. Countries that have already acceded to the EU and those on the
road to join have undergone impressive changes through accession-driven
democratic and economic reforms. Commitment, conditionality and credibility
have been situated at the core of the accession process and its success. 1.1. Building
national consensus on a new "social contract" Transition to democracy can be the result
of different processes, such as internal mass revolution (the Arab Spring
cases), civil war (Ivory Coast), negotiations processes (South Africa, Indonesia). Ensuring or restoring security is essential in order for the society to be
able to define its new governing values in a relatively calm situation or to
avoid a civil war, unilateral secession etc. The role of the police and of the
army in these first phases of transition is central. In some cases there might be an urgent need
to strongly focus on reconciliation among different parts of the country or
between different groups of the society in order to maintain national unity and
build a strong national consensus on the future of the country. For instance in
South Africa, "Truth and Reconciliation committees" applying the
principle of justice rather than revenge played an important role in the
democratic transition process at the end of the apartheid regime. Engaging all parts of the society in the
definition of the values that will form the base of the future state is another
major challenge ahead of the transitional bodies. This requires broad
participation of all parts of the society, including political parties, civil
society organisations, youth and women movements, trade unions, people from remote
areas, ethnic and religious minorities etc. The more voices participate in the
debate the more likely it is to receive broad support for reforms. Experiences
from Chile, Brazil, Argentina seem to indicate that engaging even the more
reluctant part of the society to democratisation (in these cases the army, the
police and the business community) is beneficial to the whole process. All in all, the transition process should
be nationally driven and should be as inclusive as possible in order to define
a new "social contract" between the state and all parts of the
society. This represents a major challenge as, following a long period of
authoritarian rule, political parties and civil society organisations may not
be well organised, citizens may not have a participatory culture and forces
opposed to the changes might try to block the transformation process. 1.2. Designing
democratic institutions and processes If building a national consensus on the
main values at the base of the future society is a core challenge of transition
processes, translating these broadly agreed values into facts is another one.
The national "social contract" has to materialise into the
constitutional process and the establishment of the rule of law, the electoral
process, but also into the setting up of democratic institutions, a revitalised
civil society, all these elements leading in medium term to the development of
a true democratic political culture. Regarding the writing of the new
constitution, a key challenge is the dismantlement (partial or full) of the
previous state structures and institutions, of former ruling parties and vested
economic interests. Further, it is crucial to ensure that the process is
consensual and inclusive: from establishing a new social contract and agreeing
on the broad aims, to setting up of the constituent assembly, to holding a
nationwide and public consultation process, to subjecting the draft
constitution to some form of democratic endorsement, for instance through a
popular referendum. Linked to this, the first democratic
elections represent a litmus test for the new constitutional order and the
legitimacy of the new democratic regime. In addition to the universal problems
of the influence of money and the factionalism of special interest groups,
countries in transition often face low levels of literacy or understanding of
elections and insufficient expertise and funding. A pervasive lack of trust in
transition can poison the atmosphere for credible and 'free and fair' elections,
and result in low levels of candidate or voter participation. Strong demands of democratic reform from a population need
to be promptly addressed but in parallel sufficient time is needed for
preparing an election allowing it to be sufficiently credible for the population.
Promoting inclusiveness, civic participation and transparency of the process is
crucial for its success and cannot be improvised and rushed through. The creation of democratic institutions (or
the reform of existing ones) is of paramount importance to ensure compliance
with the established democratic rules and for implementation. Therefore,
strengthening democratic state institutions and consolidating their respective
roles whilst ensuring their democratic legitimacy represents an additional
challenge and needs to be addressed at the very beginning of a transition.
Democratic checks and balances allow the parliament to exercise real oversight
on the executive. Another equally important challenge is to ensure transparent
and accountable government through a service-oriented public administration
(including through judiciary reform and security sector and police reform), the
availability of key economic and social statistics, capacitated local
authorities, efficient and independent and effective electoral bodies, court of
auditors, constitutional or other courts. 1.3. Security,
justice and the rule of law Support for security,
justice and the rule of law is of fundamental importance to establish
stability, law and order and reinstating state authority. It is also one of the
principle avenues for promoting democratic governance, citizen security gender
equality and respect for human rights, and thereby socio-economic development. Major challenges in the
transition process are: –
Not only making the third branch of state
independent, but changing it from an openly acknowledged arm of the government
(and more particularly the ruling party); –
Not only reforming written laws, but making them
implementable and respected, so that they do not merely exist on paper (addressing
implementation gaps); –
Not only strengthening juridical institutions,
but creating a culture of institutionalism, whereby independent but
inter-related institutions function collectively as a justice sector; –
Not only raising the skills of judges, lawyers,
and prosecutors, but making them into dedicated professionals who understand,
respect, and carry out their roles in a justice sector which utilises its processes
to promote respect for human rights; –
Not only improving the delivery of justice and justice
services to the population, but also ensuring access to justice for ordinary
citizens and disadvantaged social groups. The process is
complicated, politicised, context-specific, and not fully suited to reaping
full benefits from technical assistance provided by outside parties. Legal
and institutional reforms require time and must overcome resistance to change. Weak States, fragile countries, post-conflict situations, impunity, insufficient financial and
human resources, and limited information resources pose inter-connected
challenges. 1.4. Socio-economic
transformation challenges Over the longer run, the legitimacy of
democracy needs to be rooted in its capacity to produce an outcome responding
to the needs of the citizens and to enhance their welfare. One important risk
facing nascent democracies is that democratisation is limited to a rotation of
the elite in power without enhancing the effectiveness of public decisions.
When institutions fail to enhance growth, employment and welfare prospects the
democratisation process is put at risk and its legitimacy eroded. There is no one-to-one relation between
democratisation and economic success. Furthermore, economic policy challenges
differ widely between countries in democratic transition. In some cases, the
authorities may have to conduct substantial reforms to enhance the efficiency
and sustainability of the economic system. This may result in some people
loosing and other winning and impose substantial transition costs on citizens
and the production system. Both phenomena generate stress on the political,
economic and financial system. In other cases, authorities may have to reorient
some public policies or launch some new one to meet the expectations of the
newly empowered citizens. There are two key features that need to be
addressed by any country in transition: stabilisation of expectations and
adapting institutions to new challenges. Stabilising expectations is needed for
building up trust and improving incentives to investments, entrepreneurship and
SME development. Such a stabilisation depends in the building up of a consensus
on the fundamental orientation of the economic policy and the social contract
of the country. Furthermore, property right issues that may legitimately arise
after a regime change should be sorted out in a way perceived as fair and
transparent by the vast majority part of the population. Institutions
protecting equal opportunities and private initiatives are equally necessary as
well as stability oriented macro economic policy and credible macroeconomic
institutions. The second feature is to ensure that
political decision mechanisms and administrative capacities exist to
legitimately and effectively decide on institutional changes and new policies.
This supposes that demand for public goods, for equity and social inclusion by
the citizens and the economic sector can be effectively expressed and taken on
board trough political institutions. Exogenous shocks, economic transformation
and technological innovation change the nature of economic institutions and of
policies that are required and demanded: no economic policy and only few
economic institutions are adequate for ever. Political institutions that are
responsive to bottom-up signals and able to create compromises are therefore
needed. Such institutions can be best sustained in democracies. The same is
true for the democratically legitimate capacity to mobilise the resources
needed for implementing policies, in particular domestic revenues (taxation and
natural resources). Conciliating these seemingly contradictory
objectives, the stabilisation of expectations and the imperative of change, is
challenging. The fact that more than ever, economic transformation does not
occur in isolation and is shaped by globalisation provides an opportunity and a
risk. The opportunity is that aligning economic reforms on requirements
provided by multilateral rules or a regional integration project defines and
makes visible the broad direction taken. The risk is that changes required by
international commitments or objectives of regional integration are not
possible or are too slow because they cannot build up on a broad political
consensus or are opposed by vested particular interests. Moreover, it is important to address
citizens' aspirations for more equity, social inclusion and social protection
in three dimensions: political - the social contract between the state and its
citizens legitimizes political authority; economic – social protection can
contribute to growth and jobs by facilitating entrepreneurship and productive
investment in a risky market environment; and social – it reduces inequalities
and improves economic opportunities. This is where the European Union can play a
key role. It can reinforce the attractiveness of the international or regional
anchorage of the economic and social transformation of its partners taking
account of their proximity, their development needs and aspirations. And it can
support this transformation through various cooperation instruments, making it politically
and socially sustainable. 2. EXAMPLES
OF RELEVANT EU INSTRUMENTS AND TOOLS The EU has at its disposal a great variety
of tools that can be used alternatively or in combination in order to support
transition processes. While this is not necessarily an exhaustive list of all
such tools, the examples provided below represent good samples of different
modalities that can be used in various cases: projects, programme approaches,
budget support, conditionalities, incentives, innovative financing mechanisms
etc. 2.1. Actions
under geographic programmes 2.1.1. Comprehensive
democracy support In the past, the EU addressed some of these
multiple challenges by a comprehensive approach to democracy support based on a
broad and long-term support package, which aims at assisting home-grown
democratic transition processes by strengthening the capacity of governments,
parliaments and other state institutions, political actors, civil society
organisations and other actors and by accompanying constitutional and electoral
processes. The 2009 EU Council Conclusions on Democracy Support[1] in the EU's External Relations
and its Agenda for Action provide the framework for such a comprehensive
approach. The aim is to remain tailored to the needs of each country or society
in transition and to encourage local ownership of the democratic process. It is
also based on a strengthened coordination with EU MS and on increased coherence
and mainstreaming of democracy support in the delivery of EU external
assistance policies. The comprehensive EU democracy support is
based on a number of key principles: it is process-driven, it takes a long-term
approach, it supports the demand-side of democracy, it involves all actors in
the institutional reform process and the EU keeps to playing the role of
facilitator of home-grown process. In doing so, the EU contributes to
sustainable development, respect for human rights, democratic governance,
security, poverty reduction and gender equality. The challenges that the EU's
support to democracy and human rights faces in societies in transition are
centred in the following four main areas: 1. the establishment of constitutional and
electoral processes; 2. the strengthening of democratic
institutions; 3. the strengthening of political and civil
society; 4. the gradual development of a democratic
political culture. Example of support to the Parliament and to
democratic constitution: Kyrgyzstan: The
European Union has supported parliament through three projects beginning in
2007 and continuing through to 2012. All three projects worth € 2 million, have
been delivered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and focused
on (i) strengthening parliament’s legislative capacities, on public
understanding of parliament’s work, and in enhancing parliament’s use of ICT;
(ii) helping parliament meet its responsibilities outlined in the revised 2007
Constitution, and covering legislation, oversight, and representation
functions; and (iii) supporting the institutionalization of the legal framework
underpinning the country’s new democratic Constitution. EU support to the Kyrgyz parliament has resulted in
positive outcomes in terms of enhanced capacity of parliamentarians and
parliamentary administration which in turn has improved the effectiveness and
stature of the institution. It has supported critically important revisions to
the Constitution and is now helping to institutionalize the new democratic
order. While Kyrgyzstan continues to face many challenges in its democratic
transition, EU support has helped to strengthen parliament as a central
democratic institution, enabling the country to preserve and extend democratic
freedoms which stand out in a regional neighbourhood often characterized by
authoritarian governance. The EU support for democratic processes for
instance in Tunisia and Bolivia illustrate the comprehensive approach to
democracy support that relies on an effective complementary use of all existing
EU instruments and programmes, as well as on political dialogue and strengthened
coordination with EU Member States. Tunisia: the EU is supporting the transition with a broad democracy package, including support to constitutional and electoral reform,
the promotion of freedom of expression and democratic values, civic education, civil society, political parties, media,
the electoral process and .
Electoral experts were funded through EIDHR and the Instrument for Stability.
EIDHR was also used to train local election observers and to strengthen the
capacity of political parties in a non-partisan manner. EU budget support is
part of this broad package to assist Tunisia in its democratic transition
process in line with the Council Conclusions on the Future Approach to EU
budget support to third countries, ,thus providing financial assistance to
overcome immediate economic challenges (including social safety nets), jointly
with other major donors while the country goes through the political
transition. Bolivia: the EU action has included, among others, support to institutional
development and capacity building of organizations and social movements,
inclusion of marginalized groups (e.g. indigenous peoples and women), and the
decentralization process, as well as support to civil society organisations and
democracy projects based on the Instrument for Stability and the EIDHR. The EU and Member States are working towards greater
coherence based on the Agenda for Action of EU democracy support, a framework
on which to build a common understanding, approach and programming with regard
to the complex challenges of Bolivian democracy. The value-added of this
process lies on the potential to achieve greater impact by increasing coherence
of EU and Member States support to democracy through joint analysis (democracy
profile, mapping, gaps), approach and division of labour. 2.1.2. EU
support for economic and social transformation accompanying democratic
transition Supporting evolutions in the field of
governance and democracy has to be coupled with support to the economic and
social sectors, in order to increase social justice within the country. This
support can take the form of projects/programmes or be achieved through budget
support. One key element of decision regarding the modality best suited to
convey EU aid, should be the length of the procedures, keeping in mind that
economic and social quick wins for the population needs to materialise to
anchor democratic evolution. Ivory Coast: Total EU aid to Ivory Coast for the period 2008 to 2013 now stands at over €600 million. Since the end
of the political crisis a year ago, the EU has doubled its aid to Ivory Coast, allocating first an additional €180 million and then projected budgetary
support of €115 million. This aid will take the form of a ‘contract for
rebuilding the state apparatus’ and will aim to strengthen essential public
services for the population, targeting in particular the police, the judicial
system and education. The European Union is supporting Ivory Coast’s economic recovery and the process of national reconciliation. Five new
programmes worth a total of €125 million were launched in 2011, aimed at
improving the transport sector, vocational education, economic governance,
health and civil society. Since 2011, the EU has also provided €80 million in
humanitarian aid in response to the crisis in Ivory Coast. The partnership for
transition programme is being set up. Its aim is to provide basic services to
the population. Key sectors
of intervention are food security, health and refugee and IDP resettlement. This partnership involves the government, humanitarian and
development agencies signing up to an agreed strategy to allow time for the
phasing in of public services as humanitarian agencies phase out in an orderly
manner. A technical secretariat (ECHO experts) identifies good operations and
partners for funding and provide field monitoring controls In
addition, the European Union is financing the reconstruction of infrastructure
destroyed in the conflict, and contributing to governance, the judicial system,
rural development and social policies. In 2012 water supply and sanitation
programmes worth a total of €25 million are being put into effect, and the
banana sector is receiving support totalling €44 million. Morocco:
The EU supports the
implementation of the Agenda for the Equality between Women and Men adopted by
the Moroccan government in 2011 through a EUR 35 million sector budget
programme. The programme is part of broader EU support to the consolidation of
democratic governance in the Mediterranean. One of its main objectives is the
strengthening the capacities of the national institutions in charge of
implementing the Agenda for Equality. Support to the Ministry of Finance and
line ministries to institutionalise gender responsive budgeting tools is also
foreseen. 2.1.3. Supporting
civil society Supporting the development of a vibrant
local civil society should be given an important place in EU action in
transition countries context. According to its extensive definition (NGO, trade
unions, academics, private sector etc), civil society is indeed an actor
involved both in democracy, good governance and human rights and an economic
and social actor which might play a catalysing role in achieving a sustainable
and inclusive growth. The European Commission has at its disposal a wide range of instruments to support civil
society. Support can be provided through geographic
national programmes (for instance in Cameroun the PASOC programme) and/or
through regional programmes (Civil Society Facilities for enlargement or neighbourhood
countries). Within the
EU response to the Arab Spring, a specific Civil Society Facility for the
neighbourhood (both Southern and Eastern) was created, with an overall budget
of €26.4 million for 2011. This facility aims to strengthen the capacity of
civil society organizations in all its components (NGOs, universities, think
tanks, media) to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries. Specific
thematic programmes such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human
Rights or the thematic programme Non State Actors and Local Authorities
complement actions undertaken within the scope of geographic cooperation (See
also point 2.2.1 and 2.2.3) Empowerment
and participation through Women’s Resource Centres in Afghanistan In response
to the structure of the Afghan society which often segregates and prevents
women from being direct beneficiaries of development projects, the EU-funded
action supports women by organizing them into community-based Women’s Resource
Centres (WRCs). The centres provide a comprehensive training programme aiming
at empowering women and strengthening the civil society. The objective
is to include women in the democratisation process, both in the exercise of
power and in creating public institutions responsive to women’s needs. EESC role Other EU institutions may also contribute
to the strengthening of partner countries civil society. As part of its mandate
in the external relation field, the EESC may play an important role as
facilitator in the setting up or consolidation of structures for civil society
participation in different partner countries and regions. Latin America: The CC-SICA is the consultative body for
Central American civil society within the Central American Integration System
(SICA). The EESC established a regular working relationship with it from the
time of its creation and formalised those meetings through a memorandum of
understanding in 2006. Since then, the EESC has worked to enhance
the profile and recognition of the CC-SICA and to develop its capabilities,
with very positive results. This was done by offering its expertise in how to
implement consultation mechanisms, following up jointly with CC-SICA the
negotiations for an EU-Central America Association Agreement, and facilitating
contacts with political authorities both in Central America and in the EU. One
of the most significant results came in 2010 when the Association Agreement
between the EU and Central America provided for the creation of a Joint
Consultative Committee of the EESC and the CC-SICA, the civil society
consultative bodies of the two signatories to the Agreement, as part of the
institutional set up of the Agreement. The Agreement should enter into force in
late 2012 and should allow for an enhanced internal visibility and permanent
participation of Central American civil society in the monitoring of an
international agreement, thus setting the path for other opportunities for
involvement in the Central American region. Euromed: Based on its mandate under the Barcelona declaration of 1995, the EESC has established close ties with partner Economic
and Social Councils (ESCs) from the southern Mediterranean, integrating them in
a network of national ESCs from the EU and the south, and holding an annual
summit of all Euromed ESCs. In partner countries with no ESC the EESC has
established contacts with individual civil society organisations such as
employers, trade unions, socio-occupational associations and NGOs, and, taking
a longer-term view, has been helping these organisations to set up ESCs as
platforms for social and civil dialogue with the respective national
authorities. Specifically in Jordan, from 2005 onwards
the EESC cooperated closely with the ILO to promote a "tripartite +"
model of an ESC, in other words an ESC which is engaged not just in classical
social dialogue (tripartite dialogue between the social partners and the
government), but which also draws in the other sectors of civil society, such
as NGOs, socio-occupational organisations and consumers organisations. Besides
providing support to the ESC with expertise it also lobbied the Jordanian
government to support the creation of the ESC in close cooperation with the EU
delegation in Jordan. The ESC was finally set up in 2009 and got access to some
EU funds through the EU delegation. The EESC has recently visited Jordan to support the role of the ESC in the current transition period in Jordan and is planning to
hold it as annual summit in Amman in October 2012. 2.1.4. Application
of incentives and conditionalities Once initial financial support has been
provided by the EU in response to urgent needs, the incentive based approach
can sometimes prove to be a useful approach to sustain, in the long run, the
democratic evolution of a given country. All EU external
policy frameworks contain incentives and apply conditionality to varying
extents to encourage reforms in partner countries. Incentives can be financial
(e.g. assistance), economic or political (e.g. imposing or lifting sanctions);
conditions relate to the nature and extent of reforms undertaken. These vary
according to the policy framework: The EU’s Enlargement policy, as
enshrined in the Treaty on European Union1, is the response to the legitimate
aspiration of people of our continent to join the endeavour of a unified Europe. The integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade
has shown that enlargement benefits the EU as a whole and allows it to be
better positioned to address global challenges. The future prospect of accessionto the EU can be seen as an overarching
incentive throughout the process. Enlargement policy is based on the principle
of compliance with a key number of political, economic and acquis-related
criteria (known as the Copenhagen criteria) before a membership application can
be seriously considered. This framework of conditionalities, combined with
technical and financial support, accompanies all stages of the accession
process, from the granting of candidate status to opening of accession
negotiations, open and closing of individual chapters and the final accession.
Examples of conditionality range from reforms of the judiciary and the fight against
corruption and organised crime to the need to ensure full cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (arrest and transfer
of indictees to The Hague) and meeting the requirements of the internal market.
With the new approach on the rule of law negotiating chapters 23 and 24, the
Commission further developed its approach by extending the timeframe for
negotiations and supporting the candidate countries in developing concrete
Action Plans, that will concretely guide the reform process until accession.
Conditionality has also been successfully linked to progress along successive
stages of the pre-accession process – signature/entry into force of Association
Agreements, awarding of candidate status, opening/closing of negotiations and
(to a lesser degree) financial assistance. In European
Neighbourhood Policy conditionalities exist in the
field of political and security dialogue but also in economic and sector
policies dialogue (market access, migration, energy cooperation, education,
etc.). It follows an incentive-based approach, as outlined in Communications “Partnership
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” and "A New Response to a Changing
Neighbourhood". The principle of "more-for-more" is applied upon
achievements and based on differentiation: those that go further and faster
with specific, measurable reforms will receive greater support from the EU in
terms of financial assistance, enhanced mobility, market access and access to
the EU Single Market. Support will be reallocated or refocused for those who
stall or retrench on agreed reform plans. More
concretely, closer political co-operation means advancing towards higher
standards of human rights and governance, based on a set of minimum benchmarks
against which performance will be assessed. A commitment to adequately
monitored, free and fair elections should be the entry qualification for the
Partnership. Partner countries carrying out the necessary reforms can expect to
resume negotiations on or to update the existing Association Agreements with
the aim of allowing for significantly strengthened political dialogue and
increased links between the partner country and EU institutions. This will
encompass deeper engagement on mobility and improved market access to the EU. A programme on
Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) was set up with a
budget of €350 million in additional funds for 2011 and 2012 primarily for
initiatives relating to democratic reform and socio-economic development. It is
a multi-country programme with an umbrella approach that provides flexibility
for modulating the assistance swiftly on a "more for more" basis to
partner countries showing sustained commitment to, and progress in, democratic
reforms. So far Tunisia has benefitted from a concrete expression of the EU's
"more-for-more" approach through the EU SPRING support package of
over € 350 million addressed to the EU's Southern neighbours. In the
post-election period, the full implementation of the “more for more” principle
is expected to take the form of a continuous dialogue with the government and
the civil society to monitor and support reforms. Tunisia:
Since the Revolution, Tunisia has engaged into
significant reforms: freedom of expression, freedom of association, agreeing
international conventions promoting respect of human rights, holding the first
free elections including the presence of an EU electoral observation mission
during the elections, maintaining the economic situation of the country despite
the crisis and the consequences of the war in Libya. With the setting-up of the
Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the new Constitution, Tunisia entered into a new phase of democratic transition. Recognising the substantial
reform progress made by the Tunisia since the Revolution, the EU responded fast
the challenge of adapting its support to meet the needs of Tunisia. The EU increased its funding earmarked for bilateral cooperation with Tunisia from the ENPI from €240 million to €390 million for the period 2011-2013. The EU
also decided that Tunisia should be the first beneficiary of financial support
from SPRING. An initial €20 million was made available to Tunisia in 2011. Half of this was used to increase the EU contribution to the economic
recovery support programme to €100 million, while the remaining €10 million was
used for a programme of support to the implementation of the Association
Agreement and to the Transition. In the post-election period, the full implementation
of the “more for more” principle is expected to take the form of a continuous
dialogue with the government and the civil society to monitor and support
reforms. To date an Action Plan for a "privileged partnership" is
under negotiation. Furthermore, a Dialogue on migration, mobility and
security has been launched in October 2011. The negotiations leading to the
conclusion of a Mobility Partnership are on-going and well advanced with
Tunisian authorities. The Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries is also based on
political conditionality and there is an in-built mechanism (Articles 96 and
97) whereby a serious breach of human rights in a partner country can lead to
the suspension of the Agreement with that country. Some financial
instruments developed to implement the Cotonou Agreement are building on an
incentive-based approach. This is for
instance the case of the 10th EDF Governance Initiative. A recent evaluation[2] suggested that this process was more
effective where multiple stakeholders were involved and where joint funding for
governance issues from EU Member States existed. It also showed a need for more
in depth analysis of the dynamics in the country, context specific approaches
as well as strategic use of different incentives and the need for continuous
dialogue on governance including also other partners than the government. Lessons learned
in cases such as Benin illustrate that successful results could be achieved
where regular monitoring, with exposure to relevant stakeholders including
civil society, took place. This served as a strong incentive for the government
to keep the promises made and brought about credibility to the process in the
eyes of the general public. Benin:
The EU Delegation updated the Governance Profile and the status of Governance Action
Plan implementation on a yearly basis, i.e., not only at the time of the midterm
review. The documents were shared with the partners (the government in Benin, especially the relevant ministries, and EU Member States) and finalised with their
input. The updated tools were then distributed to national actors such as civil
society, the private sector and other development partners. This took place
during public workshops at which the media was present; three such workshops
have been held to date. The Governance Initiative process has
allowed a more traditional form of development cooperation to morph into a more
regular multi-stakeholder dialogue. Documents that used to be restricted to
donors and the government and that laid bare the national governance process were
made public in open consultations. A wide audience was made aware of the
existing problems and witnessed the commitments taken by government to improve
the governance of their country. Moreover, these annual reviews ensured that
regular follow-up took place. This has served as a strong incentive for the
government to keep a number of its promises and brought credibility to the
process in the eyes of the general public. Finally, it shows to all partners
(national and international) where the country stands with the governance
situation, what progress has been achieved and what has not moved on. The whole
process has thus resulted in a benchmarking of the governance situation and of
the government commitments over a period of five years.
Source: European Commission, "Support Study on the EU Governance
Initiative", November 2011. In the
context of the European Development Policy, the
Agenda for Change recently further highlights the EU's commitment to ensuring
that a country’s record and ability to conduct reforms concerning human rights,
democracy and other key elements of good governance has a direct bearing on the
mix and level of aid towards the EU's partners worldwide. In addition, in
line with the Commission Communication on the Future approach to EU Budget
Support to third countries, the EU, when granting general budget support in the
framework of its Good Governance and Development Contracts, will require
specific conditions to be met in the field of democracy and human rights. Trade Policy - while this is not its policy objective, given inter alia that
trade instruments have to be consistent with WTO rules - may also indirectly provide
incentives for partner countries' democratic transition. The EU's
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provides for
reduced tariffs for the goods of developing countries when entering the EU.
Within this framework, a special incentive arrangement for sustainable
development and good governance ("GSP+") offers further advantages
(wider product coverage and increased preferential margin) to vulnerable
developing countries that ratify and effectively implement core international
standards in the fields of human, social and labour rights, environment and good
governance. Any of the GSP arrangements may be temporarily withdrawn for the
serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the core
international conventions on human, social and labour rights and on a number of
other grounds. For instance Belarus and Myanmar have seen their general GSP
preferences withdrawn for violations of labour rights and Sri Lanka lost its GSP+ benefits for non-implementation of certain human rights
conventions. The preferences should be re-established when the situation
changes, which acts as an incentive for relevant reforms. This worked
efficiently in the case of El Salvador which introduced the necessary reforms
to remove obstacles to ILO core labour standards and thereby avoided withdrawal
of its GSP+ status. 2.1.1. Actions
through innovative financial instruments and partnerships. The Commission
supports innovative financial instruments and partnerships using grant
resources to unlock financing and expertise from the private sector. These
instruments serve to support various sectors (e.g. SME finance, infrastructure
finance) and may come in various forms. The paramount objective of these
instruments is to use a grant element strategically in order to make projects
and initiatives by public or commercial financiers financially viable and
thereby exerts a leveraged development policy impact. Such
instruments may help to alleviate market failures hampering private sector
development in partner countries and address risks that prevent investments
with a strong developmental impact from materialising. One main set-up used
successfully are the EU regional blending facilities, which combine grants with
additional flows (such as loans and risk capital) from European Finance
Institutions (e.g. EIB, EBRD) to gain financial and qualitative leverage and
thereby increase EU development policy impact. Since 2007, four regional
blending facilities have been set up: the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund
(ITF), the Neighbourhood investment facility (NIF), the Latin America investment
facility (LAIF) and the Investment facility for Central Asia (IFCA). With
Investment Facilities for Asia, the Pacific and the Caribbean established in
early 2012, global coverage has been reached. The regional level is necessary
to ensure ownership of the instruments by the beneficiary countries and increase
their visibility. For instance, the SANAD fund for micro,
small and medium-size enterprises (MSME) project for the MENA region, itself
modelled after the successful European Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE), is a
good example of pooled funding by public and commercial investors. It promotes
self-employment and income generation through microfinance and helps to create
employment through support to MSMEs. The NIF furthermore supports the SME
Finance Facility, aimed at Increasing the availability of long-term funding and
financial services to SMEs in the Eastern Neighbourhood by providing loans and
partial loan guarantees to participating financial intermediaries for
on-lending to SMEs. These types of tools should be taken into
consideration when identifying the right mix of instruments to be used in
support to a democratic transition. These instruments are aiming at mobilising
additional funding to cover investments needs in partner countries and support
infrastructure projects in various central sectors such as energy, environment,
transport and social issues and provide support to the private sector targeting
Small and Medium Size Enterprises. 2.2. Actions
through various thematic instruments In addition to funds available within the
framework of geographic cooperation, other tools exist with a worldwide scope
that could be usefully resorted to in transition contexts. 2.2.1. European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR)[3] is a self-standing financing
instrument that complements and reinforces
actions on human rights and democracy within the framework of relevant EU
policies, by primarily empowering local civil society to strengthen home-grown
democratic processes. One of its main strengths is that it may be used without
the consent of partner-governments and even where no established development
cooperation exists with the country in question. The EIDHR has made
considerable provisions for country specific small scale projects (Country
Based Support Schemes - CBSS) in order to further enhance local ownership and
improve access by national civil society organisations. EU support in this area through the European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has led to results such as, among others,
legislative changes, reinforced parliaments, increased participation of
under-represented groups in political life, a free press, trust in electoral
processes and better transparency of political activity. As part of the
increasing efforts to support democracy worldwide the EU has also for the first
time launched a dedicated global call for proposals through the EIDHR in June
2011 with a specific focus on democracy. In the context of the discussions on the
new multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020, the Commission has proposed to
render the EIDHR more effective, flexible and responsive and to strengthen its
'democracy' component. For instance, the Commission proposes to integrate into
the EIDHR some of the elements existing in the Instrument for Stability, such
as the modality of awarding direct grants to address even better any sudden
needs arising from situations of transition (such as the democratic uprisings
in the Arab world). 2.2.2. Humanitarian
Aid The humanitarian Aid instrument is not as
such an instrument aiming at promoting democratic governance. But, addressing
immediate needs of affected populations in particular in terms of furniture of
basic social services it contributes to stabilisation. Humanitarian
interventions promoting communities participation play an important
contribution in terms of empowerment of local communities. In transition contexts, humanitarian
interventions are as far as possible designed in order to support local
capacities development (building on existing systems) rather than duplicating
or substituting national structures and maintaining dependence on emergency
aid. Humanitarian interventions in South Sudan
as well as in Ivory Coast have explicitly integrated those concerns at the
level of the humanitarian strategies as well as in terms of implementation with
the partners (part of the grant agreements). 2.2.3. Instrument
for Stability The Instrument for Stability (IfS)[4] is a strategic tool designed to
address a number of global security and development challenges, and is
complementary to the geographic instruments. It encompasses two main
components. The first component is designed to allow short terms actions. These
actions should be aiming at preventing conflict,
supporting post-conflict political stabilisation and ensuring early recovery
after a natural disaster. It can only be used in a situation of crisis or
emerging crisis, in order to re-establish the conditions necessary to the
implementation of the Community's development assistance under other long-term
instruments. Through this short term component actions
can be undertaken in various fields: development of
democratic and pluralistic state institutions, support for international
criminal tribunals, promotion of independent and pluralist media, etc. The second component of the instrument is
aiming at implementing longer term actions. It should mainly contribute to
fighting trafficking of people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials, addressing
cross borders threats (terrorism, organised crime etc) and enhancing
preparedness to pre and post conflict situations. The IfS has a budget of €2.062 billion for
2007-2013[5],
of which €484 million are allocated for the long-term component (23% of the
total). This allocation reflects the intention that the IfS should primarily be
an instrument for crisis response, and that long-term measures under this
Instrument should not be a substitute for those that could be delivered under
country or regional strategies funded from the main geographic financing
instruments. 2.2.4. The
thematic programme Non State Actors and Local authorities The thematic programme for Non-State
Actors and Local Authorities in the Development Cooperation Instrument is
one of the few "actor-oriented" thematic programmes, giving a wide
range of civil society actors and local authorities the exclusive opportunity
(right of initiative) to propose actions and promoting an inclusive and
empowered local society. The actions implemented do not necessarily have the backing
of the host country government. This thematic programme strives to strengthen
civil society in development in all its forms, both in Europe and partner
countries alike. The programme has a budget of € 702 million
for 2011-2013 and the Commission has proposed to renew it under the 2014-2020
financial framework. 3. TRANSITION
EXPERIENCE OF EU MEMBER STATES Within the EU, the specific experiences of
Member States may also provide useful examples on transition management.[6] The European Consensus on
Development explicitly states (Article 33) that the "EU will
capitalize on New Member States' experience (such as transition management) and
help strengthen the role of these countries as new donors." It was within this context that the
European Commission decided to embark on a compilation of such transition
management experiences that were still very fresh in the minds of the public
administrations concerned for knowledge-sharing purposes. There is no one-size-fits all recipe, as
the causes and context of transition processes and the countries' needs vary
significantly from one country to another, not the least because some other
countries may experience complex challenges of social cohesion and governance
relating to ethnic, religious, ideological or other socio-political divisions
that have not been relevant in Member States. With these caveats, there may,
however, be useful insights that could be drawn from this wealth of experience
for other countries elsewhere in the world. The following are some excerpts of
transition management experiences out of the myriad of experiences outlined in
the European Transition Compendium (ETC). They are purely illustrative and only
intended to give an example of reforms in each Member State covered in the ETC. 3.1. The
Political Dimension of Transition 3.1.1. Set
up of a new constitutional framework Fundamental changes were needed at
constitutional level in order to ensure a successful transition to democracy
and to a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.
Some countries held their very first elections under their original
constitutional framework which was later totally superseded, whereas others
undertook this process in two stages: firstly, the adoption of the most basic
and urgent constitutional changes in the form of amendments to the existing
constitution and secondly, the adoption of a totally new constitution. The diverse approach with which a new
constitutional framework was established in all of these newly emerging
democracies shows that countries going through a political transition need to
find their own way and solutions how to go about such a process. 3.1.2. Set
up of political pluralism The set up of political pluralism is a
cornerstone for a healthy democracy. Poland[7] was one of the first countries in Central and Eastern Europe to re-establish
democracy after 44 years of Communist rule. Transition was inevitable when Poland was experiencing deep political and economic crises in the 1980s which led to the
rise of Solidarność (Solidarity). In the late 1980’s, a broad
democratic coalition developed around this movement which eventually negotiated
political and economic reforms with the leaders of the Communist Party. One of the very first steps undertaken
during Poland's transition period as an emerging democracy was to re-establish the
freedom of expression and association and the freedom to form political parties
which would lead to the immediate organisation of free and fair elections aimed
at opening up the national Parliament to democratically elected representatives
of the population. The Solidarność-led movement set up a Citizens’
Committee made up of opposition representatives and managed to get the State to
accept them as a political partner with whom reforms had to be discussed and
agreed. This movement later participated in the elections held in June 1989
and obtained a resounding victory, which forced the democratic movement to take
on the responsibility of leading the Government. These parliamentary elections
were held in 1991 under a new electoral law. The newly elected Polish Parliament passed
a first Constitutional Act in 1992 reflecting the changes that had occurred in
Poland since 1989 (the so-called "small constitution"), but an
entirely new constitution was finally adopted in 1997. The Polish experience clearly shows the
efforts undertaken to establish political pluralism as a necessary first step
in an emerging democracy and how a stable political party system can be
consolidated in spite of various country-specific challenges. 3.1.3. Decentralization
of power towards regional and local governments With the support of international donors, Hungary, in its transition period towards democracy, put strong efforts to
revitalize local communities.[8] Different
local communities throughout the country took part in the EU's LEADER program.
Transnational cooperation was strongly supported via cross-border cooperation
and the establishment of various Euroregions. During the change of regime in the 1990’s,
the emphasis was put on the democratic operation, the autonomy and the
construction of guarantees preventing the overgrowth of power when forming the
system of local governments. The system was established fast, the country did
not have enough time and experience for the development of a civil public
administration. Significant laws serving as the bases of
the operation of local governments were passed in the first four years
following the change of regime. More and more tasks were decentralized towards
local governments through various legislative acts. As Hungary developed with the new system
setup, improvements were looked for through the creation of a special
consultative body established in 2002 by the Ministry of the Interior. Based on the recommendations of this working
group, the Hungarian Government proposed the bill of the multi-purposed
micro-regional associations of the local governments, which was adopted by the
Parliament in 2004. The bill regulated the facultative associations instead of
the mandatory ones proposed in the first version of the bill The adaptation of the bill to the evolving
Hungarian situation continued with discussions being held within the Forum of
the Government and the Local Self-governments (KOEF). This Forum could work
beside the Government as a preparatory and consultative body with a
coordinating role. As the name suggests, this forum hosts both representatives
of the Government and representatives of the Local-Governments. A major
breakthrough came about with a consensus on very important reforms that enabled
the Government to adopt a proposal of amendments of the acts on
local-governments. Over the years, the political and financial
landscape of regional and local governments in Hungary faced challenges.
However, a renewed effort to view these challenges with a new perspective led
to the set-up of micro-regional associations. These associations increased
considerably the standards of service provision in terms of efficiency and also
helped bridge social and territorial differences. In Hungary the choice to have the
devolution of power away from the centre helped to improve transparency and
accountability and to eventually assist the Central Government in getting
closer to its citizen. 3.1.4. Set
up of a Rule of Law framework: Reform of Legal Systems and the Judiciary The establishment of the rule of law with
an independent legal and judiciary system is another fundamental aspect that
needs to be considered in young emerging democracies. The Czech Republic[9] provides an
interesting case study in this regard. In December 1989, the Judiciary in the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was in deep crisis at all levels and very few
politicians or legal experts had a clear idea how the judiciary could be
reformed to suit the demands and needs of the country. The judiciary lacked
facilities, was poorly funded and judges had inadequate low salaries. Judges
were ideologically involved in the previous coercive system of justice based on
political classes and all of them were to some degree compromised and
contaminated by every day contact with representatives of the totalitarian
system. In early 1990, the transition Government
and the Parliament decided to “clean up” the judiciary. It was therefore
decided to shorten the mandate of existing judges to approximately one year so
as to allow for the screening of judges against whom objections had been raised
due to their politically-driven decisions during Communist rule. The next
logical step was then to proceed with new appointments for a new mandate. New opportunities to practise law as
independent freelance professionals or employed by an emerging private sector
that offered better employment conditions led to an exodus of legal
professionals from the Government. In addition, other challenges also had to
be dealt with. This was, for example, the increased workload for the judiciary
on a daily basis. Conflicts regarding the powers of the judiciary and their
specific duties, an increased number of petty crimes, the building of a totally
new commercial register that would provide for the legal existence of tens of
thousands of companies under very primitive conditions had to be dealt with.
In short, therefore, the Court was facing increased number of cases to be
resolved with the exception of family law. The human resource gap had to be
addressed and appropriate training given. All these efforts proved futile following
the break up of the federation. It was only at the end of the 1990s that both
the legislation and the judiciary had to be remodelled in line with the
pre-requisites of membership of the European Union that acted as a true
catalyst for change. The process of preparations for acceding the EU defined the
next steps in the transformation process of the Czech Judiciary, which again
required further reviews of repeatedly amended laws and regulations. However,
despite gradual improvements, the status of judges and the basic organisational
structure of the Czech judiciary remained unchanged, as defined in 1991. This case study clearly shows the
short-term and long-term challenges that a complete overhaul of a legal and
judicial system based on the rule of law would entail. Some of the challenges
mentioned here are definitely not new to those being faced by young
democracies. Another aspect that emerges is the fact
that a regional institution (which was the EU in this case) can provide a good
boost to the transformation process that is required if it has the necessary
knowledge and expertise to provide guidance and support of the kind required It also needs to be taken into account
that any clean-up exercise in the judiciary faces the risk of strong
politicisation, which could potentially influence the judiciary for decades. It
is therefore particularly important – if a country decides to carry out such a
process – to apply full transparency and ensure the application of objective
criteria. 3.1.5. Public
Administration Reform Public Administrations are the supporting
arms and legs of a well-functioning Government. The countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States provide an interesting insight into how
the Government was finally put on centre stage in decision-making, rather than
have it subordinated to a political-party. The reform of public administration
– from internal organisation to staffing – is necessary to improve
transparency, accountability, policy effectiveness and efficiency. With its independence, Latvia needed to develop a new public administration system to operate efficiently
and transparently.[10] During the
very first phase of reform, Latvian politicians and civil servants had to design
an entirely new system to manage the transition to a democratic system as well
as the transition to a market economy. During the Soviet period, political and
executive powers were merged. This meant that every high-ranking employee in
public administration was also a member of the Communist Party. The
decision-making process was one of a top-down approach and the public had no
say in policy-making, nor could it influence decisions. During the period of
transition, the public administration consisted mainly of two categories of
officials: experienced officials who had previously worked under the old public
administration system; inexperienced people who wanted to start off a career in
the new public administration. A main bone of contention was therefore the
training of staff in a very short time. The newly elected Government created the
Ministry for State Reform (1993-1995) developed the Public Administration
Reform Policy Paper, the first Law on Civil Service (April 1994), the School of
Public Administration and the Civil Service Administration (established under
the Prime Minister). The prospect of Latvia becoming a European
Union member acted as a catalyst for change. The Public Administration Reform
Bureau (1997-1999) and the Secretariat of the Special Assignment’s Minister for
Public Reform Affairs (1999-2002) worked on the Law on the Public
Administration System and improved administrative systems. The Ministry of
Finance developed an internal audit system and the Ministry of Justice created
an Administrative Procedure system. A new Law on Civil Service came into force
in 2001, involving a move from the “career” system introduced by the 1994 Law
to a “post” system, and reducing the scope of the Civil Service to central
government Ministries and subordinated institutions and a certain number of
special groups of public servants (police, firefighters, border-guards, state
revenue service, the diplomatic and consular service). Since 2003 the State
Chancellery, which is the state organisation responsible for managing the
Centre of Government (including policy planning and coordination) has also been
responsible for public administration reforms. It also oversees in-service
training for the public administration. Interesting to note as best practice is the
fact that in 2000, the State Chancellery started the development and
implementation of a uniform policy planning and coordination system. ''Policy
Planning Guidelines'', which prescribe the basic principles for the policy
development, types of policy planning documents and their hierarchy, were
established. This was a basis for adoption of Cabinet Regulations No.111
''Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers'' of 12 March 2002. Amendments to the ''Rules of Procedure of
the Cabinet of Ministers'' adopted in 2005 stipulate that the state budget of
2007 should be drafted in accordance with the structure included in the
programme part of ministries’ strategic plans. This would ensure integration of
sectoral policies used for annual budget application of the respective direct
administration institution. The case of Latvia shows what efforts
needed to be undertaken to put up a Public Administration composed of members
of the civil service that executed their duties according to a clearly established
code of ethics and policy planning guidelines, irrelevant of political beliefs.
It also shows the sequencing of how such reforms took place. 3.1.6. E-governance Estonia[11] gave Public Administration Reform a slightly different twist .
From the very initial stages of its reform reflection process, Estonia
understood that the State and the information system of the State must be
developed hand-in-hand, that ICT must support the everyday functioning of the State
in the best possible manner to provide better public services to citizens and
businesses. ICT solutions made the provision of public services and the
communication between the State and the citizens as well as enterprises easier
and more efficient. Estonia therefore used ICT solutions to manage information
flows and facilitate institution building. Although it goes without saying
that nowadays, a modern Public Administration and ICT tools go hand-in-hand, Estonia’s example was ground-breaking for the simple reason that a 'poor' country still managed
to successfully penetrate the use of ICT across all levels of society, starting
off with Public Administration level. In fact, Estonia is now one of the leaders in integrating new technologies
into the public sector
reform process An important
step towards open and transparent governance was taken
with the Public Information Act of 2001 and the opening of a Direct democracy portal TOM (Today I decide) in the
same year, giving every citizen the possibility to present their ideas to the
Government, debate over them, and get an official response. Just last year,
the information system for legislative proceedings
was opened and it is now possible to follow the birth of legislative
proceedings until their actual date of implementation all on one 'window'.
Estonia was also the first country worldwide to implement nation-wide remote
internet voting since 2005. This case study
proves that the early investment in ICT, albeit seemingly expensive at the
beginning, is worth the effort and the financial resources. The spread of the
use of ICT has not only contributed to more efficiency but also to more
government transparency and accountability and hence more direct involvement of
citizens in a participatory democracy. At the same time, it is important to
note that the introduction of ICT needs to be based on effective administrative
procedures. ICT is only a tool to implement such procedures, but cannot replace
them. 3.1.7. Human
Rights[12] One of the core aspects of the process of
political reforms carried out in Central and Eastern Europe was to incorporate
into the legal system and to make effective the full enjoyment and free
exercise of the human, political, social, economic and cultural rights
recognised in international instruments adopted at world-wide and European
level after the end of the II World War. Many of these rights were already
enshrined in the national legislations (with notable exceptions, such as the
right to private property but they were not effectively respected and
protected. Lack of appropriate institutional mechanisms, both general (an
independent Judiciary) and specific (such as Ombudsmen) and, even more
importantly, lack of public awareness of these rights was a common feature in
the countries belonging to the former Communist block. Signature and ratification of the
international instruments and conventions on human rights and their
incorporation into the national legal systems was one of the first steps
undertaken in many of these countries in the beginning of their political
transitions. This was followed by the building of the necessary institutional
mechanisms to ensure protection of such rights with the support of
international organisations. As a country emerging from the splitting up
of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia[13] aimed to
have a strong institutional framework in place in this field as soon as it
gained independence but there was a certain gap between legislation on one hand
and practice on the other hand. Besides ratifying specific human rights
conventions, it went about to create some institutional bodies to oversee the
protection of human rights, such as the Human Rights Ombudsperson, the
Information Commissioner, the Advocate of the Principle of Equality and the Parliamentary
Commission for Petitions, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities, each of which
perform specific functions. Slovenia's case
study, shows how government institution-building is a necessary first-step to
safeguard human rights. 3.1.8. Gender
Equality and Women's Rights During its years of transition, Lithuania [14] took steps
to ensure that its legislation and all economic and social policies would
support equal opportunities for men and women in the labour market. A Law on
Equal Opportunities for Men and Women was passed in 1998, the Office of Equal
Opportunities Ombudsman was established in 1999 and an Equal Opportunities’
Commission was established in 2000 with representatives from 16 ministries and
government agencies. Women’s rights in the labour market were
included in the Law on Support of the Unemployed, the Law on Employment
Contract and the Law on Safety and Health at Work. The cumulative impact of
these laws was to have employers legally obliged to apply the same selection
criteria for men and women and to also provide equal working conditions and
opportunities. A Programme for Advancement of Women was adopted in 1998,
together with a detailed action plan for its implementation over the years
1998-2000. In spite of all these efforts during this
transition period, the Lithuanian authorities realized that gender inequalities
in the labour market persisted and new measures had to be introduced to refine
further the labour legislation in terms of equality of treatment, provide more
training and information especially for women and provide more childcare
services to encourage women to join the labour market. EU membership spurred
further reforms and improvements in this regard. Whilst the case of Lithuania gives an insight into what kind of laws were necessary to promote gender equality and
ensure the protection of women's rights, the case of Cyprus provides
insight into the institutional 'machinery'. In 1994, the Council of Minister
of Cyprus set up the National Machinery for Women's Rights which is made up of
representatives from major women's organisations in Cyprus,[15]
trade unions and government departments and is composed of four entities that
fall under the auspices of the Cypriot Ministery of Justice and Public Order.
The National Machinery for Women's Rights tackles all women-related matters and
focuses on the elimination of gender inequality and gender-related
discrimination. It also has an advisory role to the Council of Ministers on
any policies, programmes and laws promoting women's rights across all levels of
society, sensitizes government departments on equality issues, monitors and
evaluates the effectiveness and implementation of laws in this context and acts
as a direct link between the government and NGOs. Through the
multidisciplinary role of the National Machinery for Women's Rights, Cyprus has sought to strengthen women's political participation in
the transitional and post-transitional process at all levels of decision-making.[16] As can be seen from the case of
Lithuania, it is important to consider gender equality and women's rights
issues from the very early stages of transition and to pursue with ongoing
efforts to make subsequent adjustments and improvements in the years
thereafter, especially to increase the number of women in the labour market.
The case of Cyprus gives an idea how mainstreaming of gender-related issues and
sensitization to women's rights can be pushed ahead. 3.2. The
Economic Dimension of Transition The economic dimension
of transition has multiple facets, especially when considering the shift from a
centrally-planned economy to a market-based economy, as was the case for
countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc. Each country had to find its
own way through this process and therefore, as for the political dimension of
transition, there was / is no one-size-fits-all. In fact, the various
experiences in the European Transition Compendium (ETC) show that whilst each
country had its own way of sequencing and pacing of economic reforms, there was
a common underlying objective: membership in a regional or supranational organization
– in this case the European Union[17]. Economic transition
reforms undertaken by the Central and Eastern European Countries and the Baltic
States were, inter alia, the liberalisation of prices, trade and foreign
exchange, macro-economic stabilisation to deal with hyper-inflation,
restoration of private property, creating an enabling environment for economic
activity based on private ownership of enterprises and businesses, reform of
the banking and financial sectors as well as of overall fiscal policy. Some
countries chose a "shock therapy" approach to these reforms (Poland,
Czech Republic, Estonia) whereas others referred a "gradualist
approach" (Hungary and Slovenia). Private Sector Development was a key
element in their economic transformation process[18]. 3.2.1. Private
Sector Development One of the most crucial aspects to ensure
the successful transition to a market economy is private sector development.[19]
It is interesting to note that in the case of the former Soviet bloc, in some countries
(for example, in Poland), there was already a limited private sector before the
actual change started in late 1980s; and in others (Slovenia) there was a
system that, while not including private ownership, was already operating under
quasi-market conditions. However, in most countries of the Soviet bloc, the private
sector was absolutely non-existent before the political change happened. At the very beginning of the transition
process, it was necessary to change the legal framework to make way for the
creation of private companies and company registers. New private companies
emerged to fill in the gap where the State had withdrawn its functions. The
new element of 'competition', both domestically and internationally required
companies to be innovative. In the case of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
(SMEs), support measures had to be introduced through specific public policies. Another major objective of the economic
policies undertaken by these countries in transition was the attraction of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). Capital was needed to allow for the privatisation of
state companies. This, in turn, required further investment in human resource
training of how to manage a private enterprise. In the case of the Czech Republic,[20]
the beginning of the transformation process was dominated by large state-owned
companies which were then gradually replaced by Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises (SMEs). The fast growth of SMEs was a characteristic aspect of the
economic transformation that the Czech Republic was experiencing and which
needed to be supported through a legal framework which gave rise to Act No.
299/1998 Coll. on the state support of SMEs. The support of the Government to
SMEs was targeted on capital consolidation of firms, capacity building,
consultancy, data acquisition, applied research, technological development and
the creation of new job opportunities. The support was provided by the Ministry
of Industry and Trade (and its predecessors), the Ministry of Finance and since
1997 by the Ministry for Regional Development as well. Through the design and
implementation of the START programme, for example, favourable conditions for
the establishment and development of SMEs were created and they were assisted
with designing and implementing business plans. This example shows that the fast growth
of SMEs leads to economic transformation and that both processes need to be
supported with specific government measures that create the right policy
framework for a business enabling environment. When the Slovak Republic gained
independence,[21] its
economic activities concentrated on large state-owned enterprises, its
industrial production relied on the heavy industries with high consumption of
energy and raw materials. It also had a low level of finalization of
production as well as low involvement in foreign trade and it had to convert
its armaments industry. The development of the Slovak enterprise
sector as of 1993 took place in a context of reforms in the business
environment (banking sector reforms, labor market reforms, tax and public
finance reforms, bankruptcy reforms and streamlining procedures in registration
of business). Challenges that had to be overcome were weak enforcement of law
(insufficient quality and lack of stability of legislation, long duration of
resolving disputes), significant administrative burdens, high financial burdens
for employers (social security payments), a non-functioning capital market and
lack of skilled labour force in some sectors. The set-up of the National Agency for
Development of Small and Medium Enterprises (NADSME) founded in 1993 was
crucial to support development and growth of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) in the Slovak Republic with the aim to improve the competitiveness of
the sector within the single EU market and the markets of third countries. The Slovak case shows that the
strengthening of the rule of law, particularly in the field of law enforcement,
contributes to a better business environment. 3.2.2. Reform
of Public Finances Bulgaria[22] kicked off a comprehensive stabilization and economic reform
process in 1997 with the set up of the Currency Board Arrangement (CBA). This
was considered to be the best cure to deal with the circumstances of soft
budget constraints, commercial bank financing of loss-making enterprises and
hyperinflation. A conservative fiscal policy approach was adopted together
with sound macroeconomic management and the acceleration of structural reforms
in order to restore growth, reduce inflation and reassure public investors. In 1999 and 2000 major improvements were
made towards effective budget execution. Central government funds were
centralized in a single treasury account at the Bulgarian National Bank
(Central Bank) and major reforms were also undertaken in the area of
intergovernmental relations concerning municipal finances. In 2002, the
Council of Ministers approved a programme for implementation of fiscal
decentralization. This set a clear framework of intergovernmental
responsibilities, standards for service delivery, matching revenue collection
with expenditure needs, maintenance of fiscal discipline and a greater
participation of citizens in the planning and execution of municipal budgets.
Within the Ministry of Finance, a Public Finance School was inaugurated in 2004
having the special responsibility to build capacity inside the Government
system on budgetary and Public Finance Management (PFM) issues. The case of Bulgaria gives one example
on how reform in public finance was conducted to bring about economic
transition and how it was reinforced and accompanied by capacity-building of
personnel within government services. 3.3. The
Social Level At the social level, one supportive
element of political transition to democracy is surely that of civic education
and civic engagement for citizens that can effectively understand and
participate in the building and reinforcing of an active democratic culture,
well aware of their rights and duties, able to think critically and to learn
how to effectively participate in political life as a citizen by exercising
their civic rights. 3.3.1. The
development of Civil Society Organisations The development of an organized civil
society is a must for democracy to take roots because they cater for a change
in mentality and attitude in society at large vis-à-vis a ruling government.
The aim of civil society organisations is usually to empower individuals to
speak up for their individual and collective rights and this in turn influences
policy-making at the highest levels. The building from scratch of civil
society organisations is shown by the experience of the former Central and
Eastern European Countries and the Baltic States.[23] While under former regime
"civil society organisations" were part of the power and control system
of the single party regime, with no freedom of association, the democratic
transition experienced by these countries put in place an enabling legal
environment for CSOs to officially register and start freely their activities. Such
a process was supported by international donors throughout. Nowadays, CSOs
influence general policy-making and decision-making in these countries. In the particular case of Estonia[24],
two laws to regulate non-governmental organisations were adopted: the Law of
Non-profit Associations and the Law of Foundations – both of which set clear
guidelines for operation. Estonia was in fact
the first country in the region to develop a policy framework for cooperation
between government and civil society. The EKAK (Estonian Civil Society
Development Concept) was drafted between 1999 – 2002 (adopted by the Estonian
Parliament in December 12, 2002). It sets out the tasks of the public sector
and citizens' initiatives and establishes principles of their cooperation with
each other in politics and public administration. It also elaborates on the
complementarity between public authorities and civic initiatives, establishes principles
for cooperation to help strengthen overall civil society in Estonia. The Tartu Volunteer Centre, with the help of various local NGOs, was involved in
the development of a Strategy for Volunteering in Estonia which was later adopted
by the Joint Committee for implementation of the Estonian Civil Society
Development Concept. The case of Estonia is a good example of
the transition process, where government built and established a good working
relationship with civil society organisations from the very beginning and
whereby both parts considered each other's work as complementary. 3.3.2. Education Economic growth and job creation does not
happen overnight. It requires adequate support and investment in the human
resources of the country. Hence, education at all levels of society is an
essential ingredient to sustain and support economic development. Malta offers
a different experience because of the particularity and challenges of being a
small island state with a localised and geographically-confined economy.
Firstly, every single raw material and most of its produce are generally
imported, with the exception of some agricultural and fishery products. This
automatically means higher costs for consumers. Secondly, small island
economies have typically small local markets that challenge the notion of
market competition and could have monopolistic tendencies, also causing higher
consumer prices. Thirdly, Malta was extremely dependent on tourism, especially
from the UK in particular after independence in 1964. In the 90s, Malta
therefore had to find ways how to diversify its economy and eventually, how to
shift its focus from the manufacturing sector on textiles to nowadays more
services-oriented sectors and the export of semi-finished products. For Malta, tackling economic development
was inextricably intertwined to its own investment in its one and only 'natural
resource': its human capital. As the level of investment in education increased
over the years, a radical reform in professional and vocational education and
training[25]
was designed and kicked off in 2001 when the Malta College of Arts, Science and
Technology (MCAST) was established. This type of educational investment has
substantially contributed to the building of a now dynamic and competitive
knowledge-based economy. It also increased the number of opportunities for
lifelong learning, particularly in the upgrading, upskilling and reskilling of
workers to face the challenge of an ongoing changing technology. The establishment of MCAST managed to raise
the status, accessibility and attractiveness of professional and vocational
education and training (VET). It keeps abreast with changing demands of the
local industry and holds regular meetings with different industrial sectors,
the Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and Industry, Malta Enterprise, the Employment Training Corporation (ETC) and other entities. The MCAST Board of
Governors includes experienced educationists in VET but also a number of
leading industrialists who ensure that MCAST’s policies, strategies, objectives
and programmes are consonant with the changing industrial, commercial and servicing
highly competitive world outside. This case study shows that the
transition to a more developed nation is spurred on by investing in the
education of the workforce and that the country's possession or lack thereof of
natural resources does not necessarily play a role in helping the economic
development of a country. 3.3.3. Health For decades Slovenia has been
engaged in a systematic process of health care system modernisation.[26]
Reintroduction of compulsory health insurance and introduction of voluntary
health insurance have been among the most important reform strategies across
the years for Slovenia. The Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia
(”Zavod za zdravstveno zavarovanje Slovenije” - hereafter ZZZS), nowadays a
public institute bound by Law to provide compulsory health insurance for all
citizens and /or inhabitants of Slovenia, has established a stable and
efficient system with the aim of containing costs on a macro level of health
care whilst simultaneously ensuring accessibility and quality of services.
Until 1999, ZZZS was also implementing voluntary health insurance which later
led to the creation of an independent mutual voluntary health insurance
organisation called "Vzajemna." During the EU integration process, a lot of
effort was invested into the education of its healthcare system personnel,
including higher level professional training. Slovenia also established itself
as a best practise example of sustainable financing of its health care system,
especially with the successful launch of its Slovene Health Insurance (smart)
Card project. This case study shows how Slovenia
improved over the years its quality and accessibility of healthcare services
whilst at the same time bearing in mind the importance of having a healthcare
system that was financially sustainable in the long run. 3.3.4. Employment The fall of the Communist Regime under
which everybody was employed by the State obviously led to various
socio-economic changes which had to be dealt with. In the case of Romania[27],
after 1990, the new Government established an institution that would deal with
employment, vocational training and guidance for people looking for a job, but would
also make cash payments for the unemployed population as a social welfare
benefit.[28] Thus, in 1999, a National Agency for
Employment and Vocational Training was set up, as a public institution of
national interest, having legal personality. The Agency was renamed in 2000,
becoming the National Agency for Employment (ANOFM). Over the years, this
agency has expanded on its services to include, for example, professional job
coaching, vocational training, pre-dismissal services, labour mediation,
consultancy for starting a business and to provide subsidized employment for
people in disadvantaged groups of the population.
In 2006, Regional Action Plans for Employment aimed at implementing employment
policy at regional level were elaborated. The regional action plans were and
still are managed, revised and upgraded through “Regional Employment and Social
Inclusion Pacts” which involve all relevant players at local, county and
regional level. The pacts have 3 levels of operation – the programming/planning
and evaluation (regional level) – and two implementation levels (county level
and local level - municipal or communal). The pacts are supported by a
management structure, permanently providing logistical and technical
assistance, namely permanent technical secretariats. This case study shows how the employment
strategy put in place tackled employment not only from a 'central perspective'
(i.e through the establishment of the National Agency for Employment and
Vocational Training (ANOFM)) but also from a regional point of view with
specific action plans and two levels of implementation to reach out as much as
possible to the people. 3.3.5. Social
Dialogue During the whole process of transition, Romania, like other Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic states, had to set
up mechanisms and institutional bodies to ensure dialogue between government
representatives, trade unions and employers’ associations in matters of
economic and social policy. Although mostly of a consultative nature at the
outset, these tri-partite social dialogue mechanisms later expanded to more
specific policy and public governance issues (such as the management of active
employment policies at regional and local level). Therefore, social dialogue
between trade unions and representatives of employers was developed right from
the start. However, collective bargaining was somewhat slow to move ahead, both
at sector or regional level as well as at the level of individual companies or
enterprises. With the help of EU-funded projects, this particular problem was
gradually tackled and Romania and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Baltic States strengthened their experience in designing and
implementing projects in support of social dialogue.[29] A lesson-learned in this case is that
collective bargaining is an important element of social dialogue. It develops
over time and should not be overlooked, especially when trade unions start to
develop. 3.3.6. Reforms
of Pension Systems During the era of the pre-transition
period, the pension system used by Romania and other Central and Eastern
European countries, pension systems were based on a pay-as-you-go model, fully
funded by the state budget and with very early retirement ages, different for
men and for women. With the economic and demographic changes rapidly brought
about by young emerging democracies, the pension system had to radically change
because it was financially unsustainable and there was a risk of collapse of
the systems in a short period of time unless substantial reforms were
introduced.[30] Work and studies on pension reform started
in the mid-1990s, but it was only in the final years of the decade – or in some
cases in the early 2000s – that such reforms were eventually implemented,
through the adoption of new legislation. This was the case for Romania which introduced a three-pillar pension funding system to include both state and
private sector sources: firstly, a system managed by the public sector, based
on mandatory contributions; secondly, a mandatory savings system managed by the
private sector and thirdly, an optional savings system based on voluntary contributions. From this example, one can reflect
further about the advantages for partner countries to develop social welfare as
part of a social safety net for citizens. This, however, cannot come about unless there is effective domestic resource mobilization. Sharing
'transition management expertise' with partner countries Member States that joined the EU in the
past decade have found ways how to share their transition management expertise
with partner countries across the world, as have other countries before them
who have gone through similar experiences. The following are just but some examples: –
E-governance reform in partner countries is a
priority for Estonian Development Cooperation within a larger framework
of building democratic societies and transparent, accountable, and
participatory governments. Areas of shared expertise
include ICTs in public sector reform, change management, development of E-government
technical and institutional framework, development of a legal and fiscal
framework for information society, development of e-services, open governance,
e-democracy and e-participation, ICT in education, cyber security, regional and
local e-governance and mobile governance. Projects focussing on these topics
have been conducted upon request by various partner countries and there are
others in the pipeline. –
The Czech Ministry of Finance developed a
technical cooperation programme based on the Czech experience of the transition
management process in relation to public finance. This "Transformation
Financial and Economic Cooperation" has a specific budget allocation to
meet requests for knowledge transfer activities made by partner countries for
the organization of consultations, seminars, workshops and even internships targeting
public finance issues. –
Romania organised
a knowledge-sharing workshop on democratic transformation entitled "North
Africa and Eastern Europe: viewpoints and shared experiences of
transition." The institutions involved were the Romanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, UNDP, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division and the
Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania. The main aim was to explore whether the
Eastern European democratization and transition processes would provide a
useful learning process for Tunisia and Egypt and to have a forum for free
debate between Tunisian and Egyptian officials, civil society representatives,
academics, journalists and international experts in an atmosphere free from political
and social pressure. Amongst topics the discussed were the management of the
electoral process and the credibility of elections to instigate further
reflection about ownership of the democratization process. –
Lithuania – as
other enlargement countries – made use of twinning projects in support of its
own institutions since 1998. Since becoming an EU Member State in 2004, the
Lithuanian institutions made use of this twinning experience with partner
countries. An example of one of these twinning projects is the support to the
Milli Mejlis (Parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan. A second successful
example was that of capacity building in the areas of food safety and animal
welfare. In 2011, the State Food and veterinary Service of Lithuania, together
with Hungarian specialists, implemented this Twinning Project in Serbia. The main objective was to provide assistance to the Veterinary Directorate of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management to strengthen their
capacity to enforce and implement the Serbian Food Safety Law and Animal
Welfare Law which are already largely aligned with EU legislation. The experience and the expertise developed
in the EU and its Member States States through the accessions in the past
decade in handling processes of transition can be an important added-value for
partner countries around the world, aspiring towards a successful transition
management process. Eventually, the specific experience of the new Member
States could provide further scope to explore untapped comparative advantages
as areas of expertise within the EU's external action where bilateral or joint
programming could be undertaken to develop new partnerships, synergize efforts
with those of more long-standing donors and attract resources. It would also
work towards boosting the donor profile of these Member States not only within
the EU's development cooperation sphere but also internationally. After all, it
is an undisputable fact that a newly independent state can get advice from a
country that has itself recently experienced independence; a small island
developing state can get advice from small island economies that have faced and
may still face similar challenges; and a once centrally-planned economy can
walk in the footsteps of others that have learned from painful reforms towards
a market economy. Last but not least, Croatia's accession to the EU will open another facet of experience and expertise in
transition management that can be shared with partner countries. [1] EU Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External
Relations, Brussels, 17 November 2009. [2] "European Commission, "Support Study on the EU Governance
Initiative in view of the preparation of a Report by the Commission to the
Council in 2012 – Annexes to the Final Report", December 2011, p. 4. [3] Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006 of 20 December 2006. [4] Regulation
(EC) No 1717/2006 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November
2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability [5] According to the Commission Communication "A budget for
Europe 2020", COM (2011) 500 final part 1, it is envisaged to maintain
this programme with an allocation of 2.51 billion over the 2014-2020period. [6] Support to
'emerging democracies' in a state of transition from a one-party regime to a
pluralistic liberal democracy requires a whole process of support that spans
the political, economic and social spheres. It entails also the creation and
implementation of a comprehensive set of legislative and regulatory reforms, the
upgrading and modernisation of administrative capacities and a better and more
transparent service-orientated public sector vis-à-vis its citizens. This
process can be coined into the phrase 'transition management' and is
inextricably intertwined with sowing the seeds for good (or better) governance,
as an essential element in any development cooperation policy. [7] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1074 [8] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1275 [9] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1261 [10] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1266 [11] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1267 [12] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1046 [13] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1257 [14] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1534 [15] http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/640AA32E298C2742C2257036003F90A5?OpenDocument [16] http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/F2E421B065ACE7C3C22579ED00242413?OpenDocument [17] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1041 [18] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1041 [19] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1056 [20] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1407 [21] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1407 [22] http://www.minfin.bg/en/ [23] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1050 [24] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1252 [25] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1474 [26] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1495 [27] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1061 [28] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1518 [29] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1518 [30] http://www.eutransition.eu/#node:1518