52009DC0273

EN

|| COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 24.6.2009

COM(2009) 273 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan

{SEC(2009) 790} {SEC(2009) 791} {SEC(2009) 874}

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan (Text with EEA relevance)

1.           Introduction

Over the past ten to fifteen years, the threat of a terrorist group acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) materials has led governments and international organisations to adopt far-reaching regulations[1] and programmes to defend populations against the associated risks. The concerns these programmes aim to address have been fuelled by a number of well-documented instances of the interest of certain terrorist groups in acquiring such materials. Although fortunately the number of incidents involving such materials has been limited, the commonly held view is that the risks involved are such, that coordinated action in terms of prevention, detection and response is indispensable.

Even though many experts agree that there are considerable difficulties for terrorists to overcome in order for them to "successfully" develop and deploy such materials in their attacks, and that the probability of such attacks occurring is therefore rather low, it is clear that no public authority can afford to ignore this threat given its potentially very significant consequences in terms of human life, and its economic effects. There is also a consensus amongst experts that the case of a somewhat limited attack needs to be carefully considered, because the psychological, health and economic effects on the population of even a small-scale attack using such materials would be significant.

Tackling terrorist access to CBRN material is currently considered a key priority for the European Union. This is acknowledged by the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by Council on 1 December 2005, and by the “EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (WMD)” adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003[2]. In addition, the JHA Council adopted specific Conclusions in 2007 that called for further EU level work on CBRN security[3].

2.           Definitions

There are no commonly accepted definitions of CBRN materials, threats or incidents – for example earlier EU policy documents in this domain merely refer to CBRN incidents without defining what these incidents could be. Other terminology related to CBRN materials refers to terrorist attacks using unconventional means - as opposed to the more conventional means of explosives and arms. In the military context, the terminology mainly refers to the use of non-conventional weapons, or WMD.

For the purpose of this communication, however, it is most useful to use a rather broad description of the terrorist threat concerning CBRN materials: all uses of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances and materials for terrorist purposes. An approach which looks at all possible ways in which terrorists can use these materials is the only one acceptable from a point of view of prevention and detection, since all possible risks concerning these materials should be covered.

However, when considering preparedness and response in this context, it is unavoidable to start from an all-hazards approach, since no matter whether a CBRN incident is accidental or intentional, man-made or not, the response in terms of civil protection and health is likely to be similar. The CBRN policy package is therefore broadly based on an all-hazards-approach, but with a strong emphasis on countering the terrorist threat, in particular with regard to preventive actions.

3.           Recent CBRN developments at national and EU level

The CBRN policy outlined in this Communication builds on a number of different measures which have been taken forward recently both by Member States and by the European Union.

3.1.        National measures

The Member States are primarily responsible for many of the areas of work which are covered by the current policy package. They are responsible for protecting their citizens from CBRN threats by a host of different measures, and with the involvement of a wide range of responsible authorities. It is their law enforcement, civil protection and medical services which will be first on the scene of an incident, and it is their ambulances, hospitals and stockpiles of counter-measures which will need to provide both for emergency medical assistance as well as aftercare. National forensic capabilities will also be called upon to assist in the determination of the cause of any incident, as well as help in the identification of perpetrators in the case of an intentional attack. Overall, many Member states are relatively well prepared to deal with a CBRN threat, and all have found their own solutions to the significant coordination and other challenges posed by preventing, detecting and eventually dealing with a CBRN incident within their national context.

3.2.        EU level measures

The Ghent European Council of 2001 instigated the first steps in countering the CBRN threat at the EU level[4], followed by the adoption of the "Programme to improve cooperation in the European Union for preventing and limiting the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist threats" in December 2002[5]. The Programme was superseded by the Council and Commission's EU Solidarity Programme of 3 December 2004 on the consequences of terrorist threats and attacks, that widened, revised and replaced the 2002 CBRN Programme following the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004[6]. The relevant elements of the Solidarity Programme were included in the overall Strategy and Action Plan on Combating Terrorism established in 2005 after the London attacks[7].

As referred to above, the JHA Council Conclusions of 6 December 2007 "addressing Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks and on bio-preparedness" provide the most recent EU-level overview of the ongoing activities. The JHA Council states in these conclusions that it: "Considers that effective policies to address CBRN risks should be further developed (…)". The Conclusions also "Invite the Commission, in accordance with its competences, to continue its work in the CBRN field together with the Member States and relevant stakeholders, avoiding duplications and building on good practices across Member States (…)".

On the external side, this operational and cross-pillar approach, which involves close coordination and cooperation between Member States and the Commission, is reaffirmed by the implementation of the EU WMD Strategy and of Community instruments such as the Instrument for Stability, the Instrument for Nuclear Security and Cooperation (INSC) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA).[8]

3.3.        EU response mechanisms

Whilst the responsibility for responding to CBRN incidents rests with the Member States, robust crisis management procedures and tools to support the Member States in case of a crisis with cross-border implications have been developed at the EU level. The European Union reinforced its capacity to ensure a coordinated approach and support between Member States in cases when a disaster actually happens. This cooperation takes place through the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection[9]. The main role of this Mechanism is to facilitate co-operation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies which may require urgent response actions. Through the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), the Commission actively supports the mobilisation, transport and coordination of civil protection assistance to countries affected by major emergencies.

In addition, the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) provide a cross pillar approach to crisis management and are relevant both to external crises and crises within the EU. The Commission participates in these arrangements through its ARGUS crisis management system, which inter alia allows for an immediate exchange of information among Commission rapid alert systems such as the ECURIE system for radiological emergencies, the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) for communicable diseases, the RAS-BICHAT for biological and chemical health threats and the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) on civil protection issues. Also, the Health Security Committee plays an important role in responding to health threats, notably in terms of crisis preparation, exercises on CBRN events, as well as drawing up a list of pathogens and chemicals which pose a health threat, whilst the European Centre for Disease prevention and Control (ECDC) provides risk assessments for communicable diseases and biological incidents.

4.           the EU CBRN Action Plan

4.1.        Development of the EU CBRN Action Plan - the CBRN Task Force

In order to prepare the present CBRN policy, in February 2008 the Commission established a CBRN Task Force. One of the strongest characteristics of the work of the Task Force was its multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach. Participants came from a broad range of national authorities and organisations, ranging from many different Ministries such as Internal Affairs, Justice, Defence and Health, to representatives of national response organisations, civil defence, radiation protection authorities and other first responders, as well as forensic institutes and nuclear safeguards authorities. Representatives of EU bodies also participated, in particular Europol and Eurojust. This demonstrated the strong interest of many stakeholders in being involved in the development of further policy measures at the European level.

The final report of the Task Force was published in January 2009 and contained 264 separate recommendations, confirming not only that there was still a lot of work to be done, but also that there was a strong consensus amongst experts on how the existing issues could best be tackled. The EU CBRN Action Plan is based on this final report.

4.2.        Overall goal and core measures

The overall goal of the new CBRN policy proposed is to reduce the threat and damage from CBRN incidents to the citizens of the European Union, by way of a coherent, prioritised EU CBRN Action Plan, which involves all relevant stakeholders, including industry representatives. Coherence and complementarity will be sought with relevant Community and CFSP instruments, in particular the Instrument for Stability[10], the INSC and the IPA, which pursue CBRN risks mitigation and preparedness outside the EU, as well as relevant Euratom treaty provisions and secondary legislation.

This goal will be achieved by concentrating efforts and resources on minimising the likelihood of CBRN incidents occurring and limiting their consequences should they materialise. Some of the core measures to achieve these goals are:

· Deploying a risk-based approach to CBRN security in the European Union. This entails the use of risk-assessments to drive the prioritisation of security measures;

· Ensuring that CBRN materials are well protected and the potential for their diversion is limited;

· Strengthening the exchange of information between Member States on CBRN security issues in order to react more swiftly to emerging threats;

· Improving the development and use of detection systems across the EU; and

· Providing responders with the necessary tools to save lives and limit damage to property in case of CBRN incidents.

These aims will be achieved through the implementation of the 133 measures described in the EU CBRN Action Plan, which is part of the current policy package.

The EU CBRN Action Plan is not a legal instrument. Therefore, immediate legal and budgetary consequences for the EU could only derive from possible future legal instruments implementing the Action Plan, which would be subject to separate prior impact assessment - including an assessment of their impact on economic sectors and research environments and systematic and rigorous monitoring to ensure compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

4.3.        Main Areas of Work

The Action Plan foresees three main areas of CBRN security work:

· Prevention - ensuring that unauthorised access to CBRN materials of concern is as difficult as possible;

· Detection - having the capability to detect CBRN materials in order to prevent or respond to CBRN incidents;

· Preparedness and response - being able to efficiently respond to incidents involving CBRN materials and recover from them as quickly as possible.

These three areas of work are supported by a number of horizontal measures, which are broadly applicable to all CBRN work.

4.4.        Prevention

Preventive measures constitute the main focus of activity of the CBRN Action Plan. This entails that efforts should be concentrated on a limited number of vulnerabilities, which could be exploited for malicious purposes, on the basis of robust risk-assessment processes. Consequently, one of the first activities to be undertaken under the CBRN Action Plan should be the prioritisation of high-risk CBRN materials based on a thorough risk-assessment. This will be a prerequisite for many further measures targeted specifically at high-risk CBRN materials.

Subsequent actions will concentrate on the security of CBRN materials and facilities, control over CBRN materials, developing a high-security culture of staff, strengthening the identification of suspicious transactions and behaviours in relation to high-risk CBRN materials, improving the security of transport, information exchange, import and export regimes and strengthening cooperation on the security of nuclear materials.

4.5.        Detection

Detection capacity is an indispensable supplement to prevention. Detection is also crucial for ensuring an appropriate response to a CBRN incident, since without detection it is impossible to ascertain which materials were involved in the incident. In a European Union without internal frontiers, detection systems should be installed and used both at external borders and within each Member State. Proper and immediate detection may save thousands of lives and provide the necessary background for a proper response.

European Union level efforts concerning the use of detection equipment for CBRN materials will concentrate on developing minimum detection standards to be applied across the entire EU, establishing trialling, testing and certification schemes for CBRN detection and improving the exchange of good practices on the detection of CBRN materials.

4.6.        Preparedness and response

Further work should be undertaken in order to strengthen existing measures, in particular with regard to malicious CBRN incidents. Specific attention needs to be paid to CBRN emergency planning, strengthening countermeasure capacity, reinforcing information flows, developing better modelling tools and improving criminal investigation capacity.

4.7.        Horizontal actions

The horizontal actions set out in the CBRN Action Plan concentrate on international cooperation, communication with the public, information tools, training, personnel security, research and criminalisation of CBRN acts.

5.           Implementation

5.1.        Existing Structures

The implementation of the Action Plan should be taken forward primarily by way of existing structures. Although the EU Action Plan envisages the establishment of a small number of new working structures, these are mainly intended as temporary working arrangements, which have specific and time-limited goals.

In the field of civil protection, work will be taken forward under the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument to enhance preparedness for CBRN incidents. This includes workshops, training (at least once a year), exchange of experts, simulation exercises, scenario development and capability assessment. Further steps are required to increase EU CBRN response capability, notably by improving the availability of civil protection modules and exploring the need for new types of modules and the feasibility of prepositioning key modules in the event of major public events. The different strands of work under the Mechanism will be streamlined through the launch of an EU CBRN Resilience Programme, bringing together the various civil protection activities included in the EU CBRN Action Plan and ensuring a consolidated contribution from the Civil Protection Mechanism to the overall implementation of this Action Plan.

In the Health sector, an extensive framework has already been developed. The Health Security Committee and existing information exchange mechanisms such as the EWRS, RAS BICHAT and the RASFF will play an important role in the implementation of health related measures of the Action Plan.

5.2.        The CBRN Advisory Group

Given that the CBRN Task Force has been indispensable in the establishment of the current policy package, the Commission will continue to work with Task Force members also in the implementation phase, through establishing and chairing a CBRN Advisory Group. The sub-groups dealing with issues related to Chemicals, Biological materials and Radiological/Nuclear materials could meet twice a year to discuss the implementation of the Action Plan after its adoption, including reporting from the few working groups mentioned above addressing specific issues. These sub-groups could then report to the overall Advisory Group, dealing with all horizontal issues, which could meet once or twice a year, depending on the need. Naturally, an exchange of information and coordination with existing structures, such as relevant Council working parties, the Health Security Committee and groups established under the Euratom treaty, must be ensured.

5.3.        Commission financial support

The main financial tools available to the Commission to support the implementation of the current policy package are the existing Financial Programmes, in particular the specific programme ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related risks’, as well as the specific programme "Prevention of and Fight against Crime"[11]. These specific programmes will cover the period until December 2013. The Annual Work Programmes of both financial programmes will specify the amounts available for the implementation of the current policy package. It is foreseen that up to 100 million euro will be made available in support of the implementation of the CBRN Action Plan over the period 2010-2013.

Additional funding stemming from the following programmes and instruments will also contribute to the CBRN Action Plan implementation.

The Civil Protection Financial Instrument[12] provides for funding to "support and complement the efforts of the Member States for the protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and property, including cultural heritage, in the event of natural and man-made disasters, acts of terrorism and technological, radiological or environmental accidents and to facilitate reinforced cooperation between the Member States in the field of civil protection"[13]. This Instrument also runs until 31 December 2013.

In the area of research, the Seventh Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities[14], in particular the part related to security research, provides significant funding opportunities for the areas of research prioritised through the EU CBRN Action Plan. CBRN related results (detection, crisis management) of the first calls for proposals are already, progressively, made available. Like the other financial programmes mentioned, this Framework Programme runs until 31 December 2013. Further Security research priorities will be informed by the work of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), the report of which will include indications on the future threats of CBRN materials and the research and innovation efforts deemed necessary to counter them.

The EU Health Programme 2008-2013 will continue to support the work of the Health Security Committee and support actions on preparedness and response to CBRN threats to public health.

Finally, for cases where a CBRN incident has actually taken place, the European Commission has proposed an expansion of the scope of the existing European Union Solidarity Fund so that it could be used to assist the Member State(s) affected to deal with its consequences[15].

One of the specific modalities of using the funds available to implement the CBRN Action Plan could be to provide grants to a single Member State or to a group of Member States to undertake the development and implementation of particular actions. Naturally, this concept can only be implemented in as far as it respects the respective competencies of the Member States and the Commission and in accordance with the applicable financial rules.

5.4.        Timeframe, reporting and review

The EU CBRN Action Plan will be reviewed in 2013. This period should be long enough for significant progress to be achieved, and fits in well with the timeframe of the financial programmes supporting its implementation. Over the course of this period, regular reporting and monitoring of the implementation will take place through the continued involvement of the Advisory Group as described above, including reports to the respective Council Working Group(s) dealing with CBRN issues. A mid-term report will be provided by the Commission as well. Given the flexible nature of an Action Plan, adaptations to the established priorities and other changes can be agreed at any time in the course of the implementation.

6.           Bridging Security and Health – an overview of best practices

One of the conclusions of earlier work on bio-preparedness, taken forward by the Commission together with Europol and national law enforcement and health authorities, was that further cooperation and coordination between the many different actors which are involved in preventing and reacting to CBRN incidents should be developed. Although all these actors work for the public benefit, and their first priority is always the safeguarding of human lives, it is unavoidable that they will approach an incident mainly from the perspective of their own responsibility. All activities of these authorities are likely to take place in an environment which will be greatly disturbed due to a traumatic event having just taken place, possibly with mass casualties involved. These sort of situations need to be managed well and trained very regularly for the overall response to be as well-coordinated and effective as the public has a right to expect.

In order to assist the Member States in bringing their work in these areas forward, the Commission collated the results of three separate regional workshops, where such issues were discussed among practitioners from the Member States into a document laying down what had been confirmed by the experts to be the current best practices, in particular in the chemical and biological field. This document is solely intended to support the Member States in their current efforts to improve their CBRN preparedness.

7.           External relations

The most important part of current EU external relations policy related to the CBRN threat is the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - also known as the EU WMD strategy, adopted in December 2003. This Strategy was recently updated and reviewed, resulting in the adoption by the Council of "New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems" in December 2008[16]. These new lines for action and the current EU CBRN package will, together with relevant Community Instruments, in particular the Instrument for Stability, have a mutually reinforcing effect on reducing the risks from CBRN materials. From its side, the Commission will ensure a consistent and coordinated approach to their implementation. In March 2009, the Commission issued a Communication presenting its views on nuclear non-proliferation[17] and possible ways to strengthen it looking in particular from the point of view of nuclear security related Euratom treaty provisions.

Through the Instrument for Stability, the Commission supports third countries to develop training and assistance on CBRN risk mitigation and preparedness. EU assistance is progressively expanding from the countries of the Former Soviet Union into new regions of concern, including South-East Asia, the Middle East and parts of Africa, in particular in the nuclear and biological fields. The implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 will be furthered strengthened by supporting the IAEA, engaging former WMD scientists, tackling nuclear smuggling, including deceptive financial practices, and contributing to more efficient export control and border monitoring systems. Regional “centres of CBRN excellence” will be instrumental in order to exchange best practices, support capacity building and share experiences gathered at an EU level with key regions. With about € 300 million for the period 2007-2013, the Instrument for Stability seeks to develop a CBRN safety and security culture throughout the world.

A key feature of the Instrument for Stability is the close involvement of Member States’ experts through a new mechanism: the Expert Support Facility. Together with the Commission, Member States’ experts conducted a series of missions and workshops over the past year to identify priority areas. The development of new sectors in emerging economies and the associated risks of CBRN proliferation, in particular in the context of the so-called “nuclear renaissance” and biotechnology, poses a major challenge. To tackle such risks the Commission is supporting the initiative to establish multilateral nuclear fuel banks. The possibility of terrorists trying to exploit pandemics is also a major security and health concern. To this end, the Commission intends to promote specific measures including early warning systems and exchange of best practices involving regional organisations. The regional CBRN centres for excellence will be at the fulcrum of these initiatives. Issues related to the threat of CBRN materials are also discussed in a significant number of international fora[18], and are dealt with by international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the BTWC Conference, Interpol and the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI). Fully in line with article 19 of the Treaty on European Union, one of the core recommendations of the EU CBRN Action Plan is that the European Union should make a stronger effort to present a coordinated view in such international fora and at meetings of these international organisations.

In a more general sense, counter-terrorism efforts form part of many co-operation agreements in place or being negotiated between the EU and third Countries. The Council decided in 2002 that a standard counter-terrorism clause should be inserted in all agreements with third countries. Additionally, since November 2003, WMD clauses have been inserted in all new or renewed mixed agreements  now covering almost 100 countries. Work on CBRN issues with strategic partners such as the United States can be further developed based on the current policy package as well.

From the public health perspective, the Commission will continue to participate in and support the work of the Global Health Security Initiative, and intends to present a Communication on health security in 2009, outlining the internal and external aspects of health security.

8.           Conclusions

Protecting the population of the European Union from terrorism and other criminal threats is a high priority for the Commission. As exemplified by events around the world, there is continuous interest of terrorists in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials. The European Union is committed to ensuring that such non-conventional threats do not materialise. The EU CBRN Action Plan will strongly contribute to implementing this commitment.

[1]               Such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

[2]               15708/03 and SN 400/03, no 68. See also infra, paragraph 7.

[3]               16589/07, of 17 December 2007.

[4]               SN 4292/01 REV 2.

[5]               14627/02.

[6]               15480/04.

[7]               14469/4/05, paras 20 and 31.

[8]               See also the Commission Communications on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security", COM (2008) 312 final of 22.5.2008, and on nuclear non-proliferation, COM (2009) 143 final of 26.3.2009.

[9]               Council Decision of 23 October 2001 – recast by Decision 2007/779/EC (OJ L 314, 1.12.2007, p. 9).

[10]             Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 (OJ L 327, 24.11.2006, p. 1).

[11]             OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, pp. 1 and 7.

[12]             OJ L 71, 10.3.2007, p. 9.

[13]             Decision establishing the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (OJ L 71, 10.3.2007, p. 9).

[14]             Decision 1982/2006/EC (OJ L 412, 30.12.2006, p. 1).

[15]             Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund COM(2005) 108 final, 6.4.2005.

[16]             17172/08, 17 December 2008.

[17]             COM(2009) 143 final, 26.03.2009.

[18]             Such as the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and dual-use export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

EN

Annex 1 EU CBRN[1] Action Plan

1. PREVENTION........................................................................................................................................................................................ 3

Goal 1: Develop EU lists of high-risk CBRN materials and risk-based approaches to security........................................................................................................................................................................................ 3

Goal 2: Enhance the security of high risk CBRN materials and facilities........................................................................................................................................................................................ 5

Goal 3: Enhance control over high risk CBRN materials...................................................................................................................................................................................... 11

Goal 4: Contribute to the development of a high security culture of staff...................................................................................................................................................................................... 15

Goal 5: Improve the identification and reporting of suspicious transactions and behaviour...................................................................................................................................................................................... 17

Goal 6: Enhance the security of transport...................................................................................................................................................................................... 18

Goal 7: Improve information exchange...................................................................................................................................................................................... 21

Goal 8: Strengthen the import/export regime...................................................................................................................................................................................... 24

Goal 9: Strengthen cooperation on the security of nuclear materials...................................................................................................................................................................................... 26

2. DETECTION...................................................................................................................................................................................... 27

Goal 1: Establish a scenario-based/modelling approach to identifying work priorities in the detection field...................................................................................................................................................................................... 27

Goal 2: Develop minimum detection standards...................................................................................................................................................................................... 30

Goal 3: Establish trialling, testing and certification schemes for CBRN detection in the EU...................................................................................................................................................................................... 32

Goal 4: Identify good practices related to the detection of CBRN materials, awareness raising and training...................................................................................................................................................................................... 34

Goal 5: Improve the exchange of information and strengthen the monitoring of radiation for security purposes...................................................................................................................................................................................... 37

3. PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE...................................................................................................................................................................................... 38

Goal 1: Improve emergency planning...................................................................................................................................................................................... 38

Goal 2: Strengthen countermeasure capacity...................................................................................................................................................................................... 41

Goal 3: Improve domestic and international information flows in case of CBRN emergencies...................................................................................................................................................................................... 44

Goal 4: Develop improved modelling tools and strengthen decontamination capacity...................................................................................................................................................................................... 47

Goal 5: Improve the capacity to conduct criminal investigations...................................................................................................................................................................................... 49

4. ACTIONS APPLICABLE TO CBRN PREVENTION, DETECTION AND RESPONSE...................................................................................................................................................................................... 51

Goal 1: Enhance international cooperation...................................................................................................................................................................................... 51

Goal 2: Improve communication with the public...................................................................................................................................................................................... 52

Goal 3: Develop improved information tools for CBRN security...................................................................................................................................................................................... 54

Goal 4: Improve training...................................................................................................................................................................................... 56

Goal 5: Strengthen personnel security...................................................................................................................................................................................... 59

Goal 6: Strengthen and prioritise research...................................................................................................................................................................................... 62

Goal 7: Ensure the criminalisation of acts involving high-risk CBRN materials...................................................................................................................................................................................... 66

1. Prevention

Horizontal (H)

Chemical (C) || Biological (B) || Radiological-Nuclear (RN)

Goal 1: Develop EU lists of high-risk CBRN materials and risk-based approaches to security

Action H.1 The Member States and the Commission should establish and regularly update EU lists of: · high-risk chemical agents; · high risk biological agents and toxins; · high-risk radioactive sources; of special security concern. These lists should be developed based on a risk assessment analysis and should take account of existing relevant lists. This process should include the following steps: · identifying and analysing relevant CBRN materials; · assessing its potential for being used for malicious purposes; · selecting the most dangerous materials in terms of their potential for being used for malicious purposes; · assessing its vulnerability in terms of theft/loss (ease of obtaining it); · establishing possible preventive measures: physical / technical and administrative; · carrying out a cost / benefit study on these preventive measures. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 1, 82, 83, 167

Action H.2 The Commission should: · establish fora for EU level dialogue between relevant authorities in the field of CBRN risk-management in order to take cross-border threats fully into account in national and EU planning processes. This should allow the attainment of a common understanding among the Member States and the Commission of the risks faced by the entire EU. · facilitate the exchange of best-practices concerning CBRN risk-management by organising regional/EU level meetings and channelling funding toward the development/identification/implementation of suitable methodologies Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 2, 88, 168, 169

Goal 2: Enhance the security of high risk CBRN materials and facilities

Action H.3 The Member States and the Commission should develop criteria on assessing security arrangements at high-risk CBRN facilities. This should be done in the form of a good practice document. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendations No. 41, 99, 173

Action C.1 The Member States should ensure that relevant authorities engage in dialogue with the relevant site security managers and advise operators on the necessary levels of security. Member States should encourage the establishment of trusted relationships between security managers and law enforcement counterparts. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 39 || Action B.1 The Commission should assist the Member Sates in the proper implementation of applicable procedures at "the laboratory bench level" and in developing mechanisms for assessing and monitoring its correct implementation. Involved actors: Commission/MS Implementation period: Ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 89 || Action RN.1 The Member States should ensure that law-enforcement authorities keep the operators of facilities in which high-risk radioactive sources are present informed on a need-to-know basis about potential threats. If no system exists, each Member State should consider establishing a communication mechanism in order to quickly transfer security related information to security managers in facilities in which high-risk radioactive sources are handled. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 172

Action C.2 The Member States should ensure that security plans/security management systems are in place in high-risk chemical facilities. The security plans should provide for graduated levels of security based on the existing threat level. Member State authorities should be involved in assessing whether these security plans satisfy the necessary level of protection requirements. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 34 || Action B.2 The Member States should establish: · a secure registry of facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins within each Member State while allowing access to law enforcement; · a process to verify and if necessary to enhance security arrangements of facilities, including diagnostic laboratories handling and possessing any of the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins; · a mechanism within facilities storing biological agents and toxins on the EU biosecurity list to regularly review the need of such biological agents and toxins while keeping a good record of stored materials. Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: from 2010-2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 98, 100, 104 || Action RN.2 The Member States and the Commission should analyse potential gaps and, if needed, propose solutions with regard to security requirements for facilities in which certain high-risk sources are manufactured and/or disposed of (and which are located outside of nuclear facilities). Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 171

Action C.3 The Member States should: · ensure that the responsibilities of the operator and the State in terms of security of facilities should be clearly defined; · ensure that local law enforcement authorities possess information on high-risk chemical facilities in their area. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 35, 38 || Action B.3 The Commission and the Member States should support: · a process whereby facilities (clinical, diagnostic, university, etc) would avoid keeping clinical samples containing any of substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins unnecessarily; · the identification and development of good practices on handling clinical samples containing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins; · progress in creating collaborative networks of facilities working on substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins while taking into account existing networks. Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2010-2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 102-103 || Action RN.3 The Member States and the Commission should conduct an analysis of the feasibility of linking security vetting/background check requirements to existing licensing systems used to authorise the handling of high-risk radioactive sources. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 173

Action C.4 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that the chemical industry develops and implements the security side of the Responsible Care programme. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 32 || Action B.4 The Commission and the Member States should ensure that: · a comprehensive overview of the relevant standards at hand and their relevance to biosecurity and biosafety is achieved; · facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins consider as appropriate the implementation of the CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA 15793), WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or their national equivalent standards; · appropriate standards are met as part of a national authorisation or accreditation process or as a condition for issuing licences for work with substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins. Regular control over the adherence to and implementation of such standards should also be ensured. Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholder Implementation period: Ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 117-120 ||

Action C.5 The Member States and the Commission should develop a high level approach to chemical facility security which identifies key objectives and steps to be taken in order to increase security, based on national risk assessment approaches. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 37 || ||

Action C.6 The Member States and the Commission should encourage industry to replace, where possible, the use of high-risk chemicals with suitable lower-risk alternates. The potential use of the REACH framework or of separate, more specific legislation should be examined in this regard as well, in close coordination with the authorities competent for chemicals of the Member States. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 3 || ||

Action C.7 The Commission should bring together the relevant security authorities from the Member States in order to identify good practices concerning the security of high-risk chemical facilities. Based on this work, the Commission should develop a good practice document addressing such issues as: · the responsibility of an authority to assess the security measures in place for various types of materials; · creating varying levels of security measures adapted to the risk posed by particular chemical agents, amounts of certain materials or combinations of materials. These security measures should address inter alia: background checks for personnel, physical security measures and information security. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 33 || ||

Action C.8 The Commission should launch studies on: · the applicability of existing safety provisions to enhancing security. · training requirements for inspection and enforcement entities, so that they can provide the highest possible levels of relevant security expertise. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 36, 40 || ||

Action C.9 The Commission should accelerate its work to support enhancing the protection of SCADA systems against cyber-attacks. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 42 || ||

Goal 3: Enhance control over high risk CBRN materials

Action C.10 Member States and the Commission should make sure that where this does not take place already today, the chemical industry ensures that in line with international obligations, high-risk chemicals and equipment are only delivered to legitimate users. A sufficient customer qualification scheme should be established in this regard, which is proportionate to the risk and cost effective. The risks associated with trade of chemicals over the Internet should be investigated further. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010-2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 4 || || Action RN.4 The Member States should ensure that national source registries contain comprehensive information on all high-risk sources and their holders. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: 2010-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 170

Action C.11 Member States and the Commission should assess the benefits of establishing and if needed should consider creating a licensing scheme for certain high-risk chemicals (in particular for certain CWA precursors) similar to that existing for certain scheduled substances in the framework of the Drug Precursors Regulation. For chemicals covered by the CWC and the Australia Group, the CWC licensing scheme should be considered as meeting some or all of the set-out objectives. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 5 || || Action RN.5 The Member States should launch recovery programmes for disused high-risk sources. The launch of a source recovery programme could be coupled with the creation of a source exchange system among the Member States, so that recovered sources can be made available to those states that need them (rather than manufacturing new sources). Involved actors: MS Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 178

Action C.12 The Commission should perform a feasibility assessment on the possibility of using the delivery documentation mechanism to better understand and monitor the supply chain (possibly link it to tracking and tracing). Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 9 || || Action RN.6 The Member States and the Commission should assess the potential and practicalities of establishing tracking systems for high-risk sources (e.g. user-accessible web-based systems; electronic tagging of sources). Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 174

Action C.13 The Commission should launch a study concerning the availability of certain high-risk chemicals to the general public and potential security gaps in the supply chain. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 10 || || Action RN.7 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices for commercial, health care and research facilities possessing radioactive sources to ensure regular appraisal of the staff and its monitoring. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 187

|| || Action RN.8 The Commission should launch studies on the origin and consequences of the loss of control over radioactive sources, on the current status of used and disused sources in the EU and on transport patterns for legal uses of radioactive sources. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 176

|| || Action RN.9 The Commission should facilitate the exchange of experience on successful strategies concerning the detection and recovery of orphan sources (article 9 of the HASS Directive). Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 177

|| || Action RN.10 Europol should lead an analysis of losses, thefts and other relevant criminal activities related to high-risk sources in the EU. This analysis should take due account of the nature of these particular incidents and the nature of the actual sources, including orphan sources. It could be carried out in cooperation with the IAEA, Interpol and other relevant authorities. It should be made available to the relevant national authorities and reviewed regularly. Involved actors: Europol/MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 199

Goal 4: Contribute to the development of a high security culture of staff

Action H.4 The Member States and the Commission should identify, develop and spread good practices in security training and education of persons working with/having access to or handling high-risk CBRN materials. Consideration should also be given to developing EU guidelines for minimum security training requirements for persons working with, having access to, or handling such materials, based on the national experience across the EU 27. This could be done by way of a peer review process through which experts from the Member States would visit each other with a view to learning from their experience and exchanging best practices in specific fields. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 26, 189

Action H.5 The Member States should develop and implement specific training programmes for private security staff (in particular those involved in guarding specific high risk CBRN materials). Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies/ private security companies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 29, 190

Action C.14 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that the chemical industry develops and adopts codes of conduct concerning awareness of security-related issues. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 30 || Action B.5 The Commission and the Member Sates shall encourage professional and other relevant associations working on bio-issues to develop and adopt codes of conduct for their Members. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 95 ||

Action C.15 The Member States should implement specific security training for staff in industry and research, where high risk chemicals are present. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 27 || Action B.6 The Member States and the Commission should define requirements for biosafety officers (roles, competences and training). Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 121 || Action RN.11 The Member States and the Commission should engage with research stakeholders to raise awareness of security issues and facilitate the exchange of good practices on dealing with security threats. Particular attention should be given to background check requirements for visiting researchers/students. This work should lead to an increased security culture within the research sector. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 207

Goal 5: Improve the identification and reporting of suspicious transactions and behaviour

Action H.6 Member States and the Commission should: · identify and exchange good practices on the reporting of suspicious transactions in relation to high risk CBRN materials used by private and public entities within the EU (e.g. industry, medical sector, research); · establish modalities for reporting loss or suspicious transactions while enhancing awareness of relevant stakeholders about suspicious transactions and encourage stakeholders to report such transactions to law-enforcement authorities. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 7, 96-97, 195

Action H.7 Member States and the Commission should develop guidelines for the industry, the medical sector and the research community containing criteria identifying the forms of behaviour, in relation to transactions, which may give rise to suspicion. Member State authorities should provide guidance to stakeholders on what suspicious transactions are. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 6, 196

Goal 6: Enhance the security of transport

Action H.8 The Commission should organise workshops on transport security with regard to CBRN materials. These workshops should bring together experts from the transport sector, the security services and law enforcement authorities. The workshops should address the following issues: · assess whether existing transport security rules fully cover all CBRN materials; · identify and exchange good practices in the Member States concerning the transport of CBRN materials (e.g. limited quantities in one transport; or tracking systems); · identify and exchange current good practices in terms of tracking CBRN materials; · requirements for the development of tracking and tracing systems for the transport of CBRN materials; · identify and exchange good practices concerning the implementation of current ADR (and RID and ADN) and IMDG Code (class 7-radioactive materials) requirements such as the development of security plans. · identify security requirements for logistics enterprises; · consider establishing a notification system for the international transport of high risk CBRN materials; · consider the feasibility and costs/benefits of introducing a requirement that only licensed transporters would be used for the transport of high risk CBRN materials. These licensed transporters would be obliged to follow agreed minimum security requirements; · assess the possible negative impact of strict requirements for transport on transporters of high risk substances and examine potential remedies. This work should feed into existing processes such as the UNECE Ad-Hoc Working Group. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendations No. 43, 115, 180

Action H.9 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that links between law enforcement authorities and transporters of CBRN materials are enhanced. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendations No. 44, 110

Action H.10 The Member States should ensure that the training of transport staff concerning existing legislative requirements on the security of CBRN materials is improved where appropriate. Regular exercises on transport security should be organised. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendations No. 116, 179

|| Action B.7 The Commission and the Member States should initiate the creation of an EU capability and mechanism to rapidly and safely transport biological samples, in accordance with international regulations, within the EU and into the EU. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010-2014 Task Force Recommendation No. 142 || Action RN.12 The Member States and the Commission should assess the feasibility and potential costs/benefits of creating an electronic system for the control of cross-border transfers of high-risk radioactive sources. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 181

|| || Action RN.13 The Commission should launch a study analysing whether (and how) all radioactive sources, and especially those identified as high-risk, are covered by existing legal regimes concerning transport. Depending on the outcome of the analysis mentioned above, the need for new transport rules in relation to high-risk sources should be assessed. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2011-2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 182

Goal 7: Improve information exchange

Action H.11 The Member States should analyse whether potential problem areas exist in the horizontal and vertical flow of information among the entities dealing with high-risk CBRN materials both within and across the individual Member States. Each Member State should assess whether relevant need-to-know information about changing threat levels reaches license holders. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 13, 193

Action H.12 The Member States should ensure that each party within the supply chain informs without delay the relevant national authority in the event of any theft or loss of any high-risk CBRN materials. The relevant national authorities should inform without delay the relevant law enforcement authority responsible for gathering and responding to this information where this has not already been done by the party concerned within the supply chain. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2011-2012 Task Force Recommendations No. 17, 197

Action H.13 The Member States should ensure a high level of information exchange between relevant actors by having a clearly established notification mechanism which would allow anyone to inform the relevant authorities about a loss/theft of high-risk CBRN materials or about a suspicious transaction. As a minimum requirement, facility security managers should have the necessary contact information for relevant local law enforcement authorities. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2012 Task Force Recommendations No. 18, 198

Action C.16 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that public authorities provide, as appropriate, adequate security information to the entire supply chain of high-risk chemical agents, first responders (police, fire-departments, medical services, other special units as needed) and educational establishments to focus attention on issues of concern. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 14 || || Action RN.14 The Member States and the Commission should support the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database with a view to ensuring real time accessibility for law enforcement authorities, ensuring the highest possible quality of the recorded data. Enhanced EU cooperation in this area should lead to making sure that all relevant losses and recoveries of radioactive sources are reported. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 205

Action C.17 The Member States and the Commission should consider establishing an alert mechanism in order to quickly transfer security related information to security managers in facilities in which high-risk chemicals are present. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2011-2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 15 || || Action RN.15 The Commission should assess whether existing systems, in particular the IAEA's ITDB, provides sufficient information for the law enforcement community. Europol should be closely involved in this analysis. If the analysis leads to the identification of gaps, further feasibility work could be conducted on the need to setup a complementary EU Database of Illicit Trafficking Incidents. Involved actors: Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 204

Goal 8: Strengthen the import/export regime

|| || Action RN.16 The Commission should assess the need to address the issue of import/export rules in relation to potential high-risk sources not covered by the HASS Directive. Involved actors: Commission/MS Implementation period: 2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 183

|| || Action RN.17 The Commission should assess to what extent the Code of Conduct and the IAEA Guidance cover the export and import of all high-risk radioactive sources and how these documents are implemented in the EU Member States. Involved actors: Commission/MS Implementation period: 2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 184

|| || Action RN.18 The Commission should examine the need and feasibility of drawing up common EU criteria for authorising imports and exports from and to third countries, following an assessment of how the EU Member States implement the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Involved actors: Commission/MS Implementation period: 2010-2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 185

|| || Goal 9: Strengthen cooperation on the security of nuclear materials

|| || Action RN.19 The Member States and the Commission should progress the ratification of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials by the EU Member States/Community. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 215

|| || Action RN.20 The Member States and the Commission should facilitate discussion among regulators, security specialists and performance assessment experts from the EU Member States, as well as the IAEA, in order to discuss progress on the implementation of the amended Convention and identify and exchange good practices concerning physical protection measures. Existing forums should continue to be used as appropriate. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 216

2. Detection

Horizontal (H)

Chemical || Biological || Radiological/Nuclear

Goal 1: Establish a scenario-based/modelling approach to identifying work priorities in the detection field

Action H.14 The Member States and the Commission should develop scenarios at EU level (including events with cross-border effects) building on national experience while using the "black box" mechanism. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 45, 127, 217

Action H.15 The Member States should strengthen and support: · the exchange of methodologies for developing scenarios; · networking of detectors at national level (centralising the analysis of detection data); · the exchange of information and data regarding broader trends of what has been detected; · the exchange and coordination of information on exercises among the Member States and other stakeholders when relevant. Involved actors: MS/ Commission/ relevant agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 46, 133, 218, 222, 223

Action H.16 The Member States and the Commission should develop a mechanism for information exchange among Member States on scenario development related to detection. The Commission should prepare an overview of Member State activities in this area. The Commission will support, as far as required, the exchange of information by those Member States wishing to do so. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 132, 219, 221

Action H.17 The Member States and the Commission should carry out a gap analysis by creating a matrix for each developed scenario of what is needed to identify CBRN materials and the detection technology already available. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 47, 220

|| Action B.8 The Member States and the Commission should develop detection models for different biological pathogens and toxins, considering distribution, possible vectors, infectious dose and stability. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2012-2014 Task Force Recommendation No. 129 ||

Goal 2: Develop minimum detection standards

Action H.18 The Member States and the Commission should develop minimum detection standards (including within the context of border monitoring) based on relevant scenarios and threat assessments while building on existing work (e.g.: CEN). When developing such standardisation activities, adequate engagement of the private sector should be ensured and legal requirements for evidence considered. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2012-2014 Task Force Recommendation No. 224

|| Action B.9 Member States and the Commission should develop reference material of biological agents for both clinical and environmental samples (according to internationally accepted standards) in order to achieve quality assurance in detection. Involved actors: MS/ Commission Implementation period: 2012 - 2014 Task Force Recommendation No. 134 ||

|| Action B.10 Member States and the Commission should set requirements for the detection, identification and monitoring of pathogens and toxins within a civilian security context at the EU level Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2015 Task Force Recommendation No. 148 ||

Goal 3: Establish trialling, testing and certification schemes for CBRN detection in the EU

Action H.19 The Member States and the Commission should: · map out and document the technical requirements necessary for the detection of CBRN materials, according to the field of application of the devices; · establish an EU wide certification scheme to evaluate whether detection systems and tools meet set requirements relying on existing capabilities and facilities; · establish an EU wide testing scheme for detection tools and systems to assess the performance and quality of solutions relying on existing capabilities and facilities; · establish an EU wide trialling scheme to evaluate the quality of both detection tools and systems in practical field operations relying on existing capabilities and facilities; · exchange good practices, approaches to, and methodologies for quality assurance related to CBRN detection in the Member States. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 49, 50, 51, 52, 135, 136-138, 225, 226

|| Action B.11 The Member States and the Commission should establish: · sets of relevant simulants of biological agents for field tests, practical exercises and field technology trialling at national level and EU level, where appropriate; · criteria for method validation across detection of human, animal and crop threats. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2012 - 2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 139, 141 ||

Goal 4: Identify good practices related to the detection of CBRN materials, awareness raising and training

Action H.20 The Member States and the Commission should assess the feasibility of EU handbooks on the detection of CBRN materials for practitioners (e.g. operators of detection devices) in view of the creation of joint investigation teams as well as an action card for first responders, building on existing work done at the EU and international level, and within the Member States. This handbook should be translated into all official EU languages. Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2012-2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 54, 149, 229

Action H.21 The Member States and the Commission should enhance and support cooperation between forensic laboratories, reference and specialised laboratories on CBRN materials. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: Ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 144

Action H.22 The Member States and the Commission should: · establish a mechanism of exchanging best practises in the field of training and exercises, including awareness raising of front line officers; · support EU and national projects aimed at calibrating detection devices in specific environments. Cooperation and information exchange among the Member States on such projects should be enhanced; · support the exchange of good practices on how to respond when CBRN materials are detected; · exchange good practices on detection methods and processes. Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2012-2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 55, 56, 57, 128, 130, 131, 227, 228, 230

Action H.23 The Commission should: · launch a study on what is currently in place in terms of CBRN border monitoring in the EU; · elaborate guidelines on optimal localisation of detection equipment Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010-2012

Action H.24 Member States and the Commission should initiate the development of mobile detection, identification and sampling capabilities at the EU level. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010-2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 147

|| Action B.12 Member States and the Commission should enhance and support: · cooperation among laboratories assigned to deal with unknown pathogens and toxins at national level; · establish and support networking among existing laboratories which are competent and have capacity across the EU specialising in high risk biological agents and toxins. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: Ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 143, 145-146 || Action RN.21 The Member States and the Commission should develop an adequate and sustainable training programme at EU level for front line officers. The EU-SECTRA can play an important part in this process. Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2012-2014 Task Force Recommendation No. 231

Goal 5: Improve the exchange of information and strengthen the monitoring of radiation for security purposes

Action C.18 The Member States and the Commission should communicate the technical requirements of detection devices to the private sector. They should acquire knowledge of available capabilities and future research plans of the private sector. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 53 || Action B.13 The Members States and the Commission should support: · EU and national projects performing measurements of biological background at specific areas, and enhance cooperation and information exchange among Member States on such projects; · exchange good practices among Member States on cases and processes when a dangerous biological substance is detected. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 150 - 151 || Action RN.22 The Member States and the Commission should promote and support EU and national projects performing monitoring of radiation for security purposes. Cooperation and information exchange among the Member States on such projects should be enhanced. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendation No. 233

3. Preparedness and response

Horizontal (H)

Chemical (C) || Biological (B) || Radiological/Nuclear (RN)

Goal 1: Improve emergency planning[2]

Action H.25 Each Member State should integrate CBRN emergencies into its response plans (where applicable into both national and local plans). The requirements of possible criminal investigations and forensics should be fully taken into account in these plans. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 59, 235

Action H.26 Each Member State should assess whether all operators handling high-risk CBRN materials possess emergency response plans. The feasibility of extending, where needed, emergency plan requirements to such operators should be assessed. Gaps in existing regulations should be identified. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 61, 238

Action H.27 The Member States and the Commission should develop and conduct regular (at least once a year) exercises and training at all levels (national, European and international), involving and testing cooperation of all relevant organisations, particularly of health, first responders, security and judicial authorities; involvement of private sector in such exercises should be foreseen. Possible criminal investigations and forensics should be part of these regular exercises. The Commission should ensure coordination of relevant exercises at EU level. Within the Framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, simulation exercises should regularly address CBRN Scenarios. Existing Training for CBRN responders should be further developed to enhance interoperability. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 60, 154, 236

Action H.28 The Commission should launch a study concerning the organisation of Member State structures concerning CBRN incidents. The results of the study should be shared across the EU. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 237

Action H.29 Each Member State should assess whether emergency plans exist for high risk public locations and high-risk public events. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 239

|| Action B.14 The Member States and the Commission should constitute an EU level working group to consider: · better cooperation among relevant agencies in crisis and consequence management, response and recovery management; it should develop a bio-specific checklist of requirements for consequence management, response and recovery; · good practices on responding to security incidents involving the facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins. Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2011- 2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 99, 101, 157 ||

Goal 2: Strengthen countermeasure capacity

Action H.30 Further analysis is required to ensure that sufficient capabilities are available through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in case of need. The Commission should therefore: · update the 2005 assessment of the capabilities that may be available in the event of major terrorist attacks on the basis of specific CBRN scenarios. A flexible approach should be developed, avoiding extensive data gathering and focusing on those types of assistance for which insufficient information was available in 2005; · explore the need for defining additional types of modules in the CBRN area and the feasibility of pre-positioning certain key modules in the event of large public events should be explored as a further way of enhancing European resilience against CBRN emergencies; · work with the Member States to establish templates and procedures for the implementation of Article 5 (6) of the Recast of the Civil Protection Mechanism relating to vaccines, serums and other related medical assistance. Involved actors: Commission/MS Implementation period: 2010/2011

Action H.31 Each Member State should: · assess the required amounts and types of medical countermeasures in case of a incident involving high-risk CBRN materials; · assess the availability of hospital beds and hospitals able to carry out the decontamination of victims, the availability of medical and paramedical personnel, transport possibilities and of required countermeasures in the form of technical CBRN equipment; · assess the possibility of sharing medical counter-measures across borders in case of an incident; · update the 2005 assessment of the assistance that may be available through the Civil Protection Mechanism in the event of CBRN incidents. Involved actors: MS supported by the Commission Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 62, 63, 240, 241

Action H. 32 The Commission should collect and disseminate good practices among the Member States concerning the ways in which medical staff can receive guidance on dealing with large scale emergencies and a rapid increase of the number of patients. Involved actors: Commission/MS Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 64, 242

|| Action B.15 The Health Security Committee should consider: · the possibilities to a) establish therapeutics and vaccine stockpiles towards the known threat of biological agents and toxins, and determine the necessary auxiliary medical supplies to stockpile (gloves, masks, syringes, etc.); b) establish a standby capacity to produce therapeutics, including vaccines, and c) establish sustained funding for a technology platform to secure countermeasures towards biological agents and toxins that are unknown today (public-private experts working group); · the possibilities to scale up the diagnostic capacity in crises situations. Involvement of the private sector in the working group should be considered; · ensuring a sufficient amount of medical products to combat an eventual threat; · building an EU wide coordinated approach to access medical countermeasures allowing adequate protection of the EU population, based on risk assessment. Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2011- 2014 Task Force Recommendations No. 158, 159, 161, 162 ||

|| Action B.16 The Commission and the Member States should consider the creation of mechanisms for rapid licensing procedures of drugs and vaccines in crisis situations and possible exemptions from licensing procedures, taking existing work into consideration. This assessment should include possible dual-use export control implications. Involved actors: Commission/MS/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 160 ||

Goal 3: Improve domestic and international information flows in case of CBRN emergencies

Action H.33 The Member States should exchange information on emergency plans regarding CBRN incidents, involving all relevant agencies. The target group would be health and police officials, as well as civilian population. It should be developed by health and law enforcement officials together with communication experts. Involved actors: Commission/MS/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: Ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 154 - 155

Action H.34 The Member States and the Commission should setup a CBRN special units' network with a view to enhancing the exchange of information and good practices, organising joint training exercises and keeping up-to-date within the law-enforcement community dealing with CBRN threats. Involved actors: Commission/MS/Europol Implementation period: from 2010

|| || Action RN.23 Each Member State should ensure that public authorities provide relevant security information on a need to know basis to the entire supply chain of radioactive sources and nuclear materials, first responders (police, fire-departments, medical services) and educational establishments in order to enhance preparedness levels. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 245

|| || Action RN.24 The Member States and the Commission should consider integrating and building upon existing platforms for international exchange of information during nuclear emergency situations, as well as assessing their applicability to all radiological and nuclear incidents of concern (scenario-based). An effort should be made to assess the possibilities of streamlining alert messages going through different rapid alert systems. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 246

|| || Action RN.25 The Member States and the Commission should establish a process in order to develop generic scenarios illustrating the law enforcement response to a potential event involving radioactive/nuclear materials at the national and the international level. This process should in particular identify the relevant stakeholders who need to be informed about a particular situation and the applicable thresholds for triggering information exchange procedures. The process should at least involve representatives of the Member States, the Commission and Europol. Involved actors: MS/Commission/Europol Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 247

Goal 4: Develop improved modelling tools and strengthen decontamination capacity

Action H.35 The Commission should fund an assessment of existing modelling tools for the purpose of seeing whether there is need to invest in further research. The validation of existing modelling tools could be undertaken by the Commission's Joint Research Centre (possibly through the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection). This work should include the organisation of meetings of modelling experts and emergency response personnel from EU Member States in order to assess practical requirements for modelling tools. Based on this analysis funding could be provided for further research into the development of robust modelling tools applicable to events involving dangerous substances. The Commission should fund an assessment of the role of modelling tools for either pre-event scenario studies or as decision-support systems. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 71, 250

Action H. 36 The Commission should facilitate the preparation of an Emergency Response Guidebook for first responders applicable to the context of CBRN emergencies in the European Union. The guidebook would be provided to the Member States free of charge and could be translated into all official EU languages. As part of the process of preparing an Emergency Response Guidebook, a stocktaking of existing documents/guidebooks should be conducted. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 72, 252

Action H.37 Each Member should conduct a regular assessment of the available means for effective decontamination and their capacity to deal with mass casualties with reference to CBRN materials. Information about current decontamination solutions should be shared with all Member States. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 73, 253

|| || Action RN.26 The Commission should further investigate the possibility of using the RODOS and ARGOS Decision Support Systems to address CBRN releases (e.g. radiological dispersal devices, events such as the polonium incident in 2006, etc.), as well as the development of transport and dispersion models for large buildings (e.g.: airports, railway stations) and underground systems. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 251

Goal 5: Improve the capacity to conduct criminal investigations

Action H. 38 Each Member State should ensure that first responders receive training on forensic awareness in a CBRN crime-scene. Involved actors: MS Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 75, 257

Action H.39 The Commission should analyse potential problems in the transport of CBRN contaminated materials across borders within the context of criminal investigations and emergency situations in general. Involved actors: Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 77, 259

Action H.40 Eurojust should develop recommendations on ensuring that collected forensic evidence in a CBRN crime-scene is of a high enough quality to be admissible in court proceedings in the EU Member States. Eurojust, Europol, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, JRC-Institute for Trans Uranium elements and other relevant organisations should contribute to establishing laboratory practices such that results can be used during legal prosecution (e.g.: accredited measurement procedures; chain of custody). The exchange of experience and good practice concerning the transport, handling, and forensic analysis of contaminated materials in the context of criminal investigations should be pursued. Involved actors: Eurojust Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 76, 258

|| || Action RN.27 The Commission should support the networking of forensic laboratories and laboratories equipped for measurement/analysis of radioactive materials Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 260

4. Actions applicable to CBRN prevention, detection and response

Horizontal (H)

Chemical (C) || Biological (B) || Radiological/Nuclear (RN)

Goal 1: Enhance international cooperation

Action H.41 The Member States and the Commission should continue to strengthen the international exchange of good practices concerning staff-awareness and training with external partners. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 31, 192

Action H.42 The Member States and the Commission should, where appropriate, exchange information on their participation in various international forums and should strive toward coordinating their positions in order to ensure that common EU objectives are achieved. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 206

Goal 2: Improve communication with the public

Action H.43 The Member States and the Commission should regularly organise meetings of Member States' communication specialists dealing with security issues (in particular CBRN events) with a view to encouraging the spread of good practices concerning communication strategies. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 24, 67, 202, 244

Action H.44 The Member States and the Commission should review existing international guidelines and incorporate appropriate existing procedures or, when needed, should establish new guidelines for the development of security communication strategies involving CBRN incidents, which could be integrated with existing emergency planning and communications strategies, and would involve all relevant agencies. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 25, 66, 165, 201

Action H.45 Each Member State should look into the practical implementation of the good-practices on public and media relations identified in a joint effort by the Commission, Europol and the Member States. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 65, 200, 243

|| Action B.17 The Member States and relevant organisations should develop awareness and crisis communication strategies for the public living close to any facilities possessing any high risk biological agents and toxins. Involved actors: MS/relevant stakeholders Implementation period:2010 - 2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 166 ||

Goal 3: Develop improved information tools for CBRN security

Action H.46 The Commission should establish a forum in which good-practices on security could be shared. The use of existing systems should be explored in this regard. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 16, 194

Action H.47 The Commission should establish a library of resources which could be used by the relevant authorities (in particular the law enforcement community and public health authorities). The library would contain applicable information on the nature of CBRN agents and their handling. This library could include national contributions from the Member States. In light of the potentially sensitive content of such a reference library, the need for classification and thus restricted access will be considered. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 80, 214, 263

Action H.48 The Member States and the Commission should establish a law enforcement Early Warning System (EWS) for incidents related to high risk CBRN materials, taking account of existing systems and experiences. Such a mechanism would include information on immediate threats, losses/thefts, and suspicious transactions and would in any case need to be accessible to the law enforcement authorities and relevant emergency responders of the Member States and to Europol. As a first step, the extension of the existing G6 system should be considered. The system should be without prejudice to the exchange of information on public health issues. Involved actors: Commission/EU bodies and agencies Implementation period: from 2009 Task Force Recommendations No. 11, 12, 203

Goal 4: Improve training

Action H.49 The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN) should address the need for developing minimum standards of CBRN training for EOD specialists. The applicability of the standards developed by the European Defence Agency to the non-military context may be assessed in this regard. Training should be provided to EOD personnel in terms of contacting relevant CBRN specialists and on forensic awareness. Involved actors: EEODN Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 68, 248

Action H.50 The Member States should ensure that CBRN information, including on EOD matters, is integrated into training programmes for relevant first responders and local authority personnel. The Member States and the Commission should ensure that emergency response personnel receive training concerning available modelling tools. Involved actors: EEODN Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 70, 249

Action C.19 The Commission should provide support for the organisation of specific HazMat specialist trainings. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 69 || Action B.18 Member States and the Commission should identify and spread: · good practices on well targeted training for and education of individuals working with, having access to or handling substances on the EU list of high-risk biological agents and toxins; · good practices on academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of information and biological agents and toxins, and bio-ethics for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students; · good laboratory practices. Involved actors: Member States/Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2010 -2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 91 || Action RN.28 The Member States and the Commission should use the capacity of the planned European Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) to provide nuclear and radiological security related training and to support and complement such activities at the national level. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 191

Action C.20 The Member States should organise regular exercises concerning the security of chemical facilities in order to test preparedness measures in place and raise awareness among staff. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 28 || Action B.19 The Member States and the Commission should consider and develop: · guidelines at the EU level for minimum training requirements for persons working with, having access to, substances on the EU list of high-risk biological agents and toxins; · in conjunction with universities and professional associations, minimal requirements for academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of information and biological agents and toxins and bio-ethics for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students. Involved actors: Member States/Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: 2010 -2012 Task Force Recommendations No. 92-94 ||

Goal 5: Strengthen personnel security

Action H.51 The Member States and the Commission should analyse the need to establish a system of mutual recognition of security vetting processes for certain categories of personnel. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 188

Action H.52 The Member States and the Commission should develop and introduce common graduated criteria for background checks and vetting requirements in relation to personnel having access to materials on the EU list of high-risk CBRN materials along the whole chain of production, storage, distribution and use. These common criteria should be based on a graduated approach. In the course of the recruitment process, the recruiting organisation should ensure that the credentials of the candidates are properly checked and assessed. The Commission should launch a study concerning existing background check procedures and requirements within the CBRN industry. Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendations No. 20, 22, 23, 105, 107, 186

Action H. 53 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on approaches to security of non-EU visiting staff and students; Member States should aim at common procedures across the EU. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010--2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 109

Action C.21 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on robust management structures at commercial, industrial and research facilities possessing high-risk chemical agents ensuring regular appraisal of the staff and its monitoring Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies Implementation period: from 2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 21 || Action B.20 The Member States should ensure that each Member State and/or organisation has a secure registry of personnel having access to or information on substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins (along the whole chain of production, storage, distribution and use). Law enforcement should have access to such a registry.[3] Involved actors: MS Implementation period:2010-2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 106 ||

|| Action B.21 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on robust management structures at commercial, industrial and research facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins ensuring regular appraisal of the staff and its monitoring. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: 2010--2012 Task Force Recommendation No. 108 ||

Goal 6: Strengthen and prioritise research

Action H.54 The Member States and the Commission should improve the aggregation and spread of research results both at EU level as well as at national level across the EU Member States. For unclassified materials, this should be done by way of organising conferences and setting up a dedicated research web-portal (for all of CBRN security) which would contain a summary of the relevant research projects and contact information where further details can be obtained, as well as opportunities for future research collaboration and work. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 78, 211, 261

Action H.55 The Member States and the Commission should engage in further research cooperation with international partners with a view to enhancing synergies and avoiding duplications. The research work performed by the European Defence Agency and the Joint Research Centre as well as the recommendations to be made by the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) should be taken into account in these efforts. The Commission should organise periodic meetings of CBRN experts, including specialists from other partner countries, in order to share and spread good practices on CBRN issues. The results of these meetings should be collected and the disseminated among the Member States. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No.79, 212, 262

Action H.56 The Member States and the Commission should improve the use of existing scientific networks to enhance work in the detection area. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendation No. 234

Action H.57 The Commission should launch studies on: · the necessity and impacts of assessing scientific research and scientific publications against security aspects; · the potential psychological effect of CBRN emergencies on the population and the likely reactions of local populations in case of incidents, and possible action-oriented responses; · the economic and social consequences of a CBRN terrorism incident and identify practical and action-oriented responses; · rehabilitation of contaminated areas following malevolent dispersal of CBRN materials, which also addresses the question of acceptable levels of residual contamination; · decontamination procedures which do not damage forensic evidence. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 74, 81, 126, 208, 254, 255, 264

Action H.58 The Member States and the Commission should encourage funding organisations (be it public or private) to take security aspects of proposed research projects and other publications into account, as well as the suitability of the funds receiver (from both a safety and a security perspective) to work on the research the receiver is proposing. Best practices of funding organisations should be identified and exchanged across Member States. Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 123, 124, 210

Action C.22 The Commission and the Member States should support research into the following areas: · Prevention: 1. Development of low-risk alternatives to high-risk chemicals. · Detection: 1. Ensuring interoperability and network application of detection devices in view of joint team operations; 2. Improving the presentation of detection results in a way that they can easily be understood by end-users, particularly first responders; · Technology research: 1. Further miniaturising detection equipment, which should combine various capabilities in one device. 2. The development of transportable equipment which can be used by emergency responders in the field. Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 3, 58 || Action B.22 The Commission and Member States should enhance: · research on capabilities for response and recovery from biological incidents; · the understanding of and research in emergency logistics and distribution operations (e.g., of medicines) at the regional, national and international level. Involved actors: Commission/MS/relevant stakeholders Implementation period: Ongoing Task Force Recommendations No. 163-164 || Action RN.29 The Commission and the Member States should support research into the following areas: · Detection: 1. Detection and identification of difficult to detect radioactive sources and nuclear materials; 2. Detection and identification of masked and shielded sources 3. Improving spectrometry based detection and address the problems of "innocent" and false alarms 4. Detection and location of radiation source in large crowds; · Response: 1. The further development of nuclear forensics; 2. The development of radiological forensics 3. Guidance on storage of contaminated evidence for an extended period of time; 4. Guidance on the disposal of contaminated materials; 5. Particle size distribution and potential chemical composition changes following an explosion. 6. Other gaps identified based on a risk-assessment process · Technology research: 1. Detection technologies and electronic tracking systems for radioactive sources; 2. Integration of different technological solutions [address the current status when numerous devices are required for detection]; 3. Improving detection software; 4. Enhance mobility and portability of detection solutions. 5. The development of transportable equipment which can be used by emergency responders in the field (including neutralisation and detection equipment for bomb squads); 6. Decontamination equipment; Involved actors: MS/Commission Implementation period: from 2010 Task Force Recommendations No. 211, 213

Goal 7: Ensure the criminalisation of acts involving high-risk CBRN materials

Action H.59 The Commission should analyse the penal legislation enacted in the Member States concerning CBRN terrorism, in order to assess whether any further work at EU level is necessary. Involved actors: Commission Implementation period: 2010-2011 Task Force Recommendation No. 19

[1]               Although reference is made to CBRN materials throughout this action plan, nuclear materials are generally already well-covered by existing regulations - this will be taken into account in the implementation.

[2]               Work within the Framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism will be streamlined through the launch of an EU CBRN Resilience Programme.

[3]               Diagnostic facilities would only be concerned, if they stored isolated biological agents and toxins from clinical samples.