EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 1.6.2023

SWD(2023) 159 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT

Accompanying the document

PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution offences

{COM(2023) 273 final} - {SEC(2023) 209 final} - {SWD(2023) 164 final}

Table of contents

1.Introduction: Political and legal context

2.Problem definition

3.Why should the EU act?

4.Objectives: What is to be achieved?

5.What are the available policy options?

6.What are the impacts of the policy options?

7.How do the options compare?

8.Preferred policy option

9.How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?

Annex 1 - Procedural information

Annex 2 - Stakeholder consultation

Annex 3 - Who is affected and how?

1.Practical implications of the initiative

2.Summary of costs and benefits

3.Relevant sustainable development goals

Annex 4 - Analytical methods

1.Description of the analytical methods used

2.Baseline scenario

3.Impacts on costs by policy measure

4.Benefits in terms of avoided illegal ship-source pollution

Annex 5 - Discarded policy options, policy measures and problem drivers

Annex 6 - Retained policy measures

Annex 7 - Effectiveness of the different policy options

Glossary

1.Introduction: Political and legal context

This Impact Assessment accompanies a legislative proposal for a revision of Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution offences as amended by Directive 2009/123/EC (hereinafter “the SSP Directive” or “the Directive”). The Directive is one of EU’s initiatives aiming at less pollution to the sea from maritime transport.

The Directive is one of the building blocks of the EU maritime safety acquis which helps to prevent pollution to the sea from maritime transport. Maritime transport is a key sector for the EU economy as it embodies the main transport mode for European imports and exports to the rest of the world. Maritime transport is estimated to carry around 80% of worldwide goods transported and around 30% of intra-EU transport activity 1 . In 2019, 1.9 billon tonnes were transported by sea to/from the main EU ports. In addition, 418 million passengers aboard ferries and cruise vessels embarked and disembarked in EU ports in 2019.

Although the maritime sector brings substantial economic and social benefits to the EU, it also has an impact on the environment. Ships may cause pollution of the sea through accidents and (intentional) operational discharge. Oil spills are a concerning source of marine pollution, as they are difficult to clean up and can last for long periods of time in the marine environment. The cargo and fuel carried by vessels can be a threat to the marine environment in case of an accident. Other polluting substances released by ships, accidently or intentionally, such as garbage and sewage also have a negative effect on the sea. They can severely pollute marine and coastal habitats, causing damage to the natural environment and have a negative impact on the economy 2 . Although maritime accidents are a prominent source of ship-source pollution, the majority of pollution comes from deliberate discharges, such as tank-cleaning operations and waste discharges. Not all of these sources of pollution are in the scope of the SSP Directive.

Currently, the SSP Directive tackles the illegal discharges of oil and noxious substances. Not all waste that is generated on board of the ships has to be delivered to the ports. Some can be discharged into the sea. Tank-cleaning operations are also in principle allowed. The Directive defines an illegal discharge as a discharge from a ship that does not meet the relevant international standards. The Directive tackles the problem of illegal discharges by incorporating the international standards and penalising a ship that does not comply with those standards. The level of ambition of the Directive is framed by the international standards and the developments in the international arena. The Directive does not set EU standards for protecting the marine environment from polluting substances. The SSP Directive was designed to address the missing link between the cause of certain pollution of the sea and the accountability of the persons responsible for it, while taking into account the specific characteristics of the judicial systems of the Member States.

The Directive contributes towards the objective “to combat […] ocean pollution, including through […] promoting of environmentally friendly shipping by using best available technologies […]” which has been underlined in the outcomes of the Conference on the Future of Europe 8 and towards the general objective to ensure a uniform level of maritime safety and environmental protection underlined by several Council conclusions and in particular those from 2017 9 , 2020 10 and 2022 11 .

The Directive also contributes towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development” which covers safeguarding marine and coastal ecosystems by preventing and reducing marine pollution. One of the goals (SDG 14.1) is to prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds. The Directive also contributes towards SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”) and, with its provisions on prosecution, towards SDG 16 (“Peace justice and strong institutions”), as outlined in Annex 3.

International context

The Directive does not set standards for Member States/ship operators on the allowable quantity of discharge of pollutants. These standards are set at global level at the UN International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 12 . The Directive’s focus is on applicable penalties for discharges that are not in line with these international standards.

Due to its history and cross-border nature, maritime transport has developed a specific regulatory structure. The IMO developed its International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 13 (MARPOL). MARPOL has six annexes covering various categories of pollutants as presented in Table 1.  The MARPOL Convention provides rules to determine what type and quantity of pollutants a ship is allowed to dispose of at sea and what is an illegal discharge. While MARPOL outlines the rules to follow, enforcement responsibilities and the development of tools for dealing with non-complying ships is left to the IMO parties. MARPOL (Article 4(4)) encourages States to adopt adequate penalties for ship-source pollution violations without however specifying the nature of such penalties. All EU Member States are parties to MARPOL.

Table 1. Sources of marine pollution covered by the MARPOL Convention

Source: IMO

More specifically, MARPOL annexes include standards, such as:

-Annex I – it is illegal if a ship discharges oil with concentration above 15 ppm (parts per million) 14 ; 

-Annex II – it is illegal if a ship discharges noxious liquid substances at a rate exceeding the maximum rate for which the underwater discharge outlets were designed 15 ;

-Annex III – it is illegal if a ship jettisons harmful substances in packaged form where it is not necessary for securing the safety of the ship or saving life at sea 16 ;

-Annex IV – it is illegal if a ship discharges sewage which is not pre-treated 17 ;

-Annex V – it is illegal if a ship discharges garbage food waste, which cannot pass through a screen with openings less than 25 mm 18 ; 

-Annex VI – a ship cannot release scrubber discharge water into sea which do not comply with the criteria set in guidelines e.g. pH, PAH, turbidity, nitrates and water additives criteria 19 .

EU context

The policies on preventing pollution from ships were developed between 2000 and 2009, in the wake of two major maritime accidents of the ships Erika and Prestige causing substantial oil spills 20 . The lack of rules on the prevention of pollution from ships represented a void in EU legislation at the time. The Port Reception Facilities Directive and the Port State Control Directive 21 covered pollution from ships, but there were no rules making the actual act of pollution illegal under EU law.

The legislative proposal for the SSP Directive 22 was adopted in only four months after the oil spill from the Prestige. At the time of the adoption, there was significant political will and public pressure to act quickly in the field of ship-source pollution prevention. The proposed initiative’s scope was oil and noxious substances (i.e. the first two out of the six MARPOL Annexes) because these two pollutant types were of greatest concern at the time of adoption.

The SSP Directive addresses illegal discharges of oil (Annex I) and noxious substances (Annex II) from ships into the sea. ‘Illegal’ in this context refers to accidental or intentional discharges that do not meet MARPOL standards. The standards from MARPOL are mirrored in the Directive (Article 5). Illegal discharges by ships must result in the EU in penalties for the pollution offence, thereby preventing/discouraging illegal discharges and consequently ensuring safety and environmental protection in maritime transport.

The overall objective is a Union policy on safe seas also to discourage the pollution from ships into sea. EU legislation in the maritime field usually incorporates IMO standards in order to ensure their proper enforcement. EU action in the field of preventing pollution from ships both complements and enforces the international framework as defined within IMO. The transposition of IMO rules into the EU legal system makes these provisions actionable before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). National governments can be taken to court if they break EU law, and this helps to ensure that enforcement across the Union is uniform. The same principle applies to all legislation of the maritime acquis e.g. Port State Control Directive, Flag State Control Directive, Accident Investigation Directive.

The SSP Directive incorporates the international ship-source pollution standards set by the MARPOL Convention into EU law and requires Member States to take enforcement measures in specific situations and to introduce effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties (Article 8 of the Directive). Figure 1 depicts these measures and the enforcement chain in the Directive.

Figure 1. Law enforcement chain in the SSP Directive

 The SSP Directive not only incorporates international standards. It additionally  offers to the Member States information on the detection of possible spills (CleanSeaNet). It also makes the international framework clearer by establishing an EU liability regime 23 . Furthermore, the Directive established EU competence in criminal matters. At the time of the Directive’s adoption, there was no criminal competence of the EU. The approach to criminal penalties has evolved over time in the EU through framework decisions, court cases and most recently through the revision of the Environmental Crime Directive 24 (see the section below on synergies for information on the Environmental Crime Directive).

While the situation in the EU has considerably improved since the times of the Erika and the Prestige accidents with no major oil spill in EU waters since 2002, the problem identified when Directive 2005/35/EC was adopted is still relevant. Illegal discharges from ships continue to happen in European seas. Drawing on the findings of the evaluation, the legislative proposal for the revision of the SSP Directive aims to further incorporate international substantive rules by extending the scope of the Directive to cover all MARPOL Annexes. In addition, the revision aims to complement the international framework by providing further clarification of the existing EU liability regime, in particular with regards to exceptions from liability, further strengthening of the existing information and experience exchange as well as introduce new measures on types and levels of penalties which will help Member States better enforce the requirements of the MARPOL Convention.

Synergies with other EU policy instruments

The relevant EU policy instruments addressing water-based pollution and waste management are described in this section. The evaluation concluded that the Directive needs to be adapted to the changes resulting from new legislation, in particular in the context of the Environmental Crime Directive and the Port Reception Facilities Directive.

The Environmental Crime Directive 25 (ECD) lays down a list of environmental offences that Member States must consider as criminal offences. Ship-source pollution criminal offences are currently not covered by the ECD. In 2021, the Commission adopted a proposal for a new ECD 26 , which covers for the first time SSP infringements. This is to align with the post-Lisbon legal basis for harmonisation of criminal law (Article 83(2) TFEU 27 ). The proposal for a new ECD foresees transferring the description of the criminal offence from the SSP Directive to the ECD. The criminal offence for ship-source pollution, as defined in the proposal for a new ECD, mirrors the offence description of the current SSP Directive. Consequently, the criminal provisions in the SSP Directive will cease to apply and therefore will need to be removed from the SSP Directive. The SSP Directive will continue to include the sectorial provisions (e.g. on the definitions of illegal discharges considered as infringements) and provide for administrative penalties for ship-source pollution when the act will not qualify for criminal proceedings. The ECD and the SSP Directive would therefore work in a complementary fashion.

The Port Reception Facilities Directive 28  (PRF) imposes requirements for the delivery of waste from ships to ports. The PRF Directive aims at maximising the delivery of waste from ships through economic incentives (cost recovery systems) and enforcement. Ships have to report their advance waste notifications and waste delivery receipts, which form the basis for inspections recorded in an EU database called THETIS EU 29 . The SSP Directive complements the PRF Directive. While the PRF Directive implements the proper collection and management of waste, the SSP Directive discourages the illegal discharge of such waste into sea. The PRF Directive’s delivery obligation mirrors that of the discharge prohibitions in MARPOL and covers Annex I-II as well as IV-VI 30 . Hence, there is a need to bring the scope of the two directives closer so that the SSP Directive covers all discharges into the sea covered by the MARPOL Annexes. The SSP Directive and PRF Directive are instruments that work together and are designed to address the prevention of discharges from ships into sea.

At the same time, the Commission is undergoing a review of existing EU maritime safety directives: 1) Flag State Control Directive 31 , 2) Port State Control Directive 32   and 3) Accident Investigation Directive 33  . There are links with the SSP Directive in the context of 1) the responsibilities of the flag State to impose penalties for illegal discharge from its own flagged ships, 2) the responsibilities of the port State to inspect related cases and 3) accidents involving pollution incidents. The SSP Directive complements the three directives by provisions on the imposition of penalties to cases of related ship-source pollution.

There are also synergies between the satellite surveillance services used for the SSP Directive (CleanSeaNet) and the targeting and reporting system for port State control (THETIS). For example, through THETIS, Member State authorities have access to past port State control inspection findings for ships and can use this information to assess whether a ship is suspected of an illegal discharge. Member States can also use THETIS to request another Member States authority (e.g. next port of call) to inspect the suspect ship. 34  

The Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System Directive 35  (VTMIS) together with its SafeSeaNet tool is essential to have information on ships suspected of an illegal discharge. For example, SafeSeaNet records ships’ identifiers and geographical position. This information can be extracted for a certain geographical area where a possible pollution incident took place and is transferred to CleanSeaNet. This provides information to the Member States to support them in identifying the offender.

In addition, the Whistleblowing Directive 36  lays down standards for reporting channels and the protection of persons reporting the breaches of Union law. SSP Directive is part of the scope of application of the Whistleblowing Directive and there are synergies between the two as whistle-blowers can be a relevant source of information on ship-source pollution.

The Waste Framework Directive 37 lays down the main waste management principles and includes a common EU definition of waste. Any substance or object, which the holder discards (or intends or is required to discard) is considered as waste. ‘Polluting substances’ as defined in the SSP Directive are regulated by international standards set in the MARPOL Convention. Operational discharges of waste generated on board ships and that contain such substances are permitted within the strict discharge standards of MARPOL. The obligations under the Waste Framework Directive apply to the management of waste from ships covered by the Port Reception Facilities Directive.

The Marine Strategy Framework Directive 38 (MSFD) has as its main objective to protect the marine environment and to achieve Good Environmental Status of EU Marine Waters which is measured by means of so-called ‘descriptors’. Descriptor 8 on contaminants and descriptor 10 on marine litter are both relevant for the SSP Directive. The MSFD is the main European legal instrument for conserving the marine environment and ecosystems. The Directive enshrines in its rules the ecosystem approach to the management of human activities having an impact on the marine environment, integrating the concepts of environmental protection and sustainable use. The SSP Directive contributes to reaching the objectives of the MSFD by introducing dissuasive penalties for illegal discharge of polluting substances to the sea by ships.

There is no interaction between the SSP Directive and the EU air emission legislation and no regulatory gap has been identified in the context of this impact assessment. The current SSP Directive and the Port Reception Facilities Directive work together to cover pollution into sea. The revision of the SSP Directive aims at maintaining the same legal logic of prosecuting discharges of substances under MARPOL Annexes into sea.

The Directive does not cover air emissions because they traditionally follow a different regulatory approach (further detailed in Annex 5). Reducing the continuous emitting of polluting substances or greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere when en route is regulated differently than discouraging one-off illegal spills/offences by ships. Therefore, different structures for enforcement have been adopted. However, synergies may exist and be reinforced, e.g. through the use of IT tools such as THETIS-EU, with respect to exchange of and access to information concerning ship inspections of ships and enforcement actions across Member States and on the basis of various legal texts.

The current and proposed initiatives at EU level for air emissions are:

–administrative penalties under the Sulphur Directive 39 to discourage sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions triggered by use of non-compliant fuel;

–obligation for shipping companies to monitor, report and verify their annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in accordance with the revised EU MRV Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/757);

–obligation for shipping companies to surrender emission allowances for the carbon dioxide (CO2) – as well as from nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) as of 2026 – they emit, following the inclusion of shipping under the EU Emission Trading System (ETS); and

–obligation for shipping companies to reduce the average annual greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity of energy used by ships below the maximum limit set under the FuelEU Maritime legislative proposal.

Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions by the shipping sector, although addressed at IMO level 40 , are not regulated by dedicated EU legislation 41 . In EU, currently efforts are made to collect data and enhance monitoring of NOx emissions from shipping, with substantial contribution from EMSA.

Elements falling outside the proposed revision are:

-air pollutants to the atmosphere covered by MARPOL Annex VI; and 

-pollutants not covered by standards set in MARPOL. 

See the discarded measures in section 5.3 and Annex 5 for a description of these elements.

Evaluation of the Directive

The Commission has carried out an evaluation of the SSP Directive in a so-called ‘back-to-back’ manner (i.e. the evaluation and impact assessment have been launched at the same time). The links between the conclusions of the ex-post evaluation and the impact assessment are summarised in Table 2 . The evaluation of the SSP Directive is annexed to this impact assessment report.

The data available for the evaluation was not sufficiently robust to make a complete ex-post assessment for all Member States. There was no representative data available on the indicators to measure the success of the Directive. Despite the limitations, the evaluation gave a snapshot of the existing information on the implementation of the Directive.

The evaluation concluded that the objectives of the Directive were not fully achieved and the scope of the Directive is limited. The Directive defined a common legal framework for ship-source pollution offences in the EU but its effectiveness was limited. There were two cases of nonconformity investigated by the Commission - in 2009 (infringement against Greece 42 ) and in 2010 (infringement against Ireland 43 ). Both cases were closed in 2011. The Directive brought the MARPOL rules into the realm of EU law and ensured that the legislation of the Member States is aligned but it is unclear if pollution was discouraged in practice.

Table 2. Links between conclusions of the ex-post evaluation and the impact assessment

2.Problem definition

2.1.What is the problem?

Problem – Ships illegally discharging polluting substances into sea rarely face effective and dissuasive penalties.  

The first line of defence for the maritime safety and pollution prevention is provided through flag State (Flag State Control Directive) and the second line of defence through port State control legislation (Port State Control Directive), however, ships may still cause pollution of the sea through accidents and/or (intentional) operational discharges. Hence there is a need for another line of defence which is prosecuting the offenders. Drawing on the conclusions of the evaluation, the problem identified when Directive 2005/35/EC was adopted is still relevant.  Illegal discharges occur in European waters i.e. ships which discharge polluting substances do not always follow MARPOL standards. This is an issue of concern because illegal discharges from the maritime transport sector contribute to the damage of the marine environment and its ecosystems. The problem and the underlying problem drivers are presented in  Figure 2 . 

The success of the Directive would mean that the person (legal or natural) responsible for the pollution of the sea is adequately penalised to produce a deterrent effect and this way prevent pollution in the future. SSP penalties can be seen as the last line of defence for pollution prevention of the marine environment. The measure of success of the Directive would therefore be an increased proportion of confirmed illegal discharges from ships that are subject to penalties.

Figure 2. The problem tree

Due to serious limitations of data underpinning the evaluative work, there is only fragmented data to confirm that ships which discharge pollutants into sea illegally face effective and dissuasive penalties for such offence. Therefore, only an indicative and qualitative summary of the implementation of the current Directive by Member States is available.

Some scarce information is available on pollutants which ships discharge illegally into sea. Regarding volumes of Annex I discharges, around 31,000 m3 of oily waste (2.5% of the total for oily waste from ships) was likely illegally discharged in European waters over the 2011-2015 period. 44 Regarding volumes of Annex II discharges, the quantities of substances transported yet spilled are not available. Reported data shows that hazardous and noxious substance spills happen in European seas (e.g. HELCOM data of 2017 45 ; OSPAR data of 2020 46 ; REMPEC data of 2021 47 ) but there is little information on the extent and frequency of those spills at sea. 

There is no complete dataset on the number of prosecutions and the penalties imposed. The information reported to the Commission by Member States on the implementation of the SSP Directive (Article 12 reporting) shows that up to 51 offenders are identified per year by a Member State and up to 12 offenders are prosecuted (see Table 3 ). These numbers however are not representative for the situation across the EU because not all Member States report 48 . Nevertheless, based on this data, it can be considered that penalties and prosecution are rare. 

Table 3. Summary of data reported by Member States in the period 2015-2020 

Source: Reports submitted to the European Commission by Member States in 2015-2020.  

One of the reasons for penalties being rare can be attributed to the weaknesses in the SSP enforcement chain i.e. detection, verification, prosecution. Member State public authorities are responsible for enforcement yet have limited capacity to verify the potential spills (see Figure 5 in section 2.2). The decision and responsibility to undertake a check remains the prerogative of the respective Member State.

The actors responsible for and contributing to the pollution of the sea are the EU and non-EU maritime legal and natural persons i.e. ship operators, managers, owners, masters, crew etc. who illegally discharge polluting substances from their ships into sea deliberately. These legal persons are usually large enterprises and less so micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These actors cover all types of ships, irrespective of their flag, calling at EU ports or in transit through European seas.

The problem has a cross-border dimension because pollution is by nature cross-boundary and the detection and verification of ship-source pollution relies on efficient collaboration between Member States, as well as on the harmonised information exchange tools and aligned legal frameworks amongst Member States. 

Ship-source pollution is not the only (nor is it even the main) pollution source affecting the marine environment and the European citizens that live along the sea; however, it is a contributing factor and therefore a problem to be addressed. Around 35% of oil that enters the sea comes from regular shipping operations. 49 Around 45% of oil is input from land-based sources with municipal/industrial effluents and from routine oil rig operations, 10% from accidents of oil tankers, 5% natural sources, 5% undefined sources.

The size of possible spills has changed over the years since the adoption of the Directive in 2005. Large accidental spills have not occurred in European seas since the accident of Prestige in 2002 (63,000 tonnes of oil which impacted more than 200 kilometres of the coast). As shown in Figure 3 , small operational discharges are currently more likely to happen. The estimation is based on information from CleanSeaNet on possible spills. It shows that spills in European waters are of smaller size (mostly below 4 km2).

Figure 3. Number of possible spills detected by means of CleanSeaNet in 2020

Source: CleanSeaNet statistics 2020  

Stakeholders, when consulted on the frequency of imposing penalties, confirmed that penalties are rare. 18 out 28 stakeholders interviewed agreed with the overall definition of the problem. 50 For illegal discharge incidents by natural persons, 10 of the 25 respondents to the targeted survey (see Figure 4 and note the ‘I don’t know’ replies) indicated that administrative penalties imposed when prosecuting ship-source pollution are rarely or never imposed, while 13 of the 25 respondents stated that criminal penalties are rarely or never imposed. For illegal discharge incidents by legal persons, 8 of the 25 respondents indicated that administrative penalties are rarely or never imposed, while 11 of the 25 respondents answered that criminal penalties are rarely or never imposed.

Figure 4. Stakeholder answers to survey questions on problem definition 

Question: Are penalties imposed in the case of identified incidents of illegal discharges from ships for natural persons (ship crew, ship masters)? 

Source: Targeted stakeholders’ survey

Question: Are penalties imposed in the case of identified incidents of illegal discharges from ships for legal persons (non-human, juridical person as enterprises and entities with legal personhood)? 

Source: Targeted stakeholders’ survey

Although there is a significant data gap and limited evidence available that ships actually face penalties for illegal discharges, the indicative data presented in this section shows that spills occur ( Figure 3 ) and even in those cases where the polluting ship is identified, the offender is not always penalised ( Table 3 ). The evaluation concluded that the success of the Directive in achieving its intended objectives has been limited.

2.2.What are the problem drivers?

Problem Driver 1: The Directive’s scope, which is limited to Annexes I-II of the MARPOL Convention, is outdated and does not cover all relevant polluting substances discharged into sea

The Directive’s scope is currently Annexes I and II of the MARPOL Convention (i.e. oil and noxious liquid substances in bulk) and does not cover Annex III for harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form, Annex IV for sewage, Annex V for garbage and Annex VI for discharge water from scrubbers. Drawing on the conclusions of the evaluation on relevance and coherence, the Directive is only partially relevant and aligned with the objectives of the European Green Deal due to its limited scope in terms of substances covered.

During the stakeholder consultation process, 18 out of 28 stakeholders interviewed 51  agreed that the current scope of the Directive is a limitation hindering the achievement of the Directive’s objectives. In a stakeholder workshop organised on 22 September 2022, 29 out of 51 participants that voted were of the opinion that the scope of the revised Directive must be extended.

The Port Reception Facilities Directive is by design complementary to the SSP Directive (see section 1). The PRF Directive, in its scope, covers all MARPOL Annexes with the exception of Annex III on substances carried in packaged form 52 and the air component of Annex VI 53 . There was a call by the co-legislators 54 to review the SSP Directive because the EU Port Reception Facilities cannot work properly without a good legal instrument to discourage illegal discharge of polluting substances at sea for all relevant MARPOL Annexes. This was the main trigger for the revision of the Directive.

 The size of the discharges from ships of each type of polluting substances is not known due to a significant data gap but can be put in perspective by analysing quantities collected in Port Reception Facilities. Table 4 shows what substances are collected in ports - most of the waste collected in ports is oil followed by garbage. This does not mean that more oil is discharged illegally into the sea than garbage but it shows the relative quantities that are generated by ships when in the EU and collected in ports. 

Table 4. Types of waste collected in 2019 in the EU Port Reception Facilities per MARPOL Annex type of polluting substance.

Source: Reported by Euroshore members in 2021 and presented in EMSA and EEA report EMTER (2021)

Table 4 and the following description on the quantity of polluting substances discharged into sea provide details on the magnitude of the problem driver.

With reference to MARPOL Annex III on harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form there is limited data available on how much packaged harmful goods are lost at sea. Small volumes of such substances in packages are collected in Port Reception Facilities i.e. 0.3% of all waste collected as shown in Table 4.  This does not exclude the possibility that goods containing harmful substances in packaged form are accidentally lost at sea and pollute the marine environment. Packaged goods by definition are not discharged intentionally because they are the product which is being transported and not the waste which is being generated by the ship.

Regarding MARPOL Annex IV on sewage, most of the ship-source sewage discharge into sea is legal, in line with MARPOL discharge norms. The Baltic Sea is an exception as the IMO designate it as a Special area under MARPOL Annex IV, meaning that discharge of sewage from passenger ships (including cruise ships) is prohibited. Based on the PRF Impact Assessment, the possible waste gap for sewage is estimated at 136,000 m3, i.e. approximately 10% of the sewage that should be delivered on land is not received by Port Reception Facilities and might be therefore discharged illegally 55 .  Limited volumes of sewage are collected in Port Reception Facilities i.e. below 5% of all waste collected as shown in Table 4.

MARPOL Annex V (garbage) regulates the discharge into the marine environment of plastic, domestic wastes, cooking oil, incinerator ashes, operational waste, fishing gear and animal carcasses generated during the normal operation of the ship and liable to be disposed of continuously or periodically. As shown in Table 4 , volumes of garbage collected in Port Reception Facilities are approximately 15% of the total waste collected. Certain geographic areas and countries have been identified as being more vulnerable to the impacts of this type of ship-source pollution, owing to their proximity to shipping routes. For instance, in the North Sea or Aegean Sea, it is estimated that up to 25% of litter found on beaches, originates from ships, while in the Baltic Sea, this percentage accounts for up to 10% of litter found. 56  Approximately 60,000 to 300,000 tonnes, i.e. 7% to 34% of the total garbage was estimated not to be delivered annually to the EU ports 57 . This data could indicate that some of the garbage waste from ships not delivered for disposal at EU ports may have been illegally discharged at sea and contribute to the marine pollution. 

Regarding MARPOL Annex VI, the substances relevant for the SSP Directive are not those emitted to the air (e.g. SOx, NOx) but those discharged into sea (i.e. discharge water from scrubbers 58 ). Most ships use open-loop scrubbers and discharge the scrubber residue into sea 59 . Fewer ships use closed-loop scrubbers and deliver bleed-off water to the port 60 . Therefore, small volumes of scrubber discharge waters are collected in Port Reception Facilities i.e. 0.2% of all waste collected (see Table 4. ) Most of the scrubber discharge into sea is legal, in line with MARPOL discharge norms. However, the relative volumes involved for this category are large. The volume of acidic water discharges from open-loop scrubbers was estimated at 77% of the total volumes discharged from ships 61 . As large quantities are involved, which might affect the marine environment, the international framework is prone to develop for discharge water from scrubbers under Annex VI and this category is relevant for the revision of the SSP Directive.

As long as discharges of polluting substances into sea under MARPOL Annexes III-V and Annex VI discharge water from scrubbers, are not included in the scope of the Directive, Member States cannot count on systematic information from EMSA-managed tools (e.g. CleanSeaNet) when carrying out their duties of verifying the pollution. Information exchange between Member States is therefore also hindered for the remaining MARPOL Annexes. Member States cannot prosecute in a coordinated way the offenders benefiting from the clarity offered by a common EU liability regime. This is particularly important for discharges into sea because no other EU legislation covers penalties for discharging Annex III-VI substances into sea or gives rules that make the actual act of pollution into sea illegal under EU law.

Problem Driver 2: Information exchange and/or expertise to effectively detect, verify and penalise pollution from ships are inconsistent across the EU and generally insufficient

Effective detection of illegal discharges, their verification and prosecution (i.e. the enforcement chain) are essential for the Directive and its penalty system to be operative in practice. The evaluation found that Member States face challenges when carrying out their duties of enforcement. The lack of specialised knowledge, experience, financial/human resources along with political prioritisation and the existence of other priorities is a common weakness identified. 62  Moreover, Member State enforcement authorities do not always have the necessary training and specialisation. 

Based on information collected during the stakeholders’ interviews, the main challenges faced by national authorities in relation to this problem driver are:

-Limited availability of adequate resources, in terms of trained personnel, laboratory capacity and adequate equipment to perform the follow-up activities on-scene;

-Technical challenges related to the verification and evidence collection activities, such as the time and cost required to complete the sampling of the substance associated to the incident, accessibility during night hours/darkness or stormy seas. Furthermore, these challenges are exacerbated when the incident is located in an area far from the coast.

With respect to deficiencies in prosecution, judges sometimes lack specialised knowledge and awareness of the harmful effects leading to dismissed cases or low penalties. In general, stakeholders also view training and specialisation of judges as important for successful enforcement in the field of environmental proceedings. 63

Member States do not always make use of the information supplied by EMSA-managed tools and do not always record their verification results in these tools. Information exchange between Member States is therefore incomplete and not consistent across the Member States. Stakeholders’ interviews indicated the need for more EU support in exchanging experience and information about the potential polluters, identifying the pollution incidents and strengthening cooperation between Member States (training, exchanging lessons learned, guidance and real-time information from satellite surveillance or whistle-blowers). Ten national authorities interviewed 64 agreed that resources and/or expertise are insufficient to effectively identify, verify and prosecute ship-source pollution. Two Member State authorities identified the need for better availability of digital technology and equipment to facilitate evidence collection and prosecution for these discharges. Another authority emphasised the importance of introducing innovative technologies and using such information collected as evidence in ship-source pollution cases. Effective verification of pollution incidents requires adequate resources for a continuous level of readiness. Member States must take targeted and timely decisions on whether and how to follow up an alert on a possible spill (notified by national or satellite surveillance or a whistle-blower, or as a result of inspecting a vessel under a different control regime). 

Member States deploy their resources to follow-up on-scene and provide feedback to CleanSeaNet alerts to a limited degree. As shown in  Figure 5 , only 40% of possible oil spills detected by means of the CleanSeaNet are typically checked by the Member State and only 37% of the checked cases result in the confirmation of the pollution. This does not mean that the remaining 63% of the cases detected were legal discharges but it means that for the rest of the alerts nothing was observed on the surface of the sea or it was a natural phenomenon e.g. algae bloom.

Figure 5. Follow-up action by Member States for CleanSeaNet alerts on a possible pollution detection in 2021

Source: CleanSeaNet data for 2021. Alert reports for EU Member States, Norway and Iceland.

The analysis of CleanSeaNet data shows the following trends concerning verification:

-All Member States log feedback in CleanSeaNet, however only 6 Member States (out of 23) are responsible for 60% of feedback data logged in CleanSeaNet (based on 2020 data).

-A high verification rate usually does not lead to better results in the confirmation of the pollution. Based on data recorded by Member States on how they follow-up CleanSeaNet alerts, the higher number of follow-up activities per Member State does not lead to more confirmation of the pollution incidents. 65  

-The chances of confirming the pollution depend on how quickly the Member State aircraft or patrol vessel gets to the scene of the incident (the interval between the time of the satellite image acquisition and the Member State verification). The longer this interval, the more likely it is that no pollution is found on the spot. For example, in 2019, 5% of the checks were performed within 3 hours of the satellite observation. This resulted in 42% of confirmations of pollution. 66  

·Data collected by Integrated Maritime Services in SafeSeaNet, CleanSeaNet, THETIS and THETIS EU can facilitate the decision on whether to verify the incident or not. An example is that, through THETIS, Member State authorities have access to past port State control inspection findings for a particular ship and can use this information to take a decision. They can also use THETIS EU to see if the particular ship left the waste in question in the Port Reception Facility of the previous port of call.

Problem Driver 3: Penalties applied by Member States for illegal pollution from ships do not consistently discourage polluters

In order for the national enforcement to be effective, the administrative and criminal enforcement regimes must be seen as interlinked parts of one system and ought to coexist. Drawing on evaluation findings, the effectiveness of the Directive has been limited by the lack of consistency and a common understanding among Member States on when to apply which type of penalty (i.e. what constitutes a ‘minor’ discharge). The information relating to penalties applied by courts in Member States is not available or fragmented. This is because the information is not systematically reported by Member States and is often decentralised (i.e. individual courts within a Member State). Furthermore, Member States rarely report on the number of prosecutions to the Commission ( Table 3 in section 2.1) since there is no explicit requirement to provide such figures. The stakeholder feedback to consultations during the impact assessment was also limited. The response rate has been low and information received very limited 67 .

Twelve out of 26 stakeholders consulted agreed or strongly agreed with this problem driver 68 ( Figure 6 ), whereas industry generally disagreed (considering that international rules are sufficient for discouraging illegal discharges from ships). 

Figure 6. Stakeholder answers in interviews on problem driver 3

Specifically on the levels of penalties, based on the information obtained from stakeholder consultation activities and the data of the Network of Prosecutors in the Baltic Sea (ENPRO) and in the North Sea (NSN), all Member States foresee in their national legislation a minimum and maximum value for penalties as summarised in Table 5 . The higher vulnerability of some regions and diverging capacity of Member States to prosecute cases of ship-source pollution makes this problem driver key. The minimum and maximum levels of penalties diverge substantially between Member States, however it must be recalled that the Directive was not meant to harmonise the levels of penalties but aimed to harmonise the principles applicable to penalties i.e. penalties must be proportionate. As such, Member States currently have the flexibility to define the penalties’ level, method of calculation and criteria.

Table 5. Minimum and maximum levels of penalties foreseen for infringements for natural and legal persons (prices in EUR)

Source: Ricardo (2023), Evaluation support study compiled from stakeholder consultation activities and data of Network of Prosecutors in the Baltic Sea (ENPRO) and in the North Sea (NSN).

HELCOM 69 tried to address the issue of diverging penalties by adopting recommendations on a harmonised system of fines for the Baltic Sea for ship-source pollution 70 . The recommendation criteria for a common minimum level of fines in a case when a ship violates regulations were agreed and minimum amounts for fines were adopted. However, this recommendation has not been applied by HELCOM member States and the flexibility remains also for Baltic Sea countries.

Based on information collected in the evaluation and from Member States during the consultation on this impact assessment, the types and levels of penalties are different amongst Member States. Given that the Directive was not meant to harmonise levels of penalties, the logical link between the non-harmonised levels of penalties across Member States and the problem that offenders rarely face effective, proportional and dissuasive penalties is the proportionality of penalties. If penalties are too small to discourage pollution then the problem driver will continue to persist. Adding to the latter the stakeholders’ view that penalties are rarely imposed (see  Figure 4 ), one can infer that the dissuasive effect of penalties in the EU is not fully achieved.

Problem Driver 4 – Incomplete reporting by Member States on pollution incidents and on follow-up activities results in the lack of information on ship-source pollution across the EU.

The reporting streams related to ship-source pollution are described under the subheadings below. There is no systematic reporting on pollution incidents and on follow-up activities neither at European nor at international level under the IMO. The limited reporting by Member States on incidents, their verification and prosecution results in the lack of information on ship-source pollution across the EU. This hindered the evaluative analysis (see Annex 8).

European Commission

Article 12 of the SSP Directive requires Member States authorities to report to the Commission simply on the application of the Directive and cannot therefore offer the granularity needed for evaluating the effectiveness of the Directive. The reporting provision does not have any deadlines (requires reporting every three years), no requirements on what type of information is to be reported, no concrete obligations for reporting on enforcement and consequently weak basis to open infringements. This provision is not detailed enough to oblige Member States to report on the number of offenders identified and penalties imposed. For this reason, Member States have not systematically reported to the Commission (only 8 Members States submitted a report in the period 2015-2020 as shown in Table 3. , in section 2.1).

Member State can report to EMSA-operated systems. This includes information related to ship-source pollution: 1) CleanSeaNet service feedback forms on the potential pollution identified; 2) pollution incident reports (POLREP) exchanged as part of SafeSeaNet; and 3) inspection requests related to suspected MARPOL infringements submitted via THETIS. There are no obligations in the SSP Directive for Member States to report to EMSA and these tools are only being used to a limited extent by Member State authorities. For example, Member States submit on average only approximately 200 SafeSeaNet pollution incident reports and 120 inspection requests via THETIS annually 71 . Feedback to CleanSeaNet alerts is higher, with Member States submitting on average 1400 feedback forms annually. 72

International Maritime Organisation

Reporting to IMO on marine incidents, including marine safety investigations, has been low and with significant gaps for European parties of IMO. Similarly as at EU level, there is no representative information on the number of incidents nor penalties imposed. Contracting Parties of MARPOL should submit their reports using the Global Integrated Shipping Information System 73 . According to recent reporting examples, only 7 Member States reported to IMO in 2018, and only 5 Member States in 2019. The report in the format as set in the MARPOL Circular MEPC.1/Circ.318, could be of use for tracking the success of the SSP Directive. Especially relevant are Part 1 of the reporting format (Annual summary report of incidental spillages under Article II of Protocol I and Article 12), which aim to provide IMO with a summary of discharges not permitted under the MARPOL provisions and pollution due to ship casualties, as well as Part 2 (Annual enforcement report on alleged discharge violations), which aims to summarise the violation cases referred by coastal States to other administrations for prosecution or other action. However, only limited information is available under the international reporting stream and the granularity needed to assess the penalties is therefore also missing at international level.

Regional Sea Conventions

Reporting by relevant parties to Regional Sea Conventions is more advanced in some regions e.g. Baltic and North Sea (where reports on aerial surveillance activities are published annually), and less advanced in others e.g. Black Sea. In 2018-2019, 14 Member States reported to HELCOM 74  and the Bonn Agreement 75 on oil spills. The regional reporting commitments are however limited to a regional sea which means a narrow geographical scope.

In conclusion, Member States do not systematically report to the European Commission, IMO or to all Regional Sea Conventions, nor do they systematically record their enforcement activities via EMSA tools. For this reason, transparency on Member States’ action is weak and results in large gaps in information on ship-source pollution across the EU. In all Member States, there is a lack of statistical data on verification and prosecution. The lack of data results in limited information on the entire flow of cases over the law enforcement chain, from detection, through verification to prosecution. Against this backdrop, Member States’ performance cannot be compared nor evaluated properly. Such lack of data makes it difficult to monitor the effectiveness of the Directive, to identify obstacles in the law enforcement chain and to take targeted and informed decisions 76 . This leads to the lack of information to the public and the co-legislators, the general public’s lack of awareness of the scale and impacts of ship-source pollution infringements, the lack of political prioritisation and consequently the lack of the necessary resources for law enforcement authorities.

Other problem drivers considered in the impact assessment and discarded

A problem driver on air pollutants was considered during the impact assessment and discarded at an early stage:

·The Directive’s scope does not cover air pollutants released into the atmosphere regulated by MARPOL Annex VI. 

Due to the different nature of air pollution compared to pollution into sea, the IMO and the EU have opted for different regulatory frameworks to address air emissions from international shipping, namely, certification schemes, tax schemes, engine design requirements, ship design parameters (further detailed in Annex 5).

2.3.How likely is the problem to persist?

In the absence of EU action and changes to the legal framework, illegal discharges from ships into sea will continue not being addressed by effective and dissuasive penalties. As long as MARPOL Annexes III-VI are not included in the scope of the Directive, Member States will continue to be only bound by their international obligations to ensure enforcement of MARPOL. However, as explained above, there is very little reporting back to IMO on the enforcement of MARPOL provisions by Member States. Therefore, it is likely that Member States will continue to prosecute the offenders in a non-harmonised manner.

At the same time, the use of EMSA tools for information collection and exchange will remain limited for the substances in the scope of MARPOL Annexes III-VI. Nevertheless, future technological innovations may facilitate, to some extent, the work of enforcement authorities. According to the 2022 Strategic Foresight Report 77 , “enabling a greener transport sector with digital technologies” is one of the areas where the twinning of the green and digital transitions is expected to have a major effect. Member States exploiting new technologies, such as the use of innovative detection tools to better monitor the environmental performance of ships is one of the key relevant factors identified. Despite the benefits of digitalisation, EMSA tools are expected not to be used at their full potential without further EU action.

The new Environmental Crime Directive will ensure some improvement in the field with a likely impact on the number of SSP prosecutions, thanks to the introduction of a harmonised treatment of criminal sanctions. However, the identified problem will still persist because the provisions of the SSP Directive will not change and therefore will not be specific enough to make the penalties for ship-source pollution more effective and dissuasive. Moreover, the ECD will not cover MARPOL Annexes III-VI pollutants in the absence of EU action. 

The stronger rules under the Port Reception Facilities Directive ensure that adequate Port Reception Facilities are ready to accept waste at European ports. However, without further EU intervention for strengthening prevention - the detection of pollution, supporting the identification of the offenders and the dissuasive effect of penalties, the illegal discharges by ships are likely to persist with the resulting effect of less waste delivered to Port Reception Facilities.

3.Why should the EU act?

3.1.Legal basis

Title VI (Articles 90-100) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU) establishes the EU’s prerogative to make provisions for the Common Transport Policy and therefore the EU has the right to act under the Treaty on ship-source pollution. Pursuant to Article 100(2) TFEU, the Union legislator may lay down appropriate provisions for sea transport. Article 91(1)(a) of the TFEU provides that the Union has competence in the field of transport to lay down common rules applicable to international transport. In view of this, the revised SSP Directive would be based on Article 100(2) TFEU 78 .

3.2.Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action

Ship-source pollution typically leads to damage with cross-border dimensions as an SSP illegal discharge can impact the coastline of several countries or have cross-border effects. Due to the frequent transboundary impact of marine pollution and the fact that perpetrators act across borders, action by Member States alone would not be suited to tackle this problem. Therefore, it is essential that Member States have the same understanding of which discharges constitute offences and should be addressed by dissuasive penalties. Diverging national approaches in this regard hinder efficient cooperation of Member States and allow offenders to escape penalties. Cross-border cooperation between law enforcement and judicial authorities is necessary. The EU action of facilitating cooperation and information exchange is an effective approach towards ship-source pollution confirmed by the findings of the evaluation (see Annex 8). However, the findings also show that despite the progress made on a common framework for SSP offences and despite the support for cooperation and information exchange, the EU and its Member States have not been able to achieve the objective of the Directive and the problem identified is still relevant.

Certain geographic areas and countries have been identified as being more vulnerable to the impacts of ship-source pollution, owing to their proximity to shipping routes 79 . The East Atlantic and Black Sea regions are likely to be more sensitive to oily waste than the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea, whereas the Mediterranean region is the most vulnerable in relation to sewage from ships. Garbage poses a risk to the marine environment with no regional differences among them 80 . Furthermore, the evaluation shows that the verification capacity of the Member States of the North Sea and Baltic Sea are higher than those for the Mediterranean or Black Sea areas. The higher vulnerability of some regions and diverging capacity of Member States to verify and prosecute cases of ship-source pollution makes EU action necessary, especially with accompanying measures of support by common EMSA digital tools. 

In brief, given the international nature of maritime transport, there is a “Union relevance” of revising the Directive, to expand the scope of the Directive and further address the identified problem. There is a clear need to have a cross-border framework that would ensure equal treatment for ship operators regardless of where the pollution incident occurred.

3.3.Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action

Action at Union level would be more effective than action at national level because it can offer a strong deterrent effect on perpetrators that act across borders. Shipping is an international sector, operating in different EU and international waters and regulated at the global as well as regional and national instances.

Member States would be able to address the problem and incorporate the international standards for ships on their own because all Member States ratified the MARPOL Convention. However, they would not be as effective and efficient. The current Directive already complements the MARPOL standards by supporting the Member States in identifying the offenders through information from EMSA digital tools e.g. satellite surveillance. The added value of a revised Directive would be further clarification of the exceptions form liability, as part of the EU liability regime, and improved satellite surveillance covering more types of pollutants thanks to the extended scope of the Directive in line with MARPOL. The revision also aims to introduce new measures beyond MARPOL on types and levels of penalties imposed 81 as well as integrated digital solutions for data collection and exchange. The later cannot be achieved without an aligned legal framework and common digital tools. Action at Union level would therefore bring added value as compared to action at national level.

For example, satellite surveillance capabilities offered by the CleanSeaNet service constitute significant value due to economies of scale. CleanSeaNet is generally perceived by stakeholders as a significant added value of the Directive 82 . The evaluation showed that the detection of potential discharges from ships is up to 7 times less costly when done at EU level. 

In brief, a revised Directive could ensure a level playing field and facilitate national verification, and prosecution as well as cross-border enforcement leading to more dissuasive penalties. EU action will provide for clear added value on countering ship-source pollution which typically has a transnational dimension compared to what Member States acting alone can achieve.

4.Objectives: What is to be achieved?

4.1.General objectives

One of the aims of the European Union within its borders is to protect and improve the quality of the environment. The revised SSP Directive is to contribute to the overall goals set out in the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy and the European Green Deal. In view of the problem identified in section 2.1, the review of the SSP Directive should ensure that persons responsible for discharges of polluting substances into the sea are subject to adequate penalties, in order to improve maritime safety and to enhance the protection of the marine environment from pollution by ships. This means preventing pollution from ships by aligning with MARPOL standards and consequently improving maritime safety. Therefore, the general objective is:

“In line with the European Green Deal, the aim is to incorporate into EU law international standards for ship-source pollution into sea and to ensure that persons responsible for discharges of polluting substances into sea are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, in order to improve maritime safety and to enhance protection of the marine environment from pollution by ships”.

The success of the revised Directive can be measured by the increased proportion of illegal discharges for which more effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties are imposed. This should ultimately contribute to the reduction of illegal discharges because effective law enforcement increases the likelihood of detection and penalisation and reduces the chance that the offending ship gets away. Less illegal discharges in return will help to preserve the marine environment.

The revision should contribute towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 (“Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”) and SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”), and with its provisions on prosecution to SDG 16 (“Peace justice and strong institutions”).

4.2.Specific objectives

This initiative is primarily designed to complement the Port Reception Facilities Directive and to effectively address pollution coming from waste generated by ships as well as to address the identified problem. The specific objectives (SOs) and their correspondence with the problem drivers are presented in the  Figure 7 . They can be achieved through the implementation of the Directive that fosters effective detection, verification and prosecution of illegal discharges at sea. Progress towards these objectives would be measured through appropriate indicators. However, the values of these indicators in the baseline are not provided due to serious data limitations, as also shown by the ex-post evaluation.

Figure 7. Correspondence between the specific objectives and the problem drivers    

SO1: Incorporate international standards into EU law by aligning the Directive with MARPOL Annexes on discharges into sea. Member States should be able to implement the international rules established by all MARPOL Annexes on discharges into sea in a harmonised manner given the cross-border nature of sea pollution and the international nature of the shipping industry. With the raising concerns on marine environment protection, the objective is to extend the scope for the Directive (together with its satellite surveillance support) to more types of substances. The interviewed stakeholders were generally in favour of SO1. 83 Progress towards this objective could be measured through the expected increase in the detection capacity and detection levels for oil, noxious substances, packaged goods, sewage, garbage and scrubber discharge water, and, subsequently through the expected decrease in the overall number of illegal discharges due to the deterrent effect of the increased detection capacity.

SO2: Support Member States by building their capacity to detect pollution incidents, verify, collect evidence and effectively penalise identified offenders in a timely and harmonised manner. While enforcement falls under the responsibility and budgets of the Member States (also as parties to MARPOL), EU-wide information exchange tools, training and guidance can offer to the Member States cost-efficient and cross-border support for detecting pollution incidents and the collection of evidence. The integrated and enhanced information delivered to national authorities by EMSA tools will support their decision on whether to verify the incident and will make verification more targeted. The interviewed stakeholder were generally in favour of SO2. 84  This objective aims to help Member States in prioritising and streamlining their action so that they make the best use of their resources for verification (e.g. personnel, aircraft, patrol vessels) and prosecution. Progress towards this objective could be measured through the expected increase in the level of verification. In addition, the proportion of identified offenders as a result of verification could mark progress.

SO3: Ensure that persons (natural & legal) responsible for illegal discharges from ships are subject to effective, proportionate & dissuasive penalties. This objective will ensure that similar pollution incidents will be subject to similar treatment. If penalties are proportionate and effective for all illegal discharges in all European seas, they are expected to become more dissuasive. SO3 is coherent with the Environmental Crime Directive, to the extent that once a Member State, as a result of the verification carried out under the SSP Directive, determines that criminal penalties are required, the ECD would apply. However, if they decide that administrative penalties are more appropriate, the provisions of the SSP Directive would apply. The interviewed stakeholder were generally in favour of SO3. 85  Progress towards this specific objective could be measured by checking if the level and type of penalties is effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The data on the level of penalties in each Member State would allow checking if penalties are proportionate i.e. the level of penalties increases in those Member States where they are very low and hence there is more converge across Member States on the levels of penalties imposed. In addition, the data on the type of penalties in each Member State would allow checking if penalties are effective. Combined, this data would allow assessing if penalties are dissuasive. 

SO4: Ensure simplification and effective reporting on ship-source pollution incidents and follow-up activities. Information on the implementation of the Directive (e.g. number of illegal discharges verified and prosecuted as well as penalties imposed) will ensure transparency, evidence-based decision making and is expected to support enforcement by Member States. The evaluation has shown that data on the numbers of cases and penalties needed as indicators to evaluate and monitor the success of the Directive either does not currently exist or is fragmented. Improving data collection would therefore be an important specific objective of the future Directive. The simplification and effective digital reporting will contribute to the general objective by accurate data collection according to uniform standards. Additionally, access to information for decision-makers and the public is expected to have a deterrent effect, due to the risk of corporate reputation damage. The interviewed stakeholder were generally in favour of SO4. 86  Progress towards this specific objective could be measured by the improved reporting on the Directive implementation. Success would mean that Member States systematically report the pollution incidents they verified and penalised so that the policy-makers and the public are aware of the progress made.

5.What are the available policy options?

5.1.What is the baseline from which options are assessed?

The EU Reference scenario 2020 (REF2020) is the starting point for the impact assessment of this initiative. The REF2020 takes into account the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that had a significant effect on the transport sector. More detailed information about the preparation process, assumptions and results are included in the Reference scenario publication 87 . Building on REF2020, the baseline has been designed to include the initiatives of the ‘Fit for 55’ package proposed by the Commission in July 2021. A common baseline was developed for this impact assessment, as well as other impacts assessments in the area of maritime safety (Port State Control, Flag State and Maritime Accident Investigation directives impact assessments), to ensure consistency. More details on the baseline scenario are provided in Annex 4.

The baseline scenario assumes no further EU level intervention beyond the legal framework set by the current SSP Directive (MARPOL Annex I-II discharges etc.), but takes into consideration relevant initiatives at EU or international level, notably the effects of the recent entry into force of the revised Port Reception Facilities Directive and the revised Environmental Crime Directive (ECD). The new Environmental Crime Directive makes parts of the current SSP Directive obsolete because the provisions on criminal proceeding were taken over by the ECD.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on global shipping, affecting all market segments. In the baseline scenario, international maritime freight transport activity (intra and extra-EU) is projected to be 21% lower in 2020 relative to 2015. From 2021 onwards, however it is projected to start recovering and grow strongly by 2025 and beyond (i.e. 19% growth for 2015-2030 and 48% for 2015-2050), due to the rising demand for primary resources and container shipping. Relative to 2019, this is equivalent to an 8% increase in transport activity by 2030 and 33% growth by 2050. The number of port calls for 2025-2050 is projected to grow at lower rate than transport activity, following similar evolution as over the historical period.

There is high uncertainty regarding the impacts of the recent geo-political events related to the Russian aggression on Ukraine for the long-term. However, these events are not expected to have a significant impact on the baseline relevant for this impact assessment. While the local impact in certain areas (northern Black Sea, Azov Sea) has been significant and trade flows to/from both Russia and Ukraine have been impacted either through sanctions or military action, the overall impact on maritime traffic in the Union is expected to be relatively limited, despite the uncertainty.

The baseline incorporates foresight megatrends 88 and developments captured in the 2022 Strategic Foresight Report 89 . Among others, it captures the trend of increasing demand for transport as population and living standards grow. Furthermore, the cruise fleet will more than triple globally in 2050. 90  The increasing demand for transport and cruise tourism will lead to a higher number of ships addressed by the SSP Directive. The 2022 Strategic Foresight Report also reconfirms the existing megatrends identified in the 2021 Strategic Foresight Report 91 and more specifically, the megatrends of “Climate change and environmental degradation” and that of “Accelerating technological change and hyperconnectivity” that relate to the ongoing twin green and digital transitions. The ability of the EU to achieve these twin transitions very closely relates to the deployment of existing and new technologies in scale and their appropriate framing with relevant policies to achieve their maximum effectiveness. “Enabling a greener transport sector with digital technologies” is one of the areas where the twinning of the green and digital transitions is expected to have a major effect. Relevant to the SSP Directive revision, exploiting new technologies, such as the use of satellite surveillance tools to better monitor illegal discharges of ships is one of the key issues identified. The ongoing technological developments would positively influence the baseline because the technological drive would make more digital solutions available on the market for detection and verification. It is however uncertain if Member States would prioritise and allocate resources to new tools for MARPOL Annex III-VI discharges into sea. In addition, without further EU level action EMSA tools are expected not to be used at their full potential and would continue to cover only the MARPOL Annex I-II discharges. Improvements in the surveillance capabilities supported by CleanSeaNet for MARPOL Annex I-II discharges are however expected in the future in the baseline scenario.

National verification assets (aircraft, patrol boat deployment) are outside the scope as Member States have verification obligations directly steaming from their ratification of MARPOL. The amount of aerial resources committed by Member States to maritime environmental surveillance is expected to keep declining as observed over the past 15 years, but this is likely to be offset by improvements in the effectiveness of using these resources, resulting in a stable increase of effective surveillance in the future. The baseline considers the improvements in the effectiveness of using resources due to technological developments, drawing on the foresight megatrends described above.

The share of illegal discharges being detected is affected by the availability of surveillance tools and specialised resources, and improvements in their efficiency. New technological developments on surveillance tools at national and EMSA level (only covering MARPOL Annex I-II discharges in the baseline) are envisaged. National aerial surveillance activity in some Member States will systematically improve e.g. new remote sensing equipment will be purchased for aircrafts due to market developments and product availability. However, this will only be the case for some Member States and will not result in a significant deterrent effect across the EU. EMSA tools covering MARPOL Annex I-II discharges will also further develop and it is likely that in the coming years the Dynamic Overview of National Authorities (DONA) and the Integrated Maritime Services would be adapted gradually to meet the objectives of the SSP Directive. It is therefore likely that there would be some limited new opportunities for data collection and exchange on ship-source pollution in the future but this will not result in significant changes in detection levels. A small increase in the number of offences identified would also result in an indirect limited increase in prosecutions, thanks to the introduction of harmonised treatment of criminal sanctions for serious environmental offences due to the proposed revision of the Environmental Crime Directive. This could lead to improved clarity and facilitate the prosecution of cases. The stronger prosecution framework, triggered by the revision of the ECD is likely to improve the efficiency of prosecutions. Illegal discharges from ships are expected to also be affected by market developments. The increasing environmental awareness and reputation concerns 92  is expected to drive the uptake of more sustainable practices by ship operators/owners. 

A distinction needs to be made between substances that are currently in the scope of the SSP Directive and those that are not in the scope. For the MARPOL Annexes that are currently in the scope of the SSP Directive (oil and noxious liquid substances in bulk) the baseline scenario foresees a relative stabilisation over time, despite the increase in maritime traffic. This is mostly due to the maritime environmental surveillance supported by the CleanSeaNet and the small increase in the number of infringements identified, and to more limited extend due to the increasing environmental awareness of the shipping sector. The shipping industry acknowledged the improved surveillance capabilities brought by satellite surveillance services and the potential for future technological improvements. Seven of the 12 Member State authorities interviewed 93 agreed that technological developments are expected to have a moderate to a significant positive impact on the level of discharges of polluting substances that are in the scope of the SSP Directive. Thus, the baseline takes into account the ongoing twin green and digital transition.

More specifically, in the absence of further EU level intervention and despite the growth in maritime traffic, the baseline scenario projects a relative stabilisation in the total quantity of illegal oil discharges (MARPOL Annex I) by 2050. Changes in the fuel mix and a global cap on sulphur contents in Heavy Fuel Oil are likely to lead to less oily sludge production with an increased use of Liquefied Natural Gas and Marine Gas Oil as opposed to Heavy Fuel Oil and the environmental risk posed by maritime oil spills can be expected to decline further. 94  

Noxious liquid substances in bulk (MARPOL Annex II) are less frequent than oil spills 95 and, due to their infrequent nature, there is little quantitative data available. It is however expected that these noxious substance spills will remain limited in the future. 

For harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form (MARPOL Annex III), are not in the scope of the SSP Directive in the baseline and no data is available for illegal discharges. However, discharges are likely to happen almost exclusively due to accidents, as commercial packaged goods are not intentionally released.

Garbage and sewage (MARPOL Annex IV-V) are not in the scope of the SSP Directive in the baseline and they are thus not currently supported by the CleanSeaNet; albeit already detected in some CleanSeaNet images used for oil spill monitoring (and subsequently verified by Member States). Despite technological developments, which may reduce the costs of satellite monitoring services over time, very few Member States are expected to pursue such additional satellite monitoring services on their own. As shown by the evaluation report, the costs for Member States for procuring satellite images are estimated to be up to 7 times higher than the costs for EMSA. Thus, the technological developments are not expected to have a significant impact on garbage and sewage discharges, which are projected to grow in line with the maritime traffic in the baseline. Increasing environmental awareness is also expected to have limited impact. More specifically, pollution from sewage from ships (MARPOL Annex IV) is likely to increase in line with the maritime traffic, notably for RO-PAX ships 96 and cruise fleet. The transport activity for these categories of ships is projected to increase steadily as tourist levels return to pre-pandemic levels (i.e. 25% increase for 2015-2030 and 56% for 2015-2050). Garbage from ships (MARPOL Annex V) contribute to the marine litter problem with an estimated EU average of 32% and values up to 50% for some European sea basins. It is likely that discharges will increase over time due to the trend in maritime traffic, even if an increasing share of the garbage is delivered in ports and behavioural changes reduce garbage generation, notably for cruise fleet (e.g. reduction of single use plastics).

For air pollution from ships (MARPOL Annex VI), legislation in place is expected to lead to a clear decoupling from shipping volumes and a reduction of the SOx emissions released to the atmosphere by 32% by 2030 and 56% by 2050 compared with 2015. Air emissions released to the atmosphere can be reduced to compliant levels through the installation of emission abating scrubbers or the use of fuel-compliant options. The majority of scrubbers are systems operating in open loop, and their discharge waters are released into the sea, while closed loop systems generate sludge and bleed-off water delivered to Port Reception Facilities. Increases in the release of scrubber discharge waters into sea are to be expected in the future, following new restrictions on high sulphur fuels in non-Sulphur Emission Control Areas 97 . For more details on scrubber discharge waters see Problem Driver 1 in section 2.2.

In the baseline scenario, the most significant costs generated by the Directive are related to the CleanSeaNet that are based on a state-of-art system for satellite surveillance. The costs for CleanSeaNet are estimated at EUR 5.17 million in 2020 and are projected to remain stable over time (in 2020 prices) in the baseline scenario.

Member States administrations are estimated to need 80 hours per year for reporting on the application of the SSP Directive to the European Commission 98 in the baseline scenario. The total reporting costs per Member State are estimated at EUR 3,144 and at the EU level at EUR 70,048. 99 In addition, the costs for verifying the CleanSeaNet pollution alerts are estimated at EUR 105,470 for 2020 and are projected to remain stable over time. Finally, the costs for submitting pollution incident reports (POLREPs) in SafeSeaNet and inspection requests issued through THETIS 100 are estimated at EUR 13,000 per year from 2020 onwards in the baseline scenario. Thus, at EU level, total costs for Member States administrations are projected at EUR 188,518 per year by 2050 (in 2020 prices) in the baseline scenario.

5.2.Description of the policy measures and policy options

As a first step, a comprehensive list of possible policy measures was established after extensive legal analysis of the Directive’s design boundaries, consultations with stakeholders, expert meetings, and independent research in the context of the impact assessment support study and the Commission’s own analysis. This list was subsequently screened based on the likely effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality of the proposed measures in relation to the given objectives, as well as their legal, political and technical feasibility.

Retained policy measures and policy options overview

The retained regulatory and non-regulatory policy measures have been grouped in three policy options (PO A, PO B and PO C) as presented below. The tables below present the links of the retained policy measures with the specific policy objectives, problem drivers as well as policy options. The policy measures that are common to all policy options (such as PMc1 on the extension of the scope of the Directive) are presented in  Table 6 . Next,  Table 7  presents the measures that are different between policy options, to allow focusing the impact assessment on the differences between the policy options. A detailed description of the policy measures is provided in Annex 6.

Table 6. Policy measures common for all three policy options.

The common measure for all policy options to address the first specific objective (SO1) refers to the extension of the scope of the Directive by covering illegal discharges of MARPOL Annex III-V substances and discharge water from scrubbers of MARPOL Annex VI (PMc1). Four common measures would contribute to achieving SO2, namely the provision of more training and guidance to the Member States (PMc2), the establishment of an expert group (PMc3), the information from whistle-blowers (PMc4) and the enhancement of Integrated Maritime Services (PMc5). Furthermore, to address SO3, all policy options provide further clarifications on the liability regime (PMc6). Finally, and importantly, to make best use of the information from CleanSeaNet and to address SO4, each Member State will be obliged to log if and how CleanSeaNet alerts have been verified (PMc7).

In particular:

-PMc2 (training and guidance) is linked to problem driver 2 and specific objective 2. With the national authorities acquiring more training on ship-source pollution and sharing their experience with others, it is expected that enforcement is enhanced leading to a dissuasive effect. Stakeholders were generally in favour of this policy measure. 101

-PMc5 (enhancement of Integrated Maritime Services) is linked to problem driver 2 and specific objective 2 and promotes exchanges of information between different EMSA systems (CleanSeaNet, THETIS, THETIS EU and SafeSeaNet). Stakeholders were also in favour of this policy measure. 102 They emphasised the value of EMSA tools and the potential advantages of further integration.    

-PMc6 (liability regime clarifications) is linked to problem driver 3 and specific objective 3 and provides clarification of the existing legal framework. It clarifies a key legal element of the EU liability regime for the rare cases when damage to the ship or its equipment happens. This measure spells out a legal exception of MARPOL. Stakeholders did not have a good understanding of the complex legal issue and, therefore, no set opinion, however there was no opposition. 103  

-PMc7 (obligation to log if and how CleanSeaNet alerts have been verified) aims at monitoring how the surveillance mechanism of CleanSeaNet is used by Member States in practice. PMc7 is feasible under a directive because it provides a general obligation which Member States can transpose into their national legislation and decide on the details of application. There was rather low support of stakeholders for this measure due to additional work required, and some stakeholders expressed opposition. 104

All policy options achieve improved alignment with the MARPOL Convention. The ambition level for all options is similar; providing the Member States with accurate and timely information and keeping the digital tools in line with the increased pace of digital transition.

Table 7. Policy measures that are different between policy options.

Overall, the policy options present alternative ways of meeting the specific objectives to differing degrees. All options propose solutions to the identified problem, but vary in terms of approach, level of harmonisation and amount of discretion left to the Member States.

Policy option A - Emphasis on the implementation at a national level

PO A leaves most discretion to Member States on implementing MARPOL standards, whilst keeping the level of EMSA support sufficiently high (training, guidance, enhanced EMSA tools). PO A makes the Member States responsible for keeping the public informed about pollution incidents, through national websites 105 . PO A also leaves more flexibility as compared to the other options in terms of types and levels of penalties. This option follows a national approach towards determining the type of penalty and does not regulate the level of penalty. In PO A, there is thus more flexibility left to Member States with a minimum of EU intervention.

In policy option A, specific objective 1 is addressed by means of the common measure PMc1 (extension of the scope of the Directive) and specific objective 2 is addressed by four common measures: PMc2 (training and guidance), PMc3 (expert group), PMc4 (information from whistle-blowers) and PMc5 (enhancement of Integrated Maritime Services). Specific objective 3 is addressed by PMc6 (clarifications on liability regime) and PM2a (type of penalty), while specific objective 4 by PMc7 (obligation to log if and how CleanSeaNet alerts have been verified) and PM5a (information to the public on national websites). This policy option assumes that the MARPOL international standards, ratified by individual Member States are in principle sufficient to tackle the identified problem for the extended scope. The additional elements in this policy option beyond the baseline scenario are limited to the common measures (e.g. enhanced EMSA tools) and a basic national reporting measure.

Policy option B – Strengthened cooperation between EU Member States

PO B focuses on Member States working together on common setting for penalties. PO B provides that the levels of penalties will be agreed in an implementing act which will be prepared with the cooperation and support of the newly established Expert Group. Member States will also use a common reporting tool which can further enhance cooperation by information exchange within the existing Integrated Maritime Services. PO B is expected to provide a better structure for cross-border cooperation to strengthen Member State enforcement without introducing major regulatory measures and costs for Member States.

In policy option B, specific objective 1 is also addressed by means of the common measure PMc1 (extension of the scope of the Directive) and specific objective 2 is addressed by the four common measures as above. In order to ensure that offenders are appropriately penalised (SO3), this policy option aims at cooperating and agreeing on common criteria on levels of penalties (PM3a). It also provides clear principles for the components of infringements (PM2b). With regard to reporting obligations (SO4), EMSA would develop a new reporting tool to simplify data reporting and information sharing (PM4) and will keep the public informed about ship-source pollution incidents through an online portal (PM5b). This option would strengthen the capacity of Member States to interact with each other, while minimising the burden on Member State administrations. In this policy option, flexibility for Member State administrations is balanced with increased cooperation in key areas of penalties, reporting and information to the public.

Information published at EU level (PM5b – information to the public on EU website) reinforces national enforcement efforts by offering transparency to promote Member State accountability towards citizens. PM5b offers to the public the direct result of more effective reporting, linked to the specific objective 4 and problem driver 4. 106  

Policy option C - Emphasis on EU harmonisation 

PO C focuses on stronger EU harmonisation and cooperation between Member States. It obliges Member States to verify at least 60% of their CleanSeaNet alerts. PO C is expected to generate higher verification costs but, as PO B, it is expected to provide a structure for cooperation between Member States and strengthened enforcement. On the levels of penalties, PO C further strengthens harmonisation across the EU as compared to PO B.

For policy option C, specific objective 1 is addressed by means of the common measure PMc1 (extension of the scope of the Directive). Specific objective 2 is addressed by the four common measures as above, as well as by PM1 (60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts). Specific objective 3 is addressed by PMc6 (clarifications on the liability regime), PM2b (type of penalty) and PM3b (level of penalties), while specific objective 4 by PMc7 (obligation to log if and how CleanSeaNet alerts were verified), PM4 (reporting) and PM5b (information to the public on EU website).

PM1 (60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts) would make it compulsory that, upon receiving a CleanSeaNet alert, the national authority has to respond to at least 60% of the alerts. This measure is designed to lead to a higher verification rate in the EU. Six Member States (DK, FI, DE, IT, LT, SI) verified more than 60% of alerts in 2020 and this was the starting point for defining the target. The other Member States would need to increase their verification levels to meet this target. Other (lower) targets were considered based on the latest CleanSeaNet data. However, for the purpose of this impact assessment, an ambitious target has been retained to ensure alignment with the front-running Member States. Stakeholders that responded to consultation activities are mostly against this measure as they do not regard it as efficient. 107  

All policy options achieve alignment with the MARPOL Convention by extending the scope of the Directive to cover all substances discharged illegally into sea of all MARPOL Annexes (PMc1). All policy options introduce new elements over and above Member States obligations to enforce the MARPOL Convention by means of the EU liability regime (further clarified by PMc6), the satellite surveillance tool (further strengthened by PMc1 and PMc7 and access to timely information by PMc5), requirements on types of penalties (PM2a and PM2b), as well as knowledge exchange and capacity building for Member States (PMc2 and PMc3).

In relation to the differences between policy options, PM2 (type of penalty) is included in PO A in the form of PM2a, minimising EU intervention by giving Member States the flexibility to define the type of penalties in their national legislation. In contrast, PM2b and PM3 provides for a harmonised EU approach towards types and levels of penalties and is included in PO B and PO C (PM3a in PO B and PM3b in PO C) which have a broader European angle. More specifically, PM3a included in PO B provides for principles and criteria for levels of administrative penalties, whereas PM3b foresees additionally concrete provisions on values of penalties. PM4 (reporting) is only included in PO B and PO C because this measure works together with PM5b (information to the public on EU website) and it is mutually exclusive with PM5a (information to the public on national websites) which assumes lighter reporting requirements to the Commission but stronger national reporting tools.

5.3.Policy measures and options discarded at an early stage

The following policy measures were discarded and not covered in the impact assessment process:

·Extend the list of polluting substances covered by the Directive to include air emissions covered by MARPOL Annex VI (e.g. SOx, NOx, VOC, PM);

·Include a provision on minimum requirements on the verification by Member States of possible illegal emission levels (SOx, NOx): national target of 20% verification level per Member State with reference to the number of possible illegal emission levels (SOx, NOx), detected in territorial waters and EEZ for which a THETIS EU/sulphur module alert was generated.

·Extend the list of polluting substances covered by the Directive beyond MARPOL covering pollution of emerging concern (e.g. underwater noise, plastic pellets, more strict than Annex V on animal carcasses or more strict than Annex III on lost containers);

·Limit the extension of the scope of the Directive to align it with the scope of the waste categories of the PRF Directive; and

·Align the SSP Directive’s legal regime with MARPOL Article 4(4).

·In addition, one policy option was discarded in the impact assessment process - more specifically the repeal of the Directive. 

·Details on the reasoning for discarding these policy measures and the policy option are provided in Annex 5.

6.What are the impacts of the policy options?

This section summarises the main expected economic, social and environmental impacts of each policy option. 108  The proposed measures which involve the amendment of the Directive are assumed to be implemented from 2025 onwards, so that the assessment has been undertaken for the 2025-2050 period and refers to EU27 and in particular the 23 coastal Member States. Costs and benefits are expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, using a 3% discount rate. Further details on the methodological approach are provided in Annex 4.

The revision aims at improving how ship-source pollution is penalised in the EU. Some measures aim at increasing efficiency and harmonisation of penalties through better definitions, some at enhancing resources for EMSA tools and others at the alignment with other pieces of legislation. Better detection of ship-source pollution is expected to lead to an increased number of identified illegal discharges and penalties for the offenders that would ultimately result in a deterrent effect decreasing illegal discharges from ships because of the long-term dissuasive effect of the penalties and the general awareness of the public and shipping industry that such penalties are imposed. As a result, better protection of the marine environment is expected to be achieved.

MARPOL allows some discharges into sea of waste generated on board a ship, depending on their type, quantity and other conditions. As such, the Directive is not stopping ship-source pollution because it does not set the environmental standards nor prohibit discharges. Against this background, the cost benefit analysis of the MARPOL environmental standards falls outside the scope of this impact assessment.

6.1.Economic impacts 

This section provides the economic impacts of the policy options on the public authorities (Member States administrations, EMSA and the European Commission) and ship operators. It also includes an assessment of impacts on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the functioning of the internal market, competition and competitiveness.

6.1.1.Impacts on public authorities

Impact on Member States administrations. All three policy options lead to an increase in enforcement costs for the Member States administrations relative to the baseline because they will have to deal with more incidents with the increased scope of the Directive, while they would also result in enforcement costs savings because of the enhancement of the EMSA tools. PO A would additionally result in adjustment costs for the Member States administrations relative to the baseline for the deployment of national websites. Finally, both PO B and PO C are estimated to generate administrative costs savings (see Table 8 ). More explanations on each category of costs by policy option are provided below, while the detailed costs and costs savings by policy measure and by Member State (where relevant i.e. PM1), including the assumptions used to derive them, are provided in Annex 4. It should be noted that only the additional costs or costs savings related to the measures included in the policy options are covered in the assessment. The costs due to the MARPOL relevant requirements are not covered here as these steam directly from the ratification of the MARPOL Convention by Member States.

Enforcement costs for Member States administrations. The increase in enforcement costs relative to the baseline are driven by: (i) the extension of the scope of the Directive (PMc1), included in all policy options; (ii) the obligation to log if and how CleanSeaNet alerts have been verified (PMc7), included in all policy options; and (iii) the 60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1), included only in PO C.

The additional satellite monitoring services by EMSA linked to the extension of the scope of the Directive (PMc1) are expected to result in an increase in the number of CleanSeaNet alerts issued in all policy options. The number of alerts would increase by 8% in 2025 and 58% from 2030 onwards, relative to the baseline, or 209 additional verified alerts in 2025 and 1,530 additional verified alerts from 2030 onwards. The time needed to administer each alert is estimated at one hour 109 , and an average hourly labour cost of 39.8 EUR has been assumed for professional, technical and scientific services at EU level (in 2020 prices) 110 to estimate the costs. The costs for Member States administrations for processing the additional alerts are estimated at EUR 8,323 in 2025 and EUR 60,894 from 2030 onwards, relative to the baseline. 111  This is also expected to lead to additional costs for submitting pollution incident reports (POLREPs) in SafeSeaNet and inspection requests in THETIS 112 relating to ship-source pollution, estimated at EUR 1,026 in 2025 and EUR 7,597 from 2030 onwards, relative to the baseline. Thus, the total costs due to PMc1 are estimated at EUR 9,349 in 2025 and EUR 68,491 from 2030 onwards, relative to the baseline (see  Table 8 ). Expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, enforcement costs for Member States administrations are estimated at EUR 1.1 million for PMc1 in PO A, PO B and PO C, relative to the baseline. This comprises the cost of collecting and recording the data, but not the cost of verifying the incident on the spot. As explained in section 5.1, national verification assets (aircraft, patrol boat deployment) are outside the scope as Member States have verification obligations directly steaming from their ratification of MARPOL.

The obligation for Member State authorities to log feedback data for all CleanSeaNet alerts, even for those alerts that are not followed-up (PMc7) would result in an additional 5,449 feedback reports being compiled in 2025 and 8,020 feedback reports from 2030 onwards, also considering the extension of the scope in PMc1. The time for completing a feedback report is estimated at 15 minutes. The enforcement costs for Member States authorities are thus estimated at EUR 54,213 in 2025 and EUR 79,799 from 2030 onwards relative to the baseline (see  Table 8 ). Expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, the enforcement costs for Member States administrations are estimated at EUR 1.4 million for PMc7 in PO A, PO B and PO C. Similarly to PMc1, this comprises the cost of recording the data and not the cost of verifying the incident on-scene.

The provision on the minimum requirements on the verification by Member States of at least 60% of the CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1) would significantly increase the effort put into verification activities. It would increase efforts of all coastal Member States, except for those six Member States which already verify more than 60% of the alerts in the baseline. The increase in the number of verified CleanSeaNet alerts at EU level is estimated at 528 for 2025 and 775 from 2030 onwards relative to the baseline. The costs were estimated under the assumption that aerial means are used for this purpose as a check of the potential spill by aircraft is most effective. Data collected from three Member States 113 during the stakeholders’ consultation, pointed to an average cost of approximately EUR 5,000 per hour for aircraft. On average, an aerial verification is estimated to take 3 hours. The additional enforcement costs for Member States administrations, relative to the baseline, are thus estimated at EUR 7.9 million in 2025 and EUR 11.6 million from 2030 onwards (see Table 8 ). Expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, the enforcement costs for Member States administrations are estimated at EUR 202.7 million for PM1 in PO C. The additional costs by Member State are provided in Annex 4 (section 3) 114 .

Total enforcement costs for Member State authorities are the highest in PO C, estimated at EUR 205.2 million expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, followed by PO A and PO B with costs estimated at EUR 2.5 million for each relative to the baseline.

Table 8. Costs for Member States administrations by policy option and measure relative to the baseline (in thousand EUR), in 2020 prices

Source: Ricardo (2023), Impact Assessment support study

Adjustment costs for Member States administrations. The adjustments costs relative to the baseline in PO A are driven by the requirement to hold a national website with their identified incidents (PM5a). The cost for developing a website for a Member State is estimated at EUR 100,000 in 2025 (one-off adjustment costs), while the maintenance costs are estimated at EUR 25,000 from 2026 onwards relative to the baseline. At the EU level, the adjustment costs are estimated at EUR 2.3 million in 2025 for developing the 23 national websites 115 plus EUR 0.58 million recurrent annual costs to maintain them (see  Table 8 ). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050 the adjustment costs for Member States administrations relative to the baseline are estimated at EUR 12.3 million (of which EUR 2.3 million one-off costs) in PO A.

Enforcement costs savings for Member States administrations. Enforcement costs savings relative to the baseline for all policy options are driven by the enhanced Integrated Maritime Services (PMc5). The measure is expected to lead to a reduction in the time spent for processing CleanSeaNet alerts, estimated at 30 minutes, instead of one hour per alert. Thus, this is estimated to result in enforcement costs savings for Member States administrations for verifying the CleanSeaNet alerts of EUR 56,897 in 2025 and EUR 83,182 from 2030 onwards. PMc5 would also result in the near elimination of the costs for submitting pollution incident reports (POLREPs) in SafeSeaNet and inspection requests in THETIS relating to ship-source pollution, leading to costs savings of EUR 14,026 in 2025 and EUR 20,597 from 2030 onwards. Thus, the total enforcement costs savings are estimated at EUR 70,923 in 2025 and EUR 103,779 from 2030 onwards (see  Table 8 ). Expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, enforcement costs savings for Member States administrations are estimated at EUR 1.8 million.

Administrative costs savings for Member States administrations. The development of a dedicated reporting tool (PM4) in PO B and PO C would lead to significant time savings for reporting to the European Commission under the SSP Directive, which are estimated to be reduced by a factor of three. Thus, the administrative costs savings for Member States administrations are estimated at EUR 46,699 per year (see  Table 8 ). Expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, the administrative costs savings for Member States administrations are estimated at EUR 0.9 million for PM4 in PO B and PO C.

Total costs for Member States administrations (enforcement and adjustment costs) are estimated at EUR 205.2 million in PO C, EUR 14.8 million in PO A and EUR 2.5 million in PO B, expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period. In PO B, the costs are driven by the common policy measures included in all options, while in PO C the largest share of the costs is linked to the 60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1). In PO A, the largest share of the costs is due to the requirement of holding national websites (PM5a).

Total costs savings for Member States administrations (enforcement and administrative costs) are estimated at EUR 2.7 million in PO B and PO C and at EUR 1.8 million in PO A, expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period. The cost savings are driven by the reduced time for verifying the CleanSeaNet alerts thanks to the enhanced Integrated Maritime Services (PMc5) included in all policy options and also by the dedicated reporting tool (PM4) in PO B and PO C. Overall, PO B results in net costs savings for Member States administrations of EUR 0.2 million, expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period relative to the baseline, while PO A in net costs of EUR 13 million and PO C in net costs of EUR 202.5 million.

Impact on EMSA. All policy options lead to adjustment costs for EMSA relative to the baseline (see  Table 9 ). The adjustment costs relative to the baseline are driven by four policy measures included in all options: (i) the extension of the scope of the Directive (PMc1); (ii) training and guidance (PMc2); (iii) information from whistle-blowers (PMc4); and (iv) the enhanced Integrated Maritime Services (PMc5). In addition, the new reporting tool (PM4) and the information to the public on EU website (PM5b) would result in adjustment costs relative to the baseline for both PO B and PO C.

The alignment of the Directive to MARPOL, by extending the scope of the Directive (PMc1), requires the establishment of additional satellite monitoring services by EMSA to Member State authorities. The adjustment costs are estimated by EMSA at EUR 1.9 to 2.4 million for Annex III (annual recurrent costs), relative to the baseline, for the deployment of high and very high resolution radar and optical imagery (VHR), to follow relevant incidents 116 . Annex IV and V pollutants would already be detectable through the CleanSeaNet. However, the detection accuracy would benefit from additional medium resolution optical Sentinel-2 type monitoring and from increasing the monitoring volume. EMSA estimates that these upgrades to the CleanSeaNet would require an additional EUR 2.6 million annually from 2025 onwards, relative to the baseline. These upgrades could also benefit the detection of substances under the current scope of the SSP Directive. The costs encompass related IT development and operation. In addition, nine full time equivalents would be needed by EMSA to support the provision of the additional satellite monitoring services, estimated at EUR 1 million per year from 2025 onwards. Additional technical support from EMSA to Member States, to support verification activities, could also take the form of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) operations. The number of operations performed annually would however depend on Member States interest in such type of system. As such type of support is not explicitly required by the SSP Directive and the interest by the Member States in such type of operations is not known at this stage, the RPAS operations are not included in the costs. Thus, the total adjustment costs for EMSA in PMc1 are estimated at EUR 5.5 to 6 million per year relative to the baseline from 2025 onwards (see  Table 9 ). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, they amount to EUR 101.6 to 110.5 million for PO A, PO B and PO C.

PMc2 foresees training to national authorities. The adjustment costs for EMSA are estimated at one-off costs of EUR 100,000 in 2025 for developing the training session, and annual costs of EUR 50,000 for the reimbursement of participants from 2025 onwards, relative to the baseline. These costs estimates, provided by EMSA, are based on past similar projects and training sessions and they include costs related to human resources. The adjustment costs for the development of guidance documents 117 (PMc2) are estimated at EUR 400,000 in total relative to the baseline in 2025 (one-off costs). In addition, costs of EUR 80,000 per year are foreseen from 2026 onwards for providing regular updates to the guidance documents, in consultation with Member State authorities. Thus, the total adjustment costs for EMSA in PMc2 are estimated at EUR 500,000 one-off costs in 2025 and EUR 130,000 annual costs from 2026 onwards. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs for EMSA due to PMc2, relative to the baseline, are estimated at EUR 2.8 million (of which EUR 0.5 million one-off costs in 2025) in PO A, PO B and PO C.

The provision on whistle-blowers (PMc4) concerns the development of an external reporting channel for whistle-blowers, to submit information in an anonymised way. The adjustment costs are estimated by EMSA at EUR 50,000 for the development of a module to the EMSA tool (one-off costs in 2025) plus EUR 10,000 per year from 2026 onwards for its maintenance (see  Table 9 ). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs for EMSA relative to the baseline are estimated at EUR 0.2 million in PMc4 for all policy options.

The enhanced Integrated Maritime Services (PMc5) is expected to result in development costs estimated by EMSA at EUR 2 million (one-off costs in 2025) plus maintenance costs of EUR 300,000 per year from 2026 onwards, relative to the baseline. In addition, three full time equivalents would be needed by EMSA to support the development of the Integrated Maritime Services, estimated at EUR 330,000 per year from 2025 onwards. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs for EMSA for this measure are estimated at EUR 13.3 million (of which EUR 2 million one-off costs) in PO A, PO B and PO C.

The development and maintenance of a new reporting tool (PM4) is estimated to add costs of EUR 250,000 (one-off costs in 2025) for the development of the tool and EUR 180,000 recurrent annual costs for the maintenance of the tool from 2026 onwards in PO B and PO C (see Table 9 ). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050 the adjustment costs relative to the baseline are estimated at EUR 3.4 million (of which EUR 0.3 million one-off costs) in PO B and PO C.

Finally, the online tool by EMSA for keeping the public informed about ship-source pollution (PM5b) is estimated to cost EUR 100,000 (one-off costs in 2025) for developing the website and EUR 65,000 (recurrent annual costs) from 2026 onwards for maintenance 118 , based on similar projects by EMSA (see  Table 9 ). The website would draw inputs from the EMSA tools as well as collect Member States inputs. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050 the adjustment costs for EMSA due to PM5b relative to the baseline are estimated at EUR 1.2 million (of which EUR 0.1 million one-off costs) in PO B and PO C.

Total adjustment costs for EMSA are estimated at EUR 122.6 to 131.4 million in PO B and PO C and at EUR 118 to 126.8 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. The common measures included in all policy options account for EUR 118 to 126.8 million of these total costs, thus for 100% of the total costs in PO A and for 96% of the costs in PO B and PO C.

Table 9. Adjustment costs for EMSA by policy option and measure relative to the baseline (in thousand EUR), in 2020 prices

Source: Ricardo (2023), Impact assessment support study

Impact on the European Commission. The adjustment costs for the European Commission are driven by two policy measures: (i) the expert group (PMc3), that is common to all policy options; (ii) the development of an implementing act on the criteria for levels of administrative penalties (PM3a), that is included only in PO B.

In PMc3, one meeting per year is assumed to be organised by the Commission in person, to exchange lessons learned and enable cooperation between Member States. The costs are estimated at EUR 30,000 per year on average for the reimbursement of participants, from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs for the Commission relative to the baseline are estimated at EUR 0.6 million for PMc3 in all policy options. The adjustment costs for developing the implementing act on penalties (PM3a) by the Commission are estimated at EUR 200,000 (one-off costs in 2025) in PO B. Thus, the total adjustment costs for the European Commission, expressed as present value over 2025-2050, are estimated at EUR 0.8 million in PO B and EUR 0.6 million in PO A and PO C.

6.1.2.Impact on ship operators

The SSP Directive does not currently impose any action on businesses. None of the policy options include requirements for ship operators. The costs of preventing illegal discharges on board of ships have already occurred for ship operators, to ensure compliance with the MARPOL international regulations through pollution prevention procedures implemented by their fleets. However, more effective detection and penalising, may lead to more fines for non-compliant ship operators in the first years of its implementation. This is eventually expected to have a deterrent effect on non-compliant ship operators in the long-term. The core of the Directive is thus to ensure an effective support to national enforcement of the international regulations (MARPOL standards). No costs are expected for the compliant ship operators. At the same time, the indirect environmental benefits due to less illegal discharges are expected to benefit all ship operators.

6.1.3.Impact on SMEs

The proposed policy options do not include requirements for ship operators and are thus not expected to have an impact on SMEs. The extension of the Directive’s scope to cover additional substances under MARPOL (and notably Annex IV and V) may be relevant for recreational craft and fishing vessels, sector segments with high SME participation. However, the fact that this extension is focused on the enforcement of international regulations means that no impact on costs is expected for the compliant SMEs and the costs for managing polluting substances generated on board have already been present. The initiative can therefore be considered non-relevant for SMEs.

6.1.4.Functioning of the internal market and competition

Improving the detection (surveillance) and penalising (deterrence by means of penalties) is expected to contribute to a level playing field, with a positive impact on the functioning of the internal market and competition. A more harmonised regulatory framework across the Member States should ensure that shipping companies do not face different requirements and levels of penalties in each Member State for violating MARPOL rules. This decreases the risk of regulatory arbitrage when some Member States have less stringent penalties or lower likelihood of applying penalties than others in the region. The most relevant measure for the functioning of the internal market and competition are those that are expected to contribute to the improved detection of potential pollution (PMc1), included in all policy options. In all policy options, keeping the public informed about ship-source pollution incidents (PM5) may reduce information asymmetries and have a dissuasive effect through reputational damage of ship operators involved in pollution incidents. Data integration and EMSA support (PMc5) may allow to synthesise information on ships that are suspected of non-compliance and to produce valuable analytical insights, including on their past behaviour, thus leading to improved effectiveness of the identification of potential polluters.

6.1.5.Impact on competitiveness

The policy options aim to enhance the detection of pollutants discharged, by improved surveillance and support for Member State enforcement. The SSP Directive and the proposed policy options do not distinguish between EU and non-EU offenders. They cover all ships, irrespective of their flag, with the exception of warships, naval auxiliary and ships for government non-commercial use. The Directive also includes the requirement to comply with UNCLOS Article 230, where it is specified that penalties for infringements of foreign vessels beyond the territorial waters of Member States shall involve monetary penalties provided that specific conditions are met. Thus, there is no competitive distortion in favour of or against EU or non-EU entities. As explained in section 6.1.2, no additional costs are expected for the compliant ship operators in the three policy options. Ports and port reception facilities may be affected by an increased collection of waste at ports. This is however not expected to impact the competitiveness of the sector. The Port Reception Facilities (PRF) Directive has been revised in 2019 and recently brought into force. Thanks to the new rules, the facilities in ports and their infrastructure have recently been improved to allow for an increased collection of waste. Therefore, no additional costs for improved facilities and infrastructure are expected compared to those bared by the Member States for the implementation of the revised PRF Directive, which are part of the baseline. Therefore, it can be concluded that neither of the three policy options would affect the competitiveness of the maritime sector.

6.2.Social impacts

Social impacts are mainly assessed in terms of impacts on working conditions, fundamental rights, and public health.

6.2.1.Impacts on working conditions and skills

The impact of the policy options on working conditions is expected to be positive, although it has not been possible to quantify it. By improving pollution prevention, the policy options could potentially result in indirect health benefits for seafarers who are expected to be less exposed to the harmful substances. This may also improve the attractiveness of employment in the sector to some limited extent. Increased knowledge sharing and enhanced exchange of best practices are expected to reduce illegal discharges of polluting substances under all policy options. This could have a positive impact on working conditions, since seafarers will be better equipped to manage ship generated waste and understand their respective obligations. Further, under all policy options, seafarers will potentially be more accustomed with whistle-blower protection guaranteed in the EU. This will contribute to the development of a responsible work ethic, by fostering a safe environment for seafarers and other natural persons who acquired information on breaches in the context of their work-related activities to report on potential illegal practices and possibly improve the attractiveness of the seafarer profession in general. In addition, more clarity with regards to the exception from liability for crew, masters and companies under all policy options will delineate more clearly the obligations of seamen in general, to the benefit of everyday working conditions, where (intentional) operational discharges are a reality. With regards to crew in particular, it could safeguard that seafarers are not unjustifiably blamed for behaviours that they could not control or which were not within the remit of their attributed duties as members of the crew. Thus, with respect to the working conditions all policy options are expected to have a moderate positive impact.

6.2.2.Impacts on fundamental rights

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), as an instrument of primary EU law, enshrines the fundamental rights people enjoy in the EU. Overall, the three policy options are expected to lead to better performance towards fundamental rights protection and an individual’s freedoms especially with regards to justice, fair trials, non-discrimination, equal treatment of perpetrators and the principle of legality, the right to proportionate and effective penalties. The clarification on the exception form liability, as part of the EU liability regime, 119 under all policy options will specifically cover the exception concerning the liability of crew and reinforce their protection through more integrated harmonisation of international rules in national laws and better observance of the rule of law and fair trial principles (See Annex 6, PMc6 for details). It further safeguards the principle of equality, contributing to non-discrimination and equal treatment of seafarers. The measures ensuring clearer delimitation between the infringements falling within the criminal and administrative procedure will facilitate fair trials, non-discrimination, equal treatment of perpetrators and the principle of legality. All three policy options will result in better observance of the right to justice and maintain full respect of human and fundamental rights.

6.2.3.Health of the public

Ship-source pollution has an impact on the marine environment and, therefore, on the water quality of bathing sites. Low quality of the water can be harmful to the human health. Human health may be negatively impacted by various types of pollution including ship pollution to sea in a variety of ways. For instance, sewage (e.g. from cruise ships) contains nutrients and may contribute to toxic algae blooms. Additionally, exposure to chemicals can harm the nervous system, interfere with endocrine signalling, or increase the risk of cancer. Vulnerable population is disproportionately affected by such health impacts. 120 Moreover, the health benefits from consuming fish products from European seas must be taken into consideration in this context. Some fish species contain contaminants such as methylmercury, dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls. 121   

All policy options are expected to lead to positive indirect impacts on public health. The extension of the scope of the Directive to all MARPOL Annexes (PMc1), included in all policy options, is expected to have the largest positive impact on public health. Other measures with a potential impact on the marine environment are those related to improved surveillance and detection capacity as well as more transparent information for the public, included in all policy options. These are expected to discourage ships from intentional discharge of waste into sea and lead to an improvement in the quality of water. This in turn is likely to indirectly result in an improvement in the health status of individuals that use EU bathing sites or consume fish products from European seas. Geographical areas close to the coast are mostly affected by disruptions in the marine environment and therefore would be positively affected to a higher extent by this initiative.

6.3.Environmental impacts

This section provides an assessment of the environmental impacts of the policy options. All policy options are expected to have a positive yet indirect impact on the environment, driven by the reduction of illegal discharges through the deterrent effect of penalties, the awareness raising as well as reputation considerations. Due to serious data limitations concerning the volumes of potential illegal discharges of different polluting substances and the penalties applied, a quantitative assessment was only possible for PMc1 in relation to oil waste 122 . This is complemented by a qualitative assessment of the impacts of all policy measures included in the three policy options.

As explained in section 6.1.1, the upgrades to the CleanSeaNet in PMc1 (included in all options) is expected to also benefit the detection of substances under the current scope of the SSP Directive (i.e. oil). The amount of oil discharged in EU seas by 2015 was estimated at 31,000 m3/year 123 , i.e. approximately 27,280 tonnes. In the baseline scenario the oil discharged in European seas is projected to remain stable over time (see section 5.1). According to a study commissioned by the European Parliament 124 , the external cost of a discharge of a tonne of oil in the sea amounts to approximately EUR 290,000 125 , 126 . For the purpose of the assessment, a conservative assumption has been used - namely, a reduction by 0.5% in the volume of oil illegally discharged relative to the baseline from 2030 onwards. The reduction is gradually phased-in between 2025 and 2030, taking into account the growth in the number of CleanSeaNet alerts in the policy options. The reduction is the same in all policy options due to the fact that PMc1 is included in all options. Over the 2025-2050 period, it is estimated that 3,411 tonnes of MARPOL Annex I, oil discharges would be prevented. The reduction in the external costs, expressed as present value over 2025-2050, is estimated at EUR 690.5 million relative to the baseline. More details are provided in Annex 4 (section 4).

There is high uncertainty related to these estimates due to the serious data limitations and the limited input from stakeholders received during the consultation activities. To acknowledge the high level of uncertainty, sensitivity analysis has been additionally performed. Two additional cases have been considered, assuming 0.3% and 0.7% reduction in the volume of oil discharges relative to the baseline from 2030 onwards. As for the central case, the reduction is gradually phased-in between 2025 and 2030, taking into account the growth in the number of CleanSeaNet alerts. Thus, 1,501 to 5,320 tonnes of oil are estimated to be prevented over 2025-2050, that would result in a reduction of the external costs estimated at EUR 312.8 to 1,068.3 million, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 (see Table 10 ). It should however be acknowledged that even the 0.7% reduction could be considered as conservative, not least because it disregards the additional benefits brought by the prevention of other polluting substances (MARPOL Annex II-VI), which are introduced in the proposed extension of the scope of the Directive (PMc1). These could not be quantified due to the lack of data.

Table 10. Potential environmental benefits for the policy options relative to the baseline, including sensitivity analysis, over 2025-2050

Source: Ricardo (2023), impact assessment support study

The estimated reduction in the level of oil discharges is an indicator of the indirect impact of the policy options covering one out of the six waste categories/ MARPOL Annexes. Due to the significant data gaps, estimating the indirect impacts on Annex II-VI pollutants was not possible. The estimated reduction in oil discharges indirectly links to the level of ambition of the Directive: the aim is to prevent the intentional illegal discharge in the future by penalising current illegal discharges. However, it should be noted that the aim is not to directly reduce the pollution from ships, as some substances can be legally discharged based on MARPOL rules. The envisaged ambition of the Directive is measured through the response rate of Member States to the identified pollution incidents, ultimately leading to penalising the identified offenders.

In the future, the intentional illegal discharges from ships are expected to be of smaller size and more difficult to detect. 129 With accelerating technological development and hyperconnectivity of all systems, as acknowledged by the 2021 Strategic Foresight Report 130 , EMSA services are expected to change much faster in the coming decades and surveillance capacity to increase. Thus, the benefits due to the reduction in external costs may also be higher.

To complete the limited quantitative indication of benefits, a qualitative assessment of the environmental benefits by policy measure and policy option is further provided in Table 11 below.  

Table 11. Qualitative assessment of environmental impacts by policy option and policy measure relative to the baseline

Note: A scoring system is used to compare the options with the baseline scenario. From “0” (no difference from the baseline) to “++++” (significant positive impact compared to the baseline).

PO C is expected to lead to higher environmental benefits than PO B due to the 60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1) and the stronger regulatory approach to the levels of penalties (PM3b) which together would increase the deterrent effect. Provisions on mandatory requirements for Member States on following up pollution incidents and penalising the offender are likely to result in higher environmental benefits than relying on voluntary cooperation and information exchange between Member States and offering flexibility to the Member States as well as soft measures. On the other hand, the environmental benefits of PO A are expected to be lower than those of PO B because the cross-border nature of the problem would be less mitigated by means of cross-border cooperation and information exchange. It is expected that Member States will be more proactive in PO B and PO C, relative to PO A, due to the synergies coming from the common framework as opposed to individual national approaches e.g. in PM2a and PM5a.

Overall, PO C is expected to result in the highest environmental benefits with its regulatory measures, closely followed by PO B, whereas lowest environmental benefits are expected for PO A due to lost opportunities for cooperation, with a limited common framework.

In brief, it was not possible to quantify the environmental impacts from avoided ship-source pollution for all the measures included in the policy options, but as shown above, the impacts are expected to be positive in all policy options. All policy options contribute towards SDG 14 (“Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”).

No significant harm is expected on the environment in the three policy options, in particular in the area of sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources to which the initiative relates. On the contrary, as explain above, all three policy options are expected to have a positive impact on the marine environment. All policy options are consistent with the environmental objectives of the European Green Deal and the European Climate Law 131 . The focus of the SSP Directive on the deterrent effect of penalties reflects the pollution prevention angle of the Green Deal with respect to discharges from ships into sea. As for tackling climate change and emissions to air, the air related problem drivers and policy measures were discarded in the impact assessment because these have a separate approach to regulation and enforcement both at IMO and EU level. More detailed explanations are provided in Annex 5.

7.How do the options compare?

7.1.Effectiveness

The assessment of effectiveness looks at the extent to which the general and specific objectives (SO) of the intervention, as previously described, are met. Table 12  provides the link between policy objectives and assessment criteria. Annex 7 provides a more detailed overview on the effectiveness of the policy options in relation to the specific objectives.

Table 12. Link between objectives and assessment criteria

By design, each of the three policy options is developed in a way that addresses all four problem drivers and specific objectives. They achieve the objectives however at different degrees.

Concerning the general objective, the increased deterrent effect (consequently reduced level of illegal discharges) relative to the baseline benefits the marine environment to a different extent. PO C is expected to have a higher deterrent effect than PO B due to the provision on the 60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1) and the stronger regulatory approach towards the levels of penalties (PM3b). The deterrent effect of PO A is expected to be lower than that of PO B given the fact that the cross-border nature of the problem is less mitigated by means of cooperation and information exchange (PM2a, PM5a). However, it should be noted that there is high uncertainty regarding the environmental benefits of the policy options in terms of the deterrence of illegal discharges into sea, especially because of the limited data available on the volumes of illegal discharges of the polluting substances and the penalties applied.

Concerning SO1, all policy options aim to extend the scope of the Directive (PMc1) as to align with the MARPOL scope of substances discharged into sea (Annexes I to VI). Progress towards this specific objective is assessed through the increase in the level of detection of illegal discharges (oil, noxious substances, packaged goods, sewage, garbage and scrubber discharge water) by ships and the long-term decrease in the number of infringements relative to the baseline (thanks to the deterrent effect). The additional number of illegal discharges detected relative to the baseline and the reduced number of infringements is expected to be the same in all policy options, driven by PMc1 and in particular by the provision of additional satellite surveillance (CleanSeaNet). In addition, all policy options future-proof the Directive by enabling to adjust to potential changes in the existing MARPOL Annexes, thanks to a review clause (also in PMc1). Thus, all policy options are equally effective in achieving SO1.

Concerning SO2, Member State capacity to detect, verify and prosecute infringements would improve in all policy options. Progress towards this specific objective is assessed through the increase in the level of verification of potential illegal discharges as well as the increased proportion of identified offenders as a result of verification. All three policy options contribute towards SO2 through the increased use of knowledge and data sharing (PMc2, PMc3 and PMc5) for the extended list of polluting substances as well as the potential information provided by whistle-blowers (PMc4). PO C is however more effective than PO A and PO B in achieving SO2 due to potentially higher verification levels relative to the baseline, driven by the introduction of the mandatory requirement in relation to the verification of CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1).

Concerning SO3, progress is measured by checking if the level and type of penalties is effective, proportionate and dissuasive. PO A has a limited impact on ensuring that offenders are subject to proportionate penalties because of keeping the status quo i.e. leaving it to the Member States to decide on the level of penalties. However, PO A offers improvements in the prosecution process by the clarification of exceptions at EU level (PMc6) and at national level (PM2a) which could consequently have a positive impact on the application of penalties. PO B and PO C are more effective in achieving SO3 than PO A thanks to the rules on setting the level of administrative penalties (PM3a and PM3b, respectively) and the harmonisation of values of penalties at EU level in PO C (PM3b).

Concerning SO4, progress is measured by the improved reporting on the implementation of the Directive. All policy options are assessed to be effective in achieving SO4, thanks to the obligation to log if and how CleanSeaNet alerts have been verified (PMc7). However, PO B and PO C are more effective than PO A (with the national approach of PM5a) because of the economies of scale linked to the EU-wide tools provided by EMSA (PM4 and PM5b).

Overall, PO C is assessed to be the most effective in achieving the general and specific objectives, followed by PO B and PO A. The assessment of effectiveness is further detailed in Annex 7.

7.2.Efficiency

Efficiency concerns "the extent to which objectives can be achieved for a given level of resource/at least cost". The major costs of the policy options come in the form of adjustment costs for EMSA in all three policy options and enforcement costs for Member States administrations in PO C. They are summarised in  Table 13 .

PO C leads to the highest total costs among the three policy options, estimated at EUR 328.3 to 337.2 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. The highest costs in PO C are the enforcement costs for Member States administrations for the 60% verification rate for CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1). The adjustment costs for EMSA, mainly related to the provision of additional satellite surveillance services to Member State authorities required by the extension of the scope of the Directive (PMc1), represent the second largest element of the total costs of PO C. PO A shows lower costs than PO C, estimated at EUR 133.3 to 142.2 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. The highest cost categories are the adjustment costs for EMSA and the adjustment costs for Member States administrations, linked to information to the public on national websites (PM5a). Finally, PO B shows the lowest total costs among the policy options, estimated at EUR 125.8 to 134.7 million in addition to the baseline costs.

In terms of benefits, all policy options are expected to lead to enforcement costs savings for Member States administrations estimated at EUR 1.8 million, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline. They are driven by the reduction in the time spent for verifying CleanSeaNet alerts due to the enhancement in data exchange tools in the Integrated Maritime Services. In addition, PO B and PO C would also result in administrative costs savings (EUR 0.9 million) driven by the time savings for reporting to the European Commission under the SSP Directive due to the development of a dedicated reporting tool (PM4).

There is high uncertainty regarding the benefits of the policy options in terms of deterrence of illegal discharges to the sea, especially because of the limited data available on the illegal discharges and penalties applied. As explained in section 6.3, as an illustration of the possible impacts on net costs, a conservative assumption of a 0.5% reduction in the oil illegal discharge relative to the baseline is provided linked to the upgrades to the CleanSeaNet in PMc1 (included in all options). Under this assumption, and when also considering the enforcement costs savings and administrative costs savings, all policy options result in substantial total benefits estimated at EUR 693.2 million in both PO B and PO C, and EUR 692.3 million in PO A. A qualitative assessment of the environmental benefits of the policy measures included in the policy options is further provided in Table 13 , drawing on the detailed analysis included in Table 11 in section 6.3.

Table 13. Summary of costs and benefits of policy options – present value for 2025-2050 compared to the baseline (in million EUR), in 2020 prices

Note: A scoring system is used to compare the options with the baseline scenario in relation to the reduction in the external costs due to other measures. From “0” (no difference from the baseline) to “+++” (significant positive impact compared to the baseline).

All policy options would result in net benefits. The net benefits would be the largest in PO B, estimated at EUR 558.5 to 567.4 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050, followed by PO A (EUR 550.2 to 559 million) and PO C (EUR 356 to 364.8 million). PO B and PO A also show higher benefits to costs ratios (respectively, 5.1 to 5.5 and 4.9 to 5.2) relative to PO C (2.1). It should however be noted that the estimation of the net benefits and of the benefits to costs ratio is only provided for illustration purposes, to show that even when achieving low reductions in the level of illegal discharges the policy options would result in net benefits. This is due to the high uncertainly related to the estimated environmental benefits.

All policy options are expected to result in additional environmental benefits relative to the baseline, that could however not be assessed quantitatively. These impacts are expected to be the highest in PO C, followed by PO B and PO A, based on results of the qualitative assessment. This is expected to reduce the gap between the benefit to costs ratio of PO B and PO C. On the other hand, as the benefits are expected to be higher in PO B relative to PO A, the difference in the benefit to cost ratio between PO A and PO B is expected to be larger than shown in Table 13 .

Considering the sensitivity analysis on the impacts of the policy options on external costs of oil waste, provided in section 6.3, the net benefits/net costs have been calculated for each case and are provided in  Table 14 . The table shows that even with lower reduction in the oil waste discharges relative to the baseline, PO B and PO A would still result in net benefits while PO C would result in net costs. On the other hand, it should be noted that not all environmental benefits were quantified and reflected in this table. Thus, PO C may still result in net benefits under all cases assessed.

Table 14. Results of the sensitivity analysis on net benefits/net costs of policy options – present value for 2025-2050 compared to the baseline (in million EUR), in 2020 prices

7.3.Coherence

Internal coherence. The internal coherence concentrates on how the different elements within the Directive itself work together to achieve the objectives. Although all three POs address the identified problem, they do so in different ways. The updated scope of the Directive, which is the case for all policy options, can be implemented with the use of additional tools by EMSA to support the increased surveillance activities that will be required. In this respect all policy options perform equally on internal coherence.

External coherence. The external coherence concentrates on the compliance of the Directive with key EU policy objectives and international agreements. The extension of the scope of the Directive brings it in line with the scope and objectives of other EU initiatives (e.g. Port Reception Facilities Directive)   and international obligations derived from MARPOL. All policy options foster coherence with the Environmental Crime Directive by clarifying definitions in the context of ship-source pollution and removing the provisions of criminal penalties. With the new Environmental Crime Directive, the SSP Directive must be revised to ensure external coherence in the context of criminal penalties. In this respect all policy options perform the same.

7.4.Subsidiarity and proportionality

Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.

The revision of the Directive is necessary because, in the absence of further EU level action, the problem identified would most likely persist. As highlighted in section 3, there is a clear need for EU action on the problem identified, and its drivers. The EU dimension of this problem is mostly related to the cross-border nature of the illegal discharges from ships. Due to the transboundary impact of marine pollution and the fact that perpetrators act across borders, action by Member States alone would not be suited to tackle this problem. Diverging national approaches in this regard hinder an EU-wide deterrent effect preventing pollution from ships.

All policy options address the identified problem and were designed to reach all specific objectives. PO A was designed to avoid diverging approaches at national level by means of platforms for training, guidance and experience exchange as well as digital tools for collection and exchange of information. However if Member States have the flexibility in defining the components of infringements, this may still lead to diverse outcomes.

On the other hand, PO C is regarded as less proportionate because of the proposed strict regulatory approach on levels of penalties and verification obligations. Although it is likely to result in higher levels of verification this does not necessarily translate to a higher level of prosecution or follow up by means of administrative penalties. Given the fact that not all alerted possible pollution incidents can give rise to verification (in that it may not be possible to verify whether pollution has been caused, particularly at night or in bad weather) as well as the difficulties in establishing a direct and causal link between detection, verification, and the necessary follow up action (identification, prosecution and conviction) it is far from clear that PM1 will in fact lead to an increase in penalties being imposed on polluters and on the desired deterrent effect. The majority of stakeholders are of the view that it is not proportionate to apply such strict measure given the resource implications.

Furthermore, the imposition of such a strict regulatory approach in PO C is seen disproportionate on the basis of very uncertain data and weak evaluation of the initiative (due to scarce data). A justification for this choice cannot be backed up with solid data e.g. for PM1 on the 60% verification rate. Most important in this respect is the fact that, the current limited Member State feedback to CleanSeaNet alerts does not show that a higher verification rate leads to higher levels of confirmed cases and thereafter to a higher level of administrative or judicial follow up. 132  Therefore, at this stage and on the basis of the currently available information it is difficult to justify the high cost that the Member States would need to bear without more robust information on the effectiveness of such a measure. To improve the data, the revised Directive provides for the collection of better statistics on how Member States verify CleanSeaNet alerts and how many cases are confirmed to be spills. Therefore, there will also be more information on the environmental benefits of imposing SSP penalties and an opportunity to reassess such a policy option. 

To sum up, PO B is most proportionate and in line with the rules of subsidiarity. It encourages a proactive approach of the Member States placing key importance on the common measures and digital transition, without obliging the Member States to engage in costly verification activities (the results of which in terms of improvement in the enforcement statistics are unproven). The option supports tackling the problem in a proportionate way i.e. not going beyond what it necessary to achieve the objectives. The option relies on the Member States to fulfil their responsibilities effectively thanks to the technical support and capacity building offered. It also relies on their harmonised legislation and genuine, proactive cooperation between all Member States for successful penalising of polluters. Overall, PO B is expected be the most proportionate, with its synergies coming from the common framework, as opposed to individual national approaches (PO A) and strong regulatory approach (PO C).

8.Preferred policy option

8.1.Identification of the preferred policy option and stakeholders views 

8.1.1.Preferred policy option

Although each of the options addresses the problem identified, their drivers and the specific objectives, the three options take different approaches. An overview of the assessment of the policy options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, subsidiarity and proportionality is provided in Table 15 . Based on the assessment done, PO B is considered as the most efficient and proportionate of the policy options. On the other hand, PO C scores better than PO B and PO A on effectiveness. Concerning internal and external coherence, all three policy options perform the same.

Table 15. Overview of the assessment of policy options relative to the baseline

Note: A scoring system is used to compare the options with the baseline scenario. From “0” (no difference from the baseline) to “+++” (significant positive impact compared to the baseline).

The Directive is part of a broader framework of measures aiming to tackle together the identified problem of ship-source pollution in European waters. The maritime safety acquis is based on the rules and standards established by the IMO at the international level. More specifically, the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull tankers (Regulation (EU) No 530/2012) reduced the probability of accidental oil spills in European seas. The flag State Directive (Directive 2009/21/EC) provides rules for ship inspections and fleet oversight for Union flag State administrations which is relevant for preventing pollution of the marine environment in and outside of the Union. When stronger environmental rules become effective under the international conventions, the flag State responsibility to enforce them is automatically extended. The port State control Directive (2009/16/EC) is also relevant in this context because it supports the detection and correction of lack of compliance not only with safety but also with pollution prevention rules and standards, through inspections. Maritime accidents do not only cause casualties and economic losses but can have a direct impact on the environment e.g. oil pollution. Lessons learned from accident investigations (Directive 2009/18/EC) may prevent accidental pollution of the marine environment in the future. Last but not least, the Port Reception Facilities Directive (Directive 2019/EC/883) provides the solution for waste collection in ports and is a key part of the broader framework of measures aiming to tackle the ship-source pollution problem. Thus, this initiative should be seen in the broader context of the framework of measures aiming to tackle together the identified problem of ship-source pollution in European waters.

PO B is the preferred option because it is expected to be the most cost efficient and proportionate option. In terms of efficiency, the benefit to cost ratio is estimated to the be highest in PO B (5.1-5.5), with net benefits estimated at EUR 558.5 to 567.4 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. Furthermore, PO B shows the lowest total costs among the policy options, estimated at EUR 125.8 to 134.7 million in addition to the baseline costs. In terms of subsidiarity and proportionality, PO B relies most on Member States being proactive and fulfilling their responsibilities effectively thanks to the technical support and capacity building offered. It is assessed to be the most proportionate thanks to a harmonised framework, exchange of information and cooperation between all Member States for successful penalising of polluters.

It should be noted that there is high uncertainty related to the estimated environmental benefits due to the illegal discharges prevented. The environmental benefits might be higher, especially due to the increased scope. Nevertheless, PO B is still expected to result in net benefits even when lower environmental benefits are considered.

The following legal and non-legal instruments may be needed for the implementation of the preferred option:

-legal instruments: implementing act(s) e.g. on the criteria for levels of administrative penalties and on reporting requirements and their format/modalities;

-non-legal instruments: EMSA guidance documents on detection and evidence collection for ship-source pollution under the extended scope of the Directive, guidelines produced by Commission based on the work of the expert group, CleanSeaNet digital tool, online portal with key non-confidential information on ship-source pollution.

8.1.2.Overview of stakeholders’ opinions

Stakeholders largely agreed that pollution prevention was still an issue and improvements were needed in this area, particularly by making the Directive more effective. Most stakeholders considered the information systems provided by EMSA had improved pollution detection, although there was in this respect margin to improve their effectiveness. However, the consultation activities suffered from the absence of data both on cost and benefits, but also on the enforcement activities.

The main difference between stakeholders’ groups could be found between NGOs and the industry, the former strongly support to extend the scope of the Directive, including even beyond MARPOL, while the industry contested the rationale for the extension and requested to align the liability regime with MARPOL, i.e. remove the serious negligence provision.

Member States authorities were concerned with the administrative burden while supporting measures to improve exchange of information and cooperation assisted by EMSA.

In relation to the measures proposed, those common to the 3 policy options received a positive opinion from stakeholders, namely the extension of the scope of the Directive (PMc1), EMSA training and guidance (PMc2), the setting of an expert group (PMc3) and the enhancement of Integrated Maritime Services (PMc5).

For some measures, stakeholders considered they lacked sufficient knowledge to have an opinion. This was the case of gathering information from whistle-blowers (PMc4), clarifications on the liability regime (PMc6) and on the type of penalties (PM2 a & b). In the relation to the obligation to register if and how CleanSeaNet alerts had been verified (PMc7), stakeholders’ support was low.

The specific measures included in PO A faced stakeholder opposition: five out of the twelve MS authorities consulted expressed their disagreement with the request for MS to inform the public about ship-source pollution incidents through a national website (PM5a), as they believe it would be enough to provide the information through the reporting portal DONA; they considered this measure would not have a significant impact to the objectives of the SSP Directive.

The specific measures included in PO B: setting criteria for the level of penalties (PM3a), the obligation for Member States to report their data in an EMSA-managed tool on each ship-source pollution incident (PM4) and the publication online by EMSA of key EU information reported by Member States about ship-source pollution incidents (PM5b), encountered low to medium stakeholder support, but no opposition.

The specific measures included in PO C encountered on the one hand opposition, as for the mandatory verification of 60% of CleanSeaNet alerts (PM1), which Member States argued would require significant additional resources, whereas low to medium stakeholder support with no opposition was shown for the measure defining both criteria and maximum and minimum values for penalties (PM3b) or for the obligation for Member States to report their data in an EMSA-managed tool on each ship-source pollution incident (PM4).

To sum up in relation to the preferred policy option (PO B), most of the measures envisaged under this option are in principle supported by stakeholders that responded to the consultation activities. During a stakeholder workshop on 22 September 2022, when asked about the three options, 20 out of 27 voting participants selected strengthened Member State cooperation and EMSA support. However, there are also divergent opinions among stakeholders. Some industry stakeholders are of the opinion that the Directive is not needed at all as international MARPOL rules are sufficient. Four responses to the public consultation from the industry (out of 6) indicate that they consider that the same result in terms of enforcement could have been achieved largely without the Directive, through international rules. However, this was not a prevailing view. Stakeholders are in favour of having EU support for increasing the capacity of Member States and see the need for an EU initiative to support transparency, prioritisation and harmonisation in the area of ship-source pollution. In this context, it should also be noted that the transposition of MARPOL rules into the EU legal system makes these provisions actionable before the European Court of Justice.

Detailed information on the stakeholder consultation is included in Annex 2

8.2.REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)

The revision has a REFIT dimension in terms of alignment and simplification. Better aligning the scope with MARPOL brings the benefits of fully incorporating into the Directive penalties for a broader range of polluting substances under a harmonised approach towards infringements. Simplification aspects include enhancing the existing and developing new modern digital tool for data collection and exchange on ship-source pollution and further develop the relevant automated links in the Integrated Maritime Services. This will improve the use of interoperable digital solutions and make the Directive digital-ready as well as provide opportunities to avoid duplication of reporting at international level (IMO Global Integrated Shipping Information System) and regional level (Regional Sea Agreements).

Member States will face higher costs due to the scope extension as they will receive more CleanSeaNet alerts (coupled with a new requirement to log feedback data) but this has to be seen against the simplification brought about by the new digital tools. The enforcement cost savings for Member States authorities are estimated at EUR 1.8 million 133 , while the administrative cost savings at EUR 0.9 million 134 , expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline (in 2020 prices).

PO B leaves a considerable margin of discretion to Member States, specifically on carrying out their duty of verifying possible spills as to identify the offender. The decision on whether or not to verify a CleanSeaNet alert is left to the Member States and all relevant and available information will be provided to the Member State to support this decision.

In addition, the preferred policy option includes the following elements of simplification:

·The provisions of assistance to national authorities with training, guidance and a dedicated expert group to support capacity building and cooperation between Member States will improve the operational effectiveness of their surveillance and enforcement tools and resources, as well as the efficient use of such resources.

·It will clarify the liability regime i.e. the exception from liability which will improve the understanding of the EU liability regime.

·The EMSA assistance to Member States in the form of analytical tools and hi-tech solutions will increase harmonisation and standardisation across the EU in the context of ship-source pollution.

8.3.Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach

As explained in section 6.1.2, the preferred policy option is not expected to result in additional administrative costs or adjustments costs for the private sector, or for the citizens. More penalties may be expected for ships not meeting MARPOL requirements. The level playing field should bring benefits for the compliant ship operators. In addition, both citizens and business would benefit from the reduction in the ship-source pollution with the benefits expected to be larger for citizens.

9.How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?

The success of the Directive is the effective response of the Member States. It would ultimately mean that the person (legal or natural) responsible for the pollution of the sea is adequately penalised to produce a deterrent effect and this way prevent pollution in the future. SSP penalties can be seen as the end result and last line of defence for pollution prevention and the protection of marine environment.

The Commission services will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of this initiative through a number of actions and a set of core indicators that will measure progress towards achieving the specific objectives. Five years after transposition of the legislation, the Commission services should carry out an evaluation to verify to what extent the objectives of the initiative have been reached.

Table 16. Summary of how impacts will be monitored

Actions foreseen for verifying implementation include:

·Commission/EMSA verifying that feedback to CleanSeaNet alerts is being provided by the Member States in a timely and effective manner and that information on evidence collection and prosecution is uploaded to the reporting tool regularly.

·Commission/EMSA develops an EU website with core indicators on the implementation rate and the key non-confidential information updated regularly with data from the reporting tool to keep the public informed on the implementation and on pollution incidents.

·Visits to Member States to verify operations on the ground, carried out by EMSA on behalf of the Commission, as part of EMSA’s support role to the Commission. These visits will be integrated, where possible, with the visits targeting Port Reception Facilities and should be summarised in visits reports identifying shortcomings in a coherent manner. 135

·Upon request, horizontal analysis and technical assistance to be provided by EMSA 136 (indicating how the legislation is functioning and identifying gaps and solutions thereof) and to be reported to the Commission and Member States.

·

Annex 1 - Procedural information

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references

The lead DG is Directorate General for Mobility and Transport (MOVE), Unit D2: Maritime Safety

DECIDE reference number: PLAN/2019/5432

This initiative was announced under item Action 14 in Action Plan to the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy.

Organisation and timing

The impact assessment and the ex-post evaluation of the Ship-Source Pollution Directive were performed in a back-to-back manner (i.e. the evaluation and impact assessment have been launched at the same time) in 2021-2022.

The impact assessment and evaluation started in 2021, with a combined evaluation roadmap/ inception impact assessment published on 19 May 2021 137 .

The impact assessment on a possible review of the Ship-Source Pollution Directive and the ex-post evaluation were coordinated by an Inter-Service Steering Group (ISG). The Commission Services participating in the ISG were: Secretariat-General, Legal Service, DG Environment, DG Climate Action, DG for Justice and Consumers, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, the European External Action Service and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).

The Inter-Service Steering Group met 6 times: on 12 March 2021, 10 November 2021, 29 April 2022 and 21 June 2022, 14 September 2022 and 27 October 2022. It was consulted throughout the different steps of the evaluation and impact assessment process: notably on stakeholder consultation questionnaire and deliverables and on the draft Staff Working Documents. When necessary bilateral discussions were organised with the concerned services.

The revised draft Staff Working Documents, following the first opinion of the RSB, were consulted with the group during 17-28 February 2023 and comments from DG ENV and EMSA were received and taken into consideration when possible.

Consultation of the RSB