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By taking together both the expenditure as exporting Member State (see Table 26) and Member State of residence (see Table 29) the total expenditure related to the coordination of family benefits could be estimated. It is to be noted that the expenditure of the Member of residence is only based on the export of eight Member States in order to guarantee the comparability between the status quo scenario and Option 3. Although the total expenditure related to Option 3 without making this selection is reported as well (see also Table 21). Belgium, Denmark,23 Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 56 Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria,23 Slovakia, Finland, Iceland and Norway23 experience a lower budgetary cost compared to the status quo scenario. This in contrast to the Czech Republic, Germany, 57 Spain 58 and Poland23 (and probably also France taking into account the high number of exported family benefits to FR) 59 who will experience a higher budgetary cost.

Table Total estimated expenditure related to the coordination of family benefits under the status quo scenario and Option 3

	Status quo			Option 3				% change (B-A)/A
	Exporting MS	MS of residence (only 8 exporting MSs)	Total (A)	Exporting MS	MS of residence (only 8 exporting MSs)	Total (B)	Total all MSs
BE	83,566,755	59,071,068	142,637,823	37,559,439	99,052,367	136,611,806	137,395,750	-4.2%
BG							556,380
CZ	951,041	242,809	1,193,850	71,712	1,861,360	1,933,072	2,009,816	61.9%
DK	24,383,654	192,852	24,576,506	n.a.	455,175	455,175	760,725	-98.1%
DE	105,759,924	43,997,887	149,757,811	169,294,725**	80,411,307	249,706,033	253,705,347	66.7%
EE	573,075	409	573,484	4,739	77,794	82,533	2,288,033	-85.6%
IE	11,576,760	187,566	11,764,326	6,517,702	334,922	6,852,624	11,057,035	-41.8%
EL							565,132
ES	10,729	329,792***	340,521	30,261**	980,132***	1,010,393	3,351,048	196.7%
FR							179,308,374
HR							259,750
IT							3,764,048
CY							75,012
LV	107,478	35,280	142,758	n.a.	122,080	122,080	321,020	-14.5%*
LT							737,151
LU	476,900,069	322,238	477,222,307	281,936,667	476,644	282,413,311	283,126,570	-40.8%
HU	336,232	182,550	518,782	0	326,175	326,175	365,625	-37.1%
MT							33,763
NL	35,622,000	4,214,912	39,836,912	5,310,060	6,697,500	12,007,560	18,525,520	-69.9%
AT	147,322,836	6,947,102	154,269,938	n.a.	11,880,512	11,880,512	12,267,920	-92.3%*
PL	3,995,406	15,028,673	19,024,079	n.a.	48,189,652	48,189,652	70,746,823	153.3%*
PT							2,015,136
RO							1,345,554
SI							185,678
SK	1,544,876	671,030	2,215,906	16,275	1,786,344	1,802,619	2,091,131	-18.7%
FI	19,359,180	573,208	19,932,388	8,134,181	680,833	8,815,014	8,860,866	-55.8%
SE							2,692,808
UK							18,729,012
IS	116,339	3,736	120,075	51307.73334	22704	74,012	95,684	-38.4%
LI							22,345
NO	29,660,573	298,662	29,959,235	n.a.	378420	378,420	1,099,220	-98.7%*
CH							1,680,008
Total	941,786,927	132,299,772	1,074,086,699	522,661,722	253,733,922	776,395,644	1,020,038,283	-27.7%*

* No figures are available for DK, LV, PL, AT and NO as exporting Member State under Option 3. This implies that the total cost under Option 3 is underestimated! If we exclude those countries a total percentage change of -15.4% is obtained.

** The amount related to the export of family benefits to be paid by DE under this option is higher compared to the amount (€ 106 million) under the status quo scenario. This is not possible in practice and is the result of an overestimation of the supplement to be paid by DE (average annual amount per child of € 2,389 applied for DE – see Tables 16 and 17) or an underestimation of the budgetary cost related to the export of family benefits under the status quo scenario reported by the German Delegation (only an average annual amount exported per child of € 993 – see Table 16). This also applies to ES but involves only a small amount in absolute terms (from € 10,729 to € 30,261).

*** The cost to be paid as Member State of residence is probably overestimated taking into account the selective income-tested child benefit scheme of Spain.

Source The authors’ own calculations based on the questionnaire on the export of family benefits

The impact of the export of child benefits on total expenditure is quite limited for most of the Member States under the current rules. On average 1.6% of total public spending on child benefits of 16 reporting Member States could be related to the export of it. Luxembourg is an important ‘outlier’ with regard to the export of child benefits. Almost 50% of the amount of child benefits paid by Luxembourg was exported abroad. When total expenditure related to the coordination of family benefits is taken into account (amount paid as the exporting Member State but also as the Member State of residence of the child(ren)) the budgetary impact on total expenditure will be higher. A change to another option has on average no significant impact on the public spending on family benefits. Only Luxembourg will experience an important decrease in public spending if the Member State of residence of the child(ren) would become primarily competent. This in contrast to Poland (and probably also FR taking into account the high number of exported family benefits to FR), which will experience a much higher public spending if the Member State of residence of the child(ren) would become primarily competent.

Table Budgetary impact as the share of total expenditure on family benefits, 2013/2014

	Status quo	Sub-option 1a	Sub-option 1b	Option 3 (only export)	Status quo broad def. (selective)	Option 3 broad def. (selective)	Option 3 broad def. (all MSs)
BE	1.9%	1.7%	1.7%	0.8%	3.2%	3.0%	3.1%
BG
CZ	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
DK	1.3%	0.9%	0.9%	n.a.	1.3%	0.02%*	0.04%*
DE	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.5%**	0.4%	0.7%**	0.8%**
EE	0.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.0%	0.6%	0.1%	2.3%
IE	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%
EL							0.7%
ES	0.001%	0.001%	0.001%	0.002%**	0.03%	0.1%**	0.3%**
FR
HR
IT
CY
LV	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	n.a.	0.3%	0.3%*	0.7%*
LT
LU	47.4%	41.1%	41.1%	28.0%	47.5%	28.1%	28.2%
HU	19.2%	23.3%	19.2%	0.0%	29.7%	18.7%	20.9%
MT
NL	1.1%	0.8%	0.8%	0.2%	1.2%	0.4%	0.6%
AT	3.4%	3.2%	3.2%	n.a.	3.6%	0.3%*	0.3%*
PL	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	n.a.	1.1%	2.8%*	4.1%*
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI	1.3%	1.0%	1.0%	0.5%	1.3%	0.6%	0.6%
SE
UK
IS	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%
LI
NO	1.7%	0.8%	0.8%	n.a.	1.7%	0.02%*	0.06%*
CH

* No figures are available for DK, LV, PL, AT and NO as exporting Member State under Option 3. This implies that the total cost under Option 3 is underestimated!

** DE and ES: this is probably an overestimation of the budgetary impact.

Source The authors’ own calculations based on the questionnaire on the export of family benefits

Impact of bilateral flows on the budgetary impact of the exporting Member State and the Member State of residence of the children: 2 specific cases

The budgetary impact of the application of a reversed order of competence (Option 3) on the exporting Member State and on the Member State of residence of the child(ren) is visualised below for two main flows of exported family benefits, representing together almost a third of total reported expenditure on the export of family benefits.

1)From Luxembourg to France

Luxembourg has exported 62,164 family benefits to children living in France representing an amount of € 250.7 million. 37,619 children living in France received a family benefit from Luxembourg as the primarily competent Member State representing a total amount of € 184.3 million and another group of 24,524 children living in France received a family benefit from Luxembourg as the secondarily competent Member State representing a total amount of € 66.5 million. The latter already received an estimated amount of € 39.3 million from France as the primarily competent Member State. No supplement should be paid by France as the Member State of residence given that the level of the family benefit in Luxembourg (average annual amount of € 4,109 per child) is higher compared to France (average annual amount of € 1,603 per child). Under Option 3 France as the Member State of residence of the children will be competent to pay a family benefit to the total group of 62,164 children. By taking into consideration an average annual amount of € 1,603 per child, France will pay an estimated total amount of € 99.6 million. Afterwards a supplement of € 190.5 million will be paid by Luxembourg in order to ensure that the child receives the same amount under this option as under the current rules. This implies that Luxembourg has to pay a lower but still significant amount under Option 3 despite the fact that it only has to pay a supplement. This is the result of a much higher family benefit paid by Luxembourg compared to France.

Figure Estimated budgetary impact of the export of family benefits from Luxembourg to France

*The amount paid by LU under Option 3 is higher compared to the amount reported in Table 19 since total spending on the export of family benefits of both options should be equal to each other.

Source The authors’ own calculations based on the questionnaire on the export of family benefits

2)From Germany to Poland

Germany has exported 47,273 family benefits to children living in Poland representing an amount of € 70.4 million. 33,564 children living in Poland received a family benefit from Germany as the primarily competent Member State, representing an estimated total amount of € 57.1 million, and another group of 13,709 children living in Poland received a family benefit from Germany as the secondarily competent Member State representing a total estimated amount of € 13.3 million. The latter already received an estimated amount of € 10 million from Poland as the primarily competent Member State. No supplement should be paid by Poland as the Member State of residence given that the level of the family benefit in Germany (average annual amount of € 2,389 per child) is higher compared to Poland (average annual amount of € 733 per child). Under Option 3 Poland as the Member State of residence of the children will be competent to pay a family benefit to the total group of 47,273 children. By taking into consideration an average annual amount of € 733 per child, Poland will pay an estimated total amount of € 34.7 million. Afterwards a supplement of € 45.8 million will be paid by Germany in order to ensure that the child receives the same amount under this option as under the current rules. This implies that Germany has to pay a lower but still significant amount under Option 3 despite the fact that it only has to pay a supplement. This is the result of a much higher family benefit paid by Germany compared to Poland.

Figure Estimated budgetary impact of the export of family benefits from Germany to Poland

*The amount paid by DE under Option 3 is lower compared to the amount reported in Table 19 since total spending on the export of family benefits of both options should be equal to each other.

Source The authors’ own calculations based on the questionnaire on the export of family benefits

Conclusions

Chapter 8 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems covers the EU provisions on the coordination of family benefits. If family members live in a Member State other than where the insured person works and/or resides, family benefits could in some cases be exported to these family members. Since entitlement to family benefits might arise in more than one Member State (based on residence, employment or receipt of a pension) some priority rules are defined in order to determine the ‘primarily competent Member State’. In this respect, rights available on the basis of employment have first priority. However, when there is employment in two different Member States, it is the Member State of residence of the children that will become primarily competent for the payment of the family benefits. Also, a Member State might have to pay a supplement (corresponding to the difference between the two benefits) as the ‘secondarily competent Member State’ if the family benefit paid by the competent Member State is lower than the family benefit the entitled person would have received from the other Member State.

In the framework of an impact assessment of a revision of Regulation (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 by the end of 2015, the Commission requires a preparatory study on the economic impact of an amendment to the rules of the export of family benefits. The Commission proposed several alternative options, to be compared with the current situation, i.e. the ‘status quo’.

Status quo;

Option 1 – Adjustment of the exported family benefit to the living standards.

oOption 1a - Adjustment of the exported family benefit to the living standards (upwards and downwards).

oOption 1b - Adjustment of the exported family benefit to the living standards (ceiling).

Option 2 – No export (discarded).

Option 3 – A reverse order of competence.

Horizontal Option - Different coordination rules for salary-related child-raising allowances.

Three different types of public spending on family benefits could be defined, in particular benefits in cash, benefits in kind and tax expenditure towards families. However, the analysis of the economic impact of the options has in particular focused on the characteristics of the child benefit schemes. These benefits vary in many Member States with the child’s age and/or with the number of children, and even eleven Member States have implemented a means-test. Public spending on child benefits varies markedly across the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, but also across welfare state regimes. Especially the EU-15 Bismarck-oriented countries show a high level of public spending on child benefits. These differences in characteristics of the child benefits schemes, but also the distribution of means between benefits in cash or in kind and the tax system will have an impact on the national expenditure of child benefits and as a consequence on their export.

A questionnaire on the export of family benefits was launched within the Administrative Commission in order to obtain a view on the budgetary impact of the current rules, but also to use the reported figures for the calculation of the alternative options. 19 Member States were able to provide more detailed data on the export of family benefits of which 17 Member States provided data on the amount of exported family benefits. It follows that the same caution is required when drawing general conclusions on the economic impact of the different options.

A total amount of exported child benefits of € 941.8 million was reported by 17 exporting Member States under the current rules. The impact of the export of child benefits on total expenditure is quite limited for most of the Member States under the current rules. On average 1.6% of total public spending on child benefits of 16 reporting Member States could be related to their export. Luxembourg is an important ‘outlier’ with regard to the export of child benefits. Almost 50% of the amount of child benefits paid by Luxembourg was exported abroad.

The budgetary impact decreases under Sub-option 1a (-15.9%) and even further under Sub-option 1b (-16.6%) if there is an adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the cost of living in the Member State of residence of the child(ren). The budgetary impact of these sub-options will mainly be determined by the breakdown of the family benefits per Member State of residence of the child(ren), the cost of living in these Member States and the differences with the exporting Member State. Sub-option 1b even corrects the expenditure for exporting Member States which show a low cost of living compared to the Member States of residence of the child(ren).

A change of the current priority rules so that only a supplement should be paid by the exporting Member State even results in a decrease by 30.9% of expenditure by the exporting Member States compared to the status quo scenario (excluding the cost to be paid as the Member State of residence). It reflects to a high extent a shift of the expenditure from the exporting Member State towards the Member State of residence of the child(ren). In that case, France, Poland, Belgium and Germany will experience a much higher expenditure as the Member State of residence of the child(ren) compared to the status quo scenario. However, this shift is only partially realised as the level of the family benefit in the main exporting Member States is most of the time (much) higher than the level of the main Member States of residence of the child(ren).

By taking together both the expenditure as exporting Member State and Member State of residence, the total expenditure related to the coordination of family benefits could be estimated. Luxembourg will experience an important decrease in public spending if the Member State of residence of the child(ren) were to become primarily competent. This in contrast to Poland (and probably also FR taking into account the high number of exported family benefits to FR), which will experience a much higher public spending if the Member State of residence of the child(ren) were to become primarily competent.

Annex 1 List of family benefits per Member State

Table A1.1List of family benefits per Member State

	Child benefit	Child-raising allowances	Child care allowances	Birth and adoption grants	Allowance for single parents	Special allowances for children with disabilities	Advance on maintenance payments	Other allowances
Austria	Universal scheme for all residents financed by employers' contributions and taxes providing Child benefit (Familienbeihilfe)	Child-raising allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld) The Income-related Child-raising allowance (einkommensabhängiges Kinderbetreuungsgeld)	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Flat-rate Child-raising allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld): YES Tax credit for single parents (Alleinerzieherabsetzbetrag): YES	Child benefit (Familienbeihilfe) YES	YES	Accommodation and housing allowances according to the Minimum Resources Acts of the Länder. Child tax credit (Kinderabsetzbetrag) Supplement to the flat-rate Child-raising allowance (Beihilfe zum pauschalen Kinderbetreuungsgeld): Families with low income are granted a supplement
Belgium	Compulsory social insurance scheme financed by a federal grant and covering any person considered as active with lump-sum benefits or working as self-employed.	Parental leave	No special allowance.	Birth grant (allocation de naissance/kraamgeld). Adoption grant (prime d'adoption/adoptiepremie)	No special allowance.	Supplementary allowance for children	No special allowance.	When a child is put under the care of a private person through or at the expense of a public authority. Supplement called back-to-school grant. Annual amounts for children with a supplement for single parent families and a social supplement and who are disabled
Bulgaria	A universal system financed by the State budget providing flat-rate benefits to all beneficiaries.	Part of the contribution-funded scheme providing flat-rate benefit for raising a young child (Обезщетение за отглеждане на малко дете) or for adoption of a child between 2 and 5 years of age ( Обезщетение при осиновяване на дете от 2 до 5 годишна възраст). Also two non-contributory child benefits.	No special allowances.	Pregnant women whose average monthly gross income per family member is equal to or lower than a certain level if they are not entitled to maternity benefit (обезщетение за бременност и раждане) under the Social Insurance Code (Кодекс за социално осигуряване) and are permanent residents.	No special allowance.	Mothers of children diagnosed before their 2nd birthday as having more than 50% permanent disability Monthly benefit for raising a child with permanent disabilities The monthly benefit for a child until completion of secondary education with a permanent disability	YES (Министерски съвет).	Targeted allowances for pupils (Целеви помощи за ученици) Targeted allowance for free travel by rail and bus in the country for mothers of many children (Целева помощ за безплатно пътуване с железопътния и автобусния транспорт в страната за многодетни майки)
Croatia	Tax-financed scheme covering all residents who satisfy a means test and providing benefits which vary according to income.	Providing a flat-rate cash benefit payable during parental leave.	No special allowance.	New-born child assistance	No special allowance.	Children allowance (Doplatak za djecu) for disabled children	No special allowance.	Partial State subsidies for children staying in day-care centres (means tested). Benefit according to the Income Tax Act (Zakon o porezu na dohodak)
Cyprus	Tax financed scheme based on habitual residence, number of dependent children, family income and property assets.	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Maternity Grant (Βοήθημα Τοκετού) Special maternity grant to unmarried mothers (Ειδικό βοήθημα τοκετού σε άγαμες μητέρες)	Single parent benefit is granted (Επίδομα Τέκνου).	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	No other allowances.
Czech Republic	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents in the Czech Republic with income-tested benefits depending on the age of the children.	Parental Allowance (Rodičovský příspěvek): Tax financed universal system providing a flat-rate benefit to a parent who personally provides full-time proper care for a small child.	No special allowance.	Entitlement to Birth Grant (Porodné) is related to the first liveborn child and is only granted to families whose income does not exceed 2.4 times the family Living Minimum (Životní minimum). Birth Grant is paid to:	No special allowance.	Disability of children is reflected in two Foster Care Benefits (Dávky pěstounské péče): Foster Child Allowance (Příspěvek na úhradu potřeb dítěte) and Foster Parent Allowance (Odměna pěstouna), see “Other allowances”.	No special benefit.	Foster Care Benefits (Dávky pěstounské péče): * Foster Child Allowance (Příspěvek na úhradu potřeb dítěte), * Foster Parent Allowance (Odměna pěstouna), * Fostering Grant (Příspěvek při převzetí dítěte), * Motor Vehicle Grant (Příspěvek na nákup motorového vozidla), * Grant in Foster Care Termination (Příspěvek při ukončení pěstounské péče).
Denmark	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents providing benefits depending on the age of the child and the income of the family.	No special allowance.	Child care allowance: Tax financed. Municipalities can introduce such benefit for parents taking care of their own children instead of putting them in a day care facility.	Amount per child per quarter until the children's 7th birthday, in case of birth of more than one child and in case of adoption of more than one child (flerbørnstilskud). Allowance (single benefit) in case of adoption of a foreign child	The general Child allowance (ordinært børnetilskud) is supplemented (ekstra børnetilskud)	Income replacement benefit for domiciliary care of a disabled child	YES	Special allowance for parents still studying (børnetilskud til forældre under uddannelse) Supplementary child allowance (supplerende børnetilskud i visse skole- og praktikperioder) for parents during internship and school term(statens uddannelsesstøtte)
Estonia	Tax financed universal scheme with flat rate benefits covering all residents.	Parental Benefit: (vanemahüvitis) Child Care Allowance (lapsehooldustasu) Supplementary Child Care Allowance (täiendav lapsehooldustasu)	No special allowance.	Childbirth Allowance (sünnitoetus)	Single Parent's Child Allowance (üksikvanema lapse toetus)	Disabled Child Allowance (puudega lapse toetus) The Social Benefit Rate (sotsiaaltoetuste määr) Study Allowance (õppetoetus)	YES	Conscript's and Alternative Civilian Servant’s Child Allowance (ajateenija ja asendusteenistuja lapse toetus) Foster Care Allowance (eestkostel või perekonnas hooldamisel oleva lapse toetus) Adoption Grant (lapsendamistoetus)
Finland	Tax financed flat rate benefit for children resident in Finland.	Parental allowance (vanhempainraha)	All children (aged 10 months – 6 years) have a subjective right to day care arranged by municipalities. Families who care for their children at home or arrange the care privately are entitled to cash benefits.	A maternity grant (äitiysavustus) An adoption grant (adoptiotuki)	The Child Allowance (lapsilisä) is supplemented	Disability allowance for persons under 16 years of age (alle 16-vuotiaan vammaistuki)	Maintenance allowance for children (elatustuki)	Means-tested housing allowances (asumistuki) available to families with low income.
France	Universal scheme financed by contributions from employers, from the self-employed and from a portion of the Generalised social contribution (contribution sociale généralisée, CSG).	Infant Welcome Benefit (Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE).	Complement for Child Care Choice of the Infant Welcome Benefit (Complément de libre choix de mode de garde de la Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE)	Birth or Adoption Grant of the Infant Welcome Benefit (Prime à la naissance ou à l'adoption de la Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE) Basic Allowance of the Infant Welcome Benefit (Allocation de base de la Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE)	Active solidarity income (revenu de solidarité active, RSA)	Special education allowance for a disabled child (allocation d'éducation de l'enfant handicapé, Aeeh) for persons with a 50% or more handicap, up to the age of 20 Possibility to opt for the disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap, PCH)	YES	New School Year Allowance (allocation de rentrée scolaire) for children aged 6 – 18. Family supplement (complément familial) subject to means test Housing allowance (allocation de logement)
Germany	Tax-funded scheme with fixed amounts for tax exemption of the parental income to the amount of certain needs of a child for all parents and for the promotion of family, in so far as child benefit is not used for tax exemption.	Parental allowance (Elterngeld) child care allowance (Betreuungsgeld)	No special allowances.		No special allowances	No special allowances.	The Advance Payment of Maintenance Act (Unterhaltsvorschussgesetz)	The Parental allowance (Elterngeld) is treated separately from Child-raising leave (Elternzeit). Grandparents are also entitled to child-raising leave. Parents are entitled to supplementary child allowance (Kinderzuschlag)under specific conditions.
Greece	Compulsory social insurance system financed by contributions covering employees, and providing benefits depending on the number of children. Benefits are granted once every calendar year covering the whole year.	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Childbirth benefit for obstetrics costs (ΒΟΗΘΗΜΑ ΤΟΚΕΤΟΥ )	The single parent receives the Child benefit (ΟΙΚΟΓΕΝΕΙΑΚΑ ΕΠΙΔΟΜΑΤΑ)	Allowance for parent of disabled child	No special allowance.	* Benefit granted to mothers for the support of unprotected children who do not have a father. * Single allowance child support (ΕΝΙΑΙΟ ΕΠΙΔΟΜΑ ΣΤΗΡΙΞΗΣ ΤΕΚΝΩΝ) * Special benefit for families with at least three children (ΕΙΔΙΚΟ ΕΠΊΔΟΜΑ ΤΡΊΤΕΚΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΎΤΕΚΝΩΝ)
Hungary	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents.	Child Home Care Allowance (Gyermekgondozási segély) Child Raising Support (Gyermeknevelési támogatás) Child Care Fee (Gyermekgondozási díj)	In-kind benefit, local authority run crèches and kindergarden (co-financed by the parent).	Pregnancy-Confinement Benefit (Terhességi-gyermekágyi segély) Birth Grant (Anyasági támogatás)	Entitlement to higher amounts of Family Allowance (Családi pótlék)	Entitlement to higher amounts of Family Allowance (Családi pótlék)	Advance on maintenance payments (Tartásdíj megelőlegezése)	Regular Child Protection Allowance (Rendszeres gyermekvédelmi kedvezmény) Family tax allowance (Családi kedvezmény)
Iceland	Flat-rate benefits, based on residency, to families with children reduced when income exceeds a certain level.	No child-raising allowance.	No special allowance. Municipalities may subsidise the cost of day care for children in private homes, e.g. in the case of single parents.	Flat-rate adoption grant (ættleiðingarstyrkur)	Single parent allowance (mæðralaun)	Home care allowance (umönnunargreiðslur)	YES	A single flat-rate child pension with respect to education (barnalífeyrir vegna skólanáms) Means-tested housing allowances (húsaleigubætur)
Ireland	Tax financed flat rate universal scheme covering all resident children. The rate of payment is dependent on the ranking of the child within the family.	No special allowance.	Not applicable.	No special allowance.	One Parent Family Payment is available as a separate and specific means-tested scheme	Domiciliary Care Allowance	No special allowance.	Family Income Supplements (FIS) Guardian’s Payment (Non-Contributory)
Italy	System financed mainly by the employers' contributions and partly by workers’ contributions (as established in the employment contract) covering the employees with benefits depending on the family income and on the number of family members.	Optional supplementary parental leave (Congedo parentale facoltativo)	No special allowance, but vouchers are granted to help meeting the additional expenses of raising children		Increased family allowance if lone parent with a child.	No specific allowance for disabled children.	No special allowance.	Social Card Children of severely disabled persons (Erogazione integrativa per grandi invalidi)
Latvia	Tax-financed universal scheme with flat-rate benefits and covering all permanent residents.	Child Raising Allowance (Bērna kopšanas pabalsts) Parental benefit (Vecāku pabalsts)	No special allowance.	Childbirth Allowance (Bērna piedzimšanas pabalsts)	No special allowance.	Supplement to the family State benefit for disabled child (Piemaksa pie ģimenes valsts pabalsta par bērniu invalīdu) Disabled child raising allowance (Bērna invalīda kopšanas pabalsts)	No special allowance.	Compensation for taking care of an adoptee Compensation for adoption Compensation for the execution of the guardian's duties Remuneration for the fulfilment of foster family duties Allowance to a foster family for a dependent child Allowance to a foster family for the purchase of clothing and soft furnishings
Liechtenstein	Compulsory public system financed by contributions for persons resident or gainfully employed in Liechtenstein.	No child-raising allowance	No special benefit.	Amount at the birth of one child, Amount per child in the case of multiple births. Birth allowances (Geburtszulagen) are also paid in cases of adoption of a child under the age of 5.	Additional monthly Single Parent Allowance (Alleinerziehendenzulage)	No special benefit.	NO	Compensation of differences
Lithuania	Tax financed universal scheme for all residents with benefits depending on family income, age and number of the children. Child benefit is paid to families raising children and to children deprived of parental care.	Compulsory insurance for employees financed by contributions and providing earnings-related Maternity/Paternity Benefit, Motinystės/tėvystės pašalpa).	No special allowance.	Child Grant (Vienkartinė išmoka vaikui)	Payments for child maintenance in pre-school institution may be reduced by 50%.	Social assistance pension (Šalpos pensija)	No special allowance.	Benefit for a Child of a Servisman in Mandatory Primary Military Service (Išmoka privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos kario vaikui Guardianship (Curatorship) Benefit (Globos (rūpybos) išmoka) Settlement grant (Vienkartinė išmoka įsikurti)
Luxembourg	Universal tax financed scheme. Child’s own right linked to residence. The amount varies depending on the family group and increases according to the age of the child.	Child-raising Allowance (allocation d'éducation)	No special allowance.	Birth Grant (allocation de naissance)	No special benefit.	Supplementary allowance	Any maintenance due to the spouse, an ascendant or a descendant is paid on request and under certain conditions by the national solidarity fund and recovered by it.	Parental leave (congé parental) New School Year Allowance (allocation de rentrée scolaire) A child bonus (boni pour enfant)
Malta	A universal system financed by general taxation providing an earnings-related allowance to all Maltese citizens whose children reside in Malta.	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Maternity Benefit (Beneficcju tal-Maternita’)	Single Parents are treated as a family in their own right and are entitled to Social Assistance (Ghajnuna Socjali) as well as Child Allowance (Allowance tat-Tfal).	Disabled Child Allowance (Allowance ghal tfal b'Dizabilita').	The law courts determine whether and how much maintenance should be paid. If claimant does not receive maintenance, the social security department pays the full rate to claimant.	* A head of household who cares for a child or a person whose parents are unknown or have abandoned him/her will be entitled in respect of such a child or person to the allowances as a distinct and separate entitlement to that applicable in respect of his/her own children. * A benefit is payable to recognised institutions for the care of children and foster parents for the benefit of children without families or children in foster homes.
Norway	Tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit for all children.	Compulsory social insurance scheme for the active population (employees and self-employed) with Parental Benefit (foreldrepenger)	Monthly Cash Benefit for Parents with Small Children (kontantstøtte)	Maternity/Adoption Grant (engangsstønad ved fødsel/adopsjon)	* Child benefit for one more child than the single parent actually has. In addition an infant supplement (småbarnstillegg) is paid * Transitional benefit (over-gangsstønad) . * Education benefit (utdanningsstønad) * Child Care Benefit (stønad til barnetilsyn) wsyn).	Transitional benefit (overgangsstønad)	Advance maintenance payment (bidragsforskott)	Means-tested housing support (bostøtte)
Poland	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents with benefits depending on the age of the children.	Tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit as a supplement to Family Allowance.	No special allowance.	Childbirth lump-sum as supplement to Family Allowance (Dodatek z tytułu urodzenia dziecka) One-time childbirth grant (Jednorazowa zapomoga z tytułu urodzenia się dziecka)	Supplement for raising a child alone (dodatek z tytułu samotnego wychowywania dziecka)	Medical Care Allowance (Zasiłek pielęgnacyjny) Training and Rehabilitation of Disabled Child supplement (dodatek z tytułu kształcenia I rehabilitacji dziecka niepełnosprawnego) Special attendance allowance (Specjalny zasiłek opiekuńczy)	Alimony Fund Benefit (Świadczenie z funduszu alimentacyjnego)	Child-minding Allowance (Zasiłek opiekuńczy) Commencement of a School Year supplement (Dodatek z tytułu rozpoczęcia roku szkolnego) Child Education out of the Place of Residence supplement (Dodatek z tytułu podjecia przez dziecko nauki w szkole poza miejscem zamieszkania) Large family supplement (Dodatek z tytułu wychowywania dziecka w rodzinie wielodzietnej)
Portugal	Compulsory universal protection system for all inhabitants financed by taxes, with benefits depending on household income, number and age of the children. Individual right of the child, related to residence.	Extended parental benefit (subsídio parental alargado)	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Child benefit and related allowances and supplements are increased	* Supplement to Child Benefit for disabled children (bonificação, por deficiência, do subsídio familiar a crianças e jovens): * Monthly life annuity (subsídio mensal vitalício) * Extraordinary solidarity supplement (complemento extraordinário de solidariedade) i * Solidarity supplement for the elderly (complemento solidário para idosos)	No special allowance.	Funeral grant (subsídio de funeral) Additional payment (montante adicional) Prenatal Child Benefit (abono de família pré-natal) Study grant (bolsa de estudos)
Romania	Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget, providing both cash and in-kind benefits, including State Allowance for Children (alocatie de stat pentru copii) and Family Support Allowance (alocatie pentru sustinerea familiei).	Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget, providing both cash and in-kind benefits, including Child-Raising Indemnity (indemnizatie pentru cresterea copilului).	Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget, providing both cash and in-kind benefits, including Placement Allowance (alocatie de plasament).	No birth and adoption grants.	Family Support Allowance (alocatie pentru sustinerea familiei)	State Allowance for Children with Handicap (alocatie de stat pentru copii cu handicap) Child-Raising Leave (concediu pentru cresterea copilului) and Child-Raising Indemnity (indemnizatie pentru cresterea copilului)	No advance on maintenance payments.	Bonus for Insertion (stimulent de insertie)
Slovakia	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents with dependant child/ren.	Tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit to all residents with child/ren. The State supports entitled persons in the ordinary (regular) care of children.	State subsidy for kindergartens. Tax Bonus (Daňový bonus) Child Care Allowance (Príspevok na starostlivosť o dieťa)	Birth Grant (Príspevok pri narodení dieťaťa) Annual benefit for multiple birth (Príspevok na viac súčasne narodených detí)	No special allowance.		Alimony Benefit (Náhradné výživné) .	Partial refund (State subsidy) of bus/train fares to school or work and boarding costs for school or work for those undergoing vocational training. Substitute Child Care Support Benefits (Príspevky na podporu náhradnej starostlivosti o dieťa)
Slovenia	Tax financed universal scheme with income-tested benefits depending among others on income and ranking of the child in the family.	Compulsory parental protection insurance with earnings-related benefits for the insured person. Financed by contributions and taxes.	Reduction in payment of nursery school fees (znižanje plačila vrtca)	Layette (pomoč ob rojstvu otroka):	When a child lives in a single-parent family then Child Benefit (otroški dodatek) is increased by 30%.	Special Child care Allowance (dodatek za nego otroka, ki potrebuje posebno nego in varstvo) Partial Payments for Loss of Income (delno plačilo za izgubljeni dohodek)	Maintenance Replacement (nadomestilo preživnine)	Parental Allowance (starševski dodatek) Large Family Allowance (dodatek za veliko družino)
Spain	Tax financed non-contributory benefits for all residents with benefits depending on income, age and degree of disability.	Contributory benefit in kind: the first three years of parental leave (Excedencia por cuidado de hijo)	No special allowance.	Multiple birth grant for two or more children. T	No special allowance.	YES	No special allowance.	No other allowances, but as a contributory benefit in kind, the first year of leave to take care of other relatives (Excedencia para el cuidado de familiares) is considered as period of contribution.
Sweden	Tax financed, compulsory and universal scheme covering all resident parents and children providing a flat-rate child allowance (barnbidrag) and a large family supplement (flerbarnstillägg)	Municipal Child care Allowance Act (lagen (2008:307) om kommunalt vårdnadsbidrag) is giving the municipalities the right to introduce, finance and administer municipal child care allowances.	No special allowance.	No special allowance in case of birth. Allowance in case of adoption		Care Allowance for Disabled Child (vårdbidrag)	Maintenance support (underhållsstöd)	Gender equality bonus (jämställdhetsbonus): Housing allowance (bostadsbidrag) c
Switzerland	Federal scheme: Scheme for agricultural workers and self-employed farmers, financed by contributions and taxes. Cantonal schemes: Schemes for employees and self-employed not involved in agriculture (financed by contributions) and for persons not engaged in paid employment with low income (financed by taxes).	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Federal scheme: No birth allowance. Cantonal schemes: 9 cantons provide a birth allowance (Geburtszulage/allocation de naissance). 8 of these 9 cantons pay a welcome allowance (Adoptionszulage/allocation d'accueil) for the child placed to be adopted.	No special allowance.	Two cantons pay a special allowance.	All cantons have a system for advancing support payments.	Federal scheme: Household allowance (Haushaltungszulage/allocation de ménage)
The Netherlands	General Child Benefit Act (Algemene Kinderbijslagwet, AKW) and Act on Child-related Allowance (Wet op het kindgebonden budget, WKB): tax financed universal scheme covering all residents.	No child-raising allowances.	Under the Child care Act (Wet Kinderopvang) the State, parents and employers together pay the costs of child care in the case the child is cared for outside the home during working hours of the parents.	No special benefit.	No special benefit.	Invalid youths aged 18 or over are entitled to a benefit on account of incapacity for work Compensation under the Regulations governing Contributions towards the Upkeep of Disabled Children living at Home (Tegemoetkoming Onderhoudskosten Thuiswonende gehandicapte kinderen TOG).	No special benefit.	No other allowances.
United Kingdom	Child Benefit: Tax financed (non-contributory) system for all parents of children under 16 (under 20 in certain circumstances). Child Tax Credit: Tax financed, non-contributory, income-related system for all parents of children under 16 (under 20 in certain circumstances).	No child-raising allowance.	Help can be given with child care as part of Working Tax Credit.	Sure Start Maternity Grant	NO	Disability Living Allowance (care/ mobility benefit)		Working Tax Credit (WTC)

*Summary of the more detailed MISSOC tables

Source MISSOC

References

Barslund, M. and Busse, M. (2014), Making the Most of EU Labour Mobility. Report of a CEPS Task Force in cooperation with the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 45 p.

Bradshaw, J. and Finch, N. (2010), ‘Chapter 32. Family Benefits and Services’, in F.G. Castles, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger and C. Pierson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 462-478.

Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI) & Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS)(2014), Rechtsfragen und Herausforderungen bei der Inanspruchnahme der sozialen Sicherungssysteme durch Angehörige der EU-Mitgliedstaaten’, Germany, 139.

Canetta, E., Fries-Tersch, E. and Mabilla, V. (2014), Annual report on statistics on intra-EU movers, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, 76 p.

European Commission (2015), ‘Employment and Social Development in Europe 2014. Chapter 4. Restoring Convergence between Member States in the EU and EMU’, DG EMPL, p. 205-248.

European Commission (2014a), Migrant access to social security and healthcare: policies and practice. European Migration Network Study 2014, DG Home Affairs, 111 p.

European Commission (2014b), ‘Recent trends in the geographical mobility of workers in the EU – EU Employment and Social Situation – Quarterly Review – Supplement June 2014’, DG EMPL, 36 p.

European Commission (2011), Mobility in Europe 2011 – Section III: Migration and cross-border commuting, p. 66-108.

Federaal agentschap voor de kinderbijslag (2014), Buiten het rijk opgevoede kinderen, Belgium, 39 p.

Gauthier, A.H. (1999), ‘Historical Trends in State Support for Families in Europe (post-1945)’, Children and Youth Services Review, Vol. 21, No 11/12, p. 937-965.

Holzmann, R. and Koettl, J. (2014), ‘Portability of Pension, Health, and Other Social Benefits: Facts, Concepts, and Issues’, CESifo Economic Studies, 39 p.

Levy, H., Matsaganis, M. and Sutherland, H. (2013), ‘Towards a European Union Child Basic Income? Within and between country effects’, International Journal of Microsimulation, Vol. 6, No 1, p. 63-85.

Nerb, G;, Hitzelsberger, F., Woidich, A., Pommer, S., Hemmer, S. and Heczko, P. (2009), Scientific report on the Mobility of Cross-Border Workers within the EU-27/EEA/EFTA Countries, MKW Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH and Empira Kft., on behalf of EC – DG EMPL, 86 p.

Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2015), Export of family benefits, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, 33 p.

Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2014), Posting of workers: Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2012 and 2013, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, 40 p.

Sen, A. (1984), ‘The Living Standard’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 36, p. 74-90.

Stávková, J., Zufan, P. and Birciaková, N. (2012), ‘Standard of Living in the European Union’, MPRA.

Stiglitz, J.E., Sen, A. and Fittoussi, J.(2009), Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 291 p.

Tænketanken Europa (2014), ‘Sociale Ydelser og fri bevægelighed - fire bud på vejen frem. Notat’, Tænketanken Europa, Denmark. See also http://english.thinkeuropa.dk/society/social-security-and-freedom-movement-four-proposals-road-ahead

Van Lancker, W. (2014), To whose benefit? An empirical and comparative investigation into the (un)intended consequences of family policy in the social investment state, University Press Antwerp, Antwerp, 266 p.

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ANNEX XIV: HIVA Report aggregation – economic impact

ANNEX XIV

Aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits

Analysis of the economic impact of the options

Prof Dr Jozef Pacolet and Frederic De Wispelaere
HIVA-KU Leuven

August 2015

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B — Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits

Analysis of the economic impact of the options

Network Statistics FMSSFE

This report has been prepared in the framework of Contract No VC/2013/0301 ‘Network of Experts on intra-EU mobility – social security coordination and free movement of workers / Lot 2: Statistics and compilation of national data’. This contract was awarded to Network Statistics FMSSFE, an independent research network composed of expert teams from HIVA (KU Leuven), Milieu Ltd, IRIS (UGent), Szeged University and Eftheia bvba. Network Statistics FMSSFE is coordinated by HIVA.

Authors:

Prof Dr Jozef Pacolet, Head of the ‘Welfare State’ research group, HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society, University of Leuven (KU Leuven).

Frederic De Wispelaere, Senior research associate, HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society, University of Leuven (KU Leuven).

Peer reviewers:

Prof Dr József Hajdú, Head of the Department of Labour Law and Social Security, Szeged University.

Gabriella Berki, Professor Assistant at the Department of Labour Law and Social Security, Szeged University.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Preface

Introduction

1. Characteristics

2. Expenditure

3. Reference group

4. The estimated economic impact of the current rules and the alternative
options

4.1. Data collection

4.2. Overview of the different options

Option 1 – Status quo

Option 2 – The formalisation of the “one-day rule”

Option 3 – A threshold for a minimum period for aggregation

Option 4 – A change of the calculation method

4.3. Estimated economic impact of the different options

Options 1 and 2 – The current rules

Option 3 – A threshold for a minimum period for aggregation

Option 4 – A change of the calculation method: salary earned in the Member State of origin is also taken into account

Summary

Conclusions

References

List of Tables

Table 1Types of intra-EU labour mobility, 2012-2013

Table 2Unemployment benefits – Earnings taken as reference, 2014

Table 3Unemployment benefits – Determination of the duration of the benefits, 2014

Table 4Expenditure unemployment benefits (Full unemployment benefits), 2012

Table 5Migration flows of EU-27 and EFTA movers of working age (15-64), by citizenship, 2012

Table 6Number of aggregations of periods in case of unemployment, 2013

Table 7Unemployment assistance, EU-28/EFTA, 2014

Table 8Guaranteed minimum resources, cash benefits, 2014

Table 9Unemployment benefit, impact of the earnings on the level of the UB, 2014

Table 10Estimate of the annual budgetary impact under the current rules (options 1 and 2)

Table 11Estimate of the annual budgetary impact under sub-option 3a

Table 12Annual cost for the previous Member State responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one month of insurance, employment or self-employment, average duration of unemployment, three months entitled to an unemployment benefit and maximum duration entitled to an unemployment benefit

Table 13Total cost under sub-option 3a1

Table 14Estimate of the budgetary annual impact under sub-option 3b

Table 15Annual cost for the previous Member State responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed three months of insurance, employment or self-employment, average duration of unemployment, three months entitled to an unemployment benefit and maximum duration entitled to an unemployment benefit

Table 16Total cost under sub-option 3b1

Table 17Average earnings also taking into account the salaries earned in the Member State of origin compared to the current situation, threshold of one month

Table 18Average earnings taking into account also the salaries earned in the Member State of origin compared to the current situation, threshold of three months

Table 19Estimate of the budgetary annual impact under sub-option 4a

Table 20Estimate of public spending for cases less than 30 days under the baseline scenario and under sub-option 4a

Table 21Estimate of the budgetary annual impact under sub-option 4b

Table 22Estimate of public spending for cases less than three months under the baseline scenario and under sub-option 4b

Table 23A comparison of options between Member States, % change compared to the baseline scenario

Table 24A comparison of options between Member States, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact

List of Figures

Figure 1Determination of the reference group and the budgetary impact

Figure 2Unemployment benefits – Qualifying period, 2014

Figure 3Minimum and maximum duration of the unemployment benefit, 2014

Figure 4Full unemployment benefits – expenditure, in € per unemployed person, 2012

Figure 5EU-28/EFTA movers and nationals, by labour market status, 2013

Figure 6Annual gross earnings, single person without children, 67% of average wage, 2013

Preface

In the framework of an impact assessment of a revision of Regulation (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 by the end of 2015 the Commission requires a preparatory study on the economic impact of an amendment of the aggregation rules for unemployment. The Commission proposed several alternative options, to be compared with a first option representing the current situation, i.e. the ‘status quo’. 60

Option 1 – Status quo: “maintaining the wording of Article 61”.

Option 2 – The formalisation of the “one-day rule”.

Option 3 – The introduction of a minimum period for aggregating periods of insurance, employment or self-employment;

oSub-option 3a: one month of insurance, employment or self-employment needs to be completed before aggregation can be applied.

Sub-option 3a1: Previous Member State is responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one month of insurance, employment or self-employment.

oSub-option 3b: three months of insurance, employment or self-employment need to be completed before aggregation can be applied.

Sub-option 3b1: Previous Member State is responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed three months of insurance, employment or self-employment.

Option 4 – A change of the calculation method of the unemployment benefit.

oSub-option 4a: the salary earned in the previous Member State is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the competent Member State, if less than one month of insurance, employment or self-employment is completed.

oSub-option 4b: the salary earned in the previous Member State is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the competent Member State, if less than three months of insurance, employment or self-employment is completed.

Informing the debate with reliable and recent information is essential. Information could be collected in several ways to gain insight in the current situation. This information should also be useful in order to calculate the different options. Over the past few years, the collection of national administrative data moved ahead as several questionnaires were launched within the framework of the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems. In 2015, among others, a questionnaire was launched on the aggregation of unemployment benefits. These data provide already a first overview of the current situation (see Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015). Nonetheless, data collected outside the framework of the Administrative Commission is also highly relevant. These data available at EU level or at national level are especially useful when they are combined or confronted with administrative data of the questionnaire.

Some data sources, interesting for different reasons, which can be extracted at EU level:

provide information on national social security systems (MISSOC, OECD);

provide information on intra-mobility (LFS, Eurostat migration statistics, national reports);

compare total national expenditure with the specific cross-border expenditure (OECD, ESSPROS, Ageing Report 2012 or 2015).

Intra-EU labour mobility has different faces (Table 1): ‘permanent’ stay in another EU Member State as a result of migration; cross-border commuting and ‘temporary’ stay through the posting of workers. A first group are EU migrants of working age who moved to an EU Member State other than their EU Member State of birth or of their citizenship. In 2013, the ‘stock’ of citizens of working age (15 to 64 years) from an EU-28 Member State/EFTA country who resided in another EU-28 Member State was around 3.1% of the total population residing in the EU-28 Member States (Cannetta et al., 2014). In 2013, some 7 million EU citizens worked and lived in an EU Member State other than their own (equal to 3.3% of total employment in the EU) (European Commission, 2014a). However, in order to assess the current aggregation rules a more detailed view on the yearly flow of intra-EU migrants is needed. In 2012, some 1.8 million EU/EFTA citizens of working age migrated to another EU-28 Member State or EFTA country, of which some 700,000 EU-28/EFTA citizens returned to their Member State of citizenship. In addition, in 2013 some 1.3 million EU citizens were employed in an EU Member State other than their EU Member State of residence (i.e. ’cross-border workers’), representing 0.6% of total employment in the EU. 61 Some 65% (about 814 thousand) cross-border workers were employed in a neighbouring Member State (i.e. ‘frontier workers’) 62 . Finally, in 2013 some 1.34 million ‘Portable Documents A1’ 63 were issued to posted workers residing in an EU-28 Member State/EFTA country (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014). The reference group to be studied within the context of this report are the new intra-EU migrants of working age.

Table Types of intra-EU labour mobility, 2012-2013

Type	Flow/Stock	Number	%	Year
Total stock EU/EFTA migrants of working age*	Stock		3.1% of total EU-28 population of working age	2013
Flow of EU/EFTA migrants of working age*	Flow	1.8 million	0.5% of total EU-28/EFTA population of working age	2012
Of which ‘return migration’ **	Flow	714,000	0.2% of total EU-28/EFTA population of working age	2012
EU migrants working and living in another MS	Stock	7 million	3.3% of total EU employment	2013
Cross-border workers in EU-28	Stock	1.3 million	0.6% of total EU employment	2013
Of which ‘frontier workers’	Stock	814,000		2013
Posted workers in EU28/EFTA***	Flow	1.34 million	± 0.6% of total EU/EFTA employment	2013

* By citizenship of the migrant.

** We cannot know if someone has ever previously lived in the country of citizenship.

*** Number of forms issued.

Source Eurostat data on migration, Cannetta et al., 2014; Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014.

Introduction

The unemployment chapter of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 64 provides for specific coordination rules for the aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment in case of unemployment. Aggregation will be applied to those unemployed recent migrant workers who have completed their most recent periods of insurance, employment or self-employment in the Member State where the benefit is claimed. In some cases the period of insurance, employment or self-employment is insufficient to be entitled to an unemployment benefit. In that case additional periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed by the person in a Member State other than the competent State are required (by the use of a Portable Document U1 or a Structured Electronic Document U002). 65 Portable Document (PD) U1 or the corresponding Structured Electronic Document (SED) U002 certify periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed by a worker in another Member State, which are to be taken into account for the award of unemployment benefits. PD U1 is issued to the worker, on his or her request, by the institution of the Member State where the person completed the periods of insurance, employment or self-employment. SED U002 is issued at the request of the competent institution. It should be noted that a migrant worker becomes subject to the legislation of a Member State as soon as he or she starts to work there. Hence, the aggregation rules become fully applicable as from that moment.

Box 1 – Scope of the aggregation rules

The scope of the aggregation rules covered by PD U1 or SED U002 includes unemployed recent migrant workers, unemployed frontier workers and cross-border workers, other than frontier workers. However, the latter two groups fall outside the scope of this study.

- Frontier workers (i.e. people who work in a Member State other than the Member State of residence, and return home daily or at least once a week) who become wholly unemployed must apply for unemployment benefits in their Member State of residence.

- Cross-border workers, other than frontier workers (i.e. people who work in a Member State other than the Member State of residence, and do NOT return home daily or at least once a week), may apply for unemployment benefits and register with the employment service in either the Member State of last activity or the Member State of residence.

There is also a reimbursement mechanism between the Member State of last activity and the Member State of residence where unemployment benefits are claimed. The Member State of last activity only reimburses the State of residence the first three months of the unemployment benefits paid by the latter. This is extended to five months if the person has been insured in the Member State of last activity for at least 12 months in the preceding 24 months.

The group of unemployed frontier workers and other cross-border workers involved and the budgetary consequences on public unemployment spending may even be larger compared to the number of unemployed recent migrant workers and the corresponding expenditure.

By quantifying the number of new intra-EU movers who became unemployed after only a short period of employment and the budgetary consequences, an impact assessment of the current rules but also of the several options can be made (Figure 1). Thus, more information on the number of new EU/EFTA movers; the number of new EU/EFTA movers who became unemployed; the period of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in the Member State of last activity; the qualifying period; the average level of the unemployment benefit and the average duration of unemployment will be required.

Figure Determination of the reference group and the budgetary impact

Source The authors’ own figure

1.Characteristics

The analysis of MISSOC (2014) creates the opportunity to obtain an overview of the different dimensions of the national unemployment schemes and in particular of the qualified period, the waiting period, the level of the unemployment benefit, the duration of the unemployment benefit etc. A comparable exercise was recently provided by Esser et al (2013), commissioned by DG EMPL, based on data from the Social Policy Indicator Database (SPIN). 66

The entitlement to unemployment benefits is based upon the completion of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment. The qualifying period varies across Member States, from at least four months in France to 24 months in Slovakia (Figure 2). Nevertheless, many Member States apply a qualifying period of some 12 months (BE, CZ, DK, DE, EE, ES, IT, HU, MT, AT, PL, PT, RO, LI and CH). However, it should be noted that there are large differences in the time in which this period must be completed. It will make the accomplishment of the acquired period more severe or less severe. Those national provisions will influence the number of PDs U1 required and the period of insurance, employment or self-employment to be completed by a worker in a Member State other than the competent State in order to be entitled to an unemployment benefit. This report will provide more information on the links between those elements.

Figure Unemployment benefits – Qualifying period, 2014

Source MISSOC, 2014

In almost all Member States (excluding IE, MT, PL and UK) earnings received before unemployment will be taken into account as reference basis for the calculation of the unemployment benefit (Table 2). However, the applied calculation method varies, from taking into account the last salary earned (BE, NL and LI) to the average earnings of several months (from three months in HR, CZ, DK and LU to 36 months in LT).

These national rules do not apply to earnings acquired in another Member State. Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 has defined the calculation method of the unemployment benefit in case of aggregation of periods. The calculation method should only take into account the salary or professional income received by the person concerned in respect of the last activity as an employed or self-employed person. This implies that the unemployment benefit calculated on the basis of the current EU provisions might differ from the unemployment benefit if national rules would be applied (most of the Member States calculate the unemployment benefit on the basis of an average amount of earnings received during several months). 67

This calculation method of the unemployment benefit has also been changed compared to ‘old’ Regulation (EEC) 1408/71. The second part of Article 68 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 stated that “if the person concerned had been in his last employment in that territory for less than four weeks, the benefits shall be calculated on the basis of the normal wage or salary corresponding, in the place where the unemployment person is residing or staying, to an equivalent or similar employment to his/her last employment in the territory of another Member State”.

Table Unemployment benefits – Earnings taken as reference, 2014

Not based on earnings	Variation by level of earnings	Last salary earned	Average earnings of … months
			3	6	8	9	12	24	36
IE; MT; PL; UK	EL	BE; NL; LI	HR; CZ; DK; LU	IS; ES; CH	SI	EE	AT; CY; FR; DE; HU; LV; NO; PT; RO; SE	BG; IT; SK	LT

Source MISSOC, 2014

Another dimension which will influence the budgetary cost is the duration of the unemployment benefits (Table 3). 68 The applied method in order to determine the maximum entitlement period varies across Member States. In many Member States the period of insurance/employment/contribution also determines the duration of the payment while in other Member States a fixed duration of entitlement has been determined. Only Belgium has an unlimited benefit duration.

Table Unemployment benefits – Determination of the duration of the benefits, 2014

No limit	Fixed number	Unemployment rate	Insurance period	Employment (contribution) period	Insurance duration and age	Contribution duration and age	Age
BE	CY; DK; FI; IS; LV; MT; LU; NO; SK; SE; UK	PL	BG; EE; FR; HU; IE; LT	HR; EL; RO; ES; CH; NL	AT; DE; LI; SI	PT	CZ; IT

Source MISSOC, 2014

Table 4 provides information on the minimum and maximum duration of the unemployment benefit. The entitlement to an unemployment insurance benefit will be limited to a number of weeks or months (except for BE) and varies markedly across but also within Member States.

Figure Minimum and maximum duration of the unemployment benefit, 2014

*Belgium: unlimited

* Note that for Slovenia the minimum duration has changed due to a new category being introduced so that coverage of least entitled actually increased.

Source EC, 2015 (chart 76) based on MISSOC 2014

2.Expenditure

In 2012, the average EU public spending on unemployment benefits amounted to 1.0% of GDP and varied from 0.1% of GDP in Romania to 2.3% of GDP in Ireland (Table 4). Total expenditure could be divided by the total number of unemployed persons who became unemployed during the reference year. 69 The average annual spending per unemployment varies markedly across the EU Member States from a high amount per unemployed person in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway to a very low one in Romania, Lithuania and Poland (see also Figure 4). Differences in terms of expenditure across the EU-15 Member States and the EU-13 Member States could be observed as well. These amounts will be important for the calculation of the financial impact of the several options.

The eligibility criteria and the coverage of the national unemployment schemes (discussed above and described more in detail by the MISSOC tables) will influence to a high extent the public unemployment spending. 70 Moreover, the access to guaranteed minimum resources (i.e. social assistance) 71 and the transition to it when there is no longer an entitlement to an unemployment benefit could result in a shift from contribution-financed public unemployment spending towards tax-financed public spending on social assistance.

Table Expenditure unemployment benefits (Full unemployment benefits), 2012

Member State	In million €	In percentage of GDP	In € per unemployed person	In € per inhabitant**	In purchasing power standard per inhabitant
BE	5,577	1.5	15,113	429	444
BG	181	0.5	442	18	57
CZ	341	0.2	929	24	48
DK	2,696	1.1	12,310	413	332
DE	21,363	0.8	9,606	241	264
EE	37	0.2	540	20	39
IE	3,792	2.3	11,999	828	689
EL	1,279	0.7	1,071	95	130
ES	24,146	2.3	4,155	440	547
FR	31,121	1.5	10,889	425	435
HR	180	0.4	607	34	64
IT	9,929	0.6	3,618	144	163
CY	124	0.7	2,394	121	162
LV	59	0.3	378	19	44
LT	68	0.2	345	16	39
LU	275	0.6	21,189	449	380
HU	208	0.2	439	18	38
MT	23	0.3	2,115	48	74
NL	10,183	1.7	21,712	547	546
AT	2,297	0.7	12,151	235	247
PL	640	0.2	366	14	31
PT	2,482	1.5	2,969	211	283
RO	183	0.1	291	8	19
SI	199	0.6	2,214	82	118
SK	176	0.2	465	21	50
FI	3,189	1.7	15,408	499	480
SE	1,704	0.4	4,227	149	132
UK	6,646	0.3	2,623	102	89
EU-28	129,097	1.0	5,111	227	256
IS	130	1.2	11,810	501	366
NO	1,367	0.4	16,087	223	163
CH	3,266	0.7	15,157	302	246

*Annual average number of unemployed persons

** At constant 2005 prices

Source ESSPROS [spr_exp_fun], [une_nb_a] and [lfsa_ugan] (only for CH)

Figure Full unemployment benefits – expenditure, in € per unemployed person, 2012

Source ESSPROS [spr_exp_fun] and [une_nb_a]

3.Reference group

The Annual report on labour mobility (Cannetta, Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2014), commissioned by DG EMPL, provides information on the stock and flows of EU citizens residing and/or working in another EU Member State/EFTA country. In 2013, the share of citizens of working age (15 to 64 years) from an EU-28 Member State/EFTA country who resided in another EU-28 Member State was around 3.1% of the total population of working age residing in the EU-28 Member States. However, in order to assess the impact of the aggregation rules a more detailed view on the inflow of EU migrants is required. The labour status during the first year of residence of this group of recent movers and their previous labour status in the Member State of origin will determine if periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed in a Member State other than the competent Member State are taken into account by the unemployment scheme of the competent Member State.

Based on the ‘Migration and migrant population statistics’ published by Eurostat more detailed information could be obtained on the annual flow of immigrants (Table 5). In 2012, some 1.8 million EU-28/EFTA citizens of working age (between 15 and 64) migrated to another EU Member State/EFTA country. Some 700 thousand or 40% of the EU-28/EFTA movers have, however, the same nationality as their new Member State of residence (so-called ‘return migration’) 72 . This is especially observed for Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (higher than 90% of the ‘new’ immigrants). These figures on return migration are also discussed in European Commission, 2014a. 73 The flow of intra-EU movers of working age represents some 0.5% of the total EU population (this percentage is equal to 0.3% of the EU population when movers with the same citizenship as their new Member State are excluded) (Table 5). This percentage varies across Member States, from 3.8% of the population in Luxembourg and 1.8% in Switzerland, to only 0.1% in Portugal and Estonia. This annual flow of intra-EU movers is the reference group which should be studied. Some of them will become unemployed after a ‘short’ period of employment and might need to prove insured periods of another Member State in order to be entitled to an unemployment benefit.

Table Migration flows of EU-27 and EFTA movers of working age (15-64), by citizenship, 2012

Member State (MS of immigration)	EU-27 citizenship	EFTA citizenship	Total	Citizenship of reporting MS	% citizenship of reporting MS	Population	% of total population	% of total population (excl. citizenship of reporting MS)
BE	65,073	330	65,403	12,779	19.5%	7,283,976	0.9%	0.7%
BG	7,435	33	7,468	3,767	50.4%	4,966,189	0.2%	0.1%
CZ	16,807	47	16,854	6,082	36.1%	7,262,768	0.2%	0.1%
DK	32,414	1,851	34,265	14,412	42.1%	3,625,974	0.9%	0.5%
DE	325,216	2,102	327,318	63,291	19.3%	54,131,105	0.6%	0.5%
EE	1,185	2	1,187	1,131	95.3%	884,990	0.1%	0.0%
IE	32,352	247	32,599	13,955	42.8%	3,048,552	1.1%	0.6%
EL	50,511	196	50,707	31,258	61.6%	7,302,140	0.7%	0.3%
ES	100,800	1,605	102,405	20,970	20.5%	31,613,238	0.3%	0.3%
FR	157,355	3,179	160,534	85,800	53.4%	41,976,279	0.4%	0.2%
HR
IT	108,927	349	109,276	19,236	17.6%	38,698,168	0.3%	0.2%
CY	10,591	0	10,591	1,203	11.4%	609,334	1.7%	1.5%
LV	8,720	18	8,738	8,235	94.2%	1,373,105	0.6%	0.0%
LT	16,293	17	16,310	15,607	95.7%	2,016,247	0.8%	0.0%
LU	13,484	84	13,568	733	5.4%	361,617	3.8%	3.5%
HU	20,694	217	20,911	12,081	57.8%	6,815,721	0.3%	0.1%
MT	3,424	0	3,424	1,369	40.0%	287,233	1.2%	0.7%
NL	72,298	501	72,799	26,469	36.4%	11,117,321	0.7%	0.4%
AT	50,970	486	51,456	6,305	12.3%	5,687,630	0.9%	0.8%
PL	132,639	198	132,837	112,419	84.6%	27,394,455	0.5%	0.1%
PT	9,105	4	9,109	8,030	88.2%	6,961,852	0.1%	0.0%
RO	137,886	27	137,913	134,992	97.9%	13,768,151	1.0%	0.0%
SI	3,696	12	3,708	1,834	49.5%	1,416,347	0.3%	0.1%
SK						3,881,088
FI	13,987	101	14,088	5,565	39.5%	3,532,645	0.4%	0.2%
SE	35,979	2,267	38,246	14,683	38.4%	6,113,917	0.6%	0.4%
UK	219,947	4,968	224,915	68,247	30.3%	41,680,662	0.5%	0.4%
EU	1,647,788	18,841	1,666,629	690,453	41.4%	333,810,704	0.5%	0.3%
IS	1,644	1,565	3,209	1,537	47.9%	212,970	1.5%	0.8%
LI	216	230	446	121	27.1%	25,474	1.8%	1.3%
NO	32,176	4,884	37,060	4,006	10.8%	3,294,281	1.1%	1.0%
CH	77,839	18,217	96,056	17,889	18.6%	5,394,861	1.8%	1.4%
EU/EFTA	1,759,663	43,737	1,803,400	714,006	39.6%	342,738,290	0.5%	0.3%

* By citizenship of the EU/EFTA migrant.

** We cannot know if someone has ever previously lived in the country of citizenship.

Source Own calculation based on Eurostat data on migration by age group and citizenship [migr_imm1ctz]

More information on the labour status (employed, unemployed or inactive) of this group of recent movers is therefore needed. This information was extracted from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Three different categories are defined: new EU-28/EFTA movers (= < 1 year of residence), 74 recent EU-28/EFTA movers (= < 10 years of residence) and people who are born in the country. Note that also EU-28/EFTA movers who have the same nationality of their new Member State of residence (but not born in this country) have been taken into consideration. In general, some 11% of the new EU-28/EFTA movers are unemployed (Figure 5). This percentage is comparable to the unemployment rate of recent EU-28/EFTA movers but is higher compared to the unemployment rate of the nationals (7%). The unemployment rate of those three categories varies also markedly across Member States.

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Figure EU-28/EFTA movers and nationals, by labour market status, 2013

*Selection of Member States above the reliability levels

Source Own calculations based on LFS

By taking into account the yearly flow of EU-28/EFTA movers (based on the ‘Migration and migrant population statistics’ published by Eurostat presented in Table 5) and the unemployment rate (based on LFS data – presented in Figure 5) of this group, a first estimate of the number of unemployed new EU-28/EFTA movers could be provided. This group might need to prove periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed in a Member State other than the competent State (dependent on the qualifying period of the competent Member State and the ‘short’ period of employment). Confronting the 1.8 million EU-28/EFTA citizens of working age (between 15 and 64) who migrated in 2012 to another EU Member State/EFTA country with a total EU unemployment rate of 11%, some 200,000 unemployed recent movers might need a PD U1 or an SED U002 in order to acquire a right to unemployment benefits. 75

4. The estimated economic impact of the current rules and the alternative options

4.1. Data collection

Based on the data from the questionnaire on the aggregation of periods for unemployment the budgetary impact of the current rules and the different alternative options can be calculated. However, those data do not cover all EU-28/EFTA countries. A total of 23 Member States provided quantitative data, of which three Member States were not able to provide a breakdown by Member State of origin and two other Member States were not able to provide a breakdown by length of insurance, employment or self-employment in the Member State of last activity. The missing data for a number of large Member States, in particular EU-15 Member States, may lead to a distorted view. As a result, some caution is required when drawing conclusions. For a detailed reporting on the questionnaire on the aggregation of periods for unemployment we refer to Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015).

These administrative data provided by the questionnaire do not cover all components of the economic impact (e.g. expenditure on social assistance) or are insufficient to calculate the options (e.g. more data is required on average earnings, the calculation method of the unemployment benefit, the qualifying period, the average level of the unemployment benefit, the duration of the unemployment benefit etc). Therefore, these administrative data will be complemented with other data available at EU-level and in particular data of MISSOC and Eurostat.

In total 24,821 cases reported by 23 Member States for 2013 concern unemployed migrant workers whose period of insurance, employment or self-employment completed in the Member State of last activity was insufficient to be entitled to an unemployment benefit (Table 6). This is equal to an estimated share of 0.1% of total unemployment in those Member States and to 2.1% of the annual flow of intra-EU migrants of working age to these Member States. Most aggregations of periods for unemployment were reported by France (8,338 cases or 33.6% of total), Bulgaria (4,118 cases or 16.6% of total) and Spain (2,471 cases or 10.0% of total).

Table Number of aggregations of periods in case of unemployment, 2013

MS	Cases of aggregation (A)	Total annual inflow of migrants of working age (B)	% cases of aggregation (A/B)	Number of annual average unemployed persons (in ,000) (C)	% of aggregation (A/C)
BE	2,196	65,403	3.4%	417	0.5%
BG	4,118	7,468	55.1%	436	0.9%
CZ
DK	54	34,265	0.2%	202	0.0%
DE
EE	174	1,187	14.7%	59	0.3%
IE
EL
ES	2,471	102,405	2.4%	6,051	0.0%
FR	8,338	160,534	5.2%	3,010	0.3%
HR	16			318	0.0%
IT
CY	3	10,591	0.0%	69	0.0%
LV	19	8,738	0.2%	120	0.0%
LT	225	16,310	1.4%	172	0.1%
LU	48	13,568	0.4%	15	0.3%
HU	1,149	20,911	5.5%	441	0.3%
MT	8	3,424	0.2%	12	0.1%
NL	160	72,799	0.2%	647	0.0%
AT
PL	1,517	132,837	1.1%	1,793	0.1%
PT		9,109	0.0%	855	0.0%
RO	12	137,913	0.0%	653	0.0%
SI
SK	1,160
FI	135	14,088	1.0%	219	0.1%
SE	457	38,246	1.2%	411	0.1%
UK	30	224,915	0.0%	2,441	0.0%
IS
LI	726	446	162.8%
NO	500	37,060	1.3%	95	0.5%
CH	1,305	96,056	1.4%	2,449	0.1%
Total reporting MS	24,821	1,199,164	2.1%	20,416	0.1%

Source Questionnaire on aggregation of periods of unemployment; LFS; Eurostat data on migration and ESSPROS

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

4.2. Overview of the different options

Option 1 – Status quo

This option will be disregarded since the wording of Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 does not provide sufficient clarity on the time period required before aggregation.

Option 2 – The formalisation of the “one-day rule”

Aggregation is possible if any period of insurance, employment or self-employment has been fulfilled in the Member State of last activity. The unemployment benefit is calculated on the basis of the salary earned in the Member State of last activity.

Option 3 – A threshold for a minimum period for aggregation

A threshold is applied for the aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in the Member State of last activity. A threshold of one month (sub-option 3a) or three months (sub-option 3b) could be implemented.

The application of a threshold will have some important consequences on the situation of the recent migrant worker who became unemployed and has fulfilled a period of insurance, employment or self-employment below the threshold (of one or three months). In that case, there are three possibilities: a) the person tries to find a new job as quickly as possible; b) the person returns to the Member State of origin; or c) the person asks for social assistance (or a special non-contributory benefit) (if he or she is entitled to it). As a result, this option also has to take into account public spending on social assistance. However, to what extent unemployed recent migrant workers who are not entitled to an unemployment benefit will ask for social assistance is of course unclear.

If the unemployed recent migrant worker did not fulfil a minimum period of insurance, employment or self-employment required for an unemployment benefit, this person might ask for social assistance (if he or she is entitled to it). 76 Therefore, the economic impact calculated for one year could also take into account the public spending on social assistance. The person involved might be entitled to an unemployment assistance scheme (Table 7) or to a more general assistance scheme (Table 8). Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Austria, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom have defined a specific unemployment scheme. Besides, almost all Member States have defined a guaranteed minimum scheme. The monthly financial support varies from € 1,348 in Luxembourg to € 32 in Romania.

Table 7Unemployment assistance, EU-28/EFTA, 2014

MS	Unemployment assistance scheme?	Name	Conditions or remarks
BE
BG
CZ
DK	YES	Midlertidig arbejdsmarkedsydelse	Paid after entitlement to unemployment benefit has expired
DE
EE	YES	Töötutoetus	Same as for unemployment insurance benefit, but unemployment can either be voluntary or involuntary
IE	YES
EL
ES	YES		To have exhausted the entitlement to contributory unemployment benefit; not to have the right to the contributory benefit because of lack of contributions, other groups (e.g. emigrant workers returning from abroad)
FR	YES	Régime de solidarité	To have exhausted entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits
HR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT	YES	Notstandshilfe	The unemployed person must have exhausted the right to unemployment benefits and be in a state of need
PL
PT	YES		To have exhausted entitlement to unemployment benefits or not to have completed the qualifying period required for unemployment benefits; to fulfil the condition of resources
RO
SI
SK
FI	YES	Työmarkkinatuki	Same as for unemployment insurance benefits and in several cases need for assistance
SE
UK	YES	Income-based Jobseekers' Allowance	From 1 January 2014, claimants must also have been living in the UK for 3 months prior to the claim
IS
LI
NO
CH

Source MISSOC, 2014

Table Guaranteed minimum resources, cash benefits, 2014

Member State	Monthly amount (in €)	Remark
BE	817.36	Single person
BG	24.09	Single person (73% of € 33)
CZ	124	Single
DK	1,433	Basic amount for persons of 30 years and more
DE	391	Single person
EE	90	Single person
IE	806	Single person
EL
ES	426	€ 532.5 *0.8 (max. amount)
FR	499.31	Single person
HR	73.20	Single person (120% of € 66.02)
IT	484.90	€ 5,818.93 / 12 months
CY	452	Head of the household
LV	128.06	Max. amount (applied by the municipalities)
LT	101	Single person
LU	1,348.18
HU	133.20	Max. amount
MT	426.46	Single person
NL	679	Single person
AT	813.99	Single person or parent
PL	Between 4.82 and € 101
PT	178.15	Single person
RO	32	€ 113 * 0.283
SI	265.2	Single person
SK	61.6	Single person
FI	480.2	Single person
SE	321	Single person
UK	360	Single person (weekly amount of € 90)
IS		Should not be lower than the monthly UB
LI
NO	669	Single person
CH	1,977.4	€ 23,693 /12

Source MISSOC, 2014

Under this options unemployed persons who have not completed a period of one or three months of insurance, employment or self-employment risk falling between two stools given that they probably will not be entitled to social assistance. An alternative within option 3 is that the previous Member State is responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one month (option 3a) or three months (option 3b) of insurance, employment or self-employment.

Option 4 – A change of the calculation method

Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 defines the calculation method of the unemployment benefit in case of aggregation of periods. The current calculation method only takes into account the salary or professional income received by the person concerned in respect of the last activity as an employed or self-employed person.

This calculation method is changed under option 4. If a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than one month (sub-option 4a) or three months (sub-option 4b) has been fulfilled in the Member State of last activity, the calculation of the unemployment benefit will also be based on the salaries earned in the Member State of origin.

This option implies that more detailed information is required on the unemployed recent migrant worker’s Member State of origin, on the salary earned, but also on the calculation method of the competent Member States (e.g. the ceiling of the earnings taken into account, minimum and maximum unemployment benefit).

For most of the cases reported by the Member States, the period of insurance, employment or self-employment of the Member State of last activity was aggregated by an additional period completed in the United Kingdom (22% of total) and Austria (18% of total) (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015). The United Kingdom is the main Member State of origin for unemployed migrants who had to aggregate periods in order to be entitled to an unemployment benefit in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta or Poland. New EU Member States such as Bulgaria and Romania never appear as one of the main Member States of origin of the unemployed migrants in the EU-15 who had to prove additional periods of insurance, employment or self-employment. For 76% of the cases an additional period fulfilled in an EU-15 Member State was added to the period already achieved in the Member State of last activity. This might be an indication of return migration for the EU-13 Member States. However, the missing data for a number of Member States may lead to a distorted view of reality if the numbers of cases are presented by the Member State of origin. Therefore, again some caution is required when drawing conclusions.

No information on the salary earned in the competent Member State as well as in the Member State of origin was collected via the administrative questionnaire. 77 Therefore, wage data published by Eurostat should be used. In 2013, the annual gross earnings (of a single person without children and earning 67% of the average wage) for the EU-28 amounted to € 21,361 (Figure 6). These annual gross earnings vary from a high amount in Switzerland (€ 47,741) and Norway (44,763) to a low amount in Bulgaria (€ 3,332) and Romania (€ 3,915).

Figure Annual gross earnings, single person without children, 67% of average wage, 2013

Source Eurostat [earn_nt_net]

Despite the fact that the calculation of the unemployment benefit will be based on the salaries earned in the Member State of origin, this does not necessarily imply that changing this will result to the same extent in a change of the level of the unemployment benefit. Some Member States apply a maximum ceiling of earnings to be taken into account (BE, BG, DE, ES, HR, FR, IT, CY, NL, AT, SE, LI, NO and CH) (Table 9). Also, a number of Member States apply a minimum and/or a maximum benefit level which flattens a strong increase or decrease in average earnings (BE, BG, CZ (max.), DK (max.), ES, HR, IT (max.), LT, LU (max.), HU (max.), AT, SI, SE and LI (max.)).

Finally, Ireland, Malta, Poland and the United Kingdom do not take previous earnings as a reference for the calculation of the unemployment benefit (see also Table 2), which implies that this option does not influence the unemployment benefit in these Member States.

Table Unemployment benefit, impact of the earnings on the level of the UB, 2014

MS	Ceiling earnings taken as reference	Rate of the benefits	Lowest	Highest
BE	€ 2,266.59/month	65% of last salary	€ 36.66/day	€ 61.66/day
BG	€ 1,227/month	60% of the average daily contributory income for the last 24 months	€ 3.68/day	60% of the daily max. amount of the max. contributory of € 1,227 for 2014
CZ		65% of reference earnings		0.58 the national average wage
DK		90% of previous earnings		€ 109/day
DE	€ 5,000 /month	67% of net earnings (with childeren), 60% of net earnings (without children)
EE		50% of reference earnings
IE		€ 188/week
EL		€ 360/month although variation with previous earnings
ES	€ 3,597/month	70% of the calculation basis	107% of the Public Income Rate of Multiple Effects (IPREM)	175%, 200% or 225% of the IPREM
FR	4 times the social security ceiling (€12,516 per month)	40.4% reference daily wage (RDW) + € 11.72 per day or 57.4% of the RDW within the limit of 75% of the RDW.
HR	Ceiling fixed as a percentage of the budget base.	70% of the base salary	€ 148.63/month	€ 506.35/month
IT	€ 1,192.98/month	75% of the monthly reference + supplement		€ 1,165.58 month
CY	Up to 3 times basic insurable earnings
LV		50% of average contribution wage
LT		€ 101 + variable component/month	No less than the State Supported Income	€ 188/month
LU		80% of previous earnings		€ 4,802.57 month
HU		60% of the average wage		€ 329/month
MT		€ 7.72 per day for a single person
NL	Last daily wage with a max. of € 198.28	75% of the daily wage
AT	€ 4,200/month	55% of daily net income	€ 7.43/day	€ 48.02/day
PL		80% of the basic unemployment allowance of € 200
PT
RO
SI		80% of the reference basis	€ 350/month	€ 892.5/month
SK		50% of the reference earnings
FI		Basic: € 32,66 + possible supplement of € 34.44
SE	€ 2,033/month	80% of reference earnings		€ 74/day
UK		€ 90/week
IS				€ 1,155/month
LI	€ 103,601/year	80% of insured earnings
NO	6 times the basic amount (€ 63,363)	0.24% of the income basis, which normally gives a compensation level of 62.4%
CH	€ 8,633/month	80% of the insured salary

Source MISSOC, 2014

4.3. Estimated economic impact of the different options

Options 1 and 2 – The current rules

As mentioned before, in total 24,821 cases were reported by 23 Member States for 2013. 6,741 cases or 28% of total cases relate to a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than 30 days in the Member State of last activity (Table 10). 3,341 cases or 14% of total cases apply to a period between one and three months, and finally 14,014 cases or 58% to a period of three months or longer. So, for most of the cases of aggregation, already a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of more than three months was completed by the unemployed migrant worker in the Member State of last activity. This distribution varies markedly across Member States, but also between the EU-13 and the EU-15. 8,580 cases or 62% of the cases reported by the EU-15 concerned a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than three months compared to only 1,295 cases or 16% of the cases reported by the EU-13. This breakdown by period of insurance, employment or self-employment will have an influence on the budgetary impact of the different options. For example, the different options will have (almost) no impact on Cyprus (100% of the cases), Hungary (97% of the cases) and Bulgaria (96% of the cases) as they have aggregated all or most of their cases on the basis of a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of more than three months.

Under the current rules all cases should be taken into consideration. These could be multiplied by the annual average expenditure per unemployed person in order to estimate the public unemployment spending (amounts reported in Table 5 – column 3). This yearly expenditure assumes to some extent that the unemployed person did not find a job during the first year of unemployment. While the entitlement to an unemployment insurance benefit in most of the Member States (except for BE) will be limited to a number of weeks or months. Therefore, a more ‘realistic’ calculation of the yearly expenditure is calculated by taking into account the annual average duration of the payment of the unemployment benefit. 78 The average duration of the payment of the unemployment benefit amounts to 7.5 months, but differs strongly across Member States (Table 10 – column 6). The average duration is multiplied by the average amount reported in Table 5 – column 3 and results in a corrected figure reported in Table 10 – column 7.

The budgetary impact for Lithuania and Norway could be estimated for the baseline scenario, but not for the other options given that these Member States could not provide a breakdown by period of insurance, employment or self-employment. Also for Liechtenstein the budgetary impact is missing, since no information on the annual average expenditure per unemployed person is available.

A total estimate of annual public unemployment spending of € 100 million is obtained for the 22 reporting Member States. In absolute terms, in particular France (€ 53 million) and Belgium (€ 20.5 million) are the main spending Member States. Their expenditure is influenced by the higher number of cases and average expenditure per unemployed person compared to the other Member States (Table 10).

The budgetary impact of the aggregation of periods for unemployment on total unemployment spending is, however, very limited (Table 10). In general, 0.11% of total unemployment spending by the reporting Member States could be related to the aggregation of periods for unemployment. This percentage is similar for EU-13 Member States (0.12%) and EU-15 Member States (0.10%). Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Netherlands, Romania, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom spent less than 0.1% of their unemployment expenditure on unemployed recent migrant workers who completed an insufficient period of insurance, employment or self-employment to be entitled to an unemployment benefit.

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Table Estimate of the annual budgetary impact under the current rules (options 1 and 2)

	Number of unemployed persons who needed an aggregation of periods (A)					Average duration of the payment of the UB	Annual average expenditure per unemployed persons (in €) (B)	Expenditure related to the aggregation of periods (in €) C=A*B				Total expenditure in million € (D)	% share C/D
	Less than 30 days	1 to 3 months	3 months or more	Total for subperiods	Total			Less than 30 days	1 to 3 months	3 months or more	Total
BE	736	420	1,040	2,196	2,196	7.4	9,319	6,859,118	3,914,171	9,692,233	20,465,522	5,577	0.37%
BG	22	150	3,946	4,118	4,118	8.7	320	7,048	48,052	1,264,077	1,319,176	181	0.73%
CZ
DK	34	0	20	54	54	5.7	5,847	198,801	0	116,942	315,743	2,696	0.01%
DE
EE	64	31	79	174	174	8.2	369	23,603	11,433	29,135	64,171	37	0.17%
IE
EL
ES	1,195	534	742	2,471	2,471	7.6	2,632	3,144,819	1,405,300	1,952,683	6,502,801	24,146	0.03%
FR	3,948	1,283	3,107	8,338	8,338	7.0	6,352	25,077,188	8,149,451	19,735,264	52,961,903	31,121	0.17%
HR	0	1	15	16	16	9.4	475	0	475	7,130	7,606	180	0.00%
IT
CY	0	0	3	3	3	6.5	1,297	0	0	3,890	3,890	124	0.00%
LV	6	2	11	19	19	8.2	258	1,550	517	2,841	4,908	59	0.01%
LT				0	225	8.2	236	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	53,055	68	0.08%
LU	1	7	40	48	48	6.2	10,948	10,948	76,634	437,911	525,493	275	0.19%
HU	29	6	1,114	1,149	1,149	8.0	293	8,493	1,757	326,255	336,506	208	0.16%
MT	1	1	6	8	8	7.8	1,375	1,375	1,375	8,250	11,000	23	0.05%
NL	26	27	107	160	160	6.3	11,399	296,371	307,770	1,219,680	1,823,821	10,183	0.02%
AT
PL	164	379	974	1,517	1,517	7.4	226	36,983	85,466	219,642	342,091	640	0.05%
PT
RO	2	2	8	12	12	7.4	180	359	359	1,438	2,157	183	0.00%
SI
SK	217	218	725	1,160	1,160	9.8	380	82,434	82,814	275,413	440,660	176	0.25%
FI	23	50	62	135	135	4.6	5,906	135,847	295,319	366,196	797,363	3,189	0.03%
SE	156	122	179	457	457	4.8	1,691	263,777	206,287	302,667	772,731	1,704	0.05%
UK	17	1	12	30	30	6.6	1,443	24,523	1,443	17,310	43,275	6,646	0.00%
IS
LI	96	75	555	726	726			n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
NO					500	4.6	6,167	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,083,353	1,367	0.23%
CH	4	32	1,269	1,305	1,305	6.1	7,705	30,819	246,554	9,777,402	10,054,775	3,266	0.31%
Total	6,741	3,341	14,014	24,096	24,821			36,204,056	14,835,177	45,756,359	99,932,000	92,248	0.11%
EU-13	505	790	6,881	8,176	8,401			161,845	232,248	2,138,071	2,585,220	2,078	0.12%
EU-15	6,136	2,444	5,309	13,889	13,889			36,011,392	14,356,375	33,840,886	84,208,653	85,537	0.10%
EFTA	100	107	1,824	2,031	2,531			30,819	246,554	9,777,402	13,138,128	4,634	0.28%

*No data available for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, LT, PT, SI, NO and IS.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Option 3 – A threshold for a minimum period for aggregation

Sub-option 3a – A threshold of one month

If a threshold of one month is applied, 6,741 cases or 28% of the total reported cases will no longer have an impact on public unemployment spending (Table 11). The remaining 17,355 cases are again multiplied by the annual average expenditure per unemployed person in order to estimate the public unemployment spending.

The application of this sub-option results in a total estimate of annual public unemployment spending of € 60.6 million for 20 reporting Member States. This implies a decrease of expenditure by 37% compared to the baseline scenario (excl. LT and NO).

This option will in particular have an influence on competent Member States confronted with a high percentage of aggregated cases during the first month. For example, the length of insurance, employment or self-employment of most of the cases completed in Denmark and the United Kingdom is less than one month. In contrast, Croatia and Cyprus did not report any cases below a period of one month (see also Table 10). The expenditure for Denmark will decrease by 63% compared to the baseline scenario. This option has no or almost no budgetary impact on Croatia (0%), Cyprus (0%), Bulgaria (-0.5%) and Switzerland (-0.3%). The expenditure of France and Belgium, two Member States which show a high expenditure in absolute terms under the baseline scenario, will decrease by 47% and 34% respectively compared to the baseline scenario (Table 11).

Under this option, 0.07% of total unemployment spending by the reporting Member States will be related to the aggregation of periods for unemployment (Table 11). However, as mentioned above, also spending on social assistance could be added to the budgetary cost.

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Table Estimate of the annual budgetary impact under sub-option 3a

	Number of unemployed persons who needed an aggregation of periods (A)			Annual average expenditure per unemployed person (in €) (B)	Expenditure related to the aggregation of periods (in €) C= A*B			% change compared to the baseline scenario	Total unemployment spending in million € (D)	% share C/D	Excluded aggregated cases
	1 to 3 months	3 months or more	Total for subperiods		1 to 3 months	3 months or more	Total				Less than 30 days
BE	420	1,040	1,460	9,319	3,914,171	9,692,233	13,606,403	-33.5%	5,577	0.24%	736
BG	150	3,946	4,096	320	48,052	1,264,077	1,312,129	-0.5%	181	0.72%	22
CZ
DK	0	20	20	5,847	0	116,942	116,942	-63.0%	2,696	0.00%	34
DE
EE	31	79	110	369	11,433	29,135	40,568	-36.8%	37	0.11%	64
IE
EL
ES	534	742	1,276	2,632	1,405,300	1,952,683	3,357,982	-48.4%	24,146	0.01%	1,195
FR	1,283	3,107	4,390	6,352	8,149,451	19,735,264	27,884,715	-47.3%	31,121	0.09%	3,948
HR	1	15	16	475	475	7,130	7,606		180	0.00%	0
IT
CY	0	3	3	1,297	0	3,890	3,890	0.0%	124	0.00%	0
LV	2	11	13	258	517	2,841	3,358	-31.6%	59	0.01%	6
LT			n.a.				n.a.
LU	7	40	47	10,948	76,634	437,911	514,545	-2.1%	275	0.19%	1
HU	6	1,114	1,120	293	1,757	326,255	328,012	-2.5%	208	0.16%	29
MT	1	6	7	1,375	1,375	8,250	9,625	-12.5%	23	0.04%	1
NL	27	107	134	11,399	307,770	1,219,680	1,527,450	-16.3%	10,183	0.02%	26
AT
PL	379	974	1,353	226	85,466	219,642	305,108	-10.8%	640	0.05%	164
PT
RO	2	8	10	180	359	1,438	1,797	-16.7%	183	0.00%	2
SI
SK	218	725	943	380	82,814	275,413	358,226	-18.7%	176	0.20%	217
FI	50	62	112	5,906	295,319	366,196	661,516	-17.0%	3,189	0.02%	23
SE	122	179	301	1,691	206,287	302,667	508,954	-34.1%	1,704	0.03%	156
UK	1	12	13	1,443	1,443	17,310	18,753	-56.7%	6,646	0.00%	17
IS
LI	75	555	630		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.			96
NO			n.a.				n.a.
CH	32	1,269	1,301	7,705	246,554	9,777,402	10,023,956	-0.3%	3,266	0.31%	4
Total	3,341	14,014	17,355		14,835,177	45,756,359	60,591,536	-37.4%**	90,614	0.07%	6,741
EU-13	790	6,881	7,671		232,248	2,138,071	2,370,319		1,810	0.13%	505
EU-15	2,444	5,309	7,753		14,356,375	33,840,886	48,197,261		85,537	0.06%	6,136
EFTA	107	1,824	1,931		246,554	9,777,402	10,023,956		3,266	0.31%	100

* No data available for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, LT, PT, SI, NO and IS.

** Compared to the reporting Member States under the baseline scenario (excl. LT and NO).

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Sub-option 3a1 – A threshold of one month AND the previous Member State is responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one month of insurance, employment or self-employment

Under this sub-option the previous Member State (i.e. Member State of origin) will be responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one month of insurance, employment or self-employment. The Member State of last activity will still be responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who have completed more than one month of insurance, employment or self-employment.

The missing data for a number of reporting Member States may lead to a distorted view of reality if the number of cases are reported by the previous Member State. As has been pointed out, most of the aggregated cases apply to a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of more than three months. It implies that the previous Member State only for a limited number of cases will be responsible for paying the unemployment benefit if a threshold of one month is applied. Moreover, only 1,534 of the 13,113 aggregated cases which could be allocated to a previous Member state of residence have to be taken into account (see also Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015). Most of the cases with a period of insurance, employment of self-employment of less than one month were aggregated with an additional period completed in an EU-15 Member State and mainly completed in the United Kingdom (263 cases), the Netherlands (179 cases) and France (165 cases) (Table 12).

The calculation of the budgetary cost for the previous Member State could be based on the average duration of unemployment (see also Table 10), the entitlement to an unemployment benefit up to 3 or 6 months or for the maximum duration of the entitlement (see also Figure 3). Please notice that the average duration of unemployment not necessarily corresponds to the duration of the entitlement to an unemployment benefit (e.g. the period of unemployment could be longer than the entitlement to an unemployment benefit). The total annual budgetary cost for the Member States of origin varies from € 3.4 Million (entitlement up to 3 months) to € 13.7 Million (maximum duration of the entitlement) for the 1,534 reported cases depending on the calculation method used (Table 12). The Netherlands and France will probably be confronted with the highest budgetary cost in absolute figures. However, this cost is marginal if we confront the budgetary cost of paying an unemployment benefit for those unemployed persons who, in their Member State of last activity, have not completed one months of insurance, employment or self-employment with total unemployment spending (for instance equal to 0.005% of total public spending if the average duration of unemployment is taken into account).

The additional cost to be paid as previous Member State should be added to the budgetary cost Member States will experience as Member State of last activity (Table 13). However, the additional cost as previous Member state will hardly influence the total cost. Only the Netherlands shows a higher cost as Member State of origin than as Member State of last activity. The real budgetary impact is, however, underestimated given that under the baseline scenario 6,741 aggregated cases of a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than 1 month have been taken into consideration compared to only 1,534 cases under sub-option 3a1 (Table 12) and even only 986 cases when selecting only the 20 reporting Member States (Table 13). Nevertheless, these figures show already that this option will lead to a higher budgetary impact for some Member States compared to the current rules (for instance the United Kingdom). If we extrapolate the 986 cases to the total group of 6,741 cases an estimated amount of € 32.2 Million (assuming an average expenditure per unemployed person) or € 14,912,546 (assuming the entitlement for 3 months) will be paid by the Member States of origin (Table 13). It implies that the loss of an unemployment benefit in the Member State of last activity is compensated considerably by the Member State of origin (compared to an expenditure of € 36.2 Million under current rules for those 6,741 cases – see also Table 10).

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Table Annual cost for the previous Member State responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one month of insurance, employment or self-employment, average duration of unemployment, three months entitled to an unemployment benefit and maximum duration entitled to an unemployment benefit

Previous MS	Cases less than 30 days (A)	Average duration of unemployment				Three months entitled			Six months entitled			Maximum duration of entitlement
		Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	Total unemployment spending (in Million euro) (D)	% share (C/D)	Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	% share (C/D)	Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	% share (C/D)	Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	% share (C/D)
BE	23	9,319	214,347	5,577	0.004%	3,778	86,898	0.002%	7,556	173,795	0.003%	15,113	347,590	0.006%
BG	6	320	1,922	181	0.001%	110	663	0.000%	221	1,326	0.001%	442	2,651	0.001%
CZ	50	588	29,407	341	0.009%	232	11,608	0.003%	464	23,216	0.007%	696	34,824	0.010%
DK	28	5,847	163,719	2,696	0.006%	3,077	86,168	0.003%	6,155	172,336	0.006%	12,310	344,671	0.013%
DE	94	5,844	549,294	21,363	0.003%	2,401	225,737	0.001%	4,803	451,475	0.002%	9,606	902,949	0.004%
EE	8	369	2,950	37	0.008%	135	1,079	0.003%	270	2,159	0.006%	540	4,318	0.012%
IE	51	9,099	464,053	3,792	0.012%	3,000	152,985	0.004%	5,999	305,969	0.008%	7,999	407,959	0.011%
EL	29	803	23,285	1,279	0.002%	268	7,762	0.001%	535	15,524	0.001%	1,071	31,047	0.002%
ES	153	2,632	402,642	24,146	0.002%	1,039	158,938	0.001%	2,078	317,875	0.001%	4,155	635,751	0.003%
FR	165	6,352	1,048,059	31,121	0.003%	2,722	449,168	0.001%	5,444	898,336	0.003%	10,889	1,796,672	0.006%
HR	2	475	951	180	0.001%	152	303	0.000%	303	607	0.000%	607	1,214	0.001%
IT	115	2,533	291,284	9,929	0.003%	905	104,030	0.001%	1,809	208,060	0.002%	3,618	416,121	0.004%
CY	9	1,297	11,669	124	0.009%	598	5,386	0.004%	1,197	10,771	0.009%	997	8,976	0.007%
LV	2	258	517	59	0.001%	95	189	0.000%	189	378	0.001%	284	567	0.001%
LT	7	236	1,651	68	0.002%	86	604	0.001%	173	1,208	0.002%	259	1,812	0.003%
LU	32	10,948	350,329	275	0.127%	5,297	169,514	0.062%	10,595	339,028	0.123%	42,378	1,356,111	0.492%
HU	12	293	3,514	208	0.002%	110	1,318	0.001%	220	2,636	0.001%	110	1,318	0.001%
MT	3	1,375	4,125	23	0.018%	529	1,587	0.007%	1,058	3,173	0.014%	881	2,644	0.011%
NL	179	11,399	2,040,400	10,183	0.020%	5,428	971,619	0.010%	10,856	1,943,238	0.019%	21,712	3,886,475	0.038%
AT	110	5,468	601,493	2,297	0.026%	3,038	334,163	0.015%	6,076	668,326	0.029%	12,151	1,336,651	0.058%
PL	20	226	4,510	640	0.001%	91	1,828	0.000%	183	3,657	0.001%	366	7,314	0.001%
PT	18	2,004	36,077	2,482	0.001%	742	13,362	0.001%	1,485	26,724	0.001%	7,423	133,620	0.005%
RO	23	180	4,134	183	0.002%	73	1,676	0.001%	146	3,352	0.002%	291	6,704	0.004%
SI	2	1,458	2,915	199	0.001%	554	1,107	0.001%	1,107	2,214	0.001%	2,214	4,428	0.002%
SK	6	380	2,279	176	0.001%	116	698	0.000%	233	1,395	0.001%	233	1,395	0.001%
FI	10	5,906	59,064	3,189	0.002%	3,852	38,520	0.001%	7,704	77,040	0.002%	15,408	154,080	0.005%
SE	18	1,691	30,436	1,704	0.002%	1,057	19,022	0.001%	2,114	38,045	0.002%	4,227	76,090	0.004%
UK	263	1,443	379,380	6,646	0.006%	656	172,445	0.003%	1,311	344,891	0.005%	1,311	344,891	0.005%
IS	5	0	0	130	0.000%	2,953	14,763	0.011%	5,905	29,525	0.023%	0	0	0.000%
LI	0
NO	67	6,167	413,169	1,367	0.030%	4,022	269,458	0.020%	8,044	538,916	0.039%	16,087	1,077,833	0.079%
CH	24	7,705	184,915	3,266	0.006%	3,789	90,942	0.003%	7,579	181,884	0.006%	15,157	363,768	0.011%
Total	1,534		7,322,492	133,861	0.005%		3,393,539	0.003%		6,787,078	0.005%		13,690,444	0.010%

* This is an incomplete picture due to missing data for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, PT, SI and IS as reporting Member State and given that some Member states did not provide a breakdown by the Member State of origin (FR, ES and EE).

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Table Total cost under sub-option 3a1

	As Member State of last activity (in €) (n: 17,355)	Average duration			Three months
		As Member State of origin (in €) (n: 986)	Total cost (in €)	% difference baseline scenario	As Member State of origin (in €) (n: 986)	Total cost (in €)	% difference baseline scenario
BE	13,606,403	214,347	13,820,751	-32.5%	86,898	13,693,301	-33.1%
BG	1,312,129	1,922	1,314,051	-0.4%	663	1,312,791	-0.5%
CZ
DK	116,942	163,719	280,661	-11.1%	86,168	203,110	-35.7%
DE
EE	40,568	2,950	43,518	-32.2%	1,079	41,647	-35.1%
IE
EL
ES	3,357,982	402,642	3,760,625	-42.2%	158,938	3,516,920	-45.9%
FR	27,884,715	1,048,059	28,932,774	-45.4%	449,168	28,333,883	-46.5%
HR	7,606	951	8,556	12.5%	303	7,909	4.0%
IT
CY	3,890	11,669	15,559	300.0%	5,386	9,275	138.5%
LV	3,358	517	3,875	-21.1%	189	3,547	-27.7%
LT
LU	514,545	350,329	864,874	64.6%	169,514	684,059	30.2%
HU	328,012	3,514	331,527	-1.5%	1,318	329,330	-2.1%
MT	9,625	4,125	13,750	25.0%	1,587	11,212	1.9%
NL	1,527,450	2,040,400	3,567,850	95.6%	971,619	2,499,069	37.0%
AT
PL	305,108	4,510	309,618	-9.5%	1,828	306,936	-10.3%
PT
RO	1,797	4,134	5,932	175.0%	1,676		-100%
SI						0
SK	358,226	2,279	360,506	-18.2%	698	358,924	-18.5%
FI	661,516	59,064	720,579	-9.6%	38,520	700,035	-12.2%
SE	508,954	30,436	539,390	-30.2%	19,022	527,977	-31.7%
UK	18,753	379,380	398,132	820.0%	172,445	191,198	341.8%
IS
LI
NO
CH	10,023,956	184,915	10,208,871	1.5%	90,942	10,114,898	0.6%
Total	60,591,536	4,909,862	65,501,398	-32.3%	2,257,960	62,849,496	-35.1%
Extrapolation (n: 6,741)		32,177,913			14,912,546

*This is an incomplete picture due to missing data for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, PT, SI and IS as reporting Member State and given that some Member states did not provide a breakdown by the Member State of origin (FR, ES and EE).

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire

Sub-option 3b – A threshold of three months

In case a threshold of three months is applied, the remaining 14,049 cases are multiplied by the annual average expenditure per unemployed person in order to estimate the public unemployment spending.

Under this sub-option, the total estimated annual public unemployment spending for 20 reporting Member States amounts to € 45.8 million or to a decrease of expenditure by 53% compared to the baseline scenario (Table 14).

This sub-option 3b almost does not result in any further decrease of expenditure compared to sub-option 3a in Denmark (0 p.p.), 79 Cyprus (0.0 p.p.), Hungary (-0.5 p.p.), Switzerland (-2.5 p.p.), the United Kingdom (-3.3 p.p.), Bulgaria (-3.6 p.p.) and Croatia (-6.3 p.p.) (Table 14). Especially Finland (-37.0 p.p.), Sweden (-26.7 p.p.) and Poland (-25.0 p.p.) will experience a higher decrease of expenditure compared to sub-option 3a. This option will consequently lead to a further decrease of public unemployment spending to 0.05% of total unemployment spending by the reporting Member States (Table 14).

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Table Estimate of the budgetary annual impact under sub-option 3b

	Number of unemployed persons who needed aggregated cases (A)	Annual average expenditure per unemployed persons (in €) (B)	Expenditure related to the aggregation of periods C=A*B	% change compared to the baseline scenario	Change in p.p. compared to sub-option 3a	Total UB spending in million euro (D)	% share C/D	Excluded aggregated cases
	3 months or more		3 months or more					Less than 30 days	1 to 3 months	Total number
BE	1,040	9,319	9,692,233	-52.6%	-19.1 p.p.	5,577	0.17%	736	420	1,156
BG	3,946	320	1,264,077	-4.2%	-3.6 p.p.	181	0.70%	22	150	172
CZ										0
DK	20	5,847	116,942	-63.0%	0.0 p.p.	2,696	0.00%	34	0	34
DE										0
EE	79	369	29,135	-54.6%	-17.8 p.p.	37	0.08%	64	31	95
IE										0
EL										0
ES	742	2,632	1,952,683	-70.0%	-21.6 p.p.	24,146	0.01%	1,195	534	1,729
FR	3,107	6,352	19,735,264	-62.7%	-15.4 p.p.	31,121	0.06%	3,948	1,283	5,231
HR	15	475	7,130	-6.3%	-6.3 p.p.	180	0.00%	0	1	1
IT										0
CY	3	1,297	3,890	0.0%	0.0 p.p.	124	0.00%	0	0	0
LV	11	258	2,841	-42.1%	-10.5 p.p.	59	0.00%	6	2	8
LT	n.a.		n.a.							0
LU	40	10,948	437,911	-16.7%	-14.6 p.p.	275	0.16%	1	7	8
HU	1,114	293	326,255	-3.0%	-0.5 p.p.	208	0.16%	29	6	35
MT	6	1,375	8,250	-25.0%	-12.5 p.p.	23	0.04%	1	1	2
NL	107	11,399	1,219,680	-33.1%	-16.9 p.p.	10,183	0.01%	26	27	53
AT										0
PL	974	226	219,642	-35.8%	-25.0 p.p.	640	0.03%	164	379	543
PT										0
RO	8	180	1,438	-33.3%	-16.7 p.p.	183	0.00%	2	2	4
SI
SK	725	380	275,413	-37.5%	-18.8 p.p.	176	0.16%	217	218	435
FI	62	5,906	366,196	-54.1%	-37.0 p.p.	3,189	0.01%	23	50	73
SE	179	1,691	302,667	-60.8%	-26.7 p.p.	1,704	0.02%	156	122	278
UK	12	1,443	17,310	-60.0%	-3.3 p.p.	6,646	0.00%	17	1	18
IS										0
LI	555		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.			96	75	171
NO	n.a.	6,167	n.a.							0
CH	1,269	7,705	9,777,402	-2.8%	-2.5 p.p.	3,266	0.30%	4	32	36
Total	14,014		45,756,359	-52.7%**	-15.3 p.p.	90,614	0.05%	6,741	3,341	10,082
EU-13	6,881		2,138,071			1,810	0.12%	505	790	1,295
EU-15	5,309		33,840,886			54,416	0.06%	6,136	2,444	8,580
EFTA	1,824		9,777,402			3,266	0.30%	100	107	207

* No data available for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, LT, PT NO and IS.

** Compared to the reporting Member States under the baseline scenario (excl. LT and NO).

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Sub-option 3b1 – A threshold of three months AND the previous Member State is responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed three months of insurance, employment or self-employment

Under this sub-option the previous Member State (i.e. Member State of origin) will be responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed three months of insurance, employment or self-employment. The Member State of last activity will still be responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who have completed more than three month of insurance, employment or self-employment.

As mentioned before, the missing data for a number of reporting Member States may lead to a distorted view of reality if the number of cases are reported by the previous Member State. Also, most of the aggregated cases apply to a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of more than three months. It implies that the previous Member State only for a limited number of cases will be responsible for paying the unemployment benefit if a threshold of three months is applied. Moreover, only 3,027 of the 13,113 aggregated cases which could be allocated to a previous Member state of residence have to be taken into account (see also Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015). Most of the cases with a period of insurance, employment of self-employment of less than three months were aggregated with an additional period completed in an EU-15 Member State and mainly completed in the United Kingdom (577 cases), the Netherlands (371 cases) and Spain (328 cases) (Table 15).

The calculation of the budgetary cost for the previous Member State could be based on the average duration of unemployment (see also Table 10), the entitlement to an unemployment benefit up to 3 or 6 months or for the maximum duration of the entitlement (see also Figure 3). Please notice that the average duration of unemployment not necessarily corresponds to the duration of the entitlement to an unemployment benefit (e.g. the period of unemployment could be longer than the entitlement to an unemployment benefit). The total annual budgetary cost for the Member States of origin varies from € 14.2 Million (entitlement up to 3 months) to € 26.2 Million (maximum duration of the entitlement) for the 3,027 reported cases depending on the calculation method used (Table 15). Again, The Netherlands and France will probably be confronted with the highest budgetary cost in absolute figures. This cost is still marginal if we confront the budgetary cost of paying an unemployment benefit for those unemployed persons who, in their Member State of last activity, have not completed three months of insurance, employment or self-employment with total unemployment spending (for instance equal to 0.01% of total public spending if the average duration of unemployment is taken into account).

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Table Annual cost for the previous Member State responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed three months of insurance, employment or self-employment, average duration of unemployment, three months entitled to an unemployment benefit and maximum duration entitled to an unemployment benefit

Previous MS	Cases less than three months (A)	Average duration of unemployment				Three months entitlement			Six months entitlement			Maximum duration of entitlement
		Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	Total unemployment spending (in Million euro) (D)	% share (C/D)	Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	% share (C/D)	Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	% share (C/D)	Annual average expenditure (in €) (B)	Expenditure (in €) (C=A*B)	% share (C/D)
BE	41	9,319	382,098	5,577	0.0069%	3,778	154,904	0.0028%	7,556	309,809	0.0056%	15,113	619,618	0.0111%
BG	6	320	1,922	181	0.0011%	110	663	0.0004%	221	1,326	0.0007%	442	2,651	0.0015%
CZ	118	588	69,400	341	0.0204%	232	27,395	0.0080%	464	54,790	0.0161%	696	82,184	0.0241%
DK	55	5,847	321,590	2,696	0.0119%	3,077	169,258	0.0063%	6,155	338,516	0.0126%	12,310	677,032	0.0251%
DE	227	5,844	1,326,487	21,363	0.0062%	2,401	545,131	0.0026%	4,803	1,090,263	0.0051%	9,606	2,180,526	0.0102%
EE	31	369	11,433	37	0.0312%	135	4,183	0.0114%	270	8,365	0.0228%	540	16,731	0.0456%
IE	113	9,099	1,028,197	3,792	0.0271%	3,000	338,966	0.0089%	5,999	677,932	0.0179%	7,999	903,909	0.0238%
EL	39	803	31,315	1,279	0.0024%	268	10,438	0.0008%	535	20,877	0.0016%	1,071	41,753	0.0033%
ES	328	2,632	863,180	24,146	0.0036%	1,039	340,729	0.0014%	2,078	681,458	0.0028%	4,155	1,362,916	0.0056%
FR	233	6,352	1,479,986	31,121	0.0048%	2,722	634,280	0.0020%	5,444	1,268,559	0.0041%	10,889	2,537,119	0.0082%
HR	2	475	951	180	0.0005%	152	303	0.0002%	303	607	0.0003%	607	1,214	0.0007%
IT	209	2,533	529,378	9,929	0.0053%	905	189,064	0.0019%	1,809	378,127	0.0038%	3,618	756,254	0.0076%
CY	19	1,297	24,635	124	0.0198%	598	11,370	0.0091%	1,197	22,740	0.0183%	997	18,950	0.0152%
LV	6	258	1,550	59	0.0026%	95	567	0.0010%	189	1,134	0.0019%	284	1,701	0.0029%
LT	9	236	2,122	68	0.0031%	86	776	0.0011%	173	1,553	0.0023%	259	2,329	0.0034%
LU	47	10,948	514,545	275	0.1868%	5,297	248,973	0.0904%	10,595	497,947	0.1808%	42,378	1,991,788	0.7231%
HU	25	293	7,322	208	0.0035%	110	2,746	0.0013%	220	5,491	0.0026%	110	2,746	0.0013%
MT	6	1,375	8,250	23	0.0355%	529	3,173	0.0136%	1,058	6,346	0.0273%	881	5,289	0.0227%
NL	371	11,399	4,228,985	10,183	0.0415%	5,428	2,013,802	0.0198%	10,856	4,027,604	0.0396%	21,712	8,055,209	0.0791%
AT	198	5,468	1,082,688	2,297	0.0471%	3,038	601,493	0.0262%	6,076	1,202,986	0.0524%	12,151	2,405,972	0.1048%
PL	38	226	8,569	640	0.0013%	91	3,474	0.0005%	183	6,948	0.0011%	366	13,896	0.0022%
PT	40	2,004	80,172	2,482	0.0032%	742	29,693	0.0012%	1,485	59,387	0.0024%	7,423	296,933	0.0120%
RO	31	180	5,572	183	0.0030%	73	2,259	0.0012%	146	4,518	0.0025%	291	9,036	0.0049%
SI	3	1,458	4,373	199	0.0022%	554	1,661	0.0008%	1,107	3,321	0.0017%	2,214	6,642	0.0033%
SK	13	380	4,938	176	0.0028%	116	1,512	0.0009%	233	3,024	0.0017%	233	3,024	0.0017%
FI	17	5,906	100,409	3,189	0.0031%	3,852	65,484	0.0021%	7,704	130,968	0.0041%	15,408	261,936	0.0082%
SE	26	1,691	43,963	1,704	0.0026%	1,057	27,477	0.0016%	2,114	54,954	0.0032%	4,227	109,907	0.0065%
UK	577	1,443	832,327	6,646	0.0125%	656	378,331	0.0057%	1,311	756,661	0.0114%	1,311	756,661	0.0114%
IS	7	0	0	130	0.0000%	2,953	20,668	0.0159%	5,905	41,335	0.0318%	0	0	0.0000%
LI
NO	153	6,167	943,506	1,367	0.0690%	4,022	615,330	0.0450%	8,044	1,230,660	0.0900%	16,087	2,461,320	0.1800%
CH	39	7,705	300,488	3,266	0.0092%	3,789	147,781	0.0045%	7,579	295,562	0.0090%	15,157	591,123	0.0181%
Total	3,027		14,240,349	133,861	0.0106%	0	6,591,883	0.0049%		13,183,767	0.0098%		26,176,369	0.0196%

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

The additional cost to be paid as previous Member State should be added to the budgetary cost Member States will experience as Member State of last activity (Table 16). Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands show in absolute figures a higher cost as Member State of origin than as Member State of last activity. The real budgetary impact is, however, underestimated given that under the baseline scenario 10,082 aggregated cases of a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than three month have been taken into consideration compared to only 3,027 under sub-option 3b1 (Table 15) and even only 1,911 cases when selecting only the 20 reporting Member States (Table 16). Nevertheless, these figures show already that this option will lead to a higher budgetary impact for some Member States compared to the current rules (for instance the United Kingdom). If we extrapolate the 1,911 cases to the total group of 10,082 cases an estimated amount of € 47.4 Million (assuming an average expenditure per unemployed person) or € 21,955,523 (assuming the entitlement for 3 months) will be paid by the Member States of origin (Table 16). It implies that the loss of an unemployment benefit in the Member State of last activity is compensated considerably by the Member State of origin (compared to an expenditure of € 51.0 Million under current rules for those 10,082 cases – see also Table 10).

Table Total cost under sub-option 3b1

	As Member State of last activity (in €) (n: 14,014)	Average duration			Three months
		As Member State of origin (in €) (n: 1,911 )	Total cost (in €)	% difference baseline scenario	As Member State of origin (in €) (n: 1,911 )	Total cost (in €)	% difference baseline scenario
BE	9,692,233	382,098	10,074,330	-50.8%	154,904	9,847,137	-51.9%
BG	1,264,077	1,922	1,265,999	-4.0%	663	1,264,740	-4.1%
CZ
DK	116,942	321,590	438,532	38.9%	169,258	286,200	-9.4%
DE
EE	29,135	11,433	40,568	-36.8%	4,183	33,318	-48.1%
IE
EL
ES	1,952,683	863,180	2,815,863	-56.7%	340,729	2,293,412	-64.7%
FR	19,735,264	1,479,986	21,215,250	-59.9%	634,280	20,369,544	-61.5%
HR	7,130	951	8,081	6.3%	303	7,434	-2.3%
IT
CY	3,890	24,635	28,524	633.3%	11,370	15,260	292.3%
LV	2,841	1,550	4,391	-10.5%	567	3,408	-30.6%
LT
LU	437,911	514,545	952,456	81.3%	248,973	686,884	30.7%
HU	326,255	7,322	333,577	-0.9%	2,746	329,001	-2.2%
MT	8,250	8,250	16,501	50.0%	3,173	11,423	3.8%
NL	1,219,680	4,228,985	5,448,665	198.8%	2,013,802	3,233,482	77.3%
AT
PL	219,642	8,569	228,211	-33.3%	3,474	223,116	-34.8%
PT
RO	1,438	5,572	7,010	225.0%	2,259	3,697	71.4%
SI
SK	275,413	4,938	280,351	-36.4%	1,512	276,924	-37.2%
FI	366,196	100,409	466,605	-41.5%	65,484	431,680	-45.9%
SE	302,667	43,963	346,630	-55.1%	27,477	330,144	-57.3%
UK	17,310	832,327	849,637	1,863.3%	378,331	395,641	814.2%
IS
LI
NO
CH	9,777,402	300,488	10,077,889	0.2%	147,781	9,925,183	-1.3%
Total	45,756,359	9,142,713	54,899,071	-43.3%	4,211,268	49,967,627	-48.4%
Extrapo-lation (n: 10,082)		47,430,196			21,955,523

*This is an incomplete picture due to missing data for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, PT, SI and IS as reporting Member State and given that some Member states did not provide a breakdown by the Member State of origin (FR, ES and EE).

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire

Option 4 – A change of the calculation method: salary earned in the Member State of origin is also taken into account

For this option the calculation of the unemployment benefit will also be based on the salaries earned in the Member State of origin. The average wage earned during the qualifying period laid down in national legislation will be calculated. As mentioned above (see also Figure 2), many Member States apply a qualifying period of some 12 months.

Box 2 – An example

An unemployed migrant worker worked for one month (option 4a) in the Member State of last activity and received a salary of € 2,000. The qualifying period in the Member State of last activity is 12 months. Therefore, a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of 11 months completed by the unemployed migrant worker in the Member State of origin has to be taken into account for the award of an unemployment benefit by the Member State of last activity. During this period of 11 months the unemployed migrant worker received a monthly salary of € 1,000. The unemployment benefit of the Member State of last activity is calculated as a certain percentage of the average salary of the previous 12 months (i.e. the qualifying period). The average salary will amount to € 1,083 (= (€ 2,000*1 + € 1,000*11) /12). In accordance with the current rules, the calculation of the unemployment benefit would be based on the salary received in the Member State of last activity only, i.e. € 2,000.

If the unemployed migrant worker worked for three months (option 4b) in the Member State of last activity, the average salary would amount to € 1,250 (=(€ 2,000*3 + € 1,000*9) /12).

Tables 17 (threshold of one month) and 18 (threshold of three months) provide bilateral information on the impact of the average wage when also salaries earned in the Member State of origin are taken into account compared to the current situation. Figures are expressed as x times the average salary under the current rules. For example, consider the changes between Belgium and Bulgaria. The average wage in option 4a (Table 17) for an unemployed migrant worker who is employed only one month in Belgium as Member State of last activity (qualifying period = 12 months) and requiring an aggregation of a period of 11 months from Bulgaria as Member State of origin is equal to 0.2 times the average wage under the current rules. This in contrast to an unemployed worker employed in Bulgaria as Member State of last activity (qualifying period = 9 months) and requiring an aggregation of a period of eight months from Belgium as Member State of origin, where the average wage in option 4a will be equal to 8.4 times the average wage under the current rules. These cross-tables could be used to estimate the decrease or increase of the amount of the unemployment benefit. However, this should be corrected by the ceiling of earnings taken into account and the minimum and maximum unemployment benefits. For example, Bulgaria applies a maximum amount of the monthly contributory income of € 1,227. This implies that the salary earned in the Member of origin by unemployed migrant workers coming from high-wage Member States will be flattened to this ceiling. Also, unemployed migrant workers entitled to an unemployment benefit from Belgium will receive at least a daily amount of € 36.6 despite the fact that their average wage is decreased many times by taking into account also the salary earned in low-wage Member States of origin.

This is the LANDSCAPE PAGE section.

Table 17 Average earnings also taking into account the salaries earned in the Member State of origin compared to the current situation, threshold of one month

		Member State of last activity
Reference period		12	9	12	12	12	12	9	5	12	4	9	12	6	9	18	6	12	12	6	12	12	12	12	9	24	6	6	6	3	12	12	12
Gross monthly earnings		2,579	278	639	2,948	2,496	655	1,851	1,159	1,453	2,055	684	1,677	n.a.	520	430	2,986	545	1,175	2,704	2,342	549	985	326	987	558	2,359	2,517	2,325	2,118	n.a.	3,730	3,978
		BE	BG	CZ	DK	DE	EE	IE	EL	ES	FR	HR	IT	CY	LV	LT	LU	HU	MT	NL	AT	PL	PT	RO	SI	SK	FI	SE	UK	IS	LI	NO	CH
BE	2,579	1.0	8.4	3.8	0.9	1.0	3.7	1.3	2.0	1.7	1.2	3.5	1.5		4.5	5.7	0.9	4.4	2.1	1.0	1.1	4.4	2.5	7.3	2.4	4.5	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1		0.7	0.7
BG	278	0.2	1.0	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.2		0.6	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4		0.2	0.1
CZ	639	0.3	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.4		1.2	1.5	0.3	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	1.2	0.7	1.9	0.7	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5		0.2	0.2
DK	2,948	1.1	9.5	4.3	1.0	1.2	4.2	1.5	2.2	1.9	1.3	3.9	1.7		5.1	6.5	1.0	5.0	2.4	1.1	1.2	5.0	2.8	8.4	2.8	5.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.3		0.8	0.8
DE	2,496	1.0	8.1	3.7	0.9	1.0	3.6	1.3	1.9	1.7	1.2	3.4	1.4		4.4	5.5	0.9	4.3	2.0	0.9	1.1	4.3	2.4	7.1	2.4	4.3	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1		0.7	0.7
EE	655	0.3	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.4		1.2	1.5	0.3	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	1.2	0.7	1.9	0.7	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5		0.2	0.2
IE	1,851	0.7	6.0	2.7	0.7	0.8	2.7	1.0	1.5	1.3	0.9	2.5	1.1		3.3	4.1	0.7	3.2	1.5	0.7	0.8	3.2	1.8	5.3	1.8	3.2	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9		0.5	0.5
EL	1,159	0.5	3.8	1.7	0.4	0.5	1.7	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.7	1.6	0.7		2.1	2.6	0.5	2.0	1.0	0.5	0.5	2.0	1.2	3.3	1.2	2.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7		0.4	0.4
ES	1,453	0.6	4.8	2.2	0.5	0.6	2.1	0.8	1.2	1.0	0.8	2.0	0.9		2.6	3.2	0.6	2.5	1.2	0.6	0.7	2.5	1.4	4.2	1.4	2.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8		0.4	0.4
FR	2,055	0.8	6.7	3.0	0.7	0.8	3.0	1.1	1.6	1.4	1.0	2.8	1.2		3.6	4.6	0.7	3.5	1.7	0.8	0.9	3.5	2.0	5.9	2.0	3.6	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0		0.6	0.6
HR	684	0.3	2.3	1.1	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.5		1.3	1.6	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.4	1.2	0.7	2.0	0.7	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5		0.3	0.2
IT	1,677	0.7	5.5	2.5	0.6	0.7	2.4	0.9	1.4	1.1	0.9	2.3	1.0		3.0	3.7	0.6	2.9	1.4	0.7	0.7	2.9	1.6	4.8	1.6	2.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9		0.5	0.5
CY	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3		0.1	0.1
LV	520	0.3	1.8	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.4		1.0	1.2	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.6	1.5	0.6	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5		0.2	0.2
LT	430	0.2	1.5	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.3		0.8	1.0	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.5	1.3	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5		0.2	0.2
LU	2,986	1.1	9.7	4.4	1.0	1.2	4.3	1.5	2.3	2.0	1.3	4.0	1.7		5.2	6.6	1.0	5.1	2.4	1.1	1.3	5.1	2.9	8.5	2.8	5.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3		0.8	0.8
HU	545	0.3	1.9	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.4		1.0	1.3	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.6	1.6	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5		0.2	0.2
MT	1,175	0.5	3.9	1.8	0.4	0.5	1.7	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.7	1.6	0.7		2.1	2.6	0.5	2.1	1.0	0.5	0.5	2.0	1.2	3.4	1.2	2.1	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7		0.4	0.4
NL	2,704	1.0	8.8	4.0	0.9	1.1	3.9	1.4	2.1	1.8	1.2	3.6	1.6		4.7	6.0	0.9	4.6	2.2	1.0	1.1	4.6	2.6	7.7	2.5	4.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2		0.7	0.7
AT	2,342	0.9	7.6	3.4	0.8	0.9	3.4	1.2	1.8	1.6	1.1	3.2	1.4		4.1	5.2	0.8	4.0	1.9	0.9	1.0	4.0	2.3	6.7	2.2	4.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1		0.7	0.6
PL	549	0.3	1.9	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.4		1.0	1.3	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.6	1.6	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5		0.2	0.2
PT	985	0.4	3.3	1.5	0.4	0.4	1.5	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.6	1.4	0.6		1.8	2.2	0.4	1.7	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.7	1.0	2.9	1.0	1.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6		0.3	0.3
RO	326	0.2	1.2	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.3		0.7	0.8	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4		0.2	0.2
SI	987	0.4	3.3	1.5	0.4	0.4	1.5	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.6	1.4	0.6		1.8	2.2	0.4	1.7	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.7	1.0	2.9	1.0	1.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6		0.3	0.3
SK	558	0.3	1.9	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.4		1.1	1.3	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.6	1.7	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5		0.2	0.2
FI	2,359	0.9	7.7	3.5	0.8	0.9	3.4	1.2	1.8	1.6	1.1	3.2	1.4		4.1	5.2	0.8	4.0	1.9	0.9	1.0	4.0	2.3	6.7	2.2	4.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1		0.7	0.6
SE	2,517	1.0	8.2	3.7	0.9	1.0	3.6	1.3	1.9	1.7	1.2	3.4	1.5		4.4	5.6	0.9	4.3	2.0	0.9	1.1	4.3	2.4	7.2	2.4	4.4	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1		0.7	0.7
UK	2,325	0.9	7.6	3.4	0.8	0.9	3.3	1.2	1.8	1.6	1.1	3.1	1.4		4.1	5.2	0.8	4.0	1.9	0.9	1.0	4.0	2.2	6.6	2.2	4.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1		0.7	0.6
IS	2,118	0.8	6.9	3.1	0.7	0.9	3.0	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.0	2.9	1.2		3.7	4.7	0.8	3.6	1.7	0.8	0.9	3.6	2.1	6.0	2.0	3.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0		0.6	0.6
LI	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3		0.1	0.1
NO	3,730	1.4	12.1	5.4	1.2	1.5	5.3	1.9	2.8	2.4	1.6	5.0	2.1		6.5	8.2	1.2	6.4	3.0	1.3	1.5	6.3	3.6	10.6	3.5	6.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5		1.0	0.9
CH	3,978	1.5	12.8	5.8	1.3	1.5	5.7	2.0	2.9	2.6	1.7	5.3	2.3		6.9	8.8	1.3	6.8	3.2	1.4	1.6	6.7	3.8	11.3	3.7	6.9	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6		1.1	1.0

Source Own calculations based on Eurostat

Table 18 Average earnings taking into account also the salaries earned in the Member State of origin compared to the current situation, threshold of three months

		Member State of last activity
Reference period		12	9	12	12	12	12	9	5	12	4	9	12	6	9	18	6	12	12	6	12	12	12	12	9	24	6	6	6	3	12	12	12
Gross monthly earnings		2,579	278	639	2,948	2,496	655	1,851	1,159	1,453	2,055	684	1,677	0	520	430	2,986	545	1,175	2,704	2,342	549	985	326	987	558	2,359	2,517	2,325	2,118	0	3,730	3,978
		BE	BG	CZ	DK	DE	EE	IE	EL	ES	FR	HR	IT	CY	LV	LT	LU	HU	MT	NL	AT	PL	PT	RO	SI	SK	FI	SE	UK	IS	LI	NO	CH
BE	2,579	1.0	6.5	3.3	0.9	1.0	3.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.1	2.8	1.4		3.6	5.2	0.9	3.8	1.9	1.0	1.1	3.8	2.2	6.2	2.1	4.2	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0		0.8	0.7
BG	278	0.3	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.4		0.7	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.3	0.3
CZ	639	0.4	1.9	1.0	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.5		1.2	1.4	0.6	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.5	1.1	0.7	1.7	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.4
DK	2,948	1.1	7.4	3.7	1.0	1.1	3.6	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.1	3.2	1.6		4.1	5.9	1.0	4.3	2.1	1.0	1.2	4.3	2.5	7.0	2.3	4.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0		0.8	0.8
DE	2,496	1.0	6.3	3.2	0.9	1.0	3.1	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.1	2.8	1.4		3.5	5.0	0.9	3.7	1.8	1.0	1.0	3.7	2.2	6.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.8	0.7
EE	655	0.4	1.9	1.0	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.5		1.2	1.4	0.6	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.5	1.1	0.7	1.8	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.4
IE	1,851	0.8	4.8	2.4	0.7	0.8	2.4	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.0	2.1	1.1		2.7	3.8	0.8	2.8	1.4	0.8	0.8	2.8	1.7	4.5	1.6	3.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0		0.6	0.6
EL	1,159	0.6	3.1	1.6	0.5	0.6	1.6	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.5	0.8		1.8	2.4	0.7	1.8	1.0	0.7	0.6	1.8	1.1	2.9	1.1	1.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0		0.5	0.5
ES	1,453	0.7	3.8	2.0	0.6	0.7	1.9	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.8	0.9		2.2	3.0	0.7	2.2	1.2	0.8	0.7	2.2	1.4	3.6	1.3	2.4	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0		0.5	0.5
FR	2,055	0.8	5.3	2.7	0.8	0.9	2.6	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.0	2.3	1.2		3.0	4.1	0.8	3.1	1.6	0.9	0.9	3.1	1.8	5.0	1.7	3.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0		0.7	0.6
HR	684	0.4	2.0	1.1	0.4	0.5	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.6		1.2	1.5	0.6	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.5	1.2	0.8	1.8	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.4
IT	1,677	0.7	4.4	2.2	0.7	0.8	2.2	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.0	2.0	1.0		2.5	3.4	0.8	2.6	1.3	0.8	0.8	2.5	1.5	4.1	1.5	2.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0		0.6	0.6
CY	0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0		0.3	0.3
LV	520	0.4	1.6	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.5		1.0	1.2	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.6	1.4	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.3
LT	430	0.4	1.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.4		0.9	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.6	1.2	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.3	0.3
LU	2,986	1.1	7.5	3.8	1.0	1.1	3.7	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.1	3.2	1.6		4.2	5.9	1.0	4.4	2.2	1.1	1.2	4.3	2.5	7.1	2.4	4.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0		0.9	0.8
HU	545	0.4	1.6	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.5		1.0	1.2	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.7	1.5	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.4
MT	1,175	0.6	3.2	1.6	0.5	0.6	1.6	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.5	0.8		1.8	2.4	0.7	1.9	1.0	0.7	0.6	1.9	1.1	3.0	1.1	2.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0		0.5	0.5
NL	2,704	1.0	6.8	3.4	0.9	1.1	3.3	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.1	3.0	1.5		3.8	5.4	1.0	4.0	2.0	1.0	1.1	3.9	2.3	6.5	2.2	4.4	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0		0.8	0.8
AT	2,342	0.9	6.0	3.0	0.8	1.0	2.9	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.0	2.6	1.3		3.3	4.7	0.9	3.5	1.7	0.9	1.0	3.5	2.0	5.6	1.9	3.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.7	0.7
PL	549	0.4	1.7	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.5		1.0	1.2	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.7	1.5	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.4
PT	985	0.5	2.7	1.4	0.5	0.5	1.4	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.3	0.7		1.6	2.1	0.7	1.6	0.9	0.7	0.6	1.6	1.0	2.5	1.0	1.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0		0.4	0.4
RO	326	0.3	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.4		0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.5	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.3	0.3
SI	987	0.5	2.7	1.4	0.5	0.5	1.4	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.3	0.7		1.6	2.1	0.7	1.6	0.9	0.7	0.6	1.6	1.0	2.5	1.0	1.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0		0.4	0.4
SK	558	0.4	1.7	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.5		1.0	1.2	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.7	1.5	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0		0.4	0.4
FI	2,359	0.9	6.0	3.0	0.9	1.0	3.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.0	2.6	1.3		3.4	4.7	0.9	3.5	1.8	0.9	1.0	3.5	2.0	5.7	1.9	3.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.7	0.7
SE	2,517	1.0	6.4	3.2	0.9	1.0	3.1	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.1	2.8	1.4		3.6	5.0	0.9	3.7	1.9	1.0	1.1	3.7	2.2	6.0	2.0	4.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.8	0.7
UK	2,325	0.9	5.9	3.0	0.8	0.9	2.9	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.0	2.6	1.3		3.3	4.7	0.9	3.4	1.7	0.9	1.0	3.4	2.0	5.6	1.9	3.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.7	0.7
IS	2,118	0.9	5.4	2.7	0.8	0.9	2.7	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.0	2.4	1.2		3.0	4.3	0.9	3.2	1.6	0.9	0.9	3.1	1.9	5.1	1.8	3.4	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0		0.7	0.6
LI	0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0		0.3	0.3
NO	3,730	1.3	9.3	4.6	1.2	1.4	4.5	1.7	1.9	2.2	1.2	4.0	1.9		5.1	7.4	1.1	5.4	2.6	1.2	1.4	5.4	3.1	8.8	2.9	6.0	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.0		1.0	1.0
CH	3,978	1.4	9.9	4.9	1.3	1.4	4.8	1.8	2.0	2.3	1.2	4.2	2.0		5.4	7.9	1.2	5.7	2.8	1.2	1.5	5.7	3.3	9.4	3.0	6.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.0		1.0	1.0

Source Own calculations based on Eurostat

Option 4a – A threshold of one month

In order to calculate option 4a the following definition is applied:

= (Cases of less than 30 days * average spending per unemployed person * correction coefficient) + (cases more than 30 days * average spending per unemployed person).

The correction coefficient is defined in Table 17 (assuming a period of employment of one month in the Member State of last activity and 11 months in the Member State of origin). The unemployment expenditure related to the cases of a period of more than one month is already reported in Table 11 under sub-option 3a.

For six of the reporting Member States the budgetary impact could not be estimated: Lithuania and Norway could not provide a breakdown by period of insurance, employment or self-employment; France, Spain and Estonia could not provide a breakdown by Member State of origin and for Liechtenstein the average spending per unemployed person is not known.

The estimated budgetary impact does not take into account the ceiling of earnings taken as a reference defined by some Member States, or the lowest and highest levels of the unemployment benefits. Therefore, these estimates should be considered as a maximum impact, given that the real impact will be flattened for some Member States. As already mentioned, also some Member States do not take previous earnings as a reference for the calculation of the unemployment benefit and as a result this option will not affect these Member States (Ireland, Malta, Poland and the United Kingdom).

Under this sub-option 0.10% of total yearly unemployment spending by the reporting Member States will be related to the aggregation of periods for unemployment (Table 19).

If the calculation of the unemployment benefit will also be based on the salaries earned in the Member State of last activity for those unemployed recent migrant workers who fulfilled a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than one month in their Member State of last activity, in particular ‘low-wage’ competent Member States (compared to the Member States of origin) will be confronted with an additional budgetary cost (e.g. BG (+2.7%), LV (+94.7%), HU (+ 1.5%), SK (+43.7%) and SE (+3.2%)) (Tables 15 and 16). This of course in contrast to ‘high-wage’ competent Member States (e.g. BE (-6.8%), DK (-24.7%); NL (-1.4%), FI (-4.3%) and CH (-0.2%)).

Table 19 Estimate of the budgetary annual impact under sub-option 4a

MS	Less than 30 days	More than one month	Expenditure related to the aggregation of periods (in €)	% change compared to the baseline scenario	Total unemployment spending (in million €)	% share
BE	5,457,818	13,606,403	19,064,221	-6.8%	5,577	0.34%
BG	43,216	1,312,129	1,355,345	2.7%	181	0.75%
CZ		0
DK	120,852	116,942	237,794	-24.7%	2,696	0.01%
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
HR	0	7,606	7,606	0.0%	180	0.00%
IT
CY	0	3,890	3,890	0.0%	124	0.00%
LV	6,196	3,358	9,554	94.7%	59	0.02%
LT				n.a.
LU	8,103	514,545	522,648	-0.5%	275	0.19%
HU	13,621	328,012	341,634	1.5%	208	0.16%
MT	(2,100)	(9,625)	(11,725)	6.6%	23	0.05%
NL	270,987	1,527,450	1,798,437	-1.4%	10,183	0.02%
AT
PL	(152,136)	(305,108)	(457,244)	33.7%	640	0.07%
PT
RO	30	1,797	1,827	-15.3%	183	0.00%
SI
SK	275,080	358,226	633,306	43.7%	176	0.36%
FI	101,483	661,516	762,999	-4.3%	3,189	0.02%
SE	288,706	508,954	797,660	3.2%	1,704	0.05%
UK	(19,467)	(18,753)	(38,219)	-11.7%	6,646	0.00%
IS
LI				n.a.
NO				n.a.
CH	12,454	10,023,956	10,036,409	-0.2%	3,266	0.31%
Total	6,772,249	29,308,270	36,080,519	-3.2*	35,310	0.10%

* Only selecting Member States for which figures are available under sub-option 4a.

** ( ) = Member States which do not take previous earnings as a reference for the calculation of the Unemployment Benefit.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Table 20 Estimate of public spending for cases less than 30 days under the baseline scenario and under sub-option 4a

MS	Number of cases	Baseline scenario (in €)	Sub-option 4a (in €)	% change
BE	736	6,859,118	5,457,818	-20.4%
BG	22	7,048	43,216	513.9%
DK	34	198,801	120,852	-39.2%
HR	0	0	0
CY	0	0	0
LV	6	1,550	6,196	299.8%
LU	1	10,948	8,103	-26.0%
HU	29	8,493	13,621	60.4%
MT	1	1,375	2,100	(52.7%)
NL	26	296,371	270,987	-8.6%
PL	164	36,983	152,136	(311.4%)
RO	2	359	30	-91.7%
SK	217	82,434	275,080	233.7%
FI	23	135,847	101,483	-25.3%
SE	156	263,777	288,706	9.5%
UK	17	24,523	19,467	(-20.6%)
CH	4	30,819	12,454	-59.6%

* ( ) = Member States which do not take previous earnings as a reference for the calculation of the Unemployment Benefit.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Option 4b – A threshold of three months

In order to calculate option 4b the following definition is applied:

= (Cases of less than 30 days * average spending per unemployed person * correction coefficient) + (cases more than one month but less than three months * average spending per unemployed person * correction coefficient) + (cases more than three months * average spending per unemployed person).

The correction coefficient for the cases of less than 30 days is defined in Table 17 (assuming a period of employment of one month in the Member State of last activity and 11 months in the Member State of origin) and for the cases of more than one month but less than three months in Table 84 (assuming a period of employment of three months in the Member State of last activity and nine months in the Member State of origin). The unemployment expenditure related to the cases of a period of more than three months is already reported in Table 15 under sub-option 3b.

For six reporting Member States the budgetary impact could not be estimated: Lithuania and Norway could not provide a breakdown by period of insurance, employment or self-employment; France, Spain and Estonia could not provide a breakdown by Member State of origin and for Liechtenstein the average spending per unemployed person is not known.

Under this sub-option, 0.10% of total unemployment spending by the reporting Member States will be related to the aggregation of periods for unemployment (Table 21). Also, a similar view on the budgetary impact of ‘low-wage’ and ‘high-wage’ Member States as described under sub-option 4a is obtained.

Table 21 Estimate of the budgetary annual impact under sub-option 4b

MS	Less than 30 days	More than 1 month but less than 3 months	More than 3 months	Expenditure related to the aggregation of periods (in €)	% change compared to the baseline scenario	Total unemployment spending (in million €)	% share
BE	5,457,818	3,182,447	9,692,233	18,332,498	-10.4%	5,577	0.33%
BG	43,216	237,859	1,264,077	1,545,152	17.1%	181	0.85%
CZ
DK	120,852	0	116,942	237,794	-24.7%	2,696	0.01%
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
HR	0	1,315	7,130	8,446	11.0%	180	0.00%
IT
CY	0	0	3,890	3,890	0.0%	124	0.00%
LV	6,196	1,680	2,841	10,717	118.4%	59	0.02%
LT					n.a.
LU	8,103	62,786	437,911	508,800	-3.2%	275	0.18%
HU	13,621	2,424	326,255	342,300	1.7%	208	0.16%
MT	(2,100)	(721)	(8,250)	(11,072)	0.6%	23	0.05%
NL	270,987	292,771	1,219,680	1,783,439	-2.2%	10,183	0.02%
AT
PL	(152,136)	(293,485)	(219,642)	(665,263)	94.5%	640	0.10%
PT
RO	30	575	1,438	2,043	-5.3%	183	0.00%
SI
SK	275,080	248,899	275,413	799,392	81.4%	176	0.45%
FI	101,483	222,066	366,196	689,745	-13.5%	3,189	0.02%
SE	288,706	238,894	302,667	830,267	7.4%	1,704	0.05%
UK	(19,467)	(1,955)	(17,310)	(38,732)	-10.5%	6,646	0.00%
IS
LI					n.a.
NO					n.a.
CH	12,454	134,820	9,777,402	9,924,675	-1.3%	3,266	0.30%
Total	6,772,249	4,922,698	24,039,277	35,734,224	-4.1*	35,310	0.10%

* Only selecting Member States for which figures are available under sub-option 4b.

** ( ) = Member States which do not take previous earnings as a reference for the calculation of the Unemployment Benefit.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Table 22 Estimate of public spending for cases less than three months under the baseline scenario and under sub-option 4b

MS	Number of cases	Baseline scenario (in €)	Sub-option 4b (in €)	% change
BE	1,156	10,773,289	8,640,265	-19.8%
BG	172	55,099	281,123	410.2%
DK	34	198,801	120,852	-39.2%
HR	1	475	1,315	176.7%
CY	0	0	0
LV	8	2,066	7,876	281.1%
LU	8	87,582	70,889	-19.1%
HU	35	10,250	16,045	56.5%
MT	2	2,750	2,821	(2.6%)
NL	53	604,141	563,759	-6.7%
PL	543	122,449	445,621	(263.9%)
RO	4	719	605	-15.8%
SK	435	165,248	523,979	217.1%
FI	73	431,166	323,549	-25.0%
SE	278	470,064	527,599	12.2%
UK	18	25,965	21,422	(-17.5%)
CH	36	277,373	147,274	-46.9%

* ( ) = Member States which do not take previous earnings as a reference for the calculation of the Unemployment Benefit.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Summary

All Member States will experience the lowest budgetary impact on their public unemployment spending if option 3b – application of a threshold of three months – is applied (Tables 23 and 24). The budgetary impact differs for each of the Member States and depends on the percentage of aggregated cases applicable to a period of insurance, employment of self-employment below three months compared to the total number of aggregated cases. For instance, Cyprus and Hungary will experience almost no decrease of public unemployment spending under option 3b. These estimates only include the budgetary impact on public unemployment spending. However, also public spending on social assistance applicable to recent unemployed migrant workers who fall below the threshold could be taken into account. This will also limit the financial ‘gain’ when applying a threshold of one or three months. The impact of option 4 – the calculation of the unemployment benefit will also be based on the salaries in the Member State of origin if a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than one month (sub-option 4a) or three months (sub-option 4b) has been fulfilled in the Member State of last activity – depends strongly on the breakdown by Member State of origin. If average earnings in the Member State of origin are higher than the average earnings in the Member State of last activity, competent Member States will experience a higher budgetary cost compared to the baseline scenario. However, the real impact will be flattened for some competent Member States given that they have defined a ceiling of earnings taken as a reference and/or a minimum and/or a maximum level of the unemployment benefit.

Table 23 A comparison of options between Member States, % change compared to the baseline scenario

MS	Baseline	Option 3a		Option 3b		Option 4a		Option 4b
	Amount (in €)	Amount (in €)	% change	Amount (in €)	% change	Amount (in €)	% change	Amount (in €)	% change
BE	20,465,522	13,606,403	-33.5%	9,692,233	-52.6%	19,064,221	-6.8%	18,332,498	-10.4%
BG	1,319,176	1,312,129	-0.5%	1,264,077	-4.2%	1,355,345	2.7%	1,545,152	17.1%
CZ
DK	315,743	116,942	-63.0%	116,942	-63.0%	237,794	-24.7%	237,794	-24.7%
DE
EE	64,171	40,568	-36.8%	29,135	-54.6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
IE
EL
ES	6,502,801	3,357,982	-48.4%	1,952,683	-70.0%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
FR	52,961,903	27,884,715	-47.3%	19,735,264	-62.7%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
HR	7,606	7,606	0.0%	7,130	-6.3%	7,606	0.0%	8,446	11.0%
IT
CY	3,890	3,890	0.0%	3,890	0.0%	3,890	0.0%	3,890	0.0%
LV	4,908	3,358	-31.6%	2,841	-42.1%	9,554	94.7%	10,717	118.4%
LT	53,055	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU	525,493	514,545	-2.1%	437,911	-16.7%	522,648	-0.5%	508,800	-3.2%
HU	336,506	328,012	-2.5%	326,255	-3.0%	341,634	1.5%	342,300	1.7%
MT	11,000	9,625	-12.5%	8,250	-25.0%	11,725	6.6%	11,072	0.6%
NL	1,823,821	1,527,450	-16.3%	1,219,680	-33.1%	1,798,437	-1.4%	1,783,439	-2.2%
AT
PL	342,091	305,108	-10.8%	219,642	-35.8%	457,244	33.7%	665,263	94.5%
PT
RO	2,157	1,797	-16.7%	1,438	-33.3%	1,827	-15.3%	2,043	-5.3%
SI
SK	440,660	358,226	-18.7%	275,413	-37.5%	633,306	43.7%	799,392	81.4%
FI	797,363	661,516	-17.0%	366,196	-54.1%	762,999	-4.3%	689,745	-13.5%
SE	772,731	508,954	-34.1%	302,667	-60.8%	797,660	3.2%	830,267	7.4%
UK	43,275	18,753	-56.7%	17,310	-60.0%	38,219	-11.7%	38,732	-10.5%
IS
LI	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
NO	3,083,353	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
CH	10,054,775	10,023,956	-0.3%	9,777,402	-2.8%	10,048,455	-0.2%	9,924,675	-1.3%
Total			-37.4%		-52.7%		-3.2%		-4.1%

* No data available for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, LT, PT, SI, NO and IS.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Table 24 A comparison of options between Member States, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact

MS	Lowest budgetary impact					Highest budgetary impact
	Baseline	Option 3a	Option 3b	Option 4a	Option 4b	Baseline	Option 3a	Option 3b	Option 4a	Option 4b
BE			X			X
BG			X							X
CZ
DK		X	X						X	X
DE
EE			X	n.a.	n.a.	X			n.a.	n.a.
IE
EL
ES			X	n.a.	n.a.	X			n.a.	n.a.
FR			X	n.a.	n.a.	X			n.a.	n.a.
HR			X							X
IT
CY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LV			X							X
LT	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU			X			X
HU			X							X
MT			X						X
NL			X			X
AT
PL			X							X
PT
RO			X			X
SI
SK			X							X
FI			X			X
SE			X							X
UK			X			X
IS
LI	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
NO
CH			X			X

* No data available for CZ, DE, IE, EL, IT, AT, PT, SI and IS.

Source Own calculations based on the administrative questionnaire and ESSPROS

Conclusions

The unemployment chapter of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 provides for specific coordination rules for the aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment in the case of unemployment. Aggregation will be applied to those unemployed recent migrant workers who have completed their most recent periods of insurance, employment or self-employment in the Member State where the benefit is claimed. In some cases the period of insurance, employment or self-employment is insufficient to be entitled to an unemployment benefit. In that case additional periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed by the person in a Member State other than the competent State are required.

Option 1 – Status quo: “maintaining the wording of Article 61”;

Option 2 – The formalisation of the “one-day rule”;

Option 3 – The introduction of a minimum period for aggregating periods of insurance, employment or self-employment;

oSub-option 3a: one month of insurance, employment or self-employment needs to be completed before aggregation can be applied.

oSub-option 3b: three months of insurance, employment or self-employment needs to be completed before aggregation can be applied.

Option 4 – A change of the calculation method of the unemployment benefit.

Different components (the number of new EU-28/EFTA movers; the number of unemployed new EU-28/EFTA movers; the period of insurance, employment or self-employment completed in the last Member State of activity; the qualifying period; the amount of the unemployment benefit and the duration of unemployment) will determine the budgetary cost of new EU-28/EFTA movers who became unemployed after a short period of insurance, employment or self-employment.

In 2012, some 1.8 million EU-28/EFTA citizens of working age moved to another EU Member State/EFTA country and some one in ten of these new EU-28/EFTA movers were unemployed. This group might need to prove periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed in a Member State other than the competent Member State in order to be entitled to an unemployment benefit. To which extent aggregation is required (expressed by the number of PDs U1 or SEDs U002) will also depend on the qualifying period required under the legislation of the competent Member State. Most Member States apply a qualifying period of some 12 months. However, it should be noted that there are also large differences in the time in which this period must be completed. It will make the accomplishment of the acquired period more severe or less severe.

In almost all Member States the earnings preceding unemployment are taken into account as a reference basis for the calculation of the unemployment benefit. Nonetheless, the applied calculation methods vary from taking into account the last salary earned to the average earnings of several months. In case of aggregation the calculation method (as defined in Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) provides that only the salary or professional income received by the person concerned in respect of the last activity in the competent Member State is taken into account. However, option 4 is revising this by also taking into account the salary earned in the previous Member State of origin if a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than one month (sub-option 4a) or three months (sub-option 4b) has been fulfilled in the Member State of last activity .

The budgetary impact of the aggregation of periods for unemployment on total unemployment spending is very limited. Approximately 0.11% of total unemployment spending by the reporting Member States could be related to the aggregation of periods for unemployment.

All Member States will experience the lowest budgetary impact on their public unemployment spending if option 3b – application of a threshold of three months – is applied. The budgetary impact differs for each of the Member States and depends on the percentage of aggregated cases applicable to a period of insurance, employment of self-employment below three months compared to the total number of aggregated cases. These estimates only include the budgetary impact on public unemployment spending. However, also public spending on social assistance applicable to unemployed recent migrant workers who fall below the threshold could be taken into account. This will also limit the financial ‘gain’ when applying a threshold of one or three months.

In case the previous Member State is responsible for paying the unemployment benefits for those workers who, in the Member State of last activity, have not completed one or three months of insurance, employment or self-employment this additional cost should be added to the budgetary cost Member States will experience as Member State of last activity. However, most of the aggregated cases apply to a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of more than three months and implies that the previous Member State only for a limited number of cases will be responsible for paying the unemployment benefit. Nevertheless, figures show already that this will lead to a higher budgetary impact for some Member States compared to the current rules.

The impact of option 4 – the calculation of the unemployment benefit will also be based on the salaries in the Member State of origin if a period of insurance, employment or self-employment of less than one month (sub-option 4a) or three months (sub-option 4b) has been fulfilled in the Member State of last activity – depends strongly on the breakdown by Member State of origin. If average earnings in the Member State of origin are higher than the average earnings in the Member State of last activity, competent Member States will experience a higher budgetary cost compared to the baseline scenario. However, the real impact will be flattened for some competent Member States given that they have defined a ceiling of earnings taken as a reference and/or a minimum and/or a maximum level of the unemployment benefit.

References

Barslund, M. and Busse, M. (2014), Making the Most of EU Labour Mobility. Report of a CEPS Task Force in cooperation with the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 45 p.

Canetta, E., Fries-Tersch, E. and Mabilla, V. (2014), Annual report on statistics on intra-EU movers, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, 76 p.

Doherty, R., Vandresse, B., Bulté, S., Bardaji Horno, M., Ulrich, M., Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2013), Study for an impact assessment for revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009, Deloitte – HIVA KU Leuven, 295 p.

Darvas, Z. and Wolff, G.B. (2014), ‘Europe’s social problem and its implications for economic growth’, Breugelpolicybrief, Issue 2014/03, Brussels, 8 p.

Dullien, S. (2014), A European Unemployment Benefits Scheme. How to Provide for More Stability in the Euro Zone, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 143 p.

Esser, I., Ferrarini, T., Nelson, K., Palme, J. & Sjöberg, O. (2013), Unemployment Benefits in EU Member States, European Commission – DG EMPL, 25 p.

European Commission (2015), Employment and Social Development in Europe 2014, DG EMPL, 33 p.

European Commission (2014a), ‘Recent trends in the geographical mobility of workers in the EU – EU Employment and Social Situation – Quarterly Review – Supplement June 2014’, DG EMPL, 36 p.

European Commission (2014b), Migrant access to social security and healthcare: policies and practice. European Migration Network Study 2014, DG Home Affairs, 111 p.

European Commission (2011), Mobility in Europe 2011 – Section III: Migration and cross-border commuting, p. 66-108.

Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2015), Aggregation of periods for unemployment, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, May 2015, 17 p.

Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2014), Posting of workers: Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2012 and 2013, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, 40 p.

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ANNEX XV: Administrative Costs 2014 package

ANNEX XV Administrative costs of the options 80

For the assessment of the administrative and implementation costs, a limited number of Member States has been selected as a sample.

For long-term care benefits, these countries are: - Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and the United Kingdom.

For unemployment benefits, these countries are: - Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom.

The selection criteria applied are:

1) The high number of cross-border workers in these countries and experience with managing cross-border cases;

2) The efficiency level and the degree of automation in place;

3) The geographic balance;

4) The willingness of the national administrations to collaborate.

Long-term care benefits

For long-term care, it appears that the situation is very complex, as it encompasses different cares that are not understood in the same way in the whole EU and that imply a fragmented landscape of responsible and implementing actors in some Member States (e.g. over 70 different bodies are involved in Germany, while each of the 17 regions of Spain also has a different system; in many Member States, local entities are a dominant actor, etc.). The different national specificities result in a large variety of situations which may have a significant impact on the administrative burden when dealing with cross-border cases for long-term care.

There a number examples demonstrating the complexity of the processing of cross-border cases for long-term care which can result in administrative cost and burden for Member States’ authorities:

According to the interviewees, there is legal uncertainty about which benefits should be coordinated under the Sickness Chapter. Some countries still do not consider the care (social assistance) they provide as being included in the Sickness Chapter;

In our survey to the national administrations, around 50% of national administrations that are opposed to changes to the current coordination rules state that the current rules need only to be better applied in practice and to be better explained. National administrations who are in favour of a change of the current rules say that the identified problems (legal uncertainty, complex regulation and uneven applications of the rules by Member States) will persist if no change occurs;

Not in all Member States (particularly not in Member States that generally are in favour of keeping the status quo such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands) administrative burden was perceived a major concern by national administrations. One Danish interviewee gave the following argument to put the administrative burden into perspective:

“Before 2009, Germany did not ask reimbursement to Denmark for costs that it incurred by provision of LTC services to citizens that fell under the Danish system, based on a special agreement between both Member States. However, recently, Germany asked to reintroduce a reimbursement system again between both countries. The fact that Germany asked to reinstall a reimbursement system again shows that other aspects seem more important for Germany than administrative burden from reimbursement claims, for example the financial impact of LTC services provided by Germany.”

A German health insurance considered the reimbursement of LTC benefits to be slow and problematic from an administrative point of view:

“There are EUR 500 000 – 600.000 interest costs per year that my organisation has to bear because of non- or late payment. The reimbursement mechanism is not functioning well and needs a substantial revision of the rules. There is an outstanding amount of EUR 12-13 million in 2013. Late payments can be the result of checks/scrutiny of services rendered by the country of residence; however, the checks do not justify a waiting period of up to 18 months in some cases. The time needed for checks should be reduced substantially. The reimbursement mechanism could be made more efficient by using lump sum compensation mechanism. However, the views about its effectiveness are divided amongst the insuring companies.”

An Austrian representative of a health insurance fund confirms the long processing time of reimbursement:

“Particularly the reimbursement of LTC benefits in kind by the competent MS poses difficulties. Often, the information about the amount/costs of benefits in kind rendered by the Member State of residence reaches the competent Member State (which reimburses these costs) very late. Regularly, it takes 1-1.5 years to reimburse such claims. The rules stipulating information procedures should be more detailed (e.g. duty for monthly information provision of the value of the benefits in kind rendered by the MS of residence). The time-bound provision of information by all Member States is of key importance as to ensure an effective application of the reimbursement mechanism”.

In general, regardless if they believed that administrative burden from the current rules is a major problem or not, only a small minority of national administrations have a good view on the actual administrative burden or are able to support their arguments with quantitative data or a detailed description of the burden. The lack of concrete (quantitative) evidence adds to the difficulty for making a sound judgment about this issue.

In terms of substantiation of the administrative costs related to the current rules and considering the limitations of the application of the SCM methodology in this exercise, we present in the table below the estimated costs related to processing of the PD S1 document.

Despite the data limitations resulting from the problems discussed in this chapter, the assessment of the administrative cost (baseline scenario) for the PD S1 document provides a robust basis for assessing the theoretical impact (positive or negative) of the different policy options on the administrative cost.

The methodology for assessing the administrative cost is based on the following formula:

Time (T) x Wage (W) x Number (N)

The hourly rate is EUR 18 per hour. We provide an estimate for the total number of cases for processing PD S1 documents for the EU-27.

Estimated current administrative cost (Baseline Scenario)

The PD S1 form allows a person to register for healthcare in the country of residence. This form is delivered per person (not per family). The number of PD S1 forms issued provides insight into the number of people who (may) receive LTC benefits in another Member State. In the framework of this study, we have collected data on the number of PD S1 documents ‘issued’ by category of citizen and have estimated expenditure on LTC benefits. In addition, we have collected data on the number of PD S1 documents issued for Poland and Belgium by means of a workshop with experts in the respective countries. In this section, we use the data available to calculate the estimated administrative cost for processing a number of documents related to long-term care in a cross-border case.

In order to assess the administrative costs for the EU-27 stemming from the processing of the PD S1 documents, we have carried out the following steps according to the Standard Cost Model (SCM):

1.Calculation of the unit cost per case:

The unit cost per case (processing/handling of a PD S1 form by the administrative staff – clerk) provides insight into the total cost for processing one PD S1 document. It is based on the following formula:

Time (T) x Wage (W)

During the workshops in the Member States, we have collected data on the average standard time spent for processing/handling a PD S1 document. Robust data are available only for Poland. The estimated time for processing one PD S1 document in Poland is estimated at 60 minutes.

The hourly rate for processing the administrative tasks is EUR 18; this results in a rate per minute of EUR 0.3 (EUR 18/60 minutes). The average unit cost for the EU-27 per case of handling a PD S1 document is EUR 18 81 . It is calculated on the following basis: Time (60 minutes) x Wage (EUR 0.3).

Caution should be paid when interpreting this estimated unit cost as the result is based on an example of one country only (Poland) which seems to have a rather efficient way of processing PD documents (see also the discussion on the processing of PD U1 documents above). It can be expected that the time for processing a PD S1 document in the other Member States may differ (substantially). Due to data limitation, however, we have calculated the administrative cost on the basis of the Polish example.

2.Number of cases:

In our research, we have estimated data for the number of PD S1 documents ‘issued’ for the EU-27 countries on the basis of our own calculations based on data from LFS (for a detailed discussion on the estimated number of PD S1 issued by category of citizen, see section 4.2.5 in this report). The total estimated number of PD S1 documents ‘issued’ in the EU-27 is estimated at around 1 980 000.

3.Calculation of the administrative cost (per Member State and for the EU-27)

We have calculated the administrative cost for processing PD S1 documents on the basis of this formula:

Time (T) x Wage (W) x Number (N)

The table below presents the total estimated administrative cost for processing PD S1 documents. The estimated total cost for the EU-27 is EUR 35 632 000. Within the EU-27, the estimated total cost for processing PD S1 documents was highest (˃ EUR 3 000) in a number of the old Member States (in descending order): Germany, the UK, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy. It was lowest (˂ EUR 100) in a number of the new Members States (in descending order): Cyprus, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Malta, Lithuania and Latvia.

Table 1: Estimated administrative cost - PD S1 'issued', EU-27, EUR, 2013, in 000

Source: Own calculations HIVA based on data from LFS and workshop in Poland

We have also calculated the administrative cost for processing a number of other documents related to long-term care benefits for Poland by applying the following formula: Time (T) x Wage (W) x Number (N). Data were collected for the following documents:

Member State of residence:

Service of E125 forms.

Competent Member State:

Request for the issue of S1 document/ E100 series form (service of E107/E001 forms);

Registration of the S1 document;

Registration of the E100 -series form (part B);

Service of SED S001 documents;

Issuing E125 forms.

There are no data available for the EU-27 for these documents; a calculation of administrative cost for these documents is therefore not possible at this stage. We present the data only for Poland, where robust data are available. The table below presents the total estimated administrative cost for processing the documents for Poland presented according to ‘Member State of residence’ and ‘Former working Member State’:

Table 2: Estimated administrative Cost – Competent Member State, E125, Poland, EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Table 3:Estimated administrative Cost – Member State of residence, E125, S1/E100/E107/E001, S001, Poland, EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Summary – Estimated current administrative cost - Baseline scenario

The table below summarises the administrative cost for the EU-27 for the following documents for the baseline scenario: PD U1 ‘received’, PD U” ‘issued’ and PD S1 ‘issued’.

Table 4: Baseline scenario – estimated administrative cost: PD U1 (in €), PD U2 (in €), PD S1 (in € 000)

Source: Own calculations based on collected administrative data and 2012 Ageing Report and data provided during the workshops on administrative burden (Poland, Belgium and Romania).

The number of cases is multiplied by standard stylized estimated cost per case. Standard because we use for each country the same cost, stylized because round figures are used and estimated because we have only partial and anecdotic information for two countries, Belgium and Poland. Those parameters can however easily be changed in this kind of calculations when more solid information becomes available. Stylized is also the fact that we do not reproduce all administrative steps for this kind of benefits: the intake of the patient, the decision process to allocate a benefit, the administrative burden to pay a patient, to claim in needed the reimbursement, to verify the entitlements, to reimburse, or claim reimbursement of some of the administrative burden etc. Here we make the hypothesis that in the country of residence the administrative burden for the intake for a benefit in kind is € 60, as it is also € 60 for the benefit in cash. This intake is here to take place in the country of residence, although situations are thinkable that people were already entitled to this benefit before they moved (as a pensioner for instance) from the previous country of residence to a new one. In the case of a benefit in kind also in the competent state an additional cost needs to be made for the handling of this process. On top of that for the payment in kind, based on the level of the country of residence and organised in the country of residence, a reimbursement process is needed, here supposed at € 20 euro per case, triggering at the same time a similar cost in the competent country. Multiplying those standard costs with the number of cases results to an average administrative cost for the in kind cases of € 4.8 million, and € 3.6 million for the in cash cases. The % of this administrative cost to the total budgetary cost is some 0.8% for the in kind benefits, and 1.0% for the in cash benefits. The grand total is some 0.9 % of which the major part of the administrative burden is at the expense of the country of residence while the budgetary cost is completely to be paid or reimbursed by the competent country.

Table 5: Estimated administrative cost and burden baseline scenario and options where country of residence or competent country are providing LTC benefits

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS, 2012 Ageing Report, additional data delivered by DG ECFIN input from the work shops

Unemployment benefits

Estimated current administrative costs and burden

Data limitations

In order to allow the stakeholders to identify the time spent on the information obligations related to the Regulations, we have defined prior to our visits in the Member States a standard legal process stemming from the Regulations, in cooperation with the Commission.

During our first visits, we noticed several issues concerning this process:

National administrations have developed their own administrative processes for processing/handling documents related to cross-border cases for unemployment benefits and long-term care. These differ substantially between the Member States. As a result, the experts in the respective countries faced difficulties in plugging the suggested administrative processes into their national way of working (processing documents);

The legal process encompassed several sub-administrative processes and documents and therefore Information Obligations (IOs). The complexity of the different processes proved to be an obstacle in making precise estimations of the (estimated) time spent for each of the processes. The experts were often not able to provide robust data on the time spent per each of the steps defined by the legal process.

Moreover, as the Regulations impose “principles” of coordination more than specific information obligations in the sense of the SCM, and as the principles were already applied partly or integrally by the administrations or applied still differently, it proved to be impossible for the stakeholders to differentiate the specific administrative burden 82 created by the Regulations from the business-as-usual (the administrative tasks they would perform anyway in the absence of the Regulations).

Another consequence of the nature of the Regulations is that each national process is different, meaning that it results in different requirements, documents, times and complexity. It makes impossible to standardize one process that fits all national specificities.

There are examples demonstrating the complexity of the processing of cross-border cases for unemployment benefits which can result in administrative cost and burden for Member States’ authorities:

The occasionally ‘blurry’ distinction between frontier workers and other cross-border workers, the distinction between wholly and partially unemployed frontier workers, the highly interpretable character of the criteria to determine the residence of a worker, the provisions on the aggregation of periods of insurance, employment and self-employment, and the reimbursement mechanism were mentioned as factors rendering the current coordination rules as complex;

While these regulatory distinctions intend to reflect the complexities of real situations and account for the actual differences between different types of cross-border workers and different types of national systems, the result is a striking variety of possible cases in which the interpretation of the rules carried out by each institution plays a significant role;

There are notable differences in the interpretation and application of the rules on the aggregation of periods and the extension of the period of export of unemployment benefits;

The classic distinction between frontier workers and other cross-border workers has become more problematic. Inter alia, the improvement and reduction in the cost of different means of transportation has allowed workers to cover ever larger differences to commute daily or weekly for work. The elements fixed in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 are broad enough to prevent mobile workers to know with certainty their country of residence and hence the legal regime applicable to them in case of unemployment;

The reimbursement mechanism was often criticized, including claims considering that it should be made more transparent (Belgium) and that clear guidelines should be provided to each country (Luxembourg).

While the interviewees in certain countries defended that the current rules are sufficiently clear (e.g. the German Employment Services), the prevalent view was that the current coordination rules do not facilitate transparency and could be simplified. The burdensome character of the current rules was also criticized in countries which did not call for a revision of the coordination rules.

The diversity of opinions and practices in the application of certain aspects of the coordination rules is a testimony to the complexity of the rules and the lack of transparency they generate (since, given a similar situation in different regions, the similar outcome is not guaranteed). This complexity and incoherent understanding and application of the rules create a substantial (administrative) burden for the (national) administrations. This ‘burden’ is inherent to the management of cases where different understanding and national administrative processes apply; it goes beyond the definition of the administrative burden of the SCM where it is related to legal information obligations.

Around 40% of the participating public administrations reported that the EU rules create significant administrative costs and burden for national administrations. They consider the different types of forms/documents used per country, the varying requirements/understanding in terms of the information needed to fill out the documents, their mandatory or optional character and advance the procedures, and the different delays in the completion and transmission of documents as some of the most salient and recurrent problems. The reimbursement mechanism was repeatedly mentioned as a source of burden mainly due to the slow and ineffective communication between Member States.

“There are high administrative costs in what concerns to the reimbursement of the unemployment benefits that were paid. Moreover, we would highlight the delay on the treatment of the processes and the requests for payment that are denied. Because the EU rules create significant administrative costs and burdens for national administrations, EU law is not uniformly "understood" and applied by Member States and vice versa. … Paper SEDs are not always suitable for the exchange of information and not all MS use the same documents/forms. Reimbursement procedures create high administrative burden and important costs for both the MS of last activity and the MS of residence and the cost/benefit ratio is not effective, mainly for the MS of residence. The communications between institutions is slow and needs to be more effective.”

Several public officials expect the administrative burden to decrease in the next couple of years as a result of learning effects after the successful implementation and alignment of the rules. While the adoption of the Regulations took place ten years ago, it has taken time to fine-tune the implementation of the new rules and procedures. The lack of sound implementation of the new rules and procedures is particularly visible in a number of Member States. According to the online survey, 64% of the administrations stated that the communication (with other Member States) works well in general. However, there are problems with specific Member States. These reported problems are expected to be the main source of administrative costs.

Technological evolution could resolve some of the problems related to cooperation and communication. However, divergent interpretations of the rules and the information requirements for the completion of portable documents will continue to pose difficulties in the proper application of the Regulations.

In light of the limitations associated with the quantification of information obligations stemming from the application of the Regulations, we have adapted our approach for quantifying the IOs resulting from the Regulations and for assessing the (potential) impact of the policy options on the overall administrative process. In our analysis, we focused on a selected number of documents for which the stakeholders were able to provide robust information on a) the time spent to process/handle a document and b) the (approximate) number of cases.

We have collected useful information on the processing of documents related to cross-border cases for unemployment benefits on a) the estimated time and b) the number of cases in the following countries: Belgium, Poland, Luxembourg and Romania by means of a workshop. Other countries have provided a wealth of qualitative information which is useful for understanding the underlying problems related to the processing of the different documents and for assessing the (potential) impacts of the different options.

Despite the data limitations resulting from the problems discussed in this chapter, the assessment of the administrative cost (baseline scenario) for a number of key documents provides a robust basis for assessing the theoretical impact (positive or negative) of the different policy options on the administrative cost.

Aggregation of periods of employment/insurance/self-employment 83

The number of PD U1/E301 documents received/issued provides insight into the extent to which periods of insurance and (self-) employment in another Member State were taken into account when granting unemployment benefits. For the purpose of the assessment of the administrative costs, we do not make any distinction between PD U1 documents and E301 documents (Member States are using either of the documents, depending on their national administrative processes). Both documents are treated interchangeably for the purpose of this exercise.

In the framework of this study, we have collected data on the number of PD U1 documents ‘issued’ and ‘received’. The following countries provided data on the total number of PD U1 documents ‘issued’: Belgium, Estonia, Luxembourg and Romania. With regards to the number of PD U1 forms ‘received’, we have collected data for Belgium, Estonia, France, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Sweden and the UK. In addition, we have collected data on the aggregation of periods of employment/insurance/self-employment by means of a workshop in the following countries: Belgium, Poland and Romania (data provided for E301 only).

In order to assess the administrative costs for the EU-27 stemming from the processing of the PD U1 documents, we have carried out the following steps according to the Standard Cost Model (SCM) 84 :

Calculation of the unit cost per case:

The unit cost per case (processing/handling of a PD U1 form by the administrative staff – clerk level) provides insight into the total cost for processing one single PD U1 document (in a given Member State). It is based on the following formula:

Time (T) x Wage (W)

During the workshops and interviews in the Member States, we have collected data on the average standard time spent for processing/handling a PD U1 document for the following countries: Poland (5 minutes), Belgium (60 minutes) and Romania (363 minutes) 85 . As the data show, there are stark differences between the lowest time for processing data/information (Poland - 5 minutes) and countries where the processing time is relatively higher (Romania - 363 minutes). Belgium (60 minutes) ranges in the middle.

In Poland, for example, the process for handling PD U1 documents is automatized - Poland uses the portable documents efficiently (the administrative staff faces less administrative burden). According to the interviewees (national administration), the handling of the documents is reported to be less burdensome.

In Romania, on the other hand, the administration of E301 documents (note: not PD U1 in this case) is reported to be more burdensome. According to the interviewees, the administration of simple cases, with limited or no clarifications requested from the beneficiary or employer, may take minimum 1 hour of work in total for the person in charge 86 . The administration of complex cases, with a lot of missing, inadequate or incorrect information in the dossier, may request up to 8 hours of effort from the person in charge. In such cases, the respective civil servant assumes an active role in the completion of a correct dossier and starts giving phone calls, researching different taxes and employment data bases etc.

Based on the interviewees’ responses for Poland, Belgium and Romania, it can be assumed that these three countries give good indications for calculating the average unit cost for processing/handling a PD U1 document: Poland (low administrative burden – 5 minutes), Belgium (average administrative burden – 60 minutes) and Romania (high administrative burden – 363 minutes).

For consistency and comparability with other SCM assessments of EU regulation, the tariff variable used in this study is based on hourly labour costs (plus overheads) per category of employment that has previously been used in recent SCM studies for DG EMPL 87 and our recent Impact Assessment studies we have conducted for the Commission. We have applied an average tariff/hour of EUR18. It results in a rate per minute of EUR 0.3 (EUR 18/60 minutes).

The average unit cost for the EU-27 is EUR 42.8. It is calculated on the following basis: Time ((5 minutes (Poland) + 60 minutes (Belgium) + 363 minutes (Romania)) / 3) x Wage 0.3 = EUR 42.8

1.Number of cases:

We have collected data for the number of PD U1 documents ‘received’ for the following countries: Belgium, Estonia, France, Poland, Slovak Republic and the UK. We have estimated the number of PD U1 documents for the other EU-27 countries on the basis of our own calculations based on collected administrative data and the 2012 Ageing Report (see section 4.1.2.1 for more detailed information on the number of PD U1/E301 forms ‘received’ and ‘issued’). We were able to calculate the estimated administrative cost for the EU-27 on the basis of this data. The total estimated number of PD U1 documents ‘received’ in the EU-27 in 2010 is around 340 000.

2.Calculation of the administrative cost (per Member State and for the EU-27)

We have calculated the administrative cost for processing PD U1 documents on the basis of this formula:

Time (T) x Wage (W) x Number (N)

The table below presents the total estimated administrative cost for processing PD U1 documents. The estimated total cost for the EU-27 in 2010 was EUR 14 604 326. Within the EU-27, the estimated total cost for processing PD U1 documents was highest (˃ EUR 1 million) in a number of the old Member States (in descending order): Spain, France, Germany and Italy. It was lowest (˂ EUR 100 000) in descending order in Sweden, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.

Table 6: Estimated administrative Cost - PD U1 (‘received’), EU-27, EUR, 2010

Source: Estimate based on collected administrative data and 2012 Ageing Report and data provided during the workshops on administrative burden (Belgium, Poland and Romania).

We have also calculated the average administrative cost for processing/handling a number of other documents, based on the data available. We were only able to produce the administrative cost for processing PD U1 documents (‘received’) for the EU-27 as we had data available for the EU-27 on the basis of our own calculations (there are no calculations for the other documents presented below).

We have calculated the administrative cost for ‘issuing’ a PD U1 document (‘issued’) for Poland and Belgium (based on the data we have collected during the workshops in the different countries). The total estimated cost for ‘issuing’ a PD U1 document in Poland is estimated at EUR 19 800. The amount is EUR 103 698 in Belgium. The table below presents the estimated cost for ‘issuing’ a PD U1 document for Poland and Belgium.

Table 7: Estimated administrative Cost – PD U1 (‘issued’), Poland and Belgium, EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, Workshop, Poland and Belgium

We have also estimated the cost for the following documents for Poland 88 :

SED U004 'Salary Info' (answer on SED U003);

SED U006 'Family Info' (answer on SED U005).

The table below presents the estimated cost for processing the above-mentioned documents in Poland. The total estimated cost for processing a SED U004 document ‘Salary Info’ in Poland is EUR 402. The cost for processing SED U006 documents ‘Family Info’ is estimated at EUR 825.

Table 8: Estimated administrative Cost –SED U004 ‘Salary Info’, SED U006 ‘Family Info’, Poland EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Export of unemployment benefits 89

The PD U2 form is the authorisation which an unemployed person needs to export his/her unemployment benefit if (s)he wishes to move to another EU country to look for work. The competent national institution is responsible for granting this authorisation. There is a wide variety of practices in the EU-27 with regard to granting (and prolonging) authorisation to export unemployment benefit.

We have collected data on the number of PD U2 documents ‘issued’ for ten EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden and the UK. Taking together both components (survey data and own estimates) we estimate that 23.7 thousand unemployed persons have exported their unemployment benefits in 2010 (see section 4.1.3.3 for a detailed discussion on the calculation of the number of PD U2 ‘received’ and on the methodology for calculating missing data).

We have calculated the administrative cost for processing/handling a PD U2 document for the EU-27 using the following methodology:

1.Calculation of the unit cost per case:

The average unit cost per case is based on the data we have received from Poland (the only country for which we have received robust data on the time spent for processing a PD U2 document 90 ). The average unit cost per case that we found concerns the export of an unemployment benefit to 3 months 91 . Following the formula Time (T) x Wage (W), we have estimated an average unit cost per case (PD U2 ‘issued’) at EUR 4.5 92 .

The estimated unit cost should be treated with caution, however, as it is based on one case only (Poland). As discussed in the section on the ‘aggregation of periods’, Poland seems to have an efficient (automatized) system for processing/handling PD documents (the processing of the documents is reported to be less burdensome). Therefore, it is to be expected, that the Polish example presents a rather positive picture on the overall time spent to process these documents. Other countries, such as Romania (which reported a much higher time spent for processing the PD U1 document) may report longer periods for processing/handling these types of documents. Due to data limitations, we have calculated the average unit cost on the basis of the Polish example.

2.Number of cases:

We have collected data on the number of PD U2 documents ‘issued’ by means of a questionnaire for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden and United Kingdom. In 2010, the total EU-27 number of PD U2 documents ‘issued’ is estimated at around 23 700.

3.Calculation of the administrative cost (per Member State and for the EU-27)

We have calculated the administrative cost for processing PD U2 documents (‘issued’) on the basis of this formula:

Time (T) x Wage (W) x Number (N)

The calculation includes the time spent on national administrative procedures supporting the processing of the SEDS and the time needed for processing the SED.

The table below presents the total estimated administrative cost for processing PD U2 documents. The estimated total cost for the EU-27 in 2010 was EUR 106 695. Within the EU-27, the estimated total cost for processing a PD U2 documents was highest (˃ EUR 10 000) in a number of the old Member States (in descending order): Spain, Germany and France. It was lowest (˂ EUR 500) in descending order in Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Cyprus Malta and Romania.

Table 9: Estimated administrative Cost –PD U2 (‘issued’), EU-27, EUR, 2010

Source: Estimate based on collected administrative data and 2012 Ageing Report and data provided during the workshops on administrative burden (Poland).

We have also estimated the cost for the following documents for Poland 93 :

Competent employment service:

SED U011 'Effect to Entitlement - Export' (answer to SED U010);

SED U012 'Request for monthly follow-up'.

Employment service of the MS where jobseeker has gone:

Process PD U2;

SED U007 'Request Document on Export';

SED U009 'Notification Registration - Export';

SED U010 'Circumstances Affecting Entitlement - Export' (linked with U3 form);

Issue of PD U3 (linked with SED U010);

SED U013 'Monthly Follow-up' (answer on SED U013);

SED U028 'Request Entitlement to Export'.

The tables below present the total estimated administrative cost for processing the respective documents presented according to a) competent Member State and b) employment service of the Member State where the jobseeker has gone. The estimated unit cost per case is based on the data provided by Poland (T: time and W: wage (EUR 0.3)). Note that the unit cost per case differs from the one calculated for processing the PD U2 document in the documents presented below. We have not calculated the EU-27 average cost for all documents due to data limitations. Be aware that these costs occur separately, others are combined. There is no overview of the total number of flows. In the future this should be made possible by EESSI.

Table 10: Estimated Administrative Cost – Competent employment service, SED U001, SED U012, Poland, EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Table 11: Estimated Administrative Cost – Employment service of the Member State where the jobseeker has gone, PD U2 (‘process’), SED U007, SED U009, SED U010, PD U3 ‘issue’, SED U013, SED U028, Poland, EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Reimbursement claims 94

Claims for reimbursement can be made by the country of residence to the country of last activity for fully unemployed frontier workers but also for other cross-border workers who have decided to register with the competent institution in their country of residence. The country of last activity reimburses the unemployed benefits provided in the country of residence during the first three months or five months (when the unemployed person during the preceding 24 months, completed at least 12 months of (self)employment in the country of last activity). Reimbursement procedures are defined under art. 65(6) and (7) of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 and art. 70 of Regulation (EC) No. 987/2009.

1.Calculation of the unit cost per case:

The average unit cost per case is based on the data we have received from Poland (the only country for which we have robust data on the reimbursement claims. Following the formula Time (T) x Wage (W), we have estimated an average unit cost per case for each of the individual documents.

2.Number of cases:

We have collected data on the number of cases for Poland for a number of documents. There are no estimated data available for calculating the estimated total number of cases of reimbursement claims in the EU. For a detailed discussion on the number of claims received (as debtor) and the number of claims issued (as creditor) (see section 4.1.5 )..

3.Calculation of the administrative cost (Poland)

We have calculated the administrative cost for processing a number of documents related to reimbursement claims for Poland by applying the following formula: Time (T) x Wage (W) x Number (N).

Data were collected for the following documents:

Member State of residence:

SED U020 'Reimbursement Request';

SED U025 'Reimbursement Receipt/Closing notification'.

Competent Member State:

SED U021 'Reimbursement Full Acceptance' (possible answer to SED U020);

SED U022 'Reimbursement Non Acceptance' (possible answer to SED U020);

SED U023 'Reimbursement Partial Acceptance' (possible answer to SED U020);

SED U024 'Reimbursement Payment Notification'.

The table below presents the total estimated administrative cost for processing the following documents for Poland presented according to ‘Member State of residence’ and ‘Former working Member State’:

Table 12: Estimated Administrative Cost, Member State of Residence, SED U020, SED U025, Poland, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Table 13: Estimated Administrative cost – Competent Member State, SED U021, SED U022, SED 023, SED U024, Poland, EUR, 2013

Source: Deloitte, workshop in Poland

Only stylized estimates can be made on the administrative burden. Only anecdotic information on the average cost of this administrative burden was available. Based on this information we suppose first of all that in the country where the unemployment benefit is paid, an average handling time of the cases of two hours, or € 40, is required. On top of that, when there is payment in the country of residence there is an administrative burden of some € 42.8 for the handling of a PD U1 in the country of residence and some € 20 (our hypothesis) in the country of last activity. On top of that there is in those cases in the country of residence and in the country of last activity a handling time for introducing a reimbursement claim and the settling of it. We suppose the same stylised estimate of € 20 in both countries. Multiplying this standard cost (in reality this cost can differ between the countries because of differences in organisation, productivity and wages) with the total number of cases provides us the total administrative cost in the country of residence and the country of last activity, for the payment of a benefit, including the control of the unemployed person, and the cost of reimbursement.

In Table 49 those amounts are calculated, and compared with the total budgetary cost of the unemployment benefits. Remember that the total amount of benefits is estimated on a yearly basis, while reimbursement on 3 months. In the baseline scenario the total administrative burden is € 8.3 million of which € 5.2 million in the countries of residence. This is 64% of the total administrative cost and this is a very similar % of the 71% of the budgetary cost. The share of the total administrative burden in the total budgetary burden is some 1.3%. It could be compared with the average administrative cost in the unemployment insurance.

Table 14: Estimated number of unemployed cross-border workers and country responsible for payment and reimbursement

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS and the 2012 Ageing Report

Table 15: Estimated administrative cost aggregation of periods of insurance of (self-)employment

	Country of residence		Country of last activity
	Direct paying	Reimbursement	Direct paying	Reimbursement
	Administrative unit cost
Control unemployed	€ 40,0		€ 40,0
U1	€ 42,8			€ 20,0
Reimbursement administration		€ 20,0		€ 20,0
Total administrative unit cost - UB Residence	€ 82,8	€ 20,0		€ 40,0
Total administrative unit cost - UB Last activity			€ 40,0
	Administrative cost
	Baseline scenario2: Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers rational decision (=highest amount UB)
UB Residence	€ 4.258.153	€ 1.028.539	€ 0	€ 2.057.079
UB Last activity	€ 0	€ 0	€ 889.488	€ 0
Administrative cost	€ 5.286.692		€ 2.946.567
Grand total	€ 8.233.259
% cost country of residence in total administrative cost	64%
Grand total annual expenditure UB (in millions)	€ 378
Administrative cost as % of budgetary cost	2,2%
Estimated reimbursement (in millions)				€ 82
	Option B2: right of choice: rational decision (=highest amount UB)
UB Residence	€ 1.530.093	€ 369.588	€ 0	€ 739.175
UB Last activity	€ 0	€ 0	€ 2.207.391	€ 0
Administrative cost	€ 1.899.681		€ 2.946.567
Grand total	€ 4.846.248
As % of baseline scenario	59%
% cost country of residence in total administrative cost	39%
Grand total annual expenditure UB (in millions)	€ 502
Administrative cost as % of budgetary cost	1,0%
Estimated reimbursement (in millions)				€ 52
	Option C: UB provided by the country of last activity
UB Residence	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0
UB Last activity	€ 0	€ 0	€ 2.946.567	€ 0
Administrative cost	€ 0		€ 2.946.567
Grand total	€ 2.946.567
As % of baseline scenario	36%
% cost country of residence in total administrative cost	0%
Grand total annual expenditure UB (in millions)	€ 437
Administrative cost as % of budgetary cost	0,7%
Estimated reimbursement (in millions)				€ 0
	Option D: cutt-off of 12 months
UB Residence	€ 1.647.720
UB Last activity			€ 2.152.000	€ 398.000
Administrative cost	€ 1.647.720		€ 2.550.000
Grand total	€ 4.197.720
As % of baseline scenario	51%
% cost country of residence in total administrative cost	39%
Grand total annual expenditure UB (in millions)	€ 384
Administrative cost as % of budgetary cost	1,1%
Estimated reimbursement (in millions)				€ 0

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS, 2012 Ageing Report, input from the work shops

(1)

A ‘family benefit’ includes “all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses, excluding advances of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances” [mentioned in Annex I.] (Article 1(z) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

(2)

Article 68 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(3)

Cross-border workers: working in a Member State other than the Member State of residence of the child(ren). Another important group with regard to the export of family benefits are migrants living in a Member State other than the Member State of the child(ren).

(4)

This includes also tax expenditures towards families. These, however, fall outside the scope of this report.

(5)

The MISSOC tables (2014) provide more detailed information on the different types of family benefits applicable in Member States as well as their characteristics.

(6)

Mutual Information System on Social Protection. http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp

(7)

The European system of integrated social protection statistics.

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database

(8)

Some Member States provided information on several types of family benefits. Most of the time the ‘child benefit scheme’ was selected. However, it is not always sure that the term covers the same type of benefit. Also, some Member States reported only the sum of more than one family benefit (e.g. CZ, LU and MT).

(9)

Other possible cases are, for example: a single person with two children, at 67% of the average wage; a one-earner married couple, at 33% of the average wage, with two children; a two-earner married couple, one at 100%, the other at 67% of the average wage, with two children etc (see Eurostat [earn_nt_net]).

(10)

Sen (1984, p. 86) concludes that “living standard can be seen as freedom of particular types, related to material capabilities. […] It is in this sense that living standard can be seen as ‘economic freedom’.” The ‘standard of living’ needs to be distinguished from the ‘cost of living’ but certainly also from ‘purchasing power standards’. For a more detailed discussion we refer to the analysis of the economic impact of the export of family benefits (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015).

(11)

The amount of the child benefit paid by Luxembourg is divided by the net earnings of Bulgaria and Romania.

(12)

Article 68 (1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(13)

Article 68 (1)(b)(i) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(14)

Article 68 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(15)

However, there is a strong difference between the amount paid as primarily competent Member State (€ 4,898) and the supplement paid as secondarily competent Member State (€ 2,455) (see also Table 5).

(16)

However, the export is not limited only to migrants at working age. Also retired migrants might export a family benefit.

(17)

Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(18)

Article 54 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009.

(19)

Frontier workers (people who work in a Member State other than the Member State of residence, and return home daily or at least once a week – Article 1(f) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) who become wholly unemployed must apply for unemployment benefits in their Member State of residence. Cross-border workers other than frontier workers may apply for unemployment benefits and register with the employment service in either the Member State of last activity or the Member State of residence. See Article 65 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(20)

The current system for coordinating unemployment benefits applicable to the different categories of cross-border workers was already subject to an impact assessment. In the process of this assessment a preparatory study was prepared (Doherty, R., Vandresse, B., Bulté, S., Bardaji Horno, M., Ulrich, M., Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2013), Study for an impact assessment for revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009, Deloitte – HIVA KU Leuven, 295 p.). Based on the results of a questionnaire launched, it appears that more PDs U1 were issued to unemployed frontier workers and other cross-border workers compared to migrant workers.

(21)

E.g. the United Kingdom refers to some 90,000 income-based Jobseeker’s Allowances (listed as a special non-contributory benefit in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) claims made by EEA migrants. Portugal refers to 3,274 unemployment benefits granted to unemployed frontier workers and other cross-border workers, while Belgium reports 2,785 unemployed frontier workers and other cross-border workers who will receive an unemployment benefit. Slovenia refers to 2,142 unemployment benefits granted to unemployed migrant workers, frontier workers and other cross-border workers of which 90% of the benefits granted to unemployed frontier workers and other cross-border workers. Finally, Italy reports some 900 PD U1 documents issued by an electronic procedure (no breakdown reported between unemployed recent migrant workers, frontier workers or other cross-border workers).

(22)

There are 499 cases in a total of 569 cases (88%) where DK is both the competent Member State and the Member State of origin. Most of these cases concern Danish citizens from the Faroe Islands. However, the Faroe Islands are not covered by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(23)

Also in Croatia and Cyprus most of their limited number of cases are applicable to a period longer than three months.

(24)

In that respect, not only the Member State of origin but also the nationality of the unemployed recent migrant worker should be asked.

(25)

Note that no data is available on the total number of unemployed persons who were or became unemployed during the year. This implies a (small) overestimation of the share of the cases of aggregated periods in the total unemployment figure. However, also unemployment persons who required a PD U1 in previous years could still be unemployed.

(26)

Taking into consideration that most of the Member States apply a qualifying period of 12 months.

(27)

Several proposals for changes to the current rules (e.g. Holzmann and Koettl, 2014; Barslund and Busse, 2014; BMI and BMAS, 2014; Tænketanken Europa, 2014) or for a ‘harmonisation’ of the child benefit schemes (e.g. Levy et al., 2013) emerged in recent years.

(28)

Portable Document A1 is a formal statement on the applicable social security legislation and proves that the posted worker pays social security contributions in another Member State.

(29)

‘Family benefit’ means all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses, excluding advances of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances (Article 1 (z) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

(30)

Article 68 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(31)

Article 68 (1) (b) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(32)

Article 68 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(33)

Article 71 and 72 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 define the composition and tasks of the Administrative Commission for the coordination of social security schemes.

(34)

Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(35)

Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(36)

See Recital (19) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(37)

Maternity and equivalent paternity benefits (Chapter 1) and family benefits (Chapter 8) are coordinated differently under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(38)

Article 1 (z) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(39)

The OECD Family Database also reports figures on public spending on family benefits and contains not only figures on the spending in cash and in kind but also on the ‘financial support for families provided through the tax system’.

(40)

See section 4 for a detailed description of this term.

(41)

‘EU-15’ refers to the ‘old’ EU Member States: Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Sweden. ‘EU-13’ refers to the ‘new’ Member States: Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta.

(42)

See Pacolet and Coudron, 2006; EC, 2015.

(43)

The impact assessment will take all Member States into consideration.

(44)

Barslund and Busse (2014, p. 20) concluded yet that “any indexation should apply in a non-discriminatory way, i.e. also when benefits are exported to countries with higher costs of living.”

(45)

See also EU Staff Regulations, Annex XI ( http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf ).

(46)

With the exception that GDP per capita is not a good measure for a small country with a huge external workforce (cross-border commuters), as is the case for Luxembourg. In that case, GNP, which adds to the GDP net income received from abroad by the national population, is a better indicator.

(47)

Austria reported a total exported amount of € 147 million for 2013. However, an amount of € 206 million for 2013 was recently reported in a press article based on a parliamentary question. This amount includes two additional payments: retroactive payments for the last five years based on a national rule and double payments for differential supplements (2012 and 2013). Moreover, the breakdown per Member State of residence reported in this parliamentary question is very informative given that the Austrian delegation did not provide a breakdown per Member State of residence.

(48)

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Comparative_price_levels_of_consumer_goods_and_services

(49)

A second group of persons concerned are of course intra-EU migrants who live in a Member State other than their child(ren).

(50)

As not all cross-border workers with children live together as a couple (e.g. single).

(51)

However, in order to determine the competent Member State also the socio-economic position of the partner should be taken into consideration. Moreover, some households will be entitled to a child-raising allowance of the exporting Member State even if this Member State is not primarily competent. All these remarks are not taken into account and implies a possible overestimation of the reference group.

(52)

Based on De Coninck, J. (2015), Reply to an ad hoc request for comparative analysis – Salary-related child-raising benefits, FreSsco.

(53)

For instance in case a child-raising allowance is exported from Luxembourg (annual average amount per child: € 2,786) to Germany (annual average amount per child: 1,830) a supplement will be paid by Luxembourg of €955 under the current rules and an amount of € 2,786 under the new option.

(54)

The average increase per exporting Member State is based on the percentage change between the sum of supplements paid to an entitled person under the baseline scenario living in another EU-28/EFTA country or in one of the selected countries and the sum of the average amounts paid per entitled person under the new option (will always be the same amount).

(55)

The income earned in the exporting MS is a better indicator. However, no figures are available on the average income of cross-border workers (which is an important reference group). Also because this will be an individual right under the new option.

(56)

DK, LV, AT, PL and NO: No figures are available as exporting Member State under Option 3. This implies that the total cost under Option 3 is underestimated.

(57)

As already mentioned, the expenditure for DE as exporting Member State is higher under Option 3 compared to the status quo scenario. This is not possible in practice.

(58)

ES: The cost to be paid as the Member State of residence is probably overestimated taking into account the selective income-tested child benefit scheme of ES.

(59)

The total cost to be paid by FR under Option 3 was estimated at € 179 million (see Table 30). For instance, CLEISS has reported an amount related to the export of family benefits of € 9.5 million for 2013.

(60)

In recent years, several proposals of changes to the current rules (see, for instance, Barslund and Busse, 2014; BMI and BMAS, 2014; Tænketanken Europa, 2014) or for a ‘harmonization’ of the social security schemes (see, for instance, Dullien, 2014) emerged.

(61)

Based on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, an estimation of the number of cross-border workers can be made (based on the question ‘What is the name and address of the local unit of the enterprise where you work?’ and variables ‘COUNTRYW’ (country of place of work) and ‘COUNTRY’ (country of residence) in the database). However, some interpretation problems appear. While legally a distinction should be made between posted workers and cross-border workers, this distinction is not made by this question in the LFS. For that reason we think that the LFS question covers both cross-border workers (within the rules of free movement of workers) and posted workers (within the rules of free movement of services). Ideally, the LFS should make this distinction to avoid possible interpretation problems. In the further analysis we considered all workers who work in a country other than the country of residence as cross-border workers.

(62)

This definition of a frontier worker differs from the definition used in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(63)

Portable Document A1 is a formal statement on the applicable social security legislation and proves that the posted worker pays social security contributions in another Member State.

(64)

Chapter 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, Article 61-65.

(65)

Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(66)

See also EC, 2014b. The report of the European Migration Network maps national rules on social security by using the MISSOC tables.

(67)

Barslund and Busse (2014, p. 21) concluded that any revision (in this case the inclusion of actual earnings during the relevant period) should also apply to workers moving from higher to lower salary countries.

(68)

Based on LFS data we calculated in previous research the average duration of unemployment (average duration of 15 months). However, this average duration is measured at a certain moment which implies a possible underestimation of the duration of the unemployment (e.g. the person may still remain unemployed).

(69)

Note that only data is available on the number of unemployed persons at a certain time or on the average number of unemployed persons over a certain time and not on the total number of unemployed persons who were or became unemployed during the year. This implies also an overestimation of the public spending per unemployed person reported in Table 5 (based on the annual average of 2012).

(70)

See also 10.8

Top

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 13.12.2016

SWD(2016) 460 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Initiative to partially revise Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social security systems and its implementing Regulation (EC) No 987/2009

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004

(text with relevance for the EEA and Switzerland)

{COM(2016) 815 final}
{SWD(2016) 461 final}

Table of Contents

ANNEX XVI: Brodolini Report Administrative Costs family benefits3

ANNEX XVII: Brodolini Report Administrative Costs unemployment benefits96

ANNEX XVIII: Brodolini Report secondary effects family benefits186

[Catalogue number]

ANNEX XIX: Brodolini Report secondary effects unemployment benefits240

Annex XX: TECHNICal provisions to be included within the revision which are not subject to impact assessment )309

ANNEX XVI: Brodolini Report Administrative Costs family benefits

Task 1: Administrative costs of handling exports of family benefits

Study to analyse and assess the impacts of policy options for a possible EU initiative in the area of coordination of social security schemes, in particular with regard to the revision of the current EU provisions on the export of family benefits

The following national experts have contributed to the work of the authors: Tanja Klenk (Germany), Andrew Britt (Netherlands), Beata Samoraj-Charitonow (Poland), Magda Filip (Romania), Sally-Anne Barnes (UK)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B — Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Task 1: Administrative costs of handling exports of family benefits

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015

doi:[number]

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

1.Introduction

1.1.Background and purpose

1.2.Methodology

1.3.Case study Member States

2.Current administrative costs and burden

2.1.National administrations

2.2.Mobile EU-citizens and their families

3.Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

3.1.National administrations

3.2.Mobile EU-citizens and their families

4.Conclusions

Annex A – Literature

Annex B – Interview guide

Annex C – Case study for Germany

Annex D – Case study for Denmark

Annex E – Case study for Netherlands

Annex F – Case study for Poland

Annex G – Case study for Romania

Annex H – Case study for UK

Executive Summary

Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems specifies in Article 67 that a person is entitled to family benefits, also where his/her family members reside in another Member State. Currently, the entitlement is determined by the legislation of that person's Member State – henceforth called the Member State of primary competence. Family benefits are intended to contribute to families' expenses, which both depend on the number and the age of the children and on the costs of living. However, in a case of export of family benefits, the family benefit amount depends on the costs of living in the Member State of primary competence rather than that of the Member State of residence of the child – henceforth called the Member State of secondary competence 1 . For such cases the amount of family benefits paid can be higher or lower than could be argued by the local circumstances where the family resides.

Revisions to the current rules are therefore being considered to address inequalities that may result from differences in the costs of living in the Member States of primary competence in relation to those of the Member States of secondary competence. Such amendments aim to ensure that family benefits contribute equally to family expenses for all families in a given Member State, and to ensure an even distribution of the financial burden between Member States. However, such revisions to the rules may also have implications for the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations handling exports of family benefits as well as for the EU-citizens themselves and their families.

On this background, the present study looks into the following three possible revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004:

Option 1a: Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of secondary competence (residence of the child) – i.e. adjustment upwards or downwards compared to current situation.

Option 1b: Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of secondary competence – limited to the amount provided by the Member State of primary competence.

Option 3 2 : Change in the current order of priority: (1) Member State of residence of the child [secondary competence], (2) Member State of work [primary competence], and (3) Member State of pension [primary competence]. This means that the Member State of residence of the child has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of family benefits to which the entitlement exists under its national rules. The Member State of work (or pension) will top up this amount if the level of family benefits would be higher there. The family will thus receive the same amount of family benefits as before, but the allocation of the costs between the Member State of work (or pension) and the Member State of residence will differ from the current situation.

There is, however, no official information available on the costs of the different administrative tasks carried out by the national administrations in the Member States when handling a case of export of family benefits. Therefore, the study has obtained this information from its primary sources via interviews with national administrations. It was not feasible within the scope of Task 1 to gather such information for all 28 EU Member States. Hence, the results are based on analyses for six case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations of primary competence

A first observation, when assessing the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations in the Member States acting as primary competence, is that most of these national administrations – at least in the six case study Member States – handle a significant number of cases annually. Germany experiences most cases with 62,587 (in 2013), followed by the UK (20,271) and the Netherlands (20,271). However, in comparison with the sizes of the national labour market, the amount of cases do compare in between the case study Member States – ranging from 0.56 cases per 1000 employed in Poland to 2.42 cases per 1000 employed in the Netherlands. Hence, from the outset it could be assumed that there within many national administrations is good experience with handling export of family benefit cases and there might be focus on the costs of doing so. In any case, the current total administrative costs are considered to be notable in an overall context.

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use as shown in Table 0-1 on average around 2 man-hours per case, much of which is used for determining in which Member State the applicant and his/her family reside and in this context check whether the applicant is employed, unemployed, a posted worker or a civil servant. Relatively many resources are also spent on calculating the benefits that the given applicant is entitled to according to the given national legislation. This involves contacting the Member State of residence of the applicant's family to investigate the applicant's entitlement to family benefits in this Member State – i.e. to check for overlapping benefits, and it involves setting the payment of family benefits in motion. The UK and Denmark spend most resources per case, while the other case study Member States are at a lower but similar level.

Table 0-1 National administrations handling exports of family benefits as primary competence, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.(2)
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of prim. competence	0.50	1.00	0.57	0.44	1.00	2.00	0.70
Calculation of benefit	0.50	1.83	0.75	0.47	0.20	2.00	0.75
Annual control(1)	0.67	0.60	0.19	0.06	0.10	0.75	0.32
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement on competence	0.10	0.13	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.15
Overlapping benefits	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.50	0.12
Reimbursement	0.10	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.08
Recovery	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.19	0.15	0.08
Other	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.06
TOTAL	1.36	3.70	1.92	1.21	1.46	5.25	1.93

Sources: Interviews.

Notes: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in the total for new cases. (2) The UK estimates are considered too uncertain to be included in the average.

This study assesses as shown in Table 0-2 that the administrative tasks of the national administrations of primary competence are expected to increase by around one man-hour per case or by around 50% - no matter whether it is decided to implement Option 1a, Option 1b or Option 3. In other words the additional administrative efforts increase by similar amounts whether an requirement to take into account living standards in other Member States is introduced (Options 1a and 1b), or whether there is a change in the order of responsibility (Option 3). The major increase in absolute terms of man-hours is that for the calculation of benefits (around 40 minutes extra per average case). For example, where the calculations in many cases currently are being processed automatically, it will be necessary to make specific calculations in each case. In relative terms, the largest increase (around 140% = additional 6 minutes extra per average case) in the administrative burden is that for the reimbursement activity, as the more complex family benefit calculation rules are expected to lead to more cases where provisional family benefits are paid out in the Member State of secondary competence, and so have to be reimbursed by the Member State of primary competence.

Table 0-2 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for exports of family benefit cases handled by national administrations as primary competence (simple average of case study Member States(2))

Administrative tasks	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Determ. of prim. comp.	0.13	18.5%	0.13	18.5%	0.25	35.6%
Calculation of benefit	0.66	87.2%	0.66	87.2%	0.58	76.6%
Annual control(1)	0.10	30.9%	0.10	30.9%	0.08	24.8%
Additional admin. tasks
Disagr. on competence	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
Overlapping benefits	0.03	21.7%	0.03	21.7%	0.02	13.0%
Reimbursement	0.11	144.8%	0.11	144.8%	0.10	132.0%
Recovery	0.03	31.9%	0.02	19.2%	0.02	19.2%
Other	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
TOTAL	0.95	49.1%	0.94	48.6%	0.96	49.6%

Sources: Interviews.

Note: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in total for new cases. (2) No estimates for the UK, and so excluded from the average calculation.

In monetary terms, the assessment is as shown in Table 0-3 that the revisions will lead to notable increases in total administrative costs ranging from 5,600 EUR in Poland (Option 3) to 1,156,900 EUR in Germany (Options 1a and 1b). The low figures for Poland is combination of a relative low number of cases and low labour costs, while the opposite is the case for Germany.

Table 0-3 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling export of family benefit cases by national administrations as primary competence – main calculation

Member State	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	18.5	1156.9	18.5	1156.9	10.3	642.7
DK: Denmark	58.3	303.3	58.3	303.3	58.3	303.3
NL: Netherlands	25.0	505.5	25.0	505.5	25.0	505.5
PL: Poland	2.2	19.0	1.9	16.7	0.6	5.6
RO: Romania	0.8	8.7	0.8	8.7	2.7	30.4
UK: United Kingdom(1)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

Note: (1) No estimates for the UK.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations of secondary competence

The observation that most national administrations of primary competence handle a significant number of export of family benefit cases annually few cases of unemployment period aggregations implies that this also will be the case for most national administrations of secondary – as the total number of cases is the same from both perspectives for the EU as a whole. Poland experiences with 62,047 (in 2013) by far the largest number of cases, followed by Germany with 20,918 cases. In relation to the size of the national labour market, Poland handles with almost 4 cases per 1000 employed most, while at the other end the UK handles 0.11 cases per 1000 employed.

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use as shown in Table 0-4 on average just above 1.5 man-hours per case, much of which is used for determining in which Member State the applicant and his/her family reside and in this context check whether the applicant is employed, unemployed, a posted worker or a civil servant. As for the national administrations of primary competence, many resources are also spent on calculating the benefits that the given applicant is entitled to according to the given national legislation. Actually, many of the national administrations do not see many differences in tasks and efforts per case being of secondary or of primary competence.

Table 0-4 National administrations handling exports of family benefits as secondary competence, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.(2)
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of primary competence	0.50	1.00	0.57	0.69	0.12	0.75	0.58
Calculation of benefit	0.50	1.83	0.75	0.17	0.20	0.75	0.69
Annual control(1)	1.00	0.05	0.38	0.00	1.00	0.75	0.49
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement on competence	0.10	0.13	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.30	0.07
Overlapping benefits	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.50	0.13
Reimbursement	0.10	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.08
Recovery	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.15	0.05
Other	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
TOTAL	1.28	3.88	1.47	1.14	0.37	2.75	1.63

Sources: Interviews.

Notes: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in total for new cases. (2) The UK estimates are considered too uncertain to be included in the average.

This study assesses as shown in Table 0-5 that the administrative tasks of the national administrations of secondary primary competence on average will increase by almost one man-hour per case or by just above 50% - if it is decided to implement Option 1 or Option 1b, and slightly less if Option 3 is implemented. In absolute terms the largest increase is by far that for the calculation of benefits as more complex calculation rules will have to be implemented. Furthermore, there will be additional communication with the relevant Member States of primary competence to deal with. In relative terms, the largest increase in the administrative burden is – similar to when being of primary competence – that for the reimbursement activity.

Table 0-5 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for exports of family benefit cases handled by national administrations as secondary competence (simple average of case study Member States(2))

Administrative tasks	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Determ. of prim. comp.	0.13	22.6%	0.13	22.6%	0.06	10.5%
Calculation of benefit	0.70	100.7%	0.61	87.7%	0.60	86.2%
Annual control(1)	0.09	18.5%	0.00	0.0%	0.19	39.1%
Additional admin. tasks
Disagr. on competence	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.01	15.4%
Overlapping benefits	0.02	11.4%	0.02	11.4%	0.02	11.4%
Reimbursement	0.11	144.9%	0.11	144.9%	0.09	112.8%
Recovery	0.03	50.8%	0.03	50.8%	-0.01	-19.7%
Other	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
TOTAL	0.98	60.2%	0.89	54.6%	0.76	46.7%

Sources: Interviews.

Note: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in total for new cases. (2) No estimates for the UK, and so excluded from the average calculation.

In monetary terms, the assessment is as shown in Table 0-6 that the revisions will lead to increases in total administrative costs in most Member Stares – although ranging from a slight fall of 39,800 EUR in Poland (Option 1b) to 386,700 EUR in Germany (Options 1a and 1b). The fall in administrative costs for Poland in Option 1b derives from the assessment of the Polish interviewees that they can reduce their contribution to calculating benefit rates in more cases.

Table 0-6 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling export of family benefit cases by national administrations as secondary competence – main calculation

Member State	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	18.5	386.7	18.5	386.7	10.3	214.8
DK: Denmark	58.3	42.7	58.3	42.7	51.1	37.4
NL: Netherlands	25.0	189.2	25.0	189.2	25.0	189.2
PL: Poland	1.7	103.6	-0.6	-39.8	0.6	39.8
RO: Romania	1.4	6.4	1.4	6.4	0.8	3.5
UK: United Kingdom(1)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

Note: (1) No estimates for the UK.

Change in administrative costs and burden for mobile EU-citizens and their families

The proposed revisions to the EU provisions may well have implications for the mobile EU-citizens and their families. However, it is suggested that in particular Option 1a and 1b may have minor implications, while Option 3 may increase the administrative burden from increased requirements to verifications of the residence of the children. In general, the longer processing times of the cases may be consider as adverse effect. This is, for example, the assessment of the German and Danish interviewees.

Similarly, the assessment in the Netherlands, Poland and Romania is that the changes will not lead to extra tasks for the applicants. However, it is stressed that the process of handling the applications most likely will take more time why the applicant consequently must wait longer to get the application approved.

Introduction

1.1.Background and purpose

Family benefits are intended to contribute to families' expenses, which both depend on the number and the age of the children and on the costs of living. However, in a case of export of family benefits, the family benefit amount depends on the costs of living in the Member State of primary competence rather than that of the Member State of residence of the child – henceforth called the Member State of secondary competence 3 . For such cases the amount of family benefits paid can be higher or lower than could be argued by the local circumstances where the family resides.

On this background, this present study looks into the following three possible revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004:

Option 3 4 : Change in the current order of priority: (1) Member State of residence of the child [secondary competence], (2) Member State of work [primary competence], and (3) Member State of pension [primary competence]. This means that the Member State of residence of the child has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of family benefits to which the entitlement exists under its national rules. The Member State of work (or pension) will top up this amount if the level of family benefits would be higher there. The family will thus receive the same amount of family benefits as before, but the allocation of the costs between the Member State of work (or pension) and the Member State of residence will differ from the current situation.

Such revisions may affect the behaviour of the mobile EU-citizens and their families, the amounts of exported family benefits being paid, and the administration needed to handle the export of family benefit cases. The analysis within Task 1 focuses on the latter issue – i.e. the changes in administrative costs and burden from the revisions to the national administrations handling exports of family benefits. In this context, Task 1 distinguishes between the administrative costs incurring in the Member States of primary competence and those incurring in the Member States of secondary competence. Furthermore, we look into the possible changes in the administrative burden for the mobile EU-citizens themselves and their families.

However, as described further below there is no official information available on the costs of the different administrative tasks carried out by the national administrations in the Member States when handling a case of export of family benefits. Therefore, we have obtained this information from its primary sources via interviews with national administrations. It was not feasible within the scope of Task 1 to gather such information for all 28 EU Member States. Hence, the results are based on analyses for six case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

1.2. Methodology

As just introduced above, Task 1 focuses on assessing the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations handling cases of export of family benefit. For this, we have made use of the definition of administrative costs and burden provided by the EC (2009) Impact Assessment Guidelines. While doing this, we have adopted a broad definition of administrative information obligations – i.e. we have considered the costs of administrative tasks such as the determination of Member State of competence, the calculation of benefits, and the reimbursement and recovery of benefits in between Member States. We have then assessed how these administrative costs may change from the revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to comprise an additional administrative burden – positive or negative – for the national administrations as well as for the mobile EU-citizens and their families. This approach is also in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines (EC, 2015) emphasises objective of delivering maximum benefits to citizens, businesses and workers while avoiding all unnecessary regulatory burdens, and so avoiding unnecessary additional administrative burdens.

The calculations of the administrative costs for the national administrations are as illustrated in Figure 1-1 in principle simple. Firstly, the number of cases in the left-hand side of the figure are the annual cases of exports of family benefits currently registered in the six case study Members States. Actually, a given case may be dealt with in two of the six selected Member States if, for example, a given applicant for exports of family benefits (i.e. in a Member State of primary competence) has his/her family residing in another of the six Member States (i.e. in a Member State of secondary competence). In our main calculation, we assume that the number of cases does not change as a result of revisions to the EU provisions. However, we do to illustrate the sensitivity of this assumption also show a scenario where we assume a change in the number of cases based on the results of Task 3 of this study.

Secondly, we calculate the unit costs for the national administration – i.e. the current administrative costs per case as well as the changed administrative costs per case as a result of revisions to the EU provisions. The administrative costs per case will clearly differ between cases, i.e. there will be easy cases only involving standard administrative tasks while other more complex cases will involve additional tasks. Hence, we are in practice looking for average costs. These unit costs in EUR are composed of assessments of the man-hours needed per case and the costs per man-hour in EUR (see Table 1-1 in the next section).

Figure 1-1 Calculation of administrative costs for national administrations

As indicated in Figure 1-1, the estimations of the current number of cases have been provided by the HIVA KU Leuven Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA) via a data gathering exercise (see Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015).

The bulk of the work within Task 1 has been the estimation of the man-hours needed to carry out the administrative tasks of handling a case of export of family benefits. As already mentioned, such information is not available from official sources, and so we have gathered the information through interviews with national administrations in the six case study Member States. For this purpose, we identified the national administrations to interview (see Annexes C to H for the interviewees), and we developed an interview guide that was shared with our Member States experts/interviewers in the six case study Member States in their respective national languages (see Annex B for the English version of the interview guide). The interview guide was developed via a desk study approach by reviewing existing literature and guidance papers on the legislation (see Annex A) and it was tested in Denmark before being applied in the five other case study Member States.

From the Member State-specific analyses in Annexes C to H, it becomes clear that most of the man-hour estimates are based on a few interviews only. This is partly because there is often only a few national administrations that handle export of family benefit cases in each of the Member States, and partly because of limited interview resources. Hence, the premise for this analysis is the uncertainty associated with few assessments that, furthermore, mostly are based on the subjective assessments of the interviewees rather than on actual registrations of time spent on different administrative tasks. It has therefore not been feasible within the present study period to further validate the administrative cost estimates, but these may well be commented upon by national administrations in the non-case study Member States once this report is released. In this context, it should be underlined that although there are some differences in the assessments both within and in between the Member States, the overall the assessed levels of administrative costs and the additional burdens from the possible revisions to the EU provisions do compare. Finally, the assessed additional burdens can be argued to be low, in particular in absolute terms for a Member State as a whole. Hence, they may well be lower that the socioeconomic benefits caused by the revisions.

1.3.Case study Member States

As already mentioned, the calculations of the administrative costs and burden are based on information for six case study Member States only. Although, it is not the aim of Task 1 to produce a total EU-28 figure for the administrative costs and burden via an upscaling of the calculations from the case studies, we have aimed to select Member States that represent the variety within the EU.

Firstly, we have selected Member States that are geographically spread across the EU. Secondly, the selection comprises Member States that mainly attract mobile EU-citizens (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, UK), and Member States that mainly see citizens leave (Poland, Romania). Thirdly, child benefits rules and amounts differ in between Member States 5 . Whereas there are Member States that provide fixed benefit amounts (Germany, Netherlands), others provide means-tested amounts that are fixed to thresholds (Poland, Romania). Some rules specify that children residing in the Member State can receive child benefits (Denmark, Romania, UK), while others link the child benefit to the place of taxation of the parent (Germany, Netherlands). Furthermore, the amounts of child benefits paid in the Member States vary widely.

Finally, as shown in Table 1-1, the unit labour costs of the national administrations differ much in between the case study Member States. We assume here that the average wage levels of the relevant employees in the national administrations are similar to that of employees in general in the public administration with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education. Although the differences in labour costs is a reflection of general differences in labour costs in between the Member States, it could be expected that this may lead to differences in the use of man-power to carry out the administrative tasks. It could, for example, be expected that higher labour costs could lead to fewer labour-intensive processes – and vice versa. However, as shown below such difference have not been detected in between higher and lower labour cost Member States.

Table 1-1 Labour costs, 2013, EUR per hour - employees in public administration etc. with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education

Member State	Wage costs, 2010, EUR per hour(1)	Wage costs, 2013, EUR per hour(2)	Labour costs, 2013, EUR per hour(3)
DE: Germany	14.9	16.4	20.5
DK: Denmark	22.3	23.4	29.3
NL: Netherlands	16.4	17.8	22.2
PL: Poland	3.8	4.1	5.1
RO: Romania	1.7	2.0	2.5
UK: United Kingdom	14.3	14.7	18.4

Sources: (1) Eurostat, Earnings survey, 2010 [the most recent] (earn_ses10_16). (2) 2013 estimates on the basis of Eurostat, Labour cost index ([lc_lci_r2_a). (3) Using 25% overhead costs according to EC Impact Assessment Guidelines.

Current administrative costs and burden

1.4.National administrations

The export of family benefit cases are handled by similar types of national administrations in the case study Member States. In Denmark, all cases – both when being of primary competence and of secondary competence – are carried out by one institution: Udbetaling Denmark. In Germany it is Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit, in the Netherlands: Sociale Verzekeringsbank, and in the UK: Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs. In Poland and Romania, the handling of cases takes place at both national and regional level. In Poland, it is the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and the Regional Social Policy Centres (Krakow and Opole), respectively. In Romania, it is the National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection and county agencies, respectively.

The below box describes two possible examples of exports of family benefits currently handled by the national administrations. Parent A receives in both examples family benefits from the Member State [primary competence] where he works according to its rules.

Example 1 of exports of family benefits:

Parent A works in Member State A [primary competence] which has a higher cost of living than Member State B [secondary competence] while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State B.

Under the current rules, Parent A is entitled to family benefits in Member State A at the same amount as if his family was residing in Member State A.

Example 2 of exports of family benefits:

Parent A works in Member State B [primary competence] while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State A [secondary competence].

Under the current rules, Parent A is entitled to family benefits in Member State B at the same amount as if his family was residing in Member State B.

National administrations with primary competence

Table 2-1 shows that the number of cases handled by national administrations with primary competence varied between the case study Member States in 2013 6 . This is not surprising given the difference in the sizes of the Member States, and that we both have selected some that mainly attract mobile EU-citizens and some that mainly see citizens leave. However when looking at the number of cases relative to the sizes of the labour markets, the differences are less noticeable. While the Netherlands in 2013 experienced 2.42 cases per 1000 employed in the Netherlands as a whole, it was at the other end 0.56 cases per employed in Poland and 0.68 cases per employed in the UK

Table 2-1 Number of exports of family benefits handled by national administrations in 2013 as primary competence

Member State	Number of cases, 2013	Cases per 1000 employed
DE: Germany	62587	1.58
DK: Denmark(1)	5200	1.93
NL: Netherlands	20225	2.42
PL: Poland	8698	0.56
RO: Romania	11427	1.34
UK: United Kingdom	20271	0.68

Sources: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Eurostat database (lfsi_emp_a).

Note: (1) Estimate provided by the Danish national expert.

Table 2-2 shows for the six case study Member States, the man-hours per average case for the national administrations handling exports of family benefits as primary competence. The administrative tasks are divided into standard administrative tasks and additional administrative tasks.

The former tasks, which are carried out for almost all cases, comprise the determination of the national administration with primary competence – i.e. for each application for exports of family benefits, and for each of the applications, the national administration will determine in which Member State the applicant and his/her family reside and in this context check whether the applicant is employed, unemployed, a posted worker or a civil servant.

The national administration with primary competence will then calculate the benefits that the given applicant is entitled to according to the given national legislation. This involves contacting the Member State of residence of the applicant's family to investigate the applicant's entitlement to family benefits in this Member State – i.e. to check for overlapping benefits, and it involves setting the payment of family benefits in motion.

Furthermore, for each of the existing cases there will be an annual control to check whether the information/status of the applicant and his/her family has changed.

The latter tasks, which are carried out more infrequently for the more complex cases, comprise, for example, disagreements regarding the determination of the national administration having the primary competence. Such disagreement will lead to additional exchanges of information, to provision of provisional benefits, and ultimately from bringing the case before the Administrative Commission. Table 2-2 shows that this task for an average case in a Member States takes between zero and one hour. However, from the Member State-specific analyses in Annexes C to H, it e.g. shows that for Germany the 0.1 hours (around 7 minutes) per average case covers over that this task only is carried out in 5% of the cases, while each of these cases requires around two man-hours. Similarly, the 0.13 hours in Denmark cover over that such task is only carried out in 5% of the case – where the actual time spent on such rare cases typically amount to 2.5 hours.

In contrast, the 0.5 hours on average spent in Denmark on handling the issue of overlapping benefits, hereunder on deciding on a possible sharing of benefit payments, is very frequent and so almost resembles the efforts for each actual case. For Romania, the 0.08 man-hours cover over that such task is only carried out for 5% of the cases – each typically requiring 1.5 man-hours.

Overall, Table 2-2 shows that currently the resources spent on a case being the national administration of primary competence averages around two man-hours. UK 7 and Denmark are outliers at the high end, which appears to be caused by relative much emphasis on the benefit calculations, hereunder on overlapping benefits and reimbursements if provisional benefits have been paid by another Member State. Poland, Germany and Romania are at the lower end with relatively few resources spent on additional administrative tasks.

Table 2-2 National administrations handling exports of family benefits as primary competence, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.(2)
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of prim. competence	0.50	1.00	0.57	0.44	1.00	2.00	0.70
Calculation of benefit	0.50	1.83	0.75	0.47	0.20	2.00	0.75
Annual control(1)	0.67	0.60	0.19	0.06	0.10	0.75	0.32
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement on competence	0.10	0.13	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.15
Overlapping benefits	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.50	0.12
Reimbursement	0.10	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.08
Recovery	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.19	0.15	0.08
Other	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.06
TOTAL	1.36	3.70	1.92	1.21	1.46	5.25	1.93

Sources: Interviews.

Notes: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in the total for new cases. (2) The UK estimates are considered too uncertain to be included in the average.

When accounting for the differences in labour costs shown in Table 1-1, Table 2-3 shows that the average unit administrative costs in EUR differ more that the average man-hours shown in Table 2-2. The reason is that the high labour costs Members States, Denmark and the Netherlands, also spend relatively most man-hours. This could be argued to be a surprising result, i.e. it could be expected that higher labour costs could lead to less labour-intensive processes.

The lower labour costs and man-hours spent in Poland and Romania imply that an average case costs around 4 to 6 EUR, while it in Denmark reaches above 100 EUR and in the Netherlands above 40 EUR. However, looking at total costs, Germany and the UK have with their many cases the highest current costs.

Table 2-3 Administrative costs for national administrations handling exports of family benefits as primary competence, unit costs and total costs 2013, EUR

	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.(1)
Unit costs, EUR	28.0	108.5	42.7	6.2	3.7	96.4	37.8
Total costs, 1000 EUR	1751.4	564.0	862.7	53.9	42.3	1955.1

Sources: Table 1-1, Table 2-1, and Table 2-2.

Note: (1) The UK estimates are considered too uncertain to be included in the average.

National administrations with secondary competence

Table 2-4 then shows the number of cases handled by national administrations as secondary competence in the case study Member States in 2013 provided by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Poland experiences the largest number of cases, followed by Germany. Compared with the size of the labour market – i.e. with the number of employed in the Member States as a whole – Poland has in relative terms the highest number of cases with around four cases per 1000 employed. Member States that mainly attract mobile EU-citizens such as the UK and Denmark handle relatively few cases.

Table 2-4 Number of exports of family benefits handled by national administrations in 2013 as secondary competence

Member State	Number of cases, 2013	Cases per 1000 employed
DE: Germany	20918	0.53
DK: Denmark	732	0.27
NL: Netherlands	7569	0.90
PL: Poland	62047	3.99
RO: Romania	4616	0.54
UK: United Kingdom	3391	0.11

Sources: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Eurostat database (lfsi_emp_a).

Table 2-5 shows for the six case study Member States, the man-hours per average case for the national administrations handling exports of family benefits as secondary competence. The administrative tasks are divided into standard administrative tasks and additional administrative tasks.

It must firstly be underlined that many of the national administrations do not see many differences in tasks and efforts per case being of secondary or of primary competence. Hence, for Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Poland, the figures are very similar to this in Table 2-2. Romania and the UK, however, spend much less time on the determination of primary competence, when it shows that its national administration is of secondary competence.

For example, in Romania the average resources spend on a case is 0.12 man-hours when being the national administration of secondary competence while it is 1 man-hour when being of primary competence. This is both due to fewer resources spend when the task is actually carried out being of secondary competence (0.6 man-hours) and the assessment that the task only is carried out for 20% of the cases.

Table 2-5 National administrations handling exports of family benefits as secondary competence, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.(2)
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of primary competence	0.50	1.00	0.57	0.69	0.12	0.75	0.58
Calculation of benefit	0.50	1.83	0.75	0.17	0.20	0.75	0.69
Annual control(1)	1.00	0.05	0.38	0.00	1.00	0.75	0.49
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement on competence	0.10	0.13	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.30	0.07
Overlapping benefits	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.50	0.13
Reimbursement	0.10	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.08
Recovery	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.15	0.05
Other	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
TOTAL	1.28	3.88	1.47	1.14	0.37	2.75	1.63

Sources: Interviews.

Notes: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in total for new cases. (2) The UK estimates are considered too uncertain to be included in the average.

Table 2-6 therefore also shows a similar picture to that of Table 2-3 with the highest average unit administrative costs in EUR found in Denmark, followed by the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. However, looking at the total costs, Germany and Poland have as a result of handling many cases the highest costs.

Table 2-6 Administrative costs for national administrations handling exports of family benefits as secondary competence, unit costs and total costs 2013, EUR

	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.(1)
Unit costs, EUR	26.2	113.6	32.7	5.8	0.9	50.5	35.8
Total costs, 1000 EUR	547.8	83.1	247.2	362.9	4.3	171.3

Sources: Table 1-1, Table 2-4, and Table 2-5.

Note: (1) The UK estimates are considered too uncertain to be included in the average.

1.5. Mobile EU-citizens and their families

The interviews carried out in the six case study Member States have not revealed many concerns about the time spent at present by the mobile EU-citizens and their families when applying for exports of family benefits. However, as discussed in Section 3.2 the possible revisions to the EU provisions may well have implications.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

1.6. National administrations

The administrative tasks of handling a case of export of family benefits may change in both size and characteristics if the EU provisions are revised. In this study we look, as introduced in Section 1.1, into the following three possible revisions, that each are exemplified in the below boxes.

Option 1a: Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of secondary competence (residence of the child) – i.e. adjustment upwards or downwards compared to current situation.

Example 1 of new situation:

Parent A works in Member State A [primary competence] while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State B [secondary competence].

Under the revised rules, Parent A will receive family benefits from Member State A reduced to the living standard in Member State B.

Example 2 of new situation:

Parent A works in Member State B [primary competence] while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State A [secondary competence].

Under the revised rules, Parent A will receive family benefits from Member State B increased to the living standard in Member State A.

Option 1b: Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of secondary competence – limited to the amount provided by the Member State of primary competence.

Example 1 of new situation:

Parent A works in Member State A [primary competence] while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State B [secondary competence].

Under the revised rules, Parent A will receive family benefits from Member State A reduced to the living standard in Member State B.

Example 2 of new situation:

Parent A works in Member State B [primary competence] while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State A [secondary competence].

Under the revised rules, Parent A will receive family benefits from Member State B to the maximum of the rate in Member State B, irrespective of the fact that the living standard in Member State A is higher.

Option 3: Change in the current order of priority: (1) Member State of residence of the child [secondary competence], (2) Member State of work [primary competence], and (3) Member State of pension [primary competence].

Example 1 of new situation:

Parent A works in Member State A [primary competence] (which has a higher cost of living than Member State B) while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State B [secondary competence] (which has a lower cost of living than Member State A).

Under the revised rules, Parent A will receive family benefits from Member State B at the normal national rate to which the entitlement exists under its national rules. If the family is also entitled to benefits from Member State A, the family would receive a differential supplement from Member State A to the level paid under its national legislation. The family overall receives the same amount, but Parent A receives less from Member State A than his co-workers whose children reside with them in Member State A.

Example 2 of new situation:

Parent A works in Member State B [primary competence] (which has a lower cost of living than Member State A) while his non-working wife Parent B resides with their children in Member State A [secondary competence] (which has a higher cost of living than Member State B).

Under the revised rules, Parent A will receive family benefits from Member State B at the normal national rate to which the entitlement exists under its national rules. As the amount of family benefits paid in Member State B is lower than the amount paid by Member State A, Member State B will pay nothing. The family overall receives the same amount, but Parent A receives less from Member State B than his co-workers whose children reside with them in Member State B.

National administrations with primary competence

As described in Section 1.2, we assume in the main calculations that the number of cases does not change as a result of revisions to the EU provisions. Hence, in the main calculations the changes in administrative costs and burden are solely a result of changes to the unit administrative costs. Table 3-1 shows a simple average – while we refer to the annexes regarding insight into the more specific Member State calculations.

A first important observation is that on average across the case study Member States, the interviewed national administrations expect that their administrative tasks as primary competence will increase by around one man-hour per case or by around 50% - no matter whether it is decided to implement Option 1a, Option 1b or Option 3. In other words, the additional administrative efforts increase by similar amounts whether an requirement to take into account living standards in other Member States is introduced (Options 1a and 1b), or whether there is a change in the order of responsibility (Option 3).

The major increase in absolute terms of man-hours is that for the calculation of benefits. For example, where the calculations in many cases currently are being processed automatically, it will be necessary to make specific calculations in each case. For Germany it may even not be technically feasible at the moment as it is not possible to pay out reduced or higher benefits. Furthermore, calculation efforts may increase as there is a need for additional contacts with national administrations in other Member States.

In relative terms, the largest increase in the administrative burden is that for the reimbursement activity, as the more complex family benefit calculation rules are expected to lead to more cases where provisional family benefits are paid out in the Member State of secondary competence, and so have to be reimbursed by the Member State of primary competence. Similarly, the more complex calculation rules are expected to lead to more cases where applicants unjustified have received family benefits, that then need to be recovered.

Table 3-1 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for exports of family benefit cases handled by national administrations as primary competence (simple average of case study Member States(2))

Administrative tasks	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Determ. of prim. comp.	0.13	18.5%	0.13	18.5%	0.25	35.6%
Calculation of benefit	0.66	87.2%	0.66	87.2%	0.58	76.6%
Annual control(1)	0.10	30.9%	0.10	30.9%	0.08	24.8%
Additional admin. tasks
Disagr. on competence	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
Overlapping benefits	0.03	21.7%	0.03	21.7%	0.02	13.0%
Reimbursement	0.11	144.8%	0.11	144.8%	0.10	132.0%
Recovery	0.03	31.9%	0.02	19.2%	0.02	19.2%
Other	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
TOTAL	0.95	49.1%	0.94	48.6%	0.96	49.6%

Sources: Interviews.

Note: (1) Annual control concerns exiting case and has so not been included in total for new cases. (2) No estimates for the UK could be provided by the UK national administration, and so excluded from the average calculation.

Table 3-2 then shows the change in the unit costs per case, in EUR and total costs in EUR for each of the case study Member States. It shows that the estimated total cost increases range from 5,600 EUR in Poland (Option 3) to 1,156,900 EUR in Germany (Options 1a and 1b). The low figures for Poland is combination of a relative low number of cases and low labour costs, while the opposite is the case for Germany.

Table 3-2 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling export of family benefit cases by national administrations as primary competence – main calculation

Member State	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	18.5	1156.9	18.5	1156.9	10.3	642.7
DK: Denmark	58.3	303.3	58.3	303.3	58.3	303.3
NL: Netherlands	25.0	505.5	25.0	505.5	25.0	505.5
PL: Poland	2.2	19.0	1.9	16.7	0.6	5.6
RO: Romania	0.8	8.7	0.8	8.7	2.7	30.4
UK: United Kingdom(1)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

Note: (1) No estimates for the UK could be provided by the UK national administration.

The number of cases are, however, likely to change as a result of revisions to the EU provisions. There might be changes due to changing eligibility criteria for qualifying for export of family benefits and due to changing benefit incomes that affect the behaviour of the mobile EU-citizens. Task 3 of the present study has estimated such behavioural changes. We have on the basis of the behavioural change estimates for families composed of one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings derived assumptions about the likely change in the number of cases handled by national administrations as primary competence (cf. Table 3-3). Hence, the estimation/assumption is that Option 1a reduces the family income for mobile EU-citizens obtaining family benefits in Member States with high living standards such as Germany and the Netherlands, implying that fewer mobile EU-citizens stay in these Member States and claim family benefits. In contrast, it will become relatively more attractive to stay in Member States with lower living standards such as Poland and Romania, and claim family benefits from other Member States (where the children reside).

A similar picture is found for Option 1b for the Member States with high living standards as family incomes fall for mobile EU-citizens claiming family benefits. However, those claiming benefits in Member States with low livings standards will not experience any change in family incomes.

Finally, FGB et.al. (2015) assume that Option 3 only will lead to a redistribution of competence from the Member State of primary competence to the Member State of secondary competence. Hence, there will be no impact on family incomes and so on mobility.

Table 3-3 Change in number of exports of family(1) benefit cases handled by national administrations as primary competence

Member State	Option 1a	Option 1b	Option 3
DE: Germany	-3.1%	-3.2%	0%
DK: Denmark(2)	-3.5%	-3.6%	0%
NL: Netherlands	-4.0%	-4.0%	0%
PL: Poland	3.2%	0.0%	0%
RO: Romania	8.3%	0.0%	0%
UK: United Kingdom(2)	-3.5%	-3.6%	0%

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.1.

Notes: (1) Estimation for "one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings". (2) As no estimates are provided for Denmark and the UK, we have assumed/used simple average of the changes for Germany and the Netherlands.

Adjusting the main results for such possible changes in the number of cases we get as shown in Table 3-4 slightly different results. While unit cost changes are similar to those presented in Table 3-2, Options 1a and 1b lead to lower total costs increases in Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands as the number of cases to handle decreases.

Table 3-4 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling export of family benefit cases by national administrations as primary competence – assuming changes in the number of cases

Member State	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	18.5	1068.1	18.5	1063.0	10.3	642.7
DK: Denmark	58.3	272.7	58.3	272.0	58.3	303.3
NL: Netherlands	25.0	450.9	25.0	450.9	25.0	505.5
PL: Poland	2.2	21.3	1.9	16.7	0.6	5.6
RO: Romania	0.8	12.9	0.8	8.7	2.7	30.4
UK: United Kingdom(1)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.1, Eurostat and interviews.

Note: (1) No estimates for the UK could be provided by the UK national administration.

National administrations with secondary competence

Table 3-5 shows that the expectations to changes in man-hours are fairly similar to those in Table 3-1 regarding primary competence. This is as already mentioned partly a consequence of that many of the national administrations do not see many differences in tasks and efforts per case being of secondary or of primary competence. Hence, the observations are also fairly similar to those for Table 3-1.

Hence, in absolute terms the largest increase is by far that for the calculation of benefits as more complex calculation rules will have to be implemented. Furthermore, there will be additional communication with the relevant Member States of primary competence to deal with.

In relative terms, the largest increase in the administrative burden is – similar to when being of primary competence – that for the reimbursement activity. There will be additional needs to request reimbursements from Member States of primary competence of provisionally paid family benefits. Furthermore, the more complex calculation rules in Options 1a and 1b are expected to lead to more cases where applicants unjustified have received family benefits, and so a need to contribute to this task. In contrast, it is assessed that the redistribution of competences in Option 3 may lead to a slightly lower need for recovery activities.

Table 3-5 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for exports of family benefit cases handled by national administrations as secondary competence (simple average of case study Member States(2))

Administrative tasks	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base	man-hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Determ. of prim. comp.	0.13	22.6%	0.13	22.6%	0.06	10.5%
Calculation of benefit	0.70	100.7%	0.61	87.7%	0.60	86.2%
Annual control(1)	0.09	18.5%	0.00	0.0%	0.19	39.1%
Additional admin. tasks
Disagr. on competence	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.01	15.4%
Overlapping benefits	0.02	11.4%	0.02	11.4%	0.02	11.4%
Reimbursement	0.11	144.9%	0.11	144.9%	0.09	112.8%
Recovery	0.03	50.8%	0.03	50.8%	-0.01	-19.7%
Other	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
TOTAL	0.98	60.2%	0.89	54.6%	0.76	46.7%

Sources: Interviews.

Table 3-6 then shows the change in the unit costs per case, in EUR and total costs in EUR for each of the case study Member States. It shows that costs are actually expected to fall slightly in Poland in the case of Option 1b, while the highest unit cost increases are expected for Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany.

The fall in administrative costs for Poland in Option 1b derives from the assessment of the Polish interviewees that they can reduce their contribution to calculating benefit rates in more cases.

Table 3-6 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling export of family benefit cases by national administrations as secondary competence – main calculation

Member State	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	18.5	386.7	18.5	386.7	10.3	214.8
DK: Denmark	58.3	42.7	58.3	42.7	51.1	37.4
NL: Netherlands	25.0	189.2	25.0	189.2	25.0	189.2
PL: Poland	1.7	103.6	-0.6	-39.8	0.6	39.8
RO: Romania	1.4	6.4	1.4	6.4	0.8	3.5
UK: United Kingdom(1)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

Note: (1) No estimates for the UK could be provided by the UK national administration.

The likely change in the number of cases as a result of revisions to the EU provisions will also be experienced by the national administrations with secondary competence. Table 3-7 shows our estimates/assumptions for these likely changes. Since the relative attractiveness of the Member States with high living standards decreases there will be relatively more mobile EU-citizens leaving for other Member States and so leave their families behind in the Member State of secondary competence. This effect goes the other way for Member States with lower living standards.

Table 3-7 Change in number of exports of family(1) benefit cases handled by national administrations as secondary competence

Member State	Option 1a	Option 1b	Option 3
DE: Germany	0.7%	-1.0%	0%
DK: Denmark(2)	2.0%	-0.5%	0%
NL: Netherlands	3.3%	0.0%	0%
PL: Poland	-3.2%	-3.2%	0%
RO: Romania	-3.7%	-3.7%	0%
UK: United Kingdom(2)	2.0%	-0.5%	0%

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.1.

Adjusting the main results for such possible changes in the number of cases we get as shown in Table 3-8 slightly different results than those in Table 3-6. The fewer cases in Poland and Romania implies that the total cost figures are lower than those in Table 3-6, and in turn the total cost figures are higher for the remaining four case study Member States.

Table 3-8 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling export of family benefit cases by national administrations as secondary competence – assuming changes in the number of cases

Member State	Option 1a		Option 1b		Option 3
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	18.5	392.8	18.5	377.7	10.3	214.8
DK: Denmark	58.3	45.2	58.3	42.1	51.1	37.4
NL: Netherlands	25.0	203.7	25.0	189.2	25.0	189.2
PL: Poland	1.7	88.6	-0.6	-50.2	0.6	39.8
RO: Romania	1.4	6.0	1.4	6.0	0.8	3.5
UK: United Kingdom(1)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.1, Eurostat and interviews.

Note: (1) No estimates for the UK could be provided by the UK national administration.

1.7.Mobile EU-citizens and their families

The interviews carried out in the six case study Member States indicate that the proposed revisions to the EU provisions may well have implications for the mobile EU-citizens and their families. However, many interviewees suggest that in particular Option 1a and 1b may have minor implications, while Option 3 may increase the administrative burden from increased requirements to verifications of the residence of the children. In general, the longer processing times of the cases may be consider as adverse effect. This is, for example, the assessment of the German and Danish interviewees.

Conclusions

Revising the current rules for export of family benefits specified in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 will have impact on the administrative costs and burden of the national administration in the Member States handling cases where mobile EU-citizens apply for family benefits – both in the Member States where the application is submitted (Member State of primary competence) and in those where the children reside. Furthermore, the applying EU-citizens and their families will experience changes in the own administrative burden from the revisions. The overall conclusion from this study is that the impacts are expected to be notable in a number of Member States – a conclusion that is based on assessments made in six case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations of primary competence

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use on average around 2 man-hours per case, much of which is used for determining in which Member State the applicant and his/her family reside and in this context check whether the applicant is employed, unemployed, a posted worker or a civil servant. Relatively many resources are also spent on calculating the benefits that the given applicant is entitled to according to the given national legislation. This involves contacting the Member State of residence of the applicant's family to investigate the applicant's entitlement to family benefits in this Member State – i.e. to check for overlapping benefits, and it involves setting the payment of family benefits in motion. The UK and Denmark spend most resources per case, while the other case study Member States are at a lower but similar level.

This study assesses that the administrative tasks of the national administrations of primary competence will increase by around one man-hour per case or by around 50% - no matter whether it is decided to implement Option 1a, Option 1b or Option 3. In other words the additional administrative efforts increase by similar amounts whether an requirement to take into account living standards in other Member States is introduced (Options 1a and 1b), or whether there is a change in the order of responsibility (Option 3). The major increase in absolute terms of man-hours is that for the calculation of benefits (around 40 minutes extra per average case). For example, where the calculations in many cases currently are being processed automatically, it will be necessary to make specific calculations in each case. In relative terms, the largest increase (around 140% = additional 6 minutes extra per average case) in the administrative burden is that for the reimbursement activity, as the more complex family benefit calculation rules are expected to lead to more cases where provisional family benefits are paid out in the Member State of secondary competence, and so have to be reimbursed by the Member State of primary competence.

In monetary terms, the assessment is that the revisions will lead to notable increases in total administrative costs ranging from 5,600 EUR in Poland (Option 3) to 1,156,900 EUR in Germany (Options 1a and 1b). The low figures for Poland is combination of a relative low number of cases and low labour costs, while the opposite is the case for Germany.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations of secondary competence

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use on average just above 1.5 man-hours per case, much of which is used for determining in which Member State the applicant and his/her family reside and in this context check whether the applicant is employed, unemployed, a posted worker or a civil servant. As for the national administrations of primary competence, many resources are also spent on calculating the benefits that the given applicant is entitled to according to the given national legislation. Actually, many of the national administrations do not see many differences in tasks and efforts per case being of secondary or of primary competence

This study assesses that the administrative tasks of the national administrations of secondary primary competence on average will increase by almost one man-hour per case or by just above 50% - if it is decided to implement Option 1 or Option 1b, and slightly less if Option 3 is implemented. In absolute terms the largest increase is by far that for the calculation of benefits as more complex calculation rules will have to be implemented. Furthermore, there will be additional communication with the relevant Member States of primary competence to deal with. In relative terms, the largest increase in the administrative burden is – similar to when being of primary competence – that for the reimbursement activity.

In monetary terms, the assessment is that the revisions will lead to increases in total administrative costs in most Member Stares – although ranging from a slight fall of 39,800 EUR in Poland (Option 1b) to 386,700 EUR in Germany (Options 1a and 1b). The fall in administrative costs for Poland in Option 1b derives from the assessment of the Polish interviewees that they can reduce their contribution to calculating benefit rates in more cases.

Change in administrative costs and burden for mobile EU-citizens and their families

Annex A – Literature

EC (2009), Impact Assessment Guidelines, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf

EC (2015), Commission staff working document, Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 111 final, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf

Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

FGB, COWI and IER (2015), Task 3, Draft Final Report, 31 July 2015.

Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:166:0001:0123:en:PDF

Pacolet, J and F De Wispelaere (2015), Export of family benefits, Report on the questionnaire on the export of family benefits, July 2015.

Annex B – Interview guide

The attached interview guide is the actual version used for the interviews in the UK, and is so in English. The interview guide was provided to the Member States experts in their national languages.

Note that we in the interview guide make use of the option titles: Revisions (A), (B), and (C), rather than Options 1a, 1b, and 3 – as in the report. The reason for this was to avoid discussing what happened to Option 2.

The European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion has given Fondazione Brodolini, COWI and IER the task to assess changes to administrative/compliance costs within national administrations and for the families affected that would occur from the possible revision of the current EU provisions on export of family benefits specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation'.

More precisely, we aim to assess the changes in administrative/compliance tasks, and consequently costs, from having to calculate the amount of exported family benefits based on the living standard in the Member State of residence of the children rather than based on the competent Member State's benefit rates.

Furthermore, we aim to assess whether the families receiving the benefits will face changing administrative/compliance tasks.

We would therefore much appreciate your help by providing us with the list of tasks and estimates of your current administrative/compliance time needs for handling the current EU provisions, and in assessing how these time needs may change from revisions to the provisions. We would like to do this via an interview with you – either in person or by phone.

Hence, we would like to arrange the time and place for an interview; and for you to get more insight into the questions we would like to ask you – we hereby provide you with our interview guide.

You may well find that you are not able to answer all the questions. We will therefore focus on the questions you can answer – but you may also be able to help us pointing to the other services in your national administrations that can help us answering the remaining questions.

1.You and your national administration

Name and title of interviewee: _______________________________________________

National administration: _______________________________________________

Function/responsibility of interviewee: _______________________________________________

2.Current administrative tasks and consequently costs of handling exports of family benefits

In this section, we ask you to verify and estimate the costs of a number of administrative tasks that are currently carried out when handling a case of exports of family benefits. Imagine a case as described by the following examples:

Example 1 of exports of family benefits:

Carlos works in Member State A (which has a higher cost of living than Member State B) while his non-working wife Joanna resides with their children in Member State B (which has a lower cost of living than Member State A).

Under the current rules, Carlos is entitled to family benefits in Member State A at the same amount as if his family was residing in Member State A.

Example 2 of exports of family benefits:

Carlos works in Member State B while his non-working wife Joanna resides with their children in Member State A.

Under the current rules, Carlos is entitled to family benefits in Member State B at the same amount as if his family was residing in Member State B.

We do the assessment in two parts. Firstly, we ask you to assess a situation when you are the national administration with primary competence – i.e. where you deal with the applicant for family benefits.

Secondly, when you are the national administration with secondary competence – i.e. where you deal with the follow-on administrative tasks from an application submitted in another Member State.

If you only carry out one of the two types of administrative tasks – please leave out the other part.

2.1.Administrative tasks/costs – when national administration with primary competence

Consider the situation, where you are the national administration with primary competence.

Firstly, please provide your assessment of the number of cases handled by your institution.

How many cases of exports of family benefits does your institution currently handle per year as the national administration with primary competence – including new cases and already active cases?

a)New cases?

b)Existing active cases?

How do you collect data?

a)From other member states?

b)From the applicant?

When answering these questions please explain whether you collect information via IT-systems, via records of personal registration etc.

Secondly, please provide, with an outset in the below table, your assessment of the current administrative costs of handling a typical case of exports of family benefits, being the national administration with primary competence. (You may relate the tasks to the SEDs to be filled out). Hence:

Please assess the frequency of each of the detailed administrative tasks – i.e. how often are the tasks carried out for a given case?
And in this context – is it appropriate to distinguish between "standard tasks" and "additional tasks"?

Please estimate the average man-hours/minutes required per administrative task. We acknowledge that you may not keep accounts of your time spent on a case/task. Hence, we ask you to provide your best guess. Furthermore, we acknowledge that you may find it difficult to provide a specific man-hour estimate per task. Hence, you may instead provide ranges of estimates (less than 15 minutes, 15 to 30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, between 1 and 3 hours, between 3 hours and 1 working day, more than 1 working day), or you may also choose to provide a total cost estimate per case – and rank the tasks according to their resource demands, where 1 is the most resource demanding tasks and so forth.

Administrative task	Description of administrative task - hereunder frequency of tasks within a case	Average man-hours/ minutes	Comments
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of national administration with primary competence	Please revise (if necessary): You receive an application for exports of family benefits, you determine in which Member State the applicant and his/her family reside, and determine whether the applicant is employed, unemployed, posted worker, or civil servant. Please specify/revise frequency when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency: 100%.		Comments:
Calculation of benefit	Please revise (if necessary): For each of the cases where you are determined as the national administration with primary competence: You will calculate the benefits that the applicant is entitled to according to your national legislation. Furthermore, you will contact the Member State of residence of the applicant's family to investigate the applicant's entitlement to family benefits in this Member State – i.e. to check for overlapping benefits (see further below). Finally, you will set the payment of family benefits in motion. Please specify/revise frequency when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency, when you are the national administration with primary competence: 100%		Comments:
Annual control	Please revise (if necessary): For each of the existing cases of exports of family benefits: You will once a year check whether the information/status on the applicant and his/her family has changed based on the (renewed) application of the family. Please specify/revise frequency when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency, when you are the national administration with primary competence (i.e. once a year per existing case): 100%		Comments:
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Please revise (if necessary): If there is disagreement on whether you or your corresponding national administration in the other Member State is the competent one: Additional tasks/costs arise from exchange of information, from determination of which Member State to provide provisional benefits, and ultimately from bringing the case before the Administrative Commission. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Overlapping benefits	Please revise (if necessary): If the applicant is entitled to family benefits from more than one Member State: Additional costs arise from determining which Member State legislation to apply, and hence taking provisional decision on competence, and from deciding on possible sharing of benefit payments. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Reimbursement	Please revise (if necessary): If (provisional) family benefits should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Recovery	Please revise (if necessary): If an applicant unjustified has received family benefits: Additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting Member States with secondary competence to seek recovery. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with primary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Missing administrative tasks
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please estimate your total use of man-hours per case

2.2.Administrative costs – when national administration with secondary competence

Now, consider the situation, where you are the national administration with secondary competence – i.e. you receive a request for information from the national administration with primary competence in another Member State.

Firstly, please provide your assessment of the number of cases handled by your national administration.

How many cases of exports of family benefits do institution currently handle per year as the national administration with secondary competence?

a)New cases?

b)Existing active cases?

Secondly, please provide, with an outset in the below table, your assessment of the current administrative costs of handling one case of exports of family benefits, being the national administration with secondary competence. (You may relate the tasks to the SEDs to be filled out). Hence:

Please assess the frequency of each of the detailed administrative tasks – i.e. how often are the tasks carried out in a typical case of application for family benefits? 100 % means that the task is always carried out, while 50 % means it is carried out in half of the cases.
And in this context – is it appropriate to distinguish between "standard tasks" and "additional tasks"?

Administrative task	Description of administrative task - hereunder frequency of tasks within a case	Average man-hours/ minutes	Comments
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of competent national administration with primary competence	Please revise (if necessary): You receive an application for family benefits - or a notice from another Member State regarding an application for exports of family benefits - and you contribute to determining the national administration with primary competence. Please specify/revise frequency when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency: 100%.		Comments:
Calculation of benefit	Please revise (if necessary): You will assess the applicant's entitlement to family benefits in your Member State – i.e. you check for overlapping benefits (see further below). Please specify/revise frequency when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency: 100%		Comments:
Annual control	Please revise (if necessary): For each of the existing cases of exports of family benefits, you will – on request – provide the national administration with primary competence with information/status on the applicant and his/her family. Please specify/revise frequency when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency (i.e. once a year per existing case): 100%		Comments:
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Please revise (if necessary): If there is disagreement on whether you or your corresponding national administration in the other Member State is the competent one: Additional costs arise from exchange of information, from determination of which Member State to provide provisional benefits, and ultimately from bringing the case before the Administrative Commission. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Overlapping benefits	Please revise (if necessary): If the applicant is entitled to family benefits from more than one Member State: Additional costs arise from determining which Member State legislation to apply, and hence taking provisional decision on competence, and from deciding on possible sharing of benefit payments. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Reimbursement	Please revise (if necessary): If (provisional) family benefits should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Recovery	Please revise (if necessary): If an applicant unjustified has received family benefits: On request, additional costs arise from assisting the national administration with primary competence in recovering unjustified family benefits from the applicant's family. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the national administration with secondary competence: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Missing administrative tasks
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please estimate your total use of man-hours per case

3.Change in administrative costs of handling exports of family benefits from revisions to EU provisions

In this section, we then ask you to assess the likely increase or decrease in administrative task/costs within your national administration from possible revisions to the EU provisions.

We acknowledge that this may be even more difficult than estimating the current use of man-hours in the previous section – in particular if the revisions lead to new administrative tasks.

Please focus on the administrative tasks where resources in terms of average man-hours/minutes will change due to the revisions – i.e. if there is no change, please do just enter 0% in the below tables.

Please do this assessment for each of the possible revisions one by one. We firstly ask you to assess the revisions assuming you are the national administration with primary competence, and secondly we ask you to assess the revisions assuming you are the national administration with secondary competence. However, if you only carry out one of the two types of administrative tasks – please leave out the other.

Revision (a):
Adjustment of amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child – i.e. adjustment upwards or downwards compared to current situation.

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

Revision (b):
Adjustment of amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child – limited to the amount provided by the competent Member State.

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

Revision (c):
A further possible option would be that the current order of priority is changed as follows: 1) country of residence of the child; 2) the country of work; and 3) country of pension. This would mean that the country of residence of the child has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of family benefits to which the entitlement exists under its national rules. The country of work would top up this amount if the level of family benefits would be higher there. The family will receive the same amount of family benefits as before, but the allocation of the costs between the country of work and the country of residence will differ from the current rules. This also applies, where there is no entitlement to family benefits in the primary competent Member State, but there is entitlement in a secondary competent Member State, as in such a case, the latter State will pay 100% of benefits under its national legislation by way of a "top up".

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

3.1.Change in administrative tasks – when national administration with primary competence

Consider the situation, where you are the competent national administration – i.e. the national administration sending request for information to (an)other Member State(s).

Please focus on the current administrative tasks where resources in terms of average man-hours/minutes will change due to the revision. Please clearly indicate whether the change is positive or negative: a “+” indicate an increase in the man-hours needed to perform the task and a ”-“ indicate a reduction in man-hours needed to perform the task. If the estimated change is zero or insignificant please also indicate this in the table. Also please add new administrative tasks required by the revision if relevant.

Please provide a brief narrative explanation for each of the assessed changes and new administrative tasks.

Administrative task	Change in unit cost of administrative tasks due possible revisions of family benefit provisions Please provide change in average man-hours or % increase/decrease
	Revision (a)	Revision (b)	Revision (c)
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of national administration with primary competence	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Calculation of benefit	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Annual control	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Overlapping benefits	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Reimbursement	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Recovery	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Missing (current) administrative tasks [added in the previous section]
Please add missing task	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Please add missing task	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
New administrative tasks – due to the revision
Please add new task	Man-hours:	Man-hours:	Man-hours:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Please add new task	Man-hours:	Man-hours:	Man-hours:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:

3.2.Change in administrative costs – when national administration of residence of the family

Please repeat the assessment of the change in the administrative tasks/costs associated with the case handling for each of the two revisions (a) and (b).

Please focus on the current administrative tasks where resources in terms of average man-hours/minutes will change due to the revision. Please clearly indicate whether the change is positive or negative: a “+” indicate an increase in the man-hours needed to perform the task and a ”-“ indicate a reduction in man-hours needed to perform the task. If the estimated change is zero or insignificant please also indicate this in the table. Also, please add new administrative tasks required by the revision if relevant.

Please provide a brief narrative explanation for each of the assessed changes and new administrative tasks.

Administrative task	Change in unit cost of administrative tasks due possible revisions of family benefit provisions Please provide change in average man-hours or % increase/decrease
	Revision (a)	Revision (b)	Revision (c)
Standard administrative tasks
Determination of national administration with primary competence	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Calculation of benefit	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Annual control	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Additional administrative tasks
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Overlapping benefits	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Reimbursement	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Recovery	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Missing (current) administrative tasks [added in the previous section]
Please add missing task	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Please add missing task	Change:	Change:	Change:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
New administrative tasks – due to the revision
Please add new task	Man-hours:	Man-hours:	Man-hours:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Please add new task	Man-hours:	Man-hours:	Man-hours:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:

4.Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

The suggested revisions to the EU provisions on exports of family benefits, and hence changes to the administrative tasks of the national administrations, may also have administrative implications for the families – e.g. time spent when applying for exports of family benefits, when being controlled etc.

Please add relevant tasks for the families in the table below.

For each of the revisions we ask you to assess the implications for the families associated hereby.

We acknowledge that it is difficult to assess such implications, but please help us doing this by providing your qualitative (or semi-quantitative) assessments. You may just provide a narrative assessment of the implications or you may try to link the implications to the administrative tasks of the national administrations listed in the below table.

Administrative task	Implications for families due possible revisions of family benefit provisions Please specify the direction of change (and if possible its size: low, medium or high)
	Revision (a)	Revision (b)	Revision (c)
Please add task	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Please add task	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:

Thanks for your help!

Annex C – Case study for Germany

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of the German provisions for family benefits, which kind of benefits they include, who is eligible, and how the provisions are interpreted by the national administrative institution handling family benefits: Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit.

EC Regulation 883/2004, Article 1 (z) defines the term family benefits as "all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses, excluding advances of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances mentioned in Annex I".

In Germany this includes:

-Kindergeld (child benefit)

-Elterngeld (parental allowance)

-Betreuungsgeld (child care allowance)

This study considers exportable family benefits (cash benefits) only, and so only Kindergeld.

Kindergeld can be obtained by taxable persons residing in Germany, or persons subject to income taxation in Germany. There are no restrictions with respect to own children, adopted children or dependent children.

To receive Kindergeld, the applicant's children must be under the age of 18. However, there is a possibility for prolongation to 21 years of age for registered jobseekers, and to 25 for students and working students (less than 20 hours a week). Furthermore, the children must reside in Germany or in another EU Member State, the EEA, or in Switzerland.

The German scheme is universal, and so not means-tested. In 2015, the rates were EUR 184 per month for the first and second child, EUR 190 per month for the third child, and EUR 215 per month for the fourth and subsequent children.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling exports of family benefits in Germany, a number of face-to-face interviews were carried out with experts from the Nürnberg national administration for family benefits. They estimate that there in Germany as a whole are around 85,000 new cases per year and around 170,000 existing cases handled as primary competence. This is slightly more than the estimates by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) shown in Table C-1.

Averaging of the experiences of the interviewees of resources spend on administrative tasks as national administration with primary competence leads to an estimate of 1.36 man-hours per case and 1.28 man-hours per case when they act as national administration with secondary competence, c.f. Table C-1 and Table C-2. The tables show also the administrative tasks are fairly similar being of primary and of secondary competence, both with respect to type and to the amount of resources spent. Furthermore, some tasks are always carried out for a given case, while others are much rarer.

Based on the number of man-hours spent and an average labour cost at EUR 20.5 per hour this adds up to a total average of EUR 28.0 per case as national administration with primary competence and EUR 26.2 per case as national administration with secondary competence. Table C-1 and Table C-2 shows that for Germany as a whole – i.e. for all cases during a year – the current administrative costs amount to around mEUR 1.8 and mEUR 0.5, respectively.

Table C-1 Current administrative costs and burden – Germany as Member State of primary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.36 hours	100%	62587	1751.4
Determination of national administration with primary competence 8	0.5 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0.5 hours	100%
Annual control 9	0.67 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence 10	2 hours	5%
Overlapping benefits	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	1 hour	10%
Recovery	1 hour	>5%
Translation and coordination	0.25 hours	30-40%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table C-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Germany as Member State of secondary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.28 hours	100%	20918	547.8
Determination of national administration with primary competence 11	0.5 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0.5 hours	100%
Annual control	1 hour	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	2 hours	5%
Overlapping benefits	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	1 hour	10%
Recovery	1 hour	>5%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

The overall assessment from the German interviewees is that the changes will lead to few additional man-hours used per case – both being national administration of primary competence and being national administration of secondary competence. Actually, it is assumed that the changes will be similar for the two competences.

Table C-3 shows the expected change in man-hours used per case for Options 1a and 1b – as these are expected to be similar, while Table C-4 concerns Option 3. Options 1a and 1b are extremely complicated to administer as it implies that the national administrations need knowledge on all the different systems, rules and regulations of the different Member States. Technical assistance through a common database. This concerns both the determination of the national administration as well as the calculation of benefits. Furthermore, it is difficult to align different systems like flat-rate systems, income-based systems, the duration of benefit payments etc.

For all three revisions, it has to be added that there are several significant transitional costs that have to be taken into account (training in the new regulations, changes in the IT-systems, re-examination and re-calculation of all existing cases).

Table C-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 1a and Option 1b – Germany as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	0.9 hours	100%	Primary: 62587 Secondary: 27794	Primary: 1156.9 Secondary: 386.7
Determination of national administration with primary competence 12	0.4 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 13	0.25 hours	100%
Annual control	0 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	0 hours	100%
Overlapping benefits	0 hours	100%
Reimbursement 14	0.25 hours	100%
Recovery	0 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table C-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3 – Germany as Member State of primary and secondary competence

A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0.5 hours	100%	Primary: 62587 Secondary: 27794	Primary: 642.7 Secondary: 214.8
Determination of national administration with primary competence	0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 15	0.25 hours	100%
Annual control 16	0.25 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	0 hours	100%
Overlapping benefits	0 hours	100%
Reimbursement 17	0.25 hours	100%
Recovery	0 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

It is the assessment of the national administrations that Options 1a and 1b only will have few administrative implications for the families subject to export of family benefits. However, Option 3 will increase their administrative burden as there will be verifications of the residence of the child. In turn, there may be a reduction in the administrative burden as proof of income will not be necessary anymore.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Germany per year is estimated at 62587 when Germany is the Member State of primary competence, while the number of cases is somewhat lower, 20918, when Germany is the Member State of secondary competence.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.36 hours for an average case when Germany is the Member State primary competence, and to 1.28 hours when of secondary competence.

The overall assessment is that the changes will lead to few additional man-hours used per case – both being national administration of primary competence and being national administration of secondary competence. Actually, it is assumed that the changes will be similar for the two competences.

Annex D – Case study for Denmark

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of the Danish legislation on family benefits, which kind of benefits it includes, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institution handling family benefits, Udbetaling Danmark (Payment Denmark).

In Denmark, this includes 18 :

-children and youth benefits (børne- og ungeydelsen)

-child supplements and adoption supplements (børnetilskud og adaptionstilskud)

-subsidies for private childcare and subsidies for home caring of own children in accordance with the Day Care Act chapter 15 and 16 (tilskud til privat pasning og tilskud til pasning af egne børn efter dagtilbudslovens kapitel 15 og 16)

However, since this study only assesses family benefits that can be exported (cash benefits) only the children and youth benefits are relevant.

The law on child benefits (børnetilskudsloven) regulates the children and youth benefits. Danish children and youth benefits are universal and not means-tested. However, since 2014 it has been income-regulated meaning that workers with a yearly income above DKK 723,100 (EUR 96,894) receive a reduced amount of benefits.

Family benefits are obtainable for residents with Danish nationality or refugee status and foreigners with one to three years of residence in Denmark, depending on the type of benefits applied for 19 .

According to Danish law two years of residence or employment within a reference period of 10 years is required to obtain the right to family benefits 20 . Are these requirements not met the payments are reduced. Hence, the Danish law establishes that six months of residence or employment in Denmark entitles the applicant to 25% of the full amount of benefit. One year of residence or employment entitles the applicant to 50% of the full amount of benefits. 18 months entitles to 75% and two years of residence or employment entitles to 100% of the benefits 21 . All within a reference period of 10 years.

For 2015, the rates of benefits are DKK 4,443 (EUR 595) per quarter for each child of 0-2 years, DKK 3,519 (EUR 472) per quarter for each child 3-6 years, DKK 2,769 (EUR 371) per quarter for each child 7-14, and DKK 923 (EUR 124) per quarter for each child of 15-17 years 22 . The benefits are tax-free and rates are adjusted annually.

In Denmark, Udbetaling Danmark (Payment Denmark) is the national administrative institution handling family benefits. Here, the Department of Family Benefits (afdeling for familieydelser) is responsible for all processes and payments related to family benefits. Therefore, in determining the Danish national administrative burdens related to handling exports of family benefits only one interview was conducted.

Udbetaling Danmark acknowledged that the Danish legislation at first glance might seem to be inconsistent with EC Regulation 883/2004. However, they stressed that in practice the rules are in line with EU regulation since Udbetaling Danmark calculate an EU-workers' right to benefits based on an aggregation principle, where the period of time, in which the EU-worker was entitled to benefits from the Member State(s) where he/she previously resided, is included. If the Member State(s), in which an EU-worker formerly resided, has assessed there is a right to benefits, this right also applies in Denmark. In many EU Member States, the right to family benefits derives from work or insurance, where in Denmark it is based on residence.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling family benefits in Denmark an interview with Udbetaling Danmark, Department of Family Benefits, was conducted. Udbetaling Danmark has been doing measurements of time used on internal handling of different types of cases and was therefore able to give rather accurate time estimates on the different tasks. Udbetaling Danmark has only existed for two years. Prior to this family benefits were managed by the Danish municipalities.

Udbetaling Danmark estimates that they handle approximately 6,500 new cases a year (about 450 cases per month). It is estimated that in 20% – or 1,300 – of these cases Udbetaling Danmark is the national administration of secondary competence. Udbetaling Danmark currently has 10,000 ongoing cases where quarterly payments are made. Udbetaling Danmark states that the number of cases has been stable – though with a slight increase – in the two years Udbetaling Danmark has existed. The amount of new cases typically follows the different types of seasonal work (e.g. horticulture work) and bigger projects (e.g. construction projects such as the new city metro line in Copenhagen). A slight increase in the number of cases in the coming years is expected due to the economic situation in Denmark, which remains better than many other European countries. However, there is a tendency towards more EU-workers moving their families to Denmark after having worked here for a period of time, in which case the family benefits cease being exported.

It is the impression at Udbetaling Danmark that Denmark, due to its high amount of benefits, in most cases is the primary competent state (at times jointly with another Member State).

The average man-hours used handling cases on export of family benefits by Udbetaling Danmark as national administration with primary competence is estimated at 3.70 man-hours per case. As national administration with secondary competence the number is 3.88 man-hours per case. With an average labour cost at EUR 29.3 per hour this adds up to a total average of EUR 108.5 per case as national administration with primary competence and EUR 113.6 per case as national administration with secondary competence. Hence, for Denmark as a whole the annual current administrative costs amount to EUR 564,000 and EUR 83,100, respectively.

Table D-1 Current administrative costs and burden – Denmark as Member State of primary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	3.70 hours	100%	5200	564.0
Determination of national administration with primary competence 23	1 hour	100%
Calculation of benefit 24	1.83 hours	100%
Annual control	0.75 hours	80%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	2.50 hours	0-5%
Overlapping benefits 25	0.50 hours	90-100%
Reimbursement 26	12 hours	2%
Recovery 27	0.50 min.	0.25-0.5%

Notes: (1) Source: Estimate provided by the Danish national expert. (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table D-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Denmark as Member State of secondary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	3.88 hours	100%	732	83.1
Determination of national administration with primary competence 28	1 hour	100%
Calculation of benefit 29	1.83 hours	100%
Annual control 30	0.25 hours	20%
Annual recalculation of benefits as secondary MS 31	0.17 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	2.5 hours	0-5%
Overlapping benefits 32	0.5 hours	90-100%
Reimbursement 33	12 hours	2%
Recovery 34	2 hours	0.25-0.5%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

Table D-3 and Table D-4 reveal that the Udbetaling Denmark envisages that the analysed revisions to the EU provisions will have fairly similar impacts on the administrative costs – whether being the Member State of primary competence or of secondary competence. Furthermore, Option 1a and Option 1b are expected to have similar impacts, while the impacts of Option 3 are slightly lower. The main impact is expected to be on the resources spend on the calculation of benefits, while the rare reimbursement cases are expected to be even more complex.

Table D-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 1a and Option 1b – Denmark as Member State of primary and secondary competence

A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	1.99 hours	100%	Primary: 5200 Secondary: 732	Primary: 303.3 Secondary: 42.7
Determination of national administration with primary competence 35	0.25 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 36	1.5 hours	100%
Annual control 37	0.5 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	0 hours	0-5%
Overlapping benefits	0 hours	90-100%
Reimbursement	12 hours	2%
Recovery	0 hours	0.25-0.5%

Notes: (1) Source: Estimate provided by the Danish national expert, and Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table D-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3 – Denmark as Member State of primary and secondary competence

A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	Primary: 1.99 Secondary: 1.79	100% 100%	Primary: 5200 Secondary: 732	Primary: 303.3 Secondary: 37.4
Determination of national administration with primary competence	0.25 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	1.5 hours	100%
Annual control	0.25 hours	Primary: 20% Secondary: 80% (Opposite before revision)
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	0 hours	0-5%
Overlapping benefits	0 hours	90-100%
Reimbursement	12 hours	2%
Recovery	0 hours	0.25-0.5%

Notes: (1) Source: Estimate provided by the Danish national expert, and Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

The proposal, which entails that benefits are adjusted to the standard of living in the Member State of residence, will most likely provide longer case processing times for the EU-workers and their families, due to the increase in information that needs to be obtained/exchanged.
Many of the changes involve, that the EU-workers need to be in contact with an additional authority (both the primary and the secondary) since they will have the right to benefits from more than one Member State.

In cases where EU workers need to provide proof of residence to obtain benefits the revisions might make it more difficult for them. In Denmark, this would not be an issue, since the National Register (Folkeregisteret) can provide proof of this information, but many Member States do not have such a register.

Option 1a: Unchanged time used for the EU worker. EU workers must do the same as today, but will probably experience a prolonged processing time, since they in all cases must wait for information from the other Member State.

Option 1b: The same as Option 1a. Unchanged time used, but extended processing time for certain cases.

Option 3: Maybe less time consuming and experience of an easier procedure for the EU worker, since they must apply in the country where the family resides which can be assumed to have a system the EU worker will find easier to navigate in.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Denmark per year is estimated at 5200 when Denmark is the Member State of primary competence, while the number of cases is somewhat lower, 732, when Denmark is the Member State of secondary competence.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 3.70 hours for an average case when Denmark is the Member State primary competence, and to 3.88 hours when of secondary competence.

The overall assessment is that the changes will lead to around 2 additional man-hours used per case when being national administration of primary competence and around 1.8 additional hours being national administration of secondary competence.

Annex E – Case study for Netherlands

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of Dutch the legislation on family benefits, which kind of benefits it includes, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institution handling family benefits, Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB).

In The Netherlands, this includes:

-Algemene Kinderbijslagwet (AKW) (General Child Benefit)

-Wet op het kindgebonden budget (WKB) (Act on supplementary child benefit)

This study only assess exportable family benefits (cash benefits), which applies to both AKW and WKB. Both kinds of benefits are granted to EU workers with children residing in another EU Member State (EEA country or Switzerland).

To receive family benefits in the Netherlands the applicant's children must be under the age of 18. In addition, the applicant must – regardless of nationality – reside, work and consequently pay taxes on wages in the Netherlands to be eligible to family benefits. While the Algemene Kinderbijslagwet (AKW) is universal scheme and not mean-tested, the Wet op het kindgebonden budget (WKB) is means-tested.

In 2015 the AKW rates for children up to 5 years are EUR 63.88, for children in the age of 6-11 years: EUR 77.57, and for children in the age of 12-17 years: EUR 91.26. The benefits are paid per quarter.

For the WKB there is a ceiling depending on income. The benefit amount decreases as income rise: For income above the threshold of EUR 26,147 the allowance is reduced by 7.6% of the difference between the family income and the EUR 26,147. The income limit for a single person is EUR 102,499 and EUR 123,638 for partners. The monthly amount per children is for one child: EUR 39,529; for two children: EUR 46,581, for three children: EUR 48,989, for four children: EUR 50,384; (...) and for eight children: EUR 55,963.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burdens in handling family benefits in The Netherlands an interview with Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB), Directie Strategische en Externe Betrekkingen (Social Security Office, Department of Strategic and External Relations), was conducted.

SVB estimates that they handle approximately 4,800 new cases each year 38 and about 15,600 existing cases 39 . The numbers from the HIVA study (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015) for 2013 are 20,225 existing cases as national institution of primary competence and 7,596 cases as national institution of secondary competence. The calculations of administrative costs in handling family benefits are based on the data received from the HIVA study.

The present study estimates the number of man-hours spend as national administration with primary competence is 1.92 man-hours and 1.47 man-hours as national administration with secondary competence.

Based on the number of man-hours spend from this study and an average labour cost at EUR 22.2 per hour this adds up to a total average of EUR 42.7 per case as national administration with primary competence and EUR 32.7 per case as national administration with secondary competence. Hence, for the Netherlands as a whole the annual current administrative costs amount to EUR 862,700 and EUR 247,200, respectively

Below is a detailed review of the administrative cost (EUR) arising from each of the administrative tasks involved in handling the export of family benefits today and in regards to Options 1a, 1b and 3.

Table E-1 Current administrative costs and burden – the Netherlands as Member State of primary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.92 hours	100%	20225	862.7
Determination of national administration with primary competence. 40	0.5 hours	150%
Calculation of benefit	0.75 hours	100%
Annual control 41	0.38 hours	50%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence 42	0.50 hours	100%
Overlapping benefits 43	0 hours	100%
Reimbursement 44	1 hour	0-5%
Recovery 45	1 hour	0-5%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table E-2 Current administrative costs and burden – the Netherlands as Member State of secondary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.47 hours	100%	7569	247.2
Determination of national administration with primary competence 46	0.38 hours	150%
Calculation of benefit 47	0.75 hours	100%
Annual control	0.38 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence 48	1 hour	0-5%
Overlapping benefits 49	0 hours	100%
Reimbursement 50	1 hour	0-5%
Recovery 51	1 hour	0-5%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

The overall assessment from the SVB is, that the changes will lead to few additional man-hours used per case. However, the SVB stresses that the introduction of such changes most likely will be followed by a transition phase (6-12 months) involving a significant amount of policy changes, update of processes and instructions, change of IT-systems and new agreements with relevant partners (e.g. tax department).

Below is shown the expected change in man-hours used per case which for all three revisions is estimated to a total average of 1.13 hours per case both as primary and secondary national administration. With an average labour cost at EUR 22.2 per hour this adds up to a total average of additional EUR 25 per case.

Table E-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Options 1a, 1b and 3 – the Netherlands as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.13 hours	100%	27794	694.7
Determination of national administration with primary competence 52	0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 53	1.13 hours	100%
Annual control 54	0 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence 55	0 hours	100%
Overlapping benefits 56	0 hours	100%
Reimbursement 57	0 hours	100%
Recovery 58	0 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

It is the SVB assessment that the changes will not lead to extra tasks for the applicants. However, they stress that the process of handling the applications most likely will take more time why the applicant consequently must wait longer to get the application approved.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in the Netherlands per year is estimated at 20225 when the Netherlands is the Member State of primary competence, while the number of cases is somewhat lower, 7569, when being the Member State of secondary competence.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.92 hours for an average case when the Netherlands is the Member State primary competence, and to 1.47 hours when of secondary competence.

The overall assessment is that the changes due to any of the three revisions will lead to just above around 1 additional man-hour used per case – whether being national administration of primary competence or of secondary competence.

Annex F – Case study for Poland

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of the Polish legislation on family benefits, which kind of benefits it includes, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the administrative institutions handling family benefits. The institutions responsible for handling family benefits in Poland are at the national level the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and at regional level the Regional Social Policy Centres, more precisely the Regional Social Policy Centre Krakow and the Regional Social Policy Centre Opole.

To be eligible to family benefits in Poland the beneficiaries must be either:

-Polish citizen

-Foreigner who falls within the scope of the law on coordination of social security schemes or bilateral agreement on social security

-Foreigners residing with their family within the territory of Poland who holds refugee status or has residence permit. Applicants who holds an EU, EEA or Swiss citizenship are not obliged to have their children living in Poland to be eligible to family benefits.

Polish family benefits are contributory and means-tested. It is given to children under the age of 18 years or at the end of the child’s education at school. The family income per capita must not exceed PLN 539 (EUR 130) (in 2014) per month (PLN 623 (EUR 150) in the case of families with a disabled child). The monthly amounts per child depend on the age: under 5 years: PLN 77 (EUR 18), 5 - 18 years: PLN 106 (EUR 25), 18 - 24 years: PLN 115 (EUR 28).

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling family benefits in Poland interviews with the relevant Polish administrative institutions have been conducted. This includes: at the national level the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Department of Coordination of Social Security Systems, and at regional level the Regional Social Policy Centres, more precisely the Regional Social Policy Centre Krakow and the Regional Social Policy Centre Opole.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy estimates, that they in average handled 78,000 cases of family benefits in 2014 and a total of around 6,000 active cases 59 . The ministry underlined that they did not have any data on man-hours used on handling cases of family benefits. Their given estimates of man-hours used are based on intuition.

Below is a detailed review of the administrative costs arising from each of the administrative tasks involved in handling the export of family benefits today and in regards to Options 1a, 1b and 3.

Table F-1 shows that an average case for the national administration as primary competence uses just above one man-hour with most time most often spent on the calculation of benefit and on determining which Member State actually has the primary competence. In addition, the Polish interviewees mention the copying of the application and its transfer to a foreign institution as a standard task.

Table F-1 Current administrative costs and burden – Poland as Member State of primary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.21 hours	100%	8698	53.9
Determination of national administration with primary competence	0.44 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 60	0.47 hours	100%
Annual control 61	0.06 hours	0-1%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence 62	0.75 hours	0.04-1%
Overlapping benefits 63	0 hours	100%
Reimbursement	0 hours	10%
Recovery	0.33 hours	10%
Additional task 64	0.21 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table F-2 shows that a similar amount of resources are spent on an average case being the national administration of secondary competence. The largest task is here the determination of which Member State that actually has the primary competence.

Table F-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Poland as Member State of secondary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.14 hours	100%	62047	362.9
Determination of national administration with primary competence	0.69 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0.17 hours	100%
Annual control	0 hours	0%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	0.50 hours	0-0.04%
Overlapping benefits	0.17 hours	100%
Reimbursement	0 hours	10%
Recovery	0.11 hours	10%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

The interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences of three different revisions to the current EU provisions. The consequences are estimated in terms of additional man-hours to carry out the administrative tasks.

Table F-3 shows that Option 1a is expected to lead to additional resource requirements of just under half an hour – a little less being of secondary competence than of primary competence. These amounts are composed of minor additional efforts to calculate benefits, to deal with overlapping benefits

Table F-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 1a – Poland as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Primary: 0.43 hours Secondary: 0.33 hours	Primary: 100% Secondary: 100%	Primary: 8698 Secondary: 62047	Primary: 19.0 Secondary: 103.6
Determination of national administration with primary competence	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: 0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	Primary: 0.15 hours Secondary: 0.10 hours	100%
Annual control	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: -0.05 hours	Primary: 0-1% Secondary: 0%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: -0.05 hours	Primary: 0.04-1% Second.: 0- 0.04%
Overlapping benefits	Primary: 0.08 hours Secondary: 0.08 hours	100%
Reimbursement	Primary: 0.08 hours Secondary: 0.08 hours	10%
Recovery	Primary: 0.13 hours Secondary: 0.13 hours	10%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

The picture is as shown in Table F-4 similar of Option 1b when Poland is the Member State of primary competence, while resource requirements are expected to fall slightly when being of secondary competence. This is mainly due to a fall in the task of calculating benefits.

Table F-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 1b – Poland as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Primary: 0.38 hours Second.: -0.13 hours	Primary: 100% Secondary: 100%	Primary: 8698 Secondary: 62047	Primary: 16.7 Secondary: -39.8
Determination of national administration with primary competence	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: 0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	Primary: 0.15 hours Secondary: -0.15 hours	100%
Annual control	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: -0.50 hours	Primary: 0-1% Secondary: 0%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: -0.05 hours	Primary: 0.04-1% Second.: 0- 0.04%
Overlapping benefits	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: 0 hours	100%
Reimbursement	Primary: 0.08 hours Secondary: 0.08 hours	10%
Recovery	Primary: 0.08 hours Secondary: 0.13 hours	10%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Finally, Table F-5 shows that only few changes to the administrative tasks are expected from Option 3.

Table F-5 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3 – Poland as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Primary: 0.13 hours Secondary: 0.13 hours	Primary: 100% Secondary: 100%	Primary: 8698 Secondary: 62047	Primary: 5.6 Secondary: 39.8
Determination of national administration with primary competence	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: 0.10 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	Primary: 0.10 hours Secondary: 0.10 hours	100%
Annual control	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: -0.50 hours	Primary: 0-1% Secondary: 0%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence	Primary: 0 hours Secondary: -0.05 hours	Primary: 0.04-1% Second.: 0- 0.04%
Overlapping benefits	Primary: 0.03 hours Secondary: 0.08 hours	100%
Reimbursement	Primary: 0.03 hours Secondary: -0.05 hours	10%
Recovery	Primary: 0.08 hours Secondary: -0.05 hours	10%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

The Regional Social Policy Centre in Opole assesses that the revisions will not lead to any direct changes to the application procedure; neither in the time used nor in the administrative tasks to be performed. However, the Department for Coordination of Social Security Systems and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy notes that their assessment of the implications to the applicants due to the revisions are high.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Poland per year is estimated at 8698 when Poland is the Member State of primary competence, while the number of cases is somewhat higher, 62047, when being the Member State of secondary competence.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.21 hours for an average case when Poland is the Member State primary competence, and to 1.14 hours when of secondary competence.

The overall assessment is that the changes due to any of the three revisions will lead to less than half an hour additional resource per case – whether being national administration of primary competence or of secondary competence.

Annex G – Case study for Romania

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of Romanian legislation on family benefits, which kind of benefits it includes, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institution handling family benefits, National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection.

The National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection is a public institution with legal personality, subordinated to the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection. The agency operates through county agencies for payments and social inspection, who are organized and operating as decentralised public services with legal personality. While the National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection is the liaison body for family benefits in Romania, the county agencies are the competent institutions.

In Romania, this includes:

child benefits

child-raising benefits

However, since this study assesses family benefits that can be exported (cash benefits) only the child benefits are relevant.

Children up to 18 years of age (or secondary or post-secondary graduation age), who live together with their parents, and have their domicile or residence in Romania, are entitled to state allowances for children (alocaţie de stat pentru copii). The amount of child benefits is fixed (not income related), but varies according to age: 200 lei (EUR 45) for children under the age of two and to 42 lei (about EUR 9) for those older than two.

Claims for family benefits have to be submitted at the town halls. Claims that involve the use of EU forms are submitted to the county agencies for payments and social inspection who take the decision on entitlement.

Eligibility to family benefits requires documentation in the form of: original and copy of birth certificate of the child, original and copy of the ID of the legal representative, documents showing legal status of the child towards legal representative. In cases where claims for child benefits are made by EU citizens working in Romania, the applicant must provide documentation to clarify whether Romania has primary competence. This includes relevant information regarding working status and residence of the other parent and child(ren).

The National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection is using an IT tool for issuing the decisions and calculation of benefits in the case of national applications. This is not applicable for issuing the EU forms.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burdens in handling family benefits in Romania an interview with the National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection was conducted.

The National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection estimates that they handle approximately 3,000 existing active cases as primary competent state and 49,536 65 existing cases as secondary competent state.

The average man-hours used handling cases on export of family benefits by National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection as national administration with primary competence is 1.46 man-hours. As national administration with secondary competence the number is 0.37 man-hours. With an average labour cost at EUR 2.5 per hour this adds up to a total average of EUR 3.7 per case as national administration with primary competence and EUR 0.9 per case as national administration with secondary competence.

Below is a detailed review of the administrative costs arising from each of the administrative tasks involved in handling the export of family benefits today and in regards to Options 1a, 1b, and 3.

Table G-1 Current administrative costs and burden – Romania as Member State of primary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	1.46 hours	100%	11427	42.3
Determination of national administration with primary competence	1 hour	100%
Calculation of benefit	2 hours	10%
Annual control	1 hour	10%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence 66	1 hour	0.01%
Overlapping benefits 67	1.5 hours.	5%
Reimbursement	1 hour	0.1%
Recovery 68	2 hours	0.05%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table G-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Romania as Member State of secondary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	0.37 hours	100%	4616	4.3
Determination of national administration with primary competence	35 min.	20%
Calculation of benefit	1 hour	20%
Annual control	1 hour	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	1 hour	5%
Overlapping benefits	1.5 hours	0.1%
Reimbursement	-	0%
Recovery	2 hours	0.1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

The National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection expressed doubts regarding the proposed changes to the provisions of family benefits granted according to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child. The concerns were related to whether the revisions would lead to a breach with the principles of coordination of social security systems.

In addition, the National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection stressed, that since the procedure of implementing the new rules are not clear, they found it rather difficult to make an estimation of the change in administrative costs.

If the procedures are implemented through the same mechanism of EU forms and payments of benefits are made directly to the families, the administrative costs will remain almost the same. However, if the procedure shall involve reimbursements between the institutions, the administrative tasks will increase and the costs equally which most likely will affect the EU workers/applicants. The National Agency for Payments and Social Inspections also assessed, that in case the order of priority changed so that the country of residence of the children becomes the Member State with primary competence, it will lead to an increase in disagreements between the Member State on competence, since residence as a criteria is harder to implement than work.

Table G-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 1a and Option 1b – Romania as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Primary: 0.30 hours Secondary: 0.55 hours	100% 100%	Primary: 11427 Secondary: 4616	Primary: 8.7 Secondary: 6.4
Determination of national administration with primary competence	0 hours	Primary: 100% Secondary: 20%
Calculation of benefit 69	2.5 hours	Primary: 10% Secondary: 20%
Annual control	0 hours	Primary: 10% Secondary: 100%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence 70	1 hour	Primary: 0.01% Secondary: 5%
Overlapping benefits 71	1 hour	Primary: 5% Secondary: 0.1%
Reimbursement 72	1 hour	Primary: 0.1% Secondary: 0%
Recovery 73	1 hour	Primary: 0.05% Secondary: 0.1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table G-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3 – Romania as Member State of primary and secondary competence

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	Primary: 1.15 Secondary: 1.30	100%	Primary: 11427 Secondary: 4616	Primary: 30.4 Secondary: 3.5
Determination of national administration with primary competence 74	1 hour	Primary: 100% Secondary: 20%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	Primary: 10% Secondary: 20%
Annual control 75	1 hour	Primary: 10% Secondary: 100%
Disagreement regarding determination of national administration with primary competence 76	2 hours	Primary: 0.01% Secondary: 5%
Overlapping benefits 77	1 hour	Primary: 5% Secondary: 0.1%
Reimbursement 78	1 hour	Primary: 0.1% Secondary: 0%
Recovery 79	1 hour	Primary: 0.05% Secondary: 0.1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

Though they find it hard to estimate, the National Agency for Payments and Social Inspection believe that the revisions will lead to an increase in time spent by the families on providing information.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Romania per year is estimated at 11427 when Romania is the Member State of primary competence, while the number of cases is somewhat lower, 4616, when being the Member State of secondary competence.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.46 hours for an average case when Romania is the Member State primary competence, and to 0.37 hours when of secondary competence.

The overall assessment is that the changes to the administrative tasks will be quite significant. This is particularly the case for Option 3.

Annex H – Case study for UK

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of the UK legislation on family benefits, which kind of benefits it includes, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institution handling family benefits, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.

In the UK, this includes child benefits, which is a tax financed (non-contributory, not means-tested) system available for persons responsible for raising a child or children. The claimant must be present, ordinarily resident and have a right to reside in the UK. Claimant’s immigration status not subject to any limitation or condition Child and claimant to be present in UK and living together.

The benefits apply normally to children of up to 16 years or if continuing in non-advanced education or approved training up to 20th birthday. Generally, the child must be present in the UK.

In 2015, the benefit rates are GBP 88.83 (EUR 111) per month for the eldest qualifying child of a couple (monthly amount). For each other child GBP 58.72 (EUR 73).

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling family benefits in the UK an interview with Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs was conducted. In general, the interviewee found it difficult to assess administrative costs and burden as no actual measurements are made. Hence, the assessments of current costs provided are rough estimates only, while no assessments of the changes to these as a result of revisions to the EU provisions have been provided.

With this caveat in mind, Table H-1 shows that Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) estimates that the UK as primary competence handles just above 20,000 cases a year. The administrative resources spent on average on these cases are estimated to amount to almost six man-hours per case. This is higher than for the other case study Member States. Much time seems, for example, to be spent on determining who the national administration with primary competence is, and on settling disagreements in this regard.

With the significant number of cases, the total administrative costs amount to almost mEUR 2 per year.

Table H-1 Current administrative costs and burden – UK as Member State of primary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	5.75 hours	100%	20271	1955.1
Determination of national administration with primary competence	2 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	2 hours	100%
Annual control	0.75 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	2 hours	15%
Overlapping benefits	2 hours	25%
Reimbursement	0.75 hours	40%
Recovery	0.75 hours	20%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table H-2 then shows that Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) estimates that the UK as primary competence handles around 3,300 cases a year. The administrative resources spent on average on these cases are estimated to amount to 2.75 man-hours per case. This is similar to for the other case study Member States. The total administrative costs amount to almost EUR 200,000 per year.

Table H-2 Current administrative costs and burden – UK as Member State of secondary competence

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included (not annual control)	2.75 hours	100%	3391	171.3
Determination of national administration with primary competence	0.75 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0.75 hours	100%
Annual control	0.75 hours	100%
Disagreement regarding determination of primary competence	2 hours	15%
Overlapping benefits	2 hours	25%
Reimbursement	0.75 hours	40%
Recovery	0.75 hours	20%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

As mentioned above, it was not feasible for the UK interviewee to provide estimates of the change in the administrative costs from revisions to the EU provisions.

Administrative implications for families from revisions to EU provisions on exports of family benefits

Similarly, the UK interviewee could not assess the administrative implications for the families.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in the UK per year is estimated at 20,271 when the UK is the Member State of primary competence, while the number of cases is somewhat lower, 3,391, when the UK is the Member State of secondary competence.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 5.75 hours for an average case when of primary competence, and to 2.75 hours when of secondary competence.

It has not been feasible to obtain estimates of the change in the administrative costs from revisions to the EU provisions.

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[Catalogue number]

ANNEX XVII: Brodolini Report Administrative Costs unemployment benefits

Task 2: Administrative costs of handling aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B — Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Task 2: Administrative costs of handling aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015

doi:[number]

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Tables of Contents

Executive Summary

1.Introduction

1.1.Background and purpose

1.2.Methodology

1.3.Case study Member States

2.Current administrative costs and burden

2.1.National administrations

2.2.Mobile EU-workers and their families

3.Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

3.1.National administrations

3.2.Mobile EU-workers and their families

4.Conclusions

Annex A – Literature

Annex B – Interview guide

Annex C – Case study for Germany

Annex D – Case study for Denmark

Annex E – Case study for Netherlands

Annex F – Case study for Poland

Annex G – Case study for Romania

Annex H – Case study for UK

Executive Summary

1.Introduction

2.Methodology

2.1.General approach

2.2.Data and data limitation

2.3.Literature review

2.4.Simulation approach

2.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

2.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes

2.5.Case study Member States

3.Status quo Scenario

3.1 Status quo mobility flows

3.2 Status quo target population

4.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

5.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes

5.2 Possible effects of family reunifications

6.Conclusions

Annex 1 – List of Family benefits within the scope of the study (source MISSOC).

Annex 2 – Secondary effects: estimation of mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Annex 3 - Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries

5.Introduction

6.Methodology

6.1.General approach

6.2.Data and data limitation

6.3.Literature review

6.4.Simulation approach

6.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

6.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes

6.5.Case study Member States

7.Status quo scenario

3.1Status quo mobility flows

3.2Status quo target population

8.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

8.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

9.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes

9.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

10.Conclusions

Annex 1 – List of unemployment benefits within the scope of the study

Annex 2 - Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Annex 3 – Secondary effects analysis: cost changes

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries

11.Introduction

12.Methodology

12.1.General approach

12.2.Data and data limitation

12.3.Literature review

12.4.Simulation approach

12.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

12.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes

12.5.Case study Member States

13.Status quo scenario

3.3Status quo mobility flows

3.4Status quo target population

14.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

14.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

15.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes

15.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

16.Conclusions

Annex 1 – List of unemployment benefits within the scope of the study

Annex 2 - Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Annex 3 – Secondary effects analysis: cost changes

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries

Annex XX

technical provisions to be included within the revision which are not subject to impact assessment

Introduction

Technical amendments to the text and annexes

Technical amendments to the text in field of posting

Governance change

Legal basis for data exchange to detect fraud and error

Executive Summary

The right to unemployment benefits in all Member States depends on having fulfilled a qualifying period. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems specifies in Article 61 the principle of aggregation, which means that if a person does not have a sufficiently long unemployment benefit insurance record in the last Member State of activity/insurance – henceforth called the Member State of last employment, periods fulfilled in another Member State – henceforth called the Member State of previous employment. Most Member States apply the principle of aggregation after one day of insurance. This may lead to cases where unemployment benefits are being claimed after a very short period of being member of the insurance system in the Member State of last employment. It has therefore been questioned whether the current rules sufficiently ensure that a worker has an effective link to the given labour market and the related insurance system before claiming unemployment benefits there, either in terms of the length of the insurance periods fulfilled or in terms of the calculation basis for the unemployment benefits. Furthermore, claiming benefits after a short period of insurance or (self-)employment may have negative financial consequences for the Member States which has to pay the benefits.

Revisions to the current rules are therefore being considered to ensure uniform application of the principle of aggregation across Member States. This is done to ensure that the financial burden for paying unemployment benefits does not arise in situations, where mobile EU-workers have not yet made a significant contribution to the insurance system in the Member State of last employment, and in general to avoid undesirable uses of the unemployment benefit insurance systems in the EU. However, such revisions to the rules may also have implications for the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases as well as for the EU-workers themselves and their families.

On this background, the present study looks into the following four possible revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004:

Option 2a: A threshold of one month of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be completed in the Member State of last employment before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in a Member State of previous employment can be applied 80 .

Option 2b: A threshold of three months of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be completed in the Member State of last employment before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in a Member State of previous employment can be applied 81 .

Option 3a: The salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment, if less than one month of insurance or (self-) employment is completed in the Member State of last employment. The calculation is made within a national reference period.

Option 3b: The salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment, if less than three months of insurance or (self-) employment is completed in the Member State of last employment. The calculation is made within a national reference period.

There is, however, no official information available on the costs of the different administrative tasks carried out by the national administrations in the Member States when handling a case of aggregation of unemployment benefits. Therefore, the study has obtained this information from its primary sources via interviews with national administrations. It was not feasible within the scope of Task 2 to gather such information for all 28 EU Member States. Hence, the results are based on analyses for six case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations acting as authority of last employment

A first observation, when assessing the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations in the Member States acting as authority of last employment, is that most of these national administrations – at least in the six case study Member States – only handle few cases annually. Only Poland experiences a notable number of cases with 1,517 (in 2013) while the Romanian national administration only had to handle 12 cases. Hence, from the outset it could be assumed that there within many national administrations only is little experience with handling aggregation cases and not that much focus on the costs of doing so. In any case, the current total administrative costs are limited in an overall context.

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use as shown in Table 0-1 on average less than 1.5 man-hours per case, most of which is used for the collection of information from Member States of previous employment about the applicants' employment and insurance histories, followed by resources spent on the calculation of the unemployment benefit payments. The man-hour use is fairly similar in between the case study Member States, and there is no tendency to that high labour cost Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands carry out the administrative tasks using less manpower than low labour cost Member States such as Poland and Romania.

Table 0-1 National administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of last employment, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.
Standard administrative tasks
Collecting information	0.20	1.42	0.50	0.56	0.88	0.75	0.72
Calculation of benefit	0.20	0.21	0.50	0.32	1.00	0.38	0.43
Additional administrative tasks
Determination of residence	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.12
Change in circumstances	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.03
Reimbursement	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Recovery	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Other	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.06
TOTAL	0.50	1.81	1.10	1.83	1.88	1.13	1.37

Sources: Interviews.

This study assesses as shown in Table 0-2 that the administrative tasks will be almost unchanged if it is decided to implement Option 2a or Option 2b – i.e. to introduce a threshold for the period of insurance or employment to be completed in the Member State of last employment before the aggregation principle applies. If Options 2a and 2b are modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment, there will be an additional need for the latter national administration to inform the former about this situation. Although the interviewees have not assessed the administrative burden of doing this, we would expect this to a minor additional task as the national administration of last employment in any case is in contact with the national administration of previous employment regarding the exchange of information about the given applicant.

For Options 3a and 3b – i.e. taking into account the salary earned in the Member State of previous employment in the unemployment benefit calculation – it is assessed that each case on average will take around 20 minutes longer to handle, i.e. 28-29% increase. This increase is caused by the need to collect information as the salary earned in the Member State of previous employment and to use this in the calculation of the unemployment benefit payment.

Table 0-2 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for aggregation of unemployment benefit cases handled by national administrations as authority of last employment (simple average of case study Member States)

Administrative tasks	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Man-hours	% from base	Man-hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Collecting information	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.33	46.5%	0.33	46.5%
Calculation of benefit	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.13	30.7%	0.13	30.7%
Additional admin. tasks
Det. of residence	-0.04	-30.9%	-0.03	-24.1%	-0.04	-30.9%	-0.03	-24.1%
Change in circumstances	0.01	21.8%	0.01	21.8%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
Reimbursement	-0.05	0.0%	-0.04	0.0%	-0.05	0.0%	-0.04	0.0%
Recovery	0.00	14.5%	0.00	14.5%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
Other	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
TOTAL	-0.08	-5.5%	-0.06	-4.2%	0.38	27.9%	0.40	29.1%

Sources: Interviews.

In monetary terms, the assessment is as shown in Table 0-3 that the revisions will lead to minor changes in total administrative costs. Only in Poland a change in the unit costs per case and in total costs in EUR is expected as a result of Options 2a and 2b.

Table 0-3 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases by national administrations as authority of last employment – main calculation

Member State	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.3	8.9	11.3	8.9
DK: Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.1	0.8	15.1	0.8
NL: Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.4	1.4	8.4	1.4
PL: Poland	-2.3	-3.5	-1.8	-2.7	-0.8	-1.2	-0.3	-0.4
RO: Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	0.0
UK: United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations acting as authority of previous employment

The observation that most national administrations of last employment only handle few cases of unemployment period aggregations implies that this also will be the case for most national administrations of previous employment – as the total number of cases is the same from both perspectives for the EU as a whole. This said, the number of cases handled by the six case study Member States of previous employment is somewhat higher than that when being of Member State of last employment. The UK experiences with 3,333 (in 2013) the largest number of cases, followed by Germany with 1,164 cases. However, in relation to the size of the national labour market, Denmark handles with 686 cases most.

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use as shown in Table 0-4 on average less than one man-hour per case, with almost all time spent on the standard administrative task of providing information – i.e. to respond to a request from a Member State of last employment regarding an applicant's insurance and employment history. There is, however, some variation in the average time spent in between the case study Member States. In particular, the unemployment funds in Romania spend much time responding to a request for information about an applicant's previous insurance and employment history. At the other end, the UK does not see that of being the authority of previous employment involving much work.

Table 0-4 National administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of previous employment, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.
Standard administrative tasks
Providing information	0.50	0.67	0.67	0.67	2.48	0.00	0.83
Additional administrative tasks
Determination of residence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.00	0.01	0.08
Change in circumstances	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.02
Reimbursement	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Recovery	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TOTAL	0.50	0.67	0.67	1.27	2.48	0.01	0.93

Sources: Interviews.

Similar to for the national administrations of last employment, Option 2a and Option 2b will as shown in Table 0-5 not make almost no changes to the administrative tasks of the national administrations when acting as authority of previous employment. However, if Options 2a and 2b are modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment, the national administration of previous employment will have two new administrative tasks. Firstly, there will be a minor task of receiving and registering the information about the situation. Secondly, the national administration will calculate the benefits that the applicant is entitled to according to its national legislation. Our best estimate of the additional administrative burden of this is the time estimates provided by the national administrations of last employment for their similar tasks. Hence, based on their we assess that the national administration of previous employment will spent around 20 minutes extra for each case where it becomes responsible for paying the unemployment benefits.

This assessment of limited impacts goes, however, also for Options 3a and 3b when having the role as authority of previous employment.

Table 0-5 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for aggregation of unemployment benefit cases handled by national administrations as authority of previous employment (simple average of case study Member States)

Administrative tasks	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Man-hours	% from base	Man-hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Providing information	0.01	0.8%	0.01	0.8%	0.06	7.7%	0.06	7.7%
Additional admin. tasks
Det. of residence	-0.04	-57.2%	-0.04	-57.2%	-0.04	-57.2%	-0.04	-57.2%
Change in circumstance	0.01	33.7%	0.01	33.7%	0.03	112.4%	0.03	112.4%
Reimbursement	-0.06	0.0%	-0.06	0.0%	-0.06	0.0%	-0.06	0.0%
Recovery	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.03	0.0%	0.03	0.0%
TOTAL	-0.08	-8.8%	-0.08	-8.8%	0.05	5.3%	0.05	5.3%

Sources: Interviews.

Hence as shown in Table 0-6, also in monetary terms the assessment is that the revisions will lead to minor changes in total administrative costs.

Table 0-6 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases by national administrations as authority of previous employment – main calculation

Member State	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	4.8	4.1	4.8
DK: Denmark	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8
NL: Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PL: Poland	-2.7	-0.4	-2.7	-0.4	0.3	0.04	0.3	0.04
RO: Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
UK: United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

Change in administrative costs and burden for mobile EU-workers and their families

The proposed revisions to the EU provisions may well have implications for the mobile EU-workers and their families. Although it may not be considered as administrative implications, it is suggested that Option 2a and Option 2b may have a negative impact on the exercise of free movement, because a more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State.

Regarding Option 3a and Option 3b, compared with the current situation, applicants need to wait a longer time before they receive their benefits. This may further cause income problems for those without private savings. Furthermore, there is an increased requirement to provide documentation in the form of contracts, payslips etc.

Introduction

1.8.Background and purpose

Most Member States apply the principle of aggregation after one day of insurance. This may lead to cases where unemployment benefits are being claimed after a very short period of being member of the insurance system in the Member State of last employment. It has therefore been questioned whether the current rules sufficiently ensure that a worker has an effective link to the given labour market and the related insurance system before claiming unemployment benefits there, either in terms of the length of the insurance periods fulfilled or in terms of the calculation basis for the unemployment benefits. Furthermore, claiming benefits after a short period of insurance or (self-)employment may have negative financial consequences for the Member States which has to pay the benefits.

On this background, we look in the present study into the following four possible revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004:

Such revisions may affect the behaviour of the mobile EU-workers and their families, the amounts of unemployment benefits being paid, and the administration needed to handle the aggregation of unemployment benefit cases. The analysis within Task 2 focuses on the latter issue – i.e. the changes to the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases from the revisions. In this context, Task 2 distinguishes between the administrative costs incurring in the Member States of last employment and those incurring in the Member States of previous employment. Furthermore, we look into the possible changes in the administrative burdens for the mobile EU-workers themselves and their families.

There is, however, as described further below no official information available on the costs of the different administrative tasks carried out by the national administrations in the Member States when handling a case of aggregation of unemployment benefits. Therefore, we have obtained this information from its primary sources via interviews with national administrations. It was not feasible within the scope of Task 2 to gather such information for all 28 EU Member States. Hence, the results are based on analyses for six case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

1.9.Methodology

As just introduced above, Task 2 focuses on assessing the administrative costs and burden for the national administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases. For this, we have made use of the definition of administrative costs and burden provided by the EC (2009) Impact Assessment Guidelines. While doing this, we have adopted a broad definition of administrative information obligations – i.e. we have considered the costs of administrative tasks such as the collection and provision of information, the calculation of benefits, and the reimbursement and recovery of benefits in between Member States. We have then assessed how these administrative costs may change from the revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to comprise an additional administrative burden – positive or negative – for the national administrations as well as for the mobile EU-workers and their families. This approach is also in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines (EC, 2015) emphasises objective of delivering maximum benefits to citizens, businesses and workers while avoiding all unnecessary regulatory burdens, and so avoiding unnecessary additional administrative burdens.

The calculations of the administrative costs for the national administrations are as illustrated in Figure 1-1 in principle simple. Firstly, the number of cases in the left-hand side of the figure are the annual cases of aggregation of unemployment benefits currently registered in the six case study Members States. Actually, a given case may be dealt with in two of the six selected Member States if, for example, a given applicant for aggregation (i.e. in a Member State of last employment) comes from another of the six Member States (i.e. in a Member State of previous employment). In our main calculation, we assume that the number of cases does not change due to revising the EU provisions. However, we do to illustrate the sensitivity of this assumption also show a scenario where we assume a change in the number of cases based on the results of Task 4 of this study.

Secondly, we calculate the unit costs for the national administration – i.e. the current administrative costs per case as well as the changed administrative costs per case as a result of revising the EU provisions. The administrative costs per case will clearly differ between cases, i.e. there will be easy cases only involving standard administrative tasks while other more complex cases will involve additional tasks. Hence, we are in practice looking for average costs. These unit costs in EUR are composed of assessments of the man-hours needed per case and the costs per man-hour in EUR (see Table 1-1 in the next section).

Figure 1-1 Calculation of administrative costs for national administrations

The bulk of the work within Task 2 has been the estimation of the man-hours needed to carry out the administrative tasks of handling a case of aggregation of unemployment benefits. As already mentioned, such information is not available from official sources, and so we have gathered the information through interviews with national administrations in the six case study Member States. For this purpose we identified the national administrations to interview (see Annexes C to H for the interviewees), and we developed an interview guide that was shared with our Member States experts/interviewers in the six case study Member States in their respective national languages (see Annex B for the English version of the interview guide). The interview guide was developed via a desk study approach by reviewing existing literature and guidance papers on the legislation (see Annex A) and it was tested in Denmark before being applied in the five other case study Member States.

1.10.Case study Member States

As already mentioned, the calculations of the administrative costs and burden are based on information for six case study Member States only. Although, it is not the aim of Task 2 to produce a total EU-28 figure for the administrative costs and burden via an upscaling of the calculations from the case studies, we have aimed to select Member States that represent the variety within the EU.

Firstly, we have selected Member States that are geographically spread across the EU. Secondly, the selection comprises Member States that mainly attract mobile EU-workers (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, UK) and Member States that mainly see workers leave (Poland, Romania). Thirdly, although all Member States apply the general principle of providing an income support to workers that have become (involuntarily) unemployed and all apply qualifying periods, there are some differences. While the Netherlands applies a qualifying period of less than one year, it is one year or above in Germany, Denmark, Poland and Romania. Furthermore, the income replacement rates are a percentage of past earnings averaged over more than three months in Germany, while Denmark and Netherlands only look at earnings during the last three months. Poland, Romania and the UK apply a flat or fixed rate 84 . Finally, the case study Member States may well differ with respect to the capacity of administration, to the development of IT, and to the standard of living.

Redading the latter, as shown in Table 1-1, the unit labour costs of the national administrations differ much in between the case study Member States. We assume here that the average wage levels of the relevant employees in the national administrations are similar to that of employees in general in the public administration with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education. Although the differences in labour costs is a reflection of general differences in labour costs in between the Member States, it could be expected that this may lead to differences in the use of man-power to carry out the administrative tasks. It could, for example, be expected that higher labour costs could lead to fewer labour-intensive processes – and vice versa. However, as shown below such difference have not been detected in between higher and lower labour cost Member States.

Table 1-1 Labour costs, 2013, EUR per hour - employees in public administration etc. with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education

Member State	Wage costs, 2010, EUR per hour(1)	Wage costs, 2013, EUR per hour(2)	Labour costs, 2013, EUR per hour(3)
DE: Germany	14.9	16.4	20.5
DK: Denmark	22.3	23.4	29.3
NL: Netherlands	16.4	17.8	22.2
PL: Poland	3.8	4.1	5.1
RO: Romania	1.7	2.0	2.5
UK: United Kingdom	14.3	14.7	18.4

Current administrative costs and burden

1.11.National administrations

The aggregation of unemployment benefit cases are handled by different types of national administrations in the case study Member States. In Germany and Denmark, it is the task of the private unemployment insurance institutions – both when acting as the authority of last employment and of previous employment. In the Netherlands, it is the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes. In Poland, it is both at national and regional level Departments of Social Security Systems. In Romania, it is the National Agency for Employment, while it in the UK is the Department for Work and Pensions.

The below box describes an example of an aggregation of unemployment benefits currently handled by the national administrations.

Example of aggregation of unemployment benefits:

EU-worker A moves from Member State A [previous employment] to Member State B [last employment] and works there for two weeks 85 before becoming unemployed. Currently, he can claim unemployment benefits in Member State of last employment B based on his period of insurance in Member State of previous employment A.

National administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefits as authority of last employment

Table 2-1 shows that the number of cases handled by national administrations acting as authority of last employment varied between the case study Member States in 2013 86 . This is not surprising given the difference in the sizes of the Member States, and given the fact that we both have selected Member States that mainly attract mobile EU-citizens and mainly see citizens leave. Actually, only Poland experiences a notable number of cases. The differences are also notable when looking at the number of cases relative to the sizes of the labour markets – i.e. total employment in the respective Member States.

Table 2-1 Number of aggregations of unemployment benefits handled by national administrations in 2013 as authority of last employment

Member State	Number of cases, 2013	Cases per 1000 employed
DE: Germany(1)	791	0.02
DK: Denmark	54	0.02
NL: Netherlands	160	0.02
PL: Poland	1517	0.10
RO: Romania	12	0.00
UK: United Kingdom	30	0.00

Sources: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Eurostat database (lfsi_emp_a).

Notes: (1) Estimate made by consultant on the basis of data for Denmark and the Netherlands.

Table 2-2 shows for the six case study Member States, the man-hours per average case for the national administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefits as authority of last employment. The administrative tasks are divided into standard administrative tasks and additional administrative tasks.

The former tasks, which are carried out for almost all cases, comprise information collection. Hence, for each application for aggregation of unemployment benefits, the national administration will collect the information necessary to decide on the payment of unemployment benefits to the applicant. This involves, for example, obtaining information from previous Member State(s) of insurance about insurance and employment histories. Table 2-2 shows that this task for an average case in a Member States takes between 0.20 man-hours in Germany and 1.42 man-hours in Denmark (see Annexes C to H for Member State-specific analyses).

The national administration of last employment will then calculate the benefits that the given applicant is entitled to according to the given national legislation, and it will set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion. Here the average time spent per case ranges from 0.20 man-hours in Germany to 1 man-hours in Romania.

The latter tasks, which are carried out more infrequently for the more complex cases, comprise, for example, the determination of residence when this is not obvious. This task leads to additional costs as a result of collecting additional information about family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the applicant's professional activities. In Poland, this is an important task, while it is of only little importance in the other case study Member States.

Furthermore, if circumstances of the applicant change this will require a determination of the type of change and it may lead to a change of competence and to a recalculation of benefits. Finally, there may be costs from reimbursement activities if provisional unemployment benefits awarded to an EU-worker should have been paid by another Member State, and from recovery activities if an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits.

Overall, Table 2-2 shows that currently the resources spent on a case by the national administration as authority of last employment averages less than 1.5 man-hours. Germany is a slight outlier at the low end, which appears to be caused by relative less emphasis on information collection. Denmark, Poland, and Romania are at the higher end, due to different tasks, however.

Table 2-2 National administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of last employment, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.
Standard administrative tasks
Collecting information	0.20	1.42	0.50	0.56	0.88	0.75	0.72
Calculation of benefit	0.20	0.21	0.50	0.32	1.00	0.38	0.43
Additional administrative tasks
Determination of residence	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.12
Change in circumstances	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.03
Reimbursement	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Recovery	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Other	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.06
TOTAL	0.50	1.81	1.10	1.83	1.88	1.13	1.37

Sources: Interviews.

When accounting for the differences in labour costs shown in Table 1-1, Table 2-3 shows that the average unit administrative costs in EUR differ more that the average man-hours shown in Table 2-2. The reason is that the high labour cost Members State, Denmark, also spend relatively most man-hours. This could be argued to be a surprising result, i.e. it could be expected that higher labour costs could lead to less labour-intensive processes.

The lower labour costs and man-hours spent in Poland and Romania imply that an average case costs around 5 to 10 EUR, while it in Denmark reaches above 50 EUR and in the Netherlands around 25 EUR. However, looking at total costs, Germany has with its many case the highest total costs.

Table 2-3 Administrative costs for national administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of last employment, unit costs and total costs 2013, EUR

	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.
Unit costs, EUR	10.3	53.0	24.3	9.4	4.7	20.7	20.4
Total costs, 1000 EUR	8.1	2.9	3.9	14.3	0.1	0.6

Sources: Table 1-1, Table 2-1, and Table 2-2.

National administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefits as authority of previous employment

Table 2-4 then shows the number of cases handled by national administrations as authority of previous employment in the case study Member States in 2013 provided by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). There is large variation in the number of cases. The UK experiences the largest number of cases, followed by Germany. This variation is also notable when looked at it in relation to the size of the national labour markets. Using this measure, Denmark handles relatively the highest number of cases, followed by the Netherlands, the UK and Romania.

Table 2-4 Number of aggregations of unemployment benefits handled by national administrations in 2013 as authority of previous employment

Member State	Number of cases, 2013	Cases per 1000 employed
DE: Germany	1164	0.03
DK: Denmark	686	0.26
NL: Netherlands	918	0.11
PL: Poland	147	0.01
RO: Romania	887	0.10
UK: United Kingdom	3333	0.11

Sources: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Eurostat database.

Table 2-5 shows for the six case study Member States, the unit administrative costs for the national administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of previous employment. The unit costs are here measured as man-hours per average case. Most cases involve time spent on the standard administrative task of providing information – i.e. to respond to a request from a Member State of last employment regarding an applicant's insurance and employment history.

More complex cases involve additional tasks that each may take significant time, but that will be infrequent. For the case study Member States this seems only to be significant for Poland, where time is spent on the determination of residence of the applicant and on dealing with changes in circumstances.

Overall, Table 2-5 shows that there is some variation in the average time spent in between the case study Member States. In particular, the unemployment funds in Romania spend much time responding to a request for information about an applicant's previous insurance and employment history. At the other end, the UK does not see that of being the authority of previous employment involving much work.

Table 2-5 National administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of previous employment, man-hours per average case

Administrative tasks	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.
Standard administrative tasks
Providing information	0.50	0.67	0.67	0.67	2.48	0.00	0.83
Additional administrative tasks
Determination of residence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.00	0.01	0.08
Change in circumstances	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.02
Reimbursement	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Recovery	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TOTAL	0.50	0.67	0.67	1.27	2.48	0.01	0.93

Sources: Interviews.

Table 2-6 shows that the average unit administrative costs in EUR differ less than the average man-hours shown in Table 2-5. The reason is that the high labour cost Members States spend relatively few man-hours.

Table 2-6 Administrative costs for national administrations handling aggregations of unemployment benefits as authority of previous employment, unit costs and total costs 2013, EUR

	DE	DK	NL	PL	RO	UK	Av.
Unit costs, EUR	10.3	19.5	14.9	6.5	6.3	0.1	9.6
Total costs, 1000 EUR	12.0	13.4	13.7	1.0	5.6	0.5

Sources: Table 1-1, Table 2-4, and Table 2-5.

1.12.Mobile EU-workers and their families

The interviews carried out in the six case study Member States have not revealed many concerns about the time spent at present by the mobile EU-workers and their families when applying for aggregation of unemployment benefits. However, as discussed in Section 3.2 the possible revisions to the EU provisions may well have implications.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions

1.13.National administrations

The administrative task of handling a case of aggregation of unemployment benefits may change in both size and characteristics if the EU provisions are revised. In this study we look as introduced in Section 1.1 into the following four possible revisions, that each are exemplified in the boxes below.

Option 2a: A threshold of one month of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be completed in the Member State of last employment before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in a Member State of secondary competence can be applied.

Example of new situation:

EU-worker A becomes entitled to unemployment benefits in Member State A [of last employment] based on his insurance periods in Member State B [of previous employment] only after completion of at least one month of unemployment insurance in Member State A.

Option 2b: A threshold of three months of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be completed in the Member State of last employment before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in a Member State of previous employment can be applied.

Example of new situation:

EU-worker A becomes entitled to unemployment benefits in Member State A [of last employment] based on his insurance periods in Member State B [of previous employment] only after completion of at least three months of unemployment insurance in Member State A.

Option 3a: The salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment, if less than one month of insurance or (self-) employment is completed in the Member State of last employment. The calculation is made within a national reference period.

Example of new situation:

EU-worker A becomes entitled to unemployment benefits in Member State A [of last employment] after only one day of insurance in Member State A; but, as he has been employed for less than one month in Member State A, the institution in Member State A also takes his salaries earned in Member State B [of previous employment] into account for the calculation of the amount.

Option 3b: The salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment , if less than three months of insurance or (self-) employment is completed in the Member State of last employment. The calculation is made within a national reference period.

Example of new situation:

EU-worker A becomes entitled to unemployment benefits in Member State A [of last employment] after only one day of insurance in Member State A; but, as he has been employed for less than three months in Member State A, the institution in Member State A also takes his salaries earned in Member State B [of previous employment] into account for the calculation of the amount.

National administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefits as authority of last employment

A first important observation is that on average across the case study Member States, the interviewed national administrations expect that their administrative tasks as authority of last employment are expected to be almost unchanged if it is decided to implement Option 2a or Option 2b. The small decreases observed in Table 3-1 solely stem from the assessment of the Polish interviewees – i.e. that the options may lead to easier handlings of the determination of residence and regarding reimbursement activities.

If Options 2a and 2b are modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment, there will be an additional need for the latter national administration to inform the former about this situation. Although the interviewees have not assessed the administrative burden of doing this, we would expect this to a minor additional task as the national administration of last employment in any case is in contact with the national administration of previous employment regarding the exchange of information about the given applicant.For Options 3a and 3b, it is expected that the man-hours per case will increase by 28-29% which, however, only is around 20 minutes per case. This is mainly caused by increases in the need to collect information as the salary earned in the Member State of previous employment also must be taken into account in the calculation of the unemployment benefit payments.

Table 3-1 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for aggregation of unemployment benefit cases handled by national administrations as authority of last employment (simple average of case study Member States)

Administrative tasks	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Man-hours	% from base	Man-hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Collecting information	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.33	46.5%	0.33	46.5%
Calculation of benefit	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.13	30.7%	0.13	30.7%
Additional admin. tasks
Det. of residence	-0.04	-30.9%	-0.03	-24.1%	-0.04	-30.9%	-0.03	-24.1%
Change in circumstances	0.01	21.8%	0.01	21.8%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
Reimbursement	-0.05	0.0%	-0.04	0.0%	-0.05	0.0%	-0.04	0.0%
Recovery	0.00	14.5%	0.00	14.5%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
Other	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%
TOTAL	-0.08	-5.5%	-0.06	-4.2%	0.38	27.9%	0.40	29.1%

Sources: Interviews.

As just mentioned above, only the Polish interviewees expect as a change in the unit costs per case and in total costs in EUR as a result of Options 2a and 2b, c.f. Table 3-2. The costs implications of Options 3a and 3b are, however, also assessed to be negligible.

Table 3-2 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases by national administrations as authority of last employment – main calculation

Member State	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.3	8.9	11.3	8.9
DK: Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.1	0.8	15.1	0.8
NL: Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.4	1.4	8.4	1.4
PL: Poland	-2.3	-3.5	-1.8	-2.7	-0.8	-1.2	-0.3	-0.4
RO: Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	0.0
UK: United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

The number of cases are, however, likely to change as a result of revisions to the EU provisions. There might be changes due to changing eligibility criteria for qualifying for aggregation of unemployment benefits and so due to changing unemployment benefit incomes that affect the behaviour of the mobile EU-workers. Task 4 of the present study has estimated such behavioural changes. We have on the basis of the behavioural change estimates for workers with families composed of one-earner married couples with two children at 100 % of average earnings derived assumptions about the likely change in the number of cases handled by national administrations as authority of last employment (cf. Table 3-3).

Hence, the estimation/assumption is that Option 2a and Option 2b, which introduce thresholds – one month and three months, respectively, of insurance or (self-)employment periods, have larger impacts on mobile EU-workers behaviour, than Option 3a and Option 3b, which specify that salaries earned in the Member States of previous employment also may be taken into account for the calculation of unemployment benefits.

Table 3-3 Change in number of aggregation of unemployment benefit cases handled by national administrations as authority of last employment

Member State	Option 2a	Option 2b	Option 3a	Option 3b
DE: Germany	-3.5%	-4.6%	-1.3%	-1.6%
DK: Denmark	-7.0%	-7.0%	-2.3%	-2.3%
NL: Netherlands	-0.8%	-1.6%	-0.2%	-0.4%
PL: Poland	0.0%	-0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
RO: Romania	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
UK: United Kingdom	-1.7%	-1.7%	-0.5%	-0.5%

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.

Adjusting the main results for such possible changes in the number of cases we get as shown in Table 3-4 slightly different results. While unit cost changes are the same as those presented in Table 3-2, the options lead to lower total costs compared with Table 3-4 for Member States such as Denmark and Germany as the number of cases to handle decreases.

Table 3-4 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases by national administrations as authority of last employment – assuming changes in the number of cases

Member State	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	0.0	-0.3	0.0	-0.4	11.3	8.7	11.3	8.7
DK: Denmark	0.0	-0.2	0.0	-0.2	15.1	0.7	15.1	0.7
NL: Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	8.4	1.3	8.4	1.3
PL: Poland	-2.3	-3.5	-1.8	-2.7	-0.8	-1.2	-0.3	-0.4
RO: Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	0.0
UK: United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, Eurostat and interviews.

National administrations handling aggregation of unemployment benefits as authority of previous employment

Table 3-5 shows that the changes in man-hours spent by authorities of previous employments as a result of the revisions are expected to be minor. This also implies that the changes measured in EUR in Table 3-6 are very limited.

However, if Options 2a and 2b are modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment, the national administration of previous employment will have two new administrative tasks. Firstly, there will be a minor task of receiving and registering the information about the situation. Secondly, the national administration will calculate the benefits that the applicant is entitled to according to its national legislation. Our best estimate of the additional administrative burden of this is the time estimates provided by the national administrations of last employment for their similar tasks. Hence, based on the estimates in Table 2-2 we assess that the national administration of previous employment will spent around 20 minutes extra for each case where it becomes responsible for paying the unemployment benefits.

Table 3-5 Change in the man-hours per administrative task for aggregation of unemployment benefit cases handled by national administrations as authority of previous employment (simple average of case study Member States)

Administrative tasks	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Man-hours	% from base	Man-hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base	Man- hours	% from base
Standard admin. tasks
Providing information	0.01	0.8%	0.01	0.8%	0.06	7.7%	0.06	7.7%
Additional admin. tasks
Det. of residence	-0.04	-57.2%	-0.04	-57.2%	-0.04	-57.2%	-0.04	-57.2%
Change in circumst.	0.01	33.7%	0.01	33.7%	0.03	112.4%	0.03	112.4%
Reimbursement	-0.06	0.0%	-0.06	0.0%	-0.06	0.0%	-0.06	0.0%
Recovery	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.03	0.0%	0.03	0.0%
TOTAL	-0.08	-8.8%	-0.08	-8.8%	0.05	5.3%	0.05	5.3%

Sources: Interviews.

Table 3-6 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases by national administrations as authority of previous employment – main calculation

Member State	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	4.8	4.1	4.8
DK: Denmark	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8
NL: Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PL: Poland	-2.7	-0.4	-2.7	-0.4	0.3	0.04	0.3	0.04
RO: Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
UK: United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: Interviews and Eurostat.

The likely change in the number of cases as a result of revisions to the EU provisions will also be experienced by the national administrations of previous employment. Table 3-7 shows our estimates/assumptions for these likely changes – which are limited apart from for Romania.

Table 3-7 Change in number of aggregation of unemployment benefit cases handled by national administrations as authority of previous employment

Member State	Option 2a	Option 2b	Option 3a	Option 3b
DE: Germany	-1.0%	-1.2%	0.0%	0.0%
DK: Denmark	-1.2%	-1.6%	0.1%	0.1%
NL: Netherlands	-1.2%	-1.5%	0.0%	0.0%
PL: Poland	-3.4%	-4.4%	-1.3%	-1.7%
RO: Romania	-6.6%	-8.6%	-2.8%	-3.6%
UK: United Kingdom	-1.4%	-1.9%	0.0%	0.0%

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.

For completeness, Table 3-8 shows the results adjusted for such possible changes in the number of cases. This does not change the conclusion that the changes are expected to be minor.

Table 3-8 Change in unit costs per case and total costs handling aggregation of unemployment benefit cases by national administrations as authority of previous employment – assuming changes in the number of cases

Member State	Option 2a		Option 2b		Option 3a		Option 3b
	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR	Unit costs EUR	Total costs 1000 EUR
DE: Germany	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	4.1	4.8	4.1	4.8
DK: Denmark	1.2	0.7	1.2	0.6	1.2	0.9	1.2	0.9
NL: Netherlands	0.0	-0.2	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PL: Poland	-2.7	-0.4	-2.7	-0.4	0.3	0.03	0.3	0.02
RO: Romania	0.0	-0.4	0.0	-0.5	0.0	-0.2	0.0	-0.2
UK: United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: FGB et.al. (2015): Annex 2 - Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, Eurostat and interviews.

1.14.Mobile EU-workers and their families

The interviews carried out in the six case study Member States indicate that the proposed revisions to the EU provisions may well have implications for the mobile EU-workers and their families. Although it may not be considered as administrative implications, some interviewees envisage that Option 2a and Option 2b may have a negative impact on the exercise of free movement, because a more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State.

Conclusions

Revising the current rules for aggregation of unemployment periods specified in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 will have impact on the administrative costs and burden of the national administration in the Member States handling cases where mobile EU-workers apply for unemployment benefits – both in the Member States of last employment of the applicant and in those of previous employment of the applicant. Furthermore, the applying EU-workers and their families will experience changes in the own administrative burden from the revisions. The overall conclusion from this study is, however, that the impacts are expected to be limited – a conclusion that is based on assessments made in six case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations acting as authority of last employment

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use on average less than 1.5 man-hours per case, most of which is used for the collection of information from Member States of previous employment about the applicants' employment and insurance histories, followed by resources spent on the calculation of the unemployment benefit payments. The man-hour use is fairly similar in between the case study Member States, and there is no tendency to that high labour cost Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands carry out the administrative tasks using less manpower than low labour cost Member States such as Poland and Romania.

This study assesses that the administrative tasks will be almost unchanged if it is decided to implement Option 2a or Option 2b – i.e. to introduce a threshold for the period of insurance or employment to be completed in the Member State of last employment before the aggregation principle applies. If Options 2a and 2b are modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment, there will be an additional need for the latter national administration to inform the former about this situation. Although the interviewees have not assessed the administrative burden of doing this, we would expect this to a minor additional task as the national administration of last employment in any case is in contact with the national administration of previous employment regarding the exchange of information about the given applicant.

Change in administrative costs and burden for national administrations acting as authority of previous employment

Currently, the national administrations in the case study Member States use on average less than one man-hour per case, with almost all time spent on the standard administrative task of providing information – i.e. to respond to a request from a Member State of last employment regarding an applicant's insurance and employment history. There is, however, some variation in the average time spent in between the case study Member States. In particular, the unemployment funds in Romania spend much time responding to a request for information about an applicant's previous insurance and employment history. At the other end, the UK does not see that of being the authority of previous employment involving much work.

Similar to for the national administrations of last employment, Option 2a and Option 2b will not make almost no changes to the administrative tasks of the national administrations when acting as authority of previous employment. However, if Options 2a and 2b are modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment, the national administration of previous employment will have two new administrative tasks. Firstly, there will be a minor task of receiving and registering the information about the situation. Secondly, the national administration will calculate the benefits that the applicant is entitled to according to its national legislation. Our best estimate of the additional administrative burden of this is the time estimates provided by the national administrations of last employment for their similar tasks. Hence, based on their we assess that the national administration of previous employment will spent around 20 minutes extra for each case where it becomes responsible for paying the unemployment benefits.

This assessment of limited impacts goes, however, also for Options 3a and 3b when having the role as authority of previous employment.

Change in administrative costs and burden for mobile EU-workers and their families

Annex A – Literature

EC (2009), Impact Assessment Guidelines, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf

EC (2015), Commission staff working document, Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 111 final, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf

Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

FGB, COWI and IER (2015), Task 4, Draft Final Report, 31 July 2015.

Pacolet, J and F De Wispelaere (2015), Aggregation of periods for unemployment – Report on U1 portable documents for migrant workers, June 2015.

Annex B – Interview guide

The attached interview guide is the actual version used for the interviews in the UK, and is so in English. The interview guide was provided to the Member States experts in their national languages.

Note that we in the interview guide make use of the option titles: Revisions (A), (B), (C), and (D), rather than Options 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b – as in the report. The reason for this was to avoid discussing what happened to Option 1.

European Commission, Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion has given Fondazione Brodolini, COWI and IER the task to assess changes to administrative/compliance costs within national administrations and for the individuals affected that might occur from possible revision of the current EU provisions on unemployment benefits specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation'.

In this interview, we focus on the case handling of applications for unemployment benefits where the aggregation principle apply. I.e. applications from citizens having moved from one Member State to another to work who have become unemployed before the qualifying period in the competent Member State has been completed. In this interview guide we refer to these citizens as mobile EU workers.

More precisely, we aim to assess changes in the administrative/compliance tasks and consequently costs of introducing a threshold of one to three months of insurance in the competent Member State before the aggregation rule applies. Furthermore, we want to assess changes in the administrative costs of introducing a rule that states that wages earned in a previous Member State should also be taken into account when the calculating unemployment benefits if less than one or three months of insurance or (self-) employment is completed in the competent State. Finally, we aim to assess whether the unemployed receiving the benefits will face changing administrative/compliance tasks.

Hence, we would like to arrange the time and place for an interview; and for you to get more insight into the questions we would like to ask you – we hereby provide you with our interview guide.

You may well find that you are not able to answer all the questions. We will therefore focus on the questions you can answer – but you may also be able to help us pointing to the other services in your national administration that can help us answering the remaining questions.

5.You and your national administration

Name and title of interviewee: _______________________________________________

National administration: _______________________________________________

Function/responsibility of interviewee: _______________________________________________

6.Current administrative tasks and consequently costs of handling unemployment benefits

In this section, we ask you to verify and estimate the costs of a number of administrative tasks that are currently carried out when handling a case of unemployment benefits. Imagine a case as described by the following example:

Example 1 of unemployment benefits:

Carlos moves from Member State A to Member State B and works there for two weeks before becoming unemployed. Currently, he can claim unemployment benefits in Member State B based on his period of insurance in Member State A.

We do the assessment in two parts. Firstly, we ask you to assess a situation when you are the competent national administration – i.e. where you deal with the applicant for unemployment benefits. Secondly, we ask you to assess a situation where you are the national administration of a previous Member State of employment – i.e. where you deal with the follow-on administrative tasks from an application submitted in another Member State.

If you only carry out one of the two types of administrative tasks – please leave out the other part.

6.1.Administrative tasks/costs – when competent national administration

Consider the situation, where you are the competent national administration.

Firstly, please provide your assessment of the number of cases handled by your institution.

How many cases of application for unemployment benefits from Mobile EU workers do your institution currently handle per year as the competent national administration:

c)New cases?

d)Existing active cases?

How do you collect data?

c)From other member states?

d)From the applicant?

When answering these questions please explain whether you collect information via IT-systems, via records of personal registration etc.

Secondly, please provide, with an outset in the below table, your assessment of the current administrative costs in terms of average man-hours of handling one case of application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU worker, being the competent national administration. (You may relate the tasks to the SEDs to be filled out). Hence:

Please assess the frequency of each of the detailed administrative tasks – i.e. how often are the tasks carried out in a case of application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU worker? 100 % means that the task is always carried out, while 50 % means it is carried out in half of the cases.
And in this context – is it appropriate to distinguish between "standard tasks" and "additional tasks"?

Administrative task	Description of administrative task - hereunder frequency of tasks within a case	Average man-hours/ minutes	Comments
Standard administrative tasks
Collecting information	Please revise (if necessary): Determine whether the information provided by the applicant is sufficient to decide on the payment of unemployment benefits. Obtain information from other previous Member State(s) of insurance about insurance and employment history in this/these country(-ies). Please specify/revise frequency when you are the competent national administration: Frequency, when you are the competent national administration: %
Calculation of benefit	Please revise (if necessary): For each of those cases where you are the competent national administration: You calculate the benefit which the claimant is entitled to under the national legislation. You set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion. Please specify/revise frequency when you are the competent national administration: Frequency, when you are the competent national administration: 100%		Comments:
Additional administrative tasks
Determination of residence	Please revise (if necessary): If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of collecting additional information about e.g. family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the candidate's professional activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the competent national administration: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Change in circumstances	Please revise (if necessary): If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State, a re-calculation of benefits or revaluation of competent state is performed: Determine what type of change it is - whether it will lead to a re-calculation of benefits or change in competence. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the competent national administration: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Reimbursement	Please revise (if necessary): If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a Mobile EU worker should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the competent national administration: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Recovery	Please revise (if necessary): If an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits (i.e. it has been determined, that you are not the competent state after all): Additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting the competent Member States to seek recovery. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are the competent national administration: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Missing administrative tasks
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please estimate your total use of man-hours per case

6.2.Administrative costs – when national administration in a Member State of previous insurance of a mobile EU worker

Now, consider the situation, where you are the national administration in a Member State of previous insurance of a mobile EU worker – i.e. you receive a request for information from another Member State.

Firstly, please provide your assessment of the number of cases handled by your national administration.

How many cases of application for unemployment benefits from mobile EU workers do your institution currently handle per year as the national administration in a Member State of previous insurance of a mobile EU worker?

c)New cases?

d)Existing active cases?

Secondly, please provide, with an outset in the below table, your assessment of the current administrative costs of handling one application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU worker, being the national administration in a Member State of previous employment of a mobile EU worker. (You may relate the tasks to the SEDs to be filled out). Hence:

Administrative task	Description of administrative task - hereunder frequency of tasks within a case	Average man-hours/ minutes	Comments
Standard administrative tasks
Providing information	Please revise (if necessary): You receive a request for information about an applicant's previous insurance and employment history in your State from another Member State concerning an application for unemployment benefits and you contribute with the required information. Please specify frequency when you are a Member State of previous insurance: Frequency: 100%		Comments:
Additional administrative tasks
Determination of residence	Please revise (if necessary): If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of providing additional information about candidate’s professional activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are a Member State of previous insurance: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Change in circumstances	Please revise (if necessary): If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State and you are determined the competent institution: Additional costs arise a calculation of benefits is performed. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are a Member State of previous insurance: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Reimbursement	Please revise (if necessary): If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a mobile EU worker should have been paid you, but another Member State has done this: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are a Member State of previous insurance: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Recovery	Please revise (if necessary): If an applicant, who belongs to your institution has unjustified received unemployment benefits in another Member State: Additional costs arise recovery activities. Please specify frequency out of total number of cases when you are a Member State of previous insurance: Frequency: ___%		Comments:
Missing administrative tasks
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please add missing task			Comments:
Please estimate your total use of man-hours per case

7.Change in administrative costs of handling unemployment benefits from revisions to EU provisions

In this section, we then ask you to assess the likely increase or decrease in administrative tasks/costs within your national administration from possible revisions to the EU provisions.

We acknowledge that this may be even more difficult than estimating the current use of man-hours in the previous section – in particular if the revisions lead to new administrative tasks.

Please do this assessment for each of the possible revisions one by one. We firstly ask you to assess the revisions assuming you are the competent national administration, and secondly we ask you to assess the revisions assuming you are the national administration in a Member State of previous employment of a mobile EU worker. However, if you only carry out one of the two types of administrative tasks – please leave out the other.

The four revisions to assess are presented in the following boxes:

Revision (a):
A threshold of one month of insurance or (self-) employment needs to be completed before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in another Member State can be applied.

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

Revision (b):
A threshold of three months of insurance or (self-) employment needs to be completed before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in another Member State can be applied.

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

Revision (c):
The salary earned in the previous Member State is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the competent Member State, if less than one month of insurance or (self-) employment is completed. The calculation is made within a national reference period.

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

Revision (d):
The salary earned in the previous Member State is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the competent Member State, if less than three months of insurance or (self-) employment is completed. The calculation is made within a national reference period.

Please fill in the table in section 4.1 below.

7.1.Change in administrative tasks – when competent national administration

Consider the situation, where you are the competent national administration – i.e. the national administration sending request for information to (an)other Member State(s).

Please provide a brief narrative explanation for each of the assessed changes and new administrative tasks.

Administrative task

Change in use of case handling time of administrative tasks due possible revisions of unemployment benefit provisions

Please provide change in average man-hours/minutes or % increase/decrease

Revision (a)

Revision (b)

Revision (c)

Revision (d)

Standard administrative tasks

Collecting information

Change:

Explanation:

Calculation of benefit

Change:

Explanation:

Additional administrative tasks

Determination of residence

Change:

Explanation:

Change in circumstances

Change:

Explanation:

Reimbursement

Change:

Explanation:

Recovery

Change:

Explanation:

Missing (current) administrative tasks [added in the previous section]

Please add missing task

Change:

Explanation:

Please add missing task

Change:

Explanation:

New administrative tasks – due to the revision

Please add new task

Man-hours/minutes:

Explanation:

Please add new task

Man-hours/minutes:

Explanation:

7.2.Change in administrative costs – the national administration in a Member State of previous insurance of a mobile EU worker

Please repeat the assessment of the change in the administrative costs associated with the case handling for each of the revisions (a), (b), (c) and (d).

Please provide a brief narrative explanation for each of the assessed changes and new administrative tasks.

Administrative task

Change in use of case handling time of administrative tasks due possible revisions of unemployment benefit provisions

Please provide change in average man-hours/minutes or % increase/decrease

Revision (a)

Revision (b)

Revision (c)

Revision (d)

Standard administrative tasks

Providing information

Change:

Explanation:

Additional administrative tasks

Determination of residence

Change:

Explanation:

Change in circumstances

Change:

Explanation:

Reimbursement

Change:

Explanation:

Recovery

Change:

Explanation:

Missing (current) administrative tasks [added in the previous section]

Please add missing task

Change:

Explanation:

Please add missing task

Change:

Explanation:

New administrative tasks – due to the revision

Please add new task

Man-hours/minutes:

Explanation:

Please add new task

Man-hours/minutes:

Explanation:

8.Administrative implications for mobile EU workers from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

The suggested revisions to the EU provisions on unemployment benefit, and hence changes to the administrative tasks of the national administrations, may have administrative implications for the mobile EU workers – e.g. time spent when applying for unemployment benefits.

Please add relevant tasks for the Mobile EU worker in the table below.

For each of the revisions we ask you to assess the implications for the Mobile EU worker associated hereby.

Administrative task	Implications for the Mobile EU worker due possible revisions of unemployment benefit provisions Please specify the direction of change (and if possible its size: low, medium or high)
	Revision (a)	Revision (b)	Revision (c)	Revision (d)
Please add task	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:
Please add task	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:	Man-hours/minutes:
	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:	Explanation:

Thanks for your help!

Annex C – Case study for Germany

Introduction

In this section, we give a short description of the German provisions for unemployment benefits, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits: Arbeitnehmerleistungen/Sozialversicherung (the unemployment insurance funds).

Within this study, we focus on the case-handling of applications for unemployment benefits where the aggregation principle apply – i.e. applications from citizens who do not have sufficiently long insurance records in the last Member State of activity/insurance (the Member State of last employment) to qualify for unemployment benefits. Thus periods fulfilled in another Member State (of previous employment) can be aggregated in line with the "principle of aggregation" laid down in Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

In addition, to qualify for unemployment benefits in Germany the applicant must not be engaged in an employment relationship, but make an effort to put an end to this situation. He/she must be available for placement efforts undertaken by the employment agency, must not be entitled to a standard pension, and in general must make use of all possibilities of occupational integration. Furthermore, the applicant must have been compulsorily insured for at least 12 months during the last two years.

Benefits are based on the recent net earnings, on the category mentioned on the wage-tax card and on the presence or not of children. Beneficiaries with children get 67% of recent net earnings, while it is 60% for those without children.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling aggregations of unemployment benefits in Germany, five experts from the Arbeitnehmerleistungen/
Sozialversicherung were interviewed. They emphasised, as also suggested by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015), that data on new or existing cases of aggregations of unemployment benefits are not available – at least seen from the perspective of being the Member State of last employment. One reason is that the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (the German Federal Employment Agency) in its IT-systems consider the applications for unemployment benefits from EU-workers as standard files, i.e. not marked as special cases. Another reason is that the administrative procedures within the Bundesagentur für Arbeit do not differ between EU-workers and cross-border workers applying for unemployment benefits, and so any registration of cases is a mix of the two.

We have therefore for the purpose of calculating the administrative costs and burden for Germany as a whole (as authority of last employment) made use of a rough estimate of the number of cases based on the assumption that the number of cases are similar to those in Denmark and the Netherlands – adjusted for the sizes of the labour markets. This leads as shown in Table C-1 to an estimate of 791 cases in 2013.

Table C-1 shows that in total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker amount to approximately 0.5 hours in the current situation when Germany is the Member State of last employment – with most time spent on collecting information about the applicant´s unemployment insurance history from other Member States and on calculating the benefit payments. Some time is also spent on providing personal explanation to the applicant.

Table C-1 Current administrative costs and burden – Germany as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	0.5 hours	100%	791	8.1
Collecting information 87	0.2 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 88	0.2 hours	100%
Determination of residence 89	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances 90	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement 91	0 hours	0%
Recovery 92	0 hours	0%
Explanation of application process to EU-worker	0.1 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Estimate on the basis of data for Denmark and the Netherlands. (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

When Germany is the Member State of previous insurance (authority of previous employment), the national administrations are assessed as shown in Table C-2 currently to use around half an hour per case to provide information about the applicant to the Member State of last employment.

Table C-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Germany as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	0.5 hours	100%	1164	12.0
Providing information 93	0.5 hours	100%
Determination of residence 94	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances 95	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement 96	0 hours	0%
Recovery 97	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Germany as Member State of last employment

The interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences of four different revisions to the current EU provisions. The consequences are estimated in terms of additional man-hours to carry out the administrative tasks. As shown Table C-3 and Table C-4, the interviewees envisage that the changes will be similar for Option 2a and Option 2b, and for Option 3a and Option 3b, respectively.

Table C-3 shows that no change in man-hours spent per case is assessed for Option 2a and Option 2b. However, some interviewees envisage that reimbursement and recovery procedures may get more difficult and so require more time; but it is difficult to assess the amount of time needed and the frequency of cases. Furthermore, it may well be so that these two revisions may create a lot of problems as no coherent administrative practices exist for solving possible conflicts between public employment services in different Member State regarding responsibilities for paying unemployment benefits, for providing job counselling or other instruments etc.

Table C-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 2a and Option 2b – Germany as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0 hours	100%	791	0
Collecting information	0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	0%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	0%
Explanation of application process to EU-worker	0 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Estimate on the basis of data for Denmark and the Netherlands. (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Option 3a and Option 3b will require additional resources for the collection of income data – i.e. the use of two SED forms, one for employment periods and one for incomes. Although applicants are already expected to indicate their former income in the PDU 1 document, very often this information is not provided and the former insurance institution must be contacts. Furthermore, there will be an additional administrative burden from the requirement to calculate mixed benefits, i.e. taking salaries of former employment periods into consideration, c.f. Table C-4.

Table C-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3a and Option 3b – Germany as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0.55 hours	100%	791	8.9
Collecting information	0.15 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0.4 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	0%
Explanation of application process to EU-worker	0 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Estimate on the basis of data for Denmark and the Netherlands. (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Germany as Member State of previous employment

Similar to the situation as Member State of last employment, the changes are envisaged to be similar for Option 2a and Option 2b, and for Option 3a and Option 3b, respectively, when it comes to Germany as Member State of previous employment.

Furthermore, similar to Table C-3, Table C-5 shows that no change is assessed for Option 2a and Option 2b. However, some interviewees envisage also here that reimbursement and recovery procedures may get more difficult and so require more time; but it is difficult to assess the amount of time needed and the frequency of cases.

Table C-5 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 2a and Option 2b – Germany as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0 hours	100%	1164	0
Providing information	0 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table C-6 shows that Option 3a and Option 3b are expected to require a minor extra effort to provide information regarding former incomes – i.e. around 3 minutes extra for the PDU 1 or around 10 minutes extra for the SED form. Furthermore, additional consultation resources must be allocated to explain the calculation methods to the applicants.

Table C-6 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3a and Option 3b – Germany as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0.2 hours	100%	1164	4.8
Providing information	0.1 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	0%
Explanation of application process to EU-worker	0.1 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for applicants from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

The interviewees envisage that Option 2a and Option 2b may have a negative impact on the exercise of free movement, because a more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State. Furthermore, workers will be deprived of social security protection to which they would have been entitled if they had spent their working life in only one Member State. This is in particular true for the access to measures of active labour market policies.

Regarding Option 3a and Option 3b, compared with the current legislation, applicants need to wait a longer time before they receive their benefits. In case the applicant has no private savings, the increased time to calculate benefits might create problems. Furthermore, applicants are expected to provide additional data compared with the current legislation) because former salaries are unclear etc. Finally, communication with the applicant will be more complicated, as the legislation is getting more complex.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Germany per year is estimated at 791 when Germany is the Member State of last employment, while the number of cases is somewhat higher, 1164, when Germany is the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 0.5 hours for an average case – whether Germany is the Member State of last employment or of previous employment.

While Options 2a and 2b are not expected to require additional administrative resources per case, Options 3a and 3b will increase these requirements. Being the Member State of last employment, the national administrations are expected to spent 0.55 hours more per case – i.e. more than double compared with the current situation – in particular on the calculation of benefits. Being the Member State of previous employment, additional 0.2 hours per case are expected – partly for providing information, and partly for explaining the application process to the EU-worker.

Option 2a and Option 2b are envisaged to have a negative impact on the exercise of free movement, because a more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State. Regarding Option 3a and Option 3b, compared with the current legislation, applicants need to wait a longer time before they receive their benefits. In case the applicant has no private savings, the increased time to calculate benefits might create problems. Furthermore, applicants are expected to provide additional data compared with the current legislation) because former salaries are unclear etc. Finally, communication with the applicant will be more complicated, as the legislation is getting more complex.

Annex D – Case study for Denmark

Introduction

In this section, we provide a short description of Danish legislation on unemployment benefits, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits: A-kasserne (the unemployment insurance funds).

To qualify for unemployment benefits in Denmark – the applicant must fulfil the following conditions:

reside in Denmark

be unemployed

not be actively engaged with a formal education

be a registered as active jobseeker and so be available to the Jobcenter (Danish employment centre)

be able to work

be available to the job market

be between 18 and 65 years old

be actively job seeking and cooperate with the Jobcenter in building an individual action plan

have fulfilled eight weeks of work in Denmark (equivalent to 296 hours) within 12 weeks preceding the unemployment spell

The calculation of unemployment benefits is usually based on the average income over the last 12 weeks. In 2015, the amount obtained corresponds to 90% of the earlier income up to a limit of DKK 827 (EUR 111) a day. One can only receive unemployment benefits in up to two years within a three-year period.

There are 26 unemployment insurance funds (A-kasser) in Denmark. The unemployment insurance funds are private and their activities are funded by worker memberships. However, they keep responsibility of public authorities by also administering the publicly-funded share of the unemployment benefits. In other words, they constitute the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits.

It is the perception among the interviewed A-kasser that Danish legislation is fully in line with the EC regulation 883/2004. The interpretation of the regulation may, however, differ from other Member States' interpretations in that a period of eight weeks of employment in Denmark within 12 weeks has to be fulfilled in order to qualify for aggregation of unemployment period – i.e. a mobile worker will not be eligible after just one day of work in Denmark.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling unemployment benefits in Denmark, we have interviewed four unemployment insurance funds listed in Table D-1 below.

Table D-1 Interviewed unemployment insurance funds, Denmark

Unemployment insurance fund	Description 98
3F	Members within Transport, Building & Construction, Manufacturing industries, Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture/Market Gardens, Cleaning, Hotel & Restaurants, Delivery and distribution of newspapers and magazines. About 250,000 members.
HK	Unemployment fund for Trade and office workers. About 200,000 members.
ASE	Unemployment insurance fund for all types of workers. About 140,000 members.
Krifa	Unemployment insurance fund for all types of workers. About 140,000 members.

None of the four interviewed unemployment insurance funds has exact time measurements of the administrative costs in terms of man-hours used per case handled. Hence, the estimations are based on best guesses from their experience with the case handlings. However, since unemployment insurance funds are privately-owned in Denmark, both HK A-kasse and 3F A-kasse have expressed that they are focussed on limiting time used on case handling, and so they have a good feeling of the time spent.

The interviewed unemployment insurance funds handle between 20 and 150 cases of applications from workers per year (i.e. comparable with the figures in Table D-2), where the aggregation principle is applicable. They generally believe that this number will increase over time. Reasons include expectations of higher degree of travelling abroad to work – especially among young workers 99 . In the shorter run, the Danish economy shows signs of improvement causing employment to increase – and a faster improvement than other EEA countries. This will probably attract more workers seeking employment in Denmark 100 .

In total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker amount to approximately 1.8 hours in the current situation when Denmark is the Member State of last employment, c.f. Table D-2.

Table D-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Denmark as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	1.8 hours	100%	54	2.9
Collecting information 101	1.4 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 102	0.2 hours	100%
Determination of residence 103	<0.1 hours	8%
Change in circumstances 104	<0.1 hours	4%
Reimbursement 105	0	0%
Recovery 106	<0.1 hours	1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

There is a large variation in the time spend on the individual cases – mostly depending on the applicant’s previous place of insurance. For instance, if the unemployment insurance fund in the Member State of previous employment has not had much experience with exchanging information with the previous place of insurance, it might take longer to attain the information needed.

The calculation of unemployment benefits is usually straightforward. The interviewed unemployment insurance funds have all set up a calculation tool which calculates the amount to be paid out. However, in most cases the calculation is not event necessary, as the Danish rate for unemployment insurance will be paid out. The calculation is thus merely a check to see, if the applicant is entitled to more benefits than the standard rate would dictate.

When Denmark is the Member State of previous employment, the average man-hours used for case handling is 0.7 hours, c.f. Table D-3. Only time spend on providing information has proven to be a task actually carried out in the interviewed unemployment insurance funds. They acknowledge that the other tasks in principle exist. However, none of them has recent experience with handling any of them and note that these tasks are the exception rather than the rule, when handling applications for unemployment benefits from mobile EU-workers. Therefore no time estimate has been provided for these tasks.

Table D-3 Current administrative costs and burden – Denmark as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	0.7 hours	100%	686	13.4
Providing information 107	0.7 hours	100%
Determination of residence 108	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances 109	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement 110	0 hours	0%
Recovery 111	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Denmark as Member State of last employment

The interviewed unemployment insurance funds believe that Option 2a compared with the current practice could be considered to lessen the requirements to employment in Denmark. While this may push for more applications for unemployment benefits from mobile EU-workers, in turn the more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State. Similarly, FGB et.al (2015) – as also shown in Table 3-3 – assessed that stricter requirements will lead to less applications in Member States that mainly attract mobile EU-workers. In any case, the administrative burden in terms of additional man-hours required for case handlings is unchanged. Thus, as can be seen from Table D-4, Option 2a is expected to have no impact on the man-hours for case handling in the Danish context. Similarly, all of the interviewed unemployment insurance funds interpret Option 2b as being more or less the same as the current rules in Denmark. 112 The administrative burden in terms of additional man-hours required to case handlings is therefore unchanged.

Table D-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Options 2a and 2b – Denmark as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0 hours	100%	54	0
Collecting information	0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	8%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	4%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Option 3a is interpreted as leading to a much lower unemployment benefits for many of the mobile EU-worker applicants. However, the interviewees disagree on the expected effect on the number of applications for unemployment benefits from EU workers. Some argue that the living costs in Denmark are so high, that it will become harder to get by on the reduced benefit, and thus reduce the number of mobile EU-workers to travel to Denmark. Others argue that many of the applicants travel to Denmark because of spouses or other circumstances and not because of the job possibilities in itself. Those applicants will continue to travel to Denmark no matter how the benefits are calculated.

The administrative costs in terms of additional use of man-hours per case have an average estimate of total 0.5 hours subdivided into 0.4 hours for additional information gathering and 0.1 hours on calculation of benefits, c.f. Table D-5. The additional information gathering concerns the collection of salary statements. The extra time spent on information gathering varies between the interviewees, though. Some argue that no extra information is necessary. It depends on what information the unemployment insurance fund already obtain.

The calculation of benefits will become a bit more extensive, when having to include previous salary history. It increases the need to understand specific salary statements and calls for the development of standardised portable documents e.g. with clear definitions of wages to be applied for the aggregation calculations.

Option 3b is interpreted much in the same way as Option 3a, but with a slightly higher consequence on the development in the number of applications in the future. Additional time consumption on case handling are the same – i.e. a total of additional 0.5 hours per case.

Table D-5 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3a and Option 3b – Denmark as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0.5 hours	100%	54	0.8
Collecting information	0.4 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0.1 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	8%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	4%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Denmark as Member State of previous employment 113

In addition to assessing the consequences of the four revisions while being the Member State of last employment, the interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences when being the Member State previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance. Again, no new tasks have been identified for any of the revisions.

Since time spend on providing information have proven to be the only administrative task actually carried out in the unemployment insurance funds in this respect, it is the only one that has been assessed during this part of the interviews.

In general, it is the conviction, that the administrative costs in terms of additional man-hours are infinitesimal. Most interviewees give an estimate of no additional time consumption. 3F A-kasse foresee a bit more servicing of other Member States based on the revision.

Table D-6 Change in administrative costs and burden from changing information task – Denmark as Member State of previous employment

Revision	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Option 2a	<0.1 hours	100%	686	0.8
Option 2b	<0.1 hours	100%	686	0.8
Option 3a	<0.1 hours	100%	686	0.8
Option 3b	<0.1 hours	100%	686	0.8

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for applicants from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

Revising the unemployment provisions according to the proposed revisions will have different effect, depending on the unemployment insurance funds standard case handling. Overall, the more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State.

However, both HK A-kasse and Krifa already ask the applicants for documentation for employment history and salary slips, which means they do not expect any of the revisions to increase the administrative implications for the applicants. Krifa explains, that the demands they pose on mobile EU-workers today are relatively extensive, which means it is hard to imagine that the proposed revisions should make it more difficult for the applicants.

3F A-kasse and ASE do not necessarily require documentation for salary and employment history in their current case handlings of applications for unemployment benefits from mobile EU-workers. Thus, they expect the administrative implications for the applicant will increase in the case of Options 3a and 3b, where these documents will become necessary. ASE further expects, that they will demand authorised translation of the documentation, which will pose both an administrative implication on the applicant in terms of time and in terms of monetary costs. This burden may be reduced by the introduction of standardised documents.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Denmark per year is 54 when Denmark is the Member State of last employment, while the number of cases is somewhat higher, 686, when Denmark is the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.8 hours for an average case – whether Denmark is the Member State of last employment, and 0.7 hours when of previous employment. Most resources are spent on collecting and providing information.

In the Danish case, only two of the four revisions are expected to have impact on administrative costs in terms of use of man-hours when being the Member state of last employment: Options 3a and 3b. The impacts are very limited though, and thus, the increase in administrative costs in terms of labour costs are relatively small. A small impact is expected from the revisions being the Member State of previous insurance. However, the impacts are infinitesimal.

Overall, the more complex legislation may discourage workers who were planning to move to another Member State. However, applicants are already expected to provide documentation for employment history and salary slips, which means they do not expect any of the revisions to increase the administrative implications for the applicants. The demands they pose on mobile EU-workers today are relatively extensive, which means it is hard to imagine that the proposed revisions should make it more difficult for the applicants.

Annex E – Case study for Netherlands

Introduction

In this section, we provide a short description of Dutch legislation on unemployment benefits, who is eligible, and how the legislation is interpreted by the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits: the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV).

To qualify for unemployment benefits (WW-uitkering) in the Netherlands – the applicant must fulfil the following conditions:

be involuntarily unemployed

have had a loss of at least five or half the working hours per week

timely register with the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV)

be able to work

be available to the job market

be below the legal retirement age

seek employment

reside in the Netherlands

apply for benefits on the first day of unemployment

To be eligible for WW benefit the applicant needs to satisfy the "26 out of 36 weeks" ruling, which states that he/she must have been employed for at least 26 out of the 36 weeks before the first day of unemployment. An applicant who only meets the required number of weeks will receive WW benefit up to a maximum of three months. If the applicant has received wages for at least 52 days for four (out of the five) last calendar years from the year of unemployment, the benefit will be payable for as many months as the number of years the person he/she was employed.

The calculation of unemployment benefits is based on the last available daily wage with a maximum of EUR 198.28. The amount is equal to 75% of the last daily wage during the first two months, 70% thereafter. An applicant who only meets the weeks’ condition receives benefits for a maximum duration of three months, whereas a person who satisfies the years’ condition receives benefits for as many months as the number of months in employment, with a maximum of 38 months.

If unemployment benefits are less than the social minimum, a supplementary benefit can be claimed under the Supplementary Benefit Act (Toeslagenwet, TW).

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, we have interviewed the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV).

The Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV) estimates that they had 40 new cases in 2014 as national administration with last employment and a total of only 10 existing active cases. From the HIVA study (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015) the number of cases for 2013 as national administration with last employment is 160. As for the number of cases as national administration with previous employment the UWV estimates that they handled a total number of 23,808 cases in 2014, but are unable to say for how many of these cases the aggregation principle (in Dutch: samenstellingsregeling) applied. However, the HIVA study shows that the aggregation principle was used in 918 cases where the UWV was the national administration with previous employment. Hence, there seems to be some uncertainty connected with the counting of cases.

In total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker will amount to approximately 1.1 hours in the current situation when the Netherlands is the Member State of last employment, most often spent on the collection of information about the applicant's employment and insurance history and on the calculation of benefits, c.f. Table E-1. Based on the average number of man-hours spend and an average labour cost at EUR 22.2 per hour this adds up to a total average of EUR 24.3 per case as national administration with last employment, and to EUR 3,900 for all cases.

Table E-1 Current administrative costs and burden – the Netherlands as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	1.1 hours	100%	160	3.9
Collecting information 114	0.5 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 115	0.5 hours	100%
Determination of residence 116	0.5 hours	5-10%
Change in circumstances 117	0.53 hours	>5%
Reimbursement 118	0 hours	0%
Recovery 119	0.38 hours	>5%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

When the Netherlands is the Member State of previous insurance (previous employment), the average man-hours used for case handling is 0.67 hours, c.f. Table E-2, all of which is spent on providing information about the applicant's employment and insurance history to the relevant Member State of last employment.

Table E-2 Current administrative costs and burden – the Netherlands as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	0.67 hours	100%	918	13.7
Providing information 120	0.67 hour	100%
Determination of residence 121	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances 122	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement 123	0 hours	0%
Recovery 124	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – The Netherlands as Member State of last employment

As shown in Table E-3 no change in man-hours used are expected for Option 2a and Option 2b – i.e. the introduction of a threshold is not expected to make much difference to the single case handling.

Table E-3 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 2a and Option 2b – the Netherlands as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0 hours	100%	160	0
Collecting information 125	0 hours	0%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	0%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

However, the UWV assesses that Option 3a will require them to collect additional information when processing the applications and estimates this will lead to an increase in man-hours spend per case at 0.38 hours per case (Table E-4). The UWV interprets the effects of Option 3b to be much the same as Option 3a. However, based on current numbers the UWV asses that Option 3b will lead to a rise in the number of cases, since the applicant in almost all cases has worked in the Netherlands for more than one month. This said, the additional time used on processing the cases is estimated by the UWV to be the same as for Option 3a.

Table E-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3a and Option 3b – the Netherlands as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0.38 hours	100%	160	1.4
Collecting information	0.38 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0%
Recovery	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – the Netherlands as Member State of previous employment

As it is shown below in Table E-5 the UWV assess that the revisions will not lead to changes in the time used handling the cases. In addition, no new tasks have been identified for any of the revisions.

Table E-5 Change in administrative costs and burden from changing information task – the Netherlands as Member State of previous employment

Revision	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Option 2a	0 hours	100%	918	0
Option 2b	0 hours	100%	918	0
Option 3a	0 hours	100%	918	0
Option 3b	0 hours	100%	918	0

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for applicants from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

The UWV assesses that revising the unemployment provisions according to the proposed revisions will lead to a slight increase in the time used on the application for the mobile EU-worker. The reason for this mainly arise from the additional information and documents the applicant must provide – e.g. in the form of contracts, payslips etc.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in the Netherlands per year is 160 when the Netherlands is the Member State of last employment, while the number of cases is significantly higher, 918, when the Netherlands is the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.1 hours for an average case – when the Netherlands is the Member State of last employment, and 0.67 hours when of previous employment. Most resources are spent on collecting and providing information, and on the calculation of benefits.

As the interviewee only handle a small number of cases as competent state every year, the burden from revision being the competent state is relatively small. In addition, even though the Netherlands is the Member State of previous employment in a higher number of cases, the estimate of additional costs per case is limited, which means the burden is not that significant when being the state of previous employment. Hence, all in all none of the policy revisions seems to have a larger impact on administrative costs of case handling unemployment benefits in the Netherlands.

Finally, it is assessed that that revising the unemployment provisions according to the proposed revisions will lead to a slight increase in the time used on the application for the mobile EU-worker. The reason for this mainly arise from the additional information and documents the applicant must provide – e.g. in the form of contracts, payslips etc.

Annex F – Case study for Poland

Introduction

In this section, a short description is given of the Polish legislation on unemployment benefits, who is eligible, and how the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits interpret the legislation.

To qualify for unemployment benefits (Zasiłek dla bezrobotnych) in Poland – the applicant must fulfil the following conditions:

be involuntary unemployed

be without work or payment

be registered with the employment agency

be capable for work

be available for full-time work

be at least 18 years of age and less than 60 years (woman) or 65 years (man)

not be entitled to old-age or invalidity pension

hold a Polish, EU or EEA or Swiss citizenship

not be recipient of rehabilitation, sickness, maternity or child raising allowance

In addition, there is a qualifying period, where the applicant must have been in paid employment of at least 365 calendar days within a period of 18 months preceding the day of registration.

The amount of unemployment benefits are not based on earnings, but on the length of economic activity. It is calculated as a percentage of the Basic Unemployment Allowance, depending upon the length of employment: one to five years of work entitles the applicant to 80% of the Basic Unemployment Allowance; five to 20 years entitles the applicant to 100% of the full amount; 20 years and more entitle the applicant to a 120% of the full amount.

The Basic Unemployment Allowance constitutes an amount of PLN 831.10 (EUR 200) per month for a period of three months and PLN 652.60 (EUR 157) thereafter. The duration of the benefits is a period of six months in areas with an unemployment rate less than 150% national average. In areas with an unemployment rate of at least 150% or more of the national average the duration of benefits are 12 months. This period of benefits on 12 months also applies if the claimant has a qualifying period of 20 years and is more than 50 years old, or if the claimant’s spouse is unemployed, not entitled to an allowance and they have at least one dependent child under the age of 15 years.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling unemployment benefits in Poland, we have interviewed four Polish national and regional administrations listed in Table F-1 below.

Table F-1 Interviewed national and regional administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits, Poland

Institution

Regional Labour Office Warsaw, team for promoting of employment and EURES

Lower Silesian Regional Labour Office, Department of Social Security Systems

Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Department for Coordination of Social Security Systems

Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Department of Labour Market

None of the four interviewed administrations handling unemployment benefits has exact time measurements of the administrative costs in terms of man-hours used per case handling. Hence, the estimations are based on best guesses from their experience with the case handlings.

In total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker will amount to approximately 1.8 hours in the current situation when Poland is the Member State of last employment, c.f. Table F-2. The largest task is the determination of residence followed by the collection of information about the applicant's employment and insurance history from the relevant Member State of previous employment.

Table F-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Poland as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	1.83 hours	100%	1517	14.3
Collecting information 126	0.56 hours	-
Calculation of benefit 127	0.32 hours	-
Determination of residence 128	0.63 hours	-
Change in circumstances 129	0.07 hours	-
Reimbursement 130	0.01 hours	-
Recovery 131	0 hours	-

Notes: (1) The frequencies in the Polish calculations have been taken into account when calculating the average man-hours per case. (2) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (3) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table F-3 shows that Poland as Member State of previous employment annually handles around 147 cases. The average time of handling a case is 1.27 hours – with most time spent of the provision of information about the applicant to the relevant Member State of last employment, followed by efforts regarding determination of residence of the applicant.

Table F-3 Current administrative costs and burden – Poland as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	1.27 hours	100%	147	1.0
Providing information 132	0.67 hours	-
Determination of residence 133	0.46 hours	-
Change in circumstances 134	0.15 hours	-
Reimbursement 135	0 hours	-
Recovery 136	0 hours	-

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Poland as Member State of last employment

The respondents gave quite different answers to the expected changes in administrative cost and burdens due to the revisions.

In one interview with the Department for Coordination of Social Security Systems at the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy it was assessed that both Options 2a and 2b will lead to an increase of 50% in collecting information due to the need of collecting further information on the applicants previous period of employment. As for Options 3a and 3b, they estimate that there will be no changes. However, in another interview with the same department at the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy it was estimated that neither of the revisions will lead to any changes. As for Options 2a and 2b the explanation to this is, that the time it takes to analyse the documents will stay the same before and after the revisions. For Options 3a and 3b the remark is that Polish benefits are not dependent on the wages but on status. This assessment is shared by the Regional Labour Office Warsaw who notes that the revisions will not lead to any changes in the handling of documents related to the application.

The Labour Market Department – also at the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy – the assessment is that all revisions will lead to an increase in time spend on collecting information. This is again contrary to what the Lower Silesian Regional Labour Office estimates; here it is expected that the all revisions will lead to decrease on 50-70% in man-hours used due to less administrative work 137 . These differences in estimations of changes due to revisions recurs at several tasks.

The following tables give an overview of the aggregated/average estimates by the Polish interviewees of the changes when Poland is Member State of last employment. These aggregated estimates show that the overall view is that all revisions will lead to a slight decrease in administrative costs and burdens when handling unemployment benefits.

Table F-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 2a – Poland as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
Total	-0.45 hours	100%	1517	-3.5
Collecting information	0 hours	-
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	-
Determination of residence	-0.23 hours	-
Change in circumstances	0.04 hours	-
Reimbursement	-0.28 hours	-
Recovery	0.01 hours	-

Table F-5 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 2b – Poland as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
Total	-0.35 hours	100%	1517	-2.7
Collecting information	0 hours	-
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	-
Determination of residence	-0.18 hours	-
Change in circumstances	0.04 hours	-
Reimbursement	-0.23 hours	-
Recovery	0.01 hours	-

Table F-6 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3a – Poland as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
Total	-0.15 hours	100%	1517	-1.2
Collecting information	0.05 hours	-
Calculation of benefit	0.30 hours	-
Determination of residence	-0.23 hours	-
Change in circumstances	0 hours	-
Reimbursement	-0.28 hours	-
Recovery	0 hours	-

Table F-7 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3b – Poland as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
Total	-0.05 hours	100%	1517	-0.4
Collecting information	0.05 hours	-
Calculation of benefit	0.30 hours	-
Determination of residence	-0.18 hours	-
Change in circumstances	0 hours	-
Reimbursement	-0.23 hours	-
Recovery	0 hours	-

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Poland as Member State of previous employment

As shown in Table F-8, the aggregated assessment of Options 2a and 2b is that they will also lead to a slight decrease in man-hours used on handling unemployment benefits.

Opposite the estimates given on changes in administrative cost and burdens as a result of the revisions when Poland is the Member State of last employment, the aggregated assessment is, that Options 3a and 3b will lead to an almost insignificant increase in man-hours used when Poland is Member State of previous employment – c.f. Table F-9. This minor increase covers, however, over slight a slight increase in resources needed for providing information, while savings are expected regarding the determination of residence and the reimbursement task.

Table F-8 Change in administrative costs and burden from Options 2a and 2b – Poland as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
Total	-0.53 hours	100%	147	-0.4
Providing information	0 hours	-
Determination of residence	-0.27 hours	-
Change in circumstances	0.05 hours	-
Reimbursement	-0.33 hours	-
Recovery	0.02 hours	-

Table F-9 Change in administrative costs and burden from Options 3a and 3b – Poland as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case(1)	Frequency(1)	Number of cases(2)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(3)
Total	0.05 hours	100%	147	0.04
Providing information	0.08 hours	-
Determination of residence	-0.27 hours	-
Change in circumstances	0.17 hours	-
Reimbursement	-0.33 hours	-
Recovery	0.17 hours	-

Administrative implications for applicants from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

The interviewed administrative institutions were very reluctant to estimate the implications to the applicants due to the revisions. However, the Labour Market Department at the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy assesses that Option 3b will not have significant implications to the applicant, though it might lead to slight increase in workload, since the need for documentation and information will increase.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Poland per year is 1517 when Poland is the Member State of last employment, while the number of cases is significantly lower, 147, when the Netherlands is the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.83 hours for an average case – when Poland is the Member State of last employment, and 1.27 hours when of previous employment. Most resources are spent on collecting and providing information, and on the calculation of benefits and the determination of residence.

The aggregated estimates show that the overall view is that all revisions will lead to a slight decrease in administrative costs and burdens when handling unemployment benefits as authority of last employment. This result is also found for Options 2a and 2b when being the authority of previous employment, which a slight very small increase in administrative costs are expected for Options 2a and 2b.

Annex G – Case study for Romania

Introduction

In this section, we provide a short description of Romanian legislation on unemployment benefits, who is eligible, and how the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits interpret the legislation.

To obtain unemployment benefits in Romania a person has to address to the local/county agency for employment to register for unemployment benefit with the following documents:

identity document

diplomas and certificates of qualifications

documents from the former employers on ending employment: dismissal decision, the labour contract

medical certificate proving that the person it is able to work or if the person has any medical restrictions

documents issued by the financial relevant authorities, showing that the person has no income or in case of self-employed persons, or has income less than the unemployment benefit

Within this study, we focus on the case-handling of applications for unemployment benefits where the aggregation principle apply – i.e. applications from citizens who do not have sufficiently long insurance records in the last Member State of activity/insurance to qualify for unemployment benefits. Thus periods fulfilled in another Member State can be aggregated in line with the "principle of aggregation" laid down in Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The unemployment benefit level is determined by the reference social indicator, the level of earnings, and the length of contribution period.

The unemployment indemnity is calculated and paid monthly as a percentage of the reference social indicator (500 RON, 111 EUR) and is 75% for a contribution period of one year and over (375 RON, 83.3 EUR). For a contribution period of three years and over, another percentage of the average gross income earned during the last 12 months contribution period is added to the base amount:

3% of the average gross income earned during the last 12 months for a contribution period between three and five years;

5% of the average gross income earned during the last 12 months between five and ten years;

7% of the average gross income earned during the last 12 months between ten and twenty years;

10% of the average gross income earned during the last 12 months for twenty years and over.

In short, the procedure for obtaining unemployment benefit in Romania can be described as follows:

When a claim for unemployment benefits is submitted to the national administration, the local agency for employment or working point will prepare a file containing all documents submitted for granting unemployment benefits.

The employment officer from the local employment agency or work point checks the documents submitted and decides if the conditions are met to obtain the unemployment benefit.

The registered unemployed who involuntarily became unemployed is required to have completed a contribution period of 12 months during the 24 months preceding registration in order to be entitled to an unemployment indemnity (indemnizatie de somaj) from the unemployment insurance system’s scheme.

The duration of the unemployment indemnity varies with the length of contribution period: 6 months for a contribution period between one and five years, 9 months between five and ten years, and 12 months for ten years and over. The employment officer shall issue the decision on the establishment or denial of unemployment benefits. In case the claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits, it is necessary to review the length of contribution period to determine the amount and duration of the benefit, in order to issue the decision.

The Romanian National Employment Agency is using an IT tool for issuing the decisions and calculation of benefits in the case of national applications.

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling unemployment benefits in Romania, we have interviewed three bodies within the National Agency for Employment listed in Table G-1 below.

Table G-1 Interviewed unemployment insurance funds, Romania

Unemployment insurance fund	Description 138
National Agency for Employment	An autonomous public institution, under the coordination of Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly. NAE administers and operates the unemployment insurance system through 42 county employment agencies, 70 local agencies and 141 working points.
County Employment Agency, Ilfov	Hence, the county employment agencies are in practice handling unemployment aggregation case and are so the competent institutions.
Local employment agency, Brasov	However, to obtain unemployment benefits in Romania a person can approach to the local employment agency.

The interviewed national administration of Romania represented by the three bodies above handled a total of 12 cases in 2013 and 4 cases in 2014 at national level, where the aggregation principle was applicable. Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) report a total of 12 cases per year.

In total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker amounts to approximately 1.9 hours in the current situation when Romania is the Member State of last employment, c.f. Table G-2. Most time is spent on the calculation of benefits and on the collection of information about the applicant from the relevant Member State of previous employment. The remaining tasks are only infrequently carried out.

Table G-2 Current administrative costs and burden – Romania as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	1.9 hours	100%	12	0.1
Collecting information 139	0.9 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 140	1 hour	100%
Determination of residence 141	0	0%
Change in circumstances 142	1 hour	0.1%
Reimbursement 143	0.5 hours	0.01%
Recovery 144	2 hours	0.1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

When the qualifying period is only fulfilled by application of the aggregation principle of periods of employment/work/insurance in the Member State of previous employment the employment officer shall decide upon the settlement or denial of unemployment benefits.

If the person does not already have the demanded EU forms, the officer must inform the applicant about the need of the EU form in order to obtain the unemployment benefit. The applicant is advised to obtain the EU form by him-/herself. The reason is that usually in this way the EU form is received earlier than using the official/institutional way.

When the EU form has been received from the applicant the officer prepare the EU form, submit it to the director of the employment agency to be signed and send the form by e-mail or regular mail to the liaison body of the competent country. When the information needed is available, and the person is entitled to unemployment benefit, the benefit can be calculated

The Romanian National Employment Agency uses an IT tool for the issue of the E-forms. The application was not yet updated for the U-forms. This is the reason of preference of using E-forms. If an EU country requires only U-forms, these are prepared using only Word documents, taking more time than preparing an E-form. If the EU-form is returned within 30 days and contains information that the qualifying period is completed, the payment of unemployment benefits is to be set in motion, and the officer proceed to the calculation of the unemployment benefits and to issue the decision. If the EU form is not returned within 30 days or is returned and contains information that the qualifying period is not completed, the officer shall prepare a decision of denial of unemployment benefits.

After signing the decision on the settlement or denial of unemployment benefits by the Executive Director or the person empowered to do so, a copy of the decision shall be given to the claimant, a copy is kept on file unemployed and the third copy, together with the form "Information regarding payment of the benefit" is forward to the payment compartment. The decision on the right to unemployment benefit is handed to the applicant on the first visit to the agency.

To make a correct calculation of the unemployment benefit the officer needs to know the entire history of work, insurance and self-employment periods and the amount of the gross income earned in last 12 months of work. This information should be provided by the claimant within the documents submitted with the claim.

Romania handles significantly more cases as the Member State of previous employment. According to the interviewees, the national administration handled a total of 6,567 cases. Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) counts less at 887 cases per year. c.f. Table G-3. In total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker amounts to approximately 2.5 hours in the current situation when Romania is the Member State of previous employment – with almost all time spent on providing information to the relevant Member States of the applicant's employment and insurance history.

Table G-3 Current administrative costs and burden – Romania as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	2.5 hours	100%	887	5.6
Providing information 145	2.5 hours	100%
Determination of residence 146	Almost 0 hours	0.1%
Change in circumstances 147	0.25 hours	1%
Reimbursement 148	2 hours	0.1%
Recovery 149	2 hours	0.01%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

It is easier and the process is shorter if the applicant him-/herself claim the EU-form regarding the last period of insurance or the income and composition of the family directly to the Romanian institution, instead of an EU-form received from other EU institution, because in this case the officer could ask for information directly to that person.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Romania as Member State of last employment

The interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences of four different revisions to the current EU provisions. The consequences are estimated in terms of the additional man-hours to carry out the administrative tasks. No new tasks have been identified based on the revisions during any of the interviews.

The Romanian interviewees do not anticipate additional administrative costs based on neither Option 2a nor Option 2b, cf. Table G-4.

Table G-4 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 2a and Option 2b – Romania as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	0 hours	100%	12	0
Collecting information	0 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	100%
Determination of residence	0 hours	0%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0.1%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0.01%
Recovery	0 hours	0.1%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

For Options 3a and 3b, the interviewees expect that collecting information regarding the salary earned in the previous Member State will be probably necessary, and thus will require additional administrative costs in terms of man-hours for case handling. The additional cost is estimated to amount to a total of 1 hour, c.f. Table G-5.

Table G-5 Change in administrative costs and burden from Option 3a and Option 3b – Romania as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Total	1 hour	100%	12	<0.5
Collecting information	1 hour	100%
Calculation of benefit	0 hours	0.1%
Determination of residence	0 hours	1%
Change in circumstances	0 hours	0.1%
Reimbursement	0 hours	0.01%
Recovery	0 hours	100%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – Romania as Member State of previous employment

In addition to assessing the consequences of the four revisions while being the Member State of last employment, the interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences when being the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance. Table G-6 shows that none of the revisions is expected to lead to any changes to the administrative costs and burden.

Table G-6 Change in administrative costs and burden from changing information task – Romania as Member State of previous employment

Revision	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Option 2a	0 hours	100%	887	0
Option 2b	0 hours	100%	887	0
Option 3a	0 hours	100%	887	0
Option 3b	0 hours	100%	887	0

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for applicants from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

The national administration on unemployment benefits in Romania expects that only Options 3a and 3b will lead to additional administrative burden for the mobile EU worker and increased time to process the information. This burden is due to the demand for information regarding history of salary earned in the previous Member State, which will probably be necessary under these revisions.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in Romania per year is 12 when Romania is the Member State of last employment, while the number of cases is significantly higher, 887, when Romania is the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.9 hours for an average case – when Romania is the Member State of last employment, and 2.5 hours when of previous employment. Most resources are spent on collecting and providing information, and on the calculation of benefits.

As the interviewee only handle a few cases as competent state every year, the burden from revision being the competent state is infinitesimal. In addition, even though Romania is the Member State of previous employment in a higher number of cases, the estimate of additional costs per case is close to zero, which means the burden is also infinitesimal when being the state of previous employment. Hence, all in all none of the policy revisions seems to have a significant impact on administrative costs of case handling unemployment benefits in Romania.

Annex H – Case study for UK

In this section, we provide a short description of United Kingdom's legislation on unemployment benefits, who is eligible, and how the national administrative institutions handling unemployment benefits interpret the legislation.

The national institution responsible for handling contribution-based Jobseekers' Allowance (JSA) in the United Kingdom is the Department for Work and Pensions. Unemployment benefits are a flat-rate benefit, which means that benefits are not based on earnings, but vary according to age: aged 25 or over receive GBP 72.40 (EUR 90) per week and aged 18-24 receive GBP 57.35 (EUR 72) per week. There is no increase for dependants and the duration of the benefits are limited to 182 days in any job-seeking period. If the applicant has not paid enough National Insurance contributions he/she may be eligible for income-based JSA.

To qualify for unemployment benefits in the UK the applicant must fulfil the following main conditions:

be involuntarily unemployed

not be engaged in work for 16 or more hours a week

be capable of work

be available for work

be under pensionable age

has entered into a Jobseekers’ agreement

be actively seeking employment

be in the UK

not being a full-time student

not being engaged in a trade dispute (on strike or being locked-out)

In addition, there is a qualifying period, which entails that:

contributions has been paid in one of the two tax years on which the claim is based amounting to at least 26 times the minimum weekly contribution for that year

contributions has been paid or credited in both the appropriate tax years - amounting to a total of at least 50 times the minimum weekly contribution for that year

Current administrative costs and burden

To determine the current administrative costs and burden in handling unemployment benefits in the UK, we have interviewed several caseworkers and team leaders within different departments in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).

Table H-1 shows that according to Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) the UK national administration handles only around 30 cases per year being the authority of last employment. In total, an average case handling of an application for unemployment benefits from a mobile EU-worker amounts to approximately 1.1 hours in the current situation – most on collecting information about the applicant's insurance and employment history from the relevant Member State of previous employment, the rest on the calculation of benefits.

Table H-1 Current administrative costs and burden – UK as Member State of last employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	1.1 hours	100%	30	0.6
Collecting information 150	0.75 hours	100%
Calculation of benefit 151	0.38 hours	100%
Determination of residence 152	0 hours	50%
Change in circumstances 153	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement 154	0 hours	0%
Recovery 155	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Table H-2 shows that the UK national administrations hardly spend any resources when being the authority of previous employment. Only in rare cases, time is spent on the determination of residence.

Table H-2 Current administrative costs and burden – UK as Member State of previous employment

Administrative task	Average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
A typical case; first time handling of a case - all regular tasks included	0.01 hours	100%	3333	0.5
Providing information 156	0 hours	100%
Determination of residence 157	0.25 hours	3%
Change in circumstances 158	0 hours	0%
Reimbursement 159	0 hours	0%
Recovery 160	0 hours	0%

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – UK as Member State of last employment

The interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences of four different revisions to the current EU provisions. The consequences are estimated in terms of additional man-hours to carry out the administrative tasks. DWP did not envisage any changes to the man-hours spent on each case due to the revisions, and they did not expect new additional tasks. Hence, unlike most of the other case study Member States, they did not envisage an additional information collection burden from Options 3a and 3b.

Table H-3 Change in administrative costs and burden – UK as Member State of last employment

Revision	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Option 2a	0 hours	100%	30	0
Option 2b	0 hours	100%	30	0
Option 3a	0 hours	100%	30	0
Option 3b	0 hours	100%	30	0

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Change in administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions – UK as Member State of previous employment

In addition to assessing the consequences of the four revisions while being the Member State of last employment, the interviewees were also asked to assess the consequences when being the Member State previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance. Again, the DWP assessed that the revisions would not lead to any changes in man-hours used per case and no new tasks was identified for any of the revisions.

Table H-4 Change in administrative costs and burden – UK as Member State of previous employment

Revision	Change in average man-hours per case	Frequency	Number of cases(1)	Change in administrative costs, Total, EUR 1,000(2)
Option 2a	0 hours	100%	3333	0
Option 2b	0 hours	100%	3333	0
Option 3a	0 hours	100%	3333	0
Option 3b	0 hours	100%	3333	0

Notes: (1) Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). (2) Using unit labour cost estimates based on Eurostat data.

Administrative implications for applicants from revisions to EU provisions on unemployment benefits

The DWP has not noted any administrative implications for the applicants as a result of the revisions to the EU provisions on unemployment benefits.

Conclusions

The annual number of cases handled in the UK per year is 30 when UK is the Member State of last employment, while the number of cases is significantly higher, 3333, when the UK is the Member State of previous employment – i.e. of previous insurance.

Currently, the administrative resources spent on each case amount to 1.1 hours for an average case – when UK is the Member State of last employment, while the UK national administrations hardly spend any resources when being the authority of previous employment. Only in rare cases, time is spent on the determination of residence.

As the interviewee only handle a few cases as competent state every year - and the changes in man-hours per case as a consequence of the revisions are assessed to be zero – the burden from the revisions are infinitesimal. In addition, even though the UK is the Member State of previous employment in a higher number of cases, the estimate of additional costs per case is also zero, which means the burden is also infinitesimal when being the state of previous employment. Hence, all in all, none of the policy revisions seems to have a significant impact on administrative costs of case handling unemployment benefits in the UK.

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[Catalogue number]

ANNEXE XVIII: Brodolini Report secondary effects family benefits

Task 3:

Secondary effects following a change of regulations on the exportation of family benefits

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B — Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Task 3:

Secondary effects following a change of regulations on the exportation of family benefits

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015

doi:[number]

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Tables of Contents

Executive Summary1

1.Introduction4

2.Methodology7

2.1.General approach7

2.2.Data and data limitation8

2.3.Literature review8

2.4.Simulation approach11

2.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

2.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes

2.5.Case study Member States

3.Status quo Scenario17

3.1 Status quo mobility flows17

3.2 Status quo target population18

4.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

5.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes

5.2 Possible effects of family reunifications28

6.Conclusions

Annex 1 – List of Family benefits within the scope of the study (source MISSOC).

Annex 2 – Secondary effects: estimation of mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs35

Annex 3 - Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs39

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries45

Executive Summary

The background for this report are the current considerations with respect to changing the EU provisions relating to a person's entitlement to family benefits, also where his/her family member reside in another Member State (Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). Currently, the entitlement is determined by the legislation of that person's Member State – henceforth called the Member State of primary competence. Whereas the Member State of residence of the child(ren) is henceforth called the Member State of secondary competence. The amendments that are being considered aim to ensure that family benefits contribute equally to family expenses for all families in a given Member State, and to ensure an even distribution of the financial burden between Member States. The three revisions being considered are:

Option 1– Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child(ren):

-Option 1a: Adjustment upwards and downwards of the amount of exported family benefits according to the living standard in the Member State of residence of child(ren);

-Option 1b: Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child(ren), but limited to the amount provided by the competent Member State.

Option 3 161 : Making the Member State of residence of the child(ren) primarily competent. In this option, the current order of priority for the export of family benefit is changed as follows: 1) country of residence of the child(ren); 2) country of work and 3) country of pension. This would mean that the country of residence of the child(ren) has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of family benefits to which entitlement exists under its national rules. The country of work would top up this amount if the level of family benefits were higher there. The family will receive the same amount of family benefits as before, but the allocation of the costs between the country of work and the country of residence will differ from the current rules. This also applies, where there is no entitlement to family benefits in the Member State of residence of the child(ren), but there is entitlement in a secondary competent Member State, as in such a case, the latter State will pay 100% of benefits under its national legislation by way of a "top up".

On this background, the present study aims to estimate the envisaged secondary effects derived by the proposed modification of the current EU regulation to the export of family benefits. The analysis focuses on the effects that the possible revision of the current regulation on the export of family benefits may generate in terms of intra-EU mobility and in the dimension of the population interested to the export of family benefits, providing also consideration in relation to variation in family reunification. The study also offers an estimate of the variation in the expenditure for the export of family benefits that would result from the implementation of the proposed policy options and from the related mobility changes.

The simulation tool developed for the this study aims at translating the implications of the proposed policy options into expected income changes. Assuming a given connection between income differentials and the propensity to move among EU countries, a variation in mobility flows and in the number of potential cases of export of family benefits is estimated. Finally, taking into account the variation in the number of cases, the different level of benefits and the redistribution of competences between sending and receiving countries envisioned by the policy options, it is proposed an estimate of the variation in expenditure for the export of family benefits for the selected countries.

The main representative unit of population identified for the analysis is one-earner couples with two children at 100% of the average wage. As alternative target populations, we take one-earner families with up to two children and one-earner families with more than two children. The reason to focus on one-earner families with different numbers of children derives from the fact that in this case the economic differential potentially generated by the proposed policy options could be higher with respect to the case of two-earned families, increasing the incentive to mobility or family reunification .

The countries proposed for the analysis as case studies are Germany, Belgium, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Spain and Ireland 162 . The proposed countries are chosen as geographically spread across the EU. They include countries which are mainly attracting EU mobile citizens from other member states ( DE; IE) as well as countries that experience strong migration outflows (PL; RO) but also countries within the middle ground (BE; NL; ES). The selection of the 7 MS is derived also by the specific characteristics that regulate the provision and the access to family benefits.

Section 4 reports the variation of mobility patterns between the selected MS according to the policy options proposed, assessed in relation to the status quo scenario. Results generally show mild reductions in mobility changes (see fig. 4.1) attributable to the potential implementation of the policy options. Limited differences can be noted for the two policy options tested for mobility changes (1a and 1b). Excluding Poland and Romania, the other MSs analysed show a slight decrease in migration flows. The variations range between -0.2% and -4%. Because the benefits paid in Poland and Romania in the status quo scenario are lower than those paid in the other selected MS, the implementation of policy option 1a produces an incentive to move to these countries and an increase in mobility from the other 6 MS of respectively 3.2% and 8.3%. When the upward adjustment is limited to the amount provided by the competent Member State (policy option 1b), the negative impact of mobility flows is slightly increased in most countries, while the change in mobility is null for Poland and Romania.

For what concerns expenditure changes generated by policy options and mobility changes, presented in section 5, as much as the percentage variations on expenditure levels may reach high values, variations shown in absolute terms and as ratios of GDP confirm the little relevance for national budgets of the expenditure for the exportation of family benefits

In relation to family reunification it is possible to presume that some families may react to the implementation of policy options 1a and 1b by reuniting in the country of residence of the working parent. Dependant family members residing in the poorer countries will indeed have an incentive to reunite with their mobile working relative, so to avoid the reduction in the family benefit (which under policy option 1a and 1b would be computed at the level of the country of residence of the children). If all families residing in poorer countries were to react according to the economic incentive produced by policy options 1a and 1b, they would nullify the effects of the policies. On the contrary, dependant family members residing in richer countries would have a disincentive to reunite with their mobile working relative under policy option 1a, since by doing so they would lose the entitlement to higher benefits (while they would experience no difference under policy option 1b). In relation to the other policy option (3) considered, since there is no variation in the level of family benefits perceived, no economic incentive to reunite families would be produced.

1.Introduction

The right to export family benefits and the provision to manage cases of overlapping entitlement to family benefits are regulated under the current EU provisions on export of family benefits specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation'. Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 states that “A person shall be entitled to family benefits in accordance with the legislation of the competent Member State, including for his family members residing in another Member State”. Article 68(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 specifies the order of priority for competence to pay family benefits as 1) the country of work (Member State of primary competence); 2) the country of pension and 3) the country of residence of the child (Member State of secondary competence). Article 68(2) also provides that any other Member State with secondary competence must pay a differential supplement or "top up" if its own benefits are higher than the ones provided by the Member State of primary competence. In the report, the current regulation of export of family benefits defines the status quo scenario.

The study aims to estimate the envisaged secondary effects derived by a possible modification of the current EU regulation to the export of family benefits. The general objective of the proposed revision of the EU regulation (see below, policy option 1a, 1b and 3) is to modernise the EU social security coordination rules and adapt them to changes in mobility patterns and in national social security systems, demographic developments and case law of the Court of Justice. The initiative aims to ensure that the rules be fit for the purpose and constitute the basis for effective and efficient coordination and cooperation between Member States, ensuring both protection of citizen's rights and even distribution of the financial burden between Member States.

When exporting family benefits from a given competent Member State, the amount of the benefits is unrelated to the standard of living in the Member State where the family members reside..

On this background, in the present study we look into the following possible revisions to Regulation (EC) 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) 987/2009:

Option 1: Adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child(ren)

-Option 1a: Adjustment upwards and downwards of the amount of exported family benefits according to the living standard in the Member State of residence of child(ren);

Option 3 164 : Making the Member State of residence of the child(ren) primarily competent.

In this option, the current order of priority for the export of family benefit is changed as follows: 1) country of residence of the child(ren); 2) country of work and 3) country of pension. This would mean that the country of residence of the child(ren) has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of family benefits to which entitlement exists under its national rules. The country of work would top up this amount if the level of family benefits were higher there. The family will receive the same amount of family benefits as before, but the allocation of the costs between the country of work and the country of residence will differ from the current rules. This also applies, where there is no entitlement to family benefits in the Member State of residence of the child(ren), but there is entitlement in a secondary competent Member State, as in such a case, the latter State will pay 100% of benefits under its national legislation by way of a "top up".

Option 4: Different coordination rules for salary-related child-raising allowances.

This is a horizontal option, which may be applied in conjunction with any of the options above. Under this proposal, salary-related child raising allowances (or any salary-related components of a benefit which comprises of both salary-related and flat rate elements) would continue to be exportable as family benefits, but would be treated as individual and personal rights which may only be claimed by the parent who is subject to the applicable legislation in question (not by other members of their family).

In addition, it is proposed that no anti-overlapping rules would apply to such benefits meaning that they would be payable in full to the parent concerned under the applicable national legislation irrespective of whether the Member State concerned has primary or secondary competence and amounts awarded by the primary competent Member State may not be "off-set" by the secondary Member State when calculating the differential supplement.

Further, in cases where, under national legislation, parents are permitted to share a salary-related child raising allowances (e.g. Sweden) the parent who is subject to applicable legislation is entitled to the allowance for the maximum duration permitted under national legislation. However, where a family receives a salary-related child raising allowance in more than one Member State, national authorities will be entitled to "off-set" periods of entitlement in another Member State from the overall duration of the benefit (although not the amount).

Such revisions may affect the behaviour of EU mobile citizens and of their families, the amounts of family benefits paid out and the administrative work needed to handle the cases of export of family benefits. In this report, the analysis focuses on the effects that the possible revision of the current regulation on the export of family benefits may generate in terms of intra-EU mobility and in the dimension of the population interested to the export of family benefits (henceforth: target population). The study also offers an estimate of the variation in the expenditure for the export of family benefits that would result from the implementation of the proposed policy options.

The opportunity to make an assessment on the potential implementation of policy option 4 was brought up very late during the impact assessment process. Because of the intrinsic difference with the other policy options 165 and the lack of the necessary time to research the national legislations on the matter, it was impossible to deliver quantitative nor qualitative results on mobility and expenditure changes for the given policy option.

The present study assumes different sources of data, among which a parallel study on the export of family benefits , which provides detailed data for a proper estimation of the possible secondary effects related to the amendments to the current regulations, e.g. average values of child benefits and number of persons entitled. The administrative data collected by this study, however, does not provide figures on the export of family benefits for all the 28 MS. Additionally, this study is based on a limited number of Member States chosen in relation to their different characteristics in terms of social security schemes and migration flows. Hence, the analysis proposed in this report focuses on seven case-study Member States: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Ireland.

2.Methodology

2.1.General approach

The aim of the report is to provide support to considerations on the overall long-term effects of the proposed changes to the current rules on the export of family benefits in terms of mobility, migration patterns, related variation of costs generated and in relation to the possible variation in terms of family reunification. We calculate the effect of the policy options on the income differentials among MSs, then assess the impacts of said policy changes in terms of incentives to move, providing a tool for comparing the options

against the status quo scenario;

against each other.

We must emphasise the important role of family benefits in supporting national and intra-EU mobile families. Moreover, their cross-border nature highlights the relevance of these benefits in the current debate, placing family benefits at the core of a possible EU initiative in the area of coordination of social security schemes.

The output will consist of a definition of different final scenarios for each policy option and for each selected Member State (MS), with the impacts of the potential policy changes being estimated in terms of intra-EU mobility and expenditure variations. The analysis of the possible secondary effects provides for each policy option the following estimates:

estimation on the change of inflows and outflows of EU citizens;

estimation on the variation of expenditure for the export of family benefits.

It is important to draw a distinction between direct secondary effects that are potential outputs of a viable model in the present context and indirect consequences of all changes that can propagate throughout the economic and social system of a country and the EU.

In order to identify secondary effects, we will restrict the analysis to the impact on the social security system of a country attributable to changes in the family benefits exported to family members of EU mobile citizens. Therefore, our results provide a estimation of mobility and cost variations imputable to policy options for what concerns exported family benefits, without considering potential effects on other areas, e.g. on the levels of contributions and/or taxes paid or on the variation in other cost elements, e.g. health and care expenditure 166 , which are beyond the scope of the study.

A quantitative assessment of the exact variation in the number of mobile citizens as well as an exact definition of cost changes are beyond the scope of this study. Rather, we suggest reading the estimation of the secondary effects as indicative of the direction and the general magnitude of the variation generated by the implementation of the different policy options.

2.2.Data and data limitation

In order to provide information on how changes in the regulation for the export of family benefits can influence the decision to move, different sources of data are needed. The main surveys that provide micro data on individual and family condition, employment situation, social benefits and services received are the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and, to a lesser degree, the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). In order to supplement and validate the analysis of EU-LFS and EU-SILC surveys, additional datasets of the Eurostat database on migration statistics are used with the aim of defining the bilateral migration flow between the 7 selected countries. Eurostat data allow identifying the average inflow and outflow of EU mobile citizens for each pair of countries. These data represent the starting point on which to assess the variation of mobility patterns generated by each policy option. In order to get figures on the target population (EU mobile citizens residing in a MS with dependent family members residing in a different MS), we make use of the data gathered by the parallel study carried out by the HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society of KU Leuven 167 .

2.3.Literature review

While there are many aspects that drive migration and mobility decisions, we will focus in the following on a broad overview on the literature of economic drivers. Other factors such as institutions, language barriers, religion or distance will at most be discussed briefly. As the main change in the policy simulated is an economic one, while other factors remain constant, our focus reflects the focus of the simulation exercise. Further changes to other factors are also likely to take place in the future, but are not taken into account in the simulation exercise as we solemnly want to identify the effect of the specific policy changes.

In The Theory of Wages, Hicks 168 argues that the main causes of migration are differences in wages. To this day, all economic studies of migration decisions employ Hicks' considerations as the general conjecture on which more sophisticated arguments are built about the influence of various other factors. These economic factors are used for internal, i.e. within country, mobility just as much as for cross-country mobility. Migration is in this context seen as an investment into human capital, yielding potentially higher income in the receiving country than in the sending country (Sjaastad, 1962).

Borjas 169 has formulated this into an inter-temporal choice to the general evaluation of income differences. The migration decision is based on income differences between home (sending) and foreign (receiving) country, individual preferences for specific countries (which can be specified by a separate factor, or attributed in relation to the cost of moving) and the cost of moving:

d = (income_foreign - income_home) - z_i - c

as specified in Hatton and Williamson 170 . Where d is the decision to migrate. When d>0, an individual is assumed to migrate, or in other words, as long as the income difference outweighs the cost of moving (c) and the individual's compensating differential (z_i), he/she will move.

The new economics of labour migration emphasizes the importance of families or households in the decision to migrate. Rather than taking an isolated, individual decision, it is argued that the unit of interest might in many cases be the household 171 . We are considering this by taking earnings relative to household rather than individuals in our simulation tool.

Employing wage or income differentials as an explanation of mobility behaviour seems to be at odds with low mobility in the European Union, which largely diminished legal and institutional obstacles to the free movement of workers. Wages in the past have had only a weak influence on migration flows, e.g., Braunerhjelm et al. 172 find that mobility levels were not increasing despite a widening gap in income differentials and unemployment levels. In contrast to this, Bentivogli and Pagano 173 (1999) note that the US labour market shows much stronger reaction to income differentials than the EU. More recent evidence, however, shows that mobility takes on stronger roles in solving imbalances. Probably through the abolishment of inhibitions to mobility within the European Union, market forces such as wage differences allow to solve shocks to labour markets by regional mobility. For example, Arpaia et al. 174 (2014) show in their study that regional labour market mobility can adjust for about 25% within a year of the shock that affects a specific region, thus the regional mobility – which explicitly includes mobility across national borders – plays an important role in resolving labour market imbalances. Beyer and Smets 175 (2015) corroborate those findings by showing that regional labour market mobility can adjust for about 25% within a year of the shock that affects a specific region. 176

The overall economic effect of migration can be subsumed into three separate elements. The economic effects of migration include the ability of mobile workers and migrants to blend in or ‘assimilate’ into the labour market, the economic impact on the labour market (‘displacement of native workers’) and the impact on the social security system of the country, both as contributors and recipients of benefits (Kerr & Kerr, 2011). The current study deals mainly with the third effect.

Measurement of the success of mobile workers is difficult, as most datasets cannot overcome the problem of selectivity of results through re-migration. E.g. Edin et al 177 (2000) found that 30-40% of the immigrants to Sweden had left the country within five years. These re-migrants were usually less assimilated than the group of migrants staying longer. Similar patterns can also be found in other countries (e.g. Germany as reported in Constant and Massey, 2003; and Bellemare, 2007 178 ). The literature shows clear differences in the success of migrants (as measured by e.g. earnings assimilation, unemployment, or culture integration) in mobility from within the EU and migration from outside of the EU (mostly developing countries). Overall, those migrants that remain in the country exhibit earnings assimilation to the natives (Aslund and Rooth 179 , 2007). A recent report by ILO-MPI indicates the difficulties of migrant workers (from outside of the EU) to keep up their income position. 180

The country of origin seems to be the most important explanatory variable for the gaps observed between the employment rates of immigrants and those of the locals. For Sweden, Nekby (2002) reports 30-32% lower employment rates in 1990-2000, while Ekberg (1991) reports -17% for a single year (1989). For Finland, Sarvimäki 181 (2011) reports 9 – 18% lower employment levels for migrants from OECD countries. For the Netherlands, Rooddenburg et al. 182 (2003) find 4% lower employment rates for migrants from Western countries, versus 18% lower employment rates for migrants from non-Western countries. Overall Kerr and Kerr 183 (2011) conclude that “[…] the mechanisms of wage and employment assimilation are poorly understood. Immigrants may face various obstacles to employment, including issues with the recognition of educational degrees, lack of language skills, poor professional connections or networks, and regulations that prevent them from working legally.”

A crucial determinant of the economic impact of immigration on the host country is the net amount of welfare services and other social benefits that immigrants consume or contribute. The net amount has to be calculated based on the contribution minus the benefits paid. The importance of the welfare receipts is discussed in the literature both from the angle of ‘net costs’ of migrants and in terms of the attractiveness of a country through its welfare system. Borjas 184 (1999) and others have discussed possible “welfare magnet effects” where migrants are drawn to countries with high social benefits. Kerr & Kerr (2011, p. 17) conclude that this is likely to be more important in the EU countries as immigrants in most European countries rely more on social security and unemployment benefits relative to natives in the US or Canada. Using the EU Household Panel study, De Giorgi & Pellizari 185 (2009) find a significant, albeit small, effect of the generosity of welfare on (individual) migration decisions. This effect, however, is still large enough to influence the distribution of migration flows. It is, however, also the case that mobile EU workers tend to have on average lower uptake of benefits than nationals. 186

The studies that address the concept net costs of migration into a country, i.e. the contribution of migrant minus their uptake in social benefits and public expenditure find mixed evidence. Boerie 187 (2010) using EU-SILC for the core EU15 countries concludes that there is no evidence that legal migrants, notably skilled migrants, are net recipients of transfers from the state. However, there is evidence of ‘residual dependency’ on non-contributory transfers and self-selection of unskilled migrants in the countries with the most generous welfare states. Hansen and Lofstrom 188 (2003) investigated the causes of greater welfare reliance by immigrants to Sweden. They concluded that recent immigrants used relatively more social security than they did in 1980s. This is due to a change in the composition and volume of the migration flows, while observable traits do not explain the gap in welfare take-up, implying that there are unobserved differences or selectivity. Büchel & Frick 189 (2005) emphasized the heterogeneity of the European situation in migration decisions. However, examining migration flows and controlling for immigrant characteristics did not dramatically change this EU heterogeneity. The higher benefit usage thus results more from policy and institutional differences across countries than the characteristics of migrants themselves. .They conclude that limitations and restrictions to participate or access relevant parts of the labour market can be a limiting factor in the economic performance of migrants. Overall, this conclusion from 2005 should become less important to within EU mobility, as limiting factors diminished. 190

Overall, we can conclude that, while economic factors by themselves seem to bear little explanatory value to the variation of size of mobility across countries in the EU, taking into account non-economic factors yields the expected outcomes: correcting for cultural differences such as the language and cultural distance between countries, as in Belot and Ederveen 191 and Sprenger 192 , economic factors do play an important role in explaining migration flows. Over time, economic differences across regions seem to have increased in their explanatory power towards migration flows.

2.4.Simulation approach

The simulations presented aim at translating the implications of the proposed policy options into expected income changes. Assuming a connection between income differentials and the propensity to move among EU countries, a variation in mobility flows and in the number of potential cases of export of family benefits is estimated. Finally, taking into account the variation in the number of cases, the different level of benefits and the redistribution of competences between sending and receiving countries envisioned by the policy options, we give an estimate of the variation in expenditure for the export of family benefits for the selected countries.

The status quo scenario is built on a virtual ‘baseline year’, with a defined level of mobility flows and a defined level of expenditure. Changes attributable to the policy options are computed on an annual basis.

In analogy with the parallel study 193 , as a main representative unit of population we take one-earner couples with two children at 100% of the average wage. Average wage levels are derived from Eurostat (earn_nt_net), while the average amounts for family benefits are taken from the parallel study (Pacolet et al., June 2015, table 3). For this assumption of the target population, we estimate both mobility and expenditure changes.

As alternative target populations, we take one-earner families with up to two children and one-earner families with more than two children, taking information on average wage and average amount of family benefits from own elaborations on EU-SILC. In these cases, we only estimate mobility changes.

We decided to focus on one-earner families with different numbers of children since in this case the economic differential potentially generated by the proposed policy options would be higher, compared to the case of two-earner families, increasing the incentive to move.

2.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

The simulation tool takes an average level of flows between two countries to build the status quo scenario. We use the most recent available flow figures from Eurostat, computing averages from the last three available years 194 . The derived annual flows of migration are assumed to be characterizing our countries in our virtual ‘status quo years’ (before policy options are implemented). These migration flows are caused by all factors that influence the mobility decisions of EU citizens, which we do not attempt to model. Based on these existing flows and on the income level of our target households, the impact of the various policy options on the overall income of the household is evaluated.

The income level is set to the sum of the net average household earnings (source is either Eurostat, earn_nt_net, or own elaborations on EU-SILC, see above) and the average child benefit (source is either Pacolet et al., June 2015, table 3, or own elaborations on EU-SILC, see above).

(1)Income = avg_earnings + avg_FB

Income differences between two countries are then defined as:

(2)Income_difference = Income_receiving - Income_sending

It is assumed that the income differences observed in the status quo scenario – along with all other factors that the policy options do not have an impact on – generate the mobility observed in the status quo period both in terms of general mobility flows and in terms of the number of family benefits exported.

The influence of family benefits on mobility is evaluated by calculating the change attributable to the various policy options on the amounts of family benefits paid in relation to the family income in the country of origin.

(3)pct_income_change = chg_ family_benefits(policy option) / Income_sending

Once the income change is calculated, we convert that change into a potential mobility effect. In lack of useful indications from the economic literature on migration, we opted for theoretical assumptions on the elasticity of migration flows to income changes, relating elasticity to income differentials for each combination of countries (42 in total). As a measure for earnings, we consider the net earnings (PPS-adjusted) of a one-earner married couple with two children, at 100% of average wage (Eurostat). For each country, we compute the 2011-13 average value.

Table 2.4.1. Income differentials in the selected countries.

	BE	DE	ES	IE	NL	PL	RO
BE		-8%	36%	5%	-4%	133%	295%
DE	9%		49%	15%	4%	154%	331%
ES	-27%	-33%		-23%	-30%	71%	189%
IE	-5%	-13%	29%		-9%	121%	274%
NL	5%	-4%	43%	10%		144%	313%
PL	-57%	-61%	-41%	-55%	-59%		69%
RO	-75%	-77%	-65%	-73%	-76%	-41%

Source: Eurostat (earn_nt_net, web-based database). Own elaborations.
Values for the countries in rows are at the numerator, values for the countries in column at the denominator.

In the absence of relevant literature on the matter, basing on economic logic we assume the function that relates income differentials to elasticity to have the shape of a reverse U: the highest elasticity corresponds to close-to-null values in the income differential.

Figure 2.4.1. Assumed relation between income differential and elasticity in mobile patterns to income change

The assumption is that, in case of large gaps in mean earnings between countries (either positive or negative, i.e. Polish average salaries compared to German average salaries or vice-versa), the motives to move will not be substantially impacted by marginal changes of income caused by the implementation of the policy options. For a same absolute level of income differential, a lower level of elasticity is attributed when said differentials are negative compared to when they are positive: if a citizen is moving from Denmark to Romania, his/her choice is probably scarcely related to welfare motives.

Table 2.4.2. Elasticity assumptions for the selected countries

	BE	DE	ES	IE	NL	PL	RO
BE		0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4
DE	0.8		0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4
ES	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4
IE	0.8	0.8	0.6		0.8	0.4	0.4
NL	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8		0.4	0.4
PL	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1		0.6
RO	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2

Source: our calculation based on Eurostat (earn_nt_net, web-based database)
Row: Country of destination. Column: Country of origin.

Once elasticity is computed, the percentage of income change can be translated into a mobility percentage change:

pct_mobility_change = elasticity * pct_income_change (3)

The percentage of mobility change can then be translated into a change in mobility flows (in the number of people entitled to family benefits) by relating the calculated percentage change to the absolute number of mobile citizens (people entitled to family benefits) in the status quo case.

Policy option 3 leaves intact the overall amount of the family benefit paid, it only transfers the main competence from receiving to sending countries. As option 3 does not produce variations in income differentials, its impact is not studied at this point, but it is included in the estimation of expenditure changes for the national security systems (see below).

2.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes

Focusing on the population that seems to better represent the target of the policy options, one-earner couples with two children (100% of average wage) 195 , for each of the 7 selected countries we have estimated the changes in terms of expenditure dedicated to the export of family benefits to the other seven countries.

We compute the present level of expenditure by multiplying the number of cases of export of family benefits (Pacolet et al., 2015, table 6) by the average amount of family benefits (Pacolet et al., 2015, table 3).

We then observe the percentage variation of expenditure – total and related to each bilateral relation. When computing the post-policy-option expenditure, we take into account the previously estimated variation in the number of cases of family benefits, the different level of benefits envisioned by policy options 1a and 1b and the redistribution of competences envisioned by policy option 3.

2.5.Case study Member States

The countries proposed for the analysis as case studies are Germany, Belgium, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Spain and Ireland 196 . The proposed countries are chosen as geographically spread across the EU. They include countries which are mainly attracting EU mobile citizens from other member states ( DE; IE) as well as countries that experience strong migration outflows (PL; RO) but also countries within the middle ground (BE; NL; ES). The selection of the 7 MS is derived also by the specific characteristics that regulate the provision and the access to family benefits. Countries’ regulatory framework for family benefits can be summarised as follows:

Table 2.5.1. Overview of principal characteristics of child benefits in the selected countries

Family Benefits
Child Benefits: Dependence on parents income
Fixed Amount	DE, NL, BE, , IE
Means-tested	RO, PL, ES
Level of Child Benefits
High	DE, , IE
Intermediate	NL, BE, (ES)
Low	RO, PL
Child Benefits: Residence requirement
Residence required	BE, ES, , IE, RO
Parents' taxable / working	DE, NL, PL, BE
Other family (cash) benefits
Child-raising income supplement	BE, DE, RO,
Means-tested supplements	NL

Source: MISSOC (web based dataset)

As table 2.5.1 shows, family benefits vary in the amount and in the rules for the determination of the amount. There are countries that provide a fixed amount (DE; NL, BE, , IE); others provide means-tested benefits that are fixed to thresholds (RO, PL) or inversely related to the total income (ES) of the recipient’s parent. Some of the selected countries foresee child benefits for children residing in the country (BE, ES, IE, RO) 197 while others link the child benefit to the place of taxation of the parent (DE, NL, PL) without the requirement that the child live in the same country. Finally, the amount of child benefits varies greatly. The additional (cash) family benefits cover a wide range of cases reflecting the diversity and complexity of the harmonisation process on the matter of EU mobile citizens. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the principal characteristics of the child benefits for the selected countries.

The purpose of the simulation is to estimate the secondary effects of the potential implementation of the policy options on the bilateral relations between the 7 selected MS. Results for each pair of countries are essentially driven by the country-specific figures on migration flows, average levels of family benefits and income differentials with the other countries. The observed results can therefore be imputed to pair of MS countries that present similar characteristics in said aspects.

Annex 4 presents a methodology for an indicative extension of the simulation results to the other EU-28 MS.

3.Status quo Scenario

3.1 Status quo mobility flows

The table below reports the figures of mobility flows in our virtual status quo year, computed as the averages of the most recent values of annual mobility flows among the 7 selected countries 198 . The estimation of the variation in mobility patterns generated by the policy options is derived from the bilateral flows presented in table 3.1.1.

Table 3.1.1. Mobility flows between selected countries. Status quo scenario.
	Country of origin
MS of residence		BE	DE	ES	IE	NL	PL	RO
	BE		4,223	6,725	449	10,431	8,464	7,624
	DE	4,247		15,707	1,918	14,185	149,513	38,314
	ES	3,283	9,720		1,691	3,539	2,841	33,581
	IE	430	1,794	2,447		626	4,155	1,180
	NL	7,820	10,824	5,477	729		14,895	1,744
	PL	107	3,321	155	277	228		15
	RO	77	644	212	26	139	141

Poland and Romania are the two prevalent sending countries among the seven selected. In Ireland, the Netherlands and especially Germany, citizens coming from Poland represent the prevalent share in the migration flows, while Romania is the main country of origin among mobile citizens residing in Spain. Another interesting result concerns the migration flow between neighbouring countries (Belgium-Netherlands, Germany-Netherlands). Germany is also a common receiving country for citizens coming from Spain. The migration flows towards Ireland are moderate, as well as the migration from Ireland to the other selected countries. According to the data, the principal migration flows regards Romania and Poland as sending countries and Belgium, Germany and Spain as receiving countries. The highest migration flow concerns Poland and Germany: 149,513 citizens coming from Poland move to Germany in the virtual ‘status quo year’.

3.2 Status quo target population

According to the current EU provisions on export of family benefits specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation', the exportability of family benefits is regulated as follows:

Example 1

Joanna works in Member State A (which has a higher cost of living than Member State B) while her non-working husband Colin resides with their children in Member State B (which has a lower cost of living than Member State A).

Under the current rules, Joanna is entitled to family benefits in Member State A at the same amount as if her family was residing in Member State A.

Example 2:

Colin works in Member State B (which has a lower cost of living than Member State A) while his non-working wife Joanna resides with their children in Member State A (which has a higher cost of living than Member State B.

Under the current rules, Colin is entitled to family benefits in Member State B at the same amount as if his family was residing in Member State B.

As the examples suggest, the target population of the study are one-earner families in which the person entitled to the exportability of child benefits works and resides in a MS different from the one the dependent family members reside in. The HIVA study 200 allows to identify, for each selected country, the total number of persons entitled to the export of child benefits. The data provided in table 3.2.1 offer an overview of the population interested by the policy options and of the related expenditure in our virtual ‘status quo year’. The table reports the aggregate data of the bilateral relations between the seven selected countries, in terms of number of persons entitled, average values of child benefits, and related estimated expenditure 201 .

Table 3.2.1. Status quo scenario. Number of entitled persons, average amount of child benefit, and related expenditure.

	Persons entitled	Average annual values of child benefits	Estimated annual expenditure
	Number	Amount (in €)	Amount (in €)
BE	6,730	4,268	28,723,640
DE	34,922	4,605	160,815,810
IE	3,112	3,363	10,465,656
ES	30	1,763	52,890
NL	18,663	5,837	108,935,931
PL	-	1,456	-
RO	5,887	177	1,041,999
Total	69,344	3,067	299,581,391

Source: HIVA study (Pacolet et al., 2015). Own elaborations.

According to the HIVA study, in 2013, in the 7 selected countries 69,344 persons were entitled to export child benefits. In absolute terms, Germany is the country with the highest number of persons entitled, followed by the Netherlands. According to the HIVA study, in Spain only 30 EU mobile citizens were entitled to export child benefits.

The annual average values of child benefits vary significantly among the selected countries. Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany present the highest values, ranging between 4,200 euro and 5,800 euro. Romania presents the lowest values of child benefits (177 euro). In 2013, the overall expenditure on the export of child benefits among the selected countries was about 299 millions of euro. Germany and the Netherlands account for over 80% of that expenditure. In Romania and especially in Spain, the reported expenditure is very limited. Unfortunately, according to HIVA study administrative data on the number of persons entitled to the export of child benefits in Poland are not available. It is therefore impossible to estimate the annual expenditure for this country in the status quo scenario. We still decided to keep Poland among the selected countries even if the data on the export of family benefits are not available: as subsection 3.1 shows, the migration flows from Poland towards the other selected countries are the highest among those analysed.

4.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

This section reports the variation of mobility patterns between the selected MS according to the policy options proposed, assessed in relation to the status quo scenario. The mobility patterns are estimated for three categories of population. This section presents the results of the analysis for one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings. Results for the other categories of population presented above - one-earner married couples with up to two children and one-earner married couples with three or more children- are reported in annex 2. The figures are presented in aggregate terms for each MS, while the detailed results of the bilateral relations between the 7 selected MS are again presented in annex 2 202 .

As previously stated, in the estimation of mobility changes we assume all factors to stay constant but the income differential impacted by the policy options analysed.

As stated in sub-section 4.2.1, the estimation of changes in mobility only concerns policy option 1. Policy option 3 merely envisions a redistribution of competence (from receiving to sending country), with no change in the benefits paid to recipients. Since in our simulation tool mobility changes are only caused by the economic differentials generated by a modification to the current regulations, policy option 3 implies no mobility change.

Figure 4.1. Variation in mobility flows. Policy options 1a and 1b (one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings)

Source: our calculations based on data from Pacolet et al. (2015) and Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database)

Figure 4.1 shows the estimated intra-EU mobility flows as impacted by the implementation of policy options 1a and 1b. According to policy option 1a, the amount of the exported family benefits has to be adjusted (upward and downward) to the living standard in the Member State of residence of the child(ren). In the case of policy option 1b, said adjustment cannot exceed the amount of the family benefits provided in the member state of primary competence.

In aggregate terms, with the exception of Poland and Romania, policy option 1 generates a slight reduction in (net) migration flows. The Netherlands present the highest reductions in percentage terms. Policy option 1 (a and b) produces a decrease of 4.0% of the estimated migration inflow defined in the status quo scenario. In Germany, a slight difference between policy option 1a and policy option 1b is registered. In the latter case, this country experiences a reduction of the overall migration inflow from the other six countries equal to 3.2%, while in the case of policy option 1a the reduction is of 3.1%. In Belgium, the two policy options analysed produce a more marked difference. Although the impact on mobility flows of the policy option is generally limited, the effect of policy option 1b is two times higher than policy option 1a (2.2% to 1.1%). Spain and Ireland show similar results. In Poland and Romania, while policy option 1b does not generate any change in mobility, policy option 1a causes an increase in mobility towards these countries (3.2% and 8.4% for Poland and Romania respectively). This happens because the absence of a threshold for the upward adjustment on the amount of family benefits incentivizes EU mobile citizens to move to Poland and Romania. Because all factors but family benefits stay constant, the increase in family benefits generates a net incentive to move.

When the upward adjustment is limited to the amount provided by the competent Member State (policy option 1b), no change in the income differentials observed in the status quo scenario is produced, nor is the incentive to move generated, which results in no change in mobility.

As regards the bilateral relations, the main results concern the migration flows of EU mobile citizens coming from Poland and Romania. In the policy option considered, this population accounts for the majority of the reduction of migration flows for the other MS analysed. For Germany, Belgium and Ireland, the reduction of EU mobile citizens coming from Spain represents a significant share of the overall decrease in the migration flows to these countries. In the Netherlands, in addition to EU mobile citizens coming from Poland and Spain, an important reduction in migration flows is imputable to neighbouring countries. Respectively 17.0% and 15.3% of the decrease in the Dutch aggregate migration flow is attributable to citizens coming from Germany and Belgium (see annex 2 for the detailed bilateral relations).

Figure 4.2 shows the variation in potential target population according to the policy options analysed 203 . The figure presents, for each MS, the changes in percentage terms of the population that applies for the export of family benefits compared to the figures in the status quo scenario (see tab. 3.1.1). The figures report variations in target population attributable to changes in the economic differential in the case of policy option 1, and to the redistribution of competences in the case of policy option 3 204 . Policy option 3 is in a way ‘splitting’ the competence between country of work and country of residence of the children. In the following results, variations in the target population attributed to policy option 3 are only relative to the share of population to which countries are primary competent. When estimating expenditure variations, integrations are also taken into account.

In general, the variations in target population generated by policy option 1 are very moderate, between 3.9% and -3.7%, and with the exception of Belgium and Romania (policy option 1a), in all countries the result is a reduction in the export of family benefits. In absolute terms, the higher variations in target population are experienced by Germany and the Netherlands. In policy option 1b, the latter shows a reduction of the target population equal to 700 EU mobile citizens, while the reduction in Germany is of 962. Among the other countries considered, with the exclusion of Spain, in which policy option 1 affects only a very limited number of EU mobile citizens, and Romania, in which policy option 1a results in a increase of target population equal to 231 EU mobile citizens, in the other countries, policy option 1 results in a decrease of target population between 58 and 94 EU mobile citizens 205 .

Figure 4.2. Variation in potential target population. Policy options 1a, 1b, 3 (one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings).

Source: our calculations based on data from Pacolet et al. (2015) and Eurostat (earn_nt_net; web-based database). No variation can be estimated for Poland, for which no administrative data on the export of family benefits are available in the status scenario. It has to be stressed that, according to the administrative data collected by the HIVA study (Pacolet et al., 2015) in Spain the number of cases of exportation of family benefits is extremely low: only 37 overall, in 2013.

Policy option 3 results in a decrease in the number of EU mobile citizens entitled to the export of family benefits for the majority of countries considered. Only Spain records a - very important - increase in the target population. This, however, is attributable to the fact that, according to the administrative data collected by the HIVA study, only 30 EU mobile citizens coming from the other 6 selected countries that reside in Spain export family benefits in 2013 (and in our status quo scenario), while the number of family benefits claimed in the other 6 selected countries by EU mobile citizens coming from Spain is as high as 6,705. The inversion of competences therefore produces an considerable change in the target population.

In countries characterised by immigration rather than emigration, like Germany and Ireland, policy option 3 results in a reduction of the target population higher than 87%. In the Netherlands, characterised by significant migration flows towards Germany and Belgium, policy option 3 results in a more mild reduction in target population (63.9%) compared to the aforementioned countries. Similarly, in Belgium the reduction of target population is limited by the significant share of EU mobile citizens with Belgium as country of previous residence that apply for the export of family benefits in the Netherlands. Surprisingly, even Romania experiences a decrease in target population. This reduction is due to the high number of family benefits claimed in Romania by EU mobile citizens that previously resided in Spain, which alone outnumbers the family benefits asked by EU mobile citizens coming from Romania in the other 6 selected countries (see annex 2 for the detailed result of the bilateral relations).

5.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes

This section reports the estimated changes of expenditure of family benefits devoted to the target population compared to the figures observed in the status quo scenario, for each MS analysed and according to the various policy options. The results discussed in this section are referred to the representative category of the potential target population: one-earner couples at 100% of average earning with up to two children. The results are presented in aggregate terms for each MS, while the detailed results of the bilateral relations between the 8 MS considered are presented in annex 3.

As reported in section 2.4.2, in defining the expenditures changes we take into account the variation in the target population (due to both mobility changes and variations in the relevant regulations), the different level of benefits envisioned by policy options 1a and 1b and the redistribution of competences envisioned by policy option 3.

With the exception of Romania 206 policy option 1 provokes a relevant reduction in percentage terms of the expenditure for child benefits paid to the target population (figure 5.1). In Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, only a small difference is registered between the effects of policy options 1a and 1b. In Belgium, the differences between sub-options are most pronounced. Policy option 1a implicates a reduction of expenditure for the export of family benefits of 8.8%, while the estimated saving of policy option 1b is equal to 30.8%. In Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland the cost changes generated by policy option 1 are higher than half the previous expenditure. Even though Spain presents percentage variations in line with the other selected countries, since the number of family benefits exported is very limited, the savings generated by policy option 1a and 1b are extremely low in monetary terms (around € 36,000 for policy option 1a and just above € 42,000 for policy option 1b). Romania is the only country that registers an increase of expenditure for the export of child benefits when policy option 1a is applied. The difference between the average amount of child benefits paid in Romania and those of the other selected MS causes a high increase (in percentage terms) in the expenditure for the export of child benefits. As Figure 5.1 shows, the expenditure variation for Romania is of 1058.8%. Similarly to the results observed for mobility changes, when the upward adjustment is limited to the amount provided by the competent Member State (policy option 1b), no change in expenditure is observed.

In policy option 3 the country of residence of the child has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of the family benefit to which entitlement exists under its national rules. The country of work will top up this amount if the level of family benefits is higher there. In Belgium and especially in Spain, this policy option results in an increase of the expenditure devoted to the export of child benefits.

Figure 5.1. Variation of expenditure for the export of family benefits. Policy options 1a, 1b and 3 (one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings).

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet et al. (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database). No variation can be estimated for Poland, for which no administrative data on the export of family benefits are available in the status scenario. It has to be stressed that, according to the administrative data collected by the HIVA study (Pacolet et al., 2015) in Spain the number of cases of exportation of family benefits is extremely low: only 37 overall, in 2013.

As figure 4.2 shows, in Spain, policy option 3 generates an extreme increase in the target population. In the status quo scenario, only a very limited number family benefits are recorded to be exported from Spain (only 30 to the other 6 selected countries), but EU mobile citizens who have Spain as country of previous residence represent an important share of the target population in the other 6 selected MS, especially in Germany, Romania and the Netherlands. Under policy option 3, the number of family benefits Spain has to pay for therefore increase dramatically, generating an extremely high increase in expenditure (+22329.1%). However, it has to be considered that this expenditure variation could represent an overestimation. In Spain the access to family benefits is mean-tested, and only families with income per year below €11,519.16. (or €17,337.05 in the case of families with 3 dependent children) are eligible. The simulation tool used in this study is based on aggregate data at national level and does not allow taking into account the families’ income distribution. Eurostat data suggest that in 2013 less than 18% of the families residing in Spain had an income below €13,524 (second quartile top cut-off point). Hence, we can assess that, even if policy option 3 in Spain could generate a significant increase in the expenditure for the export of family benefits, the variation proposed is likely overestimated 207 .

In Belgium, the increase of expenditure for the export of child benefits (15.1%) derives primarily from the export of family benefits to the Netherlands. In the Netherlands the average amount of family benefits are higher than in Belgium. Hence the difference between the average amount of child benefits generates an increase of expenditure for Belgium estimated to be around a fifth of the expenditure defined in the status quo scenario. In Germany, an important share of the overall variation of expenditures, is due to the payment that the country’s finances would sustain to top up the gap between the amount of child benefits in Poland and in Germany, when Poland is the country of residence of the family members. In Ireland, the combination of the bilateral relations among the selected MS generates a reduction of expenditure for the export of child benefits of 37.6%. According to the data collected by Pacolet et al. (2015), there are plenty of mobile citizens entitled to the export of family benefits in Romania that have their family members in Spain. The redistribution of competences envisioned by policy option 3 actually reduces the number of benefits to be paid by Romania: the expenditure decreases by 29.0%.

Table 5.1 shows the bilateral distribution of the expenditure that each MS considered sustains in the export of family benefit in relation to the other six selected MS.

Table 5.1. Bilateral variation of expenditure export of family benefits for aggregate expenditure for family benefits, policy option 1a and 1b (one-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings).

Country of Residence	BELGIUM						GERMANY
Country of origin	DE	ES	IE	NL	PL	RO	BE	ES	IE	NL	PL	RO
status quo	3,2%	5,8%	0,2%	52,1%	33,6%	5,0%	1,6%	1,9%	0,1%	9,1%	77,0%	10,3%
P.o. 1a	3,9%	2,5%	0,2%	80,9%	12,2%	0,2%	3,8%	1,8%	0,2%	31,3%	61,9%	1,0%
P.o. 1b	4,7%	3,3%	0,2%	75,3%	16,1%	0,3%	4,1%	1,9%	0,2%	25,9%	66,8%	1,1%

Country of Residence	SPAIN						IRELAND
Country of origin	BE	DE	IE	NL	PL	RO	BE	DE	ES	NO	PL	RO
status quo	0,0%	6,7%	0,0%	0,0%	6,7%	86,7%	0,1%	0,5%	1,9%	0,0%	94,2%	3,0%
P.o. 1a	0,0%	55,6%	0,0%	0,0%	17,6%	26,8%	0,4%	1,7%	2,3%	0,0%	94,0%	0,4%
P.o. 1b	0,0%	32,4%	0,0%	0,0%	26,8%	40,8%	0,3%	1,2%	2,3%	0,0%	95,1%	0,4%

Country of Residence	the NETHERLANDS						ROMANIA
Country of origin	BE	DE	ES	IE	PL	RO	BE	DE	ES	IE	NL	PL
status quo	27,2%	21,6%	1,6%	0,1%	48,9%	0,5%	1,2%	4,6%	90,4%	1,6%	0,4%	0,7%
P.o. 1a	40,0%	34,5%	0,9%	0,1%	24,3%	0,0%	2,6%	11,3%	80,0%	2,9%	1,3%	0,5%
P.o. 1b	40,0%	34,5%	0,9%	0,1%	24,3%	0,0%	1,2%	4,6%	90,4%	1,6%	0,4%	0,7%

Country of Residence	POLAND
Country of origin	BE	DE	ES	IE	NL	RO
status quo	-	-	-	-	-	-
P.o. 1a	-	-	-	-	-	-
P.o. 1b	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet et al. (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database). No variation can be estimated for Poland, for which no data on the export of family benefits are available in the staus quo scenario. It has to be stressed that the number of cases of exportation of family benefits recorded by the HIVA study (Pacolet et al., 2015) for Spain is extremely low: only 37 overall, in 2013.

In Germany and Ireland the majority of the expenditure for the export of family benefits is devoted to EU mobile citizens coming from Poland. In Ireland the policy option 1 does not impact on the share of expenditure received by this population, which accounts for around 95% of the aggregate expenditure. In Germany policy option 1 (a and b) results in a decrease in the analysed chapter of expenditure. Additionally, in Germany, policy option 1 involves an increase of the share of expenditure of export of family benefits directed to EU mobile citizens how have the Netherlands as country of origin. This population – EU mobile citizens coming from the Netherlands – represents an relevant chapter of expenditures also for Belgium. In policy option 1, the Belgian expenditure for the export of family benefits devoted to this population ranges between 75% and 80%. In the Netherlands, policy option 1 halves the cost of export of family benefits sustained for EU mobile citizens coming from Poland. As a result, the aggregate expenditure for the export of family benefits among the countries considered is more or less evenly shared between EU mobile citizens coming from Belgium, Germany and Poland. Similarly in Spain, policy option 1 significantly reduces the share of expenditure for export of family benefits sustained for EU mobile citizens coming from Romania. This variation is compensated by an increase of the share of expenditure related to citizens coming from Germany and Poland. In Romania, while policy option 1b does not produce any variation in the distribution of the expenditure, policy option 1a generates only a small changes in the chapters of expenditure devoted to EU mobile citizens coming from Spain and Germany.

In order to provide a benchmark for the evaluation of expenditure variations, figure 5.2 reports the expenditure for the export of family benefits paid to EU mobile citizens coming from the other 6 selected countries as a ratio of the GDP, in the status quo scenario and in each policy option.

Figure 5.2. Expenditure variation in % GDP (2013), Status quo and policy option scenarios

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet et al. (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net, nama_10_gdp; web-based database).

The figure indicates that in all scenarios the expenditure for the export of family benefits devoted to the target population is very limited: in no case does the value go over 0.015% of the GDP. In Romania, policy option 1a produces a significant increase in the expenditure for the export of family benefits in absolute terms, but the share of GDP involved is still of little relevance, rising from 0.0007% in the status quo scenario to 0.0083%. As already observed, in Belgium, Germany and Ireland the expenditure variations between the status quo scenario and the policy options are moderate. In the Netherlands, policy option 1 reduces the expenditure by half while policy option 3 generates only a limited saving. In Poland, according to the available data, it is only possible to estimate the expenditure for the export of family benefits related to policy option 3 208 . In this case, the expenditure that this country sustains in order to provide family benefits to EU mobile citizens coming from this MS and residing in one of the other six MS considered is equal to 0.0152% of the GDP.

5.2 Possible effects of family reunifications

The approach followed by the study at hand does not allow to specifically account for the event of family reunifications, i.e. the dependant family members reuniting with the mobile citizen that is entitled to the family benefit. Some considerations are however possible and seem appropriate in analysing the matter at hand.

As a general note, if dependent family members were to reunite with the working partner/parent working in another MS, they would nullify the effects of all of the policy options. We shall then analyse how the economic incentives generated by the policy options may influence the decision to reunite of European families.

Under policy options 1a and 1b, dependent family members residing in the poorer countries (in terms of the level of family benefits computed) will have an incentive to reunite with their mobile working relative, so to avoid the reduction in the family benefit (which under policy options 1a and 1b would be computed at the level of the country of residence of the children). Let us take the example of a European citizen that resides and works in Belgium, while her partner and their children are in Romania. Following the implementation of policy option 1a or 1b, the household would see the family benefit reduced from the level of Belgium to the one of Romania. The dependent family members would have an incentive to move to Belgium in order to get higher benefits. If this incentive trumps the costs of moving (this is probably the case when the decision to migrate is a long-term one), the family members residing in the poorer country will move to the richer and offset the effect of the policy option.

If all families residing in poorer countries were to react according to the economic incentive produced by policy options 1a and 1b, they would nullify the effects of the policies, i.e. in our example, Belgium would have to pay family benefits at the Belgian level.

On the contrary, dependent family members residing in richer countries would have a disincentive to reunite with their mobile working relative under policy option 1a, since by doing so they would lose the entitlement to higher benefits.

Let us take the example of a European citizen that resides and works in Poland, while her partner and their children are in Germany. Following the implementation of policy option 1a, the household would see the family benefit increased from the level of Poland to the one of Germany. The dependent family members would have a disincentive to move to Poland, because that would mean getting a lower benefit.

If this disincentive is trumped by some incentive to reunite (this is probably the case when the decision to migrate is a long-term one), the family members residing in the poorer country will move to the richer and offset the effect of the policy option.

Instead, if all families residing in richer countries were to react according to the economic incentive produced by policy options 1a, the effects of the policies would stay intact.

If policy option 1b is implemented, because of the limits imposed on the level of benefits computed, no variation in the household income is envisioned, i.e. in our example, the household would see the family benefit stay at the Polish level and the incentives to reunite would not be altered.

In addition, as noticed above, no variation in the level of family benefits is imputable to policy option 4 (only changes in competence priorities are envisioned). Therefore, the economic incentives to reunite would not be altered, neither in poor-to-rich nor in rich-to-poor relations.

Table 5.3. The estimated effects of family reunifications

Policy option	Country relation	New incentive produced	Effect if reunification is determined by the new incentives produced	Effect if reunification happens nonetheless
2A	Poor-to-rich	Incentive to move	P.O. effects nullified	P.O. effects nullified
	Rich-to-poor	Disincentive to move	P.O. effects intact	P.O. effects nullified
2B	Poor-to-rich	Incentive to move	P.O. effects nullified	P.O. effects nullified
	Rich-to-poor	None	P.O. effects intact	P.O. effects nullified
4	Poor-to-rich	None	P.O. effects intact	P.O. effects nullified
	Rich-to-poor	None	P.O. effects intact	P.O. effects nullified

6.Conclusions

The aim of the study is to assess the secondary effects of the proposed modification to the current EU provisions on the export of family benefits, as specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation'. Such secondary effects include changes in the overall mobility of citizens, in the number of individuals entitled to the exportation of family benefits and in the level of expenditure attributable to the item.

To this end, we have selected 7 MS as part of the case study, with consideration to the level of representativeness of the group as regards the whole EU. For each MS, we have defined size and characteristics of the population potentially interested by the policy changes, as well as the relative expenditure for the export of child benefits. Against this ‘status quo scenario’, we have estimated the impact of the various policy changes.

A simulation tool has been defined in order to estimate the potential mobility changes attributable to the economic differentials generated by the three policy options. The second step of the analysis has concerned the estimation of the changes of public expenditure devoted to the child benefits paid to the target population.

In order to proceed with the estimate, key assumptions had to be made on the elasticity of potentially mobile EU citizens to changes in income differentials among countries, which are expected to impact the incentives to move across countries (see par. 2.4).

Results generally show mild reductions in mobility changes (see fig. 4.1) attributable to the potential implementation of the policy options. Limited differences can be noted for the two policy options tested for mobility changes (1a and 1b). Excluding Poland and Romania, the other MSs analysed show a slight decrease in migration flows. The variations range between -0.2% and -4%.

Because the benefits paid in Poland and Romania in the status quo scenario are lower than those paid in the other selected MS, the implementation of policy option 1a produces an incentive to move to these countries and an increase in mobility from the other 6 MS of respectively 3.2% and 8.3%.

When the upward adjustment is limited to the amount provided by the competent Member State (policy option 1b), the negative impact of mobility flows is slightly increased in most countries, while the change in mobility is null for Poland and Romania.

In relation to expenditure changes 209 generated by policy options and mobility changes, as much as the percentage variations on expenditure levels may reach high values, variations shown in absolute terms and as ratios of GDP confirm the little relevance for national budgets of the expenditure for the exportation of family benefits (see fig. 5.2).

However, we can presume that some families may react to the implementation of policy options 1a and 1b by reuniting in the country of residence of the working parent. Dependant family members residing in the poorer countries will indeed have an incentive to reunite with their mobile working relative, so to avoid the reduction in the family benefit (which under policy option 1a and 1b would be computed at the level of the country of residence of the children). If all families residing in poorer countries were to react according to the economic incentive produced by policy options 1a and 1b, they would nullify the effects of the policies.

On the contrary, dependant family members residing in richer countries would have a disincentive to reunite with their mobile working relative under policy option 1a, since by doing so they would lose the entitlement to higher benefits (while they would experience no difference under policy option 1b).

As already noticed, no variation in the level of family benefits perceived is imputable to policy option 3. Therefore, no economic incentive to reunite families would be produced.

Annex 1 – List of Family benefits within the scope of the study (source MISSOC).

The MISSOC Comparative Tables Database contains detailed information on social protection in 32 countries. However MISSOC gives a description of the purely national legislation and often does not take into account the application of Regulation 883/2004, while in many MS the Regulation directly applies and has priority over national law. The scope of this table is to provide a indicative overview of the characteristics of the family benefits under the national legislation in the 7 selected MS.

	Name or act	Conditions	Age limit and child residence	Benefit amount
Belgium	General Act of 19 December 1939 on Child Benefits (Loi générale du 19 décembre 1939 relative aux allocations familiales (LGAF)/ Algemene kinderbijslagwet (AKBW)) (as amended by the act of 4 April 2014)	* The beneficiary must have a parental, alliance, adoption or unofficial guardianship link with the child. * No variation with income.	Normal: 18 years. Vocational training: 25 years. Further education: 25 years. The child must be brought up in Belgium and follow his studies there and not abroad.	1st child: € 90.28 2nd child: € 167.05 3rd child and subsequent children: € 249.41 Variation with age. Monthly age supplements Children in 1st order, receiving the normal rate (i.e. not entitled to the supplement for single parent families or to a social supplement and who are not disabled): aged 6 – 12: € 15.73 aged 12 - 18: € 23.95 aged 18 or more: € 27.6
Germany	Kindergeld	Taxable persons residing in Germany or persons subject to income taxation there without restrictions for their own children, adopted children or dependent children Universal scheme, not means-tested.	18 years. Prolongation to 21 for registered jobseekers, and to 25 for student and working student (less than 20 hours a week) The child must reside in Germany or in another EU or EEA Member State or in Switzerland	1st and 2nd child: € 184 3rd child: € 190 4th and subsequent: € 215
Spain	Prestaciones por hijo a cargo	* Parents or persons in charge of the child, legally resident in Spain	* 18 years. * The child must be resident in Spain	* Child Benefit (12 payments per year): Children under 18 years of age:€24.25; * No benefit if the family income per year exceeds €11,519.16. This ceiling increases up to €17,337.05 for families with 3 dependent children. This amount increases by €2,808.12 for each dependent child after and including the fourth child.
Poland	N/A	The beneficiaries must be either: Polish citizens, foreigners who fall within the scope of the law on co-ordination of social security schemes or bilateral agreement on social security, foreigners staying in the territory of Poland who hold refugee status or residence permit if they reside in the territory of Poland together with family members. contributory and means-tested	The condition of residence of the child must be fulfilled only in relation to foreigners who: have neither EU nor EEA nor Swiss citizenship, hold refugee status or residence permit. Less than 18 years,* the end of the child’s education at school	Family income per capita must not exceed PLN 539 (€130) (in 2014) per month (PLN 623 (€150) in the case of families with a disabled child). The monthly amounts per child depend on the age: under 5 years: PLN 77 (€18), 5 - 18 years: PLN 106 (€25), 18 - 24 years: PLN 115 (€28)
Romania	Alocatie de stat pentru copii	* Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget * means-tested. * Child cohabiting with his/her parent(s)	18 years (or secondary or post-secondary graduation age) Domicile or residence in Romania	The monthly amount varies with the age of children and the Reference Social Indicator(RSI) Ceiling: The total amount of social assistance benefits accrued by a single person or a family may not exceed a certain coefficient set annually by Government Decision and which is related to the RSI
The Netherlands	Algemene Kinderbijslagwet (AKW); Wet op het kindgebonden budget (WKB) • Tegemoetkoming ouders van thuiswonende gehandicapte kinderen (TOG) • Wet Kinderopvang en kwaliteitseisen peuterspeelzalen	all (insured) residents whatever their nationality who work in the Netherlands and consequently pay tax on wages, and also maintain the child. Universal scheme, not means-tested (AKW),means-tested (WKB)	* Child up to 18 years of age *Both AKW and WKB are also paid for children who live in an EU or EEA country or Switzerland	AKW: up to 5 years: €63.88 / 6-11 years: €77.57 / 12-17 years: €91.26. The benefits are paid per quarter. WKB ceiling: above the threshold of €26,147 the allowance is reduced by 7.6% of the difference between the family income and €26,147. Income limit: €102,499 for a single person or €123,638 for partners. The benefit amount decreases as income rises. Monthly amount per children: 1 child: €39,529; 2children: €46,581; 3 children: €48,989; 4 children: €50,384; (...) 8 children: €55,963.
Ireland	Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (act)	* Child Benefit is a monthly payment, paid to the child's mother or step-mother; however it may be paid to the father or step-father if the child is living with and being supported by them. * No variation with income.	No variation with age Normal: up to 16th birthday Further education: up to 18th birthday Child must be normally living with and being supported by recipient.	€130 per child. In cases of triplets, quadruplets and other multiple births the allowance for each child is doubled. In the case of twins the allowance is one and a half times the first child payment

Source: MISSOC

Annex 2 – Secondary effects: estimation of mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Table 2.1 Secondary effects: estimation of mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs. One-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings

		Status quo			Policy option 1A				Policy option 1B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Mobility flow	Export of FB	Elasticity	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in export of FB	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in export of FB
BE	DE	4223	218	0.8	0.89%	0.7%	30	2	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
BE	ES	6725	389	0.6	-6.25%	-3.7%	-252	-15	-6.25%	-3.7%	-252	-15
BE	IE	449	13	0.8	-2.68%	-2.1%	-10	0	-2.68%	-2.1%	-10	0
BE	NL	10431	3505	0.8	4.46%	3.6%	373	125	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
BE	PL	8464	2259	0.4	-7.14%	-2.9%	-242	-65	-7.14%	-2.9%	-242	-65
BE	RO	7624	336	0.4	-10.27%	-4.1%	-313	-14	-10.27%	-4.1%	-313	-14
DE	BE	4247	543	0.8	-0.89%	-0.7%	-30	-4	-0.89%	-0.7%	-30	-4
DE	ES	15707	647	0.6	-7.10%	-4.3%	-670	-28	-7.10%	-4.3%	-670	-28
DE	IE	1918	35	0.8	-3.55%	-2.8%	-55	-1	-3.55%	-2.8%	-55	-1
DE	NL	14185	3194	0.8	3.55%	2.8%	403	91	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
DE	PL	149513	26901	0.4	-7.99%	-3.2%	-4780	-860	-7.99%	-3.2%	-4780	-860
DE	RO	38314	3585	0.4	-11.10%	-4.4%	-1702	-159	-11.10%	-4.4%	-1702	-159
ES	BE	3283	0	0.2	10.45%	2.1%	69	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
ES	DE	9720	2	0.2	11.95%	2.4%	232	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
ES	IE	1691	0	0.2	5.97%	1.2%	20	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
ES	NL	3539	0	0.2	17.92%	3.6%	127	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
ES	PL	2841	2	0.6	-1.49%	-0.9%	-25	0	-1.49%	-0.9%	-25	0
ES	RO	33581	26	0.4	-6.72%	-2.7%	-903	-1	-6.72%	-2.7%	-903	-1
IE	BE	430	4	0.8	2.90%	2.3%	10	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
IE	DE	1794	16	0.8	3.86%	3.1%	55	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
IE	ES	2447	58	0.6	-3.86%	-2.3%	-57	-1	-3.86%	-2.3%	-57	-1
IE	NL	626	9	0.8	7.73%	6.2%	39	1	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
IE	PL	4155	2932	0.4	-4.83%	-1.9%	-80	-57	-4.83%	-1.9%	-80	-57
IE	RO	1180	93	0.4	-8.21%	-3.3%	-39	-3	-8.21%	-3.3%	-39	-3
NL	BE	7820	5081	0.8	-4.18%	-3.3%	-262	-170	-4.18%	-3.3%	-262	-170
NL	DE	10824	4030	0.8	-3.34%	-2.7%	-290	-108	-3.34%	-2.7%	-290	-108
NL	ES	5477	291	0.6	-10.03%	-6.0%	-330	-18	-10.03%	-6.0%	-330	-18
NL	IE	729	18	0.8	-6.69%	-5.4%	-39	-1	-6.69%	-5.4%	-39	-1
NL	PL	14895	9131	0.4	-10.87%	-4.3%	-648	-397	-10.87%	-4.3%	-648	-397
NL	RO	1744	90	0.4	-13.80%	-5.5%	-96	-5	-13.80%	-5.5%	-96	-5
PL	BE	107	0	0.1	29.90%	3.0%	3	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
PL	DE	3321	0	0.1	33.64%	3.4%	112	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
PL	ES	155	0	0.2	3.74%	0.7%	1	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
PL	IE	277	0	0.1	18.69%	1.9%	5	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
PL	NL	228	0	0.1	48.59%	4.9%	11	0	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
PL	RO	15	0	0.6	-13.09%	-7.9%	-1	0	-13.09%	-7.9%	-1	0
RO	BE	77	68	0.1	88.76%	8.9%	7	6	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
RO	DE	644	272	0.1	96.48%	9.6%	62	26	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
RO	ES	212	5320	0.1	34.74%	3.5%	7	185	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
RO	IE	26	97	0.1	65.61%	6.6%	2	6	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
RO	NL	139	23	0.1	127.35%	12.7%	18	3	0.00%	0.0%	0	0
RO	PL	141	39	0.2	27.02%	5.4%	8	2	0.00%	0.0%	0	0

Source: Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, migr_imm1ctz, earn_nt_net, web-based database); Pacolet et al. (2015).

Table 2.2. Secondary effects: estimation of mobility patters. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MS. One-earner married couples with up to two children and One-earner married couples with three or more children.

		One-earner married couples with up to two children								One-earner married couples with three or more children
		policy option 1A				policy option 1B				policy option 1A				policy option 1B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in export of FB	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in export of FB	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in export of FB	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in export of FB
BE	DE	3.9%	3.2%	133	7	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	1.5%	1.2%	49	3	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
BE	ES	3.6%	2.1%	144	8	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	-8.2%	-4.9%	-331	-19	-8.2%	-4.9%	-331	-19
BE	IE	3.4%	2.7%	12	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	2.4%	1.9%	9	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
BE	NL	-2.5%	-2.0%	-206	-69	-2.5%	-2.0%	-206	-69	-6.0%	-4.8%	-501	-168	-6.0%	-4.8%	-501	-168
BE	PL	-3.4%	-1.4%	-115	-31	-3.4%	-1.4%	-115	-31	-10.0%	-4.0%	-339	-91	-10.0%	-4.0%	-339	-91
BE	RO	-5.0%	-2.0%	-153	-7	-5.0%	-2.0%	-153	-7	-11.5%	-4.6%	-352	-16	-11.5%	-4.6%	-352	-16
DE	BE	-3.2%	-2.5%	-108	-14	-3.2%	-2.5%	-108	-14	-1.3%	-1.1%	-46	-6	-1.3%	-1.1%	-46	-6
DE	ES	-0.3%	-0.2%	-30	-1	-0.3%	-0.2%	-30	-1	-8.9%	-5.3%	-836	-34	-8.9%	-5.3%	-836	-34
DE	IE	-0.4%	-0.3%	-6	0	-0.4%	-0.3%	-6	0	0.9%	0.7%	13	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
DE	NL	-5.1%	-4.1%	-584	-131	-5.1%	-4.1%	-584	-131	-6.9%	-5.5%	-778	-175	-6.9%	-5.5%	-778	-175
DE	PL	-5.9%	-2.4%	-3527	-635	-5.9%	-2.4%	-3527	-635	-10.6%	-4.2%	-6310	-1135	-10.6%	-4.2%	-6310	-1135
DE	RO	-7.2%	-2.9%	-1103	-103	-7.2%	-2.9%	-1103	-103	-11.9%	-4.8%	-1831	-171	-11.9%	-4.8%	-1831	-171
ES	BE	-4.0%	-0.8%	-27	0	-4.0%	-0.8%	-27	0	13.2%	2.6%	87	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
ES	DE	0.4%	0.1%	9	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	15.6%	3.1%	303	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
ES	IE	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	17.1%	3.4%	58	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
ES	NL	-6.8%	-1.4%	-48	0	-6.8%	-1.4%	-48	0	3.5%	0.7%	25	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
ES	PL	-7.9%	-4.7%	-135	0	-7.9%	-4.7%	-135	0	-2.9%	-1.8%	-50	0	-2.9%	-1.8%	-50	0
ES	RO	-9.8%	-3.9%	-1310	-1	-9.8%	-3.9%	-1310	-1	-5.4%	-2.2%	-726	-1	-5.4%	-2.2%	-726	-1
IE	BE	-3.3%	-2.7%	-11	0	-3.3%	-2.7%	-11	0	-2.1%	-1.7%	-7	0	-2.1%	-1.7%	-7	0
IE	DE	0.5%	0.4%	7	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	-0.8%	-0.7%	-12	0	-0.8%	-0.7%	-12	0
IE	ES	0.1%	0.1%	2	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	-9.3%	-5.6%	-137	-3	-9.3%	-5.6%	-137	-3
IE	NL	-5.7%	-4.6%	-29	0	-5.7%	-4.6%	-29	0	-7.4%	-5.9%	-37	-1	-7.4%	-5.9%	-37	-1
IE	PL	-6.6%	-2.6%	-110	-78	-6.6%	-2.6%	-110	-78	-10.9%	-4.4%	-182	-128	-10.9%	-4.4%	-182	-128
IE	RO	-8.2%	-3.3%	-39	-3	-8.2%	-3.3%	-39	-3	-12.3%	-4.9%	-58	-5	-12.3%	-4.9%	-58	-5
NL	BE	2.0%	1.6%	127	82	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	5.8%	4.6%	362	235	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
NL	DE	5.3%	4.2%	457	170	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	7.2%	5.8%	623	232	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
NL	ES	5.0%	3.0%	163	9	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	-2.1%	-1.3%	-70	-4	-2.1%	-1.3%	-70	-4
NL	IE	4.9%	3.9%	28	1	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	8.1%	6.5%	47	1	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
NL	PL	-0.8%	-0.3%	-46	-28	-0.8%	-0.3%	-46	-28	-3.9%	-1.6%	-231	-142	-3.9%	-1.6%	-231	-142
NL	RO	-2.1%	-0.8%	-15	-1	-2.1%	-0.8%	-15	-1	-5.3%	-2.1%	-37	-2	-5.3%	-2.1%	-37	-2
PL	BE	12.9%	1.3%	1	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	44.4%	4.4%	5	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
PL	DE	27.8%	2.8%	92	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	50.8%	5.1%	169	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
PL	ES	26.3%	5.3%	8	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	8.1%	1.6%	3	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
PL	IE	25.9%	2.6%	7	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	55.1%	5.5%	15	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
PL	NL	3.6%	0.4%	1	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	17.8%	1.8%	4	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
PL	RO	-6.1%	-3.7%	-1	0	-6.1%	-3.7%	-1	0	-6.7%	-4.0%	-1	0	-6.7%	-4.0%	-1	0
RO	BE	54.4%	5.4%	4	4	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	137.7%	13.8%	11	9	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
RO	DE	97.2%	9.7%	63	26	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	155.1%	15.5%	100	42	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
RO	ES	92.9%	9.3%	20	494	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	39.9%	4.0%	8	212	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
RO	IE	91.6%	9.2%	2	9	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	166.5%	16.6%	4	16	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
RO	NL	27.8%	2.8%	4	1	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	66.1%	6.6%	9	2	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
RO	PL	17.6%	3.5%	5	1	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	18.2%	3.6%	5	1	0.0%	0.0%	0	0

Source: Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, migr_imm1ctz, web-based database); Pacolet et al. (2015) ; EU-SILC.

Annex 3 - Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Table 3.1. Cost variation analysis. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs, policy option 1a, 1b. One-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings

		Status quo			Policy option 1A						Policy option 1B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Export of FB	Expenditure for export of FB	TOTAL Expenditure for export of FB	Change in export of FB	Export of FB	Expenditure for export of FB	% expenditure variation	TOTAL Expenditure for export of FB	% expenditure variation	Change in export of FB	Export of FB	Expenditure for export of FB	% expenditure variation	TOTAL Expenditure for export of FB	% expenditure variation
BE	DE	218	930424.00	€ 28680960	2	220	€ 1,013,126.40	8.9%	€ 26159459	-8,79%	0	218	€ 930,424.00	0.0%	19845609	-30,8%
BE	ES	389	1660252.00		-15	374	€ 659,362.00	-60.3%			-15	374	€ 659,362.00	-60.3%
BE	IE	13	€ 55,484.00		0	13	€ 43,719.00	-21.2%			0	13	€ 43,719.00	-21.2%
BE	NL	3505	€ 14,959,340.00		125	3630	€ 21,190,488.00	41.7%			0	3505	€ 14,959,340.00	0.0%
BE	PL	2259	€ 9,641,412.00		-65	2194	€ 3,195,692.64	-66.9%			-65	2194	€ 3,195,692.64	-66.9%
BE	RO	336	€ 1,434,048.00		-14	322	€ 57,071.28	-96.0%			-14	322	€ 57,071.28	-96.0%
DE	BE	543	€ 2,500,580.16	€ 160741713	-4	539	€ 2,300,452.00	-8.0%	€ 61220110	61,91%	-4	539	€ 2,300,452.00	-8.0%	56752347	-64,7%
DE	ES	647	€ 2,979,512.64		-28	619	€ 1,091,297.00	-63.4%			-28	619	€ 1,091,297.00	-63.4%
DE	IE	35	€ 161,179.20		-1	34	€ 114,342.00	-29.1%			-1	34	€ 114,342.00	-29.1%
DE	NL	3194	€ 14,708,753.28		91	3285	€ 19,176,516.00	30.4%			0	3194	€ 14,708,753.28	0.0%
DE	PL	26901	€ 123,882,333.12		-860	26041	€ 37,930,278.96	-69.4%			-860	26041	€ 37,930,278.96	-69.4%
DE	RO	3585	€ 16,509,355.20		-159	3426	€ 607,224.24	-96.3%			-159	3426	€ 607,224.24	-96.3%
ES	BE	0	€ -	€ 52890	0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!	€ 16554	68,70%	0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!	€ 10.870	-79,4%
ES	DE	2	€ 3,526.00		0	2	€ 9,210.24	161.2%			0	2	€ 3,526.00	0.0%
ES	IE	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
ES	NL	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
ES	PL	2	€ 3,526.00		0	2	€ 2,913.12	-17.4%			0	2	€ 2,913.12	-17.4%
ES	RO	26	€ 45,838.00		-1	25	€ 4,431.00	-90.3%			-1	25	€ 4,431.00	-90.3%
IE	BE	4	€ 13,452.00	€ 10465656	0	4	€ 17,072.00	26.9%	€ 4453182	-57,45%	0	4	€ 13,452.00	0.0%	€ 4.401.580	-57,9%
IE	DE	16	€ 53,808.00		0	16	€ 73,681.92	36.9%			0	16	€ 53,808.00	0.0%
IE	ES	58	€ 195,054.00		-1	57	€ 100,491.00	-48.5%			-1	57	€ 100,491.00	-48.5%
IE	NL	9	€ 30,267.00		1	10	€ 58,376.00	92.9%			0	9	€ 30,267.00	0.0%
IE	PL	2932	€ 9,860,316.00		-57	2875	€ 4,187,610.00	-57.5%			-57	2875	€ 4,187,610.00	-57.5%
IE	RO	93	€ 312,759.00		-3	90	€ 15,951.60	-94.9%			-3	90	€ 15,951.60	-94.9%
NL	BE	5081	€ 29,660,845.60	€ 108818701,6	-170	4911	€ 20,960,148.00	-29.3%	€ 52296559	51,94%	-170	4911	€ 20,960,148.00	-29.3%	€ 52.296.559	-51,9%
NL	DE	4030	€ 23,525,528.00		-108	3922	€ 18,061,280.64	-23.2%			-108	3922	€ 18,061,280.64	-23.2%
NL	ES	291	€ 1,698,741.60		-18	273	€ 481,299.00	-71.7%			-18	273	€ 481,299.00	-71.7%
NL	IE	18	€ 105,076.80		-1	17	€ 57,171.00	-45.6%			-1	17	€ 57,171.00	-45.6%
NL	PL	9131	€ 53,303,125.60		-397	8734	€ 12,721,595.04	-76.1%			-397	8734	€ 12,721,595.04	-76.1%
NL	RO	90	€ 525,384.00		-5	85	€ 15,065.40	-97.1%			-5	85	€ 15,065.40	-97.1%
PL	BE	0	€ -	-	0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!		%	0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	DE	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	ES	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	IE	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	NL	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	RO	0	€ -		0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!			0	0	€ -	#DIV/0!
RO	BE	68	€ 12,052.32	€ 1031359,56	6	74	€ 315,832.00	2520.5%	€ 11951515	1058,81%	0	68	€ 12,052.32	0.0%	€ 1.031.360	0,0%
RO	DE	272	€ 48,209.28		26	298	€ 1,372,325.76	2746.6%			0	272	€ 48,209.28	0.0%
RO	ES	5320	€ 942,916.80		185	5505	€ 9,705,315.00	929.3%			0	5320	€ 942,916.80	0.0%
RO	IE	97	€ 17,192.28		6	103	€ 346,389.00	1914.8%			0	97	€ 17,192.28	0.0%
RO	NL	23	€ 4,076.52		3	26	€ 151,777.60	3623.2%			0	23	€ 4,076.52	0.0%
RO	PL	39	€ 6,912.36		2	41	€ 59,876.08	766.2%			0	39	€ 6,912.36	0.0%

Source: Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, migr_imm1ctz, earn_nt_net, web-based database); Pacolet et al. (2015).

Table 3.2. Cost variation analysis. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs, policy option 4. One-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings

		Status quo			Policy option 3
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Export of FB	Expenditure for export of FB	TOTAL Expenditure for export of FB	Expenditure for export of FB (country of residence) POST policy	Expenditure for export of FB (country of origin) POST policy	TOTAL expenditure for export of FB (considering competence as country of residence and as country of origin) POST policy	% expenditure variation
BE	DE	218	€ 930,424.00	€ 28680960	€ -	€ 1,003,916.16	€ 33.022.276	15,1%
BE	ES	389	€ 1,660,252.00		€ 974,445.00	€ 685,807.00
BE	IE	13	€ 55,484.00		€ 11,765.00	€ 43,719.00
BE	NL	3505	€ 14,959,340.00		€ -	€ 20,460,788.00
BE	PL	2259	€ 9,641,412.00		€ 6,351,042.96	€ 3,290,369.04
BE	RO	336	€ 1,434,048.00		€ 1,374,495.36	€ 59,552.64
DE	BE	543	€ 2,500,580.16	€ 160741713	€ 183,056.16	€ 2,317,524.00	€ 123.536.779	-23,1%
DE	ES	647	€ 2,979,512.64		€ 1,838,851.64	€ 1,140,661.00
DE	IE	35	€ 161,179.20		€ 43,474.20	€ 117,705.00
DE	NL	3194	€ 14,708,753.28		€ -	€ 18,645,294.40
DE	PL	26901	€ 123,882,333.12		€ 84,699,412.56	€ 39,182,920.56
DE	RO	3585	€ 16,509,355.20		€ 15,873,949.80	€ 635,405.40	€ 11.862.758	22329,1%
ES	BE	0	€ -	€ 52890	€ -	€ -
ES	DE	2	€ 3,526.00		€ -	€ 9,210.24
ES	IE	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
ES	NL	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
ES	PL	2	€ 3,526.00		€ 612.88	€ 2,913.12
ES	RO	26	€ 45,838.00		€ 41,229.76	€ 4,608.24	€ 6.526.927	-37,6%
IE	BE	4	€ 13,452.00	€ 10465656	€ -	€ 17,072.00
IE	DE	16	€ 53,808.00		€ -	€ 73,681.92
IE	ES	58	€ 195,054.00		€ 92,800.00	€ 102,254.00
IE	NL	9	€ 30,267.00		€ -	€ 52,538.40
IE	PL	2932	€ 9,860,316.00		€ 5,589,682.08	€ 4,270,633.92
IE	RO	93	€ 312,759.00		€ 296,275.68	€ 16,483.32
NL	BE	5081	€ 29,660,845.60	€ 108818701,6	€ 7,975,137.60	€ 21,685,708.00	€ 93.977.878	-13,6%
NL	DE	4030	€ 23,525,528.00		€ 4,966,894.40	€ 18,558,633.60
NL	ES	291	€ 1,698,741.60		€ 1,185,708.60	€ 513,033.00
NL	IE	18	€ 105,076.80		€ 44,542.80	€ 60,534.00
NL	PL	9131	€ 53,303,125.60		€ 40,003,276.24	€ 13,299,849.36
NL	RO	90	€ 525,384.00		€ 509,432.40	€ 15,951.60
PL	BE	0	€ -	-	€ -	€ -	€ 60.103.492
PL	DE	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
PL	ES	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
PL	IE	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
PL	NL	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
PL	RO	0	€ -		€ -	€ -
RO	BE	68	€ 12,052.32	€ 1031359,56	€ -	€ 290,224.00	€ 732.001	-29,0%
RO	DE	272	€ 48,209.28		€ -	€ 1,252,592.64
RO	ES	5320	€ 942,916.80		€ -	€ 9,379,160.00
RO	IE	97	€ 17,192.28		€ -	€ 326,211.00
RO	NL	23	€ 4,076.52		€ -	€ 134,264.80
RO	PL	39	€ 6,912.36		€ -	€ 56,805.84

Source: Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, migr_imm1ctz, earn_nt_net, web-based database); Pacolet et al. (2015).

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries

For each of the 7 selected countries, table 4.1 offers elements for an indicative extension of the results observed.

Underneath the selected countries, in the first column, the income differential is computed by dividing the expected income values of the row countries (inclusive of the average level of family benefits) by the expected income values of the column countries. In analogy with par. 2.4.1, expected incomes are computed according to the formula:

Income = avg_earnings + avg_FB

The second column reports the quota of EU-mobile citizens coming from the row countries on the total of EU-mobile citizens in the column country. In analogy with par. 3.1, we report flow values.

When row countries that are not part of the case study show similar values in both variables to those row countries that are part of the 7 countries selected for the analysis, we can predict a similar response to the implementation of the policy options and a similar impact on the countries in column. Italy, for instance, has values similar to Spain, when related to Belgium or Germany. The income differential is indicative of the response to the policy options, the quota of mobile citizens on the total is indicative of the impact that the population moving from the given row country will have on the column country. For example, EU-mobile citizens coming from Lithuania and Latvia, when reacting to the policy options implemented, can be predicted to act similarly to mobile citizens coming from Poland (similar income differentials). Because the formers constitute a much smaller quota of the total EU-mobile citizens that move to Belgium in the baseline scenario (0.3% and 0.4% from Latvia and Lithuania respectively, against 10.3% from Poland), the impact on Belgium will be less relevant.

The extension of results proposed is to be intended as indicative. An estimation in line with the methodology proposed would have to account for the number of individuals entitled to family benefits (as well as the country of residence of their children) and separately (not only as part of the ‘expected income’) account for the level of family benefits in the different countries.

Table 4.1. Income differential and distribution of EU-mobile citizens. Selected countries and EU-28 MS

	Belgium		Germany		Ireland		Spain		Netherlands		Poland		Romania
	income difference	% mobile citizens	income difference	% mobile citizens	income difference	% mobile citizens	income difference	% mobile citizens	income difference	% mobile citizens	income difference	% mobile citizens	income difference	% mobile citizens
Austria	-4.9%	0.4%	-5.4%	4.2%	2.9%	0.6%	59.1%	0.7%	-10.9%	0.9%	298.3%	2.5%	722.4%	0.2%
Belgium	:	:	-0.5%	1.1%	8.2%	1.4%	67.2%	3.5%	-6.3%	11.2%	318.7%	1.2%	764.4%	0.6%
Bulgaria	:	4.4%	:	5.9%	:	0.5%	:	4.9%	:	3.7%	:	0.2%	:	6.3%
Croatia	-72.9%	0.4%	-73.0%	2.2%	-70.7%	0.1%	-54.6%	0.2%	-74.6%	0.4%	13.6%	0.1%	134.5%	1.6%
Cyprus	:	0.2%	:	0.1%	:	0.3%	:	0.1%	:	0.2%	:	0.1%	:	0.0%
Czech Republic	-65.7%	0.6%	-65.9%	1.8%	-62.9%	1.2%	-42.6%	0.6%	-67.9%	0.8%	43.7%	0.4%	196.7%	2.3%
Denmark	:	0.3%	:	0.8%	:	0.8%	:	0.8%	:	0.8%	:	0.6%	:	0.1%
Estonia	-71.5%	0.2%	-71.7%	0.2%	-69.2%	0.4%	-52.4%	0.3%	-73.3%	0.3%	19.2%	0.0%	146.1%	0.1%
Finland	:	0.3%	:	0.5%	:	0.6%	:	0.9%	:	0.6%	:	0.1%	:	0.0%
France	:	21.7%	:	4.9%	:	8.1%	:	10.3%	:	5.0%	:	3.7%	:	2.4%
Germany	0.5%	4.5%	:	:	8.7%	6.1%	68.1%	9.0%	-5.8%	14.6%	320.9%	36.9%	769.0%	1.3%
Greece	-54.9%	1.9%	-55.1%	2.3%	-51.2%	0.5%	-24.6%	0.7%	-57.8%	3.8%	88.9%	1.0%	289.9%	0.7%
Hungary	:	1.1%	:	6.4%	:	2.3%	:	0.9%	:	2.9%	:	0.1%	:	2.1%
Ireland	-7.5%	0.5%	-8.0%	0.5%	:	:	54.6%	1.6%	-13.4%	1.0%	287.1%	5.6%	699.2%	1.4%
Italy	-36.0%	7.5%	-36.4%	5.6%	-30.8%	4.1%	7.0%	12.3%	-40.1%	4.9%	167.8%	3.9%	453.0%	56.3%
Latvia	-79.7%	0.3%	-79.8%	0.5%	-78.0%	4.0%	-66.0%	0.4%	-81.0%	0.9%	-14.8%	0.0%	75.8%	0.6%
Lithuania	-82.9%	0.4%	-82.9%	0.9%	-81.5%	5.8%	-71.3%	0.7%	-83.9%	1.2%	-28.2%	0.2%	48.2%	1.6%
Luxembourg	49.3%	2.0%	48.5%	0.9%	61.5%	0.2%	149.7%	0.1%	39.9%	0.3%	525.2%	0.1%	1190.7%	0.0%
Malta	-52.7%	0.1%	-53.0%	0.0%	-48.8%	0.2%	-20.9%	0.0%	-55.7%	0.1%	98.0%	0.0%	308.8%	0.0%
Netherlands	6.8%	13.3%	6.2%	3.6%	15.5%	2.2%	78.6%	3.4%	:	:	347.0%	2.7%	822.9%	0.9%
Poland	-76.1%	10.3%	-76.2%	32.7%	-74.2%	13.6%	-60.1%	2.5%	-77.6%	22.1%	:	:	106.5%	6.6%
Portugal	-59.1%	4.9%	-59.3%	1.6%	-55.8%	1.0%	-31.6%	5.1%	-61.7%	2.9%	71.3%	0.1%	253.6%	2.3%
Romania	-88.4%	10.6%	-88.5%	11.9%	-87.5%	3.8%	-80.7%	22.2%	-89.2%	2.4%	-51.6%	0.1%	:	:
Slovakia	:	0.8%	:	2.2%	:	1.5%	:	0.4%	:	0.8%	:	0.1%	:	0.5%
Slovenia	-53.3%	0.2%	-53.5%	0.3%	-49.5%	0.1%	-21.9%	0.2%	-56.2%	0.2%	95.6%	0.0%	303.8%	0.1%
Spain	-40.2%	9.6%	-40.5%	4.3%	-35.3%	8.4%	:	:	-44.0%	8.4%	150.3%	2.0%	416.9%	7.0%
Sweden	:	0.5%	:	0.8%	:	1.4%	:	1.7%	:	1.3%	:	1.5%	:	0.6%
United Kingdom	:	3.2%	:	3.8%	:	30.8%	:	16.4%	:	8.6%	:	36.9%	:	4.5%

Source: for income differentials, net earnings of one-earner couples with two children at 100% of the average wage (2013), Eurostat (earn_nt_net); average family benefits, Pacolet (June 2015, table 3). For % mobile citizens, we are considering countries of last residence as ‘senders’, Eurostat (2013 or latest available, migr_imm5prv). For lack of data, for Romania countries of nationality are assumed as ‘senders’, Eurostat (2013, migr_imm1ctz) 210 .

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[Catalogue number]

ANNEXE XIX: Brodolini Report secondary effects unemployment benefits

Task 4:

Secondary effects following a change of regulations on the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B — Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Task 4:

Secondary effects following a change of regulations on the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014

doi:[number]

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Tables of Contents

Executive Summary1

1.Introduction4

2.Methodology6

2.1.General approach6

2.2.Data and data limitation7

2.3.Literature review7

2.4.Simulation approach

2.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

2.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes16

2.5.Case study Member States16

3.Status quo scenario18

3.1Status quo mobility flows18

3.2Status quo target population19

4.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

4.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

5.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes26

5.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b29

6.Conclusions

Annex 1 – List of unemployment benefits within the scope of the study

Annex 2 – Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs39

Annex 3 – Secondary effects analysis: cost changes49

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries59

Executive Summary

The background for this report are the current considerations with respect to changing the EU provisions relating the coordination of social security systems specifies in Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Article 61 defines the principle of aggregation, which means that - if a person does not have a sufficiently long unemployment benefit insurance record in the Member State of “last” employment, then activity/insurance periods fulfilled in the Member State of "previous" employment would qualify and give the right to aggregate unemployment benefits between Member States.

Most Member States apply the principle of aggregation after one day of insurance 211 . This may lead to cases where unemployment benefits are being claimed after a very short period of being member of the insurance system in the Member State of "last" employment. It has therefore been questioned whether the current rules sufficiently ensure that a worker has an effective link to the given labour market and the related insurance system before claiming unemployment benefits there. Amendments to the current rules are therefore being considered to ensure a uniform application of the principle of aggregation across Member States. The aim is to avoid that payment of unemployment benefits across Member States give rise to situations where mobile EU-workers have not yet made a significant contribution to the insurance system in the Member State of "last" employment and avoid negative financial consequences for the Member States, which have to pay the benefits. The considered revisions are:

Policy option 2a: A threshold of one month of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be completed in the Member State of last employment before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in a Member State of previous employment can be applied. The MS of previous employment is responsible for paying the UB for workers who do not meet the threshold.

Policy option 2b: A threshold of three months of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be completed in the Member State of last employment before aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment fulfilled in a Member State of previous employment can be applied. The MS of previous employment is responsible for paying the UB for workers who do not meet the threshold.

Because the specification that mobile workers would have the possibility to claim benefits if they moved back to the country of previous employment was included late during the assessment process, the quantitative results presented in this report do not consider it. If individuals do not meet the threshold, they are expected to not be entitled to any benefit.

Qualitative assessments that take into account the mentioned specification are provided.

Policy option 3a: The salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment, if less than one month of insurance or (self-)employment is completed in the Member State of last employment.

Policy option 3b: The salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment, if less than three months of insurance or (self-)employment is completed in the Member State of last employment.

On this background, the present study aims to estimate the envisaged secondary effects derived by the proposed modification of the current EU regulation on the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits. The analysis focuses on the effects that the proposed possible revision may generate in terms of labour mobility, migration patterns and related variation of costs generated.

The simulation tool developed for this study aims at translating the implications of the policy options into expected income changes. Assuming a connection between income differentials and the propensity to move among EU countries, variations in overall migration flows and in the dimension of the target population – comprised within said migration flows – are estimated. Finally, taking into account both the variation in the number of cases and the different computation rules for the benefits, we give an estimate of the change in expenditure for the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits for the selected countries.

As best representative of the target population, we chose single individuals without children at 100% of the average wage. This choice is first of all derived from the consideration that unemployment benefits are provided to individuals; also, the target population is composed of individuals who have only been working in their country of residence for a short time. We assume that this type of short-term mobility (possibly linked to short-term contracts) is more suitable to single individuals rather than families.

The countries proposed for the analysis as case studies are Denmark, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, the Netherlands, Italy and the UK. The proposed countries are chosen as geographically spread across the EU as well as differentiated in the welfare systems. They include countries that are mainly attracting EU mobile workers (DK; DE; NL; UK) from other member states as well as those that see many workers leave (PL; RO) but also countries within the middle ground (FR; IT).

Section 3 provides a description of the virtual status quo year which represents a pre-policy option scenario, against which the possible secondary effects are estimated and evaluated. This section provides figures of mobility flows, computed as the averages of the most recent values of annual mobility flows among the 8 selected countries. The section provides also the average values of the unemployment benefits as well as the estimated aggregate expenditure devoted to aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits computed in relation to the target population identified in the virtual status quo year. The number of potential cases of aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits (target population) is computed by multiplying the status quo mobility flow registered from a given sending country to a given receiving country with the ratio of unemployed non-national EU28+EFTA individuals on the total number of non-national EU28+EFTA individuals in the given receiving country.

When option 3 is implemented, much smaller changes are observed. Policy option 2 also results in an important reduction of EU mobile citizens eligible for the aggregation of periods or salaries for the purpose of receiving unemployment benefits. For policy option 3, variations in the target population are limited to those produced by the changes in overall migration flows, since this option does not reduce the population eligible to unemployment benefits.

For what concerns expenditure changes generated by policy options and mobility changes - presented in section 5 -, because policy option 2 excludes quite a large share of individuals from the entitlement to unemployment benefits, all countries experience a high decrease in the relevant chapter of expenditure (more so in the case of policy option 2b). Lower savings are observed when policy option 3 is implemented. Because the computation of benefits has to take into account salaries earned in the country of previous residence, Poland and Romania see their expenditure grow by a wide margin when option 3 is realised. In both policy option 2 and 3, most of the expenditure variation is imputable to changes in entitlement and computation rules, while the behavioral change in mobility flows accounts for only a limited share of the cost variations. As much as the percentages may reach high values, variations shown in absolute terms and as ratios of GDP confirm the little relevance for national budgets of the expenditure on unemployment benefits that require aggregation of periods or salaries.

Comparing the obtained results with the administrative data provided by a parallel study conducted by the HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society (Pacolet, 2015), it appears that for most of the countries our estimate of the potential target population in the ‘status-quo’ scenario represents an upper bound. EU mobile citizens seem to have lower take up of unemployment benefits than natives. The dimensions of the phenomenon analysed and of the expenditure figures are therefore even smaller than what has appeared in the present study.

5.Introduction

The right to unemployment benefits in all Member States depends on having fulfilled a qualifying period. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (April 29th 2004) on the coordination of social security systems specifies the principle of aggregation (Article 61): if a person does not have a sufficiently long unemployment benefit insurance record in the last Member State of activity/insurance (hereinafter ‘the Member State of last employment), periods fulfilled in another Member State (hereinafter ‘the Member State of previous employment’) can be added together.

Most Member States apply the principle of aggregation after one day of insurance 212 . This may lead to cases where unemployment benefits are claimed after a very short period of contribution to the insurance system of the Member State of last employment. It has therefore been questioned whether the current rules sufficiently ensure that a worker has an effective link to the given labour market and the related insurance system before claiming unemployment benefits there, either in terms of the length of the insurance periods fulfilled or in terms of the calculation basis for the unemployment benefits. Furthermore, claiming benefits after a short period of insurance or (self-)employment may have negative financial consequences for the Member States which have to pay the benefits.

Amendments to the current rules are therefore being considered to ensure uniform application of the principle of aggregation across Member States. This in order to ensure that the payment of unemployment benefits does not burden countries where mobile EU-workers have not yet made a significant contribution to the insurance system and more in general to avoid undesirable uses of the unemployment benefit insurance systems in the EU.

On this background, we look in the present study into the following possible revisions to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004:

Qualitative assessments that take into account the mentioned specification are provided in par. 4.1 and 5.1.

Such revisions may affect the behaviour of the mobile EU-workers and their families, the amounts of unemployment benefits paid and entitlement to them, and the administrative costs and procedures needed to handle the cases of aggregation of unemployment benefit. In this context, the report focuses on the secondary effects that the revision of the current regulation of aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits generates in terms of intra-EU mobility for the population potentially interested by the regulation change. The study aims also to estimate the changes that would occur in the expenditure for unemployment benefits.

As described further below, intra-EU mobility is quite difficult to measure. Therefore, the study assumes different sources of data, among which a study on the aggregation of period for unemployment 213 , which provides detailed data for a proper estimation of the possible secondary effects related to the amendments to the current regulations. The administrative data collected by this study, however, does not provide figures on the aggregation of unemployment benefits for all the 28 Member States. Additionally, This study is based on a limited number of Member States chosen in relation to their different characteristics in terms of social security schemes and migration flows. Hence, the analysis proposed in this report focus on eight case study Member States: Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the UK.

6.Methodology

6.1.General approach

The aim of the report is to provide support to considerations on the overall long-term effects of the proposed changes to the current rules on the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits, in terms of labour mobility, migration patterns and related variation of costs generated. Evaluating the policy options in terms of pull factors for individual and household mobility it is possible to estimate the potential impact of the policy changes at the national level, providing a tool for comparing the options

against the status quo scenario;

against each other.

The output will consist of a definition of different final scenarios for each policy option and for each selected Member State (MS), with the impacts of the potential policy changes being estimated in terms of intra-EU mobility and cost variation. The analysis of the possible secondary effects provides for each policy option the following estimates:

estimation on the change of inflows and outflows of EU citizens (and consequently of the potential target population 214 );

estimation on the variation of expenditure for unemployment benefits that require aggregation of periods or salaries paid to EU mobile workers.

In the framework of the study we focus on the impact of any changes on the mobility decisions of workers in the EU and on cost changes for unemployment expenditures (specifically in our 8 countries). In order to identify secondary effects, we will have to restrict the analysis to the impact on the specific branch of the social security system attributable to changes in the unemployment benefits paid to EU mobile workers that resort to the aggregation of periods or salaries. This will inevitably yield an incomplete picture, as we will disregard potential effects on other areas, e.g. on the levels of contributions and/or taxes paid or on the variation in other cost elements, e.g. health and care expenditure 215 , which are beyond the scope of the study.

We must also stress that the implied changes in the level of expenditure are indicative, since they are based on the assumptions made for the definition of a representative category of population, from which we extract the population interested to the aggregation of periods or salaries in order to claim unemployment benefits (see par. 3.1).

A quantitative assessment of the exact variation in the number of mobile workers and families as well as an exact definition of the cost changes are beyond the scope of this study. Rather, we suggest reading the estimation of the secondary effects as indicative of the direction and the general magnitude of the variation generated by the implementation of the different policy options.

6.2.Data and data limitation

In order to provide information on how changes in the regulation of aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits can influence the decision to move, different sources of data are needed. The main surveys that provide micro data on individual and family condition, employment situation, social benefits and services received are the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and, to a lesser degree, the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). In order to supplement and validate the analysis of EU-LFS and EU-SILC surveys, additional datasets of the Eurostat database on migration statistics are used with the aim of defining the bilateral migration flow between the 8 selected countries. Eurostat data allow identifying the average inflow and outflow of EU mobile citizens for each pair of countries. These data represent the starting point on which to assess the variation of mobility patterns generated by each policy option. Considering that intra-EU mobility in general is considered difficult to measure 216 , and that the current analysis focuses on a target population even more difficult to measure (unemployed EU mobile citizens which have worked for a limited period after entering the receiving country), we also make use of the data gathered by the parallel study carried out by the HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society of KU Leuven 217 .

6.3.Literature review

In The Theory of Wages, Hicks 218 argues that the main causes of migration are differences in wages. To this day, all economic studies of migration decisions employ Hicks' considerations as the general conjecture on which more sophisticated arguments are built about the influence of various other factors. These economic factors are used for internal, i.e. within country, mobility just as much as for cross-country mobility. Migration is in this context seen as an investment into human capital, yielding potentially higher income in the receiving country than in the sending country (Sjaastad, 1962).

Borjas 219 has formulated this into an inter-temporal choice to the general evaluation of income differences. The migration decision is based on income differences between home (sending) and foreign (receiving) country, individual preferences for specific countries (which can be specified by a separate factor, or attributed in relation to the cost of moving) and the cost of moving:

d = (income_foreign - income_home) - z_i - c

as specified in Hatton and Williamson 220 . Where d is the decision to migrate. When d>0, an individual is assumed to migrate, or in other words, as long as the income difference outweighs the cost of moving (c) and the individual's compensating differential (z_i), he/she will move.

The role of unemployment in determining the income is introduced in Harris and Todaro 221 for the rural-to-urban mobility. Harris and Todaro provide the basis for the assumption that migration decisions are likely to be based on expected income, by that meaning a combination of the expected salary and the income that one may receive as unemployed. Both are weighted by the respective probabilities.

The new economics of labour migration emphasizes the importance of families or households in the decision to migrate. Rather than taking an isolated, individual decision, it is argued that the unit of interest might in many cases be the household 222 . We take this into account in the evaluation of family benefits which is usually paid to the household, whereas the evaluation of the impact of unemployment benefits will be more individualistic.

Employing wage or income differentials as an explanation of mobility behaviour seems to be at odds with low mobility in the European Union, which largely diminished legal and institutional obstacles to the free movement of workers. Wages in the past have had only a weak influence on migration flows, e.g., Braunerhjelm et al. 223 find that mobility levels were not increasing despite a widening gap in income differentials and unemployment levels. In contrast to this, Bentivogli and Pagano 224 (1999) note that the US labour market shows much stronger reaction to income differentials than the EU. More recent evidence, however, shows that mobility takes on stronger roles in solving imbalances. Probably through the abolishment of inhibitions to mobility within the European Union, market forces such as wage differences allow to solve shocks to labour markets by regional mobility. For example, Arpaia et al. 225 (2014) show in their study that regional labour market mobility can adjust for about 25% within a year of the shock that affects a specific region, thus the regional mobility – which explicitly includes mobility across national borders – plays an important role in resolving labour market imbalances. Beyer and Smets 226 (2015) corroborate those findings by showing that regional labour market mobility can adjust for about 25% within a year of the shock that affects a specific region. The VAR framework used in both studies was developed in Blanchard and Katz 227 (1992).

The overall economic effect of migration can be subsumed into three separate elements. The economic effects of migration include the ability of mobile workers and migrants to blend in or ‘assimilate’ into the labour market, the economic impact on the labour market and the impact on the social security system of the country, both as contributors and recipients of benefits (Kerr & Kerr, 2011). The current study deals mainly with the third effect.

Measurement of the success of mobile workers is difficult, as most datasets cannot overcome the problem of selectivity of results through re-migration. E.g. Edin et al 228 (2000) found that 30-40% of the immigrants to Sweden had left the country within five years. These re-migrants were usually less assimilated than the group of migrants staying longer. Similar patterns can also be found in other countries (e.g. Germany as reported in Constant and Massey, 2003; and Bellemare, 2007 229 ). The literature shows clear differences in the success of migrants (as measured by e.g. earnings assimilation, unemployment, or culture integration) in mobility from within the EU and migration from outside of the EU (mostly developing countries). Overall, those migrants that remain in the country exhibit earnings assimilation to the natives (Aslund and Rooth 230 , 2007).

The country of origin seems to be the most important explanatory variable for the gaps observed between the employment rates of immigrants and those of the locals. For Sweden, Nekby (2002) reports 30-32% lower employment rates in 1990-2000, while Ekberg (1991) reports -17% for a single year (1989). For Finland, Sarvimäki 231 (2011) reports 9 – 18% lower employment levels for migrants from OECD countries. For the Netherlands, Rooddenburg et al. 232 (2003) find 4% lower employment rates for migrants from Western countries, versus 18% lower employment rates for migrants from non-Western countries. Overall Kerr and Kerr 233 (2011) conclude that “[…] the mechanisms of wage and employment assimilation are poorly understood. Immigrants may face various obstacles to employment, including issues with the recognition of educational degrees, lack of language skills, poor professional connections or networks, and regulations that prevent them from working legally.”

A crucial determinant of the economic impact of immigration on the host country is the net amount of welfare services and other social benefits that immigrants consume or contribute. The net amount has to be calculated based on the contribution minus the benefits paid. The importance of the welfare receipts is discussed in the literature both from the angle of ‘net costs’ of migrants and in terms of the attractiveness of a country through its welfare system. Borjas 234 (1999) and others have discussed possible “welfare magnet effects” where migrants are drawn to countries with high social benefits. Kerr & Kerr (2011, p. 17) conclude that this is likely to be more important in the EU countries as immigrants in most European countries rely more on social security and unemployment benefits relative to natives in the US or Canada. The importance of the welfare generosity is taken on in Giulietti et al. 235 . In estimating the (macro-economic) relation between (national) welfare spending and migration flow, they find, however, no evidence that workers’ mobility within the EU responds to unemployment benefit incentives. Using the EU Household Panel study, De Giorgi & Pellizari 236 (2009) find a significant, albeit small, effect of the generosity of welfare on (individual) migration decisions. This effect, however, is still large enough to influence the distribution of migration flows. It is, however, also the case that mobile EU workers tend to have on average lower uptake of benefits than nationals 237 .

The studies that address the concept net costs of migration into a country, i.e. the contribution of migrant minus their uptake in social benefits and public expenditure find mixed evidence. Büchel and Frick 238 (2003) conclude that immigrants in Germany are on average net payers to the social security system. Boeri 239 (2010) using EU-SILC for the core EU15 countries concludes that there is no evidence that legal migrants, notably skilled migrants, are net recipients of transfers from the state. However, there is evidence of ‘residual dependency’ on non-contributory transfers and self-selection of unskilled migrants in the countries with the most generous welfare states. Hansen and Lofstrom 240 (2003) investigated the causes of greater welfare reliance by immigrants to Sweden. They concluded that recent immigrants used relatively more social security than they did in 1980s. This is due to a change in the composition and volume of the migration flows, while observable traits do not explain the gap in welfare take-up, implying that there are unobserved differences or selectivity. Büchel & Frick 241 (2005) emphasized the heterogeneity of the European situation in migration decisions. However, examining migration flows and controlling for immigrant characteristics did not dramatically change this EU heterogeneity. The higher benefit usage thus results more from policy and institutional differences across countries than the characteristics of migrants themselves. They conclude that limitations and restrictions to participate or access relevant parts of the labour market can be a limiting factor in the economic condition of migrants. Overall, this conclusion from 2005 should become less important at EU level, as limiting factors diminished. 242

Overall, we can conclude that, while economic factors by themselves seem to bear little explanatory value to the variation of size of mobility across countries in the EU. Taking into account non-economic factors yields the expected outcomes: correcting for cultural differences such as the language and cultural distance between countries, as in Belot and Ederveen 243 and Sprenger 244 , economic factors do play an important role in explaining migration flows. Over time, economic differences across regions seem to have increased in their explanatory power towards migration flows.

6.4.Simulation approach

The simulations presented aim at translating the implications of the policy options into expected income changes. Assuming a connection between income differentials and the propensity to move among EU countries, variations in overall migration flows and in the dimension of the target population – comprised within said migration flows – are estimated. Finally, taking into account both the variation in the number of cases and the different computation rules for the benefits, we give an estimate of the change in expenditure for the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits for the selected countries.

Average net earnings are derived from Eurostat (earn_nt_net), while in order to compute the average unemployment benefits we made use of the replacement rates suggested by van Vliet 245 . With this target population assumed, we estimate both mobility and expenditure changes.

As an alternative target population, we take net earnings of one-earner couples with two children at 100% of the average wage. For this case, we only estimate mobility changes.

Information on the number of aggregations of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits by length of insurance (1 day, 30 days, 3 months), is obtained from the parallel study (Pacolet, 2015, Table 10) 246 .

6.4.1.The estimation of mobility changes

The simulation tool takes an average level of flows between two countries to build the status quo scenario. We use the most recent available flow figures from Eurostat, computing averages from the last three available years (see par. 2.6). The derived annual flows of migration are assumed to be characterizing our countries in our virtual ‘baseline year’ (before policy options are implemented). These migration flows are caused by all factors that influence the mobility decisions of EU workers, which we do not attempt to model. Based on these existing flows and on the status quo income level of our target households, the impact of the various policy options on the overall income of the household is evaluated.

The status quo income level is set to the average income in a country. In order to compute that status quo income, we combine the mean earnings derived from Eurostat with the probability of employment, then we add the probability of unemployment times the income that can be generate while unemployed (UB). The nominal value obtained is divided by price level indices that adjust the figures to purchasing power (base of the index is EU28 247 ): this allows individuals to account for costs of living in their choice to move.

(4)Income = (Prob(1-Unemployed) * avg_earnings + Prob(Unemployed) * UB) / PPP_index

Income differences between two countries are then defined as:

(5)Income_difference = Income_receiving - Income_sending

It is assumed that the income differences observed in the status quo scenario – along with all other factors that the policy options do not have an impact on – generate the mobility observed in the status quo scenario both in terms of general mobility flows and in terms of the number of potential cases of aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits.

A probabilistic evaluation of income as a probability-weighted combination of wage income and unemployment benefits is within the tradition of economics (e.g. search theory implements this approach). Just as in the decision for specific occupations 248 , it is rational to assume that mobile workers evaluate the overall income level while taking the decision on cross-border mobility.

Some care needs to be taken in determining appropriate amounts of unemployment benefits, we are using the following specification to translate the policy options into our framework.

The unemployment benefits are calculated as:

(6)UB = (income relevant for eligibility * replacement rate (RR) * eligibility) / PPP_index

We use the replacement rates as they are reported in van Vliet et al. (2012) for the various countries. The income relevant for eligibility is usually the income earned in the country of residence. For eligibility, we employ data collected by Pacolet (2015, table 10) on the number of aggregations of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits by length of insurance (1 day, 30 days, 3 months). Pacolet’s data do not differentiate by country of previous employment; therefore, we apply the same percentages for all of the bilateral relations studied. In addition, Pacolet’s data are collected on a single year (2013), but figures may change significantly in other periods.

Policy option 3a and 3b require a combination of the income in the present country of residence and of the income earned in the previous country or residence. In line with the letter of the policy options 3a and 3b, we have opted for an equal weighting of the two average income levels:

(7)UB = ([(avg_earnings(country of residence) + avg_earnings(country of origin)] / 2 * RR(country of residence)) / PPP_index

The influence of unemployment benefits is then evaluated by calculating the change attributable to the various policy options on the unemployment benefits in relation to the original income in the country of previous residence.

(8)pct_income_change = chg_U_benefits(policy option) / Income_sending

Once the income change is calculated, we convert that change into a potential mobility effect. In lack of useful indications from the economic literature on migration, we opted for theoretical assumptions on the elasticity of migration flows to income changes, relating elasticity to income differentials for each combination of countries (56 in total). As a measure for earnings, we consider the net earnings (PPS-adjusted) of single individuals without children at 100% of the average wage. For each country, we calculate the 2011-13 average value.

Table 2.4.1. Income differentials in the selected countries

	DE	DK	FR	IT	NL	PL	RO	UK
DE		14%	10%	33%	-12%	111%	252%	-12%
DK	-12%		-4%	16%	-23%	85%	208%	-23%
FR	-9%	4%		21%	-20%	92%	220%	-20%
IT	-25%	-14%	-17%		-34%	59%	165%	-34%
NL	14%	30%	25%	51%		140%	300%	0%
PL	-53%	-46%	-48%	-37%	-58%		66%	-58%
RO	-72%	-68%	-69%	-62%	-75%	-40%		-75%
UK	13%	29%	25%	51%	0%	140%	299%

Source: Eurostat (earn_nt_net, web-based database). Own elaborations.
Values for the countries in rows are at the numerator, values for the countries in column at the denominator.

Fig. 2.4.1. Assumed relation between income differential and elasticity in mobile patterns to income change

The assumption is that, in case of large gaps in mean earnings between countries (either positive or negative, i.e. Polish average salaries compared to German average salaries or vice-versa), the motives to move will not be substantially impacted by marginal changes of income caused by the implementation of the policy options. For a same absolute level of income differential, a lower level of elasticity is attributed when said differentials are negative compared to when they are positive: if a mobile worker is moving from Denmark to Romania, his/her choice is probably not much related to welfare motives.

Tab. 2.4.2. Elasticity assumptions for the selected countries

	DE	DK	FR	IT	NL	PL	RO	UK
DE		0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.8
DK	0.8		0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.2
FR	0.8	0.8		0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.8
IT	0.2	0.8	0.8		0.2	0.6	0.4	0.2
NL	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6		0.4	0.4	0.8
PL	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1		0.6	0.1
RO	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2		0.1
UK	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.4

Source: our calculation based on Eurostat (earn_nt_net, web-based database)
Row: Country of destination. Column: Country of origin.

Once elasticity is computed, the percentage of income change can be translated into a percentage change in mobility:

(9)pct_mobility_change = elasticity * pct_income_change

The percentage of mobility change can then be translated into a change in mobility flows by relating the calculated percentage change to the absolute number of mobile workers in the status quo case.

When measuring the impact of policy options 2a and 2b on the population potentially interested to the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits (our ‘target population’), we account for the change in mobility patterns and we subtract the share of mobile workers excluded by the entitlement of the benefits because of the one-month/three-month threshold 249 .

6.4.2.The estimation of expenditure changes

Focusing on the population that seems to better represent the target of the policy options - single individuals at 100% of the average wage - for each of the 8 selected countries we have estimated the changes in terms of expenditure dedicated to unemployment benefits that are a result of aggregation of periods or salaries by workers moving from one of the other seven countries.

We compute the present level of expenditure by multiplying the number of present potential cases of aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits by the average amount of unemployment benefits.

We then observe the percentage variation of expenditure – total and related to each bilateral relation. In evaluating the impact due to the implementation of the policy options, we are first considering the behavioral change in mobility flows. Then, employing the percentages made available by Pacolet (see note 1, Table 2), for policy option 2 we are computing no benefit to individuals having contributed less than 1 month (2a) and less than 3 months (2b) in the country of residence. For policy options 3a and 3b, we consider those same individuals and assign them with a benefit that takes into account the income perceived in the country of previous residence (see formula 4).

6.5.Case study Member States

The unemployment cases to be considered for the scope of the study are defined by Regulation 883/2004. Only contributory unemployment benefits will be analysed. The export of unemployment benefits is beyond the scope of the present study, and the issue of aggregation alone is to be analysed 250 .

Countries’ regulatory framework for unemployment benefits can be summarised as follows:

Table 2.5.1. Overview of principal characteristics of unemployment benefits in the selected countries

Unemployment Benefits
UB: Eligibility - qualifying period
below 1 year	FR, (IT), NL
1 year or more	DK, DE, IT, PL, RO,
UB: Replacement rates
% of past earnings (average over more than 3 months)	FR, DE, IT
% of last earnings (up to 3 months)	DK, NL
flat or fixed rate	PL, RO, UK

Source: MISSOC (web-based database)

The purpose and requirements for unemployment benefits are similar. The general principle of providing an income stream for those claimants that become (involuntarily) unemployed is generally found in all countries. All systems require a qualifying period, which we have dichotomised as i) below 1 year (FR, NL (IT)) or ii) above one year (DK, DE, IT, PL, RO). In many cases, specific requirements are in place about the (minimum) number of hours worked or about the level of wages earned during the qualifying period.

In terms of replacement rates for unemployment benefits, similar breakdowns can also be made of variations across countries. Here we offer a distinction among countries that base the amount of the benefits mainly on current income: some compute the average over (up to) the last 3 months of work (DK, NL), some over longer periods (FR, DE, IT). There are also countries that provide a flat or fixed amount (PL, RO, UK). Often this is linked to some minimum income level.

The purpose of the simulation is to estimate the secondary effects of the potential implementation of the policy options on the bilateral relations between the 8 selected MS. Results for each pair of countries are essentially driven by the country-specific figures on migration flows, average levels of unemployment benefits and income differentials with the other countries. The observed results can therefore be imputed to pairs of MS countries that present similar characteristics in said aspects.

Annex 4 presents a methodology for an indicative extension of the simulation results to the other EU-28 MS.

7.Status quo scenario

3.1Status quo mobility flows

The table below reports the figures of mobility flows in our virtual baseline year, computed as the averages of the most recent values of annual mobility flows among the 8 selected countries 251 . The estimation of the variation in mobility patterns generated by the policy options are defined from the bilateral flows presented in table 3.2.1.

Table 3.1.1. Mobility flows between selected countries. Status quo scenario.

	MS of previous employment
MS of last employment		DE	DK	FR	IT	NL	PL	RO	UK
	DE		2,742	19,498	21,117	14,185	149,513	38,314	13,863
	DK	3,066		1,136	1,080	721	3,396	3,137	2,886
	FR(b)	6,413	599		4,654	2,145	2,077	1,831	9,538
	IT	6,605	205	3,922		746	4,691	76,521	3,732
	NL	10,824	528	3,410	3,017		14,895	1,744	5,942
	PL	3,321	46	358	373	228		15	1,991
	RO(a)	644	44	508	850	139	141		284
	UK	17,241	1,077	21,889	13,230	7,616	32,413	10,422

Source: Eurostat (web-based database). Averages are estimated on 2011-13 data when available, or on latest available data. We are considering countries of last residence as ‘senders’ (Eurostat: migr_imm5prv). For lack of data, for Romania countries of nationality are assumed as ‘senders’ (Eurostat: migr_imm1ctz). Same is done for France, though data is not obtained from Eurostat, since it is not available, but from the United Nations Population Division (International Migration Flows to and from Selected Countries: The 2010 Revision (web-based database) 252 .

Poland and Romania are the two prevalent sending countries among the eight selected. According to the data, the highest migration flow concerns Poland and Germany. It is estimated that 149,513 citizens move from Poland to Germany in our virtual ‘status quo year’. Additionally, Poland represent the main sending country for the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK. Citizens coming from Romania represent the larger share of EU mobile citizens moving to Italy (80%). Moreover, there are also a significant number of mobile citizens who migrate from Romania to Germany (38,314) and to the UK (10,422). The table also highlights that Italy, France, the UK and the Netherlands are common countries of origin of mobile citizens moving to Germany. On the other hand, Germany represents the country of origin for a relevant number of mobile citizens moving to the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and France. An important migration flow regards the relation between UK, as a receiving country, and Italy, France and the Netherlands as countries of origin. The migration flows towards Romania and Poland in general are limited. Besides the migration flow from Germany to Poland and from the UK to Poland, in these countries the migration flows of EU citizens are lower than 1000 individuals. Compared to the other countries, in Denmark (limiting the attention to the selected MS) the migration of EU mobile workers is quite limited. The four main countries of origin of the mobile EU population in Denmark are Germany, the UK, Poland and Romania.

3.2Status quo target population

According to the policy options proposed for the revision of the current EU provisions on unemployment benefits – specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation' – the target population of the current study are EU citizens having moved from one Member State to another to work who have become unemployed before having met the qualifying period for the entitlement of unemployment benefits in the receiving country.

The number of potential cases of aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits (that compose our ‘target population’) is computed by multiplying the status quo mobility flow (see tab. 3.1.1) registered from a given sending country to a given receiving country with the ratio of unemployed non-national EU28+EFTA individuals on the total number of non-national EU28+EFTA individuals in the given receiving country 253 .

Table 3.2.1. Status quo scenario. Target population, average amount of unemployment benefits, and estimated related expenditure. Eight selected countries

Country of last employment	Target population (a)	254Annual average UB (b) 255	Expenditure (c)
DE	12185	€ 16,669.45	€ 203,117,272.62
DK	1005	€ 19,258.48	€ 19,354,769.68
FR	1218	€ 18,729.70	€ 22,812,770.56
IT	7649	€ 11,833.71	€ 90,516,009.86
NL	1563	€ 22,865.09	€ 35,738,132.30
PL	172	€ 1,898.37	€ 326,520.16
RO	50	€ 1,802.55	€ 90,127.68
UK	4240	€ 4,242.05	€ 17,986,297.02
Total	28082	€ 12,162.42	€ 341,545,207.10

Source: a) Our calculations based on data from Eurostat (migr_imm5prv; web-based database) and EU-LFS. b) Our calculations based on data on 2014 net earnings for singles at 100% of AW from Eurostat (earn_nt_net; web-based database) and replacement rates calculated by van Vliet & Caminada (2012). c) Our calculations based on a) and b).

The data provided in table 3.2.1 provide an overview of the size and related expenditure for the estimated target population of unemployed EU mobile citizens residing in one of the selected MS and coming from the other selected countries (bilateral migration flows between the selected MS) 256 . For each MS, the table reports the aggregate data in terms of the number of potential unemployed EU citizens, average values of unemployment benefits and related estimated expenditure. According to the status quo scenario, considering all the 8 selected countries, the amount of unemployed EU mobile citizens (regardless of the length of unemployment insurance period) is equal to 28,082. According to our estimation, Germany, Italy and the UK are the countries with the highest share of unemployed, and account for 85% of the total potential population identified. France, Denmark and the Netherlands present a similar number of potential unemployed mobile citizens (around 1000 persons), while in Poland and Romania the share of unemployed mobile citizens coming from the other seven selected countries is limited. The average amount of unemployment benefits varies markedly across the selected countries. The Netherlands, France, Germany and Denmark are marked by a comparatively higher annual amount of unemployed benefits. In relation to the other countries, Italy and UK are characterized by a mean value of average amount of unemployment benefits, while in Poland and Romania the average unemployment benefits are estimated to be just under 2000 euro. The total expenditure of unemployment benefits for EU mobile citizens among the selected countries is estimated at about 328 millions of euro. Germany presents the highest estimated expenditure for unemployment benefits for EU mobile citizens (more than 200 millions of euro). In Italy, the high number of unemployed mobile citizens involves an expenditure for these benefits of around 90 millions of euro. In Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and France the estimated expenditure ranges from 17 millions of euro in the UK, to 35 millions of euro in the Netherlands. Due to the limited number of unemployed mobile citizens as well as the moderate average amount of unemployed benefits, the estimated expenditure in Romania and Poland is comparatively lower respect the other selected countries, respectively 326,520 euro in Poland and 90,127 euro in Romania.

When taking in consideration figures from Pacolet (2015, p.18) it appears that for most of the countries our estimate of the potential target population in the ‘status-quo’ scenario represents an upper bound. For the Netherlands, the UK, Romania and Denmark, the administrative data collected by the HIVA study (Pacolet, 2015) reports respectively 160, 30, 12 and 54 total cases of aggregation in 2013, whereas we estimate 1005, 4240, 50 and 1005 cases of aggregation only for individuals coming from the other 7 selected countries. Assuming that the survey data shown by Pacolet is reliable, the very low access to aggregation can be explained as a consequence of potentially restrictive national legislations and lack of action from the potentially interested citizens.

Said discrepancies between our assumptions on the target population and Pacolet’s findings should also be kept in mind when assessing the observed potential impacts of the proposed policy options, as the dimension of the phenomenon may be even smaller than what is apparent in the present study.

8.Secondary effects: estimation of mobility changes

This section reports the variation of mobility patterns between the selected MS according to the policy options proposed, assessed in relation to the status quo scenario. The mobility patterns are estimated for two categories of population. This section presents the results of the analysis of the variation in mobility patterns for the representative category of the potential target population, single person at 100% of average earning. The results for the second category of population identified - one-earner married couple with two children at 100% of average earnings - are reported in annex 2. The results are presented in aggregate terms for each MS, while the detailed results of the bilateral relations between the 8 selected MS are presented in annex 2. As previously stated, in the estimation of mobility changes we assume all factors to stay constant but the income differential impacted by the policy options analysed.

Figure 4.1 shows the estimated variations in the overall mobilty flows attributable to the policy options analysed. Policy option 2 establishes that the population of unemployed EU mobile citizens who has become unemployed before the defined thresholds are met (respectively, one month of contribution in the country of competence for policy option 2a, three months for policy option 2b) is not entitled to the aggregation of periods or salaries for the purpose of receiving unemployment benefits. In relation to such policy options, Denmark and Italy present a high reduction of the migration flows in percentage terms.

In Denmark the introduction of a threshold of either one month or three months generates a decrease of migration flow equal to 6,1% 257 . In Italy, policy option 2a produces a decrease of the migration flow equal to 4.4%, while policy option 2b generates a reduction of the potential migration inflow of 5.3%.

As visible in table 2.1 of annex 2, for both Denmark and Italy a rather large change in the income difference is foreseen for groups of potentially mobile citizens coming from Poland and Romania. Together, they constitute a large component of the overall migration flow from the other 7 selected countries observed in the status quo scenario (42% for Denmark, 84% for Italy). For Denmark, one also needs to take into account that according to Pacolet’s data (Pacolet, 2015, table 10) as much as 62% of the individuals who needed an aggregation of periods had only been contributing in the new country of work for less than 1 month (same quota for less than 3 months). Policy options 2a and 2b are therefore sure to have a strong impact, since potential movers will have to consider that if they fall unemployed within a year from moving 258 , there is a strong chance (62%) that they do when they have no entitlement to unemployment benefits. That makes their expected income fall and creates an economic disincentive to move.

In Germany, the reduction generated by policy option 2 on the inflow population coming from the other seven countries analysed ranges from 2.5% to 3.3%. In France, the policy option 2 results in a decrease of the migration flow equal to 2.5% in the case of option 2a, and to 3.4% in the case of option 2b. In the Netherlands the reduction of mobility patterns of EU mobile citizens is between 0.8% and 1.5%. In Uk the impact of policy option 2 on migration flow is moderate. The introduction of policy option 2a or 2b results in a decrease of migration flow equal to 0.6%. In the cases of Romania and Poland no variation of the potential target population is estimated.

Figure 4.1. Variation in overall migration flows. Policy options 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b (single person at 100% of the average wage).

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database), van Vliet and Caminada (2012) and EU-SILC.

According to policy option 3, for the unemployed EU mobile citizens who become unemployed before the defined thresholds are met (respectively, one month of contribution for policy options 3a, three months for policy options 3b), the salary earned in the Member State of previous employment is also taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the Member State of last employment. In relation to policy option 2, the variation of mobility patterns generated by policy option 3 (a and b) are more moderate (Figure 4.1). As in the case of policy option 2, Denmark and Italy are the countries in which the reduction of migration flows is more evident. In Germany the policy option analysed diminishes the inflow of mobile citizens by 0.8%, in the case of policy option 3a, and 1.1%, in the case of policy option 3b. In France, the Netherlands and the UK the modification of the current regulation on aggregation of periods or salary for unemployment benefits generates a limited variation in the migration flow. In the case of policy option 3 the variation of migration flows of the potential target population is between 0.1% and 0.5% 259 . Similar to policy option 2, for Romania and Poland no variation in the migration flows are estimated.

As regards the bilateral relations, the main results concern the migration flows of the EU mobile citizens coming from Poland and Romania. In both policy options considered, this population accounts for the majority of the reduction of migration flows for the other MS analysed. The only exception is France in which the main variations of migration flows are attributable to EU mobile citizens coming from the UK, Germany and Italy 260 .

Figure 4.1 suggests that the impact on migration flows of the four policy options is modest, especially in the case of policy option 3. Policy option 2 generates stronger secondary effects on the mobility patterns of EU mobile citizens, inasmuch it produces a higher economic differential compared to policy option 3. The threshold for the entitlement of aggregation of periods or salaries for the purpose of receiving unemployment benefits (one and three months) generates a high variation of the expected income derived from unemployment benefits, influencing the decision of EU mobile citizens to move.

Figure 4.2 shows the variation in potential target population according to the policy options analysed. The figure presents the changes in percentage terms of the share of population in the status quo mobility flow that requires the aggregation of periods or salaries in order to be entitled to unemployment benefits in the country of residence. We take in consideration the impacts produced by both the variation in mobility flows and the changes in entitlement rules. As the figure suggests, policy option 3 (sub-options a and b) has a very limited impact on the target population. Except for small differences caused by approximation to units, results are identical to the ones observed for overall migration flows (see fig. 4.1), since policy options 3a and 3b do not restrict the entitlement to unemployment benefits. The estimated reduction varies between -1.9% or -1.7%, in Denmark and in Italy, to values close to 0 for the other MS. In absolute terms the higher variation in potential target population is in Italy, in which policy option 3b generates a reduction equal to 173 EU mobile citizens. Excluding Germany that presents values similar to the Italian ones, in the other MS the reduction of the target population is comprised between 0 and 19 EU citizens (annex 2).

Figure 4.2. Variation in potential target population. Policy options 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b (single person at 100% of the average wage).

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database), van Vliet, Caminada (2012) and EU-SILC.

The scenario significantly differs in the case of policy option 2. The introduction of thresholds (one month and three months) for the entitlement of aggregation of periods or salaries for receiving unemployment benefits results in a high variation in potential target population, compared to the status quo scenario. In percentage terms, Denmark shows the highest variation in target population among the selected countries. Policy option 2a and policy option 2b generate a reduction of target population equal to 86.5%, which corresponds to 6499 EU mobile citizens. In the UK, the variation on the target population generated by policy option 2 is around 60%. In this MS the implementation of policy option 2a and 2b leads to a reduction of the target population of respectively 2414 (59.6%) and 2554 (60.2%) EU mobile citizens. In Italy, France and Germany policy option 2 results in a similar reduction of the target population, which ranges from 40% to 64%. In absolute terms, Germany and Italy present the highest variation in target population, which in the case of policy option 2b corresponds to respectively 6499 and 4178 EU mobile citizens (annex 2). In the Netherlands, Romania and Poland the variations in target population generated by policy option 2 are significant, but comparatively limited in relation to the other MS analysed. In the Netherlands, after the introduction of policy option 2b the target population entitled to aggregation of periods or salaries for receiving unemployment benefits is equal to 1031, which means a reduction of 34.0% of the target population defined in the status quo scenario. In Romania and Poland, the variations in target population in absolute terms are moderate. In Poland, the reduction of 36.0% (policy option 2b) corresponds to 62 EU mobile citizens, while in Romania variation generated by policy option 2b corresponds to 16 EU mobile citizens.

As in the case of variation in overall migration flows, the main results related to the bilateral relation among the selected MS concerns the variation in target population generated by EU mobile citizens coming from Poland and Romania. In both policy option 2 and 3, this population accounts for the majority of the reduction in target population for the other MS (annex 2). The only exception is France in which around 75% of the total variation in target population is explained by citizens coming from UK, Germany and Italy (respectively 34.7%, 23.4% and 17.0%). Additionally, in the UK a significant reduction in target population is generated by EU mobile citizens coming from France, Italy and Germany (respectively 21.0%, 16.6% and 12.3%). In the Netherlands, around a quarter of the total reduction in the target population generated by policy option 2 derives from EU mobile citizens coming from Germany.

Figure 4.2 indicates that the two policy options analysed generate two completely different scenarios. The limited variation in the target population related to policy option 3 (a and b) is generated only by the changes in the overall mobility flow attributable to economic differentials. Conversely, in policy option 2 (a and b), the introduction of thresholds for the entitlement of the aggregation of periods or salaries for the purpose of receiving unemployment benefits significantly reduces the target population in all the MS considered.

8.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

The disincentives to move produced by policy options 2a and 2b as considered above would be reduced if potential movers were to consider the possibility to obtain welfare coverage if they moved back to the country of previous employment.

The effect of said reduction in the disincentives would essentially be linked to the level of benefits obtainable in the country of previous employment and to the costs of moving (due to both geographical distance and individual perspective when moving, short or long-term). For example, individuals that plan to move from the Netherlands to Belgium for a short term contract will look at the possibility of losing their job in less than 1 month/3 months as ‘easily solvable’ by moving back to the closeby Netherlands, where they can get a rather high benefit and compensate for the relatively low costs of moving. The results observed in the above paragraph for policy options 2a and 2b would therefore change significantly.

Viceversa, EU citizens that plan to move (for example) from Romania to the UK are more likely to be long-term movers that will not consider the possibility to move back to Romania as an actual option. In this type of cases, results for policy option 2a and 2b in their ‘refined’ versions would align to those seen in the above paragraph.

9.Secondary effects: estimation of expenditure changes

This section reports the estimated changes of expenditure on unemployment benefits devoted to workers who need to aggregate periods or salaries in order to be entitled to such benefits. The variation is computed on the aforementioned status quo scenario (see par. 3), for each MS analysed and according to the various policy options. The results discussed in this section are referred to the representative category of the potential target population: single persons at 100% of average earning. The results are presented in aggregate terms for each MS, while the detailed results of the bilateral relations between the 8 selected MS are presented in annex 3.

As reported in section 2.4.2, in evaluating the impact on expenditure due to the implementation of the policy options, we are considering both the behavioral change in mobility flows and the change in entitlement and computation rules. For each analysed MS, Figure 5.1 shows the results in aggregate terms.

In the 8 MS, policy option 2 provokes a reduction of the expenditure for unemployment benefits for the potential target population. This reduction is obviously more marked when the threshold for the aggregation of periods or salaries for unemployment benefits is set to three months (policy option 2b). In Denmark, Italy, the UK, France and Germany, the cost changes generated by the policy option 2b exceed 50%. In Denmark, the expenditure on unemployment benefits for the potential target population decreases by 86.5%. In France, policy option 2 involves a reduction of expenditure equal to 48.6%, in the case of policy option 2a, and of 64%, in the case of policy option 2b. In percentages terms, in Italy and Germany the effects of policy options 2 are similar, respectively -40.4% and -41.6% for policy option 2a, -53.3% and -54,6% for policy option 2b. In the UK, policy option 2 involves a decrease of -56.9% (option 2a) and -60.2% (option 2b). In the Netherlands, Poland and Romania the cost changes attributable to policy option 2 are similar, ranging from -16.9% to -20.0%, for policy option 2a, and from -32.0% to -36.0% in the case of policy option 2b.

In the case of policy option 2, the analysis of the disaggregated results for each bilateral relation between the 8 MS (annex 3) suggests that a significant reduction of the expenditure for unemployment benefits that require aggregations of periods or salaries in Germany (57.7%), the Netherlands (29.3%), the UK (37.4%) and Denmark (22.1%) is to be imputed to those EU mobile citizens coming from Poland 261 . In Italy, about 80% of the decrease in expenditure is due to the variation attributable to mobile workers coming from Romania. The reduction of unemployment benefits expenditure generated by target population coming from the UK is estimated to be 34.7% in France, 30.6% in Poland and 16.6% in Denmark. EU mobile citizens coming from Germany account for 53.2% of the estimated decrease for the expenditure for unemployment benefits in Poland, and for 20.5%, 26,6%, 23.3% and 19.8% respectively in the Netherlands, France and Denmark. In the UK around 20% of the savings generated by policy option 2b is to be imputed to EU mobile citizens coming from France.

Figure 5.1. Variation of expenditure for unemployment benefits that require aggregations of periods or salaries. Policy options 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b (single person at 100% of the average wage).

Source. Our calculation based on data from Pacolet (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database), van Vliet and Caminada (2012), and EU-LFS.

In policy option 3, the calculation of unemployment benefits for the potential target population takes into account the salary earned in the Member State of previous employment when the one-month/three-month threshold is not met (see equation (4) in par 2.4.1). That produces a limited reduction in the expenditure in six of the analysed MS (DE, UK, IT, FR, NL and FR). For Poland and Romania, the entry into force of policy option 3 would result in an increase of public expenditure: the computation of the unemployment benefits would have to take into account the salaries earned in the countries of previous residence, where the average salary is generally higher than in these two countries.

In the UK, Germany and Italy the cost changes related to policy option 3 are between -11.3% and -17.4%, while in Denmark the estimated expenditure reduction is -19.0% 262 . In the Netherlands the effects of policy option 3 are a reduction in expenditures between 3.6% and 7.2%. In France the policy option examined produces a very limited change (-0.6% for 3a, -1% for 3b). The most relevant results of policy option 3 concern Poland and Romania. Both would face an increase in the expenditure dedicated to unemployment benefits paid to mobile workers that require aggregation of periods or salaries. In Poland, such policy option generates an increase of public expenditure of 15.9%, in the case of policy option 3a, and of 51.3%, in the case of policy option 3b. In Romania the estimated effects on cost changes are even higher. Policy option 3a involves an additional expenditure for unemployment benefits estimated to 49.4% of the expenditure calculated in the status quo scenario, while the increase generated by policy option 3b reaches 81.4%.

The bilateral relations between the selected MS in terms of cost changes reflect those generated by policy option 2, previously analysed. Table 3.1.2 in annex 3 reports the detailed results.

In order to provide a benchmark for the evaluation of expenditure variations, figure 5.2 reports the expenditure for unemployment benefits paid to mobile workers (coming from the other 7 selected countries) that require the aggregation of periods or salaries as a ratio of GDP, in the status quo scenario and in each policy option. The figure indicates that in all scenarios the unemployment benefits expenditures devoted to the target population is very limited: in no case does the value go over 0.008% of GDP. In Denmark and Germany, the expenditure generated by policy option 3 is around 0.006% of GDP, while in Italy and the Netherlands these values range from 0.0046% to 0.0052% of GDP. In France, the UK, and especially Poland and Romania, the public expenditure in policy option 3 is even more moderate. In France and the UK, the values are around or just below 0.001%of GDP, and in Romania and Poland these expenditures account only for one millionth of GDP.

Fig. 5.2. Expenditure variation in % GDP (2014), Status quo and policy option scenarios

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net, nama_10_gdp; web-based database), van Vliet and Caminada (2012), and EU-LFS.

As already mentioned, policy option 2 generates higher savings compared to policy option 3, resulting in an even lower expenditure for unemployment benefits paid to mobile workers (coming from the other 7 selected countries) that require the aggregation of periods or salaries. This is clear in the case of Denmark, where the estimated aggregate expenditure for policy option 2 is around 0.001% of GDP. For the other considered countries, the difference between policy options 2 and 3 is not as noticeable. For a group of countries (Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) the aggregate expenditure is comprised between 0.0045% and 0.0025% of GDP, while for the UK, France, Poland and Romania the values are below or significantly below 0.001% of GDP.

Table 5.1 disaggregates the expenditure estimated for each policy option, presenting the expenditure variation due the behavioral change in mobility flows and due to the change in entitlement and computation rules.

Tab. 5.1. Cost variation attributable to mobility change and to changes in entitlement and computation rules. Policy options 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b (single person at 100% of the average wage).

		DE	DK	FR	IT	NL	PL	RO	UK
Policy option 2A	mobility change	-2.5%	-6.1%	-2.5%	-4.4%	-0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.6%
	change in rules	-37.9%	-80.4%	-46.1%	-37.2%	-16.1%	-11.0%	-20.0%	-56.4%
	Tot	-40.4%	-86.5%	-48.6%	-41.6%	-16.9%	-11.0%	-20.0%	-56.9%
Policy option 2B	mobility change	-3.3%	-6.1%	-3.4%	-5.9%	-1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.6%
	change in rules	-50.1%	-80.4%	-60.6%	-48.7%	-32.6%	-36.0%	-32.0%	-59.7%
	Tot	-53.3%	-86.5%	-64.0%	-54.6%	-34.0%	-36.0%	-32.0%	-60.2%
Policy option 3A	mobility change	-0.8%	-1.9%	-0.3%	-1.7%	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%
	change in rules	-10.4%	-17.1%	-0.4%	-11.5%	-3.4%	15.9%	49.4%	-12.8%
	Tot	-11.3%	-19.0%	-0.8%	-13.2%	-3.6%	15.9%	49.4%	-12.9%
Policy option 3B	mobility change	-1.1%	-1.9%	-0.5%	-2.3%	-0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%
	change in rules	-13.8%	-17.1%	-0.5%	-15.1%	-6.8%	51.3%	81.4%	-13.5%
	Tot	-14.9%	-19.0%	-1.0%	-17.4%	-7.2%	51.3%	81.4%	-13.7%

Source: Our calculation based on data from Pacolet (2015), Eurostat (migr_imm5prv, earn_nt_net; web-based database), van Vliet and Caminada (2012), and EU-LFS.

The changes in migration flows account only for a moderate share of the expenditure variations for all policy options. Excluding Italy and Denmark, for the other six MS considered, the behavioural change in mobility flows explains less than 3.5% of the expenditure variations. The highest expenditure variations related to changes in migration flows are registered for policy option 2b. In this case, around 6% of expenditure variation of Italy and Denmark is attributable to mobility changes. In general, most of the expenditure variation is due to a reduction of the population entitled to receive unemployment benefits (policy option 2), or to different computation rules for the benefits (policy option 3).

9.1.Refinement of policy options 2a and 2b

For what concerns policy options 2a and 2b, variations of expenditure for unemployment benefits that require aggregations of periods or salaries would not differ from the ones observed if potential movers were to consider the possibility to obtain welfare coverage if they moved back to the country of previous employment.

EU-mobile citizens that decide to come back to the country of previous employment to receive the unemployment benefits that are no longer paid in the country where they have lost their job would burden the general welfare expenditure of the MS.

10.Conclusions

The aim of the study is to assess the secondary effects of the proposed modification to the current EU provisions on the entitlement to unemployment benefits paid to mobile workers that require the aggregation of periods or salaries, as specified in Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and in Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation'. Such secondary effects include changes in the overall mobility of workers, in the number of individuals entitled to the benefits and in the level of expenditure.

To this end, we have selected 8 MS as part of the case study, with consideration to the level of representativeness of the group as regards the whole EU. For each MS, we have defined size and characteristics of the population potentially interested by the policy changes, as well as the relative expenditure for unemployment benefits. Against this status quo scenario, we have estimated the impact of the various policy changes.

A simulation tool has been defined in order to estimate the potential mobility changes attributable to the economic differentials generated by the four policy options. The second step of the analysis has concerned the estimation of the changes of public expenditure devoted to the unemployment benefits paid to the target population.

In order to proceed with the estimate, key assumptions had to be made on the elasticity of potentially mobile EU citizens to changes in income differentials among countries (see par. 2.4).

Results generally show mild reductions in overall migration flows attributable to the potential implementation of the policy options. Decreases are stronger when policy option 2 is implemented, especially 2b, since a rather relevant quota of the target population is excluded by the entitlement to unemployment benefits, which reduces the incentive to move. The disincentives to move would be reduced if potential movers were to consider the possibility to obtain welfare coverage if they moved back to the country of previous employment. When option 3 is implemented, much smaller changes are observed. Policy option 2 also results in an important reduction of EU mobile citizens eligible for the aggregation of periods or salaries for the purpose of receiving unemployment benefits. For policy option 3, variations in the target population are limited to those produced by the changes in overall migration flows, since this option does not reduce the population eligible to unemployment benefits.

As regards expenditure changes, because policy option 2 excludes quite a large share of individuals from the entitlement to unemployment benefits, all countries experience a high decrease in the relevant chapter of expenditure (more so in the case of policy option 2b). That would not change if potential movers were to consider the possibility to obtain welfare coverage if they moved back to the country of previous employmentm though of course EU-mobile citizens that decide to come back to the country of previous employment to receive the unemployment benefits that are no longer paid in the country where they have lost their job would burden the general welfare expenditure of that MS.

Lower savings are observed when policy option 3 is implemented. Because the computation of benefits has to take into account salaries earned in the country of previous residence, Poland and Romania see their expenditure grow by a wide margin when option 3 is realised. In both policy option 2 and 3, most of the expenditure variation is imputable to changes in entitlement and computation rules, while the behavioral change in mobility flows accounts for only a limited share of the cost variations. As much as the percentages may reach high values, variations shown in absolute terms and as ratios of GDP confirm the little relevance for national budgets of the expenditure on unemployment benefits that require aggregation of periods or salaries.

As noted in par. 3.2, when taking in consideration figures from Pacolet (2015, p.18) it appears that for most of the countries our estimate of the potential target population in the ‘status-quo’ scenario represents an upper bound. EU mobile citizens seem to have lower take up of unemployment benefits than natives. The dimensions of the phenomenon analysed and of the expenditure figures are therefore even smaller than what has appeared in the present study.

Annex 1 – List of unemployment benefits within the scope of the study

DENMARK
ACT or Name	Consolidated Act No 348 of 8 April 2014 on unemployment insurance (om arbejdsløshedsforsikring mv)
Main condition	* Residing in Denmark.* No working activity;* No formal educational activity;* Registered as job seeker and at the disposal of the employment office; * Capable of working; * Available for the labour market; * Age between 18-65 years; * Actively seeking employment and co-operating with the employment office to build up an individual action plan;
Qualifying period	Basic allowance: A minimum period of 1,924 hours (corresponding to full-time employment during one year) during the 3 preceding years is required. Only employment carried out while being insured is taken into account.
Waiting period	Employees: No waiting period if involuntarily unemployed. 3 weeks waiting period if voluntarily unemployed. Self-employed: 3 weeks.
Determining factors	Previous earnings; period of employment.
Amount	Employees: Calculation usually based on average earnings of preceding 12 weeks or three months. No ceiling for the reference earnings. Self-employed: Calculation on the basis of his/her daily income (1/260 of the yearly income) if the self-employed person has carried out substantial self-employed activities for at least one year in a 3-year-period.Amount. 90% of previous earnings, but not more than DKK 815 (€109) per day. The benefit is paid per month. This maximum is adjusted once a year according to the adjustment rate (satsreguleringsprocenten).Duration: 2 years within a 3-year period. Labour market benefit (midlertidig arbejdsmarkedsydelse): Paid after entitlement to unemployment benefit has expired: 80% or 60% of the maximum unemployment benefit, according as to whether or not the beneficiary has dependent children. Duration: Up to 15 months after expiry of entitlement to unemployment benefit
supplement	No family or other supplement

FRANCE
ACT or Name	assurance chômage
Main condition	Residence in France; not to have left previous employment voluntarily without good cause; to be effectively and permanently looking for work; to be registered as jobseeker and to conform to a personalised back-to-work action plan; * to be physically able to work; *not to have reached the statutory retirement age (between 60 and 62). However, the indemnity is maintained (within the limit of its maximum duration) until the person reaches the age for entitlement to full pension (between 65 and 67 years), regardless of the length of insurance.
Qualifying period	At least 4 months (122 days) insurance during the last 28 months (36 months for those aged 50 and over) preceding the unemployment.
Waiting period	The waiting period comprises paid holidays plus a general period of 7 days plus a waiting period equal to the amount of the redundancy payment divided by 90 within a limit of 180 days (75 days in the case of redundancy).
Determining factors	Earnings on which contributions have been paid.
Amount	Earnings of the last 12 months within the limit of four times the social security ceiling (€12,516 per month). 40.4% of reference daily wages (RDW) + €11.72 per day or 57.4% of the RDW within the limit of 75% of the RDW. The best result is taken into account. Minimum: €28.58 per day. The duration of payment of the benefit corresponds to the length of insurance taken into account for acquiring entitlement to benefits (between 4 months and 2 years or 3 years if the beneficiary is aged 50 and over).
Supplement	No Family or other supplement

GERMANY
ACT or Name	Arbeitslosenversicherung
Main condition	not engaged in an employment relationship (without work); * makes an effort to put an end to this situation (efforts of his or her own); * is available for the placement efforts undertaken by the employment agency (availability); not entitled to a standard pension; * the unemployed person is obliged to make use of all possibilities of occupational integration
Qualifying period	The unemployed person must have been compulsorily insured for at least 12 months during the last 2 years.
Waiting period	In principle no waiting period. If the unemployed person has terminated his/her employment contract without good reason or has caused the termination of the contract through his/her own misconduct, a waiting period (a so-called blocking period, Sperrzeit) of up to 12 weeks may become effective.
Determining factors	Benefits are based on the salary, on the category mentioned on the wage-tax card and on the presence or not of children.
Amount	Beneficiaries with children: 67% of net earnings. Beneficiaries without children: 60% of net earnings. The duration of benefits (DB) depends on the duration of compulsory insurance coverage (DI) and on the age of the beneficiary. Minimum length 12 DI, age not considered, equals to 6 months of DB; Maximum length 48 DI, age 58 years, 24 months of DB
supplement	No family or other supplement

ITALY
ACT or Name	Assegno Sociale per l’Impiego ASPI, (Indennità di disoccupazione)
Main condition	To be involuntarily unemployed, not engaged in work for more than 5 consecutive days; to be capable of work; to be available for the employment office; not benefiting from any other pension treatment; no income higher than the personal annual taxable limit; *claim to be presented within 2 months (98 days in case of dismissal without notice).
Qualifying period	ASPl: Having matured at least two years of work insurance contributions one of which accrued during the two years prior to the onset of unemployment. Mini ASpI: Having matured at least 13 weeks (3 months) of contributions during the 12 months prior to dismissal.
Waiting period	Waiting period of 8 days.
Determining factors	Previous salary with a ceiling; age; duration of unemployment.
Amount	The benefit is calculated as a percentage of the average monthly gross income earned by the worker in the last two years prior to dismissal, with a monthly ceiling of €1,192.98 for the year 2014. ASPl and mini ASPI. Amounts equal to 75% of the monthly reference earnings. The maximum payable amount is €1,165.58 per month. The amount of the benefit is reduced to 60% of the monthly reference earnings after six months and to 45% after twelve months. Duration. ASPI. Duration will be gradually increased according to age: Unemployed persons under 50 are granted the benefit for 10 months in 2015; Unemployed persons between the age of 50 and 54 are granted the benefit for a period of 12 months through 2015 (from January 2016 onwards Unemployed persons under 55 will be granted the benefit for 12 months); Unemployed persons aged 55 and over are granted the benefit for 16 months in 2015 (18 months from January 2016 onwards). Mini ASPI: Granted for a number of weeks corresponding to half the number of weekly contributions paid during the last year prior to dismissal.
supplement	Eligible unemployed persons can receive an additional allowance for family dependent family members (assegni familiari) upon request.

POLAND
ACT or Name	Zasiłek dla bezrobotnych
Main condition	Involuntarily unemployed; without work or payment; registered with the employment agency; to be capable of work; to be available for full-time work; aged at least 18 years of age and less than 60 years (woman) or 65 years (man); no entitlement to old-age or invalidity pension; Polish or EU or EEA or Swiss citizenship; *not in receipt of rehabilitation, sickness, maternity or child-raising allowance.
Qualifying period	At least 365 calendar days of paid employment during the 18 months preceding the day of registration.
Waiting period	7 calendar days.
Determining factors	Length of economic activity.
Amount	Benefits not based on earnings. The monthly amount is paid as a percentage of the Basic Unemployment Allowance, depending upon the length of economic activity: 1 to 5 years of work: 80%; 5 to 20 years: 100%; 20 years and more: 120%. Basic Unemployment Allowance: PLN 831.10 (€200) per month for a period of three months, PLN 652.60 (€157) thereafter.Duration:6 months in areas with an unemployment rate less than 150% national average; 12 months in areas with an unemployment rate of at least 150% or more of the national average, or if the claimant has a qualifying period of 20 years and is over 50 years old, or if the claimant’s spouse is unemployed, not entitled to an allowance, and they have at least one dependent child under the age of 15 years.
supplement	No family or other supplement

ROMANIA
ACT or Name	indemnizatie de somaj
Main condition	To be involuntarily unemployed; not working; to be registered as unemployed with the National Agency for Employment; to be able to work; to be available for work; to be aged between 16 and the date of meeting the conditions for the Old-Age Pension (pensie pentru limita de varsta);* to be actively searching for work; * to have domicile or residence in Romania; * to apply for benefit within 12 months.
Qualifying period	Minimum contribution period:12 months during the 24 months preceding the application date. No qualifying period for graduates.
Waiting period	No waiting period.
Determining factors	level of earnings, length of contribution period.
Amount	Reference earnings: the monthly gross income. No ceiling. The amount is related to the length of contribution period and to the Reference Social Indicator (RSI) (indicator social de referinta).The duration of Unemployment Indemnity varies with the contribution period. Minimum length, between 1-5 years, entitlement to 6 months; maximum length, 10 and over years, entitlement for 12 months.
supplement	No family supplement or any other supplement

The NETHERLANDS
ACT or Name	WW-uitkering
Main condition	To be involuntarily unemployed; loss of at least 5 or half of the working hours per week; timely registration with the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV);to be capable for work; to be available for work;below the legal retirement age; seeking employment; residence in the Netherlands; *application for benefit on the first day of unemployment.
Qualifying period	A person who has received wages in at least 26 weeks out of the 36 weeks before the first day of unemployment (weeks’ condition).A person who has received wages for at least 208 hours in four of the five calendar years preceding the year in which s/he became unemployed (years condition).
Waiting period	No waiting period.
Determining factors	Reference earnings.
Amount	The reference earning is the last daily wage with a maximum of €198.28. The amount is equal to 75% of the last daily wage during the first two months, 70% thereafter. Duration. A person who only meets the weeks condition receives benefits for a maximum duration of 3 months. A person who satisfies the years condition receives benefits for as many months as the number of months in employment, with a maximum of 38 months.
supplement	If unemployment benefits are less than the social minimum, a supplementary benefit can be claimed under the Supplementary Benefit Act (Toeslagenwet, TW)

UK
ACT or Name	Contribution-based Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA)
Main condition	to be involuntarily unemployed; not engaged in work for 16 or more hours a week; to be capable of work; to be available for work; * under pensionable age; has entered into a Jobseekers’ agreement; actively seeking employment; is in Great Britain; is not a full-time student; *is not engaged in a trade dispute.
Qualifying period	Requirements. Contributions paid in one of the 2 tax years on which the claim is based amounting to at least 26 times the minimum weekly contribution for that year, and contributions paid or credited in both the appropriate tax years amounting to a total of at least 50 times the minimum weekly contribution for that year.
Waiting period	3 days
Determining factors	Flat-rate benefit, varying according to age.
Amount	Benefits not based on earnings, but varying with age: aged 25 or over: GBP 72.40 (€90) per week; aged 18-24: GBP 57.35 (€72) per week. Additionally no increase for dependants. Duration: limited to 182 days in any jobseeking period.
supplement	If a higher rate of benefit is needed and the conditions of entitlement are met, Income-based Jobseekers’ Allowance can be payable instead. Income-based Jobseekers’ Allowance: Support for children formerly included in Income-based Jobseekers’ Allowance claims was transferred to Child Tax Credit in 2006/07.

Source: MISSOC (web database)

Annex 2 - Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs

Table 2.1. Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs. Single persons at 100% of average earnings. Policy options 2a and 2b

		Status quo scenario				Policy option 2A						Policy option 2B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Mobility flow	Unemployed/Pop rate for EU-28+EFTA mobile workers	Potential target population	Elasticity to income change	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population due to mobility change	Change in potential target population due to exclusion of <1month workers	Change in potential target population	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population due to mobility change	Change in potential target population due to exclusion of <3months workers	Change in potential target population
DE	DK	2742	4.70%	129	0.8	-1.4%	-1.1%	-31	-1	-50	-51	-1.9%	-1.5%	-42	-2	-66	-68
DE	FR	19498	4.70%	916	0.8	-1.8%	-1.4%	-275	-13	-351	-364	-2.3%	-1.9%	-366	-17	-465	-482
DE	IT	21117	4.70%	993	0.6	-2.3%	-1.4%	-286	-13	-381	-394	-3.0%	-1.8%	-380	-18	-505	-523
DE	NL	14185	4.70%	667	0.8	-1.4%	-1.1%	-162	-8	-256	-264	-1.9%	-1.5%	-215	-10	-340	-350
DE	PL	149513	4.70%	7027	0.4	-6.4%	-2.6%	-3820	-180	-2663	-2843	-8.5%	-3.4%	-5086	-239	-3513	-3752
DE	RO	38314	4.70%	1801	0.4	-10.6%	-4.3%	-1631	-77	-671	-748	-14.2%	-5.7%	-2172	-102	-879	-981
DE	UK	13863	4.70%	652	0.8	-1.5%	-1.2%	-169	-8	-251	-259	-2.0%	-1.6%	-225	-11	-332	-343
DK	DE	3,066	6.52%	200	0.8	-4.2%	-3.4%	-104	-7	-165	-172	-4.2%	-3.4%	-104	-7	-165	-172
DK	FR	1,136	6.52%	74	0.8	-4.3%	-3.5%	-39	-3	-61	-64	-4.3%	-3.5%	-39	-3	-61	-64
DK	IT	1,080	6.52%	70	0.8	-5.5%	-4.4%	-48	-3	-57	-60	-5.5%	-4.4%	-48	-3	-57	-60
DK	NL	721	6.52%	47	0.2	-3.5%	-0.7%	-5	0	-40	-40	-3.5%	-0.7%	-5	0	-40	-40
DK	PL	3,396	6.52%	221	0.6	-15.6%	-9.4%	-319	-21	-171	-192	-15.6%	-9.4%	-319	-21	-171	-192
DK	RO	3,137	6.52%	204	0.4	-26.1%	-10.4%	-327	-21	-157	-178	-26.1%	-10.4%	-327	-21	-157	-178
DK	UK	2,886	6.52%	188	0.8	-3.7%	-3.0%	-86	-6	-156	-162	-3.7%	-3.0%	-86	-6	-156	-162
FR	DE	6413	4.47%	286	0.8	-2.6%	-2.1%	-133	-6	-132	-138	-3.4%	-2.8%	-177	-8	-174	-182
FR	DK	599	4.47%	27	0.8	-2.1%	-1.7%	-10	0	-13	-13	-2.8%	-2.3%	-14	-1	-16	-17
FR	IT	4654	4.47%	208	0.8	-3.4%	-2.7%	-126	-6	-96	-102	-4.5%	-3.6%	-167	-7	-126	-133
FR	NL	2145	4.47%	96	0.2	-2.1%	-0.4%	-9	0	-45	-45	-2.8%	-0.6%	-12	-1	-60	-61
FR	PL	2077	4.47%	93	0.6	-9.6%	-5.8%	-120	-5	-42	-47	-12.7%	-7.6%	-159	-7	-54	-61
FR	RO	1831	4.47%	82	0.4	-16.0%	-6.4%	-117	-5	-36	-41	-21.2%	-8.5%	-155	-7	-47	-54
FR	UK	9538	4.47%	426	0.8	-2.3%	-1.8%	-175	-8	-198	-206	-3.0%	-2.4%	-232	-10	-261	-271
IT	DE	6605	7.93%	524	0.2	-2.1%	-0.4%	-28	-2	-203	-205	-2.8%	-0.6%	-37	-3	-270	-273
IT	DK	205	7.93%	16	0.8	-1.7%	-1.4%	-3	0	-6	-6	-2.3%	-1.9%	-4	0	-8	-8
IT	FR	3922	7.93%	311	0.8	-2.1%	-1.7%	-67	-5	-119	-124	-2.9%	-2.3%	-90	-7	-157	-164
IT	NL	746	7.93%	59	0.2	-1.7%	-0.3%	-3	0	-23	-23	-2.3%	-0.5%	-3	0	-31	-31
IT	PL	4691	7.93%	372	0.6	-7.8%	-4.7%	-219	-17	-138	-155	-10.4%	-6.2%	-292	-23	-181	-204
IT	RO	76521	7.93%	6071	0.4	-13.0%	-5.2%	-3976	-315	-2239	-2554	-17.3%	-6.9%	-5294	-420	-2924	-3344
IT	UK	3732	7.93%	296	0.2	-1.9%	-0.4%	-14	-1	-115	-116	-2.5%	-0.5%	-18	-1	-153	-154
NL	DE	10824	3.87%	419	0.8	-0.7%	-0.6%	-62	-2	-68	-70	-1.5%	-1.2%	-127	-5	-137	-142
NL	DK	528	3.87%	20	0.6	-0.6%	-0.4%	-2	0	-3	-3	-1.2%	-0.7%	-4	0	-7	-7
NL	FR	3410	3.87%	132	0.6	-0.7%	-0.4%	-15	-1	-21	-22	-1.5%	-0.9%	-31	-1	-43	-44
NL	IT	3017	3.87%	117	0.6	-0.9%	-0.6%	-17	-1	-19	-20	-1.9%	-1.1%	-35	-1	-38	-39
NL	PL	14895	3.87%	577	0.4	-2.6%	-1.1%	-158	-6	-93	-99	-5.4%	-2.2%	-322	-12	-187	-199
NL	RO	1744	3.87%	68	0.4	-4.4%	-1.8%	-31	-1	-11	-12	-9.0%	-3.6%	-63	-2	-22	-24
NL	UK	5942	3.87%	230	0.8	-0.6%	-0.5%	-30	-1	-37	-38	-1.3%	-1.0%	-61	-2	-75	-77
PL	DE	3321	2.74%	91	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-10	-10	-0.2%	0.0%	-1	0	-33	-33
PL	DK	46	2.74%	1	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0	0	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	0	0
PL	FR	358	2.74%	10	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-4	-4
PL	IT	373	2.74%	10	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.3%	-0.1%	0	0	-4	-4
PL	NL	228	2.74%	6	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2
PL	RO	15	2.74%	0	0.6	-0.4%	-0.3%	0	0	0	0	-1.4%	-0.9%	0	0	0	0
PL	UK	1991	2.74%	54	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-6	-6	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-19	-19
RO	DE	644	1.87%	12	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-4	-4
RO	DK	44	1.87%	1	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0	0	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	0	0
RO	FR	508	1.87%	10	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-3	-3
RO	IT	850	1.87%	16	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-3	-3	-0.3%	0.0%	0	0	-5	-5
RO	NL	139	1.87%	3	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1
RO	PL	141	1.87%	3	0.2	-0.4%	-0.1%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.8%	-0.2%	0	0	-1	-1
RO	UK	284	1.87%	5	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2
UK	DE	17241	4.08%	704	0.8	-0.5%	-0.4%	-68	-3	-397	-400	-0.5%	-0.4%	-72	-3	-421	-424
UK	DK	1077	4.08%	44	0.6	-0.4%	-0.2%	-3	0	-25	-25	-0.4%	-0.3%	-3	0	-26	-26
UK	FR	21889	4.08%	893	0.6	-0.5%	-0.3%	-66	-3	-505	-508	-0.5%	-0.3%	-70	-3	-534	-537
UK	IT	13230	4.08%	540	0.6	-0.6%	-0.4%	-51	-2	-305	-307	-0.7%	-0.4%	-54	-2	-323	-325
UK	NL	7616	4.08%	311	0.8	-0.4%	-0.3%	-25	-1	-176	-177	-0.4%	-0.3%	-26	-1	-186	-187
UK	PL	32413	4.08%	1323	0.4	-1.8%	-0.7%	-235	-10	-744	-754	-1.9%	-0.8%	-249	-10	-788	-798
UK	RO	10422	4.08%	425	0.4	-3.0%	-1.2%	-126	-5	-238	-243	-3.2%	-1.3%	-133	-5	-252	-257

Table 2.2 Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs. Single persons at 100% of average earnings. Policy options 3a and 3b

		Status quo scenario				Policy option 3A				Policy option 3B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Mobility flow	Unemployed/Pop rate for EU-28+EFTA mobile workers	Potential target population	Elasticity to income change	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population
DE	DK	2742	4.70%	129	0.8	0.1%	0.1%	3	0	0.2%	0.1%	4	0
DE	FR	19498	4.70%	916	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	-5	0	0.0%	0.0%	-7	0
DE	IT	21117	4.70%	993	0.6	-0.3%	-0.2%	-35	-2	-0.4%	-0.2%	-47	-2
DE	NL	14185	4.70%	667	0.8	0.1%	0.1%	15	1	0.2%	0.1%	20	1
DE	PL	149513	4.70%	7027	0.4	-2.3%	-0.9%	-1402	-66	-3.1%	-1.2%	-1867	-88
DE	RO	38314	4.70%	1801	0.4	-4.5%	-1.8%	-685	-32	-6.0%	-2.4%	-912	-43
DE	UK	13863	4.70%	652	0.8	0.1%	0.1%	10	0	0.1%	0.1%	13	1
DK	DE	3,066	6.52%	200	0.8	-0.4%	-0.3%	-10	-1	-0.4%	-0.3%	-10	-1
DK	FR	1,136	6.52%	74	0.8	-0.4%	-0.4%	-4	0	-0.4%	-0.4%	-4	0
DK	IT	1,080	6.52%	70	0.8	-1.1%	-0.8%	-9	-1	-1.1%	-0.8%	-9	-1
DK	NL	721	6.52%	47	0.2	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
DK	PL	3,396	6.52%	221	0.6	-6.1%	-3.7%	-125	-8	-6.1%	-3.7%	-125	-8
DK	RO	3,137	6.52%	204	0.4	-11.3%	-4.5%	-142	-9	-11.3%	-4.5%	-142	-9
DK	UK	2,886	6.52%	188	0.8	-0.2%	-0.1%	-4	0	-0.2%	-0.1%	-4	0
FR	DE	6413	4.47%	286	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
FR	DK	599	4.47%	27	0.8	0.2%	0.2%	1	0	0.3%	0.2%	1	0
FR	IT	4654	4.47%	208	0.8	-0.4%	-0.3%	-15	-1	-0.5%	-0.4%	-19	-1
FR	NL	2145	4.47%	96	0.2	0.2%	0.0%	1	0	0.3%	0.1%	1	0
FR	PL	2077	4.47%	93	0.6	-3.5%	-2.1%	-44	-2	-4.6%	-2.8%	-58	-3
FR	RO	1831	4.47%	82	0.4	-6.7%	-2.7%	-49	-2	-8.9%	-3.5%	-65	-3
FR	UK	9538	4.47%	426	0.8	0.2%	0.1%	12	1	0.2%	0.2%	16	1
IT	DE	6605	7.93%	524	0.2	0.3%	0.1%	4	0	0.4%	0.1%	5	0
IT	DK	205	7.93%	16	0.8	0.5%	0.4%	1	0	0.6%	0.5%	1	0
IT	FR	3922	7.93%	311	0.8	0.3%	0.2%	9	1	0.4%	0.3%	12	1
IT	NL	746	7.93%	59	0.2	0.5%	0.1%	1	0	0.6%	0.1%	1	0
IT	PL	4691	7.93%	372	0.6	-2.5%	-1.5%	-72	-6	-3.4%	-2.0%	-95	-8
IT	RO	76521	7.93%	6071	0.4	-5.1%	-2.1%	-1572	-125	-6.8%	-2.7%	-2094	-166
IT	UK	3732	7.93%	296	0.2	0.4%	0.1%	3	0	0.6%	0.1%	4	0
NL	DE	10824	3.87%	419	0.8	-0.1%	-0.1%	-6	0	-0.1%	-0.1%	-12	0
NL	DK	528	3.87%	20	0.6	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
NL	FR	3410	3.87%	132	0.6	-0.1%	0.0%	-1	0	-0.2%	-0.1%	-3	0
NL	IT	3017	3.87%	117	0.6	-0.2%	-0.1%	-3	0	-0.4%	-0.2%	-7	0
NL	PL	14895	3.87%	577	0.4	-1.0%	-0.4%	-61	-2	-2.1%	-0.8%	-125	-5
NL	RO	1744	3.87%	68	0.4	-1.9%	-0.8%	-13	-1	-3.9%	-1.6%	-27	-1
NL	UK	5942	3.87%	230	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	-1	0	-0.1%	0.0%	-2	0
PL	DE	3321	2.74%	91	0.1	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.0%	1	0
PL	DK	46	2.74%	1	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.1%	0	0
PL	FR	358	2.74%	10	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.1%	0	0
PL	IT	373	2.74%	10	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.1%	0	0
PL	NL	228	2.74%	6	0.1	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.0%	0	0
PL	RO	15	2.74%	0	0.6	-0.1%	-0.1%	0	0	-0.3%	-0.2%	0	0
PL	UK	1991	2.74%	54	0.1	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.0%	1	0
RO	DE	644	1.87%	12	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	0	0
RO	DK	44	1.87%	1	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	0	0
RO	FR	508	1.87%	10	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	0	0
RO	IT	850	1.87%	16	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	0	0
RO	NL	139	1.87%	3	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	0	0
RO	PL	141	1.87%	3	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.1%	0	0
RO	UK	284	1.87%	5	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	0	0
UK	DE	17241	4.08%	704	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	-6	0	0.0%	0.0%	-6	0
UK	DK	1077	4.08%	44	0.6	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
UK	FR	21889	4.08%	893	0.6	0.0%	0.0%	-6	0	0.0%	0.0%	-7	0
UK	IT	13230	4.08%	540	0.6	-0.1%	-0.1%	-9	0	-0.1%	-0.1%	-10	0
UK	NL	7616	4.08%	311	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
UK	PL	32413	4.08%	1323	0.4	-0.7%	-0.3%	-91	-4	-0.7%	-0.3%	-97	-4
UK	RO	10422	4.08%	425	0.4	-1.3%	-0.5%	-55	-2	-1.4%	-0.6%	-58	-2

Table 2.3. Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs. One-earner married couples with two children at 100% of average earnings. Policy options 2a and 2b

		Status quo scenario				Policy option 2°						Policy option 2B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Mobility flow	Unemployed/Pop rate for EU-28+EFTA mobile workers	Potential target population	Elasticity	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population due to mobility change	Change in potential target population due to exclusion of <1month workers	Change in potential target population	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population due to mobility change	Change in potential target population due to exclusion of <3months workers	Change in potential target population
DE	DK	2742	4.70%	129	0.8	-1.8%	-1.5%	-40	-2	-49	-51	-2.5%	-2.0%	-54	-3	-65	-68
DE	FR	19498	4.70%	916	0.8	-2.4%	-1.9%	-367	-17	-350	-367	-3.1%	-2.5%	-488	-23	-462	-485
DE	IT	21117	4.70%	993	0.6	-2.9%	-1.8%	-371	-17	-380	-397	-3.9%	-2.3%	-494	-23	-502	-525
DE	NL	14185	4.70%	667	0.8	-2.0%	-1.6%	-222	-10	-256	-266	-2.6%	-2.1%	-296	-14	-338	-352
DE	PL	149513	4.70%	7027	0.4	-9.0%	-3.6%	-5357	-252	-2635	-2887	-11.9%	-4.8%	-7133	-335	-3463	-3798
DE	RO	38314	4.70%	1801	0.4	-15.8%	-6.3%	-2427	-114	-656	-770	-21.1%	-8.4%	-3232	-152	-853	-1005
DE	UK	13863	4.70%	652	0.8	-2.1%	-1.7%	-229	-11	-249	-260	-2.8%	-2.2%	-305	-14	-330	-344
DK	DE	3,066	6.52%	200	0.8	-4.1%	-3.3%	-101	-7	-165	-172	-4.1%	-3.3%	-101	-7	-165	-172
DK	FR	1,136	6.52%	74	0.8	-4.8%	-3.8%	-44	-3	-61	-64	-4.8%	-3.8%	-44	-3	-61	-64
DK	IT	1,080	6.52%	70	0.8	-6.0%	-4.8%	-52	-3	-57	-60	-6.0%	-4.8%	-52	-3	-57	-60
DK	NL	721	6.52%	47	0.2	-4.0%	-0.8%	-6	0	-40	-40	-4.0%	-0.8%	-6	0	-40	-40
DK	PL	3,396	6.52%	221	0.6	-18.3%	-11.0%	-373	-24	-169	-193	-18.3%	-11.0%	-373	-24	-169	-193
DK	RO	3,137	6.52%	204	0.4	-32.4%	-13.0%	-407	-26	-152	-178	-32.4%	-13.0%	-407	-26	-152	-178
DK	UK	2,886	6.52%	188	0.8	-4.2%	-3.4%	-98	-6	-156	-162	-4.2%	-3.4%	-98	-6	-156	-162
FR	DE	6413	4.47%	286	0.8	-2.2%	-1.8%	-113	-5	-133	-138	-2.9%	-2.3%	-150	-7	-175	-182
FR	DK	599	4.47%	27	0.8	-2.0%	-1.6%	-10	0	-13	-13	-2.7%	-2.2%	-13	-1	-16	-17
FR	IT	4654	4.47%	208	0.8	-3.2%	-2.6%	-120	-5	-96	-101	-4.3%	-3.4%	-159	-7	-126	-133
FR	NL	2145	4.47%	96	0.2	-2.2%	-0.4%	-9	0	-45	-45	-2.9%	-0.6%	-12	-1	-60	-61
FR	PL	2077	4.47%	93	0.6	-9.9%	-5.9%	-123	-6	-41	-47	-13.1%	-7.8%	-163	-7	-54	-61
FR	RO	1831	4.47%	82	0.4	-17.4%	-7.0%	-128	-6	-36	-42	-23.1%	-9.2%	-169	-8	-46	-54
FR	UK	9538	4.47%	426	0.8	-2.3%	-1.8%	-174	-8	-198	-206	-3.0%	-2.4%	-230	-10	-261	-271
IT	DE	6605	7.93%	524	0.2	-2.2%	-0.4%	-29	-2	-203	-205	-2.9%	-0.6%	-38	-3	-270	-273
IT	DK	205	7.93%	16	0.8	-2.0%	-1.6%	-3	0	-6	-6	-2.7%	-2.1%	-4	0	-8	-8
IT	FR	3922	7.93%	311	0.8	-2.6%	-2.0%	-80	-6	-119	-125	-3.4%	-2.7%	-107	-8	-157	-165
IT	NL	746	7.93%	59	0.2	-2.1%	-0.4%	-3	0	-23	-23	-2.8%	-0.6%	-4	0	-31	-31
IT	PL	4691	7.93%	372	0.6	-9.7%	-5.8%	-274	-22	-136	-158	-13.0%	-7.8%	-365	-29	-178	-207
IT	RO	76521	7.93%	6071	0.4	-17.2%	-6.9%	-5266	-418	-2199	-2617	-22.9%	-9.2%	-7011	-556	-2854	-3410
IT	UK	3732	7.93%	296	0.2	-2.2%	-0.4%	-17	-1	-115	-116	-3.0%	-0.6%	-22	-2	-152	-154
NL	DE	10824	3.87%	419	0.8	-0.6%	-0.5%	-54	-2	-68	-70	-1.3%	-1.0%	-111	-4	-137	-141
NL	DK	528	3.87%	20	0.6	-0.6%	-0.3%	-2	0	-3	-3	-1.2%	-0.7%	-4	0	-7	-7
NL	FR	3410	3.87%	132	0.6	-0.7%	-0.4%	-15	-1	-21	-22	-1.5%	-0.9%	-31	-1	-43	-44
NL	IT	3017	3.87%	117	0.6	-0.9%	-0.6%	-17	-1	-19	-20	-1.9%	-1.1%	-34	-1	-38	-39
NL	PL	14895	3.87%	577	0.4	-2.8%	-1.1%	-167	-6	-93	-99	-5.7%	-2.3%	-342	-13	-187	-200
NL	RO	1744	3.87%	68	0.4	-5.0%	-2.0%	-35	-1	-11	-12	-10.1%	-4.1%	-71	-3	-22	-25
NL	UK	5942	3.87%	230	0.8	-0.6%	-0.5%	-31	-1	-37	-38	-1.3%	-1.1%	-63	-2	-75	-77
PL	DE	3321	2.74%	91	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-10	-10	-0.2%	0.0%	-1	0	-33	-33
PL	DK	46	2.74%	1	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0	0	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	0	0
PL	FR	358	2.74%	10	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.3%	-0.1%	0	0	-4	-4
PL	IT	373	2.74%	10	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.3%	-0.1%	0	0	-4	-4
PL	NL	228	2.74%	6	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2
PL	RO	15	2.74%	0	0.6	-0.5%	-0.3%	0	0	0	0	-1.8%	-1.1%	0	0	0	0
PL	UK	1991	2.74%	54	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-6	-6	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-19	-19
RO	DE	644	1.87%	12	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-4	-4
RO	DK	44	1.87%	1	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0	0	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	0	0
RO	FR	508	1.87%	10	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-3	-3
RO	IT	850	1.87%	16	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-3	-3	-0.3%	0.0%	0	0	-5	-5
RO	NL	139	1.87%	3	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1
RO	PL	141	1.87%	3	0.2	-0.4%	-0.1%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.9%	-0.2%	0	0	-1	-1
RO	UK	284	1.87%	5	0.1	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-1	-1	-0.2%	0.0%	0	0	-2	-2
UK	DE	17241	4.08%	704	0.8	-1.2%	-1.0%	-170	-7	-395	-402	-1.3%	-1.0%	-180	-7	-418	-425
UK	DK	1077	4.08%	44	0.6	-1.1%	-0.7%	-7	0	-25	-25	-1.2%	-0.7%	-8	0	-26	-26
UK	FR	21889	4.08%	893	0.6	-1.4%	-0.9%	-190	-8	-502	-510	-1.5%	-0.9%	-201	-8	-531	-539
UK	IT	13230	4.08%	540	0.6	-1.8%	-1.1%	-143	-6	-303	-309	-1.9%	-1.1%	-151	-6	-320	-326
UK	NL	7616	4.08%	311	0.8	-1.2%	-1.0%	-73	-3	-175	-178	-1.3%	-1.0%	-78	-3	-185	-188
UK	PL	32413	4.08%	1323	0.4	-5.5%	-2.2%	-715	-29	-734	-763	-5.8%	-2.3%	-756	-31	-775	-806
UK	RO	10422	4.08%	425	0.4	-9.7%	-3.9%	-406	-17	-231	-248	-10.3%	-4.1%	-430	-18	-244	-262

Table 2.4. Secondary effects analysis: mobility patterns. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs. One-earner married couple with two children at 100% of average earnings. Policy options 3a and 3b

		Status quo scenario				Policy option 3A				Policy option 3B
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Mobility flow	Unemployed/Pop rate for EU-28+EFTA mobile workers	Potential target population	Elasticity	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population	% income change	% mobility change	Change in total mobility flow	Change in potential target population
DE	DK	2742	4.70%	129	0.8	0.1%	0.1%	2	0	0.1%	0.1%	2	0
DE	FR	19498	4.70%	916	0.8	-0.2%	-0.1%	-27	-1	-0.2%	-0.2%	-36	-2
DE	IT	21117	4.70%	993	0.6	-0.5%	-0.3%	-58	-3	-0.6%	-0.4%	-78	-4
DE	NL	14185	4.70%	667	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	3	0	0.0%	0.0%	4	0
DE	PL	149513	4.70%	7027	0.4	-3.5%	-1.4%	-2077	-98	-4.6%	-1.8%	-2766	-130
DE	RO	38314	4.70%	1801	0.4	-6.9%	-2.8%	-1059	-50	-9.2%	-3.7%	-1410	-66
DE	UK	13863	4.70%	652	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	-3	0	0.0%	0.0%	-5	0
DK	DE	3,066	6.52%	200	0.8	-0.2%	-0.1%	-4	0	-0.2%	-0.1%	-4	0
DK	FR	1,136	6.52%	74	0.8	-0.5%	-0.4%	-5	0	-0.5%	-0.4%	-5	0
DK	IT	1,080	6.52%	70	0.8	-1.1%	-0.9%	-10	-1	-1.1%	-0.9%	-10	-1
DK	NL	721	6.52%	47	0.2	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0	-0.1%	0.0%	0	0
DK	PL	3,396	6.52%	221	0.6	-7.3%	-4.4%	-148	-10	-7.3%	-4.4%	-148	-10
DK	RO	3,137	6.52%	204	0.4	-14.3%	-5.7%	-180	-12	-14.3%	-5.7%	-180	-12
DK	UK	2,886	6.52%	188	0.8	-0.2%	-0.2%	-5	0	-0.2%	-0.2%	-5	0
FR	DE	6413	4.47%	286	0.8	0.2%	0.2%	10	0	0.3%	0.2%	13	1
FR	DK	599	4.47%	27	0.8	0.3%	0.2%	1	0	0.4%	0.3%	2	0
FR	IT	4654	4.47%	208	0.8	-0.3%	-0.3%	-12	-1	-0.4%	-0.3%	-16	-1
FR	NL	2145	4.47%	96	0.2	0.2%	0.0%	1	0	0.3%	0.1%	1	0
FR	PL	2077	4.47%	93	0.6	-3.6%	-2.2%	-45	-2	-4.8%	-2.9%	-60	-3
FR	RO	1831	4.47%	82	0.4	-7.4%	-3.0%	-54	-2	-9.8%	-3.9%	-72	-3
FR	UK	9538	4.47%	426	0.8	0.2%	0.1%	12	1	0.2%	0.2%	16	1
IT	DE	6605	7.93%	524	0.2	0.5%	0.1%	7	1	0.7%	0.1%	9	1
IT	DK	205	7.93%	16	0.8	0.6%	0.5%	1	0	0.8%	0.6%	1	0
IT	FR	3922	7.93%	311	0.8	0.3%	0.3%	10	1	0.4%	0.3%	13	1
IT	NL	746	7.93%	59	0.2	0.5%	0.1%	1	0	0.7%	0.1%	1	0
IT	PL	4691	7.93%	372	0.6	-3.3%	-2.0%	-92	-7	-4.4%	-2.6%	-123	-10
IT	RO	76521	7.93%	6071	0.4	-7.0%	-2.8%	-2143	-170	-9.3%	-3.7%	-2855	-227
IT	UK	3732	7.93%	296	0.2	0.5%	0.1%	4	0	0.6%	0.1%	5	0
NL	DE	10824	3.87%	419	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	-1	0
NL	DK	528	3.87%	20	0.6	0.0%	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0
NL	FR	3410	3.87%	132	0.6	-0.1%	0.0%	-1	0	-0.1%	-0.1%	-2	0
NL	IT	3017	3.87%	117	0.6	-0.1%	-0.1%	-3	0	-0.3%	-0.2%	-6	0
NL	PL	14895	3.87%	577	0.4	-1.1%	-0.4%	-65	-3	-2.2%	-0.9%	-133	-5
NL	RO	1744	3.87%	68	0.4	-2.2%	-0.9%	-15	-1	-4.4%	-1.8%	-31	-1
NL	UK	5942	3.87%	230	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	-1	0	0.0%	0.0%	-1	0
PL	DE	3321	2.74%	91	0.1	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.4%	0.0%	1	0
PL	DK	46	2.74%	1	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.4%	0.1%	0	0
PL	FR	358	2.74%	10	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.4%	0.1%	0	0
PL	IT	373	2.74%	10	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.1%	0	0
PL	NL	228	2.74%	6	0.1	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.4%	0.0%	0	0
PL	RO	15	2.74%	0	0.6	-0.1%	-0.1%	0	0	-0.4%	-0.2%	0	0
PL	UK	1991	2.74%	54	0.1	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.4%	0.0%	1	0
RO	DE	644	1.87%	12	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.7%	0.1%	0	0
RO	DK	44	1.87%	1	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.7%	0.1%	0	0
RO	FR	508	1.87%	10	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.7%	0.1%	0	0
RO	IT	850	1.87%	16	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.6%	0.1%	1	0
RO	NL	139	1.87%	3	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.7%	0.1%	0	0
RO	PL	141	1.87%	3	0.2	0.2%	0.0%	0	0	0.3%	0.1%	0	0
RO	UK	284	1.87%	5	0.1	0.3%	0.0%	0	0	0.7%	0.1%	0	0
UK	DE	17241	4.08%	704	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	3	0	0.0%	0.0%	3	0
UK	DK	1077	4.08%	44	0.6	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0.1%	0.0%	0	0
UK	FR	21889	4.08%	893	0.6	-0.1%	-0.1%	-11	0	-0.1%	-0.1%	-12	0
UK	IT	13230	4.08%	540	0.6	-0.3%	-0.2%	-21	-1	-0.3%	-0.2%	-22	-1
UK	NL	7616	4.08%	311	0.8	0.0%	0.0%	2	0	0.0%	0.0%	2	0
UK	PL	32413	4.08%	1323	0.4	-2.1%	-0.8%	-275	-11	-2.2%	-0.9%	-291	-12
UK	RO	10422	4.08%	425	0.4	-4.2%	-1.7%	-177	-7	-4.5%	-1.8%	-187	-8

Annex 3 – Secondary effects analysis: cost changes

Table 3.1. Cost changes analysis. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs, policy option 2A

		Status quo scenario		Policy option 2A
				Variation attributable to mobility change				Variation attributable to mobility change and change in rules
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Expenditure	Total expenditure	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation
DE	DK	€ 2,150,359.31	€ 203,100,603.17	€ 2,133,689.86	-0.8%	€ 198,099,767.57	-2.5%	€ 1,300,217.26	-39.5%	€ 121,036,890.97	-40.4%
DE	FR	€ 15,269,218.03		€ 15,052,515.16	-1.4%			€ 9,201,537.50	-39.7%
DE	IT	€ 16,536,096.38		€ 16,319,393.51	-1.3%			€ 9,968,332.30	-39.7%
DE	NL	€ 11,118,524.48		€ 10,985,168.87	-1.2%			€ 6,717,789.16	-39.6%
DE	PL	€ 117,136,239.20		€ 114,135,737.84	-2.6%			€ 69,744,987.17	-40.5%
DE	RO	€ 30,021,683.05		€ 28,738,135.25	-4.3%			€ 17,552,932.96	-41.5%
DE	UK	€ 10,868,482.70		€ 10,735,127.09	-1.2%			€ 6,551,094.64	-39.7%
DK	DE	€ 3,851,695.46	€ 19,335,511.21	€ 3,716,886.12	-3.5%	€ 18,160,744.09	-6.1%	€ 539,237.36	-86.0%	€ 2,619,152.91	-86.5%
DK	FR	€ 1,425,127.32		€ 1,367,351.89	-4.1%			€ 192,584.77	-86.5%
DK	IT	€ 1,348,093.41		€ 1,290,317.98	-4.3%			€ 192,584.77	-85.7%
DK	NL	€ 905,148.43		€ 905,148.43	0.0%			€ 134,809.34	-85.1%
DK	PL	€ 4,256,123.48		€ 3,851,695.46	-9.5%			€ 558,495.84	-86.9%
DK	RO	€ 3,928,729.37		€ 3,524,301.35	-10.3%			€ 500,720.41	-87.3%
DK	UK	€ 3,620,593.73		€ 3,505,042.87	-3.2%			€ 500,720.41	-86.2%
FR	DE	€ 5,356,693.25	€ 22,812,770.56	€ 5,244,315.07	-2.1%	€ 22,250,879.66	-2.5%	€ 2,771,995.11	-48.3%	€ 11,724,790.12	-48.6%
FR	DK	€ 505,701.81		€ 505,701.81	0.0%			€ 262,215.75	-48.1%
FR	IT	€ 3,895,776.91		€ 3,783,398.73	-2.9%			€ 1,985,347.85	-49.0%
FR	NL	€ 1,798,050.88		€ 1,798,050.88	0.0%			€ 955,214.53	-46.9%
FR	PL	€ 1,741,861.79		€ 1,648,213.31	-5.4%			€ 861,566.05	-50.5%
FR	RO	€ 1,535,835.13		€ 1,442,186.64	-6.1%			€ 767,917.56	-50.0%
FR	UK	€ 7,978,850.79		€ 7,829,013.21	-1.9%			€ 4,120,533.27	-48.4%
IT	DE	€ 6,200,861.44	€ 90,516,009.86	€ 6,177,194.03	-0.4%	€ 86,492,550.15	-4.4%	€ 3,774,951.91	-39.1%	€ 52,849,326.71	-41.6%
IT	DK	€ 189,339.28		€ 189,339.28	0.0%			€ 118,337.05	-37.5%
IT	FR	€ 3,680,282.27		€ 3,621,113.74	-1.6%			€ 2,212,902.84	-39.9%
IT	NL	€ 698,188.60		€ 698,188.60	0.0%			€ 426,013.38	-39.0%
IT	PL	€ 4,402,138.28		€ 4,200,965.29	-4.6%			€ 2,567,913.99	-41.7%
IT	RO	€ 71,842,423.30		€ 68,114,806.22	-5.2%			€ 41,619,140.63	-42.1%
IT	UK	€ 3,502,776.69		€ 3,490,942.99	-0.3%			€ 2,130,066.91	-39.2%
NL	DE	€ 9,580,471.81	€ 35,738,132.30	€ 9,534,741.63	-0.5%	€ 35,463,751.24	-0.8%	€ 7,979,915.66	-16.7%	€ 29,701,749.11	-16.9%
NL	DK	€ 457,301.76		€ 457,301.76	0.0%			€ 388,706.49	-15.0%
NL	FR	€ 3,018,191.60		€ 2,995,326.51	-0.8%			€ 2,515,159.66	-16.7%
NL	IT	€ 2,675,215.28		€ 2,652,350.19	-0.9%			€ 2,217,913.52	-17.1%
NL	PL	€ 13,193,155.68		€ 13,055,965.16	-1.0%			€ 10,929,511.99	-17.2%
NL	RO	€ 1,554,825.97		€ 1,531,960.89	-1.5%			€ 1,280,444.92	-17.6%
NL	UK	€ 5,258,970.20		€ 5,236,105.12	-0.4%			€ 4,390,096.87	-16.5%
PL	DE	€ 172,751.95	€ 326,520.16	€ 172,751.95	0.0%	€ 326,520.16	0.0%	€ 153,768.22	-11.0%	€ 290,451.07	-11.0%
PL	DK	€ 1,898.37		€ 1,898.37	0.0%			€ 1,898.37	0.0%
PL	FR	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 17,085.36	-10.0%
PL	IT	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 17,085.36	-10.0%
PL	NL	€ 11,390.24		€ 11,390.24	0.0%			€ 9,491.87	-16.7%
PL	RO	€ -		€ -	#DIV/0!			€ -	-
PL	UK	€ 102,512.14		€ 102,512.14	0.0%			€ 91,121.91	-11.1%
RO	DE	€ 21,630.64	€ 90,127.68	€ 21,630.64	0.0%	€ 90,127.68	0.0%	€ 18,025.54	-16.7%	€ 72,102.14	-20.0%
RO	DK	€ 1,802.55		€ 1,802.55	0.0%			€ 1,802.55	0.0%
RO	FR	€ 18,025.54		€ 18,025.54	0.0%			€ 14,420.43	-20.0%
RO	IT	€ 28,840.86		€ 28,840.86	0.0%			€ 23,433.20	-18.8%
RO	NL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 3,605.11	-33.3%
RO	PL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 3,605.11	-33.3%
RO	UK	€ 9,012.77		€ 9,012.77	0.0%			€ 7,210.21	-20.0%
UK	DE	€ 2,986,404.03	€ 17,986,297.02	€ 2,973,677.88	-0.4%	€ 17,884,487.79	-0.6%	€ 1,289,583.56	-56.8%	€ 7,745,985.46	-56.9%
UK	DK	€ 186,650.25		€ 186,650.25	0.0%			€ 80,598.97	-56.8%
UK	FR	€ 3,788,151.71		€ 3,775,425.55	-0.3%			€ 1,633,189.71	-56.9%
UK	IT	€ 2,290,707.64		€ 2,282,223.54	-0.4%			€ 988,397.93	-56.9%
UK	NL	€ 1,319,277.92		€ 1,315,035.87	-0.3%			€ 568,434.86	-56.9%
UK	PL	€ 5,612,233.72		€ 5,569,813.20	-0.8%			€ 2,413,727.12	-57.0%
UK	RO	€ 1,802,871.75		€ 1,781,661.50	-1.2%			€ 772,053.32	-57.2%

Table 3.2. Cost changes analysis. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs, policy option 2B

		Status quo scenario		Policy option 2B
				Variation attributable to mobility change				Variation attributable to mobility change and change in rules
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Expenditure	Total expenditure	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation
DE	DK	€ 2,150,359.31	€ 203,100,603.17	€ 2,117,020.40	-1.6%	€ 196,449,491.82	-3.3%	€ 1,016,836.57	-52.7%	€ 94,782,504.07	-53.3%
DE	FR	€ 15,269,218.03		€ 14,985,837.35	-1.9%			€ 7,234,542.17	-52.6%
DE	IT	€ 16,536,096.38		€ 16,236,046.25	-1.8%			€ 7,834,642.44	-52.6%
DE	NL	€ 11,118,524.48		€ 10,951,829.96	-1.5%			€ 5,284,216.28	-52.5%
DE	PL	€ 117,136,239.20		€ 113,152,240.18	-3.4%			€ 54,592,455.30	-53.4%
DE	RO	€ 30,021,683.05		€ 28,321,398.95	-5.7%			€ 13,668,950.64	-54.5%
DE	UK	€ 10,868,482.70		€ 10,685,118.73	-1.7%			€ 5,150,860.67	-52.6%
DK	DE	€ 3,851,695.46	€ 19,335,511.21	€ 3,716,886.12	-3.5%	€ 18,160,744.09	-6.1%	€ 539,237.36	-86.0%	€ 2,619,152.91	-86.5%
DK	FR	€ 1,425,127.32		€ 1,367,351.89	-4.1%			€ 192,584.77	-86.5%
DK	IT	€ 1,348,093.41		€ 1,290,317.98	-4.3%			€ 192,584.77	-85.7%
DK	NL	€ 905,148.43		€ 905,148.43	0.0%			€ 134,809.34	-85.1%
DK	PL	€ 4,256,123.48		€ 3,851,695.46	-9.5%			€ 558,495.84	-86.9%
DK	RO	€ 3,928,729.37		€ 3,524,301.35	-10.3%			€ 500,720.41	-87.3%
DK	UK	€ 3,620,593.73		€ 3,505,042.87	-3.2%			€ 500,720.41	-86.2%
FR	DE	€ 5,356,693.25	€ 22,812,770.56	€ 5,206,855.68	-2.8%	€ 22,044,852.99	-3.4%	€ 1,947,888.45	-63.6%	€ 8,222,336.84	-64.0%
FR	DK	€ 505,701.81		€ 486,972.11	-3.7%			€ 187,296.97	-63.0%
FR	IT	€ 3,895,776.91		€ 3,764,669.03	-3.4%			€ 1,404,727.25	-63.9%
FR	NL	€ 1,798,050.88		€ 1,779,321.18	-1.0%			€ 655,539.38	-63.5%
FR	PL	€ 1,741,861.79		€ 1,610,753.91	-7.5%			€ 599,350.29	-65.6%
FR	RO	€ 1,535,835.13		€ 1,404,727.25	-8.5%			€ 524,431.51	-65.9%
FR	UK	€ 7,978,850.79		€ 7,791,553.82	-2.3%			€ 2,903,102.99	-63.6%
IT	DE	€ 6,200,861.44	€ 90,516,009.86	€ 6,165,360.33	-0.6%	€ 85,143,507.77	-5.9%	€ 2,970,259.97	-52.1%	€ 41,074,790.20	-54.6%
IT	DK	€ 189,339.28		€ 189,339.28	0.0%			€ 94,669.64	-50.0%
IT	FR	€ 3,680,282.27		€ 3,597,446.33	-2.3%			€ 1,739,554.64	-52.7%
IT	NL	€ 698,188.60		€ 698,188.60	0.0%			€ 331,343.74	-52.5%
IT	PL	€ 4,402,138.28		€ 4,129,963.06	-6.2%			€ 1,988,062.45	-54.8%
IT	RO	€ 71,842,423.30		€ 66,872,267.19	-6.9%			€ 32,270,513.65	-55.1%
IT	UK	€ 3,502,776.69		€ 3,490,942.99	-0.3%			€ 1,680,386.12	-52.0%
NL	DE	€ 9,580,471.81	€ 35,738,132.30	€ 9,466,146.37	-1.2%	€ 35,212,235.28	-1.5%	€ 6,333,629.33	-33.9%	€ 23,573,905.56	-34.0%
NL	DK	€ 457,301.76		€ 457,301.76	0.0%			€ 297,246.14	-35.0%
NL	FR	€ 3,018,191.60		€ 2,995,326.51	-0.8%			€ 2,012,127.73	-33.3%
NL	IT	€ 2,675,215.28		€ 2,652,350.19	-0.9%			€ 1,783,476.85	-33.3%
NL	PL	€ 13,193,155.68		€ 12,918,774.63	-2.1%			€ 8,643,003.20	-34.5%
NL	RO	€ 1,554,825.97		€ 1,509,095.80	-2.9%			€ 1,006,063.87	-35.3%
NL	UK	€ 5,258,970.20		€ 5,213,240.03	-0.9%			€ 3,498,358.44	-33.5%
PL	DE	€ 172,751.95	€ 326,520.16	€ 172,751.95	0.0%	€ 326,520.16	0.0%	€ 110,105.64	-36.3%	€ 208,821.03	-36.0%
PL	DK	€ 1,898.37		€ 1,898.37	0.0%			€ 1,898.37	0.0%
PL	FR	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 11,390.24	-40.0%
PL	IT	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 11,390.24	-40.0%
PL	NL	€ 11,390.24		€ 11,390.24	0.0%			€ 7,593.49	-33.3%
PL	RO	€ -		€ -	#DIV/0!			€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	UK	€ 102,512.14		€ 102,512.14	0.0%			€ 66,443.06	-35.2%
RO	DE	€ 21,630.64	€ 90,127.68	€ 21,630.64	0.0%	€ 90,127.68	0.0%	€ 14,420.43	-33.3%	€ 61,286.82	-32.0%
RO	DK	€ 1,802.55		€ 1,802.55	0.0%			€ 1,802.55	0.0%
RO	FR	€ 18,025.54		€ 18,025.54	0.0%			€ 12,617.88	-30.0%
RO	IT	€ 28,840.86		€ 28,840.86	0.0%			€ 19,828.09	-31.3%
RO	NL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 3,605.11	-33.3%
RO	PL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 3,605.11	-33.3%
RO	UK	€ 9,012.77		€ 9,012.77	0.0%			€ 5,407.66	-40.0%
UK	DE	€ 2,986,404.03	€ 17,986,297.02	€ 2,973,677.88	-0.4%	€ 17,884,487.79	-0.6%	€ 1,187,774.33	-60.2%	€ 7,152,098.29	-60.2%
UK	DK	€ 186,650.25		€ 186,650.25	0.0%			€ 76,356.92	-59.1%
UK	FR	€ 3,788,151.71		€ 3,775,425.55	-0.3%			€ 1,510,170.22	-60.1%
UK	IT	€ 2,290,707.64		€ 2,282,223.54	-0.4%			€ 912,041.00	-60.2%
UK	NL	€ 1,319,277.92		€ 1,315,035.87	-0.3%			€ 526,014.35	-60.1%
UK	PL	€ 5,612,233.72		€ 5,569,813.20	-0.8%			€ 2,227,076.87	-60.3%
UK	RO	€ 1,802,871.75		€ 1,781,661.50	-1.2%			€ 712,664.60	-60.5%

Table 3.3. Cost changes analysis. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs, policy option 3A

		Status quo scenario		Policy option 2B
				Variation attributable to mobility change				Variation attributable to mobility change and change in rules
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Expenditure	Total expenditure	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation
DE	DK	€ 2,150,359.31	€ 203,100,603.17	€ 2,150,359.31	0.0%	€ 201,450,327.42	-0.8%	€ 2,228,930.36	3.7%	€ 180,246,567.74	-11.3%
DE	FR	€ 15,269,218.03		€ 15,269,218.03	0.0%			€ 15,152,188.73	-0.8%
DE	IT	€ 16,536,096.38		€ 16,502,757.48	-0.2%			€ 15,700,229.99	-5.1%
DE	NL	€ 11,118,524.48		€ 11,135,193.94	0.1%			€ 11,583,092.56	4.2%
DE	PL	€ 117,136,239.20		€ 116,036,055.37	-0.9%			€ 99,651,117.23	-14.9%
DE	RO	€ 30,021,683.05		€ 29,488,260.59	-1.8%			€ 24,609,841.79	-18.0%
DE	UK	€ 10,868,482.70		€ 10,868,482.70	0.0%			€ 11,321,167.09	4.2%
DK	DE	€ 3,851,695.46	€ 19,335,511.21	€ 3,832,436.98	-0.5%	€ 18,969,600.14	-1.9%	€ 3,572,762.87	-7.2%	€ 15,668,197.99	-19.0%
DK	FR	€ 1,425,127.32		€ 1,425,127.32	0.0%			€ 1,308,763.82	-8.2%
DK	IT	€ 1,348,093.41		€ 1,328,834.93	-1.4%			€ 1,119,165.82	-17.0%
DK	NL	€ 905,148.43		€ 905,148.43	0.0%			€ 911,029.94	0.6%
DK	PL	€ 4,256,123.48		€ 4,102,055.66	-3.6%			€ 2,753,630.38	-35.3%
DK	RO	€ 3,928,729.37		€ 3,755,403.07	-4.4%			€ 2,349,261.16	-40.2%
DK	UK	€ 3,620,593.73		€ 3,620,593.73	0.0%			€ 3,653,583.99	0.9%
FR	DE	€ 5,356,693.25	€ 22,812,770.56	€ 5,356,693.25	0.0%	€ 22,737,851.77	-0.3%	€ 5,408,604.80	1.0%	€ 22,635,792.66	-0.8%
FR	DK	€ 505,701.81		€ 505,701.81	0.0%			€ 534,596.50	5.7%
FR	IT	€ 3,895,776.91		€ 3,877,047.21	-0.5%			€ 3,675,779.05	-5.6%
FR	NL	€ 1,798,050.88		€ 1,798,050.88	0.0%			€ 1,906,033.26	6.0%
FR	PL	€ 1,741,861.79		€ 1,704,402.40	-2.2%			€ 1,416,603.38	-18.7%
FR	RO	€ 1,535,835.13		€ 1,498,375.73	-2.4%			€ 1,197,807.01	-22.0%
FR	UK	€ 7,978,850.79		€ 7,997,580.48	0.2%			€ 8,496,368.66	6.5%
IT	DE	€ 6,200,861.44	€ 90,516,009.86	€ 6,200,861.44	0.0%	€ 88,977,628.20	-1.7%	€ 6,603,414.82	6.5%	€ 78,610,980.89	-13.2%
IT	DK	€ 189,339.28		€ 189,339.28	0.0%			€ 210,104.70	11.0%
IT	FR	€ 3,680,282.27		€ 3,692,115.97	0.3%			€ 3,893,230.25	5.8%
IT	NL	€ 698,188.60		€ 698,188.60	0.0%			€ 781,082.90	11.9%
IT	PL	€ 4,402,138.28		€ 4,331,136.05	-1.6%			€ 3,797,992.64	-13.7%
IT	RO	€ 71,842,423.30		€ 70,363,210.17	-2.1%			€ 59,401,426.05	-17.3%
IT	UK	€ 3,502,776.69		€ 3,502,776.69	0.0%			€ 3,923,729.54	12.0%
NL	DE	€ 9,580,471.81	€ 35,738,132.30	€ 9,580,471.81	0.0%	€ 35,669,537.03	-0.2%	€ 9,447,312.39	-1.4%	€ 34,464,042.81	-3.6%
NL	DK	€ 457,301.76		€ 457,301.76	0.0%			€ 456,785.91	-0.1%
NL	FR	€ 3,018,191.60		€ 3,018,191.60	0.0%			€ 2,966,889.62	-1.7%
NL	IT	€ 2,675,215.28		€ 2,675,215.28	0.0%			€ 2,592,988.57	-3.1%
NL	PL	€ 13,193,155.68		€ 13,147,425.51	-0.3%			€ 12,316,834.24	-6.6%
NL	RO	€ 1,554,825.97		€ 1,531,960.89	-1.5%			€ 1,421,757.90	-8.6%
NL	UK	€ 5,258,970.20		€ 5,258,970.20	0.0%			€ 5,261,474.18	0.0%
PL	DE	€ 172,751.95	€ 326,520.16	€ 172,751.95	0.0%	€ 326,520.16	0.0%	€ 197,895.20	14.6%	€ 378,449.04	15.9%
PL	DK	€ 1,898.37		€ 1,898.37	0.0%			€ 1,898.37	0.0%
PL	FR	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 21,361.45	12.5%
PL	IT	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 20,631.84	8.7%
PL	NL	€ 11,390.24		€ 11,390.24	0.0%			€ 14,620.43	28.4%
PL	RO	€ -		€ -	#DIV/0!			€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	UK	€ 102,512.14		€ 102,512.14	0.0%			€ 122,041.74	19.1%
RO	DE	€ 21,630.64	€ 90,127.68	€ 21,630.64	0.0%	€ 90,127.68	0.0%	€ 31,905.08	47.5%	€ 134,648.59	49.4%
RO	DK	€ 1,802.55		€ 1,802.55	0.0%			€ 1,802.55	0.0%
RO	FR	€ 18,025.54		€ 18,025.54	0.0%			€ 27,823.64	54.4%
RO	IT	€ 28,840.86		€ 28,840.86	0.0%			€ 39,721.89	37.7%
RO	NL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 11,792.96	118.1%
RO	PL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 6,161.25	13.9%
RO	UK	€ 9,012.77		€ 9,012.77	0.0%			€ 15,441.20	71.3%
UK	DE	€ 2,986,404.03	€ 17,986,297.02	€ 2,986,404.03	0.0%	€ 17,960,844.71	-0.1%	€ 2,837,320.02	-5.0%	€ 15,661,679.38	-12.9%
UK	DK	€ 186,650.25		€ 186,650.25	0.0%			€ 185,545.39	-0.6%
UK	FR	€ 3,788,151.71		€ 3,788,151.71	0.0%			€ 3,564,214.59	-5.9%
UK	IT	€ 2,290,707.64		€ 2,290,707.64	0.0%			€ 2,042,646.17	-10.8%
UK	NL	€ 1,319,277.92		€ 1,319,277.92	0.0%			€ 1,317,081.16	-0.2%
UK	PL	€ 5,612,233.72		€ 5,595,265.51	-0.3%			€ 4,366,937.17	-22.2%
UK	RO	€ 1,802,871.75		€ 1,794,387.65	-0.5%			€ 1,347,934.88	-25.2%

Table 3.4. Cost changes analysis. Detailed results of bilateral relations between selected MSs, policy option 3B

		Status quo scenario		Policy option 2B
				Variation attributable to mobility change				Variation attributable to mobility change and change in rules
Country of Residence	Country of origin	Expenditure	Total expenditure	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation	Expenditure	% expenditure variation	Total expenditure	% total expenditure variation
DE	DK	€ 2,150,359.31	€ 203,100,603.17	€ 2,150,359.31	0.0%	€ 200,916,904.96	-1.1%	€ 2,255,644.52	4.9%	€ 172,817,404.20	-14.9%
DE	FR	€ 15,269,218.03		€ 15,269,218.03	0.0%			€ 15,113,398.12	-1.0%
DE	IT	€ 16,536,096.38		€ 16,502,757.48	-0.2%			€ 15,435,500.14	-6.7%
DE	NL	€ 11,118,524.48		€ 11,135,193.94	0.1%			€ 11,731,243.64	5.5%
DE	PL	€ 117,136,239.20		€ 115,669,327.43	-1.3%			€ 93,941,737.74	-19.8%
DE	RO	€ 30,021,683.05		€ 29,304,896.62	-2.4%			€ 22,852,336.87	-23.9%
DE	UK	€ 10,868,482.70		€ 10,885,152.16	0.2%			€ 11,487,543.19	5.7%
DK	DE	€ 3,851,695.46	€ 19,335,511.21	€ 3,832,436.98	-0.5%	€ 18,969,600.14	-1.9%	€ 3,572,762.87	-7.2%	€ 15,668,197.99	-19.0%
DK	FR	€ 1,425,127.32		€ 1,425,127.32	0.0%			€ 1,308,763.82	-8.2%
DK	IT	€ 1,348,093.41		€ 1,328,834.93	-1.4%			€ 1,119,165.82	-17.0%
DK	NL	€ 905,148.43		€ 905,148.43	0.0%			€ 911,029.94	0.6%
DK	PL	€ 4,256,123.48		€ 4,102,055.66	-3.6%			€ 2,753,630.38	-35.3%
DK	RO	€ 3,928,729.37		€ 3,755,403.07	-4.4%			€ 2,349,261.16	-40.2%
DK	UK	€ 3,620,593.73		€ 3,620,593.73	0.0%			€ 3,653,583.99	0.9%
FR	DE	€ 5,356,693.25	€ 22,812,770.56	€ 5,356,693.25	0.0%	€ 22,700,392.38	-0.5%	€ 5,425,524.12	1.3%	€ 22,575,462.12	-1.0%
FR	DK	€ 505,701.81		€ 505,701.81	0.0%			€ 543,487.17	7.5%
FR	IT	€ 3,895,776.91		€ 3,877,047.21	-0.5%			€ 3,610,058.83	-7.3%
FR	NL	€ 1,798,050.88		€ 1,798,050.88	0.0%			€ 1,942,027.39	8.0%
FR	PL	€ 1,741,861.79		€ 1,685,672.70	-3.2%			€ 1,310,864.68	-24.7%
FR	RO	€ 1,535,835.13		€ 1,479,646.04	-3.7%			€ 1,084,160.88	-29.4%
FR	UK	€ 7,978,850.79		€ 7,997,580.48	0.2%			€ 8,659,339.05	8.5%
IT	DE	€ 6,200,861.44	€ 90,516,009.86	€ 6,200,861.44	0.0%	€ 88,468,778.89	-2.3%	€ 6,735,625.98	8.6%	€ 74,781,740.17	-17.4%
IT	DK	€ 189,339.28		€ 189,339.28	0.0%			€ 217,026.50	14.6%
IT	FR	€ 3,680,282.27		€ 3,692,115.97	0.3%			€ 3,959,714.31	7.6%
IT	NL	€ 698,188.60		€ 698,188.60	0.0%			€ 809,915.70	16.0%
IT	PL	€ 4,402,138.28		€ 4,307,468.63	-2.2%			€ 3,601,616.80	-18.2%
IT	RO	€ 71,842,423.30		€ 69,878,028.27	-2.7%			€ 55,395,013.87	-22.9%
IT	UK	€ 3,502,776.69		€ 3,502,776.69	0.0%			€ 4,062,827.00	16.0%
NL	DE	€ 9,580,471.81	€ 35,738,132.30	€ 9,580,471.81	0.0%	€ 35,600,941.77	-0.4%	€ 9,308,278.29	-2.8%	€ 33,170,878.25	-7.2%
NL	DK	€ 457,301.76		€ 457,301.76	0.0%			€ 456,098.12	-0.3%
NL	FR	€ 3,018,191.60		€ 3,018,191.60	0.0%			€ 2,915,587.65	-3.4%
NL	IT	€ 2,675,215.28		€ 2,675,215.28	0.0%			€ 2,506,434.13	-6.3%
NL	PL	€ 13,193,155.68		€ 13,078,830.25	-0.9%			€ 11,408,811.63	-13.5%
NL	RO	€ 1,554,825.97		€ 1,531,960.89	-1.5%			€ 1,311,554.92	-15.6%
NL	UK	€ 5,258,970.20		€ 5,258,970.20	0.0%			€ 5,264,113.51	0.1%
PL	DE	€ 172,751.95	€ 326,520.16	€ 172,751.95	0.0%	€ 326,520.16	0.0%	€ 255,724.70	48.0%	€ 493,900.34	51.3%
PL	DK	€ 1,898.37		€ 1,898.37	0.0%			€ 1,898.37	0.0%
PL	FR	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 28,494.61	50.1%
PL	IT	€ 18,983.73		€ 18,983.73	0.0%			€ 25,576.18	34.7%
PL	NL	€ 11,390.24		€ 11,390.24	0.0%			€ 17,850.62	56.7%
PL	RO	€ -		€ -	#DIV/0!			€ -	#DIV/0!
PL	UK	€ 102,512.14		€ 102,512.14	0.0%			€ 164,355.85	60.3%
RO	DE	€ 21,630.64	€ 90,127.68	€ 21,630.64	0.0%	€ 90,127.68	0.0%	€ 42,179.52	95.0%	€ 163,504.54	81.4%
RO	DK	€ 1,802.55		€ 1,802.55	0.0%			€ 1,802.55	0.0%
RO	FR	€ 18,025.54		€ 18,025.54	0.0%			€ 32,722.69	81.5%
RO	IT	€ 28,840.86		€ 28,840.86	0.0%			€ 46,975.92	62.9%
RO	NL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 11,792.96	118.1%
RO	PL	€ 5,407.66		€ 5,407.66	0.0%			€ 6,161.25	13.9%
RO	UK	€ 9,012.77		€ 9,012.77	0.0%			€ 21,869.64	142.7%
UK	DE	€ 2,986,404.03	€ 17,986,297.02	€ 2,986,404.03	0.0%	€ 17,960,844.71	-0.1%	€ 2,828,726.20	-5.3%	€ 15,528,379.78	-13.7%
UK	DK	€ 186,650.25		€ 186,650.25	0.0%			€ 185,501.19	-0.6%
UK	FR	€ 3,788,151.71		€ 3,788,151.71	0.0%			€ 3,550,937.68	-6.3%
UK	IT	€ 2,290,707.64		€ 2,290,707.64	0.0%			€ 2,028,054.32	-11.5%
UK	NL	€ 1,319,277.92		€ 1,319,277.92	0.0%			€ 1,316,943.87	-0.2%
UK	PL	€ 5,612,233.72		€ 5,595,265.51	-0.3%			€ 4,296,324.71	-23.4%
UK	RO	€ 1,802,871.75		€ 1,794,387.65	-0.5%			€ 1,321,891.80	-26.7%

Annex 4 – Extension of results to EU-28 countries

For each of the 8 selected countries, table 4.1 offers elements for an indicative extension of the results observed.

Underneath the selected countries, in the first column, the income differential is computed by dividing the expected income values of the row countries by the expected income values of the column countries. In analogy with par. 2.4.1, expected incomes are computed according to the formula:

Income = (Prob(1-Unemployed) * avg_earnings + Prob(Unemployed) * UB) / PPP_index

The second column reports the quota of EU-mobile citizens coming from the row countries on the total of EU-mobile citizens in the column country. In analogy with par. 3.1, we report flow values.

When row countries that are not part of the case study show similar values in both variables to those row countries that are part of the 8 countries selected for the analysis, we can predict a similar response to the implementation of the policy options and a similar impact on the countries in column. Belgium, for instance, has similar values to Denmark, when related to Germany. Bulgaria has similar values to Romania, when related to the Netherlands. The income differential is indicative of the response to the policy options, the quota of mobile citizens on the total is indicative of the impact that the population moving from the given row country will have on the column country.

The extension of results proposed is to be intended as indicative. An estimation in line with the methodology proposed would have to account for an estimate on the length of insurance (1 day, 30 days, 3 months) of EU-mobile citizens that require aggregation and separately (not only as part of the ‘expected income’) account for the level of unemployment benefits in the different countries.

Table 4.1. Income differential and distribution of EU-mobile citizens. Selected countries and EU-28 MS

	Germany		Denmark		France		Italy		Netherlands		Poland		Romania		United Kingdom
	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens	income differential	% mobile citizens
Austria	-7.7%	4.2%	7.0%	0.7%	3.6%	0.8%	24.2%	0.5%	-16.3%	0.9%	83.5%	2.5%	189.8%	0.2%	-8.4%	:
Belgium	-13.3%	1.1%	0.5%	1.2%	-2.7%	8.4%	16.7%	1.2%	-21.4%	11.2%	72.3%	1.2%	172.1%	0.6%	-14.0%	:
Bulgaria	-67.9%	5.9%	-62.8%	4.5%	-64.0%	2.0%	-56.8%	4.2%	-70.9%	3.7%	-36.2%	0.2%	0.7%	6.3%	-68.2%	:
Croatia	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Cyprus	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Czech Republic	-49.1%	1.8%	-41.0%	0.7%	-42.9%	0.9%	-31.5%	0.4%	-53.8%	0.8%	1.2%	0.4%	59.8%	2.3%	-49.5%	:
Denmark	-13.8%	0.8%			-3.2%	1.0%	16.1%	0.2%	-21.8%	0.8%	71.4%	0.6%	170.8%	0.1%	-14.5%	:
Estonia	-51.8%	0.2%	-44.1%	0.7%	-45.9%	0.1%	-35.2%	0.1%	-56.3%	0.3%	-4.2%	0.0%	51.3%	0.1%	-52.2%	:
Finland	-11.7%	0.5%	2.4%	0.9%	-0.9%	0.6%	18.8%	0.2%	-19.9%	0.6%	75.5%	0.1%	177.2%	0.0%	-12.4%	:
France	-10.9%	4.9%	3.3%	3.9%			19.9%	4.1%	-19.2%	5.0%	77.1%	3.7%	179.7%	2.4%	-11.6%	16.2%
Germany			16.0%	10.4%	12.3%	11.9%	34.6%	6.4%	-9.3%	14.6%	98.8%	36.9%	214.1%	1.3%	-0.8%	8.3%
Greece	-42.5%	2.3%	-33.3%	1.8%	-35.4%	0.8%	-22.5%	0.8%	-47.8%	3.8%	14.4%	1.0%	80.7%	0.7%	-42.9%	:
Hungary	-57.9%	6.4%	-51.1%	2.5%	-52.7%	0.9%	-43.3%	0.8%	-61.8%	2.9%	-16.2%	0.1%	32.4%	2.1%	-58.2%	4.5%
Ireland	-23.2%	0.5%	-10.9%	1.0%	-13.7%	1.3%	3.4%	0.4%	-30.3%	1.0%	52.8%	5.6%	141.3%	1.4%	-23.8%	:
Italy	-25.7%	5.6%	-13.9%	4.1%	-16.6%	8.0%			-32.6%	4.9%	47.7%	3.9%	133.3%	56.3%	-26.3%	11.7%
Latvia	-64.3%	0.5%	-58.6%	2.3%	-59.9%	0.2%	-51.9%	0.2%	-67.6%	0.9%	-29.0%	0.0%	12.2%	0.6%	-64.5%	:
Lithuania	-62.9%	0.9%	-56.9%	4.7%	-58.3%	0.3%	-50.0%	0.4%	-66.3%	1.2%	-26.2%	0.2%	16.6%	1.6%	-63.2%	:
Luxembourg	5.6%	0.9%	22.5%	0.3%	18.6%	0.4%	42.2%	0.2%	-4.2%	0.3%	109.9%	0.1%	231.6%	0.0%	4.8%	:
Malta	-22.7%	0.0%	-10.3%	0.2%	-13.1%	0.0%	4.1%	0.1%	-29.8%	0.1%	53.8%	0.0%	142.9%	0.0%	-23.2%	:
Netherlands	10.2%	3.6%	27.8%	2.6%	23.8%	4.2%	48.4%	0.9%			119.2%	2.7%	246.2%	0.9%	9.4%	:
Poland	-49.7%	32.7%	-41.7%	12.0%	-43.5%	5.4%	-32.3%	4.0%	-54.4%	22.1%			58.0%	6.6%	-50.1%	19.4%
Portugal	-38.9%	1.6%	-29.1%	1.3%	-31.4%	15.6%	-17.8%	0.6%	-44.6%	2.9%	21.5%	0.1%	91.9%	2.3%	-39.4%	6.1%
Romania	-68.2%	11.9%	-63.1%	11.6%	-64.2%	5.6%	-57.1%	64.5%	-71.1%	2.4%	-36.7%	0.1%			-68.4%	10.8%
Slovakia	-56.9%	2.2%	-50.0%	1.2%	-51.6%	0.6%	-41.9%	0.6%	-60.9%	0.8%	-14.2%	0.1%	35.5%	0.5%	-57.2%	:
Slovenia	-46.4%	0.3%	-37.9%	0.2%	-39.8%	0.2%	-27.9%	0.3%	-51.4%	0.2%	6.5%	0.0%	68.3%	0.1%	-46.8%	:
Spain	-24.2%	4.3%	-12.1%	6.1%	-14.9%	7.0%	2.0%	3.9%	-31.2%	8.4%	50.7%	2.0%	138.0%	7.0%	-24.8%	23.0%
Sweden	-9.7%	0.8%	4.8%	14.3%	1.4%	1.6%	21.6%	0.3%	-18.1%	1.3%	79.6%	1.5%	183.7%	0.6%	-10.4%	:
United Kingdom	0.8%	3.8%	16.9%	10.1%	13.2%	21.7%	35.7%	3.8%	-8.6%	8.6%	100.4%	36.9%	216.5%	4.5%

Source: for income differentials, net earnings of single individuals without children at 100% of the average wage (2013), Eurostat (earn_nt_net); unemployment rates (2013), Eurostat (une_rt_a); replacement rates for UB (2009), van Vliet, O.; Caminada, K. (2012). For % mobile citizens, we are considering countries of last residence as ‘senders’, Eurostat (2013 or latest available, migr_imm5prv). For lack of data, for Romania countries of nationality are assumed as ‘senders’, Eurostat (2013, migr_imm1ctz). Same is done for France, though data is not obtained from Eurostat, since it is not available, but from the United Nations Population Division (2003, International Migration Flows to and from Selected Countries: The 2010 Revision (web-based database) 263 .

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Annex XX: technical provisions to be included within the revision which are not subject to impact assessment

technical provisions to be included within the revision which are not subject to impact assessment

Introduction

The revision package will also include a number of proposals for technical amendments to the coordination rules. The amendments will clarify the rules, but will not substantially revise them and are not subject to a formal Impact Assessment. For reasons of transparency, this section provides an overview of the proposed changes.

Technical amendments to the text and annexes

These amendments concern a number of periodic updates of the Regulations to reflect developments in national legislation that have an effect on the application of the coordination rules. The aim is to ensure legal certainty for institutions and citizens by making technical amendments to the wording of provisions or by amending certain country specific annexes. This is necessary, for instance, where a benefit ceases to exist in a Member State and has to be deleted from a specific annex to one of the Regulations, or where the wording of an Article needs to be corrected or clarified to avoid misinterpretation.

Technical amendments to the text in field of posting

As a result of recommendations arising from the targeted review on Posting, in the area of social security, it has been recommended 264 to clarify the relationship between posting within the meaning of the EU social security rules and the Posting of Workers Directive 265 and to introduce further a number of technical amendments concerning posting with a view to clarify and expedite the administrative procedure, but without conferring new entitlements or requirements. These may be summarised as follows:

Clarification of the relationship between the Regulations and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 266

an obligation for Member States to certify the accuracy and completeness of Portable Document A1 (attestation that a detached worker remains subject to the social security system of the home state)

an obligation for social security institutions to cooperate with labour inspectorates both within their respective Member States and in cross-border situations

express deadlines for responding to requests for information concerning suspected fraud and error and an accelerated procedure for withdrawal of the PD A1 in the case of serious fraud or error.

Possibility for the Commission after consultation with the Administrative Commission, to further specify a uniform approach to the issuance, verification and withdrawal of the Portable Document A1. regarding the posting provisions by legally binding ‘implementing acts’ in accordance with Article 291 TFEU.

Governance change

Some Member States have called for changes to speed up the procedure for adapting the Annexes to the social security Regulations, as the time lapse between the changes in the national legislation and the updating of the Regulations is seen as taking too long. 267 It is already the case that some Annexes to these Regulations can be amended by a Commission Regulation. In order to make it simpler and faster in the future to adapt all the annexes, it could be proposed that all annexes to the Regulations are amended by a Commission Regulation.

Legal basis for data exchange to detect fraud and error

Finally, the package will contain an improved legal basis for data exchange to detect fraud and error to give the Member States a powerful tool to periodically transmit personal data of persons to whom the social security coordination Regulations apply. The amendment expands the current legal basis to provide that such data transmission can take place even in a case where there is no doubt about the accuracy of the information for the purposes of routine verification of information in order to detect instances of fraud or error and to ensure that the Regulation continues to be correctly applied.

(1) Not that the Member State of residence of the child is not always the state of secondary competence. For example, where both parents are economically active it will be the Member State of primary competence (Art 68(1)(b)(i)).

(2) Option 2 of no export of family benefits was initially considered for assessment, but was discarded because of concerns as regards its compatibility with Article 45(2) of the TFEU.

(3) Not that the Member State of residence of the child is not always the state of secondary competence. For example, where both parents are economically active it will be the Member State of primary competence (Art 68(1)(b)(i)).

(4) Option 2 of no export of family benefits was initially considered for assessment, but was discarded because of concerns as regards its compatibility with Article 45(2) of the TFEU.

(5) See Annexes C to H for more details on rules in the different case study Member States. Note in this context that Regulation overruns such national provisions if these are in conflict with this.

(6) 2013 has been chosen as it is year for the information on the number of cases gathered by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015).

(7) Note that he UK estimates are considered particularly uncertain due to difficulties of the UK interviewee to provide estimates.

(8) The determination of competence and the calculation of benefit is considered as one working task – taking one hour altogether.

(9) The annual control is done via questionnaires sent out to benefit recipients.

(10) Happens rarely and the most important problem is missing answers from other administrations.

(11) The determination of competence and the calculation of benefit is considered as one working task – taking one hour altogether.

(12) The interviewees have indicated a change of "up to double effort"

(13) The interviewees have emphasised that it is not technically feasible at the moment as it is not possible to pay out reduced or higher benefits. They have assessed a change of "++" which we have interpreted as a 50% increase.

(14) The unit costs will increase if information provision by the other Member States is not corking and benefits are paid out without proper calculation. The interviewees have assessed a change of "+" which we have interpreted as a 25% increase.

(15) The interviewees have emphasised that it is not technically feasible at the moment as it is not possible to pay our reduced or higher benefits. They have assessed a change of "++" which we have interpreted as a 50% increase.

(16) The control costs will increase as the residence of the child will have to be changes. In general, the control of the residence of the child is considered to be difficult to implement. However, as it is no longer necessary to control the existence of an employment contract, administrative costs might also decrease. All in all, the interviewees have assessed a change of "+" which we have interpreted as a 25% increase.

(17) The unit costs will increase if information provision by the other Member States is not corking and benefits are paid out without proper calculation. The interviewees have assessed a change of "+" which we have interpreted as a 25% increase.

(18)

'Vejledning om EF-regler om social sikring – Familieydelser' (The official Danish manual on the interpretation of the EC regulation 883/2004 in a Danish context).

(19) Børnetilskudsloven § 5.

(20) Børnetilskudsloven § 5a, stk. 1.

(21) Børnetilskudsloven § 5a, stk. 2.

(22) https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Boerne-ungeydelse.aspx Rates publicly available at the citizens information service borger.dk:

(23) The EU worker does not submit an actual application; he/she just provide the requested information to Udbetaling Danmark (or another MS) who then initiates the process. Exchange of information with other relevant Member State already takes place on receipt of application/information on EU worker. Other relevant Member State provides (amongst other things) information on the family status.

(24) Information and answers obtained before any calculation of benefits are made. Point should therefore be noted under 'determination of national administration with primary competence', where it is also included in the estimation of man-hours.

(25) There is usually overlap in entitlement why it should not be listed as a separate task, but should be located under 'determination of national administration with primary competence'. In Denmark, the right to benefits is conditioned by Danish residency, but in many other MS the right to benefits often derives from work or insurance. This creates an overlap in entitlement to benefits. Often an overlap in benefits occurs when the applicant moves between DK and another MS, as DK typically pre-pay, while other countries post pay.

(26) Very few cases after the new regulation. Today it is no longer possible to pay benefits to an applicant who is eligible in another MS, and then seek reimbursement from the other MS. Instead, the requirement today is to bypass the other MS and approach the applicant directly (which transfers most of the cases to the 'recovery' category). Reimbursement is only relevant in cases where there are three member states involved. For example, when the mother works in Denmark, and applies for family benefits here, the father works in Sweden, and applies for benefits there, while the family (children) lives in Norway. In this case both Denmark and Sweden are the competent administration why either Denmark or Sweden pays benefits to the family and afterwards seek reimbursement from the other MS.

(27) Genuine recovery is done via the Danish tax authorities.

(28) The EU worker does not submit an actual application; he/she just provide the requested information to Udbetaling Danmark (or another MS) who then initiates the process. Exchange of information with other relevant Member State already takes place on receipt of application/information on EU worker. Other relevant Member State provides (amongst other things) information on the family status.

(29) Information and answers obtained before any calculation of benefits are made. Point should therefore be noted under 'determination of national administration with primary competence', where it is also included in the estimation of man hours.

(30) When secondary state, less control is needed.

(31) The annual recalculation of benefits as secondary institution is relevant to Member States that have high family benefits. Udbetaling Danmark estimate that this goes for about one third of the MS. Eastern and southern Europe generally have very low benefits. Only Sweden (when the children are older), Netherlands and (some parts of) Germany have higher benefits than Denmark.

(32) There is usually overlap in entitlement why it should not be listed as a separate task, but should be located under 'determination of national administration with primary competence'. In Denmark, the right to benefits is conditioned by Danish residency, but in many other MS it is often conditioned by work. This creates an overlap in entitlement to benefits. There is often also an overlap when the applicant moves between DK and another MS, as DK typically pre-pay, while other countries post pay.

(33) Very few cases after the new regulation. Today it is no longer possible to pay benefits to an applicant who is eligible in another MS, and then seek reimbursement from the other MS. Instead, the requirement today is to bypass the other MS and approach the applicant directly (which transfers most of the cases to the 'recovery' category). Reimbursement is only relevant in cases where there are three member states involved. For example, when the mother works in Denmark, and applies for family benefits here, the father works in Sweden, and applies for benefits there, while the family (children) lives in Norway. In this case both Denmark and Sweden are the competent administration why either Denmark or Sweden pays benefits to the family and afterwards seek reimbursement from the other MS.

(34) In Denmark payments are made four times a year (30 min. x 4 times a year = 2 hours per case). There are currently 38 cases in which DK has been asked by other MS to hold back payments of benefits. Genuine recovery is done via the Danish tax authorities.

(35) To some extend it will be the same as the current situation. However, it will probably be necessary to gather information more often, on whether the EU workers entitlement to benefit in the other MS has changed.

(36) Instead of calculations being processed automatically there will be necessary to make specific calculations in each case.

(37) Due to a need for additional control and further exchange of information.

(38) Based on the number of new cases in the period from October to December 2013.

(39) Based on numbers available for the last quarter of 2014.

(40) This task is done both during an intake and during mutation. Often there are one or more mutations during a year, why the task in average is done 1,5 times per year.

(41) Annual control is only done in about 50 pct. of the cases and often depend on which the country.

(42) Very few cases with disagreements on competence. Almost never happens.

(43) These task falls under the 'calculation of benefits'.

(44) Frequency per case is very hard to estimate. For both reimbursement and recovery, the tasks that the SVB has to do are the same. The SVB first tries to recover the money from the applicant, and only when that fails, do they contact the relevant institution in another Member State. Both for reimbursement and recovery the SVB uses the term 'Verrekening', which means 'solving miscalculation'.

(45) Frequency per case is very hard to estimate. For both reimbursement and recovery, the tasks that the SVB has to do are the same. The SVB first tries to recover the money from the applicant, and only when that fails, do they contact the relevant institution in another Member State. Both for reimbursement and recovery the SVB uses the term 'Verrekening', which means 'solving miscalculation'.

(46) This task is done both during an intake and during mutation. Often there are one or more mutations during a year, why the task in average is done 1.5 times per year.

(47) Due to the need for additional contact to national administrations in other Member States and contact to the national tax department, this task is in average performed four times a year for active cases.

(48) Very few cases with disagreements on competence. Almost never happens.

(49) These task falls under the 'calculation of benefits'.

(50) Frequency per case is very hard to estimate. For both reimbursement and recovery, the tasks that the SVB has to do are the same. The SVB first tries to recover the money from the applicant, and only when that fails, do they contact the relevant institution in another Member State. Both for reimbursement and recovery the SVB uses the term 'Verrekening', which means 'solving miscalculation'.

(51) Frequency per case is very hard to estimate. For both reimbursement and recovery, the tasks that the SVB has to do are the same. The SVB first tries to recover the money from the applicant, and only when that fails, do they contact the relevant institution in another Member State. Both for reimbursement and recovery the SVB uses the term 'Verrekening', which means 'solving miscalculation'.

(52) Rules do not actually change.

(53) Option 1a: Additional 50% since living standards has to be taken into account. Option 1b: Additional 50% since living standards has to be taken into account and gathering of additional information from other Member States needs to be done.

(54) Rules do not actually change.

(55) Rules do not actually change.

(56) Rules do not actually change.

(57) Rules do not actually change.

(58) Rules do not actually change.

(59) Cases that were initiated in 2013 and which had not been completed by 2014.

(60) In Poland the amount of family benefit is - to a large extend - fixed.

(61) The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy notes, that in Poland a new application has to be submitted every year, why annual control - in principle - is not relevant. However, in some cases they still have an annual inspection. It takes around 10 min. to submitting a new application.

(62) Time used on this task usually derives from challenges on gathering information from other Member States.

(63) Benefits in Poland are most often lower than in other Member States. Also, this is handled within the task of determination of national administration with primary competence.

(64) Copying the application and attachments to transfer to a foreign institution (Art. 68, 3 883/2004).

(65) Note it is not the number of new cases in 2014 but existing active cases in 2014. The number of new cases for 2014 is not available.

(66) 10-20 cases per year

(67) Information from other MS are received very late

(68) 844 cases in 2014. Degree of recovery 50%

(69) More information will probably be necessary to calculate the benefit.

(70) The number of cases where the MS disagree will probably increase.

(71) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(72) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(73) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(74) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(75) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(76) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(77) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(78) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(79) The number of tasks and checks will probably increase.

(80) We also qualitative assess the possible additional administrative burden, if the option is modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment.

(81) idem.

(82) We also qualitative assess the possible additional administrative burden, if the option is modified/extended to make the Member State of previous employment responsible for paying unemployment benefits for those workers who have not completed the required period of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of last employment.

(83) idem.

(84) See Annexes C to H for more details on rules in the different case study Member States. Note in this context that Regulation overruns such national provisions if these are in conflict with this.

(85) Note that some Member States currently have stricter requirements, e.g. Denmark requires 8 weeks of work within 12 weeks to qualify.

(86) 2013 has been chosen as reference year, since the information on cases gathered by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) is from 2013.

(87)

20 min. when PDU 1 is handed in and (more or less) filled in completely; 30 min. when an information request must be sent to the former insurance institution (filling in SED).

(88) Part of this administrative task has already taken place as part of "collection of information". In any case, it is not more time consuming than the calculation for 'normal' German applicants. Furthermore, former periods of employment are under the current legislation not relevant for the calculation of benefits.

(89) As the applicant in question has had a working contract in Germany and is eligible for German unemployment benefits, the determination of residence is not necessary.

(90) Not considered as a relevant administrative task, as Germany no longer is the Member State of last employment.

(91) Not considered as a relevant administrative task under the current legislation.

(92) Not considered as a relevant administrative task under the current legislation.

(93)

When the applicant requests information: fill in PDU 1; when the public employment service of another Member State requests information: fill in SED; in some cases: contacting former employers and determining pension insurance number.

(94) Not applicable.

(95) Not applicable.

(96) Not applicable.

(97) Not applicable.

(98) Memberships are per January 1st 2015.

(99) Interview with HK A-kasse.

(100) Interview with Krifa.

(101)

Determination of whether the information provided by the applicant is sufficient to decide on the payment of unemployment benefits. Obtain information from other previous Member State(s) of insurance about insurance and employment history in this/these country(-ies).

(102) For each of those cases where the interviewed unemployment insurance fund is the competent national administration: Time spend on calculation of the benefit, which the applicant is entitled to under the national legislation. The interviewed unemployment insurance fund set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion.

(103) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of collecting additional information about e.g. family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the candidate's professional activities.

(104) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State, a re-calculation of benefits or revaluation of competent state is performed: Determine what type of change it is - whether it will lead to a re-calculation of benefits or change in competence.

(105) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a Mobile EU worker should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(106) If an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits (i.e. it has been determined, that the interviewed unemployment fund are not the competent state after all): additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting the competent Member States to seek recovery.

(107)

The interviewed unemployment fund receive a request for information about an applicant's previous insurance and employment history in your State from another Member State concerning an application for unemployment benefits and you contribute with the required information.

(108) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of providing additional information about candidate’s professional activities.

(109) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State and the interviewed unemployment fund are determined the competent institution: Additional costs arise a calculation of benefits is performed.

(110) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a mobile EU worker should have been paid by the interviewed unemployment fund, but another Member State has done this: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(111) If an applicant, who belongs to the interviewed unemployment fund has unjustified received unemployment benefits in another Member State: Additional costs arise recovery activities.

(112) ASE interprets Option 2b as a slight lessening of the current rules, while Krifa interprets the revision as a slight tightening of the rules.

(113) The estimation of the administrative costs and burden from revised EU provisions when Denmark is the Member State of previous insurance is based on three interviews, since HK A-kasse was not able to give an estimation on this.

(114)

(115) For each of those cases where the interviewed administration is the competent national administration: Time spend on calculation of the benefit, which the applicant is entitled to under the national legislation. The interviewed unemployment insurance fund set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion.

(116) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of collecting additional information about e.g. family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the candidate's professional activities.

(117) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State, a re-calculation of benefits or revaluation of competent state is performed: Determine what type of change it is - whether it will lead to a re-calculation of benefits or change in competence.

(118) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a Mobile EU worker should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(119) If an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits (i.e. it has been determined, that the interviewed unemployment fund are not the competent state after all): additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting the competent Member States to seek recovery.

(120)

The interviewed administration receive a request for information about an applicant's previous insurance and employment history in your State from another Member State concerning an application for unemployment benefits and you contribute with the required information.

(121) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of providing additional information about candidate’s professional activities.

(122) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State and the interviewed unemployment fund are determined the competent institution: Additional costs arise a calculation of benefits is performed.

(123) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a mobile EU worker should have been paid by the interviewed unemployment fund, but another Member State has done this: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(124) If an applicant has unjustified received unemployment benefits in another Member State: Additional costs arise recovery activities.

(125) In the current situation much of the information needed for Option 2a and Option 2b is already being gathered in the current situation. The period of time the applicant has worked in the Netherlands does not influence the administrative process.

(126)

(127) For each of those cases where the interviewed administration is the competent national administration: Time spend on calculation of the benefit, which the applicant is entitled to under the national legislation. The interviewed administration set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion.

(128) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of collecting additional information about e.g. family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the candidate's professional activities.

(129) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State, a re-calculation of benefits or revaluation of competent state is performed: Determine what type of change it is - whether it will lead to a re-calculation of benefits or change in competence.

(130) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a Mobile EU worker should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(131) If an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits (i.e. it has been determined, that the interviewed unemployment fund are not the competent state after all): additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting the competent Member States to seek recovery.

(132)

(133) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of providing additional information about candidate’s professional activities.

(134) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State and the interviewed unemployment fund are determined the competent institution: Additional costs arise a calculation of benefits is performed.

(135) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a mobile EU worker should have been paid by the interviewed unemployment fund, but another Member State has done this: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(136) If an applicant, who belongs to the interviewed administration has unjustified received unemployment benefits in another Member State: Additional costs arise recovery activities.

(137) "No need to fill in a declaration printing (printing extensive and time-consuming)"

(138) Memberships are per January 1st 2015.

(139)

(140) For each of those cases where the interviewed unemployment insurance fund is the competent national administration: Time spend on calculation of the benefit, which the applicant is entitled to under the national legislation. The interviewed unemployment insurance fund set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion.

(141) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of collecting additional information about e.g. family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the candidate's professional activities.

(142) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State, a re-calculation of benefits or revaluation of competent state is performed: Determine what type of change it is - whether it will lead to a re-calculation of benefits or change in competence.

(143) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a Mobile EU worker should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(144) If an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits (i.e. it has been determined, that the interviewed unemployment fund are not the competent state after all): additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting the competent Member States to seek recovery.

(145)

(146) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of providing additional information about candidate’s professional activities.

(147) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State and the interviewed unemployment fund are determined the competent institution: Additional costs arise a calculation of benefits is performed.

(148) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a mobile EU worker should have been paid by the interviewed unemployment fund, but another Member State has done this: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(149) If an applicant, who belongs to the interviewed unemployment fund has unjustified received unemployment benefits in another Member State: Additional costs arise recovery activities.

(150)

(151) For each of those cases where the interviewed unemployment insurance fund is the competent national administration: Time spend on calculation of the benefit, which the applicant is entitled to under the national legislation. The interviewed unemployment insurance fund set the payment of unemployment benefits in motion. The DWP notes that they do not calculate benefits, since they use a flat rate.

(152) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of collecting additional information about e.g. family ties, housing situation, characteristics of the candidate's professional activities. The DWP notes, that the only cost they have derives from the issue of a questionnaire to the customer/applicant. They can determine competence, but do not always enhance the insurance record.

(153) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State, a re-calculation of benefits or revaluation of competent state is performed: Determine what type of change it is - whether it will lead to a re-calculation of benefits or change in competence. The DWP notes, that if the insured applicant leaves the UK the claim ends after 5 days if they fail to attend the Jobcentre (PES) and the DWP do not calculate benefits.

(154) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a Mobile EU worker should have been paid by another Member State: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities. The DWP notes, that any overpayment would be classed as an 'official error' in UK terms and written off. Their PES can invite repayment from the customer. Only relevant in Article 65 cases.

(155) If an applicant unjustified has received unemployment benefits (i.e. it has been determined, that the interviewed unemployment fund are not the competent state after all): additional costs arise from determining whether there is a basis for recovery, from calculation of benefits to recover, and from contacting the competent Member States to seek recovery. The DWP notes, that they do not seek recovery.

(156)

(157) If the State of residence is not readily overt determination of residence needed to determine whether the applicant is eligible for unemployment benefits under the national legislation: Additional costs arise as a result of providing additional information about candidate’s professional activities.

(158) If circumstances change and it leads to a change of who is the competent Member State and the interviewed unemployment fund are determined the competent institution: Additional costs arise a calculation of benefits is performed.

(159) If (provisional) unemployment benefits awarded to a mobile EU worker should have been paid by the interviewed unemployment fund, but another Member State has done this: Additional costs arise from reimbursement activities.

(160) If an applicant, who belongs to the interviewed unemployment fund has unjustified received unemployment benefits in another Member State: Additional costs arise recovery activities.

(161) After a revision of the policy options originally proposed, policy option 2 has been substituted by policy option 3.

(162) When analysing countries of focus for secondary effects of exportability of family benefits, we noticed that for 4 of the countries originally selected no data on the Export of child benefits – number of persons entitled –, were provided by the parallel study (see Pacolet, 2015, Table 6). We then opted for the replacement of, France, Italy and the UK respectively with, Belgium, Spain and Ireland, for which data were available.

(163) PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F., Export of family benefits, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, June 2015

(164) After a revision of the policy options originally proposed, policy option 2 has been substituted by policy option 3.

(165) Both in terms of object ('salary-related child-raising allowances' instead of general 'family benefits') and area of impact (time away from work instead of income differential).

(166) Due to the available data for the specific categories of population analysed, secondary effects on other area or on other expenditure issues cannot be estimated.

(167) PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F., Export of family benefits, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, June 2015, 18 p

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(186) http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11568&langId=en Social situation monitor, Access of mobile EU citizens to social protection, Research note No 10/2013, available at .

(187) Boeri, T. (2010). Immigration to the Land of Redistribution. Economica, 77(308), 651-687.

(188) Hansen, J., & Lofstrom, M. (2003). Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare Participation Do Immigrants Assimilate Into or Out of Welfare?. Journal of Human Resources, 38(1), 74-98.

(189) Büchel, F., & Frick, J. R. (2005). Immigrants’ economic performance across Europe–does immigration policy matter?. Population Research and Policy Review, 24(2), 175-212.

(190) http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11568&langId=en See also: Social situation monitor, Access of mobile EU citizens to social protection, Research note No 10/2013, available at .

(191) Belot, M., & Ederveen, S. (2012). Cultural barriers in migration between OECD countries. Journal of Population Economics, 25(3), 1077-1105.

(192) Sprenger, E. (2013). The Determinants of International Migration in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis IOS Working Paper, No. 325.

(193) PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F. (2015).

(194) The choice to choose a reference period of 3 years in the estimation of the average flows between MS derives from the necessity to consider the most recent values but still avoid ‘year effects’.

(195) According to Eurostat data, in EU, between 2001 and 2013, the average value of the fertility rate (he average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime) is close to 1.6.

(196) When analysing countries of focus for secondary effects of exportability of family benefits, we noticed that for 4 of the countries originally selected no data on the Export of child benefits – number of persons entitled –, were provided by the parallel study (see Pacolet, 2015, Table 6). We then opted for the replacement of, France, Italy and the UK respectively with, Belgium, Spain and Ireland, for which data were available.

(197) For the purpose of the study, and following the data collected by Pacolet (see note 1) we assume the present EU regulations (Regulation (EC) 883/2004: the 'Basic Regulation' and Regulation (EC) 987/2009: the 'Implementing Regulation') as in force. Therefore, child benefits are considered payable also to children not residing in the country of work of the employed parent.

(198) In order to contextualize the relations between the eight selected MS in the intra-EU mobility, according to Eurostat (migr_imm5pr), the bilateral migration flows considered account for around 20% of the overall intra-EU migration flow. Data are usually computed as 2011-13 averages. We are considering countries of last residence as ‘senders’. For lack of data, for Romania countries of nationality are assumed as ‘senders’.

(199) Taking country of nationality as country of origin seems problematic for the case of Romania: in 2013, as many as 124,273 EU-mobile citizens were reported to enter Romania (Eurostat, no differentiation available in terms of sending country), but in the same year only 1,024 non-Romanian EU citizens were reported to enter Romania.

(200) PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F., Export of family benefits, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, June 2015, 34 p

(201) The analysis of the secondary effects of policy options are based on the bilateral relations between the selected MS. For this reason, the simulation tool uses the number of entitled persons derived by each combination between the selected MSs provided by the HIVA study (Pacolet, 2015).

(202) For the three categories of population considered, annex 2 provides to the reader the possibility to extrapolate the bilateral results for each MS considered.

(203) As previously stated, in this case target population refers to one-earner families in which the person entitled to the exportability of child benefits works and resides in a MS different from the one the dependent family members reside in.

(204) In policy option 3, the country of residence of the child(ren) has primary responsibility to pay the full amount of family benefits to which entitlement exists under its national rules. The country of work of the parent will top up this amount if the level of family benefits is be higher there.

(205) It has to be stressed that, according to the administrative data collected by the HIVA study (Pacolet, 2015), in Spain the number of cases of exportation of family benefits is extremely low: only 37 in 2013. Additionally administrative data on the export of family benefits are not available for Poland, and no estimation are provided for this country.

(206) As previously stated, since data on the number of cases of export of family benefits are not available for Poland in the HIVA study, we cannot estimate the changes in expenditures for family benefits for this country.

(207) Similar considerations can be applied in the case of Romania and Poland where, similarly to Spain, the access of family benefits is means-tested.

(208) Still, no estimation can be made on the expenditure – derivable from the potential implementation of policy option 3 – relative to the integration of family benefits paid to EU mobile citizens residing in Poland. These costs would most likely have little relevance, since the average level of family benefits paid in Poland is the second lowest amongst the 7 selected countries. The only accountable costs here are those Poland would sustain, as MS of primary competence, to pay family benefits to mobile citizens whose children reside in Poland.

(209) No variation can be estimated for Poland, for which no data on the export of family benefits are available in the status quos scenario (no data in Pacolet et al, 2015). Results observed for Spain should be considered most carefully, since according to administrative data collected by the HIVA study (Pacolet et al., 2015) the number of cases of exportation of family benefits are extremely low for this MS: only 37 overall, in 2013.

(210) See note 39.

(211) When building the status quo scenario, we are assuming that all countries have implemented the one day rule.

(212) When building the status quo scenario, we are assuming that all countries have implemented the one day rule.

(213) PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F., Aggregation of periods for unemployment, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, June 2015, 18 p.

(214) By ‘target population’, we hereby refer to individuals who need to aggregate periods or salaries in order to claim unemployment benefits.

(215) Due to the available data for the specific categories of population analysed, secondary effects on other area or on other expenditure issues cannot be estimated.

(216)

Canetta, E., Fries-Tersch, E. and Mabilia-Milieu, V. 2014 Annual report on labour mobility (October 2014). Available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/contentAdmin/BlobServlet?docId=13484&langId=en . EU Employment and Social Situation. Recent trends in the geographical mobility of workers in the EU – Quarterly Review (June 2014). Available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11945&langId=en .

(217) Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2015).

(218) Hicks, John R. (1932). The Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan

(219)

Borjas, G. J. (2014). Immigration economics. Harvard University Press.

(220) Hatton, T. J., & Williamson, J. G. (2002). What fundamentals drive world migration? (No. w9159). National Bureau of Economic Research

(221) Harris, J. R., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis. The American economic review, 126-142.

(222)

(223) Braunerhjelm, P., Faini, R., Norman, V., Ruane, F., & Seabright, P. (2000). Integration and the regions of Europe: how the right policies can prevent polarization. Monitoring European integration 10. CEPR, London.

(224) Bentivogli, C., & Pagano, P. (1999). Regional Disparities and Labour Mobility: the Euro‐11 versus the USA. Labour, 13(3), 737-760.

(225) Apaia, A.; Kiss, A.; Palvolgyi, B.; Turrini, A. (2014): Labour mobility and labour market adjustment in the EU, Economic Papers 539, European Commission.

(226) Beyer, R.C.M. & Smets, F. (2015): Labour market adjustements in Europe and the US: How different?, European Central Bank, Working Paper 1767.

(227) Blanchard, O. & Katz, L.F. (1992): Regional evolutions, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1-75.

(228) Edin P-A., Fredriksson P., Aslund O. (2000), Emigration of immigratns and measures of immigrant assimilation: Evidence from Sweden, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 7, 163-204.

(229) Constant A. & Massey D. (2003) Self-slection, earnings, and out-migratin: a longitudianl study of immigrants to Germany, Journal of Population Economics, 16, 631-653. Bellemare, C. (2007). A life-cycle model of outmigration and economic assimilation of immigrants in Germany. European Economic Review, 51(3), 553-576.

(230)

Åslund, O., & Rooth, D. O. (2007). Do when and where matter? initial labour market conditions and immigrant earnings. The Economic Journal, 117(518), 422-448.

(231) Sarvimäki, M. (2011). Assimilation to a Welfare State: Labor Market Performance and Use of Social Benefits by Immigrants to Finland*. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(3), 665-688.

(232) Roodenburg, H. J., Euwals, R., & ter Rele, H. (2003). Immigration and the Dutch economy (Vol. 26). The Hague: CPB.

(233) Kerr, S. P., & Kerr, W. R. (2011). Economic impacts of immigration: A survey (No. w16736). National Bureau of Economic Research.

(234) Borjas, G. J. (1999). Immigration and welfare magnets. Journal of labor economics, 17(4), 607-637.

(235) Giulietti, C., Guzi, M., Kahanec, M., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2013). Unemployment benefits and immigration: evidence from the EU. International Journal of Manpower, 34(1), 24-38.

(236) De Giorgi, G., & Pellizzari, M. (2009). Welfare migration in Europe. Labour Economics, 16(4), 353-363.

(237) http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11568&langId=en Social situation monitor, Access of mobile EU citizens to social protection, Research note No 10/2013, available at .

(238) Büchel, F., & Frick, J. R. (2004). Immigrants in the UK and in West Germany–Relative income position, income portfolio, and redistribution effects. Journal of population Economics, 17(3), 553-581.

(239) Boeri, T. (2010). Immigration to the Land of Redistribution. Economica, 77(308), 651-687.

(240) Hansen, J., & Lofstrom, M. (2003). Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare Participation Do Immigrants Assimilate Into or Out of Welfare?. Journal of Human Resources, 38(1), 74-98.

(241) Büchel, F., & Frick, J. R. (2005). Immigrants’ economic performance across Europe–does immigration policy matter?. population Research and policy Review, 24(2), 175-212.

(242) http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11568&langId=en See also: Social situation monitor, Access of mobile EU citizens to social protection, Research note No 10/2013, available at .

(243) Belot, M., & Ederveen, S. (2012). Cultural barriers in migration between OECD countries. Journal of Population Economics, 25(3), 1077-1105.

(244) Sprenger, E. (2013). The Determinants of International Migration in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis IOS Working Paper, No. 325.

(245) van Vliet, O.; Caminada, K. (2012). Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009: An update, extension and modification of Scruggs’ Welfare State Entitlements Data Set, NEUJOBS Special Report No. 2, Leiden University.

(246) Since figures for Germany and Italy are not collected by Pacolet et al. (2015), they have been computed as an average of the figures collected for the other seven countries.

(247) Source: Eurostat (prc_ppp_ind).

(248) D. Fouarge, B. Kriechel, T. Dohmen (2014), Occupational sorting of school graduates: The role of economic preferences, in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 106, 335-351.

(249) Source: Pacolet (2015).

(250) Annex 1 and 2 present a list of unemployment and family benefits in the countries proposed for the case studies, made on the bases of the MISSOC.

(251) In order to contextualize the relations between the eight selected MS in the intra-EU mobility, according to Eurostat (migr_imm5prv), the bilateral migration flows considered account for 32.7% of the overall intra-EU migration flow.

(252) Taking country of nationality as country of origin seems particularly problematic for the case of Romania: in 2013, as many as 124,273 EU-mobile citizens were reported to enter Romania (Eurostat, no differentiation available in terms of sending country), but in the same year only 1,024 non-Romanian EU citizens were reported to enter Romania.

(253) Source: LFS, own elaborations. We would indeed need unemployment rates specific to individuals that have the country of last residence and work (not the country of nationality) as ‘sender’ State. Because we do not dispone of such data, the mentioned approximation was necessary. We also opted for unemployment rates relative to all the EU28+EFTA mobile citizens because we found the estimation to be more robust than if made on specific nationalities (lack of an adequately large sample in LFS).

(254) The average values of unemployment benefits is calculated according to the average replacement rate provided by van Vliet & Caminada (2012). The table reports the average values for the category of population used for the definition of the main result: single person at 100% of average earnings.

(255) We estimated the population according to the average values of the recent migration flows (2011-2013) between the 8 selected countries provided by Eurostat (migr_imm5prv; web-based database), and according to the share of unemployed EU mobile citizens on the total EU mobile citizens population in each MS.

(256) The two policy options produce the same result, since, according to the HIVA study (Pacolet et al., 2015), in Denmark there are no EU mobile citizens coming from the other seven selected countries that have required an aggregation of unemployment insurance periods after having contributed for more than one month but less than three months. The same share of target population is therefore applied to both policy option 2a and 2b.

(257) We are taking annual flows in consideration.

(258) In the case of France, the limited share of EU mobile citizens coming from Romania and Poland can explain said low results. In the Netherlands, a significant share of the migration flow is composed by EU mobile citizens coming from neighbouring countries (DE, DK and FR), in relation to which the variation in income differentials generated by policy option 3 is moderate. The low level of unemployment benefits in the UK (see tab. 3.2.1) does not allow the policy options to produce relevant changes in weighted income (that accounts for both earnings and unemployment benefits, see equation (1) at par. 2.4.1). No relevant change is therefore observed in the income differentials with any country.

(259) The detailed figures of bilateral mobility changes are reported in Annex 2.

(260) Since there is a slight difference between policy option 2a and policy option 2b in terms of bilateral relations between the 8 MS considered, in this section we focus only on the results of policy option 2b. The complete set of results is reported in annex 3.

(261) Policy option 3a: IT -13.2% (€ 11,949,089); DE -11.0% (€ 22,425,518 ); UK -12.8% (€ 2,310,933); DK 19.0% (€ 3,682,527). Policy option 3b: IT -17.4% (€ 15,772,988); DE -14.6% (€ 29,741,402); UK -13.6% (€ 2,444,233); DK -19.0% (€ 3,682,527).

(262) See note 42.

(263) Taking into account challenges which have arisen in some Member States and which had been outlined in the European Report 2013 of the trESS network, the FreSsco network was mandated to prepare a report on “Procedures related to the granting of portable documents A1”. This report was based on a survey among the delegates of the Administrative Commission and presented in May 2014. Further to this survey, an Ad-Hoc Group on posting issues was established by decision of the Administrative Commission dealing with a number of questions to improve procedures in the field of posting.

(264) Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services

(265) OJ L 018 , 21.01.1997 p. 1

(266) Some of the changes are pending since 2011, as since that time, no proposal for a Regulation has been adopted. At the June 2015 Meeting of the Administrative Commission, an important number of MS asked if it were possible to decouple the technical amendments from the more fundamental changes, in order to have the technical amendments adopted quicker. It is considered to split the proposal into a proposal with technical amendments (no impact assessment) and a proposal with changes that have been subject to an impact assessment.

Top

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 13.12.2016

SWD(2016) 460 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

{COM(2016) 815 final}
{SWD(2016) 461 final}

Table of Contents

Annex XXI - MAPPING OF NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 4

ANNEX XXII - OVERVIEW OF CURRENT EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK 174

ANNEX XXIII - GLOSSARY OF TERMS 192

ANNEX XXIV: ANALYSIS ON ECONOMICALLY INACTIVE PERSONS197

ANNEX XXV: FRESSCO ANALYSIS CHILD RAISING ALLOWANCES202

ANNEX XXVI - HIVA UPDATE OF 2013 ANALYSIS: LONG-TERM CARE AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS353

Annex XXI Mapping of national systems of long-term care benefits, family benefis, unemployment benefits and special non-contributory cash benefits

Annex XXI Mapping of national systems of long-term care benefits, family benefits, unemployment benefits and special non-contributory cash benefits 1

1.Long-term care benefits

AUSTRIA

Applicable statutory basis

Cash benefits:

Federal Long-term Care Benefit Act (Bundespflegegeldgesetz, BPGG), Official Journal (BGBI.) No. 110/1993, and 9 similarly phrased Long-term Care Benefit Acts of the Länder.

Benefits in kind:

Numerous applicable statutory bases, e.g. the Agreement between the Federal Government and the Länder on joint measures for persons in need of care. Social Assistance Acts and Disability Acts of the Länder.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Mobile and outpatient care, such as:

• visiting service,

• Social homecare (home-helpers),

• 24-hour-care,

• meals on wheels,

• family support,

• personal assistance,

• medical home care,

2. Semi-residential care • semi-stationary care in care facilities, e.g. in day centres or residential care facilities • day centres for people with disabilities 3. Residential care • residential care facilities, e.g. nursing homes • comprehensive care in residential communities • short-term care • residential care facilities for people with disabilities 4. Other benefits A consulting and information service for persons in need of care and their relatives, such as: • long-term care phone service • legal counsel for disabled persons • case- and care Management • support groups / self-help groups

Cash benefits

* Pflegegeld: under the Bundespflegegeldgesetz (BPGG) or one of the Landespflegegeldgesetze of the nine provinces. The latter have been repealed as of the beginning of 2012 and all entitlements are determined now under the federal law.

Pflegegeld is a tax-financed benefit granted irrespective of the cause of need, the recipient’s income, assets or age. There are seven different levels of Pflegegeld depending on the intensity of the need of care and assistance.

Pflegegeld (per Month):

Level 1 € 154.20

Level 2 € 284.30

Level 3 € 442.90

Level 4 € 664.30

Level 5 € 902.30

Level 6 € 1 260.00

Level 7 € 1 655.80

In case of semi-residential long-term care (e.g. in a day centre), long-term care benefits are due.

In case of providing residential care in a care facility, a maximum of 80% of the long-term care benefit is transferred to the institution bearing the cost of residential care. The monthly spending money amounting to € 44.30 is left to the person in need of care.

The long-term care benefit (Pflegegeld) is paid directly to the person in need of care and can be spent by him or her for the financing of the long-term care at his or her sole discretion. In case of improper use of the long-term care benefit, it can be replaced by benefits in kind.

* Zuwendungen aus dem Unterstützungsfonds (§§ 21a, 21b BPGG; directives released by the Federal Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumers’ Protection): Means-tested allowances can be granted by supporting funds (but without legal entitlement)

a) to persons giving care to close relatives who are entitled to Pflegegeld of at least level 3 (even level 1 will be sufficient if the recipient of the Pflegegeld is suffering dementia or is underage) as long as they have to take leave. The allowance shall enable them to make use of substitutional professional care during that rest period and amounts from € 1 200 up to € 2 200 (subject to the level of Pflegegeld) per year.

b) to the person in need of care him or herself or their relatives as long as they make use of 24-hours-assistance by professional caregivers: The allowance amounts to € 550 per month if the professional caregivers are self-employed and to € 1 100 per month for employed caregivers.

* erhöhte Familienbeihilfen für erheblich behinderte Kinder18

18 It is argued in the Austrian note that higher family benefits for considerably disabled children could fall under the definition of LTC benefits. However, they are coordinated as family benefits, which might be more beneficial for the entitled persons.

Combination of benefits

Cash benefits from the State and Länder as well as benefits in kind via public and private providers.

A combination of benefits is possible. If recipients of Pflegegeld make use of professional services at home or in a nursing home they (and sometimes even close relatives, at least their spouses) have to pay means-tested cost shares taking into account up to 80 per cent of the Pflegegeld.

These cost shares have to be considered as one of the main reasons that – as recent studies show – only one third of recipients of Pflegegeld make use of professional services.

Benefits for the Carer

• Zuwendungen aus dem Unterstützungsfonds (see above, Cash benefits)

• Pension insurance for caring family members: an option of a preferential voluntary insurance and preferential continuation of affiliation to the pension insurance from category 3. The federal government pays contributions for voluntary self-insurance or optional continued insurance in the field of pension insurance entirely and for an unlimited period of category 3 and above.

BELGIUM

Applicable statutory basis

No specific legislation at federal level. However, certain benefits are provided for in the legislation on sickness and invalidity insurance and on guaranteeing sufficient resources namely the:

• Health Care and Sickness Benefit Compulsory Insurance Act (Loi relative à l'assurance obligatoire soins de santé et indemnités / Wet betreffende de verplichte verzekering voor geneeskundige verzorging en uitkeringen), coordinated on 14 July 1994; and the

• Act of 27 February 1987 on disabled persons’ allowances (Loi relative aux allocations aux personnes handicapées / Wet betreffende de tegemoetkomingen aan gehandicapten), respectively.

At the level of the federated entities (Flemish Community): the Decree of the Flemish Parliament of 30 March 1999 on the organisation of care insurance (Decreet houdende de organisatie van de zorgverzekering), last amended in March 2011 to take account of the modernised EU social security Coordination Regulations; and Orders of the Flemish government of 28 September 2001.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Sickness and invalidity insurance:

Nursing care at home for heavily dependent patients. The insurance covers part of the fixed costs of this care according to the state of physical dependence of the patient:

• dependency category A:

€15.94 with preferential scheme,

€12.13 without preferential scheme;

• dependency category B:

€30.93 with preferential scheme,

€28.05 without preferential scheme;

• dependency category C:

€42.40 with preferential scheme,

€38.37 without preferential scheme

2. Semi-residential care

Sickness and invalidity insurance:

No benefits in kind in case of semi-residential care.

3. Residential care

Sickness and invalidity insurance:

Rest and nursing homes, psychiatric nursing homes and rest homes for the elderly: a single lump sum determined by the institution.

4. Other benefits

Sickness and invalidity insurance:

No other benefits.

Cash benefits

Sickness and invalidity insurance:

A single person or a cohabiting person without dependants who draws invalidity benefit (indemnité d'invalidité / invaliditeitsuitkering) receives a higher compensation rate (65% instead of 55% or 40%) if he or she is recognised as being in need of constant care.

Disabled persons who have dependants and who fulfil the conditions to be recognised as being in need of the assistance of a third party are entitled to a flat-rate allowance of € 12.99 per day.

Care insurance (Zorgverzekering/Assurance soins):

Insurance coverage for community-based care and home care: a fixed monthly amount of € 130. The same amount is granted if the person resides in an institution other than a service flat.

The benefit is paid to the user.

Integration allowance (allocation d'intégration / integratietegemoetkoming) and allowance for assistance to the elderly (allocation pour l'aide aux personnes âgées / tegemoetkoming voor hulp aan bejaarden):

Integration allowance:

Category I: € 1 082.50

Category II: € 3 688.76

Category III: € 5 894.18

Category IV: € 8 587.07

Category V: € 9 741.49

Allowance for assistance to the elderly:

Category I: € 925.06

Category II: € 3 531.18

Category III: € 4 293.35

Category IV: € 5 055.29

Category V: € 6 209.71

Sickness and invalidity insurance, care insurance (Zorgverzekering/Assurance soins), integration allowance (allocation d'intégration/integratietegemoetkoming) and allowance for assistance to the elderly (allocation pour l'aide aux personnes âgées/tegemoetkoming voor hulp aan bejaarden):

Discretionary use.

Benefits are paid on a flat-rate basis. The actual provision of care to the beneficiary need not be proven.

The supplementary allowance for children with disabilities under the age of 21. The amount of this allowance, which is a supplement to the child benefit, varies according to the degree of disability, taking into account the physical and mental consequences of the disability, the consequences for the participation of the child in daily life (mobility, learning capacity, personal hygiene) and the consequences for the family.

Some benefits of the Flemish and Walloon agencies for disabled persons (VAPH/AWIPH, respectively), notably the personal assistance budgets. These are (earmarked) budgets (i.e. no discretionary use) awarded to disabled persons in order to, among other things, ensure their independent living, in particular by allowing them to personal assistants (employed or not, respectively) for help in activities of daily living.

In the case of accidents at work and occupational diseases, a supplementary allowance can be awarded of a maximum of 12 times the average monthly guaranteed income, according to the degree of need, index-linked from the beginning of the period of compensation and terminated as of the 91st day of hospitalisation.

Mixed benefits

Sickness and invalidity insurance:

The possibility of mixed benefits in case of heavily dependent patients. See “Benefits in kind”, “1. Home care” and “Cash benefits”, “1. Amount”.

Care insurance (Zorgverzekering/Assurance soins), integration allowance (allocation d'intégration/integratietegemoetkoming) and allowance for assistance to the elderly (allocation pour l'aide aux personnes âgées/tegemoetkoming voor hulp aan bejaarden):

No mixed benefits.

No free choice between benefits in kind and cash benefits.

Benefits for the carer

No specific benefits for the carer.

BULGARIA

Applicable statutory basis

Long-term care in Bulgaria is not a separate social risk. The possible benefits in such cases are of various natures – social insurance, public assistance, etc. They are regulated in many statutory acts. The most important of these acts are:

• the Social Insurance Code,

• the Social Assistance Act,

• and the Regulation for the Implementation of the Social Assistance Act,

• the Integration of Persons with Disabilities Act,

• and the Regulation for the Implementation of the Integration of Persons with Disabilities,

• the Family Allowances for Children Act,

• the Wars Veterans Act,

• and the Regulation for the Implementation of the Wars Veterans Act,

• the Ordinance on the Medical Expertise of the Working Capacity,

• the Tariff of the Fees for Social Services Financed by the State Budget.

Benefits in kind

Depending on the content of these benefits they may be divided as follows:

1. Home care.

People receive the necessary care in their home. The forms of such benefits are:

• The delivery of food, cooking and help with eating,

• Shopping and the delivery of necessary household goods,

• Maintaining personal and home hygiene,

• Support in taking medicines, accompanying during doctor visits, etc,

• Support in the supply of technical facilities in case of invalidity or severe disease,

• Administrative and everyday necessities services (payment of electricity, phone and other utilities, filling in administrative forms, etc),

• Assistance in communication and social contacts.

2. Semi-residential care

In these cases people live in their homes, but receive some care in specialised establishments. The main forms of such care are:

• Day care centre – provides a complete package of services to the persons during the day, including the provision of meals as well as the provision of the daily health, educational and rehabilitation services plus the organisation of free time and personal contacts.

• Centre for social rehabilitation and integration – performs rehabilitation, legal consultations, educational and professional training and guidance elaboration and performance of individual programmes for social inclusion.

3. Residential care

People receive the necessary care out of their homes, in specialised establishments. The types of these establishments are:

• Centre for family-type accommodation. A complete package of social services delivered in an environment similar to the family environment for a limited number of persons are provided in such centre.

• Home for medical and social care. A complete package of services for children up to 3 years of age is provided here.

• Home for children with physical disabilities – provides a complete package of services for children between 3 and 18 years of age.

• Home for children with mental backwardness – a complete package of services for children between 3 and 18 years of age is the characteristic of this home.

• Home for adults with mental backwardness – the same as the previous, but for people over 18 years of age.

• Home for adults with mental disorders. A complete package of services for people over 18 years of age depending on their situation.

• Home for adults with physical disabilities – the same as the previous.

• Home for adults with sensor disorders – the same as the previous.

• Home for adults with dementia -- the same as the previous.

• Home for elderly people. People having reached the statutory retirement age, including those with disabilities receive a complete package of social services for people in such homes.

4. Other benefits

Here, we may point out the targeted assistance the purchase and repair of technical supportive devices, facilities and medical appliances for compensation of the disability. The assistance is provided in the form of reimbursement of actual expenditures made by persons with disabilities for the purchase and repair of the devices, facilities and appliances.

Cash benefits

These are provided by various sources. Such benefits are:

• Family benefits for children with permanent disabilities. These are paid by the state budget and are: - The monthly benefit for raising a child with permanent disabilities. It is paid until the child reaches the age of 2 years regardless of family income.

- The monthly benefit for a child with a permanent disability until the completion of secondary education.

- The monthly supplement for children up to 18 years of age with a permanent disability.

• Benefits for social integration of persons with permanent disabilities. The state budget pays these benefits. These are: o Monthly allowances.

Targeted allowances depending on the particular needs of the person.

• Supplement to the pension of pensioners with reduced working capacity over 90% who need permanent assistance of a carer. This is paid by the state social insurance.

The Bulgarian note it is argued that this benefit (top-up for a personal assistant to persons with a 90% disability in need of assistance in their day to day life) is essentially the only LTC cash benefit. Some benefits have been removed from the list (Invalidity pensions, Cash allowance when the insured person does not meet the requirements for invalidity pension and Santorium and resort treatment compensation).

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits.

Free choice between cash and/or benefits in kind not possible.

Benefits for the carer

Persons (parents, spouses, individuals) employed under the National Programme “Assistants for People with Disabilities” and the National Programme “Social Services in Family Environment” receive a monthly remuneration the amount of which is equal to the statutory monthly minimum wage.

CYPRUS

Applicable statutory basis20

Social Welfare Services (Υπηρεσίες Κοινωνικής Ευημερίας):

20 Additional sources of information:

- Feedback provided by Social Welfare Services, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, Cyprus, on June 2011

- Official Website of Social Welfare Services, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance (http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/sws, as at 17.6.2011)

- Other sources, including relevant developments on Cyprus at ec.europa.eu/social/ajax/BlobServlet?docld=2602&langld=el, as at 17.6.2011

- A private database providing updates on legislation and case law in Cyprus (www.leginet.com)

- National Report on the Strategies on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 2008-2010, Nicosia, October 2008, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance - European Union (in Greek)

- The Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED)- VT/2007/005, ANED country report on the implementation of policies supporting independent living for disabled people, Cyprus/S. Symeonidou (2009).

- ASISP (Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms), Annual National Report 2010, Pensions, Health and Long-term Care, Cyprus, May 2010, by M. Petmesidou, European Commission and GVG.

- MISSOC tables.

The Public Assistance and Services Act of 2006 (Ο περί Δημοσίων Βοηθημάτων και Υπηρεσιών Νόμος του 2006, Ν. 95(Ι)/2006)

The Public Assistance and Services Regulations (Οι περί Δημοσίων Βοηθημάτων και Υπηρεσιών Κανονισμοί)

The Homes for the Elderly and Disabled Persons Act of 1991, as amended (Ο περί Στεγών για Ηλικιωμένους και Ανάπηρους Νόμος του 1991, Ν. 222/1991). Last amendment: Act 65(I)/2011

Adult Centres Act of 1997 (Κέντρο Ενηλίκων Νόμος του 1997, Ν. 38(Ι)/1997). Last amendment: Act 64(I)/2011

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

This includes services such as personal hygiene, house cleaning, washing of clothes, cooking, payment of bills, shopping, etc. It is provided to people entitled to a public assistance benefit or people who cannot meet their special needs with their income. This support provided to vulnerable groups of people aims to enable the latter to live at home. Social Welfare Services employ carers who visit people in need of care at their own premises and who provide services according to their needs. Carers can also be employed by Community Councils or may be self-employed. The salary of the last two categories is paid by the Public Assistance Fund.

2. Semi-residential care

The day care service offers the elderly and the disabled persons the opportunity to live at home as long as possible. People who cannot care for themselves can spend their daytime at their local day centres where they are offered cooked meals and laundry facilities. Day care centres are operated by the Community Welfare Councils and are financed by the Scheme of State Funding.

3. Residential care

Residential care is strictly provided for people when their individual needs cannot be met on a 24-hour basis by their family or other supportive services. The Social Welfare Services place people in need of Residential Care in governmental, community or privately owned Residential Homes.

It should be noted that “Houses in the community” are houses providing accommodation for up to five disabled persons. They function on the basis of The Homes for the Elderly and Disabled Persons Law of 1991. Foundations may run such “Houses in the community”.

“Shelters for the elder and people with disabilities” provide residential care. They are subject to the Homes for the Elderly and Disabled Persons Act of 1991.

4. Other benefits

The Social Welfare Services subsidises the Pancyprian Volunteerism Coordinative Council which may, among others, offer training courses for non-governmental home carers.

Telecare services have been suspended as of September 2010.

• The National Action Plan for the Elderly 2005-2015, elaborated by the Ministry of Health, provides a programme on the development of geriatric services. The latter aim at the timely diagnosis and treatment of diseases which lead to the dependency of the elderly, the extension of their capacity to take care of themselves and the improvement of the quality of their life. We are not aware of the state of progress of this action plan.

• Specialised programmes in the framework of the Community Nursing Mental Health policy concerning the elderly with mental problems, the persons suffering from Alzheimer or other disorders, etc. Mental Health Community Centers notably direct their services towards individuals, including the elderly, with chronic mental health problems that require continuous support and mobilisation in their families and professional environment.

• The Scheme on Social Assistance on Improving Housing Conditions (Σχέδιο Παροχής Κοινωνικής Αρωγής για τη Βελτίωση των Συνθηκών Στέγασης), which provides a lump sum principally to the recipients of public assistance in view of improving their housing conditions.

• The Scheme on the Support of Families for Caring for the Elder and/or Disabled Members (Σχέδιο για την Ενίσχυση Οικογενειών για τη Φροντίδα Ηλικιωμένων ή/και Αναπήρων Μελών τους), which aims to enhance the families in view of keeping their elderly and/or disabled members at home via the adjustment of their housing conditions.

• The Scheme on the Funding of Local Authorities, in view of providing technical or financial assistance by the Social Welfare Services, under the form of a State subsidy, for the development of actions in local societies.

• Care Programmes for Drugs: programmes including prevention, timely intervention, treatment and social inclusion of persons that are addicted to drugs.

• Care Programmes at Prisons for condemned persons who are mentally ill and require long-term treatment and care. We are not aware of the state of progress of said programme.

Cash benefits

According to data provided by the national administration, cash benefits relating to home care amount to € 6 per hour or a maximum of € 240 per month; cash benefits relating to day care vary from € 85 to € 137 per month, depending on the services offered to the recipient concerned, and cash benefits relating to residential care vary from € 623 to € 744 per month.

With regard to home helpers, in the case of a person in need of 24-hour home care who is entitled to public assistance, it was reported by Social Welfare Services that from 1.7.2011, their salary amounts to € 326, plus social insurance contributions amounting to € 83.

• Care benefit: intended for paraplegics and quadriplegics who are in need of personal care due to wheelchair use and limited body functioning.

• Financial Assistance for Technical Equipment Benefit: addressed to disabled persons aiming to improve their quality of life by using technical means that contribute to their autonomy at the workplace and at home.

• Financial Assistance for Wheelchairs Benefit for People with Severe Mobility Impairment. The scheme aims at ensuring a financial aid in view of covering certain additional needs of persons with severe motor disabilities. The persons concerned cannot walk and permanently sit in the wheelchair.

• There is an allowance concerning the blind (ειδική χορηγία για τυφλούς) which is granted on an annual basis by the Service of Grants and Benefits of the Ministry of Finance under the conditions provided in Article 6 of the Law on Special Grants of 1996 (Ο περί Παροχής Ειδικών Χορηγιών Νόμος του 1996). The allowance should enable the beneficiaries to deal with the specificities concerning their disability (e.g. purchase of special devices, adaptation of their domicile in view of improving their conditions of living, etc).

• A child benefit is granted under the conditions provided in the Act on Child Benefits of 2002 (Ο περί Παροχής Επιδόματος Τέκνου Νόμος του 2002). Its personal scope of beneficiaries includes children aged under 18, unmarried dependants aged 18-25 doing their military service or aged 18-23 engaged in education, dependants aged 23-25 engaged in education for the same duration as their military service and children, regardless of their age, who are permanently deprived of their capacity for self-preservation.

Combination of benefits

Recipients of public assistance who are in need of short or long-term care may be provided services in kind and/or cash benefits for care.

Care services include day care, residential care and home care. Cash benefits include the monthly fees paid for residential/day care, the Home Helper’s salary and social insurance contributions, and pocket money for persons who live in public residential homes and Community Homes.

The claimant cooperates with a welfare officer to develop his or her personal care plan (e.g. type of care, frequency) based on individual needs for care services in kind and/or cash benefits.

The claimant has the choice to decide on the type of care (in cash and/or in kind) needed.

Benefits for the carer

Social Welfare Services (Υπηρεσίες Κοινωνικής Ευημερίας):

The State may pay (fully or partly) a private home carer who may be a family member. It is possible to compensate a family member who provides long-term care (if a family member is required to stop working for that purpose, or if he or she is of low socio-economic standing), or a friend or a non-governmental organisation, offering home care services for the provision of long-term care to persons entitled to public assistance who are in need of care.

Moreover, the state may pay the salary and the social security contributions of a Home Helper in the case of a person in need of 24-hour home care who is entitled to public assistance.

In the case of informal caregivers a contract is signed between the Social Welfare Services, the person in need and the caregiver (if the amount allocated for care exceeds a certain amount).

CZECH REPUBLIC

Applicable statutory basis

• Act No. 108/2006 on social services (Zákon o sociálních službách).

• Act No. 20/1966 on Care for Public Health (Zákon o péči o zdraví lidu).

• Act No. 48/1997 on Public Health Insurance (Zákon o veřejném zdravotním pojištění).

• Act No. 160/1992 on Non-State Health Care Facilities (Zákon o nestátních zdravotnických zařízeních).

Benefits in kind

The benefits in kind are regulated especially by Act 108/2006 on social services. Among the social services, the home services, home social care services and personal assistance are regulated. There are also special health care facilities provided to people in need of LTC, regulated by Act 20/1966 and financed by the health insurance system. This service is, however, financed for a definite time only. When the situation of the patient does not improve, there are classical social services offered.

1. Home care

Health care facilities:

Special outpatient facilities: home health care, home health care agencies (note that home care workers ensure only medical care), palliative care, and hospices.

Social services:

Home services (in clients’ home ensuring social assistance and support apart from specialised medical treatment):

- home social care services (domiciliary care provides assistance in the care of one's own person, organising meals and assistance in running a household to people with a limited ability in the area of personal and home care),

- personal assistance (intended for people whose capabilities are limited because of disabilities, age or illness for example in the areas of personal care, use of public places, household care, contact with family and broader society. The service is provided in the environment where the individual lives, works, etc. The personal assistance services include reading, interpreting and guiding services),

- emergency care,

- early intervention services (oriented towards entire families with a young child whose development is at risk because of a disability or illness. The service includes the use of educational, social and health care measures. The objective is to return or maintain the parents' competence to raise the child and create suitable conditions for the child's development. The services are provided in the household and specialised day care institutions, usually free of charge)

- social counselling (part of every kind of social service).

2. Semi-residential care

In case the person only needs day care, especially when the health situation of the person allows it, there are day care centres available according to the Social Services Act.

Day and week care centres are intended for people whose capabilities are limited, particularly in the areas of personal care and household care and who cannot live at home on a daily basis without someone else's assistance. Providing temporary housing may be part of the service.

In the same vain, there are also some specific outpatient services, like day service centres, respite care services etc., again regulated by the Social Services Act.

Respite care is the assistance for families that take all year-long care of a disabled person or a senior. The provider supplies services to the individual at times when the family members are at work, on holiday, do common errands outside the home, etc. The care is provided in the household or in specialized residential institutions (day care or short-term stays of up to three months).

3. Residential care

Health care facilities:

Aftercare health care facilities: establishment for the long-term ill, expert and rehabilitation treatment institutes, mental hospitals.

Social services:

Residential services are mainly provided under the social services act, which envisages establishing residential services facilities: weekly short-stay social welfare institutions, homes for the elderly and persons with disabilities and special purpose homes (for the mentally ill, for drug addicts, persons with Alzheimer’s dementia, etc.).

Stays in homes for the elderly and homes for the people with learning disabilities are intended for people whose capabilities are limited, particularly in the areas of personal care and household care and who cannot live at home in this situation. Providing housing in accommodation that is specifically designated for such a purpose and substitute homes for the users are a part of the service. The service is not restricted by time.

Protected and supported housing is intended for people whose capabilities are limited, particularly in the areas of personal care and household care and who want to live independently in the standard environment. Providing housing in an apartment that represents a home for the user, is managed by the provider and is part of a standard housing complex, is a part of the service.

Other social services and special purpose homes are intended for persons in specific situation, e.g. homelessness, drug addiction, poverty etc.

The residential care services are mainly run by the public local authorities – often established by the cities or municipalities – there are, however, also some NGOs, especially the church NGOs, which also establish residential care services for people in need of LTC.

4. Other benefits

No other benefits are directly applicable.

Some additional social assistance benefits might be mentioned, if also rehabilitation and occupational and empowerment activities would be considered as LTC. The social assistance benefits are regulated by Act No. 100/1988 Coll. on social security and by order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs No. 182/1991 Coll. on implementing the act on social security. Under this legislation, a benefit for compensation assistance tools – like a wheelchair, stocks etc. – can be claimed, as well as an allowance to buy a car for a handicapped person or to rebuild a house or a flat in order to make it barrier-less. However, these benefits do not fall under the coordination and, from the coordination’s point of view, are not considered as LTC benefits.21

21 This argument is underpinned by the Czech note stating that the reference to the additional social assistance benefits is no longer up-to-date, however, as these benefits do not come within the material scope of coordination rules, it is not necessary to amend the list.

Cash benefits

In case of LTC, the most important cash benefit seems to be the care allowance, as regulated in the Social Services Act. Care allowance is a benefit paid to individuals dependent on care to arrange for necessary care or services. The rate of the care allowance varies according to the age of the beneficiaries (aged under or over 18) and the degree of dependency (based on an assessment of self-care capabilities - ADL, IADL). There are four levels of amount of the care allowance according to the seriousness of health problem, disability and incapability of self-sufficiency etc. Users pay for care and have a choice to use care allowance for either professional or informal care.

Combination of benefits

Benefits in kind and cash benefits can be combined.

The person in need of care may not choose between benefits in kind and cash benefits, but has a choice to use a cash benefit (care allowance) for either professional or informal care.

Benefits for the carer

Carers are not entitled to specific benefits. They receive the care allowance from dependent persons. The State pays health and social insurance contributions for those registered as informal carers. Periods of caring are taken into account for the purposes of old-age pension calculation.

However, Respite care as assistance for families is provided (see point 2. Semi-residential care, above).

DENMARK

Applicable statutory basis

• Consolidated Act No 81 of 04/02/2011 on Social Service Benefits (om social service).

• Consolidated Act No. 103 of 11/02/2011 on Social Housing (om almene boliger).

• Consolidated Act No. 663 of 14/06/2011 on Housing Subsidies (om individual boligstøtte)

• Consolidated Act No. 666 of 17/06/2010 on Housing for elderly and handicapped persons (om boliger for ældre og personer med handicap)

• Consolidated Act No. 743 of 27/06/2011 on Help with the purchase of equipment and consumables after the Consolidated Act on social services benefits (om hjælp til anskaffelse af hjælpemidler og forbrugsgoder efter serviceloven)

Benefits in kind

1. Home care (consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 83)

Personal hygiene, domestic help and assistance to a person to maintain his or her capacities (rehabilitation).

In some cases, the accompanying person under 67 years (for persons who are severely disabled the accompanying service includes 15 hours monthly).

2. Semi-residential care (consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 108)

The municipal council shall provide accommodation in facilities suitable for long-term accommodation for persons in need of extensive assistance for general day-to-day functions or care, attendance or treatment, where such needs cannot be addressed in any other way.

The municipal council can offer people who have need for it, a temporary stay in a care centre or nursing home.

After specific individual evaluation, relief can be granted to a family or a person taking care at home of a person with a reduced mental or physical functional capacity. This relief can take the form of care in a day centre or of an overnight stay in a nursing home.

3. Residential care (Consolidated Act on Social Housing)

There are many different types of housing (mainly for elderly, but also for disabled persons):

• Family home

• Close-care accommodation

• Private nursing home

• Private nursing home/private dwelling

The local authority decides whether a citizen requires assistance which cannot be given in the form of home care. If a citizen is offered residential accommodation, she or he can choose between different alternatives within the municipality or even in other municipalities.

4. Other benefits • the adaptation of the dwelling and provision of special equipment, consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 100. • The replacement and relief of a person who is providing his or her partner or a close relative care at home, the consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 84. • Subsidies for the purchase of cars. Consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 114: • Subsidies for the purchase of cars shall be available for persons with permanently impaired physical or mental function substantially reducing their freedom of movement or substantially reducing their possibilities of finding or maintaining employment or completing an education without the use of a car. • Technical aids. Consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 112 (1): The municipal council shall grant support for technical aids for persons with permanent impairment of physical or mental function, where the aid (i) will remedy the permanent effects of the functional impairment significantly; (ii) will facilitate daily life in the home significantly; or (iii) is necessary to enable the person to carry out an occupation. The municipal council may direct that a specific aid shall be supplied by particular contractors. In connection with the conclusion of supply contracts by the municipal council, representatives of the users shall be involved in the drafting of performance specifications. In some cases there are free choices, e.g. hearing aid. • Housing subsidies: Consolidated Act on Housing Subsidies section 2a: Owners or members of private housing cooperatives who are severely physically disabled and whose dwelling is suitable for such purpose, shall upon application be eligible for housing benefits under this Act. The same shall apply for persons who are severely physically disabled, and who share a household with a tenant, an owner or a member of a private housing cooperative, and who live in a dwelling suitable for severely physically disabled persons. • Food service (Madservice-ordning) The Consolidated Act No. 81 of 04/02/2011 on Social Service Benefits, Chapter 16, Section 83: The municipality must offer citizens in need food service. The citizen can receive the food service after a specific individual evaluation. The food service requires payment from the citizen. Cash benefits In Danish note it is argued that for coordination purposes benefits mentioned under “cash benefits” seem to be better placed under “benefits in kind” in accordance with the definition given in Art. 1 (va) of the Regulation 883/2004. Subsidies in cash: • The Consolidated Act on Social Services, Section 95 (1): If the municipal council is unable to provide the necessary assistance for a person in need of assistance under sections 83-84, the municipal council may instead pay a subsidy towards any assistance engaged by such person.

• The Consolidated Act on Social Services, Section 96 (1): The municipal council shall offer citizen-controlled personal assistance. Citizen-controlled personal assistance shall be offered in the form of subsidies to cover the cost of employing care assistants and supervision and attendance of citizens with considerably and permanently impaired physical or mental function who require special support.

Necessary extra costs in relation to disability:

The Consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 100 (1): The municipal council shall pay any necessary extra costs relating to the personal day-to-day maintenance of persons between the age of 18 and the state pension age, cf section 1 a of the Act on Social Pensions, with permanent impairment of physical or mental function, and of persons with permanent impairment of physical or mental function who have deferred their claim for old-age pension pursuant to Section 15 a of the Act on Social Pensions. It shall be a condition that the extra costs are a result of the impaired function and are not recoverable under any other legislation or under other provisions of this Act.

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits.

Benefits for the carer

The Consolidated Act on Social Service Benefits, Section 84: A person with a gainful activity who wishes to take care of a closely related person suffering from a significant disability can be employed by the municipality where the disabled person lives.

ESTONIA

Applicable statutory basis

The Social Welfare Act (Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus) of 1995.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home care is provided by local government, helping them to manage in their usual environment, excluding the care that requires physical contact.

Long-term supportive services are continuously provided for people living independently to enable them to use general public services.

Home services are, for example, cleaning and caring for the house, the procurement of food, pharmaceuticals, other necessities and firewood or other fuel, and information and assistance in administrative matters.

2. Semi-residential care

Provided by local government, to support a person or his or her family to maintain capacity in institutions where the person spends the day. Day care is provided by day centres where social services, developmental and hobby activities are offered during the day. An elderly or disabled person can visit the day centre as often as he or she wishes (has need for).

Day care centres can offer services for people with dementia – family members/caregivers bring a person diagnosed with dementia to the day care centre and professionals take care of him or her.

The purpose of day centres is to maintain the welfare and activity of their clients; and to support them in staying at home for as long as possible.

3. Residential care

Nursing homes, homes for the elderly and disabled.

4. Other benefits

Technical appliances (including prostheses) financed by the State and community based mental health services for people with special mental needs, partially provided by the State and partially by the local government.

Activities aimed at improving the mobility of persons (various transportation subsidies/services) could also be considered. The reason is that the freedom of mobility plays the most important role in ensuring people's independence and awareness of social activity.

It seems important to add that the organisation of LTC is predominantly done by local authorities. Local governments provide a flexible approach to a wider opportunity for LTC services with existing local needs and resources.

Cash benefits

No cash benefits. Estonia only has benefits in kind. It is believed that at the moment it is not the most appropriate time to create the cash benefit system. It is argued that long-term care, in particular, first needs a variety of services and assistance, and less direct forms of financial assistance.

Combination of benefits

No cash benefits.

Benefits for the carer

The Caregiver's Benefit (hooldajatoetus): provided by the local governments to caregivers who support persons with an assessed degree of disability in everyday activities (paying bills, organising transportation to a doctor or to a bank when needed) and who also provide care service at home (personal assistance in eating, clothing, washing; home assistance in cleaning, cooking, buying products). In some local governments this benefit is paid to the disabled person.

The conditions are regulated by the local governments and may therefore differ. The main condition is that the caregiver or the family member who provides the care has been appointed by the local government. The amount is different (€ 25.56 – 31.96), plus national insurance contributions. The benefit is applicable for the informal caregiver. 85 / 156

FINLAND

Applicable statutory basis

• The Disability Benefits Act (Laki vammaisetuuksista) of 11 May 2007.

• The Services and Assistance for the Disabled Act (Laki vammaisuuden perusteella järjestettävistä palveluista ja tukitoimista) of 3 April 1987.

• The Act on interpretation services for disabled persons (Laki vammaisten henkilöiden tulkkauspalveluista) of 19 February 2010.

• The Social Welfare Act (Sosiaalihuoltolaki) of 17 September 1982.

• The Act on Support for Informal Care (Omaishoidon tuki) of 2 December 2005.

• The Act on Special Care for Handicapped Persons (Laki kehitysvammaisten henkilöiden erityishuollosta) of 23 June 1977

• The Primary Health Care Act (Kansanterveyslaki) of 28 January 1972.

The Finnish legislation concerning disability benefits has been changed as of the 1st of January 2008. Disability benefits are gathered under one Act Concerning Disability Benefits (Laki vammaisetuuksista) (570/2007).

The child care allowance has been abolished and replaced by a benefit called the Disability allowance for persons under 16 years of age.

The Finnish Disability allowance which was mentioned in annex IIa of Regulation 1408/71 is also abolished from Finnish legislation and replaced by a benefit called The Disability allowance for persons aged 16 years or over.

The Pensioners’ care allowance has been transferred from the Act concerning National Pension to the Act Concerning Disability Benefits (Laki vammaisetuuksista) (570/2007). There is also a fourth benefit covered by the same act, namely the Dietary Grant for persons with celiac disease.

It might be argued that only benefits provided under the Disability Benefits Act should be considered as LTC benefits for the purpose of the social security coordination. The other benefits (housing allowance for pensioners) and services mentioned might not be considered as LTC benefits, but as social services which seem to be outside the scope of the Regulations. All services mentioned are provided by the municipalities with a wide discretion on the need to provide these services in the municipality in question. The person in need of care does not have a right to a specific service, but it is the municipality that evaluates which type of services can and should be provided in the situation in question.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home services and services for the disabled (transport services, a personal assistant, house alteration).

Support for informal care (care allowance, statutory leave for the caregiver, support and counselling).

2. Semi-residential care

Service housing for older people and people with disabilities who need outside support and assistance, which cannot be arranged in an ordinary dwelling. 86 / 156

3. Residential care

Statutory institutional care services include the institutional services provided in homes for elderly, in the inpatient wards of municipal health centres and in specialised care units for people with mental disabilities. Long-term institutional care is given in various types of nursing homes and homes for disabled war veterans. NGOs and private firms also provide institutional care in old people’s homes and private hospitals.

4. Other benefits

Technical equipment, when needed.

Cash benefits

Pensioners’ care allowance (Eläkkeensaajien hoitotuki): € 57.55 per month.

Increased rate: € 143.27 per month.

Special rate: € 302.96 per month.

Pensioners’ housing allowance (Eläkkeensaajien asumistuki)

Disability allowance for persons under 16 years of age and disability allowance for persons aged 16 years or over (Alle 16-vuotiaan ja 16 vuotta täyttäneen vammaistuki ):

Both benefits have three rates depending on the degree of strain: € 85.93, € 200.51 or € 388.80 per month.

The Disability Allowance for persons under 16 years of age is payable at three rates.

• Basic rate (€ 85.93 per month)

The disability allowance at the basic rate is payable for a child who on account of an illness, injury or handicap needs treatment and rehabilitation at least weekly, placing the family under additional strain for at least 6 months.

• Middle rate (€ 200.51 per month)

The disability allowance is paid at the middle rate if the treatment and rehabilitation of the child imposes a considerable daily strain for at least 6 months.

• Highest rate (€ 388.80 per month)

The disability allowance is paid at the highest rate if the treatment and rehabilitation of a child imposes an extreme, around-the-clock strain on the family for at least 6 months.

Disease-specific evaluation

The amount of disability allowance payable does not solely depend on the diagnosis but also on the strain that the illness or injury imposes on the family and the level of commitment it requires. Certain diseases are relatively uniform in terms of the amount of care and assistance they demand, the strain they impose and the level of commitment they require. These diseases and the special needs associated with them are defined in the administrative guidelines applied by Kela.

The effect of other benefits and income

Eligibility for the disability allowance does not depend on the income or assets of the child or family, nor is the award of the allowance prevented by other benefits or compensations. However, if the child is in receipt of a foreign benefit comparable to the disability allowance, this foreign benefit may be deducted from the Finnish allowance. Similarly, if the child is in receipt of a care allowance or a supplementary handicap benefit from a workers’ compensation or motor vehicle insurance plan, it is deducted from the disability allowance.

The disability allowance for persons over 16 years of age is payable at three rates depending on the need of assistance, guidance and supervision as well as special expenses.

• Basic rate (€ 85.93 per month)

You can receive a disability allowance at the basic rate if you have an illness or injury that causes you significant hardship and continuous expenses. The expenses must be at least equal to the amount of the basic disability allowance per month.

• Middle rate (€ 200.51 per month)

You can be paid a disability allowance at an increased rate if the hardship is considerable and you need outside assistance or supervision at least weekly or you have expenses that are at least equal to the amount of the increased disability allowance per month.

• Highest rate (€ 388.80 per month)

The disability allowance at the highest rate can be awarded to persons with severe disabilities who need substantial outside assistance on a daily basis or who incur substantial expenses from their disability. The expenses have to be at least equal to the amount of the highest disability allowance per month. Persons who are blind, unable to move or prelingually deaf are always entitled to the highest rate of disability allowance.

The Care Allowance for Pensioners is payable at three rates depending on the need of assistance, guidance and supervision as well as on special expenses.

• Basic rate (€ 57.55 per month)

You may be eligible for the basic rate if your illness or injury results in at least a weekly need of assistance in personal activities of daily living or guidance or supervision with them. If your illness or injury causes special expenditure that is at least equal to the amount of the basic rate, you may be eligible for the allowance. Persons who are blind or unable to move are always eligible for the basic rate at least.

• Middle rate (€ 143.27 per month)

You may be eligible for the middle rate if your illness or injury results in a daily need of several personal activities (such as eating, getting dressed, washing) or if you need regular guidance and supervision. If your illness or injury causes special expenditure that is at least equal to the amount of the middle rate, you may be eligible for the allowance.

• Highest rate (€ 302.96 per month)

You may be eligible for the highest rate if your illness or injury results in an around the clock assistance and guidance by another person. If your illness or injury causes special expenditure that is equal to the amount of the highest rate, you may be eligible for the allowance.

• The Care Allowance for Pensioners is a tax-free benefit.

Special expenses

For disability benefits purposes, ’special expenses’ refers to necessary additional costs incurred on account of an illness or injury in respect of work, study or activities of daily living. Usually, only regular expenses lasting at least 6 months (and not one-time costs) are covered.

Are for example recognised as special expenses:

• the costs of medical care and medication

• additional transportation costs

• the costs of home health care and home help.

Are for example not recognised: normal expenditures for food or clothing, hobbies, purchases of equipment or car ownership costs.

The amount of the Dietary Grant is € 21.00 per month.

The use of the Pensioners’ Care Allowance (Eläkkeensaajien hoitotuki), the Pensioners’ Housing Allowance (Eläkkeensaajien asumistuki), and the Disability Allowance for persons under 16 years of age and the disability allowance for persons aged 16 years or over (Alle 16-vuotiaan ja 16 vuotta täyttäneen vammaistuki ) is at the discretion of the beneficiary.

Combination of benefits

Depending on the degree of disability and the need of care.

Both cash benefits and benefits in kind are provided through different schemes.

No free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind. Municipalities can provide a service voucher (benefit in kind).

Benefits for the carer

Caregiver’s allowance: depends on the municipality, the minimum is € 336.41 per month. Those caregivers who have made an agreement with the municipality have the right to 3 free days per month.

FRANCE

Applicable statutory basis

The supplement for assistance of a third party (majoration pour aide d'une tierce personne):

Articles L. 341-4, L. 355-1 and L. 434-2 of the Social Security Code (Code de la sécurité sociale).

The special education supplement for a disabled child (complément d'allocation d'éducation de l'enfant handicapé):

Article L. 541-1 of the Social Security Code (Code de la sécurité sociale).

The disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap - PCH):

Article L. 245-1 of the Social Action and Family Code (Code de l'action sociale et de la famille).

The allowance for loss of autonomy (allocation personnalisée d'autonomie - APA):

Article L. 232-1 of the Social Action and Family Code (Code de l'action sociale et de la famille)

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

The disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap - PCH) and the allowance for loss of autonomy (allocation personnalisée d'autonomie - APA):

Assessment of the assistance required for staying at home. The amount of the benefit depends on the assistance plan used, less the participation of the beneficiary, calculated according to his or her means.

France chose to treat dependency and disability differently by creating two distinct types of benefit: the allowance for loss of autonomy (allocation personnalisée d’autonomie, APA) for older people and disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap, PCH).These benefits are granted to older or disabled people living at home (APA and PCH) or in institutions (APA).

The APA and the PCH are compulsory benefits governed and granted outside the French legal framework for social insurance and without the involvement of a social-security body: they are managed by local authorities or departments (or conseils généraux) under social-assistance legislation. Social-assistance benefits and benefits granted under social-insurance schemes (social security, supplementary schemes) together make up the social-protection system in France.

The APA was created by Act No 2001-647 of 20 July 2001 on provision for the loss of independence of older people and the personal independence allowance. This law laid down the right to APA of any older person unable to cope with the consequences of a lack or loss of independence due to his or her physical or mental state. Any person aged over 60 may apply for APA; the amount to be granted depends primarily on the degree of dependence, with remaining costs to be met by the person concerned at a level commensurate with his or her resources. The four most severe levels of dependence (1 to 4) always confer a potential right to assistance. The maximum amounts granted under the assistance plans directly financing benefits range from € 552.03 for people registered as GIR 423 to € 1 288.09 for GIR 1 (the most severe level). These assistance plans are paid for by the local authority where the older person's income is less than € 725.23 per month.

23 GIR = Groupe iso-ressources [iso-resource group] 90 / 156

This benefit in kind directly finances a very wide range of services: expenditure linked to remuneration for a home help, temporary reception costs (with or without accommodation) in institutions, payments for services rendered by foster carers and the costs of transport, technical aids, adaptations to dwellings and any other expenditure enhancing the beneficiary's independence.

To cope with the rapid rise in the costs of this benefit and the corresponding costs for the departments, various reforms have been introduced with a view to financing the APA. One important provision of the Act of 30 June 2004 on solidarity for the independence of older and disabled people was to create the Solidarity Day, which takes the form of an extra, unpaid working day for employees and an "independence solidarity" contribution of 0.3% for employers, based largely on wages and salaries. The funds collected are managed by the National Solidarity Fund for Independence [Caisse nationale de solidarité pour l'autonomie – CNSA], a State-administered public enterprise.

The Act of 11 February 2005 on equal rights and opportunities, participation and citizenship for persons with disabilities provided for disability compensation allowance [prestation de compensation du handicap or PCH]. This benefit takes the form of personalised financial assistance to cover needs linked to the loss of independence of people having become disabled before age 60, provided that it is applied for by age 75 at the latest. These needs are recorded in a personalised plan drawn up by a multidisciplinary team from the Maison départementale des personnes handicapées (MDPH) (the department's disabled people's centre) on the basis of a life plan expressed by the person concerned.

This benefit in kind covers the costs linked to a need for human or technical assistance, adaptations to the disabled person's dwelling or vehicle, any additional transport costs or specific or exceptional expenditure, such as the costs of acquiring or maintaining products associated with the disability or assistance animals.

Although the departments manage both the APA and the PCH, these benefits are not financed entirely from the local authorities' own tax resources. The national solidarity fund contributes in the form of assistance paid to the departments by the CNSA. This assistance is supplied by the independence solidarity contribution (CSA), supplemented for the APA by part of the general welfare contribution (contribution sociale généralisée - CSG). The CSA and CSG are taxes under French law, not social-security contributions. The CNSA contributes 29% of APA funding and 58% of PCH funding.

Public expenditure on financing dependence is not limited to the APA and the PCH; other institutions also contribute:

- the State in the form of the tax expenditure linked to income tax exemptions or reductions linked to dependence;

- health insurance for expenditure on care by social and medico-social establishments and services, hospital and non-hospital care, the costs of social services and regional health insurance funds and exemptions from social contributions linked to dependence financing;

- the National Solidarity Fund for Independence (CNSA) also helps to finance establishments, the promotion of innovative schemes, the improvement of professional skills, publicity, prevention and studies and to co-finance investment operations;

- the National Old-Age Insurance Fund [Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse – CNAV], the Central Agricultural Mutual Insurance Fund [Caisse centrale de mutualité sociale agricole – CCMSA] and the self-employed persons' social scheme [Régime social des indépendants – RSI] cover the costs of support at home and in communal establishments;

- the National Family Allowances Fund [Caisse nationale d'allocations familiales – CNAF] finances social housing allowances and personalised housing assistance.

In 2011 the Government organised a major national debate on the dependence of older people that gave rise to several working groups, analytical reports and proposals. The results of this work should feed into the discussions on a reform of dependence financing in 2012. This has been postponed until after the presidential elections.

2. Semi-residential care

The disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap - PCH) and the allowance for loss of autonomy (allocation personnalisée d'autonomie - APA):

The possibility to receive the benefit in case of day care in a specialised centre. The number of hours granted depends on the evaluation of the need of assistance. See point 1. Home care, above.

3. Residential care

Accommodation in a social or medico-social institution, hospitalisation in a health institution. The Institution for accommodating elderly dependent persons (Établissement pour hébergement pour personnes âgées dépendantes, EHPAD).

In case of accommodation in a specialised institution, the amount of the benefit corresponds to the amount of the expenses corresponding to the degree of loss of autonomy according to the institution’s tariffs, minus the participation of the beneficiary him or herself.

4. Other benefits

Technical aids granted for the purchase or renting of specific equipment, adaptation of frequently used equipment, housing support (adaptation), transport-related support, specific or exceptional help, assistance animals.

Some other benefits might be mentioned as well:

• the aide ménagère (household aid) is a social assistance benefit granted by local authorities or by local social security institutions. They cover costs such as house cleaning, meal preparation or delivery, 24-hour medical assistance, etc. Usually, it is a means-tested benefit. It can be either a cash benefit or a benefit in kind (the amount based on actual expenses);

• the majoration pour tierce personne is provided to pensioners who, before age 65, need the assistance of a third person to accomplish their daily life activities;

• the SSIAD are service providers who provide special care for dependent persons who stay at their home.

Cash benefits

The supplement for assistance of a third party (majoration pour aide d'une tierce personne):

40% increase of the pension, with a monthly amount of at least € 1 038.36.

The special education supplement for a disabled child (complément d'allocation d'éducation de l'enfant handicapé - Aeeh):

6 categories of supplements ranging from € 93.41 to € 1 038.36 per month.

A specific increase for dependent children of a single parent, who is benefiting from the allowance and from a supplement for a disabled child of at least the 2nd category (between € 50.60 and € 416.44).

Discretionary use.

The adult disability allowance (allocation aux adultes handicapés - AAH) could be mentioned as well. It is a cash benefit which provides a minimum income for disabled persons. It is completed by the majoration pour la vie autonome (supplement for independent life).

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits.

Choice between the special education supplement for a disabled child (complément d'allocation d'éducation de l'enfant handicapé) and the disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap). The choice is made on the basis of the proposals in the personalised compensation plan.

Benefits for the carer

The employed carer is entitled to benefits on the same basis as other employees.

The beneficiary of the allowance can make use of home services offered by specialised organisations (services organised by the municipality, by State authorised associations or by undertakings). She or he can also opt to remunerate these organisations by using a universal service employment cheque (chèque emploi service universel, CESU). The beneficiary can choose to be employer him or herself, either directly or by proxy.

In addition, persons who take care of a dependent person can get tax advantages. There is also a waiving of tax contributions on the salary of a person employed by a dependent.

Addendum: Social security coordination aspects

According to the Note of the French delegation, the listing essentially puts four major benefit or assistance categories:

- the "dependency" benefits: the allowance for loss of autonomy (APA) and disability compensation allowance (PCH);

- the social-security benefits coordinated in chapters of the Regulation other than sickness, such as the supplement for permanent assistance from another person which constitutes an old-age benefit, or the supplement paid with disability benefit;

- the special non-contributory benefits mentioned in Annex X of the Regulation, such as the disabled adults' allowance (allocation aux adultes handicapés, AAH);

- assistance arising from social assistance or from social action by organisations.

The local assistance able to be granted by local authorities or social-security bodies is a non-compulsory fringe benefit whose grant criteria, amount, purpose and conditions of use vary according to the territories, authorities or bodies paying it, which are not obliged to grant it. This would be very hard to coordinate under Regulation 883/2004, which according to the Note of the French delegation means that it should not be covered by the Regulation.

Apparently, only the APA and the PCH constitute long-term care benefits within the scope of the proposed definition in the trESS 2011 report, and should remain on this list. These benefits, and the APA in particular, have for several years been treated as social-security benefits in the Union law, particularly in the light of the findings in the Molenaar (1998) and Jauch (2001) cases; under French national law these benefits are classed as social-assistance benefits. They are granted subject to on-the-spot assessment of the specific situation and needs of each applicant; the content and extent of the assistance are individualised on the basis of this assessment. Lastly, these benefits are non-contributory and are financed by taxes.

The AAH was recognised in the Union law as a special non-contributory benefit and is mentioned as such in Annex X to the Regulation. According to the view of the Note of the French delegation, this classification need not be reviewed, since it is a social minimum unrelated to the sickness risk, optional in use and intended to combat monetary poverty.

The other social-security benefits should continue to be coordinated according to the current rules in the Regulation. The types of assistance arising from local social action (municipality, department) or from social-security funds or other organisations, provided that they are optional, are not suitable for coordination by Regulation, and it is suggested in the Note of the French delegation that they be removed from this list.

GERMANY

Applicable statutory basis

Statutory long-term care insurance (Gesetzliche Pflegeversicherung):

Social long-term care insurance for persons insured under statutory sickness insurance and private compulsory long-term care insurance for persons insured under private sickness insurance: Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch), Book XI (SGB XI), lastly amended by Article 3 of the Act to regulate the need of care assistance in hospitals (Gesetz zur Regelung des Assistenzpflegebedarfs im Krankenhaus) of 30 July 2009 (BGBl. I, S. 2495).

Social assistance (Sozialhilfe):

Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch), Book XII, - social assistance -, of 27 December 2003.

As of: the Act on Family Benefits (Familienleistungsgesetz) of 22 December 2008 (BGBl. I S. 2955).

According to the Note of the German delegation, long-term care benefits are not only provided by the statutory and the private long-term care insurance and the social assistance scheme, but also e.g. by the work-accident insurance, if the need for long-term care ensues from an industrial accident or an occupational disease. The need for such long-term care is basically taken into account by a care allowance („Pflegegeld”). This benefit currently ranges from € 310 to € 1 2140 (West) and from € 272 to € 1 086 (East) depending on the amount of care needed. At the request of the insured person, nursing care at home („Hauspflege“) or in an appropriate residence („Heimpflege“) may also be provided.

Benefits in case of need for long-term care or supplements are also provided according to the Federal Law on War pensions (“Bundesversorgungsgesetz”), where the contingency occurred in the course of the exercise of a military or similar service or due to an accident suffered during such a service.

The amounts below have been adjusted (increased) as of the beginning of 2012.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Monthly benefits in kind (provision of basic care, general care and domestic help by outpatient care centres or individual carers) which amount:

• Category I: up to € 440;

• Category II: up to € 1 040;

• Category III: up to € 1 510;

• In cases of particular hardship: up to € 1 918.

Several persons in need of care, especially in new forms of housing, can combine entitlements to benefits in kind (the so-called “pooling”) and the increased efficiency, especially of care benefits, are to be used in favour of the “pooling” participants.

2. Semi-residential care

Monthly benefits in kind for care in day and night centres in addition to home care which amount:

• Category I: up to € 440;

• Category II: up to € 1 040;

• Category III: up to € 1 510.

Apart from the entitlement to day/night care, a 50% entitlement to the respective outpatient care benefit in kind or care allowance remains.

3. Residential care

A lump-sum payment of the costs for care, medical care treatment and social care expenses as a monthly benefit in kind in the following categories:

• Category I: € 1 023

• Category II: € 1 279

• Category III: € 1 510

• In cases of particular hardship: € 1 825.

In addition, the care insurance pays care providers for additional care of persons with significant general need for long-term care. For every 25 persons an additional carer could be engaged.

4. Other benefits • Benefits for home care are complemented by aids and appliances to facilitate the provision of care, unless, as a result of illness or disability, they have to be provided by another fund, and by technical aids and appliances for household activities, used for the alleviation of home care or mitigation of ailment of the person in need of long-term care or to support an individual way of life of such a person. Expenses for aids and appliances meant for usage are reimbursed up to € 31. Technical aid is preferably provided on loan. In certain circumstances participation of 10% is due, but not more than € 25. • Courses of instruction in the provision of care for caring family members and other voluntary carers. • Respite care (Pflegevertretung) provides carers a break from normal caring duties and thus alleviates the burden of caregiving: payment up to an amount of € 1 510 for a maximum of 28 days in the calendar year for the substitution of a carer, if he or she is on holiday or ill. The carer must, however, have provided care for at least twelve months prior to the date of his or her absence. If the stand-in is a professional carer or works for a home care service, the long-term care insurance fund will cover the cost up to a maximum amount mentioned above. This amount can likewise be claimed if the stand-in is a neighbour or distant relative (i. e. not a first or second degree relative or in-law). • Short-term care (Kurzzeitpflege): In case of absence of a carer or following the inpatient care, the costs of residential care during a short period up to a maximum of 28 days per year are covered for an amount of € 1 510. Short-term care for children in need of care up to 18 years is also possible in the support institutions for disabled people or in other appropriate institutions. • Additional care benefits for persons with an extensive general need of care (e.g. people with dementia, mentally disabled and people with mental illnesses) up to € 100 per month (basic amount) or up to € 200 per month (increased amount). The care must comprise at least 14 hours per week within the home area of the person in need of care and may not be rendered on a commercial basis (the care allowance passed to the caregiver is not considered to constitute such “commerce”). • The reimbursement of expenses for measures to improve the living environment up to € 2 557 per measure with regard to appropriate participation.

Cash benefits

Statutory long-term care insurance:

If a person in need of care provides for the care him herself, he or she can get care allowance in order to assure necessary basic care and household assistance in an adequate way. For this benefit the monthly amount is:

• Category I: € 225;

• Category II: € 430;

• Category III: € 685.

Care allowance can be claimed instead of home care services.

Social assistance:

The same benefit amounts as under the long-term care insurance.

Combination of benefits

Statutory long-term care insurance:

Cash benefits and benefits in kind may be combined: if the person in need of care only claims the benefits in kind partly, he or she is entitled to receive proportionate care allowance next to it. The care allowance is reduced by the percentage corresponding to the claimed benefits in kind. The person in need of care is bound by the decision relating to ratio between cash benefits and benefits in kind for a period of six months.

There is free choice between benefits in kind and cash benefits.

In order to exercise their right to self-determination the person in need of long-term care in principle has the free choice between home care and residential care, as well as the choice between several licensed facilities and services. Together with the notice of approval, the care funds provide a list with a comparison of services and prices of the facilities in the catchment area, the nearest care station (Pflegestützpunkt) and suggestions for individual care consultation. Since January 2009, the insured person has the right to additional care consultation vis-à-vis their care funds or private insurance organisation. Normally, the care advisers are staff members of the care funds, they analyse the need of care on the basis of an MDK report, set up a plan for the provision of the needed social benefits and rehabilitation in the individual case, of healthy, preventive, curative or other medical care and care based social assistance and they work towards approval and conduction of the corresponding measures. If so-called care stations (Pflegestützpunkte) are set up, the care advisers have to be placed there.

Benefits for the carer

Statutory long-term care insurance:

Payment of pension insurance contributions for caring family members and other informal carers by the long-term care insurance. A protection without contribution is also provided for these persons by the accident insurance. Contributions to the statutory pension insurance are also paid during the carer’s holidays.

Employees in companies with at least 15 employees have an entitlement to unpaid leave for up to 6 months in order to take care of a relative (so-called care time, Pflegezeit). As a general rule, their family health insurance continues during this time and the pension insurance continues via the long-term care insurance fund. The entitlement from the unemployment insurance remains because of the contributions of the long-term care insurance fund. The contributions for health insurance and long-term care insurance are borne by the long-term care insurance fund up to the minimum contribution amount if necessary.

If a person suddenly becomes dependent on long-term care, employees can stay away from work at short notice for up to 10 days in order to ensure care in need during this time or organise suitable care (so-called short-term work incapability, kurzzeitige Arbeitsverhinderung).

Social assistance:

The payment of the contributions for the carer for adequate old-age provision, unless this is provided otherwise.

GREECE

Applicable statutory basis

No special scheme.

According to the Note of the Greek delegation, the policy on long-term care benefits is undergoing restructuring and has not yet been finalised. The conditions demanding restructuring are firstly the necessity to re-examine all benefits of this type, in order to avoid one person being able to accumulate benefits, and secondly the rationalisation of the terms and conditions for granting benefits with the ultimate aim of economising resources and distributing them to people who are really in need.

To help achieve this aim, significant administrative alterations have already taken place in the structure of the Services through the transfer of the Social Welfare Section from the Ministry of Health and Welfare to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security under Article 9(5) of Law 4052/2012, and the gradual integration of all the branches of sickness benefits in kind into the EOPYY (National Health Services Organisation).

However, under Article 138 of the recent Law 4052/2012, a Home Care Programme for Pensioners was established with the aim of ensuring independent living conditions for elderly and disabled pensioners at home. This programme will cover pensioners belonging to primary insurance funds that come under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, although those receiving a pension from OGA (Agricultural Insurance Organisation) as uninsured elderly people, pensioners from NAT (Mariners' Retirement Fund), public sector pensioners and those qualifying for welfare benefits may also be included in the scheme. The programme will be implemented after the publication of the provisions by the same law of Ministerial decisions, and from 1 September 2012 a special levy to fund the benefits will be established for those who are insured by bodies that come under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, those who will retire after 1 January 2015 and fulfil the criteria for benefiting from the programme.

Hence, the benefits mentioned below are currently being reassessed in Greece.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

The Programme "Aid at Domicile" (ΒΟΗΘΕΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΣΠΙΤΙ) is part of the primary social care services, providing nursing care, social care services and domestic assistance to elder people who live alone continuously or at certain times of the day and cannot sufficiently take care of themselves, and also to disabled people who face situations of isolation, exclusion or family crisis. Its aim is to support and care for the elderly in their home, to enhance the quality of their life, to inform society and to attract volunteers. It is implemented under the responsibility of the Local Authorities in municipalities throughout the country, primarily in remote mountainous and island areas.

2. Semi-residential care

During the day, in urban and suburban areas, the Day Care Centres of the Elderly (ΚΕΝΤΡΑ ΗΜΕΡΗΣΙΑΣ ΦΡΟΝΤΙΔΑΣ ΗΛΙΚΙΩΜΕΝΩΝ – Κ.Η.Φ.Η.) accommodate elderly people who cannot care for themselves (due to physical difficulties, dementia, etc), and whose family members are not able to take care of them due to their work or serious social or economic problems or health problems.

The Day Care Centres of the Elderly are established and operated by municipal enterprises, joint municipal enterprises, municipal business associations of local authorities and, also, by private non-profitable entities. They cooperate with local organisations providing social services such as health units and the Welfare Directorates of the Prefectures of the country providing social services.

3. Residential care

Hospitalisation in a public hospital, a contracted clinic or a social welfare centre for the chronically ill.

Elderly Care Units (ΜΟΝΑΔΕΣ ΦΡΟΝΤΙΔΑΣ ΗΛΙΚΙΩΜΕΝΩΝ), which can be established and operated by charitable associations, the Orthodox Church or the local authorities and, in this case, are non-profitable, or they can be established by individuals (and, thus, are profitable). The Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity, in the framework of its social policy, has contracted with private Elderly Care Units for the provision of some beds, in order to care for indigent elderly who cannot be served by State institutions due to lack of or insufficient beds. The cost of these beds is covered by the national budget.

4. Other benefits

The Open Protection Centres of the Elderly (ΚΕΝΤΡΑ ΑΝΟΙΚΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΗΛΙΚΩΜΕΝΩΝ - Κ.Α.Π.Η.) are open programmes that involve the elderly over 60 years without socio-economic criteria, in order to integrate and socialise all members of the community. They provide all forms of organised recreation, medical care, physiotherapy treatment, occupational therapy, social work, hospital care and all kinds of material and psychological support services to the elderly.

Cash benefits

The benefit for non-residential care (ΕΞΩΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΕΠΙΔΟΜΑ):

A benefit of € 660.80. Conditional upon the insured person having completed:

• the days of work that are required for acquiring sickness benefits in kind, during the year of the application (70 days from 1/1/2010, 80 days from 1/1/2011, 90 days from 1/1/2012 and 100 days as of 1/1/2013 and beyond) and at least 350 days of insurance during the last 4 years before the invalidity, or

• 1 000 days of insurance in total.

The total invalidity benefit (ΕΠΙΔΟΜΑ ΑΠΟΛΥΤΟΥ ΑΝΑΠΗΡΙΑΣ):

Paid to pensioners because of invalidity, as long as they are in a state that requires continuous care from another person (total invalidity), to pensioners because of death and exceptionally, to pensioners because of old age who, after their retirement, became blind. The amount corresponds to 50% of the invalidity pension paid.

Housing allowance (ΣΤΕΓΑΣΤΙΚΗ ΣΥΝΔΡΟΜΗ):

A benefit in the form of a rental fee, paid to uninsured and financially weak elderly over 65 years who live alone or in a couple and do not own a house. The programme was implemented by the Directorate of Social Welfare of the Prefectures of the country. Amount: € 362. It is suggested by the Note of the Greek delegation (without any explanation though) that the housing allowance is removed from the list of LTC benefits.

No discretionary use, but the cash benefits may be used to pay both professional providers and informal caregivers. Free choice of provider.

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits.

No free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

Provisions for retirement at a lower age and/or with fewer years of insurance for parents of children with a level of invalidity of at least 67% and for spouses of persons with a level of invalidity of at least 80%.

HUNGARY

Applicable statutory basis

In case of long-term care services providing personal social care (social services):

The Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Assistance (törvény a szociális igazgatásról és szociális ellátásokról) supplemented by Government and Ministerial decrees.

There is no separate insurance system for long term care in Hungary. Those requiring long term assistance can rely on the services provided by the health and social care system.

According to the Note of the Hungarian delegation, municipalities are responsible for long term care benefits in kind (different social services have to be provided, according the number of inhabitants living there). Until 2012, county municipalities were responsible for operating residential care for elderly, people living with mental problems, or addictions, people with disabilities or homeless people, but from 2012 these institutions with many other cultural, educational ones became governmentally operated institutions. The purpose of this reorganisation is to streamline the organisation, develop and make services more efficient and economical. Besides, many other, non-governmental or church organizations also provide long term care for people in need.

The key elements of the ongoing governmental intentions:

- streamlining the organizations,

- develop services to be more efficient and economical,

- build appropriate environment for the residential services users (e.g. smaller institutions),

- ensure all conditions for people in need living either at home or in institution without burdens and barriers.

There have not been major changes relating to the long-term care benefits in kind and no changes are foreseen at present.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home care is provided to persons who are unable to care for themselves in their home and who have no one to care for them.

According to statistics, about 46 000 persons were cared for at home in 2007. (This means that, of the 60+ population, the number of care recipients per ten thousand was 209.6).

2. Semi-residential care

Day care facilities are provided for:

• Elderly persons;

• People with disabilities;

• Psychiatric patients;

• Persons with addictions;

• Homeless persons.

Day care allows persons who live in their own homes (as well as homeless people) but who need social and mental support due to their health condition or old age, persons who are partly or wholly unable to cater for themselves, persons with disabilities or autistic persons in need of supervision, psychiatric patients and persons with addictions to find daytime shelter, to maintain social relations and to satisfy their basic hygienic needs, and, if required, organises the daytime meals for the care recipients.

Day care facilities are usually open from 8am to 4pm or from 9am to 5pm, but it depends on the need of the users.

Day care is provided primarily in (separate) day care facilities but can be provided at care homes too.

3. Residential care

Residential care is provided in four types of institutions:

a) care facilities providing nursing and care;

b) institutes of rehabilitation;

c) residential care homes;

d) institutes providing temporary placement.

a) Care facilities providing nursing and care:

They provide comprehensive care for persons who are unable to care for themselves, or for those who are able to do so only with continuous help (meals provision, housing, care, health care).

Types:

• elderly homes,

• care homes for psychiatric patients ,

• care homes for persons with addictions,

• care homes for persons with disabilities,

• care homes for homeless persons.

b) Institutes of rehabilitation:

Rehabilitation institutions serve to develop or restore the ability of residents to lead independent lives.

Types:

• rehabilitation institutes for psychiatric patients

• rehabilitation institutes for persons with addictions,

• rehabilitation institutes for persons with disabilities,

• rehabilitation institutes for homeless persons.

c) Residential care homes

The residential care homes are small care homes with 8-12 residents. They are more modern, more homely and more personalised.

Residential care homes provide care in compliance with the health condition and the degree of independence, to disabled persons, psychiatric patients and victims of addiction.

d) Institutions providing temporary placement:

They provide care for a maximum of one year (which can be prolonged), with the exception of the temporary shelter and night shelter of homeless people.

Main types of these institutions:

• care homes for the elderly,

• care homes for persons with disabilities,

• temporary homes for psychiatric patients,

• temporary homes for persons with addictions,

• night shelters,

• temporary accommodation for homeless persons.

4. Other benefits

Signalling home care (or alarm system based home care) is a kind of service to persons living in their own homes and needing such assistance due to their health and social conditions, in order to overcome crisis situations that arise.

Cash benefits

Nursing fee (ápolási díj) as a flat rate, non-contributory benefit is payable to persons who provide long-term care to family members who are disabled or under 18 years of age and permanently ill. The amount of benefit is 100% of the basic amount (alapösszeg) defined by the Act on the Central Budget (HUF 29,500 or € 107), or 130% (HUF 38,350 or € 139) in case of an increased need of nursing. The third form of the nursing fee is provided by the local government; the amount is determined by the local governments and may be no less than 80% of the basic amount (HUF 23,600 or € 86). However the first and second form of nursing fee is not means-tested; the benefit is regulated among social assistances in the Act on Social Benefits and Social Administration. It is administered by the local governments, which means there are about 3200 authorities who are potentially competent.

A nursing fee (ápolási díj) is paid to the carer (the carer has to be a family member) and not to the person in need of care. This means that from the side of the care recipient one can neither speak of a free choice, nor of discretionary use.

Combination of benefits

Not applicable.

Benefits for the carer

A nursing fee (ápolási díj) is paid to the carer (not to the person in need of care) – the carer has to be a family member.

In the case of persons with severe disabilities, the assistance amounts to 100% of the basis amount defined by the Act on the Central Budget, while in the case of persons with severe disabilities in need of intensive care this is 130%.

In 2011, the basis amount is HUF 29 500 per month. See above Cash benefits.

The amount of the cash benefit (nursing fee) does not cover the full costs of the carer; rather it tries to compensate her or him for the lost income.

According to the Labour Act (Act XXII of 1992 on the Labour Code), those who are taking care of their relatives can take unpaid leave for a maximum of 2 years.

ICELAND

Applicable statutory basis

Constitution of the Republic of Iceland, (Stjórnarskrá Lýðveldisins Íslands) No. 33/1944: Article 76:

The law shall guarantee for everyone the necessary assistance in case of sickness, invalidity, infirmity by reason of old age, unemployment and similar circumstances.

The law shall guarantee for everyone suitable general education and tuition.

For children, the law shall guarantee the protection and care which is necessary for their well-being. 1)L. 97/1995, 14. gr.

Act on the Mandatory Guarantee of Pension Rights and the Operation of Pension Funds. (Lög um skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða) No 129/1997 of December 1997.

Act on the Affairs of the Elderly (Lög um málefni aldraðra) No 125/1999, of December 1999.

Act on the Affairs of People with Disabilities (Lög um málefni fatlaðra) No 59/1992 of June 1992.

Act on Social Security (Lög um almannatryggingar) No 100/2007 of May 2007.

Public Health Services Act (Lög um heilbrigðisþjónustu) No. 40/2007 of March 2007.

Health Insurance Act (Lög um sjúkratryggingar) No. 112/2008 of September 2008.

Municipalities´Social Services Act, (Lög um félagsþjónustu sveitarfélaga) No. 40/1991 of March 1991.

Act on payments to parents of chronically ill or severely disabled children (Lög um greiðslur til foreldra langveikra eða alvarlega fatlaðra barna) No. 22/2006 of April 2006.

Act on service-center for persons with sight problems. (Lög um þjónustu- og þekkingarmiðstöð fyrir blinda, sjónskerta og daufblinda einstaklinga), No 160/2008 of December 2008.

Act on Social Service (Lög um félagslega aðstoð) No. 99/2007 of May 2007. The Act provides assistance both in cash and kind such as home care, cleaning, basic financial assistance etc.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

The Act on the Affairs of the Elderly (Lög um málefni aldraðra) No 125/1999 emphasize on assisting the elderly to stay at their own home as long as they wish so to do. To acquire that objective, home care is increasing, often together with some day-care or leisure activities. It is possible to receive nursing and some assistance at home, (meals, cleaning, personal assistance, physiotherapy, nursing etc.) provided by health care authorities, The Social Insurance Administration and municipalities as well as private contractors.

2. Semi-residential care

Day-care centres are provided for persons living at their own house but are not capable of staying home alone the whole day. The duration is max. 8-10 hours per day, 5 days per week. Medical and personal assistance and counselling as well as leisure activities available.

Temporary care in a nursing home can be provided.

3. Residential care

Nursing homes and homes for the elderly and persons with disabilities.

a) Public nursing homes for the elderly.

b) Private nursing homes for the elderly.

c) Public residential care for persons with disabilities.

d) Public residential care for the elderly.

e) Service-flats and housing for persons with disability.

4. Other benefits

Telecommunications service, technical aids, assistance for home-improvement, transport service, etc. can be provided under certain circumstances, mostly from municipalities.

Cash benefits

1. The elderly and persons with disability may be paid a supplement for purchasing a car they require because of a mobility handicap. A supplement may also be granted to the provider of a motor-impaired child receiving home-care payments.

2. Reimbursement of exceptional high medical costs.

Benefits for the carer

1. Home-care allowances are financial assistance to parents having children who are grappling with a handicap or serious illness. This is social assistance that is provided when care is demanding, and the cost because of healthcare service, treatment and training has become considerable and severe for parents.

2. A caregiver benefits card provides parents with discounts on medical services for children.

3. Spouse´s benefits (makabætur) to spouse or close relative who wishes to take care of a closely related person suffering from a significant disability or illness.

IRELAND

Applicable statutory basis

The Health Act of 1970:

Home Care

The Health (Nursing Homes) Act 1990: Nursing Home Subvention Scheme.

According to the Note of the Irish delegation, since the commencement of the Nursing Homes Support Scheme Act, 2009, no further applications under The Health (Nursing Homes) Act 1990 (Nursing Home Subvention) will be considered.

The Nursing Homes Support Scheme Act 2009: Nursing Homes Support Scheme

It should also be noted that, with regard to the Nursing Homes Support Scheme, the Health Service Executive pays the balance of the cost of care directly to the nursing home where the person is residing.

The Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005:

• Constant Attendance Allowance

• Carers’ Benefit

• Carers’ Allowance

• Respite Care Grant

• Domiciliary Care Allowance

It might also be mentioned that the rates of weekly pensions are higher in Ireland than the rates of weekly benefits for those below pension age, because people on reaching pension age will have lost and will continue to lose a certain amount of personal autonomy for the reasons listed in the definition.

Similarly, allowances for travel, telephone, electricity, gas and fuel are paid to qualified pensioners over pension age, but to those below pension age only on grounds of long-term disability.

One of the key objectives of this range of benefits is to enable such people to have personal autonomy as long as possible and to considerably limit the extent to which they require assistance from others. Accordingly, if these cash benefits were not provided, many of these recipients could require assistance from family or other persons.

According to the Note of the Irish delegation, investment in the supply of more and better care for older people in the community and in residential settings will be a priority. Additional funding will be provided each year for the care of older people. This funding will go to more residential places, more home care packages and the delivery of more home help and other professional community care services.

The Nursing Homes Support Scheme system of financing nursing home care will be reviewed with a view to developing a secure and equitable system of financing for community and long-term care which supports older people to stay in their own homes.

Finally, it should be noted that LTC may be statutory based (e.g. the Nursing Homes Support Scheme) or not (e.g. HSE Home Support Services). Any future developments would be dependent on evolving service priorities and overall resource availability. 106 / 156

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home Care Packages are an additional support on top of the existing mainstream community services, and are designed to enhance rather than replace existing home support services. The packages were first introduced in 2005, with the primary objective of supporting older people to continue to live in their own communities.

Carers’ Allowance:

Free Travel, Telephone Allowance, Electricity or Gas Allowance and Television Licence. These benefits seem to be provided without reference to the care needs of the beneficiary and might as well be excluded from the scope of long-term care allowances (although listed in the MISSOC tables under the chapter on long-term care).

According to the Note of the Irish delegation, there have been changes to these schemes which take effect from April 2012. These provide that new applicants for Carers’ Allowance, who are not living with the person to whom they are providing care, are no longer entitled to the Household Benefits package (Telephone Allowance, Electricity / Gas Allowance and Television Licence) in their own right.

2. Semi-residential care

Day care centres providing services such as a midday meal, a bath, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, chiropody, laundry and hairdressing services. A number of hours is not specified, but depends on individual circumstances.

3. Residential care

Public nursing home care is provided subject to charges. For all new entrants to public nursing homes after 27 October 2009, the charge is equal to the cost of care but financial support towards this cost can be provided via the Nursing Homes Support Scheme.

4. Other benefits

Grants for home adaption are available from the Department of the Environment.

Cash benefits

The Nursing Homes Support Scheme:

The financial assessment determines the applicant’s co-payment towards their care. The HSE will pay the balance of the cost of care. The price charged by the private nursing home is agreed in advance with the National Treatment Purchase Fund. The price charged by public nursing homes (i.e. the full cost of care) is also published.

The Carers’ Benefit:

In respect of a single care recipient: € 205.00 per week.

In respect of several care recipients: € 307.50 per week.

The Carers’ Allowance:

Maximum amounts:

In respect of a single care recipient: € 204 per week (€ 239 if aged 66 or over).

In respect of several care recipients: € 306 per week (€ 358.50 if aged 66 or over). 107 / 156

The Constant Attendance Allowance: € 205.00 per week.

This is payable in respect of persons who receive a disablement benefit resulting from an occupational injury or disease and who require constant care. This payment is made directly to the care recipients, although it is not payable during periods when they are in hospital or other residential institutions.

The Domiciliary Care Allowance:

Maximum rate per month: € 309.50 per child with a disability.

The Respite Care Grant: € 1 700 (annual rate for each person being cared for).

The Carers’ Benefit, Carers’ Allowance, Constant Attendance Allowance, and Respite Care Grant are paid directly to the carer as a Social Welfare income support payments to meet his/her own needs and the amounts are not different according to dependency levels. Domiciliary Care Allowance is a monthly payment for a severely disabled child who is under age 16 and needs full-time care and attention far beyond what is normally required by a child of the same age. It is paid to the person with whom the child is living and who is providing for the care of the child.

The Nursing Home Subvention: This can only be paid directly to the nursing home where the person is residing. Since it is paid directly by the HSE to the residential home, and the benefit is the care provided, this subvention might as well be categorised as a benefit in kind.

The Carers’ Benefit, Carers’ Allowance, Domiciliary Care Allowance, Constant Attendance Allowance and Respite Care Grant are paid to the informal caregiver who has discretion as to how the cash benefit is spent.

It might be worth mentioning that the Carers’ Benefit, Carers’ Allowance, Respite Grant and Domiciliary Care Allowance are paid to the carers as income to meet their own needs. Normally, the care recipients are also getting benefits, e.g. pensions, in their own right. The care they receive from those getting the care benefits or allowances would, therefore, for them appear to be benefits in kind. If such ‘carers’ were not available, they would probably need to be cared for in a residential home and would thus be regarded as receiving benefits in kind.

Combination of benefits

Home Care:

In most cases the person receives the service. However, in a very small number of cases, the person receives a weekly payment from the Health Service Executive and purchases the service privately. This practice is being phased out.

Nursing Home Subvention: The person’s weekly entitlement is paid directly to the nursing home where he or she is residing.

Benefits for the carer

Carers’ Benefit / Carers’ Allowance / Constant Attendance Allowance / Domiciliary Care Allowance / Respite Care Grant: as outlined above.

In addition to Carers’ Allowance and Benefit, carers may also qualify for other social insurance payments such as Illness Benefits or State Pension Contributory. Where a person qualifies for another social insurance payment the Carers’ Allowance etc. will be paid at a half rate.

According to the Note of the Irish delegation, for the reasons outlined above the Domiciliary Care Allowance could not be considered as a benefit for the carer and should not be referenced here.

ITALY

Applicable statutory basis

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, the bulk of social services to be provided to the elderly and/or disabled is split into four service sectors:

• Home assistance (ADI/SAD): As it is provided by regions, this service is not yet homogeneously spread, geographically-wise.

• Family carer attendance: is now playing a growing, almost structural role which is not simply limited to the domestic functions, but integrates and sometimes replaces, the public service – both social and health services .

• The hospital or elderly-home stay accounts for nearly 3% of the granted services with high peaks in the North.

• Money transfers, attendance allowances and care allowances: account for a large part of the public expenditure, with 10 billion euro spent only towards financing the constant attendance allowances.

Act No. 118 of 30 March 1971 on civilian invalidity benefits (Legge 30 Marzo 1971, n. 118 - Conversione in Legge del D.L. 30 gennaio 1971, n. 5 e nuove norme in favore dei mutilati ed invalidi civili).

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, these are special non-contributory benefits, included in Title III, Chapter 9 of the Regulation 883/2004.

Act No. 18 of 11 February 1980 on mobility allowances (Legge 11 Febbraio 1980, n. 18 - Indennità di accompagnamento agli invalidi civili totalmente inabili).

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, it is a special non-contributory benefit, included in Title III, Chapter 9 of the Regulation 883/2004.

Act No. 104 of 5 February 1992, Article 33 (Framework act on disability) (Legge 5 Febbraio 1992, n. 104 - Legge-quadro per l'assistenza, l'integrazione sociale e i diritti delle persone handicappate).

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, the law only provides for rules related to labour law (paid leave)

Legislative Decree No. 112 of 31 March 1998 on the transfer of legislative tasks and administrative competences from the State to the Regions and local entities (Decreto Legislativo 31 Marzo 1998, n. 112 - Conferimento di funzioni e compiti amministrativi dello Stato alle regioni ed agli enti locali, in attuazione del capo I della Legge 15 Marzo 1997, n. 59 ).

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, the law is related to territorial organization of the State.

Act No. 183 of 4 November 2010, Article 24 (Changes rules about permissions and assistance for disable persons). (Legge n. 183 del 4 Novembre 2010, art. 24 – Modifiche alla disciplina in materia di permessi per l’assistenza a portatori di handicap in situazione di gravità).

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, the law only provides for rules related to labour law (paid leave)

Benefits in kind

It is explained in the Note of the Italian delegation that according to the Italian legislation, there is not a specific notion of long term care benefits (LTC), i.e. is not established any specific category of benefits in kind for LTC differing from the other benefits in kind. The Health System covers all the health needs required by the insured people, irrespective of the forecasted or the effective length of time of the treatment concerned. Therefore notwithstanding the LTC are not namely quoted in the Italian legislation as such, they should be regarded as health benefits in kind tout-court.

1. Home care

Home care services are provided for at local level. They generally include home help, meal delivery, medical treatment and nursing care.

Home healthcare is provided directly by the Health System only in some Regions and inside them in very few territories. It concerns only the medical treatments and the nursing service.

2. Semi-residential care

The possibility of staying in a day care centre.

In the Health System there are centres of this kind but their availability in giving assistance cannot cover the overall demand. They provide only the medical treatments and moreover the nursing service. All this means that such LTC are granted both by the Health System and in many cases by the private providers who have not any agreement with the Health System. In the latter cases the relevant costs shall be covered by the insured persons.

3. Residential care

Residential care is provided for in the most serious cases. The length of the stay varies according to the seriousness of the situation of dependency.

In the Health System there are centres of this kind but their availability in giving assistance cannot cover the overall demand. They provide only the medical treatments and moreover the nursing service. All this means that such LTC are given both by the Health System and in many cases by private providers who have not any agreement with the Health System. In the latter cases the relevant costs shall be covered by the insured persons.

4. Other benefits

Technical aids are provided for in the most serious cases.

Provision for benefits contributing to the purchase of prostheses or other necessary medical equipment; the purchase or adaptation of private means of transport; the purchase of tools making it possible to carry out a self-employed activity.

The granting of the electronic appliances or prostheses is up to a previous ascertainment of the relevant need by the competent institution and the relevant procedure for providing the aforementioned benefits depends on the ground of the need.

Cash benefits

Invalidity and incapacity insurance:

The invalidity allowance (assegno ordinario d'invalidità, AOI) and Incapacity pension (pensione di inabilità).

In the coordination of social security systems, these are invalidity benefits, included in Title III, Chapter 4 of the Regulation 883/2004.

Guaranteeing sufficient resources:

The attendance allowance (Indennità di accompagnamento) for disabled people: € 480.47 (€ 472.45 for recipients of the incapacity pension; € 783.60 for totally blind people). 110 / 156

Disabled people, deaf-mutes and totally blind persons in hospitals and partially blind persons: € 256.67 (€ 277.57 for non-hospitalised totally blind persons).

The Special allowance for partially blind persons (Indennità speciale per ciechi parziali): € 185.25.

The communication allowance for deaf-mutes (Indennità di comunicazione per sordomuti): € 239.95.

All these benefits are for the coordination purposes considered to be special non-contributory cash benefits, included in Title III, Chapter 9 of the Regulation 883/2004.

Discretionary use.

Combination of benefits

The possibility to combine cash benefits and benefits in kind.

No free choice between benefits in kind and cash benefits.

Benefits for the carer

No specific benefits for the carer. However, periods of leave to take care of a disabled family member are taken into account as periods of insurance for the purposes of a pension insurance.

Addendum: Additional social security coordination aspects

According to the Note of the Italian delegation, it is not possible to say if the list of LTC benefits is correct neither if it is complete, because:

- at the moment such benefits are coordinated in different chapters of the Regulation (e.g. sickness, invalidity, AWOD, special non-contributory benefits). So it is necessary to specify exactly the AC’s purpose: to create a new kind of coordination or a list of benefits, or modify the Regulation according to the judgments of the Court etc.

- as far as the local benefits are concerned, monitoring such heterogeneous benefits granted by 8.092 municipalities, 115 provinces and 20 Regions is quite impossible.

LATVIA

Applicable statutory basis

The Act on Social Services and Social Assistance (Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības likums) of 31 October 2002.

The Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 1046 "Health care organisation and financing procedure" of 19 December 2006.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Care by a trained or other person (informal caregiver) to perform housework and to deliver meals. If (social) home care is provided by family members, the local authority supports them by training, consulting and if necessary also by providing benefits in cash.

The provider of health care at home (main tasks):

• plans the health care of the patient;

• prescribes diagnostic and therapeutic manipulations;

• assists the doctor during the diagnostic and therapeutic manipulations;

• carries out the palliative care;

• trains the patient and his or her family members in the care provision.

2. Semi-residential care

Is provided for various groups – care and possible involvement in physical and mental activities is provided to elderly, disabled with physical disorders, people with mental disorders, persons after serious and continuous diseases.

The number of hours that the recipient may attend the institution and any specialised services are set by the municipalities according to agreements with care institutions.

Day care centres are run by municipalities or NGOs. Day care centres for people with mental disabilities are partly financed by the State.

3. Residential care

Fulltime care is provided by long-term social care institutions for:

• orphans and children deprived of parental care,

• people of retirement age and the disabled with physical disorders or blind people,

• children with serious mental disorders, and

• adults with serious mental disorders.

Long-term care institutions are run by State and municipalities.

4. Other benefits

The state provides technical aids (tehniskie palīglīdzekļi) for persons to help prevent or reduce the functional incapacity caused by long-term or irreversible functional disorders of the body or anatomic defects:

• disabled of categories I, II or III,

• disabled children under the age of 18 years,

• children for whom the technical aids are necessary to reduce or eliminate functional inability,

• adult persons for whom the technical aids are necessary to reduce or eliminate functional inability,

• persons with anatomic defects who need a prosthesis or orthopaedic footwear

• persons with anticipated disability according to an individual rehabilitation plan.

Health care at home taking into account a person’s health and health care needs can be provided.

Patients with the following diagnoses are entitled to health care at home:

• Immobile patients with cancer diagnosis (C00-C97; D37- D48);

• Patients with mental disorders (F00-F03; F06.0-F06.3; G10- G32; A81);

• Patients with bedsore (L89);

• Patients with cerebral stroke and other paralytical syndromes (G80-G83);

• Patients who need respiratory therapy (Z99.1);

• Patients with mobility disorders and the following diagnoses: B20-B24; E10-E11; G35; I60-I69; T91.3; Z48; Z93; Z94; Z98.

The referral from a general practitioner or specialist (if health care at home is needed after release from the hospital) is needed. The referral must contain: the health care services required, the statement of reasons for health care at home, the duration of health care at home.

Another benefit - care of disabled child benefit - could be also considered as long-term care benefit according to the trESS 2011 definition. Persons who permanently reside in the territory of Latvia have the right to State social allowances - also care of disabled child benefit. According to the national legislation and Regulation 883/2004 it falls under family benefits.

Cash benefits

Local authority may provide benefits in cash for a person in need if he or she is not receiving home care services. Cash benefits are also available for family members who provide care.

The municipality can grant additional benefits.

The amount and conditions for the provision of cash benefits depend on the municipality and the internal regulations they approve.

No discretionary use.

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits.

No free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

Depends on the municipality’s decision.

The conditions for the provision of benefits for the carer depend on the municipality and the internal regulations they approve.

Addendum: Social security coordination aspects

According to Annex X of the Regulation 883/2004 for Latvia special non-contributory cash benefits are State Social Security Benefit (Law on State Social Benefits of 1 January 2003); Allowance for the compensation of transportation expenses for disabled persons with restricted mobility (Law on State Social Benefits of 1 January 2003).

According to the Note of the Latvian delegation, another benefit should be added - An allowance for a disabled person for whom care is necessary (Law on State Social Benefits of 1 January 2003) which is in force since 2008. After having re-examined this request Latvia has decided to withdraw this request again.

Care of disabled child benefit is considered as family benefit according to national legislation and the Regulation 883/2004 and the latter sets up priorities to determine the competent MS.

LIECHTENSTEIN

Applicable statutory basis

• The Act on Sickness Insurance of 24 November 1971 (Gesetz über die Krankenversicherung, KVG).

• The Act on compulsory Accident Insurance of 28 November 1989 (Gesetz über die obligatorische Unfallversicherung, UVersG).

• The Act on Invalidity Insurance of 23 December 1959 (Gesetz über die Invalidenversicherung, IVG).

• the Act on the granting of allowances for blind persons of 17 December 1970 (Gesetz über die Gewährung von Blindenbeihilfen).

• The Act on Old-age and Survivors' Insurance of 14 December 1952 (Gesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung, AHVG).

• the Act on Supplementary Benefits to the Old-age, Survivors' and Invalidity Insurance of 10 December 1960 (Gesetz über Ergänzungsleistungen zur Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenversicherung, ELG).

• The Act on Assistance for Victims of Crime of 22 June 2007 (Gesetz über die Hilfe an Opfer von Straftaten, OHG).

• The Act on Social Assistance of 15 November 1984 (Sozialhilfegesetz, SHG).

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

KVG:

Examinations, treatment and care at the home of the patient by doctors and chiropractors24as well as, on the basis of a medical prescription, by nurses or homecare organisations (= SPITEX);

24 Assuming that the notion of „ambulant“ is the same as in Switzerland.

25 Assuming that the notion of „ambulant“ is the same as in Switzerland.

26 UVersG not for long-term care.

UVersG:

• treatment at the home of the patient by doctors and chiropractors25;

• care at the home of the patient, prescribed by a doctor and provided by nurses or homecare organisations (= SPITEX);

ELG (special medical measures): treatment at home by a doctor or, on prescription, by paramedical staff.

2. Semi-residential care

In no field envisaged according to MISSOC. (See, however, Gesundheitsgesetz, Article 37, and below under “Supplementary benefits [according to ELG]”.)

3. Residential care26

KVG: examinations, treatment and care in a hospital or in a medico-social establishment as well as the stay in the general ward of the hospital.

ELG (special medical measures): treatment, board and accommodation in the general ward of a hospital.

4. Other benefits

Auxiliary equipment

Simple and adequate model. Appear on a list.

- KVG: therapeutic equipment prescribed by a doctor;

- UVersG: therapeutic equipment; auxiliary equipment to compensate for physical damage or loss of a function;

- AHVG and IVG: auxiliary equipment necessary for the insured person in order to move about, establish contacts with her or his entourage or develop personal autonomy;

- ELG: therapeutic and auxiliary equipment.

Cash benefits

Helplessness allowance

Depends on the degree of helplessness. Monthly amounts.

• ELG:

An amount depending on the degree (slight – moderate – severe) of helplessness;

for persons over 65 in principle only in case of moderate and severe degree of helplessness;

a supplement for minors living in an institution.

• UVersG:

An amount depending on the degree (slight – moderate – severe) of helplessness.

Allowances for the blind (Gesetz über die Gewährung von Blindenbeihilfen):

As a compensation for the additional expenses due to the visual impairment.

An amount depending on the degree of visual impairment.

Supplementary benefits (according to ELG)

Also designed to cover (up to a certain amount) particularly the costs of a stay in a medico-social establishment or in a hospital (particularly daily fee), of health care, of home care (in part including costs for loss compensation in favour of caring family members) and semi-residential care as well as of therapeutic and auxiliary equipment.

Support and care allowance (according to ELG)

For covering costs borne by the assisted person for compensating his or her home carer. The latter can also be a family member receiving a salary from the person in need of assistance or care. Six levels.

Compensation for expenses for home care in case of special medical measures being carried out at the home of the patient27(according to ELG)

27 For this situation see above under benefits in kind – home care – ELG.

• Home care by medical nursing staff: compensation for adequate expenses for nursing staff.

• Home care by other persons: flat rate compensation; 4 levels (need of intensive care of 8 hours a day at least – need of intensive care of 6 hours a day at least – need of intensive care of 4 hours a day at least – need of intensive care of 2 hours a day at least or need of continuous surveillance).

A priori bearing of part of the long term care costs by the State (not in the form of cash benefits to the persons in need of long term care themselves; KVG).

Contributions according to the OHG: contributions for long-term help of third persons and compensation by the State (both insofar as not covered particularly by social security or the author of damage).

Social assistance (insofar as not covered particularly by social security).

Combination of benefits

The benefits are provided by several branches of social security: benefits in kind and cash benefits, which are often granted to a person for the same period of time. In general, the person does not have freedom of choice as to whether he or she prefers a benefit in kind or a cash benefit.

Benefits for the carer

A person caring for family members or (only for non-profit care) for other persons who are helpless to a moderate degree in terms of the ELG at least and who live with him or her in the same (or a neighbouring) household may claim a bonus for caretaking. The yearly bonus corresponds to 48 times the amount of the minimum monthly old-age 1st pillar pension. The bonus is part of the determining income for the calculation of the carer’s 1st pillar pension.

See also above under “Supplementary benefits (according to ELG)” and “Support and care allowance (according to ELG)”.

Contributions according to the OHG (see above)28 .

28 Assuming that the Liechtenstein law is interpreted in the same way as the Swiss law.

Addendum: Social security coordination aspects

At the beginning of 2010 Liechtenstein introduced an ‘attendance and care allowance’ for care at home. According to the Note of the Liechtenstein delegation, this is a sickness benefit in kind within the meaning of Regulation No 883/2004 (rather than a cash benefit). The attendance and care allowance must be used to pay for care services provided by third parties. Evidence of this must be produced, otherwise there is no entitlement. There is no regionalisation.

LITHUANIA

Applicable statutory basis

• Temporary Act on Social Benefits’ Re-calculation and Payment (Socialinių išmokų perskaičiavimo ir mokėjimo laikinasis įstatymas) of 9 December 2009 (No. XI-537).

• Act on State Social Assistance Benefits (Valstybinių Šalpos išmokų įstatymas) of 29 November 1994 (No. I-675).

• Act on Social Services (Socialinių paslaugų įstatymas) of 19 January 2006 (No. X-493).

• Act on Health Insurance (Sveikatos draudimo įstatymas) of 21 May 1996 (No I-1343).

• Act on the Health care System (Sveikatos sistemos įstatymas) of 19 July 1994 (No I-552).

• Act on Health Care Institutions (Sveikatos priežiūros įstaigų įstatymas) of 6 June 1996 (No. I-1367).

In Lithuania there is a central system of LCT which is supplemented on a municipal level:

1) Lithuanian Government adopts long-term national programs, strategies, requirements and standards.

2) Municipalities are directly responsible for organisation and planning of provision of social services; for determination of individual needs for social services; for supervision of social services. They prepare and implement municipal programs of disabled social integration, also organise the primary health care (financed by Compulsory Health Insurance Fund. Municipalities are also responsible for granting target compensations for nursing or attendance (financed by State budget).

LTC is organised in day centres, home care centres, residential social care institutions and nursing or general hospitals.

There is no single legal act regulating LTC. LTC for the persons in need is provided by through several branches: social services, target compensations for nursing or attendance and long term healthcare.

Benefits in kind

Benefits in kind are the most important part of LTC benefits.

1. Home care

One of the main principles of providing social services at home is to help to a adult with a disability to create conditions for him to live at home, in his family and organising the assistance co-ordinated with education, employment, personal health care and special assistance measures, helping to develop or compensate for his abilities to care for his personal (family) life and to participate in the labour market.

People in need of home help are regularly visited by social workers or social workers assistants.

Social attendance or social care at home includes performance of housework and care by home helpers.

Social care services includes services which are provided by a team of specialists (social workers, social workers assistants, health care assistants and others depends on the need) at a person‘s home.

Elderly and disabled people can receive day care services at home from 2 hours till 8 hours per day up to 7 times per week, short - term care up to 8 hours per day till one month at person‘s home.

Services financed from municipal budget and if person is with severe disability could be financed from special targeted subsidies of the State budget to municipal budgets and persons (families) payments.

Cash allowance. In some cases, when where is expedient to organise social services at home in monetary form, services may be changed into a cash allowance. This cash allowance is paid for person (family) to pay for a help of assistance. Cash allowance financed from the municipal budgets.

Primary health care institutions are responsible for the organisation and provision of nursing services at home.

Palliative care and nursing services can be provided at home by a team of specialists: a doctor, nurse and social workers. Social care services includes services which are provided by various specialists at a person‘s home.

Nursing at home financed from the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund.

2. Semi-residential care

Elderly and disabled people can receive day care, social care services in day care centres from 3 hours per day up to 5 days per week in institution.

Short - term social care for elderly and disabled people providing not less than 12 hours per day till 6 months per year or 5 days per week or termless in institution.

Long term care in residential social care institutions depending on the kind of recipients of the services, for elder persons no less than 6 months per year or termless.

Semi-residential care is financed from the municipal budgets or special targeted subsidies of the State budget to municipal budgets and persons (families) payments.

3. Residential care

Residential care is financed from the State, municipal budgets or special targeted subsidies of the State budget to municipal budgets, and persons (families) payments.

Residential care is provided for children deprived of parental care, children and adults with disabilities and elderly people by foster families, social care houses (old-age homes, housing for disabled, specialised social care homes, etc.).

Nursing and maintenance treatment is provided in nursing or general hospitals.

Palliative care is provided in the general, cancer and nursing hospitals.

4. Other benefits

Other benefits in kind include the provision of special equipment. Disabled people receive special aid for purchasing a car, they are provided with wheelchairs, their flats are arranged according to their disability.

However, these benefits might be provided to a larger scope of beneficiaries and not only to long-term care recipients.

Respite care is the assistance for families that take care all year – long of disabled person or senior not less than 12 hours per day till 6 months per year or 5 days per week or termless in institution. For persons with severe disabilities could be providing social care (in day centres, at home, in institutions) and financed from special targeted subsidies of the State budget to municipal budgets.

Cash benefits

The Special Compensation for Care Expenses (Slaugos išlaidų tiklsinė kompensacija): Paid for disabled children with a severe degree of disability, to disabled persons with a reduction in capacity for work of 75% - 100% or to the persons of retirement age if the need of permanent care is determined. The amount is 250% of the social insurance basic pension (currently LTL 900 (€ 261)). Temporarily, for the period 2010-2011, benefits are paid at 85% of the above-mentioned amounts.

The Special Compensation for Attendance Expenses (Priežiūros (pagalbos) išlaidų tikslinė kompensacija): Paid to disabled children with a severe and moderate degree of disability whether or not the need of permanent care is determined and to disabled persons with a reduction in capacity for work of at least 60% and to persons of retirement age if the need of permanent attendance is determined. The amount is 50% or 100% of the social insurance basic pension depending on the category of the recipient (respectively LTL 180 (€ 52) or LTL 360 (€ 104)). Temporarily, for the period 2010-2012, benefits are paid at 85% of the above-mentioned amounts.

The person has the free choice to use cash benefit at his or her own discretion.

Combination of benefits

Mixed benefits.

No choice between cash benefits or benefits in kind.

However, if a person who receives residential care is at the same time entitled to special compensations mentioned above, the compensations are paid, and the amounts are included in the income of this person. A person may not pay more than 80 per cent of his or her full income for residential care. The rest is covered by local governments. So it may happen that up to 80 per cent of the special compensations (being a part of person’s income) are deducted as a payment for residential care. Payment could be more than 80 per cent of income, if a person has a property above a certain limit (i.e. if person’s property exceeds the ration established by the legislation, 1 % is calculated in respect of property value exceeding the ration), but in any case no less than 20 per cent of income leaves for person to ensure daily life expenses. The similar rule is also applied in the case of home care (in this case not more than 20 per cent of the income is deducted).

Benefits for the carer

No benefits for the carer, but the periods of care influence his or her entitlement and amount of social pension, means-tested social benefit, etc.

LUXEMBOURG

Applicable statutory basis

The Act of 19 June 1998 introducing the dependency insurance, in force since 1 January 1999 amended several times, but not fundamentally, in order to better ensure the correct use of the benefits provided and to adapt provisions to practical problems which appeared while applying the legislation. No major reform planned at short term.

Insurance system financed by contributions paid by insured persons and determined on professional income and all other income, plus financial participation of the State budget.

All persons covered by Luxembourg health insurance are automatically covered by dependency insurance.

Benefits in kind are care services provided by professional carers. Up to a certain limit professional care may be provided by an informal carer (family member, friend, hired person) and in this case benefits in kind are replaced by a cash benefit which has to be paid to this informal carer.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

• Assistance and care necessary for the basic everyday activities;

• assistance for the general upkeep of the house and laundry;

• assistance in the form of support activities. These might include a presence in the home of a person who cannot stay alone, specialised individual supervision, accompaniment for an outing or shopping, or group support activities, notably visiting a semi-stationary centre;

• assistance in the form of professional advice aimed at maintaining the autonomy potential of the person and teaching those in the dependent person’s social circle the adequate actions for providing assistance and care.

Technical and adaptation assistance:

• reimbursement of the cost of purchasing or renting technical assisting devices: wheelchair, adapted bed, walking stick, seats;

• measures for adapting the accommodation in order to improve its accessibility;

• financial aid for the purchase of products necessary for the assistance and care.

2. Semi-residential care (in approved centres)

Visiting a semi-stationary centre constitutes a group support activity (see “Benefits in kind”, “1. Home care”). The assistance and care which the dependent person requires during his stay in a semi-stationary centre are granted in accordance with the person’s care plan.

3. Residential care

• Assistance and care necessary for the basic everyday activities;

• Assistance in the form of support activities. These might include specialised individual supervision or group support activities;

• Reimbursement of the cost of purchasing or renting technical assisting devices that are not included in the standard equipment of an institution.

Products necessary for the assistance and care are provided free of charge to the dependent person. They are paid by the administering institution by calculating the monetary value.

4. Other benefits

No other benefits.

Cash benefits

Cash benefits may totally or partially replace benefits in kind (home care only).

The monetary value of the cash benefit amounts to € 25 per hour. The maximum weekly amount is € 262.50 (10.5 hours).

The dependent person must use the cash benefits to obtain the care and assistance provided in the care plan, outside contracted professional services. Since the Act of December 23, 2005, the cash benefit may only be used to »remunerate« the informal caregiver.

Combination of benefits

The possibility to combine benefits in kind and cash benefits (with the legal limitations mentioned above).

The person can choose the type of benefit which he or she would like to receive: benefits in kind, cash benefits or mixed benefits (combination of benefits in kind and in cash).

Benefits for the carer

The dependency insurance pays pension insurance contributions on behalf of the informal caregiver, who provides home care.

MALTA

Applicable statutory basis

Social Security Act (Att dwar is-Sigurta' Socjali) (Cap. 318).

State-Owned Institutions and Hostels Rates Regulations.

Transfer of Funds (Government Financed Beds) Regulations.

Specified State-Owned Institutions and Hostels Regulations.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home care helps to provide assistance to persons in need. It offers help of a personal and light domestic nature in order to allow older persons and/or persons with special needs, to continue living in their community in as much of an independent manner as is feasibly possible. It also provides respite and support for informal carers, and averts/delay demand for long-term residential care.

Benefits in-kind available as home care include:

- meals on wheel service (meals are supplied by a non-governmental organisation against a subsidised charge),

- handyman service (The objective of this service is to help older adults and persons with special needs to continue living as independently as possible in their own home. The Handyman Service offers a range of around seventy repair jobs that vary from electricity repairs to plumbing, carpentry and transport of items. The service is normally requested by phone.),

- home care help,

- incontinence service,

- community nurse service.

2. Semi-residential care

There are thirteen state-run day care centres that open daily from 8.30am to 4.00pm. Occupational therapy is offered in these centres.

3. Residential care

One central institution for permanent elderly residents, supplemented by seven regional residences – all state run. There are also private residential homes.

In addition, there is a state run central mental institution that provides treatment and care for mentally impaired persons who need psychiatric treatment.

Another central and state run institution/hospital provides long-term care for cancer patients and other malignant diseases.

4. Other benefits

The incontinence service: essentially a benefit-in-kind which provides adult nappies at a reduced cost.

Cash benefits

There is no special benefit related solely to long-term care. Benefits are directly payable to person needing long-term care or his/her legal guardian.

Beneficiaries are free to use the money received as they deem to fit.

Combination of benefits

The same person can be entitled to both cash and in kind benefits.

Free choice between cash and benefits in kind is possible.

Benefits for the carer

A Carers’ Pension is paid to a person who is either single or a widow/er and who takes full-time care of a sick relative who is bedridden or confined to a wheel-chair and living in the same household. The rate of benefit is € 95.58 per week and is paid to the carer.

A Carers’ Allowance (Pensjoni tal-Wens) is paid to a person who is either single or a widow/er and who takes constant care of a sick relative living in the same household. The rate of benefit is € 69.24 per week and is paid to the carer.

THE NETHERLANDS

Applicable statutory basis

The General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (Algemene wet bijzondere ziektekosten, AWBZ), of 14 December 1967.

According to the Note of the Dutch delegation, the government has started a program aimed at restructuring long term care in the Netherlands. The aims of this program are to improve the quality of LTC, to align the care as much as possible to the wishes of the recipients, to decrease the amount of regulations and to better control the costs of LTC.

Benefits in kind

Care is provided in the form of “products”. For example home care, admission to a care home, nursing home, institution for the development or physically disabled are all products offered under the AWBZ. A product consists of a single function or a combination of functions.

Long-term care is defined in five broadly defined functions. Next to personal care, also nursing (e.g. administering injections), supportive guidance (assistance in managing daily activities), treatment (e.g. specific treatment by a geriatric specialist, a doctor for the developmentally disabled or a behavioural scientist) and accommodation are provided as benefits in kind.

1. Home care

Care provided at home by an institution to insured persons with a somatic, psychogeriatric or psychiatric condition or impediment, or a physical or mental disability. The activities in the field of personal care are supported or taken over, with a view to compensate for the (temporary) inability of the insured person to live independently.

Home care includes the loan of nursing equipment for a maximum period of 26 weeks.

2. Semi-residential care

Care provided by an institution to insured persons with a somatic, psychogeriatric or psychiatric condition or impediment, or a physical or mental disability. The care is aimed at the promotion or preservation of the ability to live independently and serves to prevent institutionalisation or neglect of the insured person.

3. Residential care

Care in an institution which is necessary due to the need for a protected living environment, therapeutic environment or permanent supervision of an insured person with a somatic, psychogeriatric or psychiatric condition or impediment, or a physical or mental disability.

4. Other benefits

Several specific benefits for specific kinds of patients such as psychiatric treatment and treatment for persons with visual or hearing impairments.

In addition to care functions, there is also entitlement to, for example, patient transport, nursing supplies, care and support related to sign language, hospital care after one year, rehabilitation care, prenatal care, research into certain congenital metabolic disorders, and vaccinations included as part of a vaccination programme.

Cash benefits

Within the framework of an experiment, the insured person can opt not to obtain care provision in kind, but to receive a personal care budget (persoonsgebonden budget, PGB) to enable him or her to purchase care independently. The budget is only available for certain functional forms of care, such as nursing, general care and guidance; the budget is not available for treatment or institutional accommodation. The amount of the personal care budget is dependent on the required care.

Discretionary use.

The Netherlands´ government has the intention to end this experiment and make the personal care budget an entitlement as a benefit in cash under the AWBZ.

Combination of benefits

The AWBZ basically provides for benefits in kind. However, within the framework of an experiment, the insured persons have the choice between receiving the benefit in kind or in the form of a personal care budget (persoonsgebonden budget, PGB); a combination of the two is also possible.

Free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

An amount of € 250 per year is granted to informal caregivers who provide long-term care at home to a person with an indication for long-term care.

NORWAY

Applicable statutory basis

• The Municipal Health Services Act (lov om helsetjenesten i kommunene) of 19 November 1982.

• The Social Services Act (lov om sosiale tjenester) of 13 December 1991.

• The National Insurance Act (folketrygdloven) of 28 February 1997, Chapter 6.

• The new Act on Municipal Health and Care Services (lov om kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenester mm.) of 24 June 2011.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Practical assistance and care at home according to the need. Home care services are available day and night (round-the-clock). Community care housing is both a supplement and alternative to nursing homes and institutions.

2. Semi-residential care

Short-term stays in nursing homes (weekends etc) are offered as a relief measure for the family of patients cared for at home. No time limit.

3. Residential care

Provided in municipal nursing homes, day and night service flats, homes for elderly, housing for disabled children, etc.

4. Other benefits

Both the nursing homes and the home care services are supported by other municipal health and social services, such as short-term technical aids (walker, etc). The home care services are also supported by long-term technical aids from the National Insurance Scheme (folketrygden), such as wheelchairs, telecommunication services, etc.

Cash benefits

For the disabled: The Basic benefit (grunnstønad) and Attendance benefit (hjelpestønad) from the general National Insurance Scheme (folketrygden) are paid directly to the person who is in need of care.

The Basic benefit to cover extra expenses due to permanent illness, injury or deformity. There are 6 different rates of benefit according to the level of extra expenses, ranging from NOK 7 572 (€ 1 031) to NOK 37 860 (€ 5 157) per year.

The Attendance benefit to cover the need for special attention or nursing. The standard rate is NOK 13 572 (€ 1 849). For disabled children under 18, the benefit can be paid at 3 different higher rates, up to NOK 81 432 (€ 11 092).

A condition for the Attendance benefit is that the care is provided by an informal caregiver.

The Discretionary cash benefit (omsorgslønn) paid by the municipality to an informal carer who has a particular burdensome care work.

No discretionary use. The cash benefits are a supplement to the benefits in kind. 127 / 156

Combination of benefits

Mainly benefits in kind.

Combined benefits are possible. It is for the local municipality authorities to decide how the person’s needs can be fulfilled, with different combinations of benefits in kind and cash benefits. The cash benefits are a supplement to the benefits in kind.

No free choice between cash and/or benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

Discretionary cash benefit (omsorgslønn) paid by the municipality to an informal carer who has a particular burdensome care work.

It is for the local municipality authorities to decide in each single case if the caregiver has “a particular burdensome care work”. The level (amount) of the benefit is also determined by the local authorities.

POLAND

Applicable statutory basis

In Poland there is no integrated long term care system regulated by single legal act.

People who need such care are entitled to certain benefits under various legal acts, such as e.g. from the field of social assistance, health care, family benefits or benefits for disabled persons. The amounts of benefits are the same for all regions of Poland.

• The Act on Health Care Services financed from Public Means (Ustawa o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych) of 27 August 2004.

• The Act on Social Assistance (Ustawa o pomocy społecznej) of 12 March 2004.

• The Act on Family Benefits (Ustawa o świadczeniach rodzinnych) of 28 November 2003.

• The Act on Social Pension (Ustawa o rencie socjalnej) of 27 June2003.

• The Act on Social Insurance Fund Pensions (Ustawa o emeryturach i rentach z Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) of 17 December 1998.

• The Act on Vocational and Social Rehabilitation and Employment of Disabled Persons (Ustawa o rehabilitacji zawodowej i społecznej oraz zatrudnianiu osób niepełnosprawnych) of 27 August 1997.

In addition, some other legal acts might be mentioned:

• The Act of 24 January 1991 on veterans and some victims of war and post-war repressions

• The Act of 25 June 1999 on cash benefits from social insurance for sickness and maternity

• The Act of 30 October 2002 on social insurance for accidents at work and occupational diseases

• The Ordinance by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of 27 July 1999 on rules and procedures for medical certification under the social Insurance Institution

• The Ordinance by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of 14 December 2004 on certifying incapacity to work

• Ordinance No. 61/2007/DSOZ by the President of National Health Fund (NFZ) of 19 December 2007 on the contracts under the provisions on long-term care

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Specialised care services, including those for people with mental disorders, are one of the basic forms of assistance in kind.

Bedridden and chronic patients who stay at home and who require systematic nursing services due to existing health problems may receive long-term nursing care in the home based environment. Persons with chronic diseases, aggravating disability, sick persons who are not eligible for hospitalisation but need permanent professional nursing, rehabilitation and care are eligible for this type of care. In such cases, long-term care is provided in the home based environment, as long-term nursing care at the patient’s home.

2. Semi-residential care

Support centres, which are organisational units of day care social assistance. Support centres include, among others: community mutual-aid houses for persons with mental disorders, day care assistance houses and mutual aid clubs.

3. Residential care

Social assistance centres, family-based assistance houses, social assistance houses, family support centres.

4. Other benefits

There is a possibility to award certain “accompanying measures” to persons who have the legal assessment of disability. Such measures include possibilities to obtain the co-financing of, for example,

• the participation of disabled persons and their attendants in rehabilitation stays,

• provision of rehabilitation equipment, orthopaedic equipment and auxiliary devices allocated to disabled persons under separate provisions,

• liquidation of architectural and technical barriers in connection with individual needs of disabled persons,

• rehabilitation of children and the young.

Disabled persons may also participate in occupational therapy workshops, which are organisationally and financially separated establishments allowing for social and vocational rehabilitation of disabled persons incapable of work, aimed at gaining or recovering skills required to pursue employment. Occupational therapy workshops may be organised by foundations, associations or other entities, and the costs of establishment and operation of such workshops, or resulting from the increased number of the workshop participants, are co-financed by the State Fund for Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons (Państwowy Fundusz Rehabilitacji Osób Niepełnosprawnych, PFRON), from the funds of local governments or other sources.

In addition, the Act on social assistance provides assistance in the form of protected housing (mieszkania chronione)

• For a person who, because of the difficult life situation, age, disability or illness needs support in everyday life, but does not require the services provided in the specialised, stationary care facilities, in particular, a person with a mental disorder, a person leaving the foster family, childcare facility, youth educational centre or youth detention centre, as well as foreigners who reside in Poland on the basis of a status of refugee or subsidiary protection.

• Protected housing is a form of social assistance that prepares its tenants, under the care of specialists, to live independently, or provides housing in lieu of a facility that assures 24-hour care. Protected housing provides the conditions for independent functioning in and integration into the local community.

• Protected housing can be conducted by any entity of social assistance or by a public benefit organisation.

The National Health Fund finances, inter alia, the provision of long-term care in the form of home care and residential care services:

• Care and treatment facilities, nursing and care facilities (zakłady opiekuńczo-lecznicze i pielęgnacyjno-opiekuńcze). They provide nursing, rehabilitation and pharmacological treatment (previously provided during hospital treatment) for patients who have completed the process of diagnosis, surgery or intensive medical treatment and do not need further hospitalisation, but are chronically ill, dependent and suffer from a partial or advanced disability and therefore need permanent medical control, professional nursing and rehabilitation, which involves the necessity of staying in the care facilities.

• Long-term care homes for mechanically ventilated adults, children and youth (zespoły długoterminowej opieki domowej dla dorosłych, dzieci i młodzieży wentylowanych mechanicznie) provided for people with respiratory failures that need permanent or temporary respiratory therapy (either through tracheotomies or through other devices) without the necessity of being hospitalised on an intensive care unit, but they need a permanent, specialist and professional care, nursing and rehabilitation.

• Hospital departments for LTC and palliative services (świadczenia w oddziale medycyny paliatywnej/hospicjum stacjonarnym) for terminally ill with a progressive, life-threatening disease. • Home care hospices for adults and children (świadczenia realizowane w hospicjum domowym dla dorosłych i dzieci) – doctors, nurses, psychologists and physiotherapists engaged in these hospices can help families in the care of a sick person who is staying at home. • The provision of palliative care medicine in the clinic – (świadczenia w poradni medycyny paliatywnej) for the sick who are in a stable state of health and can come to the clinic. Cash benefits The Medical Care Supplement (Dodatek pielęgnacyjny) - PLN 181.10 (€ 41.46) per month and Medical Care Allowance, (Zasiłek pielęgnacyjny) – PLN 153.00 (€ 35.02) per month. Medical Care Allowance can be granted for disabled children up to the age of 16, disabled persons over the age of 16, persons over the age of 75. The Training and Rehabilitation of Disabled Child supplement (dodatek z tytułu kształcenia I rehabilitacji dziecka niepełnosprawnego) – PLN 60 per child until the child is 5 or PLN 80 per child between 5 and 24. Social Pension (Renta socjalna) – PLN 593.28. According to the Note of the Polish delegation, Social Pension under provisions of the Law of 27/6/2003 on Social Pension (also in Annex X of Regulation) is granted for adults (aged 18 years and over), and those whose invalidity began before the age of 18 years (25 years in the case of full-time students). It is financed from the State budget and granted to those who are totally incapable of work but they do not require (considerable) assistance/care from other persons to carry out essential daily activities. This benefit is similar to “normal” invalidity pension and could not be treated as LTC. The Permanent Allowance (Zasiłek stały) – awarded to an adult person keeping a single household and totally incapable of work due to age or disability, provided that the income of that person is lower than the income criterion for a person keeping a single household, and to an adult person staying with the family, completely incapable of work due to age or disability, provided that the income of that person, as well as the income per person in the family, is lower than the income criterion per person in the family. Amount: maximum PLN 444.

Earmarked allowance (Zasiłek celowy) – awarded for the coverage, in full or in part, of the costs of the purchase of food, medicine and treatment, fuel, clothing, daily necessities, minor apartment repairs, and funeral costs. The amount depends on the individual situation.

The Periodic Allowance (Zasiłek okresowy) – awarded due to any chronic disease or disability to a person keeping a single household whose income is lower than the income criterion for a person keeping a single household and to a family whose income is lower than the income criterion for the family. Amount: maximum PLN 418 (€ 95.69).

A form of financial assistance paid directly to persons in need of long-term care services are the Medical Care Allowance (Zasiłek pielęgnacyjny) and the Medical Care Supplement (Dodatek pielęgnacyjny), which are granted for a partial coverage of expenses resulting from the need to provide a disabled person with care and assistance of another person due to his or her incapacity for independent existence. The person concerned has a free choice and can use the money for the services he or she prefers. There is no difference if a cash benefit is used for professional care providers or informal caregivers. The amount of the benefits does not relate to the level/scale of dependency.

In addition, some other cash benefits might be mentioned.

The Family allowance (Zasiłek rodzinny): The entitlement to a family allowance is, among others, subject to means-testing. The right to the family allowance is awarded if the income per person in a family or if the average monthly income of a learning person does not exceed PLN 504. If there is a child with a certified disability or with a certified moderate or severe disability in the family, the family is entitled to a family allowance if the average monthly income per capita in the family or the average monthly income of a learning person does not exceed PLN 583.

Some benefits for veterans might be mentioned as well (although they are not necessarily linked to long-term care). They may include direct benefits and reduced transport tariffs.

The Care allowance (Zasiłek opiekuńczy) granted on the basis of the Act on cash benefits payable for sickness and maternity from the social insurance of 25 June 1999.

The Care Allowance is granted when it is necessary to take care of:

a. a child up to 8 years of age in case of:

b. an unexpected closing of a day nursery, a kindergarten or a school which the child attends,

c. childbirth or sickness of the insured person's spouse who permanently takes care of the child if the childbirth or sickness make them unable to take care of the child,

d. a stay of the insured person's spouse who takes care of the child in a health care institution,

e. a sick child is up to 14 years of age,

f. any other sick member of the family (spouse, parents, parents-in-law, grandparents, grandchildren, siblings, and children over 14 – if they stay in the same household with the insured person).

If care is taken of the child up to 14 years of age, the care allowance is granted for the period of caretaking, which cannot exceed 60 days per calendar year. If a child is older or if care is taken of another member of the family care allowance is granted for a maximum period of 14 days in the calendar year.

Care allowances are jointly granted for taking care of children and other members of the family for the period not exceeding 60 days per calendar year.

The allowance is payable at the rate of 80% of the basis of contribution rates (average salary).

The incapacity to work pension (Renta z tytułu niezdolności do pracy) might be considered as a long-term care benefit only if a person has a certificate of the ZUS-authorised physician to the medical commission of the social security institution about the total inability to perform any kind of work and in the case of finding that the ability of the organism has been impaired to a degree which makes it necessary for the person concerned to be under permanent or long-term care to satisfy her or his basic living needs and the inability to conduct independent existence is announced.

Combination of benefits

Cash benefits and benefits in kind.

As a general rule, there is a free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Nevertheless, the cash benefits usually do not include the possibility to receive benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

The nursing benefit (Świadczenie pielegnacyjne) – established to support people who do not undertake or resign from employment or other paid work due to the necessity of taking care of a disabled child. The child (under 16 years old) must be in possession of a certificate confirming his or her disability with recommendations of constant or long-term care or help, related to a limited ability of the child to independent existence and a necessity of the everyday participation of a caretaker in the process of medical treatment, rehabilitation and education, or (if the child is older than 16 years) of a certificate confirming a considerable degree of disability. A caregiver can receive the nursing benefit only if he or she is one of the parents or the factual guardian of the child. The amount of money paid directly to the caregiver is PLN 520 (€ 119.04) per month. The caregiver can have his or her social insurance contributions paid from the state budget.

A social assistance centre pays the contribution to an old-age and pension insurance. The amount is subject to income criteria per person in the family, to a person that gives up employment due to the necessity to exercise direct, personal care for a member of the family suffering from a long-term or serious disease, and for a non-cohabiting mother, father, or for siblings, provided that the actual income per person in the family of the person exercising such care does not exceed 150% of the amount subject to income criteria per person in the family, and provided that the person exercising such a care is not covered by mandatory old-age or disability pension insurance under other titles and receives no old-age or disability pension. The above also refers to individuals who – due to the necessity to exercise such a care – are on unpaid leave. The contribution to old-age and pension insurance – in the amount specified under relevant provisions on the social insurance system – is paid for the duration of exercising such care.

Addendum: Social security coordination aspects

According to the Note of the Polish delegation, the above listed benefits in kind represent a mix of sickness benefits and social services that are not considered as part of social security system (health care) in Poland but that belong to the sphere of social assistance.

The Polish delegation noted that according to their view only Medical Care Supplement (Dodatek pielęgnacyjny) and Medical Care Allowance for adults (Zasiłek pielęgnacyjny) can be treated as LTC cash benefits.

They have emphasized that according to the Judgement of The Court (C-333/00 Mahheimo) a benefit such as the home child-care allowance is a family benefit within the meaning of Article 4(1)(h) of the Regulation 1408/71. That is why Medical Care Allowance should be treated as LTC only in the case of adults (not in case of children).

According to the view of the Polish delegation, Supplement to family benefit (Training and Rehabilitation of Disabled Child supplement, dodatek z tytułu kształcenia i rehabilitacji dziecka niepełnosprawnego) cannot be coordinated as sickness benefits. All supplements to family allowances in Poland are integral part of “main” family allowance (they cannot be granted separately). All supplements to family allowances are recognized as family benefits under the Regulation 883/2004.

The Polish delegation expressed their believe that social assistance benefits cannot be coordinated as LTC benefits, since the Regulation No 883/2004 does not apply to social assistance. In Poland the duty of guaranteeing the implementation of social assistance tasks rests upon territorial self-government units/communes and governments administration. They prepare an evaluation of social support resources based on an analysis of local social and demographic situation, which affects the assistance aimed at people in need. When granting assistance, family background interview shall be conducted to determine personal and financial situation, family income and assets of individuals and families.

The nursing benefit (Świadczenie pielegnacyjne) is established to support people who do not undertake or resign from employment or other paid work due to the necessity of taking care of a disabled child. It is granted to the carer (not to a disabled child/person); the carer can have his/her social insurance contributions paid from the State budget. The carer’s activity is regarded as a gainful activity under Polish legislation, where the activity is exercised. In this situation we should treat this person (carer) in accordance with Article 1 and Title II of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.

PORTUGAL

Applicable statutory basis

Social insurance:

Statutory Decree 265/99 of 14 July 1999, amended by Statutory Decree 309-A/2000 of 30 November 2000.

Guaranteeing sufficient resources:

Statutory Decree 265/99 of 14 July 1999, amended by Statutory Decree 309-A/2000 of 30 November 2000.

Social security system and National Health Service:

Statutory Decree 101/06 of 6 June 2006.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home care (apoio domiciliário).

Daily care, personal comfort, cleaning, meal delivery, accompaniment during medical visits etc.

Foster families (famílias de acolhimento).

Temporary or permanent integration of elderly persons or disabled adults (maximum 3) in foster families who ensure that their basic needs, including in terms of medical care, are met.

Integrated home care teams (Equipas de Cuidados Continuados Integrados) - Health and Social community multidisciplinary teams, for citizens in convalescence with functional dependence or terminal illness that do not need in-patient care.

2. Semi-residential care

A Night Centre (Centro de Noite) for elderly people who are isolated and, accordingly, in need of assistance during the night (from 6pm to 8am);

Day care centres (Centro de dia) for elderly persons. At least 8 hours per day;

Centres for day care and promotion of autonomy (Unidades de dia e de promoção da autonomia): 8 hours per day;

Sheltered workshops (centro de actividades ocupacionais) for seriously disabled persons;

Centres for social and occupational measures (forum sócio-ocupacional) for persons with minor mental disorders;

Nursing homes for temporary stay (lar temporário) of disabled children and youngsters between the age of 6 and 16 years.

3. Residential care

Nursing homes for permanent stay (lar de idosos) of elderly persons who are or risk to become severely dependent;

Homes (residência) for persons over the age of 16 years with permanent or temporary disabilities;

Centres for supported life (unidade de vida apoiada) for persons with permanent mental disabilities;

Centres for protected life (unidade de vida protegida) for adults who suffer from serious psychological problems likely to become permanent;

Centres for autonomous life (unidade de vida autónoma) for adults who suffer from serious psychological problems likely to become permanent, but who maintain a certain degree of autonomy;

Temporary Reception Centres for Emergencies (Centro de Acolhimento Temporário de Emergência) for elderly persons in a difficult social situation;

Convalescent centres (Unidades de convalescença) for medical rehabilitation care following hospitalisation;

Medium-term and rehabilitation centres (Unidade de média duração e reabilitação), in conjunction with the hospital, for medical rehabilitation care and social / psychological support;

Long-term and maintenance centres (Unidade de longa duração e manutenção) for social support and maintenance treatment of persons suffering from chronic pathologies;

Centres for palliative care (Unidades de cuidados paliativos) for the support, in a hospital environment, of seriously ill persons.

4. Other benefits

The provision of technical aids.

Premature intervention (Intervenção Precoce) integrated aid measure combining education, health and social assistance for children up to 6 years old with disabilities or with a serious risk of mental retardation.

Cash benefits

Social insurance:

The Long-term care supplement (complemento por dependência): paid to recipients of invalidity, old-age and survivors' pensions who are reliant on care. A monthly amount is indexed to the amount of the social pension (pensão social) and annually updated. In 2012 this amount is € 97.70 regarding 1st degree of dependency and € 175.86 concerning 2nd degree of dependency.

14 benefits paid yearly. The Christmas and holiday bonus: amount equal to the benefit paid for the corresponding month.

The allowance for the assistance by a third party (subsídio por assistência de terceira pessoa)is a family benefit granted to severely disabled descendants who are incapable to carry out their basic needs and need the permanent help of a third person. In 2012 it mounts to € 88.37.

Guaranteeing sufficient resources:

The long-term care supplement (complemento por dependência): paid to recipients of invalidity, old-age and survivors' social pensions who are in need of permanent assistance of a third party. Monthly amount indexed to the indexing reference of social support (indexante dos apoios sociais, IAS): € 94.77 or € 170.59 according to the degree (1st or 2nd) of dependency.

Allowance for assistance by a third party (subsídio por assistência de terceira pessoa): see above.

Discretionary use. However, the benefits are paid to the care provider in case the beneficiary is incapacitated or if she or he resides in a social support (or assimilated) institution.

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits.

Not applicable. Accumulation possible.

Benefits for the carer

No specific benefits for the carer.

ROMANIA

Applicable statutory basis

Law 448 of 6 December 2006 on Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Handicap (Legea privind protectia si promovarea drepturilor persoanelor cu handicap), with subsequent amendments.

Law 17 of 6 March 2000 on Social Assistance of Senior Persons (Legea privind asistenta sociala a persoanelor varstnice), with subsequent amendments.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Persons with handicap:

Personal Assistant (asistent personal) – care and protection for a period longer than 24 hours.

Senior persons:

Caregiver (persoana de ingrijire) – social and socio-medical services for a period longer than 24 hours.

2. Semi-residential care

Persons with handicap:

Qualified Personal Assistant (asistent personal profesionist) – care and protection for a period longer than 24 hours,

Day centres – social services integrated with medical, education, housing, labour force employment and other similar services up to 24 hours.

Senior persons:

Day, night, and other specialised centres for senior persons – socio-medical services up to 24 hours.

3. Residential care

Persons with handicap:

Residential centres – social services integrated with medical, education, housing, labour force employment and other similar services for a period longer than 24 hours in:

Care and assistance centres,

Recovery and rehabilitation centres,

Integration centres providing vocational therapy,

Centres of training for an independent life,

Crisis centres,

Centres for community and training services,

Sheltered housing, etc.

Senior persons:

Homes for senior persons – social, socio-medical and medical services for a period longer than 24 hours.

4. Other benefits

Persons with handicap:

e.g. Gratuities by Urban Transportation (calatorii gratuite la transportul urban). 138 / 156

Cash benefits

Persons with handicap:

The Indemnity (indemnizatie) which is an alternative to the Personal Assistant (asistent personal) is paid to the person with severe handicap. It is equal to the net wage for a certain category of social worker.

The amount is at his/her discretion.

Senior persons:

Not applicable.

Combination of benefits

Persons with handicap:

Cash and in kind benefits.

The person with severe handicap may freely choose between Indemnity (indemnizatie) and Personal Assistant (asistent personal) (includes inter alia relatives and spouses).

Senior persons:

In kind benefits.

Benefits for the carer

Persons with handicap:

As the Personal Assistant (asistent personal) (includes inter alia relatives and spouses) and the Qualified Personal Assistant (asistent personal profesionist) have employment contracts, they are covered for different risks.

The Personal Assistant and the Qualified Personal Assistant are entitled to benefits in kind such as free urban and inter-urban transportation, etc.

Senior persons:

As the Caregiver (persoana de ingrijire) has an employment contract, he/she is covered for different risks

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Applicable statutory basis

The Act on Social Services (Zákon o sociálnych službách) No. 448/2008.

The Act on Financial Benefits for Compensation of Disabled Persons (Zákon o peňažných príspevkoch na kompenzáciu ťažkého zdravotného postihnutia) No. 447/2008.

The Act on Health Care and Services Related to Health Care (Zákon o zdravotnej starostlivosti a službách súvisiacich s poskytovaním zdravotnej starostlivosti) No. 576/2004.

The Act on Health Care Providers, Medical Workers and Professional Medical Associations (Zákon o poskytovateľoch zdravotnej starostlivosti, zdravotníckych pracovníkoch a stavovských organizáciách v zdravotníctve) No. 578/2004.

The Act on Subsistence Minimum (Zákon o životnom minime) No. 601/2003.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Attendance services to help with personal activities of daily living, with keeping up the household and with basic social activities.

2. Semi-residential care

Semi-stationary care is provided in the social services facilities e.g. Daily Stationary Facility (Denný stacionár). It is provided as a daily or a weekly care (with persons returning home during the weekend). Different activities like specialised services, nursing etc., are provided there.

There are no exactly defined daily hours during which the recipient may attend the facility.

3. Residential care

Nursing home care is provided in social services facilities: Shelter Facility (Zariadenie chráneného bývania), Social Service Home (Domov sociálnych služieb) and Home of Supported Inhabitation (Zariadenie podporovaného bývania). For a temporary period, the nursing home care is provided also in the Attendance Service Facility (Zariadenie opatrovateľskej služby) and in the Rehabilitation Centre (Rehabilitačné stredisko).

4. Other benefits

Social Guidance (Sociálne poradenstvo), Interpretation (Tlmočenie), Social rehabilitation (Sociálna rehabilitácia). According to the Note of the Slovak delegation these benefits do not satisfy the aspects of LTC benefits.

The social services system, in which providers (self-government of municipalities and upper regional units, public and non-public providers) offer social services to persons in social need (disabled persons, elderly, single parents, homeless persons, etc).

Cash benefits

For professional providers within home care the Personal Assistance Benefit (Príspevok na osobnú asistenciu) is set: the sum of 1.39% of the subsistence minimum per hour of assistance required (maximum of 7 300 hours per year). This benefit is granted to the person who is in need of care and whose income is lower than 3 times the subsistence minimum, otherwise the benefit is lower.

Personal assistant is not necessarily a professional caregiver. It can be any natural person who has reached 18 years of age, is legally competent and with whom the severely disabled person has concluded an agreement on the performance of personal assistance.

For informal carers (relatives) within home care the Attendance Service Benefit (Príspevok na opatrovanie) is set: up to the level of 111.32% of the subsistence minimum per month if only 1 person receives home care and up to the level of 148.42% of the subsistence minimum per month if 2 or more persons receive home care. The benefit is paid directly to the carer (obviously a family member) in the carer's own right. An increase of the benefit by the sum equivalent to € 49.80 per month is granted if a severely disabled child is in home care and the provider has no other income.

The Benefit for Purchasing, Repairing, Adjusting and Training of Utilisation Equipment (peňažný príspevok na kúpu, úpravu alebo opravu pomôcky): maximum benefit of € 8 630.42.

Purchasing a Hoisting Device Benefit (Peňažný príspevok na kúpu zdvíhacieho zariadenia): maximum benefit of € 11 617.88.

Purchasing and Adjusting a Car Benefit (Peňažný príspevok na kúpu alebo úpravu osobného motorového vozidla): maximum benefit of € 8 298.48.

Transportation Benefit (Peňažný príspevok na prepravu): maximum benefit is 51.02% of the subsistence minimum (Životné minimumi) per month.

Adaptation of a Residence or a Garage Benefit (Peňažný príspevok na úpravu bytu, rodinného domu alebo garáže): maximum benefit of € 8 298.48.

The Compensation of Enhanced Costs Benefit (Peňažný príspevok na kompenzáciu zvýšených výdavkov): monthly supplements for special dietary requirements (up to 18.56% of the subsistence minimum), personal and domestic hygiene, clothing, shoes and housing equipment (9.28% of the subsistence minimum), operation of a car (16.7% of the subsistence minimum), maintenance of a guide dog (22.27% of the subsistence minimum).

Combination of benefits

Cash benefits as well as benefits in kind at home and in institutions can be combined; however, for selected benefits, the combination is not possible (e.g. the Attendance Service Benefit (Príspevok za opatrovanie) with the Personal Assistance Benefit (Príspevok na osobnú asistenciu)).

Free choice between cash benefit and benefit in kind possible.

Benefits for the carer

The state pays contributions on the carer´s old-age and invalidity insurance. It is possible to take a paid leave in order to care for a dependent person (relief service).

Addendum: Social security coordination aspects

In the Note of the Slovak delegation it is stressed that for cash allowances the income and the assets of the person with a severe disability, as well as all the jointly assessed persons, are established, which is regularly reviewed once a year, indicating the fact that the allowances can be provided only to such a group of persons with severe disabilities that are at a lower social level. They are linked to the socio-economic situation in the Slovak Republic and their amount depends on the subsistence minimum.

Cash allowances are provided on the basis of individual and discretionary review of particular situation and circumstances of the applicant and his or her family (the social assessment activity) for the purpose of compensating for the social consequences of severe disability. The cash allowances are not claimable, are not awarded automatically to persons meeting certain criteria, and are of the discretionary nature. Their aim is contributing to the support of autonomy as well as social integration of disabled persons, helping them to lead a life comparable with that of persons not having disabilities. Therefore care allowances should not be exportable.

According to the view of the Slovak delegation, expressed in their Note, cash benefits for compensation of a severe disability are social assistance benefits. If they were to be regarded as long-term care benefits, the list should give only two cash benefits that can have some of their features:

- the cash allowance for care, which is provided to the caregiver and

- the cash allowance for personal assistance, which is provided to a natural person with a severe disability but subject to monthly produced statements of the number of hours of personal assistance, as well as the receipts of the fees paid to the personal assistant, without which cash allowance cannot be paid out. For this reason it is debatable whether this cash allowance should not be regarded as an LTC benefit in kind.

SLOVENIA

Applicable statutory basis

No specific law related to long-term care.

Long-term care benefits are included in the following acts:

The Pension and Disability Insurance Act (Zakon o pokojninskem in invalidskem zavarovanju, ZPIZ-1) (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 109/2006, offical consolidated text).

The Social Assistance Act (Zakon o socialnem varstvu, ZSV) (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 36/04)

Financial Social Assistance Act (Zakon o socialno varstvenih prejemkih, ZSVarPre) (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 61/2010)

Rights Enforcement from Public Funds Act (Zakon o uveljavljanju pravic iz javnih sredstev, ZUPJS) (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 62/2010)

The Parental Care and Family Benefits Act (Zakon o starševskem varstvu in družinskih prejemkih, ZSDP) (Official Gazette, No. 110/2003, 10/2008- offical consolidated text)

The Mentally and Physically Handicapped Persons Act (Zakon o družbenem varstvu duševno in telesno prizadetih oseb, ZDVDTP) (Official Gazette SRS, No. 41/83)

The Health Care and Health Insurance Act (Zakon o zdravstvenem varstvu in zdravstvenem zavarovanju, ZZVZZ) (Official Gazette, No. 100/2005).

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Home care is provided by the following services:

- Community services provide medical-social care at home. The user is provided nursing care services, preventive home visits and assistance in obtaining adequate social treatment. The costs of nursing care services are covered by the compulsory health insurance.

- Community psychiatry is a team approach to the treatment of patients after their discharge from treatment at the secondary (specialist) level into home care, providing their social inclusion, maintenance and follow-up of their health condition.

- Social home help is organised locally, provided within the public service network by the Social Work Centres, homes for elderly and special institutions for home care. Home help is available for a maximum of 4 hours a day or 20 hours a week.

- Personal assistance is a program ran by persons with disabilities themselves, and is financed by the state, local community and user funds (it is not available across the country).

- Social alarms/telecare is organised locally, not provided within the public service network; available only in some municipalities (currently there are essential changes).

- Meals on wheels is a commercial service unless when is being part of home help service package.

- Sheltered housing emerged in recent years and is funded by public sector (municipal housing funds, Pension Real Estate’s Fund by private investors or as public-private partnership ventures).

2. Semi-residential care

Day care centres are organised locally and include the following services: protection, food supply, health care, social integration, social activities and transport.

Day care is usually performed in the welfare employment centres, in homes for elderly (domovi za starejše) and in private institutions on a basis of a concession contract concluded between institutions performing day care and the state or on the basis of a work permit.

Group homes and day centers for people with mental health problems (stanovanjske skupine) are organised locally, not provided within the public service network; available only in some municipalities; financed by the state, local community and user funds (it is not available across the country).

3. Residential care

Residential care is mainly a public responsibility: in terms of the establishing and maintaining facilities, of developing the network of social care homes. The system of financing the residential care is a combination of public and private responsibility: people have to cover the expenses of accommodation, food and social care services, but if income is insufficient, the state (municipality) supplements the payment up to the entire price.

Residential care in Slovenia is provided by:

- homes for the elderly,

- special social care homes,

- centres for care and training (residential institutions for people with learning disabilities),

- institutions for training of severe and profound mentally disabled children.

Homes for the elderly have the longest tradition in Slovenia and are operating in the public and private domain (private institutions with concessions). Special social care homes and institutions for training of severe and profound mentally disabled children are only public and there are no private partnerships. The centres for care and training operate in both the public and private domain. In the public sector the providers of homes for the elderly are municipalities and in the private sector the providers are private social institutions who have acquired a license or concession.

Health care is covered from the compulsory health insurance by the Health insurance Institute of Slovenia (HIIS) according to the contracts between the HIIS and above-mentioned institutions.

Nursing hospitals could also be mentioned. Although several Slovenian hospitals already operate departments for non-acute medical treatment, the first nursing hospital in Slovenia was opened in February 2011 in Ljubljana. Nursing hospitals should be opened in other cities as well. The purpose of such hospitals is to accept patients who have concluded an acute medical treatment, but are not yet ready to lead an independent live at their home or in a home for elderly. The nursing hospital is thus a transitional stage between a hospital treatment and living at home (again) or in the home for elderly. It is not intended for indefinite hospitalisations. The decision on the admittance is taken by the team of experts, according to the overall plan of treatment and care. In a nursing hospital the emphasis is on care activities, therefore a stable medical condition is one of the conditions to be accepted to a nursing hospital. Also the majority of staff are nurses, and only few are physicians.

Within the framework of non-acute hospital care, hospices perform the following services:

- extended hospital treatment (EHT) where patients are treated after completed acute therapy because they are unable to return to their home environment due to their current health condition; where they are provided with an adequate rehabilitation programme, a relatively rapid improvement of their condition may be expected, which enables them to return into their home environment (expected health improvement, a list of hospitals that offer such rehabilitation programmes);

- nursing care is provided for a short period of time when the health condition after completed acute therapy has deteriorated so that the patient’s return to their previous environment is impossible while no improvement may be expected and therefore it is necessary to provide suitably adjusted conditions (social care; return into home care is not possible);

- non-acute palliative care (terminal stages – short-term conditions, in this case short life expectancy; no improvement of the condition may be expected; institutional care placement in such a short time is not feasible).

4. Other benefits

The right to technical aids (orthopaedic, hearing and other aids intended for home care – special beds, sanitary medical equipment, etc) available under compulsory health insurance. Costs are covered in full for children with severe and profound mental disabilities, the disabled and other persons who rely on the assistance of another person for all or most of their existential functions, disabled persons who have at least 70% physical disability according to regulations on pension and invalidity insurance, persons over 75 years, and social assistance recipients (for the latter co-payments are covered by the State).

Cash benefits

Cash benefits are paid directly to a person in need of care. Cash benefits are intended to cover additional costs arising from a need for care of another person (professional or informal caregiver).

The Supplement for Care and Assistance (dodatek za tujo nego in pomoč) granted to disabled persons who are incapable of performing basic life functions and for which they require the constant help of another person. This supplement amounts from 20% to a maximum of 30% of the national average net personal income per employee if a person needs assistance of another person in performing all of his or her basic life functions (€ 165.07), and 10% to 20% if help of another person is required in performing a majority of the basic life functions (€ 82.54).

The Assistance and Attendance Allowance (dodatek za pomoč in postrežbo): available to lawfully permanent resident recipients of old-age, invalidity, widow/widower's and survivor's pension, should they need permanent help to satisfy their vital necessities. It amounts to at least 70% of the minimum pension for a full pension qualifying period for persons, who are in need of assistance and attendance provided by a third person to help him/her with all of basic day-to-day activities (€ 290.15) or half of the amount for persons who need assistance in performing a majority of basic day-to-day activities (€ 145.08) or 100% of the minimum pension for a full pension qualifying period for the most severely handicapped (€ 414.50).

The Special Childcare Allowance (dodatek za nego otroka, ki potrebuje posebno nego in varstvo): provides financial assistance to a family with a child with special needs who are permanent residents, and is intended to cover the higher cost of caring for such a child. The benefit is paid until the age of 18 or 26 if the child is in education. The monthly amount is € 101.05; for children who are in need of special care 24 hours a day the monthly amount is € 202.17.

The Partial Payments for Loss of Income (delno plačilo za izgubljeni dohodek):

Paid to one of the parents who has left his or her job in order to care for a child with special needs. The child and one of the parents must be permanent residents and EU citizens. The monthly amount equals to the national minimum wage (€ 734.15 – gross value).

The Assistance and attendance allowance (dodatek za pomoč in postrežbo) for social assistance recipients, who due to old-age, illness or invalidity are incapable of independent living and require the assistance of another person (Article 31.a of the Social Assistance Act of 1992 with later amendments). It is of a subsidiary (social assistance) legal nature. The same rules apply as for the assistance and attendance allowance as a supplement to an old-age, invalidity, widow’s or family pension (described above). It is also foreseen in the new social assistance act, which should come into force in 2012.

The Assistance and attendance allowance for war invalids (of a certain degree), according to the War Invalids Act (of 1996 with later amendments, Article 22 and following). The same criteria as for the assistance and attendance allowance as a supplement to an old-age, invalidity, widow’s or family pension apply (described above). There are some special provisions, mainly to the benefit of the allowance recipient. This allowance could be classified as an LTC benefit for victims of war.

The person has a free choice and can use the money at his own discretion. There is no control on how the money is spent.

Combination of benefits

There is a combination of cash benefits and benefits in kind. Cash benefits are paid directly to the beneficiary.

Free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

The benefit is paid to a carer in case a person entitled to residential care opts for the right to choose a family assistant (družinski pomočnik) instead. The locally competent Centre for Social Work awards the family assistant to a disabled person who requires help with performing all of the activities of daily living. A family assistant is paid by the local municipalities (€ 578.55 per month – gross value).

The Partial Payments for Loss of Income (delno plačilo za izgubljeni dohodek) have already been mentioned above. It is rather automatically transformed to a benefit for a family assistant when the child reaches maturity.

SPAIN

Applicable statutory basis

Act No. 39/2006 on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Assistance to persons in situations of dependence of 14 December 2006, as amended.

It seems that in Spain a formal criterion is followed, i.e. as long-term care benefits are considered only those regulated by the above-mentioned legislative act.

However, it is obvious that the “need of care” can be also protected by other social security benefits (partially also linked with long-term care):

• maternity benefits for parents while nursing their children

• Contributory and non-contributory invalidity pensions

Both branches only specifically guarantee financial help to persons in need of nursing care when they satisfy two requisites: to be legally qualified as disabled and to require the help of another person to carry out the most essential day-to-day activities, as a result of the loss of "functional or anatomical capacity", which should be determined by the medical services.

Under Spanish law, four different degrees of invalidity may be distinguished, depending on their consequences for the person´s capacity to work: partial permanent incapacity; total permanent incapacity; absolute incapacity, and extreme disability.

Extremely disabled is a worker or an employee, who not only suffers from a total permanent incapacity to perform any kind of job, but also needs the help of someone to perform the most essential acts of life such as eating, getting dressed, walking, or any other similar examples, due to their anatomical or functional shortcomings.

• Family benefits: there is only one example in which Spanish rules take into account the case of those young people suffering from an extreme incapacity that demands non-medical nursing care: when the person is 18 years old or over, he or she is affected by the loss of anatomical or functional capacity, at least for a degree of 75% and he or she needs the help of another person to carry out the daily activities.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Different forms of assistance in the home of the person in a situation of dependence. Services aimed at promoting personal autonomy and preventing dependency are stipulated in Article 15(1)(a) of the Act 39/2006.

Tele-assistance and prevention are provided for.

2. Semi-residential care

Attendance at day and night care centres. The duration and the type of care depend on the individual need of the dependent person.

3. Residential care

Long-term care provided in institutions, mainly old-age homes and centres for the disabled.

4. Other benefits

No other benefits.

Cash benefits

The amounts are fixed by law and vary according to the degree of dependency. The maximum monthly amount: € 833.96.

With regard to cash benefits, the Act 39/2006 mentions three types of benefits, two of which, despite being monetary, are of the same nature as the benefits in kind for the coordination purposes.

In the Spanish note it is argued that two cash benefits should be considered as benefits in kind according to case law of the Court of Justice of the European Community (CJEU), Decision No 175 of 23 June 1999 of the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers on the interpretation of the concept of ‘benefits in kind’ in the event of sickness or maternity pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, and more recently, Decision No S5 of the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems of 2 October 2009 on the interpretation of the concept of ‘benefits in kind’ as defined in Article 1(va) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 in the event of sickness or maternity.

a) Financial benefit linked to a service (Article 17)

This is periodical and is only granted when access to a public or organised care service is not possible, in accordance with the degree and level of dependency and economic situation of the beneficiary, pursuant to the provisions of the agreement between the General State Administration and the corresponding Autonomous Community.

This personal financial benefit is, in any case, linked to the acquisition of a service. Therefore, this financial benefit is of the same nature as a benefit in kind.

b) Financial benefit for personal care (Article 19).

The objective of the financial benefit for personal care is to encourage highly dependent persons to be more autonomous. The aim is for this benefit to contribute towards the hiring of a personal assistant for a number of hours, which will facilitate the beneficiary's access to education and work and will give them a more autonomous life in terms of pursuing basic, day-to-day activities.

Therefore, this financial benefit is of the same nature as a benefit in kind.

c) Financial benefit for care in the family and support for non-professional carers (Article 18).

In exceptional circumstances, when the beneficiary is being cared for in the family environment, financial benefit for care in the family is granted as long as certain conditions and requirements are met. The carer must adhere to the rules on Social Security registration, membership and contributions laid down by law.

The Spanish legislation on protection against dependency does not provide for any care allowance to pay for housing or to supplement the benefit.

With regard to the tax benefits in the personal income tax, there are a number of measures which exempt persons with disabilities from paying taxes, or deduct or reduce their tax rate. Some of these may benefit persons with disabilities in a recognised situation of dependency, such as the measures to award net income from work or economic activities for contributions to listed heritage or for pension schemes, etc.

With regard to the personal income tax in the specific case of persons declared dependent under Act 39/2006, there are a number of measures in place which are set out in Act 35/2006 of 28 November 2006, as well as other implementing provisions.

Combination of benefits

The benefit compatibility scheme (mixed benefits) is regulated at territorial level by each of the Autonomous Communities.

Benefits for the carer

Cash benefits are payable to the beneficiary, who pays the informal caregiver. Compulsory inclusion of the informal caregiver in the Social Security System.

SWEDEN

Applicable statutory basis

The Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlagen) (2001:453) of 2002.

The Health Care Act (Hälso- och sjukvårdslag) (1982:763).

The Social Security Code (2010:110).

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

This is the most common service.

If a person is in need of medical care that does not involve hospital care he or she should, according to the Health Care Act, be given that kind of care in his or her own home. The assistance in the form of home help shall also be given in a person’s own home. The municipality cannot refuse to give anyone in need assistance in their own home. There is no legal responsibility for spouses or children to care for their elderly relatives.

2. Semi-residential care

Exists in the form of short-term stay, as a complement to home care.

3. Residential care

Mainly for people with Alzheimer disease or persons with severe medical conditions or persons who suffer severely from anxiety and loneliness.

4. Other benefits

Day care, rehabilitation, security alarms etc.

Persons with the lowest pension are entitled to a state financed income-tested housing supplement. Although, its purpose seems to be to top up the regular pension from an economic point of view, rather than a complement due to special care needs.

Cash benefits

Based on individual assessment.

The amount depends on municipalities.

Cash benefits as an alternative to municipal provision are not intended to be used as payments to informal carers.

In addition, other benefits might be mentioned as well:

The care benefit (vårdbidrag), according to Chapter 22 of the (2010:110) Social Security Code.

This is paid to the carer (normally the legal parent) of a disabled (or sick, in the need of care for at least six months) child from 0-19 years of age. It is a flat-rate benefit of SEK 107 000 a year (SEK 8 917 a month). There is also the possibility of extra cash benefits for extra expenses.

The occasional parental benefit (tillfällig föräldrapenning), Chapter 11-13 of the (2010:110) Social Security Code.

This is paid to the carer of certain disabled children of 16-21 (23) years of age when the child is occasionally ill with a maximum of 120 days per year.

The disability benefit (handikappersättning), Chapter 50 of the (2010:110) Social Security Code.

This is paid to disabled persons of 19 years of age or older (at 19 the right to a care benefit, see above, expires). This is a benefit to cover extra expenses due to care of assistance.

Assistance benefit (assistansersättning), Chapter 51 of the (2010:110) Social Security Code

This is a cash benefit paid per hour of assistance to those who, due to a severe handicap, is in the need of assistance with a minimum of 20 hours per week concerning basic human needs.

Car benefit (bilstöd), Chapter 52 of the (2010:110) Social Security Code.

This is a special benefit for the disabled with permanent (at least 9 years ahead) difficulties to use public transportation.

Combination of benefits

Benefits in kind.

Elderly care, such as home help is usually provided as a benefit in kind.

Cash benefits are allowed but not very common. A voucher-like system gives the individual a right to a certain amount of help related to a cost per hour or presumed result. This approach is considered to better target the quality issues.

Mixed benefits: could be possible, but are very uncommon.

Free choice between cash and/or benefits in kind is possible, but uncommon.

Benefits for the carer

Support from the municipality, e.g. providing information, support groups for carers, relief on demand or scheduled relief, centres for carers with activities.

Cash benefits, including the allowance to a relative, are usually calculated according to the number of hours of care. The payment can also be based on other criteria than number of hours. There is no national framework for the cash benefits and they are not paid out in all municipalities. Care benefits and occasional parental benefits paid to the carer have been mentioned above among the cash benefits.

Addendum: Social security coordination aspects

According to the Note of the Swedish delegation the aid and benefits granted in accordance with the Swedish Social Services Act (2001:453) are considered to cover benefits that clearly fall within the category of social assistance and therefore fall outside the material scope of Regulation 883/2004. Moreover, in Sweden, such benefits and measures are – with certain exceptions - established entirely at municipal level. It is only in the event of special obligations being imposed on the municipality by the Social Services Act that the municipalities’ freedom to decide on their course of action in the said area is limited.

SWITZERLAND

Applicable statutory basis

1. The Federal Law on Sickness Insurance of 18 March 1994 (Bundesgesetz über die Krankenversicherung, KVG/Loi fédérale sur l'assurance-maladie, LAMal/Legge federale sull’assicurazione malattie, LAMal).

2. The Federal Law on Accident Insurance of 20 March 1981 (Bundesgesetz über die Unfallversicherung, UVG/Loi fédérale sur l'assurance-accidents, LAA/Legge federale sull’assicurazione contro gli infortuni, LAINF).

3. The Federal Law on Invalidity Insurance of 19 June 1959 (Bundesgesetz über die Invalidenversicherung, IVG/Loi fédérale sur l'assurance-invalidité, LAI/Legge federale su l’assicurazione per l’invalidità, LAI).

4. The Federal Law on Old-age and Survivors' Insurance of 20 December 1946 (Bundesgesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung, AHVG/Loi fédérale sur l'assurance-vieillesse et survivants, LAVS/Legge federale su l’assicurazione per la vecchiaia e per i superstiti, LAVS).

5. The Federal Law on Supplementary Benefits to the Old-age, Survivors' and Invalidity Insurance of 6 October 2006 (Bundesgesetz über Ergänzungsleistungen zur Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenversicherung, ELG/Loi fédérale sur les prestations complémentaires à l’AVS et à l’AI, LPC/Legge federale sulle prestazioni complementari all’assicurazione per la vecchiaia, I superstiti et l’invalidità, LPC).

6. The Federal Law on Military Insurance of 19 June 1992 (Bundesgesetz über die Militärversicherung, MVG/Loi fédérale sur l’assurance militaire, LAM/Legge federale sull’assicurazione militare, LAM).

7. the Federal Law on General Provisions concerning Legislation on Social Insurances of 6 October 2000 (Bundesgesetz über den Allgemeinen Teil des Sozialversicherungsrechts, ATSG/Loi fédérale sur la partie générale du droit des assurances sociales, LPGA/Legge federale sulla parte generale del diritto delle assicurazioni sociali, LPGA).

8. The Federal Law on Assistance for Victims of Crime of 23 March 2007 (Bundesgesetz über die Hilfe an Opfer von Straftaten, OHG/Loi fédérale sur l’aide aux victimes d’infractions, LAVI/Legge federale concernente l’aiuto alle vittime di reati, LAV).

9. Cantonal laws concerning the funding of long-term care.

10. Cantonal laws on social assistance.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

• KVG/LAMal:

- examinations and treatment at the home of the patient by doctors and chiropractors;

- contribution to care at the home of the patient by nurses or home care organisations (= SPITEX), on the basis of a medical prescription and of an established need for care;

• UVG/LAA/LAINF:

- treatment at the home of the patient by doctors and chiropractors;

- care at the home of the patient, prescribed by a doctor and provided by nurses or home care organisations (= SPITEX) (on a discretionary basis30contribution for home care provided by other persons);

• IVG/LAI (medical measures of the IV/AI): treatment at home by a doctor or, on prescription, by paramedical staff;

• MVG/LAM:

30 H. Landolt, ‘Soziale Sicherheit von pflegenden Angehörigen‘, (2009) Aktuelle Juristische Praxis, 1233 et seq (with an overview of the administrative practice concerning the care by family members on page 1237).

Examinations, treatment and care at home.

2. Semi-residential care

• KVG/LAMal:

- examinations and treatment of outpatients in a hospital or in a medico-social establishment, as well as outpatient care in hospitals by doctors, chiropractors, and persons providing services on prescription or according to medical orders (partly qualification as ambulant);

- contribution to outpatient care provided in day or night care facilities or in a medico-social establishment, on the basis of a medical prescription and of an established need for care.

Semi-residential care also exists as far as the UVG/LAA/LAINF, the IVG/LAI and the MVG/LAM are concerned (partly qualification as ambulant).

3. Residential care

• KVG/LAMal:

- examinations, treatment and care in a hospital by doctors, chiropractors and persons providing services on prescription or medical orders, and stay in the general ward of the hospital;

- examinations and treatment in a medico-social establishment by doctors, chiropractors, and persons providing services on prescription or medical orders;

- contribution to care provided in a medico-social establishment, on the basis of a medical prescription and of an established need for care;

• UVG/LAA/LAINF, IVG/LAI (medical measures of the IV/AI) and MVG/LAM: treatment, board and accommodation in the general ward of a hospital.

4. Other benefits

Auxiliary equipment

Simple and adequate model. Appear on a list (except for MVG/LAM).

• KVG/LAMal: diagnostic or therapeutic equipment prescribed by a doctor (reimbursement up to a maximum amount);

• UVG/LAA/LAINF: therapeutic equipment; auxiliary equipment to compensate for physical damage or loss of a function.

• AHVG/LAVS: auxiliary equipment necessary for the insured person in order to move about, establish contacts with her or his entourage or develop personal autonomy;

• IVG/LAI and MVG/LAM: therapeutic equipment; auxiliary equipment necessary for the insured person in order to move about, establish contacts with her or his entourage or develop personal autonomy.

Cash benefits

Helplessness allowance

Depends on the degree of helplessness. Monthly amounts:

• IVG/LAI:

slight: CHF 464;

moderate: CHF 1 160;

severe: CHF 1 856.

The helplessness allowance paid to insured persons living in an institution is half these amounts.

Minors who need intense care and who are not living in an institution are entitled to a supplement to the helplessness allowance, which is CHF 1 392 a month if there is a need of care for 8 hours a day at least, CHF 928 if there is a need of care of 6 hours a day at least and CHF 464 if there is a need of care of 4 hours a day at least.

Probably from the 1st of January 2012: assistance allowance in addition to the helplessness allowance.

• AHVG/LAVS:

slight: CHF 232 (not for insured persons living in an institution);

moderate: CHF 580;

severe: CHF 928.

• UVG/LAA/LAINF:

slight: CHF 692;

moderate: CHF 1 384;

severe: CHF 2 076.

• MVG/LAM: also a sort of helplessness allowance in the form of supplementary allowances for persons receiving home care and facing supplementary costs for care (also by non-medical staff) or assistance.

Yearly supplementary benefit (according to ELG/LPC)

Also designed for covering the daily fee of a stay in a medico-social establishment or in a hospital. Paid monthly. The cantons can limit the amount to be taken into account (they can also provide more extensive benefits than those provided by the ELG/LPC).

Reimbursement of special costs (according to ELG/LPC)

Reimbursement (up to a maximum amount; in addition to supplementary benefits to the old-age, survivors’ and invalidity insurance) of the costs for help, care, assistance and auxiliary equipment (home and semi-residential care; according to MISSOC cash benefit, according to national law benefits in kind). The cantons specify which costs are reimbursed (they can also provide more extensive benefits than those provided by the ELG/LPC).

The a priori bearing of part of the long-term care costs by cantons/municipalities according to cantonal laws concerning the funding of long-term care (not in the form of cash benefits to the persons in need of long-term care themselves). Of course, 26 cantonal legislations could not be analysed, but an example was found (Zürich) in a decision of the Federal Court of 24 March 2011, 2C_864/2010. 33 Cf Konferenz der kantonalen Sozialdirektorinnen und Sozialdirektoren (ed.), Empfehlungen der Schwei-zerischen Verbindungsstellen-Konferenz Opferhilfegesetz (SVK-OHG) zur Anwendung des Bundesgesetzes über die Hilfe an Opfer von Straftaten (OHG) (21 January 2010).

Contributions according to the OHG/LAVI/LAV: contributions for long-term help of third persons and compensation by the canton33 (both insofar as not covered particularly by social security or the author of damage).

Social assistance (cantonal legislation; insofar as not covered particularly by social security).

Combination of benefits

The benefits are provided by several branches of social security: benefits in kind and cash benefits, which are often granted to a person for the same period of time. In general, the person does not have the freedom of choice as to whether he or she prefers a benefit in kind or a cash benefit.

Benefits for the carer

A person caring for relations in ascending or descending line or for siblings who are entitled to an AHV/AVS or IV/AI helplessness allowance for a degree of helplessness which is at least moderate and who live with him or her in the same household may claim a bonus for caretaking. The yearly bonus corresponds to three times the amount of the minimum yearly old-age 1st pillar pension (in 2010: CHF 41 760). The bonus is part of the determining income for the calculation of the carer’s 1st pillar pension.

See also above at footnotes 30 and 31.

Contributions according to the OHG/LAVI/LAV (see above).

UNITED KINGDOM

Information in this Annex relates to England only. Competence for social care (benefits in kind) is devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Local authorities are responsible for identifying the needs of their local population and commissioning social care services to meet them. Services are delivered through the public, private and voluntary sector.

Applicable statutory basis

The Health and Social Care Act 2008.

The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.

Benefits in kind

1. Home care

Local authorities can provide home care, meals on wheels and special aids and equipment.

2. Semi-residential care

Local authorities can provide attendance at day care centres.

3. Residential care

Local authorities can arrange the admission to residential and nursing homes.

4. Other benefits

Local authorities can provide adaptations to the home and temporary respite care.

People on low income may be able to get help with paying for prescriptions, dental treatment, sight tests and reasonable travel costs to and from hospital.

Cash benefits

Attendance Allowance:

Higher rate: GBP £73.60 (€ 81.46). Lower rate: GBP £49.30 (€ 54.56).

A person receiving an Attendance Allowance may get extra money for severe disability paid as part of:

• a Pension Credit,

• a Housing Benefit,

• a Council Tax Benefit.

The Disability Living Allowance:

Three rates for care needs:

GBP £19.55 (€ 21.63), GBP £49.30 (€ 54.56) or GBP £73.60 (€ 81.46).

Two rates for mobility needs:

GBP £19.55 (€ 21.63) or GBP £51.40 (€ 56.88).

The receipt of a Disability Living Allowance might increase the amount of the following benefits that a person is entitled to:

• Income Support • Income-related Employment and Support Allowance;

• Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance;

• Pension Credit;

• Housing Benefit;

• Council Tax Benefit;

• Working Tax Credit;

• Child Tax Credit.

The Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance are the cash benefits payable to people with care needs. The use is at the discretion of the claimant.

Combination of benefits

No mixed benefits (but see above).

No free choice between cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Benefits for the carer

The Carers’ Allowance is payable to help people who look after someone who is disabled. They do not have to be related to or live with the person that they care for.

Amount: GBP 55.55 (€ 67) a week. Dependant additions are also available.

A person who receives a Carers’ Allowance or who has an underlying entitlement to it will qualify for the carer premium in Income Support and income-based Jobseeker's Allowance, worth up to £31.00 (€ 34.30) per week and an increased entitlement to Pension Credit.

2. National social security schemes for unemployment 2

Table 1 – Overview of Social Security Coverage for Unemployment per Country

Country	Compulsory/voluntary scheme?	Covers all employed persons?			Covers all self-employed persons?
		Yes	No	Additional details	Yes	No	Additional details
Belgium	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees and young persons who are unemployed following their training.		X	Does not cover any category of self-employed persons.
Bulgaria	Compulsory		X	- Employees who work for more than five working days or 40 hours per calendar month and assimilated groups (e.g. civil servants, employees in elective offices, judges, soldiers and military personnel, servants of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and other registered religions having clerical rank). - Paid and active members of co-operatives legally engaged by the co-operative, - Management executives and those in control of commercial companies.		X	Does not cover any category of self-employed persons 3
Czech Republic	Compulsory	✓			✓
Denmark	Voluntary	✓		Voluntary - required that the person becomes a member of an unemployment insurance fund in order to be insured. Persons who are resident in Denmark and aged between 18 and between 18 and two years below retirement age can join an unemployment insurance fund.	✓		Voluntary - required that the person becomes a member of an unemployment insurance fund in order to be insured. Persons who are resident in Denmark and aged between 18 and two years below retirement age can join an unemployment insurance fund.
Germany	Compulsory Voluntary		X	Covers all employees and trainees including young disabled persons. No compulsory insurance if income from work is marginal, less than € 450 (2013).		X	Voluntary insurance is possible for self-employed persons working at least 15 hours per week. No cover for self-employed farmers, craftsmen and retailers.
Estonia	Compulsory	✓				X	Does not cover any category of self-employed persons. However, self-employed persons may be entitled to unemployment allowance (see table 2) 4 .
Ireland	Compulsory		X	Does not cover civil and public servants recruited before April 1995 or persons earning less than €38/week.		X	No scheme for self-employed workers.
Greece	Compulsory	✓				X	No scheme for self-employed workers.
Spain	Compulsory Voluntary (for self-employed persons)	✓			✓		Voluntary
France	Compulsory Voluntary in some circumstances	✓				X	Does not cover any category of self-employed persons
Croatia 5	Compulsory	✓				X	Does not cover any category of self-employed persons 6 .
Italy	Compulsory		X	Does not cover persons working in the farming industry 7 .		X	Does not cover any category of self-employed persons.
Cyprus	Compulsory Voluntary	✓		Covers employees and voluntarily insured persons working abroad for Cypriot employers.	X		Does not cover any category of self-employed persons.
Latvia	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees		X	No scheme for self-employed workers.
Lithuania	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees		X	No scheme for self-employed workers 8 .
Luxembourg	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees, young persons who are unemployed after their studies and self-employed persons.	✓
Hungary	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees	✓		Covers all self-employed workers
Malta	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees		X	No scheme for self-employed workers
Netherlands	Compulsory Voluntary in exceptional cases	✓		Covers all employees		X	No scheme for self-employed workers
Austria	Compulsory Voluntary for self-employed persons		X	Covers all employees, freelancers, trainees and participants in vocational rehabilitation. No compulsory insurance if the income is less than €376.26/month.		X	Self-employed persons eligible for voluntary insurance: - Persons covered for old-age in accordance with Austrian legislation; - lawyers; - civil engineers. No possibility or voluntary insurance for persons over the age of 60, the age for early retirement or for persons receiving an old-age benefit 9 .
Poland	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees	✓		Covers all self-employed workers
Portugal	Compulsory Voluntary for certain categories of self-employed persons	✓				X	Voluntary scheme open to self-employed workers with business and industry activities and members of statutory bodies of corporations 10
Romania	Compulsory Voluntary for self-employed persons and Romanian citizens working abroad	✓			✓		Voluntary scheme
Slovenia	Compulsory Voluntary for certain categories	✓		Voluntary insurance in some circumstances for: - persons working abroad for a foreign employer; - persons whose employment contact is suspended; -spouses/partners of diplomats or civil servants posted abroad.	✓
Slovakia	Compulsory Voluntary for self-employed persons	✓		Covers all employees	✓		Voluntary scheme
Finland	Compulsory (basic scheme) Voluntary (income-related scheme)	✓		Covers all employees aged 17 to 64. The voluntary income-related scheme requires membership of a Finnish unemployment insurance fund.	✓		Covers all self-employed persons aged 17 to 64. The voluntary income-related scheme requires membership of a Finnish unemployment insurance fund.
Sweden	Compulsory (basic scheme) Voluntary (income-related scheme)	✓		The voluntary income-related scheme requires membership of a Swedish unemployment insurance fund.	✓		The voluntary income-related scheme requires membership of a Swedish unemployment insurance fund.
United Kingdom	Compulsory Voluntary		X	Compulsory for employees, except for those earning less than £149 a week (tax year 2013-14). These workers can choose pay voluntary National Insurance contributions 11 .			Compulsory for self-employed persons, except for those with earnings less than £5,725 (tax year 2013-14). These self-employed persons can choose to pay voluntary National Insurance contributions 12 .
Iceland	Compulsory	✓			✓
Liechtenstein	Compulsory	✓		Covers all employees and apprentices		X	No scheme for self-employed workers
Norway	Compulsory			Covers employees, freelancers.		X	Generally no scheme for self-employed workers, with the exception for fishermen.
Switzerland	Compulsory	✓				X

Sources:

Main source (unless marked otherwise)

Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC): Comparative tables on social protection , last updated July 2012

Other sources

trESS Think Tank Report (2012) on Coordination of Unemployment Benefits

trESS Analytical Support (2011) Unemployment benefits for self-employed persons - Overview of Member States' legislation concerning unemployment benefit schemes for the self-employed persons – situation 31.1.2011

Interinstitutional file 2010/0380 (COD) of 07.09.2011from the Presidency of the Council of the European Union to the Working Party on Social Questions

SSM-MOVE: Social Security on the Move: Promoting coordination on the transferability of welfare benefits within a cluster of social security institutes (2013). Information on Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania

Specific sources for Member States:

Croatia: Information provided by the Croatian Employment Service 29.04.2013

Italy: Note AC 503/12 Italy of 05.12.2012 to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

Portugal: Note AC 026/13 of 27.04.2013 from Portugal to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

United Kingdom: HM Revenue & Customs www.hmrc.gov.uk

Table 2 - Country-specific information on unemployment schemes

MS	Unemployment benefit (UB) or unemployment assistance	Legislation covered by 883/2004 13	Beneficiaries			Qualifying conditions – employment/self-employment (E) and insurance (I)	Specific conditions when receiving benefits 14	Level of benefits	Maximum duration
			Employed	Self-employed	Additional categories
BE	Unemployment benefit Allocations de chômage/werkloosheidsuitkeringen	✓ - Article 7 of the Law concerning the social security of workers - Royal Decree concerning unemployment regulation	✓	X	✓ Also covers young people who are unemployed following their training.	E+I The qualifying period varies depending on the age of the person, between 312 insured working days during the previous 18 months and 624 insured working days during the previous 36 months.	- Be involuntarily unemployed - Reside in Belgium - Possible to work part-time and receive unemployment benefit in proportion to working hours 15 .	Daily amounts: - Cohabitants with dependants: min. €42.79, max. €61.66, - Single persons: min. €35.94, max €61.66, - Cohabitants without dependants: min. €18.99, max. €61.66 16 .	Unlimited Reduction from 60% of reference earnings to 55% for single persons and 40% for cohabitants without dependants in in 2nd year of unemployment 17 .
BG	Unemployment benefits	✓ - The Social Security Code - The Employment Promotion Act	✓	X 18		E+I 9 months in the last 15 months	- Be voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed	Minimum amount BGN 7.20/day (€3.68). Maximum daily amount of benefit can never exceed 60% of the daily maximum amount of the maximum contributory income for the country, which is BGN 2,000 (€1,023) for 2012.	Maximum 12 months. Depends on the length of the insurance period: - 0 to 3 years: 4 months; - 3 to 5 years: 6 months; - 5 to 10 years:8 months - 10 to 15 year: 9 months: 15 to 20 years: 10 months; 20 to 25 years: 11 months - over 25 years:12 months
CZ	Unemployment benefit 19	✓ - Act No 435/2004 (Employment Act) - Act No 589/1992 on social security contributions and the contribution to the state employment policy - Act No 155/1995 (Pension Insurance Act)	✓	✓		E+I 12 months in past 2 years.	- Possible to undertake partial employment up to 20 hours per week and not exceeding half the minimum wage, and still receive UB 20 .	First 3 months: 50% of previous income; 40% of previous income for the remaining period. For self-employed persons the amount is calculated on the basis of previous contributions 21 .	Up to the age of 50 years: 6 months From the age of 50-55 years: 9 months Over the age of 55: 12 months 22 .
DK	Unemployment benefit (arbejdsløshedsdagpeng)	✓ Unemployment Benefit Act (Consolidation Act No 642 of 22 June 2012)	✓ Entirely voluntary UB scheme – requires membership of a Danish unemployment insurance fund	✓ Entirely voluntary UB scheme – requires membership of a Danish unemployment insurance fund	- Young people immediately after completing training of at least 18 months; - Persons in military service; - Persons holding a public office (e.g. members of Parliament) or a municipal office.	E+I: Full-time 52 weeks or part-time 34 weeks in last 3 years	- Be voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed - Reside and stay in Denmark - Specific reporting obligation: Every week confirm jobseeking activities online - Possible to work part-time and receive reduced UB in proportion to working hours (max. 30 weeks within 104 weeks) 23	90% of average earnings of last 3 months for employees. Max. DKK 801/day, 5 days/week or for part-time insured persons, max. DKK 534/day, 5 days/week. Young unemployed persons or persons after military service: 82% of max. amount after a month’s waiting period. 8.	2 years within a 3-year period. (Benefits paid 5 days/week)
DE	Unemployment benefit I (Arbeitslosengeld I)	✓ Social Code, Book III (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB III) of 24.3.1997	✓	X		E+I: 12 months in the 2 years. Also other periods than insured employment can be taken into account, e.g. periods of military or civil service, periods when the person has received social security benefits for e.g. maternity, sickness, or injury 24 .	- Involuntary or voluntary unemployment; - Possible to work part-time as employed or self-employed while receiving UB, as long as the hours do not exceed 15 hours/week. The income work reduces the amount of UB, unless it is below €165/month 25 .	Benefits based on previous salary (average daily salary during the last year), fiscal category and whether the person has any children. 60%, or 67% for persons with children, of net earnings Max. amount €78.83/day or €2364.90/month No min. amount, but possibility to receive supplementary benefits 26 .	Between 6 and 24 months, depending on the length of the previous insurance period and the person's age. The maximum entitlement of 24 months applies to persons who have completed insurance periods of 48 months and are aged over 58 years 27 .
DE	Unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II)	✓ (SNCB) Social Code, Book II (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB II) of 24.12.2003	✓	✓	✓	N/A Needs-orientated and means-tested	- Resident in Germany. 28 - Persons who have marginal employment (minijob) of up to €450/month are exempt from tax and compulsory social insurance contributions. The income from the minijob will be taken into account for the calculation of the benefit 29 .	Persons receive benefits securing their subsistence. Normal requirements according to legislation: - Adults: €345/month - Singles, single parents, as well as adults with a underage partner: €382/month Additional supplements for children, depending on their age 30 .	In principle unlimited if the conditions of eligibility are met. However, the benefit is usually granted for 6 months, after that the entitlement will be assessed again.
			All persons aged 15-65/67 years capable of work, including self-employed persons and persons who have exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit II.
EE	Unemployment insurance benefit (töötuskindlustushüvitis)	✓ - Unemployment Insurance Act, - Labour Market Services and Benefits Act	✓	X		E+I: 12 months in last 36 months	- Involuntarily unemployed; - Resident in Estonia	Max. €34.02/day for first 100 calendar days, after this max. €27.22/day Min. amount = half the national minimum wage.	Max.360 calendar days, depending on length of insurance period: - Less than 56 months: 180 180 calendar days; -more than 56 months, but less than 111 months: 270 calendar days; - 111 months or more: 360 calendar days.
EE	Unemployment allowance (töötutoetus)	✓ (SNCB) Labour Market Services and Benefits Act	✓	✓	✓	E: 80 calendar days of work activity over the 12 months before registration as unemployed Also other periods of full-time studies can be taken into account 31 .	Same as for unemployment insurance benefit, but unemployment can either be voluntary or involuntary.	€101.68/month (flat rate)	270 days 210 days if less than 180 days remain to pension age
			Unemployed persons who do not qualify for the unemployment insurance benefit, who have worked or finished full-time studies, and who have an income that is less than the allowance.
IE	Jobseeker’s benefit	✓ Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended) Part 2 Chapter 12	✓	X		I: 104 weekly contributions paid; and 39 weekly contributions paid or credited in last during the relevant contribution year preceding the benefit year, of which a minimum of 13 must be paid contributions. The latter requirement may be satisfied by contributions paid in some other contribution years, or 26 weekly contributions paid in each of the two relevant tax years preceding the benefit year.	Involuntarily unemployed	Flat-rate benefit, maximum of €188/week (gros). Increase for adult dependant: €124.80/week	312 days but limited to 234 days if the person has paid less than 260 weekly contributions. (Benefits paid 6 days/week)
IE	Jobseeker’s allowance	✓ (SNCB) Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, Part 3, Chapter 2	✓	✓	All residents	No qualifying period Subject to a means and residence test.	Same as for persons receiving UB	Flat rate, maximum of €188/week (gros) For new claimants aged 18 to 21 years: €100/week or aged 22-24 years: €144/week (not applicable if an increase for a child dependant is payable). Other increases for spouse/partner	Not defied in time
GR	Unemployment benefit	✓ Legislative Decree 2961/1954 on the establishment of an employment and unemployment insurance organisation - Law 1545/1985 on a national system to protect against unemployment and other provisions - Law 1836/1989 promoting employment and vocational training and other provisions - Law 1892/1990 on modernisation and development, and other provisions - Law 3552/4.4.07 setting up a special social solidarity fund and other provisions - Law 3986/2011 on emergency measures to implement the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy Framework for the period 2012-2015.	✓	X	Young people aged 20-29 who are new on the labour market	E +I: 125 days in last 14 months or 200 days in last 2 years. - For first time claimants, additional requirement: 80 days/year in last 2 years. - Persons employed in tourism or other seasonal professions: 100 days in last 12 months.	- Be unemployed involuntarily; - Register within 60 days - The person can work 3 days/week or 12 days/month when receiving UB	Calculated on the basis of daily earnings, in relation to daily earnings of a blue-collar worker. Basic rate €360/month. 10% increase for each family dependant.	5 to 12 months, depending on the previous period of employment, age and profession 32 . From 1 January 2013 the UB period cannot exceed 450 days in a four-year period and from 1 January 2014 it cannot exceed 400 days in a four-year period 33 .
GR	Long-term unemployment benefit 34	c.f. above	✓	✓		E/I: N/A Means-tested		€200/month For persons with dependants increased by €587 per child.	12 months
			For persons who have exhausted their entitlement to UB
ES	Unemployment benefit (prestación por desempleo)	✓ -Royal Legislative Decree 1/1994 of 20 June 1994 approving the recast General Social Security Act. - Royal Decree 625/1985 of 2 April 1985 implementing Law 31/1984 of 2 August 1984 on unemployment protection. - Royal Decree 1369/2006 of 24 November 2006 regulating the active integration benefits programme for unemployed people with special economic needs and difficulties in finding work.	✓	X		9.I: 360 days in the past six years	- Involuntary unemployed - Part-time employment, but not self-employment, is allowed while receiving UB. The amount of benefit is reduced in proportion to working hours.	Based on contributions.in the last 180 days. 70 % of the regulatory base over the first six months, and then 60%. Amount for persons without children: Min.: €497/month Max. €1087.20/month. Amount for persons with children: Min. €664.74/month. Max. €1242.52/ month (one child) or €1397.83 (two or more children) 35 .	From a min. of 4 months (120 days) to a max. of 2 years (720 days), depending the contributions paid in the last six years.
ES	Unemployment benefit for self-employed persons (Prestación por cese de actividad de los trabajadores autónomos)	✓ - Law 32/2010 of 5 August 2010 setting up a specific system of protection for self-employed persons in the event of cessation of activity.	X	✓ (voluntary)		10.I: 12 months	Not possible to work as employed or self-employed while receiving UB.	Based on previous contributions in the last 12 months. 70% of the regulatory base. Amount also varies depending on whether the person has dependent children.	From a min. of 2 months to max. of 12 months, depending the contributions paid in the last 48 months 36 .
ES	Unemployment allowance (subsidio por desempleo)	✓	✓	✓	✓	N/A if the person has fulfilled the qualifying period above for contribution-based UB. General conditions for others: I: 3 months for persons with dependants, 6 months for persons without dependants Depending on the person’s situation, other specific criteria also apply. 37		Amount varies depending on the person’s situation	Normally 6 months, possible to extend for further 6-month months, up to a total of 18 months.
			Persons who have exhausted the entitlement to UB and have family dependants or is over 45 years old - Persons who do not qualify for contribution-based UB - Unemployed persons who previously have received incapacity benefit
FR	Unemployment benefit (L’Allocation d’aide au Retour à l’Emploi (ARE))	- UNEDIC unemployment insurance scheme - Legislation concerning solidarity allowances for unemployed persons According to Missoc table: Art. L. 5422-1 to L. 5422-24 of Labour Code (Code du travail)	✓	X		I/E: At least 122 days of insurance or 610 working hours in last 28 months (36 months for persons aged 50 and over).	- As a main rule, involuntarily unemployed, although some reasons for voluntary resignation are legitimate - Resident in France - Possible to work part-time and receive reduced UB in proportion to working hours 38 .	40.4% of reference daily wages + fixed amount of €11.57/day or 57.4% of the reference daily wages (max. 75% of reference daily wages). Min. €28.21/day (or less if working part-time) 39 .	Between 4 months and 24 months or 36 months (for persons aged 50 and over), depending on the length of the insurance period.
FR	Unemployment assistance/special solidarity allowance (L’Allocation de Solidarité Spécifique (ASS))	UNEDIC unemployment insurance scheme - Legislation concerning solidarity allowances for unemployed persons According to Missoc table: Art. L. 5422-1 to L. 5422-24 of Labour Code (Code du travail)	✓	Certain unemployed persons (artists, fishermen, etc.)	✓	E: 5 years’ employment within a 10-year reference period Periods treated as work: Training periods and military service Means-tested: income less than €1094.10 for a single person or €1719.30 for couples	The allowance can be combined with employment or self-employment under certain conditions 40 .	Means-tested, max. €15.63/day	6 months, renewable
			Long-term unemployed persons who have exhausted their entitlement to UB Unemployed persons over 50 years can opt for the assistance instead of UB.
FR	Unemployment assistance /Temporary waiting period allowance (L’Allocation Temporaire d'Attente (ATA))	UNEDIC unemployment insurance scheme - Legislation concerning solidarity allowances for unemployed persons According to Missoc table: Art. L. 5422-1 to L. 5422-24 of Labour Code (Code du travail)	- Certain categories of foreigners, e.g. asylum seekers - Former prisoners - Employed expatriates who on return to France cannot claim UB			Apart from a common condition to register as a jobseeker, different conditions apply depending on the person's situation (e.g. asylum seeker, former prisoner, returning expat) 41		€11.01/day	12 months
HR 42	Unemployment benefit	N/A	✓	X 43		I: 9 months in last 24 months	- Involuntary unemployment - Registration with employment service within a legal deadline of 30 days - Specific reporting obligation: Report to the employment service in person once a month	- For the first 90 days: 70% of reference earnings, max. amount of UB HRK 3834.60/ €504/month, - For the remaining period: 35% of average earnings, max. amount HRK 1917.30/€250 /month Min. amount: HRK 1125.60/€148 /month	Between 90 days and 450 days, depending on how long the person has previously been employed (90 days if 9 months in the last 2 years). - A person who has worked for more than 32 years has a longer entitlement until he/she finds employment or retires
IT	Unemployment benefit (Indennità di disoccupazione ASpI) 44	✓ Law n. 92 of 28 June 2012	✓	X		I: 52 weeks in last 2 years Periods of maternity or paternity leave or periods of caring for sick children under the age of 8 years can under some circumstances also be taken into account.	- As a main rule, involuntary unemployed, although some reasons for mutual consent of termination of contact are acceptable, e.g. if the person's place of work is transferred more than 50 km away or an average of more than 80 minutes by public transport. - Apply for UB within a legal deadline (period depends on reason for end of employment). - Possible to carry out ancillary and temporary work, as long as the income does not exceed €3000 euros (after pension contributions).	- 75% of monthly reference earnings in last 2 years - Reduced to 60% of reference earnings after 6 months - Reduced 45% of reference earnings after 12 months Maximum: €1.119.32/month	Depends on age and year of payment, currently 8- - Aged under 50 years: 8 months (2013 and 2014, 10 months (2015) - Aged 50-54 years: 12 months (2013, 2014 and 2015) - Aged over 55 years: 12 months (2013), 14 months (2014) and 16 months (2015). From 2016: 12 months for persons aged under 55 years and 18 months for persons aged above 55
IT	Mini Unemployment benefit (Mini Indennità di disoccupazione Mini-ASpI 45 )	✓ Law n. 92 of 28 June 2012	✓	X	For persons who do not qualify for normal UB.	I: 13 weeks in last 12 months Periods of maternity or paternity leave or periods of caring for sick children under the age of 8 years can under some circumstances also be taken into account.	As above	As above	6 months
CY	Unemployment benefits	✓ - The Social Insurance Act of 2010 (Act 59(I)/2010) - The Social Insurance (Benefits) Regulations of 2010 (RAA 288/10) - The Social Insurance (Contributions) Regulations of 2010 (RAA 289/2010) - The Social Insurance (Fund Accounts) Regulations of 2010 (RAA 290/2010)		X	Persons working abroad for Cypriot employers can be voluntarily insured.	I +E - 26 weeks of employment; - paid basic insurance equal to at least 26 times the weekly basic insurable earnings of €170.88 per week; and - paid and/or assimilated insurance in the relevant contribution year at least equal to 20 times the weekly amount of basic insurable earnings. In order to re-qualify for UB after the first entitlement, 26 weeks' employment, or 13 weeks for persons over the age of 60, is required following the end of entitlement	- Be voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed - not engaged in work that pays more than 1/12 of the amount of the basic insurable earnings (€14.24/ day)	The UB consists of a basic and a supplementary benefit.	156 days
LV	Unemployment benefit (Bezdarbnieka pabalsts)	- Law of 1 October 1997 on state social insurance - Law of 25 November 1999 on unemployment insurance - Law of 9 May 2002 on support for unemployed persons and job-seekers - Law of 16 June 2009 on the payment of State benefits during the 2009-14 period - Cabinet Regulation No 866 of 21 October 2008 on arrangements for calculating the average wage on which insurance contributions are based for the purposes of determining the level of unemployment benefit and arrangements for awarding, calculating and paying unemployment and death benefits - Cabinet Regulation No 230 of 5 June 2001 laying down rules on compulsory contributions in respect of state social insurance from the general state budget and from special budgets for state social insurance	✓	X		I: 9 months in last 12 months	- Voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed	Rate between 50% and 100%; depends on the insurance period, the income on the basis of which unemployment contributions have been paid and also on the duration of the UB. No ceiling	Depends on the insurance record: - 1-9 years: 4 months; - 10-19 years: 6 months; - more than 20 years: 9 months.
LT	Unemployment Insurance Benefit (Nedarbo draudimo išmoka)	✓ - Law No IX-1904 of the Republic of Lithuania of 16 December 2003 on social insurance for unemployment	✓	X		I: 18 months within the last 36 months	- Voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed	Maximum: LTL650 (€188).	Depends on the length of the insurance period: - Less than 25 years: 6 months - 25 - 30 years: 7 months - 30 - 35 years: 8 months - 35 years and over: 9 month
LU	Unemployment benefit (Indemnitié de chômage)	✓ Labour Code, Volume V – Employment and unemployment, Chapter II – Full unemployment benefits - Labour Code, Volume V – Employment and unemployment, Chapter III – Compensatory allowance for loss of wages as a result of bad weather and for intermittent or partial unemployment - Articles 3 to 10 of the Act establishing an employment fund and regulating the granting of full unemployment benefits of 30 June 1976	✓	✓	Young unemployed persons after their studies	Employees: E+I: 26 weeks, at least 16 hours/week, in the last 1 year. Self-employed persons: E+I: Insured self-employment for 2 years, but also periods of employment can be taken into account, as long as the person was self-employed for 6 months before the claim for benefit. N/A for young persons The reference period can be prolonged in some cases, e.g. detention or period of receiving unemployment benefits.	- Voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed - Resident in Luxembourg	Calculated on earnings during the 3 months which precede unemployment. 80% of previous gross earnings or 85% for persons with dependent children. Max. amount: €4685.48/month, reduced to €3748.38/month after 9 months 46 .	365 calendar days during a reference period of 24 months. Prolongations in some cases, e.g. for persons particularly difficult to place (+182 days) or persons over 50 years of age (+6, 9 or12 months).
HU	Job-seeker Benefit (Álláskeresési járadék)	? - Act No IV of 1991 on the promotion of employment and on unemployment benefits - Decree No 2/2011 of 4 January 2011 of the Minister for National Economy on registration and deletion from the register of job seekers	✓	✓		I: 360 days in last 3 years	- Voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed	Generally 60% of the average earnings in 4 previous quarters of the year. Max. gross amount of HUF 98000 (€360)/month, the same as monthly min. wage 47	90 days, depending on the length of the insurance period in the last 3 years. 10 days of paid contributions=1 day of UB Minimum: 36 days
MT	Unemployment Benefit (Beneficcju ghal dizimpjieg) or means-tested Special Unemployment Benefit (Beneficcju specjali ghal dizimpjieg)		✓	X		I: 50 weeks of at least 20 in the last two years.	Involuntarily or voluntarily unemployed	Flat rate benefits not based on earnings Married persons: €11.26/day or single persons €7.37/day Means-tested special UB paid to persons who are head of a household: - Married or single parent: €18.92/day: - Other persons: €12.35/day. Benefit paid for 6 days/week.	156 days (paid for 6 days/week)
MT	Unemployment assistance		✓	✓		N/A Means-tested		Means-tested €98.15/week with supplement of €8.15/week for every additional unemployed person in the household 48 .	Not stated
			For persons who are the head of a household
NL	Unemployment Benefit (Werkloosheidsuitkering)	✓ - Unemployment Benefits Act - Income Support (Older Unemployed Workers) Act - Income Support (Older and Partially Incapacitated Unemployed Workers) Act	✓	X		E+I: 26 weeks in last 36 weeks. Shorter requirement for musicians, film employees and artists: 16 weeks in last 39 weeks 49	- Involuntarily unemployed - Resident in the Netherlands - Possible to work part-time and receive reduced rate of UB under certain conditions. - After 3 months, the employment service checks whether the person has tried hard enough to find work: if not UB is reduced. - Temporary exemptions to look for work include voluntary work for 20 hours/week and providing informal care 50 .	75% of the last daily wage (maximum of €193.09) during the first two months, 70% thereafter.	Maximum 38 months, depending on the length of previous employment Minimum 3 months (for persons who meet the minimum week requirement)
NL	Supplementary unemployment benefit (Bovenwettelijke werkloosheidsuitkering)t	✓ (SNCB) Supplementary Benefits Act	✓	X	For persons whose UB is lower than the guaranteed minimum income.	As above Means-tested	As above	Means-tested supplement to UB above	As above
AT	Unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld)	✓ Unemployment Insurance Act No 609/1977	✓	✓ (voluntary)		I+E: 52 weeks of insurance periods within the last 24 months. For persons under the age of 25: 26 weeks within the last 12 months. If repeated UB claim: 28 weeks within preceding 12 months.	- Involuntarily or voluntarily unemployed. - Possible to work part-time and receive UB as long as the income from employment does not exceed €376.26/month. Special provisions exist for short-term employment for less than one month and for self-employment.	60% of previous average daily income or 80 % for persons entitled to family supplements. Maximum amount: €47.19/day 51 Family supplement of €0.97/day for children and spouse/partner	Generally 20, 30, 39 or a maximum of 52 weeks depending on the person's insurance period and age. Following vocational rehabilitation: 78 weeks
AT	Unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe) Unemployment Insurance Act No 609/1977	✓ Unemployment Insurance Act No 609/1977	✓	✓		N/A Means-tested	Same as for UB	92% (in some cases 95%) of the basic amount of unemployment benefit. I After 6 months the level depends on the length of the previous UB entitlement.	52 weeks but may be extended indefinitely 52 .
			For persons who have exhausted the entitlement to UB.
AT	"Bridging Benefits" (Überbrückungshilfe 53 )	✓ Bridging Benefits Act No 174/1964 as amended, and corresponding provisions for public servants	Specific benefit for Austrian civil servants who are not covered by the general unemployment scheme			Same as for unemployment benefit and unemployment allowance	Same as for unemployment benefit and unemployment allowance	Same as for unemployment benefit and unemployment allowance	Same as for unemployment benefit and unemployment allowance
PL	Unemployment Allowance (Zasiłek dla bezrobotnych) Law on Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions of 20 April 2004.	✓ Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions Act of 20 April 2004	✓	✓		E+I: 365 calendar in last 18 months	- Involuntary unemployed	Depending upon the length of economic activity: - 1 to 5 years of work: 80% - 5 to 20 years: 100% 20 years and more: 120% Basic Unemployment Allowance: PLN794.20 (€188)/month for a period of 3 months, PLN623.60 (€148) thereafter.	- 6 months in areas with unemployment rate less than 150% of the national average. - 12 months in areas with an unemployment rate of at least 150% or more of the national average. - 12 months if the claimant has a qualifying period of 20 years and is over 50 years old. - 12 months if the claimant's spouse is unemployed, not entitled to an allowance and they have at least one dependent child under the age of 15 years.
PT	Unemployment benefit (subsídio de desemprego)	- Unemployment benefits scheme for employees – Decree Law No 220/2006 of 3 November 2006 - Unemployment benefits scheme for economically dependent self-employed workers – Decree Law No 65/2012 of 15 March 2012 - Unemployment benefits scheme for self-employed workers performing business activities, managers and administrators - Decree Law No 12/2013 of 25 January 2013 - Unemployment benefits scheme for teachers of public-sector primary and secondary schools – Decree Law No 67/2000 of 26 April 2000 and the Code of Contributory Schemes - Unemployment benefits for military personnel serving under contract or on a voluntary basis covered by the convergent social protection scheme – Decree Law No 320-A/2000 - Unemployment benefits for all other public administration employees – Law No 11/2008 of 20 February 2008.	✓	✓		E+I: 450 days in 24 months	- Involuntary unemployed - Resident in Portugal - In case of part-time work, possible to receive reduced level of UB	65% of reference earnings, reduced by 10% after 180 days Increased by 10% for persons with unemployed partner/spouse and persons who are single parents.	Amount depends on the length of insurance period and age. - less than 30 years: 270 -260 days - 30-40 years: 360-540 days - 40-45 years: 540-720 days - 45-50 years: 900 days Additional days also possible for long E+I periods
PT	Unemployment assistance (subsídio social de desemprego)	Social security benefits for those persons not covered by any other social protection scheme – Decree Law No 160/80 of 27 May 1980,	✓	✓		E: 180 days in 12 months Means-tested	As above
			Persons who have exhausted their entitlement to UB or do not qualify for UB
RO	Unemployment benefit (indemnizatie de soma)	✓ - Law No 76 of 16 January 2002 on the unemployment insurance system and the stimulation of employment - Government Decision No 174 of 20 February 2002 approving implementing rules for Law No 76/2002 on the unemployment insurance system and the stimulation of employment	✓	✓ (voluntary)		I: 12 months in 24 months No qualifying period for graduates	- Involuntarily unemployed - Resident in Romania	Amount depends on the length of insurance period and the average gross earnings in the last 12 months. No ceiling	6, 9 or 12 months, depending on the length of the insurance period. - 6 months if insurance period is 1 year; - 9 months is the insurance period is 5 years; - 12 months of the insurance period is 10 years and over 54 .
SI	Unemployment benefit (denarno nadomestilo za primer brezposelnost)	✓ Labour Market Regulation Act of 28 September 2010	✓	✓		I: 9 months in the last 24 months	- Voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed 55 - Benefits can be paid to persons who work part-time as long as they seek full-time work. The benefit is reduced is reduced proportionally.	Average monthly earnings (no ceiling) in the last 8 months 80% of reference earnings in the first 3 months, then 60% and after 12 months 50% Minimum: €350/month gross maximum: €892.50/month gross	3 to 12 months, depending on the length of the insurance period and whether the person is over 50/55 years old
SK	Unemployment benefit (Dávka v nezamestnanosti)	✓ - Act No 461/2003 of 30 October 2003 on social insurance - Act No 5/2004 of 4 December 2004 on employment services	✓	✓		I: 2 years in the last 3 years 2 years in the last 4 years in case of insured temporary employment or voluntary insurance from an activity other than as an employee 56	- Be involuntarily unemployed	Based on gross earnings of last 2 years. 50 % of reference earnings times the number of days of the month. Ceiling of 3 times the national average monthly wage.	6 months (4 months for employees on fixed-term contracts).
FI	Unemployment benefit, either 1.basic unemployment allowance (peruspäiväraha) or 2.earnings-related unemployment allowance (ansiopäiväraha) for those who are voluntarily insured (members of a Finnish unemployment fund).	✓ Unemployment Allowances Act (30.12.2002/1290	✓	✓	?	1. Basic unemployment allowance (E): - Employees: 34 weeks in last 28 months, at least 18 hours/week. - Self-employed persons: 18 months in last 48 months. 2. Earnings-related insurance (E+I): The person must additionally have been insured as a member of an unemployment fund	Resident in Finland Partial unemployment: Persons can work part-time as employed (max. 80%) or self-employed, or two weeks full-time, and receive adjusted basic or earnings-related unemployment allowance 57 .	1. Basic unemployment allowance: €32.46/day (2013), paid 5 days/week 2. Earnings-related allowance €32.46/day + 45% of the difference between the daily wage and the basic allowance. For both allowances, there are family supplements for persons with children under 18 years of age. 58	500 days (5 days/week) Older unemployed persons who meet the qualifying condition regarding previous employment are eligible for an extended unemployment allowance.
FI	Labour market support (työmarkkinatuki)	✓ (SNCB) Act on Labour Protection (30.12.2002/1290)	✓	✓	✓	No qualifying period	Resident in Finland Certain restrictions apply for persons under the age of 25, e.g. must not reject vocational training offered. Waiting period of 5 months for those who have not completed vocational training 59 .	Flat rate of €32.46/day (2013), paid 5 days/week 60 . Means-tested, apart from during first 180 days after UB exhaustion. Family supplements if children under 18 years of age.	Unlimited
			Unemployed persons who either do not fulfill the conditions for unemployment benefit or have exhausted their entitlement.
SE	Unemployment benefit, paid either from the general basic insurance (grundförsäkring) or the voluntary income-related insurance (inkomstbortfallsförsäkring) 61	✓ Act (1997:238) on unemployment insurance	✓	✓		E (+I - everyone who works in SE is covered by basic insurance): 6 months' employment or self-employment, at 80 hours/month or 480 hours during six consecutive months with at least 50 hours in each month, in the last 12 months. I+E: In order to receive income-related benefits the person must additionally have been member of a Swedish unemployment insurance fund for at least 12 months (paid contributions).	- Involuntarily or voluntary unemployed - Persons who are partially unemployed and work part-time are entitled to partial benefits in proportion to their working hours - Specific reporting obligation: Declaration card to be sent to fund, usually every two weeks 62	Basic benefit: Flat rate, max. SEK 320 gross/day. No minimum amount; can be less if the person worked part-time Income-related: based on previous earnings in the last 12 months: - First 200 days: 80%. - Day 201-300 (or 450 for persons with children under 18 years old): 70%. Maximum of SEK 680 gross/day.	300 days or 450 days for persons with children under the age of 18 (benefits paid for 5 days/week) Days when activity support 63 have been paid are deducted. Persons who are partially unemployed and work part-time are only entitled to a maximum of 75 days.
SE	Activity grant (aktivitetsstöd) Ordinance (1996:1100) on Activity Grant	X Considered as benefit paid during activation measures rather than UB. As it is coordinated with UB, in terms of duration and levels of benefits, it has been included here.	✓	✓	✓	N/A – See conditions above for persons who previously received unemployment benefits.		Same level as for UB, if the person is a member of an unemployment insurance fund, i.e. maximum SEK 680 gross/day (see above). Reduced depending on number of days of UB or activity grant paid (see above). If the UB period has been exhausted after 300/450 days, 65% of reference earnings is paid. For persons who have not been a member of a fund or never qualified for UB, the basic level is SEK 223 gross/day, 5 days/week.	Depends on the length of the programme.
			Paid to persons in labour market programmes: - Job and Development Programme, for persons who have exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefits of 300/450 days; - Job Guarantee for Young People, for persons under the age of 25, after 90 days' registration with the employment service, regardless of whether or not they are entitled to unemployment benefits; - Other labour market programmes that persons can be referred if motivated, regardless of whether or not they are entitled to unemployment benefits.
UK	Contribution-based Jobseekers Allowance (JSA)	✓ - The Jobseekers Act 1995 - The Jobseekers (Northern Ireland) Order 1995	✓	X	Some 16 and 17-year can claim benefits in exceptional case	I: 1 year in last 2 tax years amounting to at least 26 times the minimum weekly contribution for that year, and contributions paid or credited in both the appropriate tax years amounting to a total of at least 50 times the minimum weekly contribution for that year.	- involuntarily unemployed - work on average less than 16 hours/week - Resident in Great Britain (England, Scotland, Wales) or in Northern Ireland, depending on where the benefit is claimed - Specific reporting obligation: attend interviews at the employment service every two weeks	Flat rate benefit, varying according to age - Aged 18-24: £56.80/week; - Aged 25 or over: £71.10/week 64	182 days (approximately 6 months)
UK	Income-based Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) 65	✓ (SNCB) - The Jobseekers Act 1995 - The Jobseekers (Northern Ireland) Order 1995.	✓	✓		N/A Mean-tested benefit and the person must be habitually resident in the UK	Main conditions as for contribution-based JSA. In addition, it is means-tested and the person and his/her partner may not work more than 24 hours/week. Special rules may apply to persons under 18 years old.	Amount varies according to family circumstances and income. Basic levels: - Singles under 25: £56.80/week - Singles over 25: £71.70/week - Couples (both aged 18 and over): £112.55/week - Lone parent under 18: £56.80 - Lone parent 18 and over: £71.70 66	Unlimited as long as entitlement conditions are satisfied.
IS	Unemployment benefit (atvinnuleysisdagpeningar), basic flat-rate and or earnings-related benefits	Unemployment Insurance Act No. 54/2006 of June 2006. Act on Labour Market Measures No 55/2006 of June 2006 67 .	✓	✓		E: A minimum of 3 months, at least 25% of full-time, during 12 months for minimum entitlement 68 . 12 months for the maximum entitlement E+I: Self-employed persons must additionally have paid social security contributions to be entitled to benefits.	- Involuntarily or voluntary unemployed - Resident and present in Iceland (only allowed to go abroad if holding a PD U2) -Persons who are partially unemployed and work part-time are entitled to partial benefits in proportion to their working hours.	- For the first 10 days basic flat-rate benefits are paid, a minimum of ISK 43152/month and a maximum of ISK 17260/month. - After this income-related benefits are paid for 3 months. For employed persons the amount is 70% of average earnings in a 6-month period ending 2 months before the unemployment. For self-employed persons the amount is 70% of average earnings in the last year. Maximum of ISK 272113/month. After three months, basic flat-rate benefits are paid again Supplement for children under 18 years old: ISK 6904/child 69	3 years (Benefits paid 5 days/week)
LI	Unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosenentschädigung) In addition, unemployment benefits paid due to partial or intermittent unemployment, either for financial reasons (Kurzarbeitsentschädigung) 70 or due to bad weather Schlechtwetterentschädigung) 71	- Act on unemployment insurance and allowances in case of insolvency of 24 November 2010, LGBl. 2010 No. 452. - Ordinance to the Act on unemployment Insurance and allowances in case of insolvency of 14 December 2010, LGBl. 2010 No. 465 72	✓	X	Apprentices	I: 12 months in 2 years 11.Also persons exempt from paying contributions due to e.g. sickness, maternity leave or training can under some circumstances qualify for entitlement unemployment benefit for a duration of 130 days 73 . For other type of short-term or partial UB (see left column, a range of other conditions apply, e.g. only employees in certain professions can receive the bad weather benefit 74 . Can only be paid for max 18 month during a period of 2 years.	- Involuntary or voluntary unemployed - Resident in Liechtenstein - Possible to work part-time while receiving unemployment benefit.	70% or 80% of last gross earnings. 70% if the person - has no dependant children under the age of 25 - receives full unemployment benefits of more than CHF140 (€117)/day, and - does not receive invalidity benefit. For short-term or partial UB (see left column): 80% of reference earnings.	130-500 days within a two-year period, depending on age and contribution period. - 130 days if exempt from paying contributions - 200 days if under 25 years and without dependants: - 260 if insured for 12 months and over 25 years: - 400 days if insured for 18 months and over 50 years; - 500 days if insured for 22 month and in receipt of an invalidity pension of at least 40%
NO	Unemployment benefits 75 National Insurance Act of 28 February 1997	✓ National Insurance Act of 28 February 1997	✓	X	Fishermen	Income requirement: income from employment of at NOK 123,183 (€16,263) in the previous calendar year, or at least NOK 82,122 (€10,842) in the last 3 calendar years. Parental benefit, pregnancy benefit and sickness benefits in connection with pregnancy also count as income from work and are included in the minimum income requirement.	- Voluntary or involuntary unemployment - Stay in Norway - Possible to work part-time and unemployment benefits in proportion to the reduction of working hours - Report to employment service every two weeks by sending in a report in which the person declares any hours of work, illness, studies etc.	Income in the previous calendar year, or, when more favourable, the yearly average over the last 3 calendar years. Ceiling: 6 times the Basic Amount NOK 492,732 (€65.051). Child supplement of NOK 17 (€2.24)/day for each dependent child under 18 Holiday supplement of 9.5% of daily benefits.	52 or 104 weeks depending on income from employment: - Maximum 104 weeks if income at least NOK 164,244 - 52 weeks of employment income of less than NOK 164,244 but higher than NOK 82,122 Persons whose working hours are reduced by 40% due to redundancy can receive benefits form 52 weeks within a 18 month-period. Benefits paid 5 days/week
CH	Unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosenentschädigung/indemnités de chômage)		✓	X		I: 12 months within 2 years. Certain persons are exempted from the contribution period conditions.	- Resident in Switzerland -Possible to work part-time and receive UB	70% or 80% of last gross earnings. 70% if the person - has no dependent children under the age of 25 - receives full unemployment benefits of more than CHF 140 (€117)/day, and - does not receive invalidity benefit. 80% of the relevant loss of salary taken into consideration. UB is paid for a maximum of 18 months over a 2-year period.	90-200 days, depending on age and contribution period. - 90 days for persons exempt from paying contributions; - 200 days for persons under 25 with no dependants; - 260 days if insured for at least 12 months; - 400 days if insured for at least 18 months; - 520 days if above 55 years and insured for 22 months; - 520 days if in receipt of an invalidity pension of at least 40%.

Sources:

Main source (unless indicated otherwise)

Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC): Comparative tables on social protection , last updated July 2012

Other sources

Declarations by Member States 2013 pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004

trESS Think Tank Report (2012) on Coordination of Unemployment Benefits

Interinstitutional file 2010/0380 (COD) of 07.09.2011 from the Presidency of the Council of the European Union to the Working Party on Social Questions

SSE-MOVE: Social Security on the Move: Promoting coordination on the transferability of welfare benefits within a cluster of social security institutes (2013). Information on Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania

PES-Benchmarking PES-Benchmarking Conditionality questionnaire on conditions to receive services and/or benefits on conditions to receive services and/or benefits www.pes-benchmarking.eu/uploaddoc4852/235_WS_Vienna_Feb13_Whitepaper_Conditionality_WIFO_AT.pdf and questionnaire

Specific sources for Member States:

Belgium:

Belgian National Employment Office (ONEM/RVA): www.onem.be

Missoc country guide, Your social security rights in Belgium, available on DG EMPL Social Security Coordination website , last updated July 2012

Czech Republic:

Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs www.mpsv.cz/en/1604#loe

Denmark

Danish government portal for citizens www.borger.dk

Germany:

Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de

Estonia:

Eesti töötukassa: www.tootukassa.ee

Greece:

Greek Manpower Employment Organization (OAED): www.oaed.gr

Note AC 496/12 of Greece to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

France

Pôle emploi www.pole-emploi.fr

Croatia:

Information by e-mail from Croatian Employment Service 29.04.2012

Spain:

Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal, www.sepe.es

Italy:

Istituto Nazionale Previdenza (INPS) www.inps.it

Note AC 503/12 of Italy to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

Luxembourg:

Luxembourgish government www.guichet.lu

Malta:

Maltese government Maltese government gov.mt

The Netherlands

Dutch government website www.government.nl

Austria:

Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS) www.ams.at

Portugal:

Note AC 026/13 of 27.04.2013 from Portugal to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

Slovakia

Slovak Social Insurance Agency www.socpoist.sk

Finland:

Kela www.kela.fi

Finnish Federation of Unemployment Funds www.tyi.fi

Sweden:

Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen): www.arbetsformedlingen.se

Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Forsakringskassan) www.fk.se (on Activity Grant)

United Kingdom

England, Scotland and Wales government www.gov.uk/jobseekers-allowance and www.gov.uk/universal-credit

HM Revenue & Customs www.hmrc.gov.uk

Northern Ireland government hwww.nidirect.gov.uk/index/information-and-services/money-tax-and-benefits/benefits-and-financial-support/employed-or-looking-for-work/benefits-and-help-when-looking-for-work.htm

Iceland:

Icelandic Directorate of Labour (Vinnumálastofun) www.vinnumalastofnun.is

Liectenstein

Landesverwaltung Fürstentum Liechtenstein www.llv.li/

Norway:

Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) www.nav.no

3.Family benefits

	Child benefit	Child-raising allowances	Child care allowances	Birth and adoption grants	Allowance for single parents	Special allowances for children with disabilities	Advance on maintenance payments	Other allowances
Austria	Universal scheme for all residents financed by employers' contributions and taxes providing Child benefit (Familienbeihilfe)	Child-raising allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld) The Income-related Child-raising allowance (einkommensabhängiges Kinderbetreuungsgeld)	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Flat-rate Child-raising allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld): YES Tax credit for single parents (Alleinerzieherabsetzbetrag): YES	Child benefit (Familienbeihilfe) YES	YES	Accommodation and housing allowances according to the Minimum Resources Acts of the Länder. Child tax credit (Kinderabsetzbetrag) Supplement to the flat-rate Child-raising allowance (Beihilfe zum pauschalen Kinderbetreuungsgeld): Families with low income are granted a supplement
Belgium	Compulsory social insurance scheme financed by a federal grant and covering any person considered as active with lump-sum benefits or working as self-employed.	Parental leave	No special allowance.	Birth grant (allocation de naissance/kraamgeld). Adoption grant (prime d'adoption/adoptiepremie)	No special allowance.	Supplementary allowance for children	No special allowance.	When a child is put under the care of a private person through or at the expense of a public authority. Supplement called back-to-school grant. Annual amounts for children with a supplement for single parent families and a social supplement and who are disabled
Bulgaria	A universal system financed by the State budget providing flat-rate benefits to all beneficiaries.	Part of the contribution-funded scheme providing flat-rate benefit for raising a young child (Обезщетение за отглеждане на малко дете) or for adoption of a child between 2 and 5 years of age ( Обезщетение при осиновяване на дете от 2 до 5 годишна възраст). Also two non-contributory child benefits.	No special allowances.	Pregnant women whose average monthly gross income per family member is equal to or lower than a certain level if they are not entitled to maternity benefit (обезщетение за бременност и раждане) under the Social Insurance Code (Кодекс за социално осигуряване) and are permanent residents.	No special allowance.	Mothers of children diagnosed before their 2nd birthday as having more than 50% permanent disability Monthly benefit for raising a child with permanent disabilities The monthly benefit for a child until completion of secondary education with a permanent disability	YES (Министерски съвет).	Targeted allowances for pupils (Целеви помощи за ученици) Targeted allowance for free travel by rail and bus in the country for mothers of many children (Целева помощ за безплатно пътуване с железопътния и автобусния транспорт в страната за многодетни майки)
Croatia	Tax-financed scheme covering all residents who satisfy a means test and providing benefits which vary according to income.	Providing a flat-rate cash benefit payable during parental leave.	No special allowance.	New-born child assistance	No special allowance.	Children allowance (Doplatak za djecu) for disabled children	No special allowance.	Partial State subsidies for children staying in day-care centres (means tested). Benefit according to the Income Tax Act (Zakon o porezu na dohodak)
Cyprus	Tax financed scheme based on habitual residence, number of dependent children, family income and property assets.	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Maternity Grant (Βοήθημα Τοκετού) Special maternity grant to unmarried mothers (Ειδικό βοήθημα τοκετού σε άγαμες μητέρες)	Single parent benefit is granted (Επίδομα Τέκνου).	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	No other allowances.
Czech Republic	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents in the Czech Republic with income-tested benefits depending on the age of the children.	Parental Allowance (Rodičovský příspěvek): Tax financed universal system providing a flat-rate benefit to a parent who personally provides full-time proper care for a small child.	No special allowance.	Entitlement to Birth Grant (Porodné) is related to the first liveborn child and is only granted to families whose income does not exceed 2.4 times the family Living Minimum (Životní minimum). Birth Grant is paid to:	No special allowance.	Disability of children is reflected in two Foster Care Benefits (Dávky pěstounské péče): Foster Child Allowance (Příspěvek na úhradu potřeb dítěte) and Foster Parent Allowance (Odměna pěstouna), see “Other allowances”.	No special benefit.	Foster Care Benefits (Dávky pěstounské péče): * Foster Child Allowance (Příspěvek na úhradu potřeb dítěte), * Foster Parent Allowance (Odměna pěstouna), * Fostering Grant (Příspěvek při převzetí dítěte), * Motor Vehicle Grant (Příspěvek na nákup motorového vozidla), * Grant in Foster Care Termination (Příspěvek při ukončení pěstounské péče).
Denmark	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents providing benefits depending on the age of the child and the income of the family.	No special allowance.	Child care allowance: Tax financed. Municipalities can introduce such benefit for parents taking care of their own children instead of putting them in a day care facility.	Amount per child per quarter until the children's 7th birthday, in case of birth of more than one child and in case of adoption of more than one child (flerbørnstilskud). Allowance (single benefit) in case of adoption of a foreign child	The general Child allowance (ordinært børnetilskud) is supplemented (ekstra børnetilskud)	Income replacement benefit for domiciliary care of a disabled child	YES	Special allowance for parents still studying (børnetilskud til forældre under uddannelse) Supplementary child allowance (supplerende børnetilskud i visse skole- og praktikperioder) for parents during internship and school term(statens uddannelsesstøtte)
Estonia	Tax financed universal scheme with flat rate benefits covering all residents.	Parental Benefit: (vanemahüvitis) Child Care Allowance (lapsehooldustasu) Supplementary Child Care Allowance (täiendav lapsehooldustasu)	No special allowance.	Childbirth Allowance (sünnitoetus)	Single Parent's Child Allowance (üksikvanema lapse toetus)	Disabled Child Allowance (puudega lapse toetus) The Social Benefit Rate (sotsiaaltoetuste määr) Study Allowance (õppetoetus)	YES	Conscript's and Alternative Civilian Servant’s Child Allowance (ajateenija ja asendusteenistuja lapse toetus) Foster Care Allowance (eestkostel või perekonnas hooldamisel oleva lapse toetus) Adoption Grant (lapsendamistoetus)
Finland	Tax financed flat rate benefit for children resident in Finland.	Parental allowance (vanhempainraha)	All children (aged 10 months – 6 years) have a subjective right to day care arranged by municipalities. Families who care for their children at home or arrange the care privately are entitled to cash benefits.	A maternity grant (äitiysavustus) An adoption grant (adoptiotuki)	The Child Allowance (lapsilisä) is supplemented	Disability allowance for persons under 16 years of age (alle 16-vuotiaan vammaistuki)	Maintenance allowance for children (elatustuki)	Means-tested housing allowances (asumistuki) available to families with low income.
France	Universal scheme financed by contributions from employers, from the self-employed and from a portion of the Generalised social contribution (contribution sociale généralisée, CSG).	Infant Welcome Benefit (Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE).	Complement for Child Care Choice of the Infant Welcome Benefit (Complément de libre choix de mode de garde de la Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE)	Birth or Adoption Grant of the Infant Welcome Benefit (Prime à la naissance ou à l'adoption de la Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE) Basic Allowance of the Infant Welcome Benefit (Allocation de base de la Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE)	Active solidarity income (revenu de solidarité active, RSA)	Special education allowance for a disabled child (allocation d'éducation de l'enfant handicapé, Aeeh) for persons with a 50% or more handicap, up to the age of 20 Possibility to opt for the disability compensation allowance (prestation de compensation du handicap, PCH)	YES	New School Year Allowance (allocation de rentrée scolaire) for children aged 6 – 18. Family supplement (complément familial) subject to means test Housing allowance (allocation de logement)
Germany	Tax-funded scheme with fixed amounts for tax exemption of the parental income to the amount of certain needs of a child for all parents and for the promotion of family, in so far as child benefit is not used for tax exemption.	Parental allowance (Elterngeld) child care allowance (Betreuungsgeld)	No special allowances.		No special allowances	No special allowances.	The Advance Payment of Maintenance Act (Unterhaltsvorschussgesetz)	The Parental allowance (Elterngeld) is treated separately from Child-raising leave (Elternzeit). Grandparents are also entitled to child-raising leave. Parents are entitled to supplementary child allowance (Kinderzuschlag)under specific conditions.
Greece	Compulsory social insurance system financed by contributions covering employees, and providing benefits depending on the number of children. Benefits are granted once every calendar year covering the whole year.	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Childbirth benefit for obstetrics costs (ΒΟΗΘΗΜΑ ΤΟΚΕΤΟΥ )	The single parent receives the Child benefit (ΟΙΚΟΓΕΝΕΙΑΚΑ ΕΠΙΔΟΜΑΤΑ)	Allowance for parent of disabled child	No special allowance.	* Benefit granted to mothers for the support of unprotected children who do not have a father. * Single allowance child support (ΕΝΙΑΙΟ ΕΠΙΔΟΜΑ ΣΤΗΡΙΞΗΣ ΤΕΚΝΩΝ) * Special benefit for families with at least three children (ΕΙΔΙΚΟ ΕΠΊΔΟΜΑ ΤΡΊΤΕΚΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΎΤΕΚΝΩΝ)
Hungary	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents.	Child Home Care Allowance (Gyermekgondozási segély) Child Raising Support (Gyermeknevelési támogatás) Child Care Fee (Gyermekgondozási díj)	In-kind benefit, local authority run crèches and kindergarden (co-financed by the parent).	Pregnancy-Confinement Benefit (Terhességi-gyermekágyi segély) Birth Grant (Anyasági támogatás)	Entitlement to higher amounts of Family Allowance (Családi pótlék)	Entitlement to higher amounts of Family Allowance (Családi pótlék)	Advance on maintenance payments (Tartásdíj megelőlegezése)	Regular Child Protection Allowance (Rendszeres gyermekvédelmi kedvezmény) Family tax allowance (Családi kedvezmény)
Iceland	Flat-rate benefits, based on residency, to families with children reduced when income exceeds a certain level.	No child-raising allowance.	No special allowance. Municipalities may subsidise the cost of day care for children in private homes, e.g. in the case of single parents.	Flat-rate adoption grant (ættleiðingarstyrkur)	Single parent allowance (mæðralaun)	Home care allowance (umönnunargreiðslur)	YES	A single flat-rate child pension with respect to education (barnalífeyrir vegna skólanáms) Means-tested housing allowances (húsaleigubætur)
Ireland	Tax financed flat rate universal scheme covering all resident children. The rate of payment is dependent on the ranking of the child within the family.	No special allowance.	Not applicable.	No special allowance.	One Parent Family Payment is available as a separate and specific means-tested scheme	Domiciliary Care Allowance	No special allowance.	Family Income Supplements (FIS) Guardian’s Payment (Non-Contributory)
Italy	System financed mainly by the employers' contributions and partly by workers’ contributions (as established in the employment contract) covering the employees with benefits depending on the family income and on the number of family members.	Optional supplementary parental leave (Congedo parentale facoltativo)	No special allowance, but vouchers are granted to help meeting the additional expenses of raising children		Increased family allowance if lone parent with a child.	No specific allowance for disabled children.	No special allowance.	Social Card Children of severely disabled persons (Erogazione integrativa per grandi invalidi)
Latvia	Tax-financed universal scheme with flat-rate benefits and covering all permanent residents.	Child Raising Allowance (Bērna kopšanas pabalsts) Parental benefit (Vecāku pabalsts)	No special allowance.	Childbirth Allowance (Bērna piedzimšanas pabalsts)	No special allowance.	Supplement to the family State benefit for disabled child (Piemaksa pie ģimenes valsts pabalsta par bērniu invalīdu) Disabled child raising allowance (Bērna invalīda kopšanas pabalsts)	No special allowance.	Compensation for taking care of an adoptee Compensation for adoption Compensation for the execution of the guardian's duties Remuneration for the fulfilment of foster family duties Allowance to a foster family for a dependent child Allowance to a foster family for the purchase of clothing and soft furnishings
Liechtenstein	Compulsory public system financed by contributions for persons resident or gainfully employed in Liechtenstein.	No child-raising allowance	No special benefit.	Amount at the birth of one child, Amount per child in the case of multiple births. Birth allowances (Geburtszulagen) are also paid in cases of adoption of a child under the age of 5.	Additional monthly Single Parent Allowance (Alleinerziehendenzulage)	No special benefit.	NO	Compensation of differences
Lithuania	Tax financed universal scheme for all residents with benefits depending on family income, age and number of the children. Child benefit is paid to families raising children and to children deprived of parental care.	Compulsory insurance for employees financed by contributions and providing earnings-related Maternity/Paternity Benefit, Motinystės/tėvystės pašalpa).	No special allowance.	Child Grant (Vienkartinė išmoka vaikui)	Payments for child maintenance in pre-school institution may be reduced by 50%.	Social assistance pension (Šalpos pensija)	No special allowance.	Benefit for a Child of a Servisman in Mandatory Primary Military Service (Išmoka privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos kario vaikui Guardianship (Curatorship) Benefit (Globos (rūpybos) išmoka) Settlement grant (Vienkartinė išmoka įsikurti)
Luxembourg	Universal tax financed scheme. Child’s own right linked to residence. The amount varies depending on the family group and increases according to the age of the child.	Child-raising Allowance (allocation d'éducation)	No special allowance.	Birth Grant (allocation de naissance)	No special benefit.	Supplementary allowance	Any maintenance due to the spouse, an ascendant or a descendant is paid on request and under certain conditions by the national solidarity fund and recovered by it.	Parental leave (congé parental) New School Year Allowance (allocation de rentrée scolaire) A child bonus (boni pour enfant)
Malta	A universal system financed by general taxation providing an earnings-related allowance to all Maltese citizens whose children reside in Malta.	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Maternity Benefit (Beneficcju tal-Maternita’)	Single Parents are treated as a family in their own right and are entitled to Social Assistance (Ghajnuna Socjali) as well as Child Allowance (Allowance tat-Tfal).	Disabled Child Allowance (Allowance ghal tfal b'Dizabilita').	The law courts determine whether and how much maintenance should be paid. If claimant does not receive maintenance, the social security department pays the full rate to claimant.	* A head of household who cares for a child or a person whose parents are unknown or have abandoned him/her will be entitled in respect of such a child or person to the allowances as a distinct and separate entitlement to that applicable in respect of his/her own children. * A benefit is payable to recognised institutions for the care of children and foster parents for the benefit of children without families or children in foster homes.
Norway	Tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit for all children.	Compulsory social insurance scheme for the active population (employees and self-employed) with Parental Benefit (foreldrepenger)	Monthly Cash Benefit for Parents with Small Children (kontantstøtte)	Maternity/Adoption Grant (engangsstønad ved fødsel/adopsjon)	* Child benefit for one more child than the single parent actually has. In addition an infant supplement (småbarnstillegg) is paid * Transitional benefit (over-gangsstønad) . * Education benefit (utdanningsstønad) * Child Care Benefit (stønad til barnetilsyn) wsyn).	Transitional benefit (overgangsstønad)	Advance maintenance payment (bidragsforskott)	Means-tested housing support (bostøtte)
Poland	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents with benefits depending on the age of the children.	Tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit as a supplement to Family Allowance.	No special allowance.	Childbirth lump-sum as supplement to Family Allowance (Dodatek z tytułu urodzenia dziecka) One-time childbirth grant (Jednorazowa zapomoga z tytułu urodzenia się dziecka)	Supplement for raising a child alone (dodatek z tytułu samotnego wychowywania dziecka)	Medical Care Allowance (Zasiłek pielęgnacyjny) Training and Rehabilitation of Disabled Child supplement (dodatek z tytułu kształcenia I rehabilitacji dziecka niepełnosprawnego) Special attendance allowance (Specjalny zasiłek opiekuńczy)	Alimony Fund Benefit (Świadczenie z funduszu alimentacyjnego)	Child-minding Allowance (Zasiłek opiekuńczy) Commencement of a School Year supplement (Dodatek z tytułu rozpoczęcia roku szkolnego) Child Education out of the Place of Residence supplement (Dodatek z tytułu podjecia przez dziecko nauki w szkole poza miejscem zamieszkania) Large family supplement (Dodatek z tytułu wychowywania dziecka w rodzinie wielodzietnej)
Portugal	Compulsory universal protection system for all inhabitants financed by taxes, with benefits depending on household income, number and age of the children. Individual right of the child, related to residence.	Extended parental benefit (subsídio parental alargado)	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Child benefit and related allowances and supplements are increased	* Supplement to Child Benefit for disabled children (bonificação, por deficiência, do subsídio familiar a crianças e jovens): * Monthly life annuity (subsídio mensal vitalício) * Extraordinary solidarity supplement (complemento extraordinário de solidariedade) i * Solidarity supplement for the elderly (complemento solidário para idosos)	No special allowance.	Funeral grant (subsídio de funeral) Additional payment (montante adicional) Prenatal Child Benefit (abono de família pré-natal) Study grant (bolsa de estudos)
Romania	Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget, providing both cash and in-kind benefits, including State Allowance for Children (alocatie de stat pentru copii) and Family Support Allowance (alocatie pentru sustinerea familiei).	Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget, providing both cash and in-kind benefits, including Child-Raising Indemnity (indemnizatie pentru cresterea copilului).	Social assistance scheme, universal, financed by the State Budget, providing both cash and in-kind benefits, including Placement Allowance (alocatie de plasament).	No birth and adoption grants.	Family Support Allowance (alocatie pentru sustinerea familiei)	State Allowance for Children with Handicap (alocatie de stat pentru copii cu handicap) Child-Raising Leave (concediu pentru cresterea copilului) and Child-Raising Indemnity (indemnizatie pentru cresterea copilului)	No advance on maintenance payments.	Bonus for Insertion (stimulent de insertie)
Slovakia	Tax financed universal scheme covering all residents with dependant child/ren.	Tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit to all residents with child/ren. The State supports entitled persons in the ordinary (regular) care of children.	State subsidy for kindergartens. Tax Bonus (Daňový bonus) Child Care Allowance (Príspevok na starostlivosť o dieťa)	Birth Grant (Príspevok pri narodení dieťaťa) Annual benefit for multiple birth (Príspevok na viac súčasne narodených detí)	No special allowance.		Alimony Benefit (Náhradné výživné) .	Partial refund (State subsidy) of bus/train fares to school or work and boarding costs for school or work for those undergoing vocational training. Substitute Child Care Support Benefits (Príspevky na podporu náhradnej starostlivosti o dieťa)
Slovenia	Tax financed universal scheme with income-tested benefits depending among others on income and ranking of the child in the family.	Compulsory parental protection insurance with earnings-related benefits for the insured person. Financed by contributions and taxes.	Reduction in payment of nursery school fees (znižanje plačila vrtca)	Layette (pomoč ob rojstvu otroka):	When a child lives in a single-parent family then Child Benefit (otroški dodatek) is increased by 30%.	Special Child care Allowance (dodatek za nego otroka, ki potrebuje posebno nego in varstvo) Partial Payments for Loss of Income (delno plačilo za izgubljeni dohodek)	Maintenance Replacement (nadomestilo preživnine)	Parental Allowance (starševski dodatek) Large Family Allowance (dodatek za veliko družino)
Spain	Tax financed non-contributory benefits for all residents with benefits depending on income, age and degree of disability.	Contributory benefit in kind: the first three years of parental leave (Excedencia por cuidado de hijo)	No special allowance.	Multiple birth grant for two or more children. T	No special allowance.	YES	No special allowance.	No other allowances, but as a contributory benefit in kind, the first year of leave to take care of other relatives (Excedencia para el cuidado de familiares) is considered as period of contribution.
Sweden	Tax financed, compulsory and universal scheme covering all resident parents and children providing a flat-rate child allowance (barnbidrag) and a large family supplement (flerbarnstillägg)	Municipal Child care Allowance Act (lagen (2008:307) om kommunalt vårdnadsbidrag) is giving the municipalities the right to introduce, finance and administer municipal child care allowances.	No special allowance.	No special allowance in case of birth. Allowance in case of adoption		Care Allowance for Disabled Child (vårdbidrag)	Maintenance support (underhållsstöd)	Gender equality bonus (jämställdhetsbonus): Housing allowance (bostadsbidrag) c
Switzerland	Federal scheme: Scheme for agricultural workers and self-employed farmers, financed by contributions and taxes. Cantonal schemes: Schemes for employees and self-employed not involved in agriculture (financed by contributions) and for persons not engaged in paid employment with low income (financed by taxes).	No special allowance.	No special allowance.	Federal scheme: No birth allowance. Cantonal schemes: 9 cantons provide a birth allowance (Geburtszulage/allocation de naissance). 8 of these 9 cantons pay a welcome allowance (Adoptionszulage/allocation d'accueil) for the child placed to be adopted.	No special allowance.	Two cantons pay a special allowance.	All cantons have a system for advancing support payments.	Federal scheme: Household allowance (Haushaltungszulage/allocation de ménage)
The Netherlands	General Child Benefit Act (Algemene Kinderbijslagwet, AKW) and Act on Child-related Allowance (Wet op het kindgebonden budget, WKB): tax financed universal scheme covering all residents.	No child-raising allowances.	Under the Child care Act (Wet Kinderopvang) the State, parents and employers together pay the costs of child care in the case the child is cared for outside the home during working hours of the parents.	No special benefit.	No special benefit.	Invalid youths aged 18 or over are entitled to a benefit on account of incapacity for work Compensation under the Regulations governing Contributions towards the Upkeep of Disabled Children living at Home (Tegemoetkoming Onderhoudskosten Thuiswonende gehandicapte kinderen TOG).	No special benefit.	No other allowances.
United Kingdom	Child Benefit: Tax financed (non-contributory) system for all parents of children under 16 (under 20 in certain circumstances). Child Tax Credit: Tax financed, non-contributory, income-related system for all parents of children under 16 (under 20 in certain circumstances).	No child-raising allowance.	Help can be given with child care as part of Working Tax Credit.	Sure Start Maternity Grant	NO	Disability Living Allowance (care/ mobility benefit)		Working Tax Credit (WTC)

4.Special non-contributory cash benefits

SPECIAL NON-CONTRIBUTORY CASH BENEFITS

(Article 70(2)(c))

BELGIUM

(a) Income replacement allowance (Law of 27 February 1987);

(b) Guaranteed income for elderly persons (Law of 22 March 2001).

BULGARIA

Social Pension for old age (Article 89 of the Social Insurance Code).

CZECH REPUBLIC

Social allowance (State Social Support Act No 117/1995 Sb.).

DENMARK

Accommodation expenses for pensioners (Law on individual accommodation assistance, consolidated by Law No 204 of 29 March 1995).

GERMANY

(a) Basic subsistence income for the elderly and for persons with reduced earning capacity under Chapter 4 of Book XII of the Social Code;

(b) Benefits to cover subsistence costs under the basic provision for jobseekers unless, with respect to these benefits, the eligibility requirements for a temporary supplement following receipt of unemployment benefit (Article 24(1) of Book II of the Social Code) are fulfilled.

ESTONIA

(a) Disabled adult allowance (Social Benefits for Disabled Persons Act of 27 January 1999);

(b) State unemployment allowance (Labour Market Services and Support Act of 29 September 2005).

IRELAND

(a) Jobseekers' allowance (Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, Part 3, Chapter 2);

(b) State pension (non-contributory) (Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, Part 3, Chapter 4);

(c) Widow’s (non-contributory) pension and widower’s (non-contributory) pension (Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, Part 3, Chapter 6);

(d) Disability allowance (Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, Part 3, Chapter 10);

(e) Mobility allowance (Health Act 1970, Section 61);

(f) Blind pension (Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, Part 3, Chapter 5).

GREECE

Special benefits for the elderly (Law 1296/82).

SPAIN

(a) Minimum income guarantee (Law No 13/82 of 7 April 1982);

(b) Cash benefits to assist the elderly and invalids unable to work (Royal Decree No 2620/81 of 24 July 1981);

(c) (i) Non-contributory invalidity and retirement pensions as provided for in Article 38(1) of the Consolidated Text of the General Law on Social Security, approved by Royal Legislative Decree No 1/1994 of 20 June 1994; and ▼M1 2004R0883 — EN — 01.07.2013 — 005.001 — 83

(ii) the benefits which supplement the above pensions, as provided for in the legislation of the Comunidades Autonómas, where such supplements guarantee a minimum subsistence income having regard to the economic and social situation in the Comunidades Autonómas concerned;

(d) Allowances to promote mobility and to compensate for transport costs (Law No 13/1982 of 7 April 1982).

FRANCE

(a) Supplementary allowances of:

(i) the Special Invalidity Fund; and

(ii) the Old Age Solidarity Fund in respect of acquired rights

(Law of 30 June 1956, codified in Book VIII of the Social Security Code);

(b) Disabled adults’ allowance (Law of 30 June 1975, codified in Book VIII of the Social Security Code);

(c) Special allowance (Law of 10 July 1952, codified in Book VIII of the Social Security Code) in respect of acquired rights;

(d) Old-age solidarity allowance (ordinance of 24 June 2004, codified in Book VIII of the Social Security Code) as of 1 January 2006.

ITALY

(a) Social pensions for persons without means (Law No 153 of 30 April 1969);

(b) Pensions and allowances for the civilian disabled or invalids (Laws No 118 of 30 March 1971, No 18 of 11 February 1980 and No 508 of 23 November 1988);

(d) Pensions and allowances for the civilian blind (Laws No 382 of 27 May 1970 and No 508 of 23 November 1988);

(e) Benefits supplementing the minimum pensions (Laws No 218 of 4 April 1952, No 638 of 11 November 1983 and No 407 of 29 December 1990);

(f) Benefits supplementing disability allowances (Law No 222 of 12 June 1984);

(g) Social allowance (Law No 335 of 8 August 1995);

(h) Social increase (Article 1(1) and (12) of Law No 544 of 29 December 1988 and successive amendments).

CYPRUS

(a) Social Pension (Social Pension Law of 1995 (Law 25(I)/95), as amended);

(b) Severe motor disability allowance (Council of Ministers’ Decisions Nos 38210 of 16 October 1992, 41370 of 1 August 1994, 46183 of 11 June 1997 and 53675 of 16 May 2001);

LATVIA

(a) State Social Security Benefit (Law on State Social Benefits of 1 January 2003);

(b) Allowance for the compensation of transportation expenses for disabled persons with restricted mobility (Law on State Social Benefits of 1 January 2003). ▼M1 2004R0883 — EN — 01.07.2013 — 005.001 — 84

LITHUANIA

(a) Social assistance pension (Law of 2005 on State Social Assistance Benefits, Article 5);

(b) Relief compensation (Law of 2005 on State Social Assistance Benefits, Article 15);

(c) Transport compensation for the disabled who have mobility problems (Law of 2000 on Transport Compensation, Article 7).

LUXEMBOURG

Income for the seriously disabled (Article 1(2), Law of 12 September 2003), with the exception of persons recognised as being disabled workers and employed on the mainstream labour market or in a sheltered environment.

HUNGARY

(a) Invalidity annuity (Decree No 83/1987 (XII 27) of the Council of Ministers on Invalidity Annuity);

(b) Non-contributory old age allowance (Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Benefits);

(c) Transport allowance (Government Decree No 164/1995 (XII 27) on Transport Allowances for Persons with Severe Physical Handicap).

MALTA

(a) Supplementary allowance (Section 73 of the Social Security Act (Cap. 318) 1987);

(b) Age pension (Social Security Act (Cap. 318) 1987).

NETHERLANDS ▼M3

(a) Work and Employment Support for Disabled Young Persons Act of 24 April 1997 (Wet Wajong). ▼M1

(b) Supplementary Benefits Act of 6 November 1986 (TW).

AUSTRIA

Compensatory supplement (Federal Act of 9 September 1955 on General Social Insurance — ASVG, Federal Act of 11 October 1978 on Social insurance for persons engaged in trade and commerce — GSVG and Federal Act of 11 October 1978 on Social insurance for farmers — BSVG).

POLAND

Social pension (Act of 27 June 2003 on social pensions).

PORTUGAL

(a) Non-contributory State old-age and invalidity pension (Decree-Law No 464/80 of 13 October 1980);

(b) Non-contributory widowhood pension (Regulatory Decree No 52/81 of 11 November 1981);

(c) Solidarity supplement for the elderly (Decree – Law No 232/2005 of 29 December 2005, amended by Decree – Law No 236/2006 of 11 December 2006).

SLOVENIA

(a) State pension (Pension and Disability Insurance Act of 23 December 1999);

(b) Income support for pensioners (Pension and Disability Insurance Act of 23 December 1999);

(c) Maintenance allowance (Pension and Disability Insurance Act of 23 December 1999). ▼M1 2004R0883 — EN — 01.07.2013 — 005.001 — 85

SLOVAKIA

(a) Adjustment awarded before 1 January 2004 to pensions constituting the sole source of income;

(b) Social pension which has been awarded before 1 January 2004.

FINLAND

(a) Housing allowance for pensioners (Act concerning the Housing Allowance for pensioners, 571/2007);

(b) Labour market support (Act on Unemployment Benefits 1290/2002);

SWEDEN

(a) Housing supplements for persons receiving a pension (Law 2001:761);

(b) Financial support for the elderly (Law 2001:853).

UNITED KINGDOM

(a) State Pension Credit (State Pension Credit Act 2002 and State Pension Credit Act (Northern Ireland) 2002);

(b) Income-based allowances for jobseekers (Jobseekers Act 1995 and Jobseekers (Northern Ireland) Order 1995); ▼M3

__________ ▼M1

(d) Disability Living Allowance mobility component (Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 and Social Security Contributions and Benefits (Northern Ireland) Act 1992); ▼M3

(e) Employment and Support Allowance Income-related (Welfare Reform Act 2007 and Welfare Reform Act (Northern Ireland) 2007).

ANNEX XXII - OVERVIEW OF CURRENT EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Freedom of movement for workers is one of the four freedoms on which the Single Market is founded. The underlying principle is equal treatment – this is a safeguard against social dumping and protects national workers as much as it protects migrant workers. In the context of the free movement of workers in the EU, workers from one Member State working in another Member State should benefit from the same minimum level of protection.

But free movement would not be possible if the social security rights of mobile Europeans were not protected. Clearly, if people think they will lose out on their social security rights, they will be much less likely to move to another Member State. This means that social security coordination is essential if freedom of movement is to work in practice. Article 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) assigns to the legislator the competence to make arrangements to secure the right to benefits and the payment of the benefits to persons resident in another EU Member State.

EU law in the field of social security provides for the co-ordination and not the harmonisation of social security schemes. This means that each Member State is free to determine the details of its own social security system, including which benefits shall be provided, the conditions of eligibility, how these benefits are calculated and how much contribution should be paid. EU law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, establishes common rules and principles which must be observed by all national authorities when applying national law. These rules ensure that the application of the different national legislations respects the basic principles of equality of treatment and non-discrimination. By doing so, it is ensured that the application of the different national legislations does not adversely affect persons exercising their right to free movement within the EU. In order to attain this goal, the coordination system employs a number of key principles: the non‐discrimination on grounds of nationality; the aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or residence; the waiving of residence rules; and the application of a single legislation in terms in respect of liability to contribute and entitlement to benefits.

Coordination of social security thus leaves unaffected the substantive and procedural differences between the national social security systems. The coordination rules offer no guarantee that transferring one's residence or professional activities to another Member State is neutral as regards social security. Given the disparities in social security legislation, such transfer may work to one's advantage or not, depending on the circumstance.

The material scope of the Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 extends to all legislation concerning the following branches of social security: sickness; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; invalidity pensions; old-age pensions; survivors’ benefits; benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases; death grants; unemployment benefits; pre-retirement benefits; and family benefits. This list is exhaustive. Consequently, a branch of social security which is not mentioned is in principle outside the scope of the regulation. This is the case, for instance, for housing allowances or social assistance.

Over and above these social security benefits, the coordination regulation also applies to special non-contributory cash benefits listed in an annex (Annex X to Regulation 883/2004).

A number of benefits are expressly excluded from the regulation’s scope. First of all, it does not extend to social assistance. Furthermore, the regulation does not cover benefits in relation to which a Member State assumes the liability for damages to persons and provides for compensation, such as benefits for victims of war or its consequences but also benefit schemes for victims of crime, assassination or terrorist acts, for victims of damage occasioned by State agents in the course of their duties and for victims of political or religious repression. Moreover, it does not apply to advances to maintenance payments and to special childbirth and adoption allowance.

Long-term care benefits

The material scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 stretches to the "traditional” social security risks as enshrined in ILO Convention No. 102 concerning minimum standards of social security, 1952. These include sickness, old-age, invalidity, death, accident at work or occupational disease, unemployment and raising a family.

Under Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 Long-term care benefits are mentioned at several occasions; nevertheless there is no clear definition (leaving aside the clarification in Art. 1 (va) that also Long-term care benefits in kind have to be regarded as benefits in kind for the application of the health care chapter. Therefore, recourse has to be made to definitions already given by the Court of Justice.

Long-term care benefits for the purposes of the regulation are benefits intended to improve the state of health and quality of life of persons reliant on care and as such, have as their essential purpose the supplementing of sickness insurance benefits (although under national legislation this could be a system totally separated from the sickness insurance or health care system). If these benefits are granted objectively and on the basis of a legally defined position (i.e. in a non-discretionary way), they are covered by the regulation, for which they constitute sickness benefits. This implies that they are coordinated according to the regulation’s rules governing sickness benefits. As a rule, long-term care benefits are designed to develop the independence of persons reliant on care, in particular from the financial point of view. Typically, they promote home care in preference to care provided in hospital but could also consist in granting aids or cost sharing for people staying in homes for people with disabilities.

The conditions for the grant of the benefit and the way in which it is financed do not affect the classification of a benefit as a long-term care benefit. The fact that the grant of the benefit is not necessarily linked to payment of a sickness insurance benefit, or the circumstance that the benefit is non-contributory, is of no importance for the qualification as a long-term care benefit.

Long-term care benefits can take different forms. Like sickness benefits, they can be in kind or in cash. Benefits consisting in the provision of home care services or the direct payment or reimbursement of the costs of a specialised home entailed by the insured person’s reliance on care, constitute long-term care benefits in kind. Long-term care benefits in cash include allowances (of a fixed or differential amount) to compensate for the additional expenditure resulting from the recipients’ condition of reliance on care, in particular the cost of the assistance it is necessary to provide them with (independently of the costs actually incurred by the persons concerned). An example would be financial aid which recipients may use to remunerate a member of their family or entourage who is assisting them on a voluntary basis. The payment of the old-age insurance of a third person to whom a person in need of care resorts for assistance at home is also to be categorised as a long-term care benefit in cash.

In an attempt to shed light on the diversity in long-term care benefits across the Member States, the trESS network grouped them according to the type of benefit and the organisation per Member State 76 :

Statutory organisation of long-term care benefits 77

Statutory organisation	Classification	Member States
Global care system and/or unifying legislation	Social security*	BE (Flemish care insurance), LU, NL
	Social assistance	CY, EE, ES, UK**
	Combination of both social security and social assistance	DK, SE** (although social security element is by far the strongest)
Differentiated approach (disintegrated care system)	Social security	CZ
	Social assistance	LV, MT, RO
	Combination of both social security and social assistance	AT, BE, BG, CH, FI, FR, GR, HU, IS IE, IT, LI, LT, NO, PL, PT, SK, SI, DE**

* Social security refers to benefits which fall under the material scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004

** Some (or all) of the benefits of these states have been declared as “normal” sickness benefits for the purpose of the application of Regulation (EC) No. 8823/2004 by the ECJ or the EFTA Court.

Several Member States relate long-term care to the different branches of social security. The following table summarises the range of definitions that exist across Member States 78 :

Benefits in kind/cash or both	Organisation (choice of provider / spending / benefit)	Member States
Only benefits in kind	Only state-run	/
	Only private institutions and/or informal caregivers	/
	Combination of both public and private institutions and caregivers	EE, FR, IS, LV 79
Only benefits in cash	Freedom of choice regarding the spending of the allowances	BE (Flemish care insurance) 80
	No freedom of choice regarding the spending of the allowances	/
Combination of both benefits in cash and in kind	Possibility to choose and/or combine and/or substitute both types of benefits	AT, BE, CY, DK, HU, IE, LU, MT, NL, PL, RO, SK, SI ,SE, DE
	No possibility to choose and/or combine and/or substitute both types of benefits	BG, CH, CZ, FI, GR, IT, LT, NO, PT, ES, UK, LI

As can be seen in the table, most Member States have implemented a combination benefits in cash and in kind. An anti-overlapping provision for long-term care benefits in case a person is entitled to these benefits in the state of insurance as well as the State of residence has been introduced in the Sickness Chapter in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

Under the Sickness Chapter, there are differences in competence between sickness benefits in cash and sickness benefits in kind. Sickness benefits in cash always have to be paid by the competent Member State, i.e. the State in which the person is insured under a health care scheme. Pensioners for example who receive a pension from their former State of work and who reside in another Member State are entitled to receive long-term cash benefits from the pension-granting Member State.

Example: A person lives in Member State A and draws a pension from Member State B. Which State is responsible for providing long-term care benefits?

The answer to this question essentially depends on whether the legislations of the States concerned provide for long-term care benefits in kind or in cash (see the answer to the previous question).

In principle, an insured person is entitled to have a long-term care benefit in cash exported by the institution of Member State B, as if it were a sickness cash benefit. Please note, however, that if the legislation of Member State A provides for long-term care benefits in kind, and the person claims and receives these benefits, the amount of the cash benefit he/she receives from the institution of State B may be reduced by the amount of the benefit in kind he/she receives from the institution from State A (and the cost of which is to be borne by the institution of State B). This is an application of the principle that overlapping of benefits is in principle prohibited. The institution of State B must inform the person of this rule. Its application should not result in the benefits being lower than those to which he/she would be entitled if you resided in State B.

In case the legislation of the State paying the pension, i.e. State B, does not provide for long-term care benefits in cash, the person can nevertheless claim the long-term care benefits in kind provided for by the legislation of the State of residence, State A. The cost of these benefits will be reimbursed to the institution of the State A by its counterpart in State B. However, if no such benefits are provided for under the legislation of State A, he/she has no claim to long-term care benefits.

If only the legislation of the State where he/she resides provides for long-term care benefits, and these benefits are in cash and not subject to conditions of insurance, employment or self-employment, he/she might be able to rely on the status of EU citizen to claim a right to equal treatment as regards this long-term care benefit outside the rules of the Regulation which would not allow that. However, caution is needed. As the law on this point is still developing, the extent of the rights attached to the status of EU citizen is not yet clear. It is certain, however, that the social benefit rights stemming from EU citizenship are not unlimited.

Sickness benefits for frontier workers and their family members

In common with other workers who reside outside the competent State (the State of insurance), frontier workers and their members are entitled to medical care in the Member State in which they reside, at the expense of the competent institution (Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). Benefits in cash are directly paid by the competent institution across the border (Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). In order to receive medical care in the State of residence, they must register with the institution of the place of residence. Upon the request or upon request of the institution of the place of residence, they will receive from the competent institution a document (portable document S1) certifying the entitlement to medical care in the State of residence. Note that, when the family members are entitled to medical care under the legislation of the Member State of residence and the spouse exercises a gainful activity there, the cost of the benefits provided to the family members is borne by the institution of that State.

Sickness benefits for pensioners and their family members

Pensioners and their family members are entitled to medical care in the Member State in which they reside, provided in accordance with the legislation of that State. The cost of the medical care is always borne by a Member State which pays a pension. A distinction has to be made between three situations.

When a person receives a pension from the State in which he/she resides and is entitled to sickness benefits under that State’s legislation, the cost of the care is borne by the institution of that State, even though the pensioner additionally draws a pension under the legislation of one e or more other States.

Example 1: During his career, Mr. X has worked in Spain and in France. He is now retired and receives pensions from both these States. Mr. X lives in France. Mr. X may receive medical care in France, at the expense of the French institution. The same goes for his family members.

If a person receives a pension under the legislation of one or more Member States, and is not entitled to medical care under the legislation of the State in which he/she resides, the pensioner and his/her family members may nevertheless obtain medical care in the State of residence, provided they would be entitled to medical care if they were resident in (one of) the State(s) which is paying a pension. In those cases, the cost of the care is borne by the institution of the latter State (or, in case he/she receives pensions from two or more Member States, by the institution of the State where he/she has been insured for the longest time, or, in case of insurance of exactly the same length, by the institution where he/she have been insured lastly.

Example 2: During her career, Ms. Y has worked for 21 years in Member State B and then for 9 years in Member State C. Ms. Y is now retired and resides in Member State A. She draws pensions from States B and C. Ms. Y does not satisfy the conditions for entitlement to medical care in State A. If she were to reside there, Ms. Y would satisfy the conditions for entitlement to medical care in State C but not in State B. Ms. Y may obtain medical care in State A, at the expense of State C. Suppose, alternatively, that Ms. Y, if she were to reside there, would be entitled to medical care both in State B and State C. In that case, she could still obtain medical care in State A, but at the expense of State B, as she was insured there for the longest period of time.

Finally, if the pensioner receives a pension under the legislation of one or more Member States, but not under the legislation of the State in which he/she reside, he/she is entitled to medical care in the latter State on account of the fact that its legislation makes this entitlement subject only to residence on its territory, the same rules apply as in the second situation.

Example 3: During his career, Mr. Z has worked for 11 years in Member State E and then for 11 years in Member State F. Mr. Z is now retired and resides in Member State D. He draws pensions from State E and F. Despite the fact that he does not draw a pension from State D, he is entitled to medical care there, as State D operates a residence-based medical care system. Suppose that Mr. Z, if he were to reside there, would satisfy the conditions for entitlement to medical care in both State E and State F. Mr. Z may obtain medical care in State D, at the expense of State F, as he was last insured there.

If person is in the second or in the third situation, he/she and their family members must register with the institution of the State of residence in order to be able to receive care there. Their right to medical care in the State of residence shall be certified by a portable document S1, which is issued, at their request or at the request of the institution of the place of residence, by the institution responsible for bearing the costs of the care. The cost of the medical care provided to the pensioner and his/her family members is refunded by this institution to the institution of their place of residence on the basis of real costs, on production of proof of actual expenditure. However, in respect of several Member States listed in an annex to the regulation (Annex 3 to Regulation 987/2009), the reimbursement is made on the basis of fixed amounts (lump-sums), which are calculated by reference to average annual health care costs Regulation (EC) No 883/2004oken down by age group. The States claiming reimbursement on the basis of fixed amounts are Ireland, Spain, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the UK.

Rulings by the Court of Justice

In a number of rulings the Court of Justice ruled that, in the absence of a specific legal regime for their coordination; long-term care benefits must be regarded as 'sickness benefits' within the meaning of the Regulation and coordinated as such. It made the following clarifications under Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 that are still valid under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004:

• As there is no mention of Long-term care benefits in the list of the risks covered by Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 but these benefits are without any doubt social security benefits covered by this Regulation they have to be coordinated under the rules concerning one of the risks mentioned in this list. As the closest relationship exists to sickness these rules have to be applied.

• Long-term care benefits which are granted to all persons resident in the Member State concerned or to all persons insured against that risk under the legislation of a Member State cannot be regarded as special as it is a general risk which has been included into the social security schemes of many Member States. Therefore an inclusion in the list of special non-contributory benefits of Annex IIa of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 is not correct. Due to these rulings Annex IIa had to be re-examined and Long-term care benefits had to be deleted from that list.

• Coordination has to be made under the general rules applicable to benefits provided for the risk of sickness. Therefore the Member State competent for the provision of health care benefits under Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 has also to grant Long-term care benefits. So there may be a different competence for benefits in cash and in kind. Benefits in cash have always to be granted by the competent Member State (which includes export of these benefits). The Member State for example, where the father works has to grant Long-term care benefits in cash also for disabled children resident in another Member State (if the first Member State is also competent to reimburse the health care benefits in kind in the Member State of residence (case C-286/03 Hosse). But also a pensioner receiving only a pension from one Member State and residing in another Member State is entitled to receive the Long-term care cash benefits from the pension-granting Member State (as this State is also competent to reimburse the health care benefits in the Member State of residence – case C-215/99 Jauch). Benefits in kind are only granted in the Member State of residence or stay in accordance with the legislation applicable there (no export), nevertheless the competent Member State (which would also have to grant the Long-term care benefits in cash) has to reimburse the tariffs of these benefits. In case the legislation of the Member State of residence does not provide for benefits in kind the person concerned cannot receive such benefits even if the legislation of the Member State competent for health care benefits has such benefits (case C-208/07 Chamier-Glisczinski).

Unemployment benefits

The general rules

The general principle for determination of the legislation applicable is that a person pursuing a gainful activity should be affiliated to the social security scheme of the State in which territory he/she is employed or self-employed (lex loci laboris principle).

Article 65 of the Regulation derogates from this general principle by establishing a divergent unemployment status for frontier workers or persons other than frontier workers residing in a Member State other than the competent State. For them it is the State of residence which has to be primarily addressed. The Community legislator chose to make an exception to the lex loci laboris principle for this particular group with the aim to ensure that they receive unemployment benefits under the most favourable conditions for finding new employment. The rules are explained in more detail below.

Partially unemployed workers

The person who is partially or intermittently unemployed and who resides in a Member State other than the competent Member State must make himself or herself available to the employment services in the competent Member State. The latter is also responsible for providing unemployment benefits to the person in accordance with its legislation as if the worker were residing in that state (see Article 65(1) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

Wholly unemployed workers

Frontier workers

A frontier worker, that is to say a person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed person in a Member State and who resides in another Member State to which he/she returns, as a rule, daily or at least once a week, has to claim unemployment benefits in the Member State of residence.

Article 65 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 stipulates that this person shall make himself/herself available to the employment services in the Member State of residence.

If the amount of unemployment benefit depends on the salary or professional income of a jobseeker, the institution granting the benefit has to base its calculation on the salary or professional income actually received by the person concerned during his/her activity in the competent State (see Article 62 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

In order to increase the prospect of finding new employment and to facilitate the search for employment in various Member States, Regulation 883/2004 introduced an additional option for those cross-border workers (most probably frontier workers), to also register – as a supplementary step – with the employment services of the Member State in which they pursued their last activity. In cases where Luxembourg was the State of last employment, the option of simultaneous registration began on 1 May 2012 (see Article 87 (10).)

As a result, while the person concerned receives benefits from the Member State of residence, he/she can search for employment simultaneously in both the Member State of residence and the Member State of last activity. In such a case, the employment services of both Member States have a duty of mutual information with regard to the job-seeking activities of the person in the territory of each State.

The person who chooses to be registered with employment services of both Member States has to comply with the control procedures and obligations applicable in each State (Article 65 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). However, as the benefits are paid by the Member State of residence, obligations and job-seeking activities in that State have priority. On the other hand, non-fulfilment of the obligations in the Member State of last activity does not affect the benefits awarded in the State of residence (Article 56 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009).

Persons other than frontier workers (see Article 65(2) last subparagraph)

These are persons who reside in a Member State other than the competent Member state, but are different from frontier workers in that they return to their home state less frequently than once a week. Upon becoming unemployed, these persons have a right to choose – they can either remain available to the employment services in the State of their last activity (i.e. register with the unemployment office in the Member State where they worked) and receive unemployment benefits there, or they can register with the employment services and claim unemployment benefits in their Member State of residence if they return there.

If they decide to register as jobseekers and claim unemployment benefits in their Member State of residence, the calculation of benefits will also be based on the professional income they received during their last activity in the Member State where they worked.

These persons have also the option to make themselves available first in the state of last employment and claim benefits there and later return to the state of residence while exporting the unemployment benefits in the state of last activity under the conditions laid down in Article 64 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (period of 3 months which may be extended to maximum of 6 months). In such a case, the provision of unemployment benefits in the Member State of residence is suspended for the period during which the person receives benefits from the Member State which was last competent (see Article 65(5)(b) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

Self-employed frontier workers

Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, and Article 65 in particular, also apply to self-employed persons. However, there used to be a gap in cases where a formerly self-employed frontier worker contributed to an unemployment scheme in the country of last activity but resided in a Member State where there was no unemployment insurance for the self-employed. There are 10 EU Member States that do not have an unemployment benefit scheme for self-employed people. When applying the rules stipulated in Article 65 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, on becoming unemployed, a former self-employed frontier worker residing in one of these 10 countries was left without any unemployment benefit. This was an obstacle to free movement of workers.

Therefore, by Regulation (EU) No 465/2012 , a new provision (Article 65a) was inserted in Regulation 883/2004. Article 65a is a derogation from Article 65 and applies to wholly unemployed persons who, as a frontier worker, have most recently completed periods of insurance as a self-employed person or periods of self-employment recognised for the purposes of granting unemployment benefits in a Member State other than the Member State of residence where the Member State of residence has made a notification that there is no possibility for any category of self-employed persons to be covered by an unemployment benefits system of that Member State. In all other cases, rules set out in Article 65 apply.

Under Article 65a, the unemployed person must register with the employment services and fulfil job-seeking activities in the country of last activity in order to be fully entitled to an unemployment benefit there. This way, the person concerned will receive a return on the contributions paid. When he/she applies for unemployment benefits, he/she must continuously meet the conditions laid down under the legislation of the Member State of last activity. The person may, as a supplementary step, register with the employment services of the Member State of residence.

Paragraph 3 of the new provision provides that if the unemployed person to which Article 65a applies does not wish to become or remain available to the employment services of the Member State of last activity after having registered there, and wishes to seek work in the Member State of residence only, the person can export the unemployment benefits under Article 64 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. In this situation, the person shall not be obliged to have remained available in the Member State of last activity for at least four weeks after becoming unemployed (ie. condition set out in Article 64(1)(a) does not apply). In addition, the competent institution may extend the period of export to the person who looks for job in his/her Member State of residence up to the end of the period of the person's entitlement to benefits under its legislation. Of course, the unemployed person may also request export of unemployment benefits to other Member State that the State of residence under the conditions set out in Article 64 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

Which Member State is responsible for granting sickness benefits, pensions, family benefits etc. to wholly unemployed workers receiving unemployment benefits in the Member State of residence?

Those persons who become subject to the social security legislation of the State of residence are also covered by Regulation 883/2004 with regard to other social security branches, as stipulated in Article 11(3)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 2004.

Aggregation of periods

A general provision on aggregation of periods (Article 6 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) is valid for all chapters of the Regulation. In addition, for the reasons of legal certainty, special provision has been included in the unemployment chapter (Article 61 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

According to Article 61 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed under the legislation of another Member State shall be taken into account, to the extent necessary, by the competent Member State as though they were completed under the legislation it applies.

Aggregation in the unemployment field has two particular features:

1) First, there are differences between the national schemes as in some Member States an entitlement to unemployment benefits is based upon completion of periods of insurance and, in others it is conditional upon completion of periods of employment or self-employment. This is reflected in Article 61(1).

A. Aggregation of insurance periods

'Periods of insurance' means periods of contribution, employment or self-employment as defined or recognised as periods of insurance by the legislation under which they were completed or considered as completed, and all periods treated as such, where they are regarded by the said legislation as equivalent to periods of insurance (Article 1(t) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).

The term 'periods of insurance' must be therefore understood as referring not only to periods in which contributions to an unemployment insurance scheme were paid but also to periods of employment or self-employment considered by the legislation under which they were completed as equivalent to periods of insurance, that is to say, periods in which insurance covered by such a scheme is guaranteed. Such periods must be taken into account by the institution of the competent Member State, even if they would not have been considered as periods of insurance under the legislation of that State.

It follows from Article 61(1) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 that all periods of insurance, without any further examination of their nature by the competent institution, must be taken into account for assessing entitlement to unemployment benefits by the competent state. This is irrespective of whether they were based on employment, self-employment, or they were other periods equal to insured (self-)employment (for example, periods of sickness, maternity, education, military service).

B. Aggregation of periods of employment or self-employment

'Periods of employment' or 'periods of self-employment' mean periods so defined or recognised by the legislation under which they were completed, and all periods treated as such, where they are regarded by the said legislation as equivalent to periods of employment or to periods of self-employment (Article 1(u) Regulation (EC) No 883/20041).

The Court of Justice confirmed that the classification of a period of work as a 'period of employment' is dependent on the national legislation under which it was completed.

The competent institution is not bound to take into account such periods of employment or self-employment completed in another Member State, unless, according to the legislation of the State where benefits have been requested, those periods are to be regarded as periods affording cover under an unemployment insurance scheme.

2). Secondly, aggregation is applied only to those workers who have completed their most recent periods of insurance, employment or self-employment in the State where the benefit is claimed. This condition does not apply in the case of cross-border workers who resided in a state other than the last competent Member State (see Article 61(2)). In this case, the Member State of residence, when it is the competent State for providing unemployment benefits, must aggregate periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed in another Member States even if the unemployed person has never completed any periods in the State of residence. 81

A questionnaire launched in the Administrative Commission showed a significant divergence of opinions on the proper interpretation of the principle of aggregation of periods for the entitlement to unemployment benefits.

Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 does not specify when a period of insurance, employment or self-employment is completed.

As stated above, the aim behind Article 61(2) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is that the State in which the unemployed person last worked or paid contributions should bear the burden of providing unemployment benefits. Therefore, the rule ensures that it is the competent Member State that provides the unemployment benefits.

Under the rules of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (Title II), a migrant worker becomes subject to the legislation of a Member State as soon as he starts to work there. Consequently, the provisions on aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment are fully applicable as of that moment. In other words, the link between the person and the competent State is created as of day one of the economic activity of the person.

Any other interpretation would deprive migrant workers, who became unemployed during this period, of any entitlement to unemployment benefits in the EU, despite having completed periods of insurance or (self-) employment in the EU. This would lead to the loss of social security protection of a migrant worker and create an effect that is clearly contrary to the purpose of Article 48 TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

Examples

Example 1:

Mr X had completed periods of insurance as a self-employed person in Member State A. After, he moved to Member State B and completed periods of insurance as an employed person there. Mr X loses his job and claims unemployment benefits in Member State B.

Member State B must aggregate periods of insured self-employment completed in Member State A. Pursuant to Article 61(1) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, all periods of insurance for entitlement to unemployment benefits in the Member State where they were completed should always be taken into account for the purposes of aggregation, without further examination.

Example 2:

Mr Y had completed a period of employment in Member State A. After, he moved to Member State B and completed periods of employment there. Mr Y loses his job and claims unemployment benefits in Member State B.

Pursuant to the second para of Article 61(1) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, periods of employment or self-employment completed in Member State A should be aggregated by Member State B only if those periods would have been considered to be periods of insurance had they been completed in Member State B.

Example 3:

Ms Z, employed in Member State A, went on maternity leave. Under the legislation of Member State A, the maternity leave period is considered to be a period of insurance. Afterwards Ms Z moved to Member State B and completed periods of insured employment there. She loses her job and claims unemployment benefit in Member State B.

Member State B must aggregate all insurance periods, which come within the definition of insurance period under Article 1(t) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (without questioning or examining its nature). If Member State A notifies periods of insurance that were neither employment nor self-employment periods (e.g. periods of sickness, maternity, deprivation of liberty, education or military service) as periods of insurance, the competent institution in Member State B must take them into account for the purposes of aggregation.

Export of unemployment benefits

For persons who intend to look for a job abroad while maintaining their right to unemployment benefits can do so for a period of 3 months. The competent institution may extend this period up to six months. National institutions reported substantial differences in the application of this provision.

The aggregation rules complement the fundamental aim of Article 48 TFEU: to contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers in the EU. To this end, arrangements must be made to secure for employed and self-employed migrant workers aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of several countries.

SPECIAL NON CONTRIBUTORY CASH BENEFITS (SNCBs)

SNCBs are defined as benefits which are provided under legislation which, because of its personal scope, objectives and/or conditions for entitlement, has characteristics both of the social security legislation and of social assistance (Article 70(1) Regulation 883/2004).

SNCBs can either provide supplementary, substitute or ancillary cover against the risks covered by the branches of social security, and which guarantee the persons concerned "a minimum subsistence income having regard to the economic and social situation in the Member State concerned” or “solely specific protection for the disabled, closely linked to the said person's social environment in the Member State concerned” (Article 70(2)(a) Regulation 883/2004).

The financing of SNCBs derives exclusively from compulsory taxation intended to cover general public expenditure and the conditions for providing and for calculating the benefits are not dependent on any contribution in respect of the beneficiary. However, benefits provided to supplement a contributory benefit shall not be considered to be contributory benefits for this reason alone (Article 70(2)(b) Regulation 883/2004).

Benefits meeting the regulation criteria and listed in Annex X follow the rules applicable to SNCBs. Both conditions are cumulative. It implies that benefits which are not listed in Annex X are subject to standard rules of coordination and in particular to the principle of export unless they would fall exclusively within the scope of ‘social assistance’: in this case, coordination rules do not apply.

If all conditions for belonging to the SNCB category are satisfied and if the claimant falls within the personal scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, SNCBs are provided exclusively in the Member State where the persons concerned reside, in accordance with its legislation, and are provided by and at the expense of the institution of the place of residence (Article 70(4) Regulation 883/2004).

FAMILY BENEFITS

The concept of family benefits is a broad one. Family benefits means all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses under the social security legislation of a Member State, excluding advance of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances which are listed in Annex I of Regulation 883/2004.

Family benefits further encompass child-raising allowances or parental benefits, intended to enable one of the parents to devote him- or herself to the raising of a young child, and designed to remunerate the service of bringing up a child, to meet the other costs of caring for and raising a child and, as the case may be, to mitigate the financial disadvantages entailed in giving up income from an occupational activity.

The person concerned is entitled, in respect of the family members, to the family benefits provided for by the legislation of the State to which s/he is subject according to the rules determining the applicable legislation.

The family benefits will be provided by the competent institution in accordance with the legal provisions administered by that institution (amount, age limits, number and/or ranking of children, etc.).

A. Family members of the beneficiary reside in the state where the beneficiary is covered

If the members of the family of the beneficiary reside in the state under whose legislation he is covered as an employed or self-employed person, this state will always be competent for the payment of family benefits. He is entitled to exactly the same amount of benefits as nationals of that state.

B. Family members of the beneficiary do not reside in the state where he is covered

Family benefits are exportable. This means they must be awarded, even if the person concerned and/or his/her family reside in another Member State. In essence, the members of the family are treated as if they resided in the State of (self-) employment (the State to whose legislation the person concerned is subject). The coordination regulation effectively overrules any residency requirement in national legislation regarding family benefits.

C. Cases where there is simultaneous entitlement to family benefits under legislation of two Member States

Situations of overlapping entitlements to family benefits are very common when members of family live and work in different Member States. As a matter of principle, the parents cannot receive family benefits twice over the same period and for the same child. The Regulation 883/2004 provides for priority rules in cases of overlapping entitlements.

If the beneficiary is entitled to family benefits under the legislation of more than one state, his family will, in principle, receive the highest amount of benefits provided for in the legislation of one of these states. In other words, his family is treated as if all persons concerned reside and are insured in the state with the most favourable legislation.

The beneficiary cannot receive family benefits twice over the same period and for the same family member. There are priority rules which provide for suspension of benefits of one state up to the amount of the benefits of the other state which is primarily competent for payment of the family benefits.

According to these priority rules, entitlement to family benefits under the legislation of one of the States will be suspended. However, this suspension is not total. Rather, benefits due under the legislation of one State will be suspended up to the amount of the benefits due under the legislation of the State that takes priority. Thus, if the amount of family benefit provided for by the legislation of the former State is higher than that provided in accordance with the legislation of the other State, the former State will pay a supplement corresponding to the difference between the two benefits.

Example: The father works in Member State A. The mother works in Member State B and lives there with the children. In this case, where the parents work in different States and the children reside in one of these States, there is a situation of overlapping entitlements on the same basis, i.e. on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed person. Priority is given to the right available under the legislation of the State of residence of the children (State B). Entitlement to family benefits in State A where the father works – and where the children do not reside – is suspended up to the amount of benefits provided for in the legislation of the State B, where the other parent works. If the amount of benefits is lower in State B than in the State A, the difference between the two amounts is payable by the institution of the State A in the form of a differential supplement.

The substance of the priority rules is the following: if there are overlapping entitlements (i.e. entitlements under two or more legislations in respect of the same family member and for the same period) on different bases, the order of priority is as follows:

1.rights available on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed person,

2.rights available on the basis of receipt of a pension and

3.rights obtained on the basis of residence.

In the case of rights available on the same basis, the Member State where the children reside shall be competent by priority right, if work is carried out there (in case of overlapping entitlements on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed person) or if a pension is payable under that legislation (in case of overlapping entitlements on the basis of receipt of a pension).

The differential supplement does not need to be provided for children residing in another Member State when entitlement to the benefit is based on the residence only. It means that if the father in the example above lost the job in State A and stayed there without any unemployment benefits or pension payable under State A's legislation, State A does not need to provide any family benefits (differential supplement) even if State A benefits were higher than those available in State B.

D Family benefits as a benefit for the entire family

Family benefits are considered to be benefits for the family. In the joined cases Hoever Zachow (C-245/94 and C-312/94) determined under Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, the CJEU held that where an employed person is subject to the legislation of a Member State and lives with his or her family in another Member State, the family is entitled to receive a benefit such as a child-raising allowance (parental allowance) from the State of employment, regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law. The logic of this is that as the purpose of a family benefit is to meet the expenses of the entire family it may therefore may be exercised by either parent. This principle was affirmed in the case of Dodl Oberhollenzer (C-543/03). To support this concept the Regulations contain two provisions: Article 68a Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (which permits family benefits to be reassigned to the person actually maintaining the family in cases where the actual beneficiary is not using the benefit for this purpose) and Article 60(1) Regulation third indent (EC) No 987/2009 which requires competent institutions to recognise an application for family benefit from either parent.

ANNEX XXIII - GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Annex XXIII Glossary of Terms

Term	Explanation
Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems	The Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems (AC) is attached to the Commission and made up of a government representative from each Member State. The AC deals with administrative questions and questions of interpretation, facilitates the uniform application of EU law, fosters and develops cooperation between Member States and can make relevant proposals to the Commission for improving and modernising the acquis.
Aggregation (general) (unemployment)	A general principle of social security coordination meaning that periods of insurance completed in another Member State shall also be taken into account for the purpose of acquisition, retention, recovery or duration of a right to benefits in a given Member State. As regards unemployment, however, aggregation is only permitted if the person concerned has most recently completed periods of insurance, employment or self-employment in the competent Member State. Under this rule, there is no aggregation without previous insurance in the competent Member State. A required length of previous insurance is not laid down in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, but it is understood by most Member Sate that one day of unemployment insurance is sufficient
Export of benefits	A general principle of social security coordination laid down in the Treaty, according to which benefits are paid to a person residing in another MS than the one competent for paying the benefit. The Court only allowed exceptions to this principle with regard to the period of export of unemployment benefits and special non-contributory cash benefits.
Family benefits	All benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses under the social security legislation of a Member State. This is a broad concept which includes income-replacement benefits such as child-raising or child care allowances but expressly excludes advance of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances, where listed in the Regulation. They also exclude study grants, which are social advantages falling under the scope of Regulation 492/2011
Family member	(i) any person defined or recognised as a member of the family or designated as a member of the household by the legislation under which benefits are provided; (ii) with regard to benefits in kind pursuant to Title III, Chapter 1 on sickness, maternity and equivalent paternity benefits, any person defined or recognised as a member of the family or designated as a member of the household by the legislation of the Member State in which he/she resides; 2. If the legislation of a Member State which is applicable under subparagraph 1 does not make a distinction between the members of the family and other persons to whom it is applicable, the spouse, minor children, and dependent children who have reached the age of majority shall be considered members of the family; 3. If, under the legislation which is applicable under subparagraphs 1 and 2, a person is considered a member of the family or member of the household only if he/she lives in the same household as the insured person or pensioner, this condition shall be considered satisfied if the person in question is mainly dependent on the insured person or pensioner;
Dependant	A person having a derived right to a social security benefit from an insured person.
Differential supplement	A concept specific to family benefits. The priority rules provide that entitlement to family benefits under the legislation of one of the States will be suspended up to the amount of the benefits due under the legislation of the State that takes priority. However, to ensure the family does not lose out, if the amount of family benefit provided for by the legislation of the secondary competent State is higher than that provided under the primary competent State, the former State will pay a supplement or "top up" corresponding to the difference between the two benefits. This concept has been upheld by the Court as a requirement of the Treaty.
Insured person	In relation to the social security branches covered by Title III, Chapters 1 and 3, means any person satisfying the conditions required under the legislation of the Member State competent under Title II to have the right to benefits, taking into account the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
Frontier workers	Workers pursuing their activity in one Member State while residing in another Member State. The term ‘cross-border workers’ is larger as it comprises e.g. also seasonal workers staying in another Member State for more than a week, whereas the term ‘frontier workers’ in its strictest sense only comprises those cross-border workers who return to their country of residence as a rule daily or at least once a week.
Member State	Member State of the European Union. In relation to EU rules on social security coordination, the term "Member State" also refers to EEA countries (Iceland , Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland.
Competent Member State	The Member State in which the institution with which the person is insured is located, or the institution paying the social security benefit.
Member State of residence	Member State where the institution which is competent to provide benefits in the place where the person resides is located.
Third country national	Nationals of a non-EU Member State
Social security benefits	Social security benefits are granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and relate to one of the risks expressly covered by Regulation No 883/2004. Those risks are sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age, death, accidents at work, unemployment, pre-retirmeent, maintenance of a family
Social assistance benefits	Social assistance benefits are means-tested, intended to guarantee a person’s minimum subsistence income and not related to any specific social security risk mentioned above. Therefore, they are not covered by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. However, the Court clarified that special non-contributory cash benefits which are falling under the social security Regulations are also social assistance within the meaning of the Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC).
Social advantage	Are advantages which are provided to workers due to their status as worker or on the basis of their residence. The term social advantage also includes all social security benefits, such as family benefits, as far as they are related to workers. Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 on the free movement of workers provides for equal treatment for all social and tax advantages.
Special non-contributory cash benefits	Benefits which present characteristics of both social security benefits and social assistance. They are linked to social security in that they create legally-defined rights connected to a social security benefit and relate to one of the risks covered by the coordination rules. At the same time, they have links with social assistance, in the sense that they are non-contributory and closely linked to the social-economic enviroment of a country (= minimum subsistance). In order for a benefit to be a special non-contributory cash benefit, it must fulfil the following conditions: • First, it must be special. The special character is defined by its purpose. In particular, the benefit must be intended to provide either: ◦supplementary, substitute or ancillary cover against one of the risks covered by the branches of social security and it must guarantee the persons concerned a minimum subsistence income having regard to the economic and social situation in the Member State concerned (e.g. supplements to old-age pensions) or ◦specific protection for disabled people, closely linked to the social environment of the said person in the Member State concerned. •Second, it must be non-contributory, which essentially depends on the way in which the benefit is financed. In particular, the benefit must be financed from compulsory taxation intended to cover general public expenditure. The conditions for providing and calculating the benefit should not be dependent on any contribution in respect of the beneficiary. The fact that a benefit is provided to supplement a contributory benefit does not necessarily imply that it is itself contributory in nature. •Third, it must be listed in an Annex to the Regulation (Annex X to Regulation 883/2004).
Sickness benefits in kind/cash	The distinction between benefits in cash and benefits in kind depends on their purpose: benefits in kind are benefits that consist of medical care, or a reimbursement thereof. Cash benefits are paid, as a rule, periodical and fixed in advance and their amount is not subject to certain expenditure actually incurred by the recipients. While sickness benefits in kind are provided under the legislation of the State of residence at the expense of the competent State, the cash benefits are calculated in accordance with the legislation applied by the competent State and are at its expense so in case of residence in another Member State they remain unchanged and are exported.
Long-term care benefits	Benefits intended to improve the state of health and quality of life of persons reliant on care who on account of old-age, disease or incapacity require assistance from other person or considerable help in carrying out essential daily activities. Long-term care benefits are designed to develop the independence of such persons reliant on care, in particular from the financial point of view, including benefits granted to the persons providing such care (carers). Currently, they are coordinated according to the EU rules governing sickness benefits and similarly to sickness benefits, they can be in kind or in cash.
Member State of last employment	The Member State where an unemployed person had been employed or self-employed before he moved to another Member State.
Unemployment benefits	All benefits payable in case of unemployment. They are generally subject to the condition - that the unemployed person had been insured against this risk for a certain ‘qualifying’ period, - that the unemployed person in person registers with the employment service of his region as being available for work, i.e. as being ready to accept any suitable employment at any time. - For this purpose, it might also be required that the unemployed person regularly shows up in order to underline that s/he is still actively looking for employment.
Residence	‘Habitual’ residence, i.e. the place where a person has his or her ‘centre of interest’. Under the coordination Regulations, insured persons can only have one place of habitual residence, even when they have acquired or rented a house in more than one Member State.

Annex XXIV: Analysis on economically inactive persons

1 Data on access to family benefits, long-term care benefits and sickness benefits by non-active mobile EU citizens

Annex XXV Fressco analysis salary releated child raising allowances

ANNEX XXV

Reply to an ad hoc request for comparative analysis

Salary-related child-raising benefits

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B — Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

Contact: Marzena Brauhoff

E-mail: EMPL-FRESSCO@ec.europa.eu

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Reply to an ad hoc request for comparative analysis

Salary-related child-raising benefits

FreSsco - Free movement of workers and Social security coordination

This report was prepared in the framework of Contract No VC/2014/1011 ‘Network of Experts on intra-EU mobility – social security coordination and free movement of workers / Lot 1: Legal expertise in the field of social security coordination and free movement of workers’. This contract was awarded to FreSsco, a network of independent experts from 32 European countries coordinated by Ghent University.

Author:

Joyce De Coninck, doctoral researcher, Ghent University.

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Table of contents

Executive Summary

1.Introduction

2.THE HISTORY OF SALARY-RELATED CHILD-RAISING BENEFITS

3.DESCRIPTION OF THE SALARY-RELATED CHILD-RAISING ALLOWANCE

3.1.Conditions of entitlement

3.2.Level of the benefit

3.3.Calculation of the benefit

3.4.Maximum duration of the right to the benefit

3.5.Who can claim the benefit?

3.6.Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?

3.7.Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?

3.8.Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?

4.Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?

5.Annex

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

The Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Executive Summary

In the Hoever and Zachow judgment, 82 family benefits are described as benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses. More specifically, family benefits in cash are explained as being paid solely to a family comprised of one child or more, the amount of which varies (partly) according to the children’s age and the number of children, as well as according to the parents’ income. In addition, family benefits in cash are intended to enable one of the parents to devote him or herself to the raising of (a) child(-ren) and thus meet the costs of caring for and bringing up a child. As confirmed in the Hoever and Zachow judgment, (salary-related) child-raising (cash) benefits are qualified as family benefits in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

Despite the aforementioned finding by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) however, it appears that controversy remains as to the qualification of salary-related child-raising allowances as being either family benefits or maternity/paternity benefits. The distinction between a family benefit vis-à-vis a maternity/paternity benefit is not to be underestimated when applying Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. In particular, it need be noted that whilst family benefits may give rise to entitlement of derived rights as confirmed by the Hoever and Zachow case, this is not the case for maternity/paternity benefits, which are deemed as being personal rights. In addition, when applying Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, it becomes clear that Article 68 thereof is limited in its application to family benefits, thus excluding maternity/paternity benefits. This is relevant because the provision concerned allows for differential supplements to be disbursed in case of overlapping family benefits based upon the legislation of two or more Member States. Entitlement to such differential supplements is not possible however, for maternity/paternity benefits. Clearly, the classification of a salary-related child-raising benefit as being either a family benefit or a maternity/paternity benefit will thus impact access thereto, as well as the modalities thereof. Within this context, it need be noted though, that despite the definition of maternity/paternity benefits encompassed in CJEU case law 83 as well as Recital 19 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, de facto issues remain when attempting to distinguish family benefits from maternity/paternity benefits. Whereas in some national Member State legislations, a distinction is clearly made, other Member States do not distinguish between these two types of benefits. Hence it remains a difficult yet crucial exercise to determine the qualification of a salary-related child-raising benefit as being one or the other.

The request at hand concerns the existence and qualification of salary-related child-raising benefits in individual Member States, which would thus be subject to the respective rules in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Salary-related child-raising benefits specifically are defined as ‘any benefit calculated with reference to employment or professional income regardless of whether a worker is engaged under a contract of employment or engages in a self-employed activity’ and intended to meet the costs of caring for and bringing up a child, as well as mitigating the financial disadvantages entailed in giving up income from full-time employment.

In view of the upcoming Labour Mobility Package and envisaged proposals to amend Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, as well as the debate surrounding (salary-related) child-raising benefits, an overview of such benefits in the various Member States is necessary. In what follows an overview will be given as to the history of such benefits (Section 2), a description of the benefits (Section 3) and the application thereof in view of the Hoever and Zachow judgment (Section 4). Lastly, a schematic overview will be given of salary-related child-raising benefits – insofar possible – in the Member States via individualised country sheets.

1.Introduction

With a view to defining what constitutes a salary-related child-raising benefit, several preliminary observations need be made. Whilst many Member States do provide benefits which are intended to meet the costs of caring for and raising a child, as well as to mitigate the financial disadvantages entailed in giving up income from full-time employment, these benefits are not infrequently qualified as maternity and paternity benefits as opposed to family benefits. Within this vein, case law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) need be recalled, and the Hoever and Zachow judgment in particular, whereby family benefits under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 are not to be distinguished from other benefits by reference to their classification in national legislation. Rather they are to be distinguished by reference to their respective purpose and conditions of entitlement. Consequently, despite various Member States qualifying similar salary-related child-raising benefits as maternity and paternity benefits in national law, they will nevertheless be included in what follows, as there is no certitude as to their classification as a family benefit under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 absent further rulings by the CJEU. In addition to the foregoing, note need also be made of the fact that the salary-related child-raising benefits discussed below are oftentimes not clearly identifiable as a distinct benefit. Consequently, these benefits often cannot be identified as either paternity/maternity benefits or, alternatively, family benefits. Again, such benefits will nevertheless be taken into consideration in what follows. Consequently, the report will focus upon those salary-related child-raising benefits that are related to the individual salary of the beneficiary concerned.

Currently, various Member States provide for distinct salary-related child-raising benefits (AT, BG, HR, EE, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, RO, SI, ES and SE). Within this context, Austria, Croatia, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Romania, and Spain clearly distinguish the salary-related child-raising benefits from maternity and paternity benefits. 84 Contrary thereto, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden seemingly qualify the respective salary-related child-raising benefits in national legislation as maternity and paternity benefits. As concerns Latvia and Lithuania it appears that the benefits concerned are not explicitly qualified as either maternity/paternity benefits or family benefits. As indicated, however, the delineation of what constitutes a salary-related child-raising benefit and whether it is provided for in national legislation as a family benefit, or alternatively as a maternity/paternity benefit, is not as unambiguous as could be hoped. Several Member States have provided for benefits which, if regarded independently, would in all likelihood not be considered as salary-related child-raising benefits. However – as is the case in Greece and Portugal – certain maternity/paternity benefits have been complemented by additional protective paid leave, which highly resembles a salary-related child-raising benefit. In Greece for example, the standard maternity benefit is complemented by a six-month special maternity protection leave, which is indeed salary-related. Similarly in Portugal, extended parental leave is provided for, which equally so is salary-related.

Various other Member States simply do not provide for salary-related child-raising benefits (BE, CY, CZ, FR, IS, IE, LI, LU, MT, NL, NO, PL, SK, CH and UK). The absence of salary-related child-raising benefits in national legislation of respective Member States does not necessarily entail that no child-raising benefits exist. Rather, as is the case in a number of the aforementioned States, exclusively flat-rate child-raising benefits are provided for, as opposed to salary-related child-raising benefits. Flat-rate child-raising benefits as such can be found in Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Luxembourg, Norway and Poland. In Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom on the other hand, such benefits simply do not exist.

In what follows, a schematic overview is given, indicating the various Member States which have introduced a salary-related child-raising benefit, the various Member States who do not have a salary-related child-raising benefit and lastly, those Member States which require a somewhat more nuanced approach in addressing the notion of salary-related child-raising benefits.

Salary-related child-raising benefits 85

AT, BG, HR, DK, EE, FI, DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, PT, RO, SI, ES, SE

No salary-related child-raising benefits
Flat-rate child-raising benefits	No child-raising benefits
BE, CZ, FR, LU, NO, PL	CY, IS, IE, LI, MT, NL, SK, CH, UK

2.THE HISTORY OF SALARY-RELATED CHILD-RAISING BENEFITS

As the history of salary-related child-raising benefits differs substantially amongst the States concerned, a schematic overview thereof cannot be given. To exemplify the latter, it suffices to refer to the history of salary-related child-raising benefits in Austria and Germany. The salary-related child-raising benefit in Austria was introduced by Federal Gazette No 116/2009, which entered into force in 2010. The historical aim of this benefit is to help claimants who just want to interrupt their employment for a short time and have a high level of income to maintain their standard of living. In 2011 (Federal Gazette No 139/2011) the conditions of entitlement were modified. The level of income, which can be earned while drawing the benefit, was raised from € 5,800 to € 6,100. Furthermore, the condition of at least six months of employment before drawing the benefit was introduced. By this amendment also the present formula for the calculation of the benefit was introduced. In 2013 the level of income was raised again up to € 6,400 (Federal Gazette No 117/2013).

In Germany on the other hand there is only one benefit which seeks to replace income during child-raising periods and which is calculated wholly or partially with reference to a salary or professional income, namely Elterngeld as encompassed in the BEEG. The BEEG entered into force on 1 January 2007. The Elterngeld is the successor of the child-raising allowance Erziehungsgeld, which was paid according to the Child-Raising Allowance Act.

In view of the substantial differences concerning the history of salary-related child-raising benefits in the respective Member States, the history can be found in the Country Sheets attached in the Annex. Where possible, statistics have been added concerning the use thereof.

3.DESCRIPTION OF THE SALARY-RELATED CHILD-RAISING ALLOWANCE

3.1.Conditions of entitlement

Mindful of the fact that various Member States (BE, CY, CZ, FR, IS, IE, LI, LU, MT, NL, NO, PL, SK, CH and UK) simply do not provide for a salary-related child-raising benefit, solely the entitlement conditions for those Member States (AT, BG, HR, EE, FI, EL, DE, HU, IS, IT, LV, LT, PT, RO, SI, ES and SE) that do provide for a benefit as such will be discussed.

Of the foregoing Member States, several merely require previous insurance. In Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Lithuania (previous) insurance suffices in order to be entitled to the salary-related child-raising benefit. In Lithuania the individual concerned must have been covered by sickness and maternity insurance specifically. In Croatia, the individual seeking the benefit must have been insured for a minimum period of 12 months or, alternatively, 18 months with interruptions in the last two years. Croatian legislation furthermore stipulates that insofar these conditions have not been met, entitlement may nevertheless arise albeit limited to 50% of the benefit. Conversely, several Member States (LV, SE) require previous insurance with additional conditions to be met, in order to be entitled to salary-related child-raising benefits.

Other Member States have imposed seemingly more stringent conditions in order to be entitled to salary-related child-raising benefits. Amongst these Member States, Austria, Estonia and Portugal (albeit to a limited extent) impose residence requirements upon which entitlement to such benefits are conditioned.

In addition to the foregoing entitlement conditions, various Member States require a specific period of previous employment (AT, DK, EL, LV, PT, RO, ES, SE) as well as adherence to fiscal and tax obligations (RO). Furthermore, in Austria, Germany and Romania, it is explicitly obliged for the recipient of the benefit to be living together with the child concerned. Lastly, in Greece the recipient must also have been receiving maternity allowance as a precondition to receiving salary-related child-raising benefits. In order to determine the individual conditions of entitlement for the respective Member States, see Annex.

3.2.Level of the benefit

Not inconceivably, the level of the salary-related child-raising benefit is affected by a number of factors, not to mention the means of calculation thereof (see infra Calculation of the Benefit). Consequently, the level of the benefit differs greatly from Member State to Member State. Recalling that various Member States (BE, CY, CZ, DK, FR, IS, IE, LI, LU, MT, NL, NO, PL, SK, CH and UK) do not provide for a benefit as such, it is interesting to note that the remaining Member States predominately provide limitations as to the level of the benefit. In particular, several Member States (AT, BG, DK, DE, EE and EL) impose both maximum and/or minimum nominal ceilings concerning the permitted level of the benefit to be disbursed (see Annex for exact figures).

Similarly, other Member States impose ceilings by reference to permitted percentages of previous remuneration that the benefit may represent. In particular, Bulgarian legislation provides that the minimum benefit may not be below the minimum wage, whilst declaring that the maximum permitted benefit received may not exceed 90% of previous pay. Similarly, in Slovenia the benefit constitutes 90% of the basis from which contributions for parental protection insurance have been calculated in the past 12 consecutive months. In addition, Slovenian legislation imposes a maximum ceiling and a minimum floor whereby the benefit cannot be higher than twice the average monthly wage and cannot be less than 55% of the minimum wage as set in 2006. In Italy, the salary-related child-raising benefit may only amount to 30% of previous or standard pay. Within this same vein, the benefit provided for by the extended parental leave in Portugal amounts to 25% of previous pay. Sweden sets an 80% ceiling with an additional nominal ceiling. Interestingly, Croatia provides for a benefit representing 100% of previous remuneration, albeit subject to the nuance that a maximum ceiling and minimum floor have also been incorporated. Similarly, Finland allows for a salary-related child-raising benefit representing 70% of previous remuneration with a nominal floor of € 24,02 per day. Hungary also makes use of an approach as such, and provides that the benefit amounts to 70% of average gross earnings with a ceiling amounting to 70% of the minimum wage doubled. Lastly, Spanish legislation provides that the benefit may constitute 100% of the contribution base for professional risks, with a maximum and minimum limit of € 3,606 and € 756, respectively.

In Latvia, Lithuania and Romania the percentages vary depending on the duration of the benefit. Whilst in Latvia, the permitted level of the benefit amounts to 60% of previous remuneration if taken for the first year following birth, the permitted level of the benefit will be reduced to 43.75% if taken for a year and a half. Similarly, in Lithuania, the benefit for the first year will represent 100% of previous pay, but will be reduced to 70% for the first year and 40% of compensatory salary during the second year. In Romania, the permitted percentage of previous remuneration received is 85% for the first and second year. However, the maximum permitted nominal ceiling insofar the benefit is taken for the second year is lower than if only called upon for the first year.

3.3.Calculation of the benefit

As previously indicated, certain Member States (BE, CY, CZ, FR, IS, IE, LI, LU, MT, NL, NO, PL, SK, CH and UK) do not have the benefits concerned. This is to be attributed to the fact that some of these Member States (BE, CZ, FR, LU, NO, PL) do provide similar benefits, but make use of flat-rate amounts as opposed to salary-related amounts to determine the level of the benefit. Other Member States (CY, IS, IE, LI, MT, NL, SK, CH and UK) simply do not provide for benefits in national legislation, which resembles a child-raising benefit as such, irrespective of its means of calculation.

Of the Member States that do provide for salary-related child-raising benefits, the majority (AT, BG, HR, DK, FI, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, RO, SI and ES) calculate the amount of the benefit with exclusive reference to the salary of the recipient. It need be noted that Croatia – as do Finland, Germany and Hungary – opts for a maximum ceiling and a minimum floor that the benefit is permitted to amount to (see Annex for exact figures). For the remaining Member States (EL, PT, EE and SE), the salary-related child-raising benefits are calculated in part with reference to the salary of the recipient. In Greece and Portugal in particular, the benefit, which may be qualified as a salary-related child-raising benefit, is in fact an extension of maternity leave and parental leave respectively, whereby solely the calculation of the extension is salary-related. In Estonia the calculation of the benefit will depend upon whether the individual seeking the benefit had a previous income which was subject to taxation. Insofar this is the case, he or she will be entitled to a salary-related child-raising benefit. If the person concerned did not have a salary as such, however, he or she will be entitled to a flat-rate child-raising benefit. Lastly, in Sweden, the child-raising benefit itself is made up of a flat-rate element, which lasts for 90 days, and a salary-related component, which is applied for the remaining 390 days.

Exclusively salary-related

AT, BG, DK, HR, FI, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, RO, SI, ES

Partially salary-related

EE, EL, PT, SE

Not applicable
Flat-rate benefits	No benefits
BE, CZ, FR, LU, NO, PL	CY, IS, IE, LI, MT, NL, SK, CH, UK

3.4.Maximum duration of the right to the benefit 86

As is to be expected, the maximum permitted duration during which parents can make use of the respective salary-related child-raising benefits differs from State to State. However, several general observations can be made. A number of Member States (AT, HR, DE, EL, IT, PT and ES) limit the entitlement to the salary-related child-raising benefits after the expiration of a number of months. In particular, the salary-related child-raising benefits in Austria can be received for 12 months, extendable to 14 months insofar shared between the parents. Similarly, Germany allows for the benefit to be claimed for a duration of 12 months, which is extendable to 14 months. Additional extensions remain possible in specific circumstances (see Annex). Croatian legislation on the other hand stipulates that the benefit may be claimed for a period ranging between 8-30 months upon expiry of the first six months after birth, depending upon the number of children in the respective family. In Italy, the benefits are available to both parents for six months each. In Greece on the other hand, they are available for a maximum duration of six months, whereas in Portugal the benefit is available for three months. Lastly, in Spain, as it concerns a specific salary-related child-raising benefit for children with a serious illness only, the maximum duration of entitlement is one month, with consecutive possible extensions by two months, should the situation require this.

In Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania on the other hand, the maximum duration of entitlement of salary-related child-raising benefits is expressed in terms of years, and can in all three cases be extended. Specifically, in Bulgaria and Hungary the salary-related child-raising benefit may be claimed until the child concerned reaches the age of two. In Latvia in particular, the benefit can either be made use of for one full year, or, alternatively, a year and a half – with the due impact upon the calculation of the level of the benefit (see supra). Similarly, in Lithuania and Romania the benefit can be provided for a duration of one year, and can be extended for an additional year. Romanian legislation furthermore provides for an additional extension of one year, insofar the child-raising concerns a child with a disability.

Lastly, Estonia, Finland, Slovenia and Sweden provide for a maximum duration of salary-related child-raising benefits in terms of days. In Estonia the benefit is provided for 435 days following the expiry of the maternity benefit, whilst in Sweden the benefit may be provided for 480 days (of which 390 are salary-related). In Slovenia, the benefits are available for 130 days for each parent concerned, amounting to a total of 260 days, of which the benefits are to a certain extent, transferable. In Finland the benefit may be made use of for a period of 158 days. Finally, in Denmark the maximum duration of the benefit is referred to in terms of weeks and allows for the benefit to be received for a total duration of 32 weeks.

3.5.Who can claim the benefit?

The overwhelming majority of Member States (AT, HR, DK, EE, FI, DE, HU, IT, LT, PT, RO, SI and SE) which provide for salary-related child-raising benefits, allow for both parents – albeit not always simultaneously – to make use thereof. In Austria, insofar both parents claim the benefit, the permitted duration thereof will be extended from 12 months to 14 months. The choice of who enjoys the child-raising benefit may be altered twice. This is also the case in Lithuania, where the parent enjoying the benefit may also be changed twice. In Italy both parents are entitled to the benefit for a maximum duration of six months each before the child concerned reaches the age of six. In Romania, the benefit may be shared between the respective parents, albeit subject to the condition that the minimum duration of the benefit per parent must be at least one month. Similarly to the foregoing, Swedish legislation allows for the sharing of the benefit by the parents with the one condition that 60 days are effectively reserved for the father. Most Member States (AT, HR, EE, FI, HU, LT, RO and SE) which allow for the child-raising benefit to be shared by parents, do explicitly note, however, that this right is not to be exercised simultaneously. In Germany, Portugal and Slovenia on the other hand, such simultaneous use is possible. Seemingly this is also the case in Denmark.

A limited number of Member States (BG, EL, LV, ES) reserve salary-related child-raising benefits to one parent only. In Greece, by means of an example, the benefit is reserved solely for the mother. In Latvia and Spain the benefit is simply granted to one parent, without a distinction being made as such. Finally, in Bulgaria the mother is the recipient of the benefit. Only if the mother has passed away or has been deprived of her rights as a mother, will the father be accorded the benefit.

Shared entitlement	Single entitlement
AT, HR, DK, EE, FI, DE, HU, IT, LT, PT, RO, SI, SE	BG, EL, LV, ES

3.6.Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?

As can be derived from the Country Sheets, an overwhelming majority of Member States (AT, HR, DK, EE, FI, DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, RO, SI, ES and SE) allow for salary-related child-raising benefits to nevertheless be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working. However, it need be noted that various Member States explicitly make note of the fact that the benefit will subsequently be limited proportionally or in accordance with a given percentage. Austria, Estonia and Slovenia in particular note that the benefit will be decreased accordingly. Similarly, German and Latvian legislation impose a 50% and 30% threshold which the benefit may subsequently amount to, vis-à-vis a ‘regular’ salary-related child-raising benefit. Lithuanian legislation applies a different approach. During the first year the benefit will solely consist of the difference between the salary-related benefit and the salary itself, unless the salary proves to be higher. During the second year on the other hand, the benefit will be disbursed irrespective of the salary.

Contrary to the foregoing, in Portugal the salary-related benefit is not reconcilable with part-time working/flexible working. Similarly, it appears that in Bulgaria the receipt of salary-related child-raising benefits is de facto not reconcilable with part-time work/flexible working.

Reconcilable with part-time/flexible working	Not reconcilable with part-time/flexible working
AT, HR, DK, EE, FI, DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, RO, SI, ES, SE	BG, PT

3.7.Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?

The majority of the Member States (HR, EE, EL, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, PT and SE) which provide a salary-related child-raising benefit note that this is meant to complement parental leave as defined in the Parental Leave Directive. In addition, in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Romania and Slovenia the benefit effectively complements parental leave, albeit in a slightly more indirect and de facto manner.

Conversely, in Spain the benefit is regarded as being completely independent, and hence not meant to complement the Parental Leave Directive.

Complementary	De facto complementary	Not complementary
HR, EE, DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, PT, SE	AT, BG, DK, FI, RO, SI	ES

In a majority of Member States (AT, BG, EE, LV, PT and ES), the employer cannot off-set or claim reimbursement for salaries paid to the employee. This is furthermore also the case in Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden as the employer simply does not pay the employee during parental leave, or alternatively, as is the case in Italy, the employer pays on behalf of the competent authority INPS.

In Denmark and Finland, contrary to the foregoing, reimbursement may be claimed or off-set for salaries paid throughout the duration of the parental leave.

Off-set/reimbursement possible	Off-set/reimbursement not possible	Not applicable
DK, FI	AT, BG, EE, LV, PT, ES	HR, DE, EL, HU, IT, LT, RO, SI, SE

4.Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?

Finally, as concerns the factual fulfilment of the effective child-raising and subsequent access to the salary-related child-raising benefit in conformity with the Hoever and Zachow judgment – an overwhelming majority of the Member States (AT, EE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, PT, RO, SI, ES and SE) providing such benefits reserve these for the individual who is factually fulfilling the child-raising. In other words, in the large majority of Member States the salary-related child-raising benefit is a personal right and exclusively reserved for the person factually taking care of the child. It is unclear however, whether this entails that the entitlement is exclusively restricted to the person under the applicable legislation only.

Conversely, in Bulgaria the right may be granted to the individual concerned despite not factually fulfilling the child-raising activity. This is also the case in Germany as well as in Finland following an amendment dating from 1 January 2015. Furthermore, in Croatia the salary-related child-raising benefit is de iure a personal right, yet the practice surrounding the entitlement thereto is rather flexible, and may thus be interpreted in conformity with CJEU case law. However, as no such issues have arisen and the practice with respect thereto is highly limited, it is unsure whether the individual concerned must personally and factually engage in the child-raising activity.

Factual fulfilment required	Factual fulfilment not required	Uncertain
AT, EE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, PT, RO, SI, ES, SE	BG, DE, FI	HR, DK

5.Annex

Austria

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The salary-related child-raising benefit was introduced by Federal Gazette Nr 116/2009, which got into force in the year 2010. The historical aim of this benefit is to help claimants who just want to interrupt their employment for a short time and have a high level of income to maintain their standard of living. In the year 2011 (Federal Gazette Nr 139/2011) the conditions of entitlement were modified. The level of income, which can be earned during drawing the benefit, was raised from € 5.800 to € 6.100. Furthermore the condition of at least six month of employment before drawing the benefit was introduced. By this amendment also the present formula for the calculation of the benefit was introduced. In the year 2013 the level of income was raised up again to € 6.400 (Federal Gazette Nr 117/2013). In July 2015 60.418 claimants (women: 58.833; men: 1.585) were drawing child-raising benefits in Austria. Therefrom 18.259 (women: 16.254; men: 2.005) were drawing salary-related child-raising benefits. So almost 1/3 of all claimants in July 2015 were drawing salary-related child raising benefits (cf statistics of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Families and Youth; http://www.bmfj.gv.at/familie/finanzielle-unterstuetzungen/kinderbetreuungsgeld/monatsstatistik.html).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The salary-related child-raising benefit (called “einkommensabhängiges Kinderbetreuungsgeld”) is calculated according to Section 24a Child Raising Benefit Code (Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz) as follows: Income x 0,62 + 4000/365 The maximum amount however is € 66 per day. The “income” consists of the income according to the income tax assessment of the year prior to the year of the birth of the child, provided that child rising benefits were not drawn in this year. If so, the outcome of the income tax assessment of the previous year is used.
	Conditions of entitlement	According to Section 24 Child Raising Benefit Code (Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz) the entitlement to salary-related child-raising benefits is subject to the conditions that the claimant -Is entitled to family allowance and already draws family allowance -Lives together in one single household with the child -Has his/her centre of interests in Austria -Is legally residing in Austria -Was employed for the last six months previous to the birth of the child (excluding interruptions of less than two weeks) based on an employment contract, which constitutes inclusion into the Austrian social insurance system -Does not obtain an income during drawing child raising benefits exceeding € 6.400 per year
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Cf calculation of benefit
	Maximum duration of the benefit	12 months – in case that the father claims child-raising benefits as well (and takes parental leave) the maximum duration is extended up to 14 months
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Both the mother and the father can claim the benefit. In this case the maximum duration lasts 14 months. The mother and the father can change two times. However the minimum duration of drawing child raising benefits is for each parent two months.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Salary-related child-raising benefits can only be claimed if the income of the claimant during drawing salary-related child-raising benefits does not exceed € 6.400 per year. So the claimant can peform part-time work, if his/her earinings do not exceed € 6.400 per year.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Legally the entitlement to salary-related child-raising benefits is independent from exercising parental leave. However due to the fact that only an income up to a maximum of € 6.400 per year can by earned during drawing child-raising benefits almost every claimant takes parental leave. So in practice the benefits intend to complement the exercise of parental leave rights.
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Both the mother and the father can claim the benefit. In this case the maximum duration lasts 14 months. The mother and the father can change two times. However the minimum duration of drawing child-raising benefits is two months. Thus salary-related child-raising benefits cannot be exercised simultaneously.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	No. Every parent who is claiming salary-related child-raising benefits must complete the conditions laid down by Section 24 Child Raising Benefit Code (“Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz”). Thus both mother and father must be employed in Austria, provided that inclusion into Austrian social insurance is a precondition for the entitlement to salary-related-child raising benefits.

Belgium

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	N/A
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	N/A
	Conditions of entitlement	N/A
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	N/A
	Maximum duration of the benefit	N/A
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	N/A
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	N/A
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	N/A
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	N/A
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	N/A
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	N/A

Bulgaria

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	According to the Social Insurance Code of the Republic of Bulgaria, insured persons shall be entitled to a cash benefit for pregnancy and birth, if they have completed a contributory service of at least six months and are insured for all social risks, excluding occupational accident and occupational disease, or for all insured social risks excluding unemployment, of which three months during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the month when the pregnancy and childbirth leave started. Presently, the cash benefits for pregnancy and birth and for raising a small child are regulated in the Social Insurance Code (effective from 12.17.1999, amended and supplemented many times). Social security, social assistance and policy aimed at promoting and stimulating natality in Bulgaria is long-standing and was launched after 1968, when a significant reduction in fertility was registered. The adopted policies and legislative amendments covered everyone, because in that period there were no unemployed and uninsured persons and since they were aimed to increase the birth rate. In result, natality was encouraged, whereas cash benefits increased according to the number of born children up to three, then for each successive child the amount of cash benefit was equal to that for the first birth, i.ee the lowest amount of all. Another incentive policy was to increase the duration of maternity leave to raise a child up to the age of 3, with a guaranteed workplace for the mother, provision of affordable and flexible childcare services, etc. At present, cash benefits for pregnancy, birth and child rearing largely follow an established practice of the past century. As a legacy of the generous financial benefits bestowed from national economy and social policy from socialist era and policy to promote natality and support childcare, in particular, is the relatively lengthy paid leave for child rearing - up to the age of 2 years, long pregnancy and birth leave - 45 days, among others. Recently, a parental leave was introduced, which is unpaid and in its major part (five of the six months) can be transferred between parents. In the context of Bulgaria, men are those who transfer the leave to women (mother or adoptive mother), which reinforces the unfair social distribution of functions by gender in child rearing and the consequent practice of impeded career fulfilment of women, gender-based discrimination in the workplace – in recruitment, pay and career. Along with cash benefits for employed mothers or fathers, inactive persons or families, respectively households, with very low income are entitled to social benefits for childbirth and child raising. The number of persons who receive benefits for pregnancy, birth and child rearing has declined significantly due to several key reasons: a sharp drop in the number of births and relatively low share of employed and insured young women. Data on age-specific unemployment and female employment demonstrates very low employment rates of two groups - women over the age of 50 and young women between 20 and 30 years of age. Another factor for the low number of births over the past 25 years is the high emigration rate, where emigrants were mainly young people, with very high rate of girls and young women, in some years exceeding the number of young male emigrant by respective age groups. In 2009, for example, the number of cash benefits for pregnancy and birth (i.e. maternity benefit) was 858 199. The gender-based structure of ‘maternity’ benefit is characterized by a predominance of women (97.8%) and a very small percentage of men (2.2% ). In line with promotion of gender equality, the proportion of men accessing cash benef in cases provided by law has increased slightly (2.2% in 2009). The structure of benefits for raising a child is similar - women predominate (99 2%) compared to men (0.8%). It is believed that a change of terminology is needed, e.g. insurance for pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing. Those terms were imposed with Title III of the Labour Code of 1951 and its Implementing Rules, and was transferred in the current Social Insurance Code. It is believed that a modern terminology, promoting and respecting gender equality, is needed in the field of social security and social assistance. For the first half of 2015, the National Social Security Institute (NSSI) paid BGN 142 million (appr. 73 million Euro) for pregnancy and childbirth benefits, which is over BGN 18 million more than for the previous year. The average benefit for women is BGN 365 (appr. € 183), which is 6.5 percent higher than last year. The amount paid for child rearing benefits is BGN 64 million.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The daily cash benefit during pregnancy and childbirth is set at 90% of the average gross wage or insurance contributory income as defined in the respective regulation (Article 41 of the Social Insurance Code). The amount of the daily cash benefit cannot be lower than the statutory minimum wage for the country and cannot exceed the average net remuneration for the period for which the compensation is calculated.
	Conditions of entitlement	At least one of the parents should be insured n order to receive a benefit for raising of a small child. In the case of entitlement to maternity (pregnancy and birth) benefit, woman concerned shall be insured against the respective insurance risk.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Exclusively
	Maximum duration of the benefit	A mother, who is insured against all social risks, is entitled to a cash benefit for pregnancy and birth for a period of 135 calendar days, of which 45 days before birth. Similar entitlement shall be granted to mother who is not insured against occupational accidents, occupational diseases and unemployment. When birth occurs before the expiry of 45 days from the benefit launch, the remainder up to 45 days is used after birth. When a child is stillborn, has died, was placed in a nursery school with full state subsistence allowance or was given up for adoption, mother shall be entitled to cash benefit until the expiry of 42 days from birth. If mother’s performance in result of birth has not been recovered after 42 days, the duration of benefit is extended at discretion of the health authorities until she has restored her performance. Until expiry of that period, the aforementioned benefit shall be paid as pregnancy and childbirth cash benefit. When a child is given up for adoption, placed in a nursery school with full state subsistence allowance or dies after 42-nd day after birth, the benefit is terminated starting the next day. Person insured against all social risks who adopta a child shall be entitled to cash benefit amounting to the difference of age of the child on the day of its surrender for adoption to the expiry of the due birth benefit. Benefit upon mother’s death or severe illness. Upon the death or serious illness of the mother (adoptive mother), which prevents her to take care of a small child, the person who takes leave as provided under the Labor Code shall receive the corresponding cash benefit therein. Benefit for Pregnancy and Child-Birth upon Termination of Social Insurance. Upon termination of social insurance against general sickness and maternity during a period of entitlement to a benefit for pregnancy and child-birth, the insured person shall be paid a cash benefit until the lapse of the period of entitlement to a benefit for pregnancy and child-birth. Entitlement to Child-Care Benefit. Persons insured against general sickness and maternity shall be entitled to a child-care benefit, if the said persons have logged a contributory service of six months as a person insured against all social risks, against all social risks excluding occupational accident and occupational disease, or against all social risks except unemployment, of which three months during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the month from which the leave for raising a child has started. Child-Care Benefit. After the lapse of the period of entitlement to a benefit for pregnancy and child-birth during the additional paid childcare leave, the mother (adoptress) shall be paid a monthly cash benefit to an amount fixed by the Public Social Insurance Budget Act. When the additional paid child-care leave is used by the father (adopter) instead of the mother (adoptress) or by the person responsible for caring of the child, a monthly cash benefit shall be paid to an amount fixed by the Public Social Insurance Budget Act. Such benefit shall be paid to the guardian where the said guardian uses the leave under Article 167 (2) of the Labour Code. The payment of the cash benefit shall be terminated upon the death of the child, if the child is given up for adoption or placed in a nursery school with full state subsistence allowance. Benefit When Additional Paid Child-Care Leave Is Not Used (Since 2003) In cases where the additional paid child-care leave is not used or where the person who uses such leave interrupts the use thereof, mother (adoptress) shall be entitled to a cash benefit amounting to 50 per cent of the benefit, if she is insured against all insurance social risks, excluding occupational accident, occupational illness and unemployment. If the mother (adoptress) is deceased, has forfeited child custody, or the exercise of child custody has been awarded to the father (adopter), this benefit shall be paid to the father (adopter), and if he is deceased, to the guardian. The benefit shall be paid if the person who has assumed responsibility for the care of the child is insured against general sickness and maternity. The benefit shall not be paid if the child is placed in a fully public financed child institution, as well as if the child is taken care of by an individual included in the Maternity Support Programme.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Benefits for pregnancy and childbirth are provisionally received by the expectant mother, as far as this process is still inherent in only one biological sex. Generally, the child-raising benefit is provided to be used by the mother, respectively adoptive mother, reflecting social practice and common understanding in society that it is the mother who takes care of the upbringing and education of child. Therefore the law (Social Insurance Code, hereafter CIS) provides child-raising benefit to be bestowed on the father if the mother (respectively, adoptive mother) dies or is deprived of these rights with decision of the court. There is no known practice of dividing the benefit between parents. The benefit is provided to that parent who raises the child (when parents are separated) and most often to the mother (adoptive mother, respectively).
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	According to CIS, the amount of benefit depends on insurance income, i.e. of the amount of wages on which insurance contributions and benefits, respectively, are determined. Part-time work and various forms of flexible employment are less prevalent in Bulgaria and the majority of part-time workers are employed under a second employment contract and/or work without a contract and without insurance, respectively.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Parental leave is used after the expiry of statutory pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing leaves. In Bulgaria, paid and unpaid leave for raising of a small child (where employer retains the workplace) are some of the longest in Europe (up to 3 years of child age). Bulgarian labor law (the Labor Code) transposes the provisions of Directive 2010/18/EU of 08.03.2010 implementing a revised Framework Agreement on parental leave. The amendments came into force on 28.01.2012. The supplement to the Labour Code (Art. 167a para. 1) enables each parent (adoptive) of a child under the age of 8, to take up to five months from the statutory leave to the other parent (adoptive parent) with his or her consent. Before, i.e. from 01.01.2007 to 28.0102012, the entitlement to unpaid parental leave was a personal right and could not be transferred. By 31.12.2006, there was an opportunity one of the parents to take the whole leave upon consent of the other parent. At present, following the amendments to the Labour Code, each parent (adoptive parent) can transfer to the other parent (adoptive parent) up to 5 months 6 months unpaid leave to care for a child up to 8 years of age, of which one is entitled. Since most women are paid lower wages than men, the entitlement is most often taken by women. Under the provisions of the Labour Code (Art. 167a para. 1) after use of the leaves provided in Article 164 (1) and Article 165 (1) herein, each of the parents (adopter), if working under an employment relationship and the child has not been placed in a fully public-financed child-care institution, shall be entitled upon request to use unpaid child-care leave in the amount of six months until the child’s attainment of the age of 8 years. The leave may be used only after the terms of child-caring leave have expired (Art. 164, para. 1 and Art. 165, para. 1 of the LC and no later than the date on which the child turns 8 years old).
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No, because in Bulgaria the parental leave is unpaid. Entitlement to parental leave: According to the provisions of the Labour Code (Art. 167a para. 1) after use of the leaves provided in Article 164 (1) and Article 165 (1) herein, each of the parents (adopter), if working under an employment relationship and the child has not been placed in a fully public-financed child-care institution, shall be entitled upon request to use unpaid child-care leave in the amount of six months until the child’s attainment of the age of 8 years. Subject to certain conditions, other persons may be also entitled to that type of leave. The leave may be used only after the terms of child-caring leave have expired (Art. 164, para. 1 and Art. 165, para. 1 of LC and no later than the date on which the child turns 8 years old). Entitlement to leave for children up to 8 years of age shall have: child's parents, adoptive parents; guardian if the child's parents have died – who can be parent of the father or mother (grandmother or grandfather on the maternal or paternal line); a single parent who alone raises the child. Therefore, the Regulation on working time, breaks and holidays (RWTBH) contains provisions that establish conditions and requirements for use of the leave by any of those parties. Since cases are different, the Regulation establishes certain universal requirements for all parties. It also indicates the requirements that are specific to each individual case.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	The entitlement to child-raising benefit can be used by one of the parents. The entitlement to pregnancy and birth benefits is used only by pregnant women. Please see above.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Yes

Croatia

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The current system of maternity and parental benefits, including salary-related child-raising benefits was introduced in 2008, under the Act on Maternity and Parental Benefits (Official Gazette Narodne novine nos. 85/08, 110/08, 34/11, 54/13 and 152/14). This Act redefines, expands and attempts to flexibilize the already existing system of benefits established under the (old) Labour Act of 1995 (and its predecessors) and Act on Maternity Leave of self-employed and unemployed mothers of 1996. However, salary-related child-raising benefits were not a novelty in the Croatian legal system since it gained independence from the former SFRY in 1991, because Croatia inherited a relatively strong and developed system of maternity benefits, developed during socialism and taken over as an important instrument of family and population policy. In the last decade, the number of beneficiaries of maternity and parental benefits, in the form of paid maternity and parental leave as the most typical forms of salary-related child raising benefits revolves around 18 000 – 22 000. In February 2008, before the current system was implemented, there were 22 863 beneficiaries of maternity leave up to six months after child’s birth and 16 686 beneficiaries of additional maternity leave (today: parental leave) from six months after child’s birth until a child turns 1 year (source: Draft (No. 85) Act on Maternity and Parental Benefits; Croatian Health Insurance Fund). In December 2009, approximately one year after implementation of the new system, there were 17 194 beneficiaries of maternity leave up to six months after child’s birth and 16 172 beneficiaries of parental leave from six months after child’s birth until a child turns 1 year (source: Draft (No. 726) Act on Maternity and Parental Benefits; Croatian Health Insurance Fund).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Maternity benefit for employed or self-employed persons amounts to 100% of the monthly earnings of the insured person, calculated on the basis of average salary received in the six months preceding the maternity leave. There is no ceiling. Parental benefit for employed or self-employed persons is 100% of the monthly earnings, but cannot exceed a maximum of 80% of budget calculation base (currently HRK 2,660.80 (€347) per month). It cannot be lower than 50% of the budget calculation base (currently HRK 1,663.00 (€217) per month).
	Conditions of entitlement	Minimum period of insurance is required: 12 months of consecutive insurance or 18 months with interruptions during the last two years. The prescribed insurance period is the period that the person has accumulated on the basis of his/her employed or self-employed activity or on the basis of salary compensation after termination of employment. If this condition is not fulfilled, the insured person is entitled to salary compensation amounting to 50% of the budget calculation base currently HRK 1,663.00 (€217) per month).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Maternity benefit: exclusively calculated with respect to salary, no ceiling applies.Parental benefit: in principle calculated with respect to salary, but upper and lower limits apply.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Maternity benefit is paid during maternity leave: 28 days before confinement until the child turns six months. Exceptionally, maternity leave may start 45 days before confinement. Compulsory part of maternity leave covers a period of 70 days after confinement and it is not transferrable (only a mother is entitled to it). After expiration of compulsory part of maternity leave (i.e. from 71st day after confinement), additional maternity leave until a child turns six months is transferrable and may be used either by a mother or a father. Parental benefit is paid during parental leave. Parental leave starts when a child is six months, and may be used in duration of 8 months (for the first and second child) or 30 months (for twins, third and each consecutive child). If only one parent uses parental leave, it lasts 6 months (for the first and second child) or 30 months (for twins, third and each consecutive child).
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Maternity benefit during compulsory part of maternity leave: only mother entitled to benefit. Maternity benefit after expiration of compulsory part of maternity leave (so-called additional maternity leave): either parent entitled to benefit (but not simultaneously). Parental benefit during parental leave: either parent (but not simultaneously).
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes. The above calculation method applies. Benefit is calculated in relation to average salary received in the period of six months prior to taking the leave, i.e. later changes in salary do not affect it. Benefit cannot be lower than 50% of the budget calculation base (currently HRK 1,663.00 (€217) per month), regardless whether employed or self-employed parent works full or part-time.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Yes.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	Cash benefits during maternity or parental leave are paid at the expense of the Croatian Health Insurance Fund.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Both parents cannot claim salary-related child-raising benefits simultaneously. Compulsory maternity leave and pertaining benefit in the form of salary or income compensation can be claimed only by the mother. Additional maternity leave and parental leave, as well as pertaining benefits can be claimed either by a mother or a father.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	All rights under the Act on Maternity and Parental Benefits (leaves, cash benefits) depend on a person’s status as insured person in compulsory health insurance. Where no such status exists (whether as employed, self-employed, unemployed, retiree, student, family member of insured person not otherwise insured under any other basis etc.), no right can be granted under the Act. Therefore, salary-related child-raising benefits are contributory benefits and personal rights granted to parents in accordance with their status as insured persons in compulsory health insurance. Under Article 10(2) of the Compulsory Health Insurance Act, a family member (spouse, child, etc.) of insured person acquires the (derived) status of insured person in compulsory health insurance if he/she is not compulsory insured under any other basis provided in that act and if he/she has residence or is granted the right of permanent stay in Croatia “unless otherwise prescribed by EU law or international agreements”. Consequently, this provision does allow a certain amount of flexibility to interpret national provisions in line with the CJEU case law, but there is no practice to confirm this opinion.

Cyprus

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	No child-raising benefit is provided in the Cypriot legal order, i.e. a benefit that would be paid to mothers or fathers who take time off on a full or part-time basis with a view to caring their child/children – such benefit typically being triggered upon expiry of the maternity/paternity benefit, aiming at mitigating the financial disadvantage entailed in giving up income from employment. Related benefits (but with a different function than the child-raising benefit) which are provided for in Cyprus are the ‘classical’ maternity benefit, the maternity grant (βοήθημα τοκετού), which is provided after the child’s birth on certain insurance conditions, and the family benefit (in the last case, depending on revenues, to families whose habitual place of residence is in Cyprus for a defined period).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	N/A
	Conditions of entitlement	N/A
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	N/A
	Maximum duration of the benefit	N/A
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	N/A
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	N/A
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	N/A
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	N/A
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	N/A
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how? 87	N/A

Czech Republic

Preliminary remark

As a preliminary remark, it should be noted, that in the Czech Republic, there is the main child-raising benefit called “parental allowance”. However, this benefit makes part of state social support system and is not related to income. It´s provided for up to 4 years of child´s age in a flat-rate – 220 000 CZK (some 8150 EURO). In the Czech sickness insurance scheme (Act No. 187/2006 Coll., on sickness insurance), there is the maternity benefit (financial assistance during maternity). This benefit seeks indeed to replace income during first child-raising period, during the maternity leave, which lasts in general for max. 22 weeks after the birth. This maternity benefit will be tackled in following answers.

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The maternity benefit was launched in 1968 – that time it was a right of the mother only. The possibility of transferring this right to the father was introduced with the new law in 2006, which entered into force in 2007. Statistics concerning the number of claimants of maternity benefit are publically not available.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	From the first calendar day, the maternity benefit amount is 70% of the daily basis of assessment per calendar day.
	Conditions of entitlement	A basic condition for entitlement to financial assistance while on maternity leave is participation in insurance (e.g., continuation of insured employment) at the time of commencement of maternity leave. The time is determined by the expectant mother herself between the eighth and sixth week prior to the expected date of birth, or the date of birth if the birth occurs prior to the time of commencement of maternity leave. The period of protection for women whose insurance (employment) terminated during pregnancy is 180 calendar days from the date of termination of the insurance. The insured person must have participated in the sickness insurance scheme for at least 270 calendar days over the last two years before the date of starting the maternity leave to have the right to this benefit. The period of participation in sickness insurance for the right to maternity benefit includes the period of studies at a secondary school, vocational college or university considered to be the systematic preparation for a future profession. An insured person who is the father of a child or husband of a woman who bore the child also has the right to maternity benefit, if the person has concluded a written agreement with the mother of the child that he will take care of the child. The agreement must include data laid down by law, and may be concluded with effect no sooner than the beginning of the 7th week after the childbirth.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	The maternity benefit is calculated exclusively with reference to salary, no flat-rate elements are envisaged. There is only a ceiling.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	The support period for the maternity benefit begins with the start of the maternity leave (no later than the beginning of the 6th week before the anticipated date of childbirth), and is 28 weeks for an insured woman who bears a child, even if she is an employee who is not married, is widowed, divorced, or alone for other serious reasons. For an insured woman who bears two or more children at the same time, the support period is 37 weeks and, after 28 weeks of the support period, the benefit will only be received if the insured woman continues to take care of at least two of these children. For an insured person who assumed the care of a child (on the basis of a decision of the relevant authority, due to the mother’s death, or long-term serious disease, or on the basis of an agreement made with the mother of the child), the support period is 22 weeks. If this insured person takes care of two or more children at the same time, the support period is 31 weeks and, after 22 weeks of the support period, the maternity benefit will only be received if the insured person continues to take care of at least two of these children. If the income was partially reduced, the amount of the benefit will be adequately reduced. In general however, it´s not possible to combine the entitlement to this maternity benefit with a gainful activity.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	As already explained, the benefit can be claimed by mother, or eventually by the father of the child, or by another insured person, who takes care after the child (e.g. an adoptive or foster parent). If parents want to make the above mentioned written agreement, that the father will take care after the child instead of the mother, such an agreement can be made only after 6 weeks after the child was born. The benefit will not be split, but it will be only one of the parents, who can claim it.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes, only that the amount will be reduced.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Not really, it´s more a maternity benefit according to the Directive 92/85. 88
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The maternity benefit is paid from the state budget; the employer is only obliged to employ the parent returning from maternity/parental leave. For this obligation, there is no compensation. No salary is paid during parental leave.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	As explained above, it´s not possible. It´s one or the other parent.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	As regards the above described maternity benefit, it´s not possible, that such a benefit would be for a family as such. The person, who claims the benefit, must fulfil the conditions for entitlement under the sickness insurance act. As already mentioned, it´s more a maternity benefit, than a family benefit, but still, it´s replacing the income during the child-raising period and it´s income-related.

Denmark

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	An overall introductory comment is that the Danish child care allowance is in its current state defined by the law on child and youth care allowance (Lov om børne- og ungeydelse, LBK nr 964 af 19/09/2011) from 2011. This benefit is only related to salary in the way that since 2014, a recipient with a high salary (i.e. above the top-bracket tax level of 723.100 Danish kroner per year) will be offered a reduced benefit. In practice, the benefit is almost de facto universal as only a small share (about 10 percent, source: Ministry of Taxation: http://www.skm.dk/skattetal/statistik/generel-skattestatistik/bund-,-mellem-og-topskatteydere-1994-2015) of the total population of taxpayers earns above the top-bracket tax level. The following is based upon the Ministry of Taxation unless anything else is noted (http://www.skm.dk/skattetal/beregning/skatteberegning/boerne-og-ungeydelse-i-2015-og-2016). The child care allowance has been disbursed since 1987 and has undergone a series of changes throughout the years. In rough terms, the benefit can be characterised upon three time spans; from 1987 to 2010; from 2011 to 2013 and from 2014 onwards. The total expenses on the benefit from 1987 to 2015 are as follows In addition, a cash benefit is available to parents (dagpenge ved barsel)
	Level of the benefit	The level of the child care benefit in 2015 is as follows (Source: The website borger.dk, which is the citizens’ joint entry to public authorities in Denmark, https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Boerne-ungeydelse.aspx): 0-2 years old: 4.443 Danish kroner per quarter of a year 3-6- years old: 3.519 Danish kroner per quarter of a year 7-14- years old: 2.769 Danish kroner per quarter of a year 15-17- years old: 923 Danish kroner per month The level can of the child-raising benefit is determined as follows: Employees: Calculation on the basis of the hourly wage of the employee with a maximum of DKK 4,135 (€556) per week or DKK 111.76 (€15) per hour (37 hours per week), and on the number of hours of work. Self-employed: Calculation on the basis of the earnings from the occupational activity of the self-employed person, with the same maximum as mentioned above.
	Conditions of entitlement	Due to current Danish legislation, eligibility to the child care benefit is dependent on the following criteria (Source: The website borger.dk, which is the citizens’ joint entry to public authorities in Denmark, https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Boerne-ungeydelse.aspx): residence in Denmark   fully liable to taxes   aged above 18   the child is resident in Denmark* (see, however, note beneath)   the child is not provided for by public authorities   the child is unmarried   the recipient must have resided in Denmark for 2 years during the last 10 years in order to be  eligible to the benefit Eligibility to the child-raising allowance is determined as follows: Employees: Period of work of at least 120 hours in 13 weeks preceding the paid leave, or; Unemployed entitled to benefits from unemployment insurance or similar benefits (activation measures), or; Persons who within the last month have completed a vocational training course for a period of at least 18 months, or; Pupils in a vocational training course regulated by law, or; Persons in a "flexible job" with a private or public employer. Self-employed: Professional activity on a certain scale (at least 18½ hours average weekly) for at least 6 months within the last 12-month period, of which 1 month immediately precedes the paid leave, or; Receipt of flex wage subsidy (flekslønstilskud) (i.e. a benefit for self-employed who have a flexible job in their own company).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	From January 1 2014, the child care benefit is made salary-related. This means that if the recipient or the recipient’s spouse earns above the top-bracket tax level (723.100 Danish kroner per year), the benefit is reduced by 2 percent of the amount exceeds 723.100 Danish kroner (Source: The website borger.dk, which is the citizens’ joint entry to public authorities in Denmark The child-raising benefit is exclusively earnings-related.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	18 years per child, i.e. from the child is born until (s)he turns 18 for the child care benefit (Source: The website borger.dk, which is the citizens’ joint entry to public authorities in Denmark, https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Boerne- ungeydelse.aspx). The maximum duration of the child-raising benefit is 32 weeks after the 14th week following birth.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	The child care benefit is automatically disbursed to the mother unless the father holds custody over the child. If the father holds custody but resides with the mother, however, the benefit is disbursed to her (Source: The website borger.dk, which is the citizens’ joint entry to public authorities in Denmark, https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Boerne-ungeydelse.aspx). In the case of a shared custody where the two parents live apart, the child care allowance is disbursed to the parent with whom the child has his or her permanent address (Source: Respondent in Udbetaling Danmark (‘Disbursement Denmark’), Family Benefits, September 2015). The child-raising benefit may be shared between both parents. The modalities thereof is determined by the parents themselves.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Concerning the child care benefit this is possible, but since the disbursement is not dependent on a specific salary, this is not relevant in the Danish case. The child care allowance is reduced if the recipient earns above the top-bracket tax level (723.100 Danish kroner per year), cf. history section above. This is also possible for the child-raising benefit.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	No, the child care benefit is disbursed irrespectively of other social benefits (Source: Respondent in Udbetaling Danmark (‘Disbursement Denmark’), Family Benefits, September 2015).
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No concerning the child care benefit (Source: Respondent in Udbetaling Danmark (‘Disbursement Denmark’), Parental Leave, September 2015). Yes as concerns the child-raising benefit.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	No. As noted above, the child care allowance can only be disbursed to one parent. Yes concerning the child-raising allowance. The modalities thereof are to be determined by the parents.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	We perceive the question to concern whether Denmark would disburse the child care allowance to the parent who takes upon the child- raising task in practice and not the parent who officially applies to be the recipient of the child care allowance. In such case, the disbursement of the child care allowance would be to the mother unless the father holds custody over the child or, in case of shared custody, to the parent with whom the child officially resides (Source: Respondent in Udbetaling Danmark (‘Disbursement Denmark’), Family Benefits, September 2015). In relation to the issue of which member state is responsible for disbursing the benefit, it can be noted that family benefits in general are disbursed according to lex loci laboris, i.e. depending on the country of employment (Source: Respondent in Udbetaling Danmark (‘Disbursement Denmark’), Family Benefits, September 2015). Unclear concerning the child-raising benefit.

Estonia

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Firstly, a woman has the right for pregnancy and maternity leave for 140 days. For that period the Estonian Health Insurance Fund is paying the maternity benefit, which is calculated on the basis of the social tax paid for the worker in previous calendar year (e.g. if the maternity leave is taken out in 2015, the benefit is calculated according to the social tax paid in 2014). The level of the maternity benefit is 100% of the average daily income of previous calendar year. Secondly, a mother or father has the right to child care leave until his or her child reaches the age of three years (the right to child care leave starts after the right to pregnancy and maternity leave ends). Child care leave may be used by one person at a time. Child care leave may be used in one part or in several parts every year. During child care leave a parent has the right to parental benefit (see below, calculated with reference to previous income) or child care allowance (76 eur 70 cent per month, paid according to the state family benefits act). The child care allowance is paid after the right to parental benefit has ceased. Parental benefit, which aim is to grant the previous income for persons whose income decreases due to the raising of a child, and to support the reconciliation of work and family life, was introduced in 1, January, 2004. The benefit is granted for the period of 435 days as of the date on which the right to receive the benefit arises. The amount of the benefit per calendar month shall be calculated on the basis of the average income of the applicant for the benefit per calendar month. The average income per calendar month is income which is subject to social tax paid for the person for previous calendar year. The maximum amount of the benefit per calendar month is three times the average income subject to social tax of the year before the previous calendar year prior to the date on which the right to receive the parental benefit arises. In year 2015 it is 2548 eur per month. In case a person has not had socially taxable income, then the rate of the parental benefit is determined by Parliament by state budget. In year 2015 it is 390 eur per month. One reason Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) introduced the parental benefit, was the fact that the natural growth of Estonian population was poor. One of the reasons might have been also the fact that before parental benefit, the state support for child rising was poor as there was very little support for families after the maternity benefit ended (the child care allowance, mentioned above, has always been very low; the day care facilities are available for children usually after they are 1,5-2 years old). The parental benefit has worked out well, although, there are some discussions in society whether it is too generous. At the same time the economically more strong women have had more children, as the parental benefit together with the maternity benefit gives them economic security after the child is 1 and half year old, and at this time it is more realistic to leave the child to kindergarten. Below I will bring the number of persons who have received the parental benefit (data from Statistics Estonia) Below I will give information how many persons have received the maximum amount of the benefit (data from Statistics Estonia) Below I will give information how many persons have received the minimum amount of the benefit (data from Statistics Estonia) Below I will describe the parental benefit.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	In year 2015 the minimum level of parental benefit is 390 EUR (hereinafter: benefit rate) and the maximum amount is 2548 EUR.
	Conditions of entitlement	The right to receive the benefit is for permanent residents of Estonia and aliens residing in Estonia on the basis of a temporary residence permit or temporary right of residence (hereinafter residents of Estonia). A resident of Estonia who has residence in several states has the right to receive the benefit if he or she is a resident within the meaning of subsection 6 (1) of the Income Tax Act or if he or she resides permanently in Estonia within the meaning of the Aliens Act or the Citizen of the European Union Act. A parent, adoptive parent, step-parent, guardian or caregiver raising a child with respect to whom a written foster care contract has been entered into has the right to receive benefit. Before the child attains seventy days of age, the mother of the child who is raising the child has the right to receive the benefit except if the mother of the child is dead or fails to perform the obligation to raise and care for the child arising from the Family Law Act. If one of the parents is on parental leave (child care leave (see above) after the child attains seventy days of age, that parent has the right to receive the benefit.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	For persons who have had salary from where the social tax has been calculated the previous year, the benefit is calculated with respect to the salary up to the maximum amount (the maximum amount of the benefit per calendar month is three times the average income subject to social tax of the year before the previous calendar year prior to the date on which the right to receive the parental benefit arises. In year 2015 it is 2548 eur per month). For persons who have not had income where social tax has been calculated, the parental benefit is paid in fixed sum (at benefit rate) which is determined every year by state budget (in 2015 it is 390 EUR).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	435 days from the date when the right arises. The right to receive the benefit arises as of the date following the final date of the certificate for maternity leave or a certificate for adoption leave which grants the right to receive maternity benefit or adoption benefit provided for in the Health Insurance Act. If the mother of a child does not have the right to receive maternity benefit, the right to receive parental benefit arises as of the birth of the child.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	See conditions of entitlement. After the child is 70 days old, both parents can claim the benefit. At a time, only one parent can receive the benefit. If one parent is on child care leave, this parent has the right to the benefit.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	If a person at a period when he receives parental benefit also receives income from where social tax is calculated, the benefit is reduced. More precicly, if the recipient of benefit receives income subject to social tax (including from another Contracting Party to the EEA Agreement or from the Swiss Confederation), except the income from self-employment, which exceeds the benefit rate (in 2015 it is 390 EUR), during the calendar month of payment of the benefit, the amount of income exceeding the rate of the benefit divided by two shall be deducted. The amount of the benefit shall be at least half of the benefit granted to the person but not smaller than the benefit rate.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	I would say yes.
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	This scheme, that employer continues to offer pay during parental leave, is usually not in practice in Estonia. If it would be so, the employer is not entitled to off set the social tax nor the salary of the worker. If employer offers pay, the social tax is calculated from that pay, and for this reason the parental benefit is reduced.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	After the child is 70 days old, both parents can claim the benefit, but it is not possible to receive the benefit simultaneously. The benefit is available for one parent at a time. But parents can change their right every month during the period the benefit is available.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	No.

Finland

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	There is no salary-related child-raising benefits in spite of maternal, paternal and parental allowances. After those one can get a flat rate child home care allowance, partial care allowance or flexible care allowance or a private day care allowance to support one´s child-raising and combining work and care, but they are not income related. However, one can get a care supplement to Child home care allowance and private day care allowance, which depends on the family´s total income. Also the fees in municipal day care depend on the family`s income and size. The maximum fee for one child is 283 € per month. (See http://www.okm.fi/OPM/Koulutus/varhaiskasvatus/?lang=en ) The idea behind the CHCA is that all children under school age – which is 7 – have a subjective right to municipal day care. CHCA was created to compensate those parents not able to use municipal day care (for example living in remoted areas) or not willing to do that. Private home care allowance compensates those willing to buy daycare from the market. Subjective right to day care as well as country wide right to CHCA were introduced in 1985 as well as a parents firght to care leave from work. In addition to the national CHCA, many municipalities have encouraged parents to use CHCA instead of municipal day care services by offering an additional Municipal Home Care Allowance. The municipalities are free to decide on the criteria and the amount of this allowance independently. The use and amount of this allowance varies in time, but approximately half of the municipalites have used it (See Miettunen 2008, https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10250/7933/Tutkimuksia101.pdf?sequen , of history of parental allowances and the encouraging of both parents to a more equal take-up of leaves se f. eg, Varjonen 2011, https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/27824/Tutkimuksia118.pdf?sequence=3 ) The other allowances are planned to help combining work and child raising. Flexible care allowance is for those parents of children under 3 and Partial care allowance is for parents of a child in the 1st or 2nd year of school, who are willing to work part time and care for part time. Parents have a right to partial leave from work and these allowances compensate the loss of earnings. There were 159 244 children in the municipality’s own services in 2014 (See Sotkanet: https://www.sotkanet.fi/sotkanet/en/taulukko/?indicator=sy52ttY1szbVM7Q2TLY2BlKmnta65kAxIGUWb2hibaSnC5RLgsi5AeUA&region=s07MBAA=&year=sy4rtTbR0zUEAA==&gender=t&abs=f&color=f ) while 133 548 children were taken care with the help of the CHCA and the Private day care allowance. (http://raportit.kela.fi/ibi_apps/WFServlet) There are also other benefit to support families in child caring. Parents with whom the child lives are paid child allowance until the child turns 17. Seriously ill or disabled children may be entitled to disability allowance. Parents or other persons taking care of a seriously ill or disabled child may also get Informal care support from the local municipality. The care support is paid as stepped payments according to the binding natures and level of requirements of the care – not the previous salary of the carer. The minimum amount of care support is €310,44 per month. Single parent families are often eligible for benefits at an increased rate: eg. single-parent supplement to child benefit. Single-parents may claim child maintenance allowance if one does not receive child support or it is too low or e.g. general housing allowance. Multiple-birth families or families adopting two or more children at the same time get some of the benefits at higher rate or for longer period. Eg. parental allowance for additional 60 days and both parents can stay home at the same time.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The sum of maternal, paternal and parental allowance is calculated according to previously taxed earnings. The amount of the parental allowance is usually about 70% of your earnings. The minimum allowance is always €24,02 per working day. Child home care allowance is paid separately for every child eligible for the allowance. The amount of care allowance is € 342,53 per month for one child under 3 years of age; € 102,55 per month for each additional child under 3 years of age and € 65,89 per month for a child over 3 years of age but under school age (7 years). Care supplement depends on the size and gross income of the family. The maximum amount of care supplement is € 183,31 per month. It is paid for one child only. For example a family of 4 or more receives no care supplement if the income of the family is € 4020,32 or more. (See more closely www.kela.fi/families ) Flexible care allowance is € 244,18 if the recipient works no more than 22,5 hours per week or no more than 60% of normal full-time hours or € 162,78 per month if the recipient works more than 22,5 hours or more than 60% but no more than 80% of normal full-time hours. It is taxable income. Partial care allowance is €98,09 per month. It is paid for one child only even if there are more 1st and 2nd graders in the family. It is taxable income.
	Conditions of entitlement	Maternal allowance is for mothers, Paternal leave for fathers, Parental leave is for mother or father of a new born child. There is also Partial parental leave, which the father and the mother can take at the same time providing they both work part time. Child home care allowance is eligible to a parent or other legal guardian with a child under 3 years of age who is not in municipal day care. Also a sibling of a child under 3 years of age may be granted CHCA. According to the Employment Contracts Act a parent of a child under 3 years of age is also entitled to a care leave. One must notify one’s employer at least 2 months before one plan to take the leave. One can take one´s care leave in one or two periods – unless one´s employer agrees to several periods. However, parents can also work and receive the allowance at the same time. Crusial is, that the child is not in municipal day care. Flexible care allowance can be paid to a parent who works no more than 30 hours per week on average or no more than 80% of normal full-time hours. Flexible care allowance is payable for one child at a time only. Partial care allowance is for employed parents of a child in the 1st or 2nd year of school, who work no more than 30 hours per week. One must have been with the same employer for at least 6 months over the past year. both parents can receive partial care allowance if they are not off work at the same time. Private day care allowance can be claimed by a family whose under-school-age child is looked after by a nanny hired by the family or by private day care provider – that is, the child do not have a place in municipal day care.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Maternal, paternal and parental allowances are calculated exclusively with one´s salary. But if one doesn´t have any income, there is a universal, flat rate compensation of € 24,02 per working day. Child home care allowance is a flat rate benefit, but one can get a Care supplement on top of it, which depends on the size and gross income of the family. Private day care allowance is also a flat rate benefit but can as well include a care supplement, which depends on the family’s income. It is paid separately for each child eligible for the benefit. Flexible care allowance or private day care allowance are flat rate benefits.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Parental allowance is paid for 158 working days (just over 6 months). One is entitled to CHCA or to the Flexible care allowance until the child turns 3 years of age. Private day care allowance in for children under school age. Partial care allowance is for parents of a child in the 1st or 2nd year of school.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Either of the parent can receive CHCA but not at the same time. The CHCA is paid per child. Flexible care allowance can be paid to both parents at the same time if they make work arrangements that allow them to look after the child at different times (e.g. one parent on Mondays and the other on Fridays). Also a parent not living in the same household with the child can receive the allowance (f.ex. a divorced mother). Both parents can take partial care leave as long as they share the responsibility for looking after the child and are not off work at the same time. If both parents take partial care leave, both of them are also eligible for partial care allowance. Partial care allowance is also available to so-called non-resident parent, i.e. a parent who does not live in the same household with the children Parental leave can be taken by the mother or the father and the parental allowance is paid accordingly. The parents can also alternate the leave, but not take it at the same time – with execption of multiple birth families. If the parents share the leave they can each take up to 2 periods of leave divided between as they wish. Partial parental leave, which the father and the mother can take at the same time providing they both work part time and receive partial parental allowance.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Both partial care leave and partial care allowance as well as partial parental leave with partial parental allowance are ment to make part-time/flexible working possible and to compensate the loss of earnings.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	After parental leave the child is about 9 months old. After the leave father can take paternity leave and get allowance mother, father or another carer may stay at home to look after the child or the family may hire a carer alone or together with other families until she/he turns three and receive child home care allowance (CHCA) the child may be cared for by a a private child care provider, in which case the family may claim private day care allowance a family with under three years old child may work part time (no more than 30 hours per week) and receive flexible care allowance the child may attend municipal day care.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either “off-set” or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	According to the Empolyment Act an employer need not to pay salary during neither the maternal leave nor parental leave. However, many collective agreements provide for full salary during the maternity leave. Usually parents on paternal leave do not get paid but receive the paternal allowance only. The benefits can be paid directly to the employer in case it has paid salary during the employee´s leave.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	As mentinoned above: Either of the parent can receive CHCA but not at the same time. The CHCA is paid per child. Flexible care allowance can be paid to both parents at the same time if they make work arrangements that allow them to look after the child at different times (e.g. one parent on Mondays and the other on Fridays). Also a parent not living in the same household with the child can receive the allowance (f.ex. a divorced mother). Both parents can take partial care leave as long as they share the responsibility for looking after the child and are not off work at the same time. If both parents take partial care leave, both of them are also eligible for partial care allowance. Partial care allowance is also available to so-called non-resident parent, i.e. a parent who does not live in the same household with the children Parental leave can be taken by the mother or the father and the parental allowance is paid accordingly. The parents can also alternate the leave, but not take it at the same time – with execption of multiple birth families. If the parents share the leave they can each take up to 2 periods of leave divided between as they wish. Partial parental leave, which the father and the mother can take at the same time providing they both work part time and receive partial parental allowance.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Maternal or parental allowances are individual and the amount of them is considered according to the receivers income. The receiver must be insured her/himself. However, following an amendment to the law which became effective Janury 1st 2015, fathers and mothers can work during the parental leave. In practice this might enable a parent not insured in Finland to take care of a child. The allowance paid in these circumstance is, however, rather small: If a father or mother work during the parental leave, he or she will be paid parental allowance at the minimum rate. Child home care allowance is paid if the child is not in municipal day care to the eligible parent. It is not controlled who in practice takes care of the child. If Finland is the country responsible for the family benefits of the family, CHCA is paid for a child living in another EU-country.

France

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	History France has a long history of child-raising benefits granted to parents who choose to interrupt their professional activity The purpose of the last 30 years reforms has been to simplify the rules, make it financially sustainable and encourage a better splitting between parents: -In 1985, the “allocation parentale d’éducation” is created -In 2004, the “allocation parentale d’éducation” is replaced by the “Complément de libre choix d’activité”. -In 2015, the the “Complément de libre choix d’activité” (CLCA) is replaced by the ”prestation partagée d’éducation de l’enfant (PreParE)”. The PreParE applies to children born after 1st January 2015. One of the objectives of this new benefit is to encourage the splitting between both parents. Statistical elements -In 2012, CLCA was granted to roughly 530 000 parents for an overall cost of 2.1 Billion € -96% of claimers were women. 45% of them claimed a reduced rate benefit corresponding to a part-time activity; 1/3 were exercising an activity between 50 and 80% of full-time; 10% an activity of less than 50%. -Most CLCA (92%) are claimed for the 1st, 2nd or 3rd child. For thr 1st child the average length is 5 months (compared to a max. of 6 months). Only 56% of the parents use up the maximum length
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	See figures below
	Conditions of entitlement	To interrupt wholly or partially professional activity To have a record of at least 8 trimesters of social security contribution at the moment of the claim To be in charge of a child under 3 years old (or under 20 years old if the child has been adopted) No means-test
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Benefit amount not related to the salary. The benefit amount depends on whether the activity is wholly or partly interrupted: 390 €/month (full interruption), 252 € / month (half-time interruption), 145 € / month (interruption less than half time) A supplement “PreParE majorée” is granted if: at least 3 dependent children + full interruption of professional activity. If both conditions are met, the benefit amounts to 638 € / month
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Duration depends on two criteria: number of dependent children; family structure. Example 1: for 1 dependent child raised by a single parent, duration is limited to one year (until 1st birthday of child). Example 2: for any additional dependent child raised by a couple, each parent is entitled to two years of benefit (until the youngest child reaches the age of 3). Example 3: for 3 children and more, each parent can claim the “PreParE majorée” for 8 months max. (until 1st birthday of youngest child)
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Compared to the previous benefit (CLCA), the “PreParE” creates incentives for a better splitting of the benefit between parents (rules not applicable in case of lonely parents). Example 1: For the 1st child, each parent is entitled to the benefit for 6 months (until 1st birthday of child). The law does not allow to divide the 12 months differently (e.g. 4 months by one parent and 8 months by the other parent is not allowed). In the former system applicable to children born until 31st Dec.2014, the benefit was granted for 6 months max. and for only one parent. Example 2: if the couple has another child, each parent is entitled to the benefit for max. 24 months (until 3rd birthday of child). In the former system applicable to children born until 31st Dec.2014, one parent could be granted 36 months max.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes (see above)
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Yes (see above system of splitting)
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either “off-set” or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The “PreParE” cannot be cumulated with work income. Even if a collective agreement provides for maintain of salary during the parental leave (to my knowledge, this situation does not exist), the employer would not be entitled to claim any reimbursement from social security. The “PreParE” cannot be cumulated with social security cash benefits. For example, unemployment benefits cannot be cumulated with the “PreParE”, but it is possible to delay the granting of the unemployment benefits for the period of the “PreParE”. By deorgation, a female civil servant is entitled to cumulate his/her full time salary during maternity leave and the “PreparE” at part-time rate
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	The benefit can be claimed simultaneously or alternately by the parents. If the benefit is claimed simultaneously, the overall amount granted to both members of the couple is however limited to the “full interruption” rate (390 € / month)
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	I don’t think so. The benefit is an individual right: according to Art. L531-4 of the social security code, the “PreParE “ is granted “to the person who chooses not to exercise a professional activity in order to take care of a child…”. Further on, the same law stipulates that “When both members of a couple are each entitled to the PreParE…and that each one claims the benefit…”.

Germany

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	In Germany, there is only one benefit, which seeks to replace income during child-raising periods and that is calculated wholly or partially with reference to a salary or professional income. It is the “Elterngeld” (literally: “parents´ money”), paid according to § 1 Federal Child-Raising Allowance and Parental Leave Act (Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz, BEEG, from 5.12.2006, BGBl. I 2006, p. 2748). An English description of the complicated rules is given by the German ministry under http://www.bmfsfj.de/RedaktionBMFSFJ/Broschuerenstelle/Pdf-Anlagen/ElterngeldPlus-mit-Partnerschaftsbonus-englisch,property=pdf,bereich=bmfsfj,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf . The BEEG entered into force on 1. January 2007. The “Elterngeld” is the successor of the child raising allowance “Erziehungsgeld”, which was paid according to the Child-Raising Allowance Act (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz, BErzGG, from 6.12.1985, BGBl. I 1985, p. 2154, entered into force on 1. January 1986. During the first three months of 2015, 835 000 persons received „Elterngeld“. 88 % (733 000) of them were mothers, and 12 % of them (102 000) were fathers ( https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2015/06/PD15_223_22922.html;jsessionid=B41947091A215C1737A96857EF26F923.cae4 ).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The minimum amount of parental benefits is 300 €, the maximum amount of parental benefits is 1.800 €, § 2 para. 1 s. 2, para. 4 s. 1 BEEG (details below, under ‘Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary’).
	Conditions of entitlement	The BEEG requires the person entitled to live in one household with the child, to care for and raise the child and furthermore not to exercise any or no full rate employment (see § 1 para. 1 - 3 BEEG).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	According to § 2 para. 1 BEEG the parental benefit is 67 % of the average monthly net wages the year before the childbirth. For the calculation of the monthly wages the income tax act, Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG) is partially referred to (§ 2 BEEG). The crucial element is the income of the entitled person, i.e. the parent responsible for raising the child. This 67 %-rule does only apply, if the average monthly net wages the year before the childbirth was between 1,000 € and 1,200 €. Regarding wages under 1,000 € there is an increase arranged, § 2 para. 2 s. 1 BEEG. The lower the income, the bigger the increase. It is 0.1% for every 2 €, with which the income differs from 1,000 €, up to 100%. That means e.g., that a person, who had a monthly net income of 700 €, receives 82% (67% plus 15%) of this sum, i.e. 574 €. A person, who had a monthly net income of 340 €, receives 100% (67% plus 33%) of this sum, i.e. 340 €. The minimum amount of parental benefits is 300 €, § 2 para. 4 s. 1 BEEG. Regarding wages of 1,200 € and more there is a decrease arranged, § 2 para. 2 s. 2 BBEG. The higher the income, the bigger the decrease. It is 0.1% for every 2 €, with which the income differs from 1,200 €, down to 65%. That means e.g., that a person, who had a monthly net income of 1.220 €, receives 66% (67% minus 1%) of this sum, i.e. 805.20 €. A person, who had a monthly net income of 1,240 €, receives 65% of this sum, i.e. 806 €. A person, who had a monthly net income of 1,500 €, receives 65% of this sum, i.e. 975 €. The maximum amount of parental benefits is 1.800 €, § 2 para. 1 s. 2 BEEG. There are no payments, if, according to income tax law, the income of the person was higher than 250,000 € in the last calendar year (couples: 500,000 €), § 1 para. 8 BEEG. Additional rules apply with multiples and other children, which were born in a short period of time,§ 2a BEEG.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	The benefits are paid up to twelve months and altogether no longer than 14 months. In the case of single-parent families and other instances it is possible for the single parent to get parental benefits for 14 months (§ 4 para 6 BEEG). For parents of children who are born after 30th June 2015, there exists the possibility to have “ElterngeldPlus”. The entitlement may exist even if the person has only reduced his or her work time. In this case, according to § 4 para 3 BEEG, the entitlement period is extended by factor two, but the maximum of the Elterngeld is half of the “normal” Elterngeld for parents who do not work at all. Here, one Elterngeld month becomes two ElterngeldPlus months, and the ElterngeldPlus, like the Elterngeld, replaces the loss or the reduction in income by 65 to 100 percent in the described way (§ 4 para 3 s. 1 BEEG). But the sum of the ElterngeldPlus may not be more than the half of the Elterngeld, which would be paid, if the person had no income (§ 4 para 3 s. 2 BEEG). Example: If a person, in the year before birth, had a netto income of 1,400 € and reduces it after the birth to 400 €, he or she has a right to receive ElterngeldPlus. According to the general rule (§ 4 para 3 s. 1, § 2 para 2 BEEG), it´s amount is 65% of the reduction sum (1,000 €), i.e. 650 €. But according to§ 4 para 3 s. 2 BEEG, the sum may not be more than the half of the Elterngeld, which would be paid, if the person had no income. This sum would be 910 € (65% of 1,400 €). So, the ElterngeldPlus will sum to the half of 910 €, i.e. 455 € (example according to von Koppenfels-Spieß in Knickrehm e.a., Sozialversicherungsrecht, 4th edition, Munich 2015, § 4 BEEG, No. 13). Additionally, the time of 14 months can be exceeded for another two months according to § 4 para 4 s. 2 BEEG. This rule requires, that both parents care for the child and that (only) one parent has a reduction or a loss of income (“Partnermonate” partnership months). This time of two months gets exceeded to four months, if both parents do not work less than 25 and not more than 30 hours a week, § 4 para 4 s. 3 BEEG (“Partnerschaftsbonus” partnership bonus). For parents of children who are born before 1st July 2015, old law applies, which made a factor-two-extension possible, but - in a lot of cases - led to lower payments.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	According to the BEEG, both parents have a right to Elterngeld, and both have the right to exercise it even simultaneously. The maximum duration for one person is 12 months. That means, that, e.g., the mother may take an off time period of four moths with an Elterngeld-payment, and the father may take an off time of ten moths with an Elterngeld-payment, simultaneously or later, but all within a period of 14 months after birth. Extensions with a factor two are possible under the half-payment-rule of “ElterngeldPlus”, § 4 para 3 BEEG, and extensions for up to four months are possible, if both parents care for the child together, under the “Partnermonate”- and “Partnerschaftsbonus”-rule, § 4 para 4 BEEG (see above, under ‘Maximum duration of the benefit’).
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes; see above, under ‘Maximum duration of the benefit’.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Parents are entitled by § 15 BEEG to an unpaid parental leave from work. According to § 15 para. 5 - 7 BEEG, they are entitled to a reduction of working hours in companies with more than 15 employees if there are no objections in the form of urgent operational reasons. That means, that parental leave rights within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive are regulated in § 15 BEEG, and not in the above quoted §§ 1 – 4 BEEG. Nonetheless, the function of the parental leave benefit “Elterngeld” (§§ 1 – 4 BEEG) is, of course, to complement the exercise of parental leave rights within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either “off-set” or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	According to the BEEG, employers are not obliged to continue payments during statutory periods of parental leave. Thus, there is no need to entitle them to reimbursement. Such a reimbursement system exists only for employer´s payments according to the Mutterschutzgesetz (MuSchG, Maternity Protection Act). In Germany during the period of not being employed due to MuSchG (normally six weeks before the birth of the child and eight weeks after childbirth), the woman continues to receive her former average wages. These maternity benefits are paid to a certain extent by health insurance (§§ 11, 13 MuSchG). The remaining amount is paid by the employer. In earlier days these maternity benefits resulted in the fact that employers were not willing to employ women presumed to be giving birth in the future. This situation was corrected in the beginning of 2006 by the Act on the Compensation of Employer Expenditures and to Amend Further Laws (Aufwendungsausgleichsgesetz, AAG from 22.12.2005, BGBl. I 2005, p. 3686). According to this law, every employer has to contribute with a certain percentage of the wages he or she pays. In the event of employing a pregnant employee or mother, the employer is then entitled to a compensation of these payments, as per § 1 Para. 2 AAG.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Yes; see above, under ‘Maximum duration of the benefit’.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Yes. The BEEG entered into force on 1. January 2007. The “Elterngeld”, which is paid according to §§ 1 ff. BEEG, is the successor of the child raising allowance “Erziehungsgeld”, which was paid according to the Child-Raising Allowance Act (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz, BErzGG, see above). In its Hoever Zachow judgment (C-245/94 and C-312/94), the ECJ decided, that the German “Erziehungsgeld” is a benefit, to which a family is entitled such as a child-raising allowance (parental allowance) from the State of employment, regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law in relation to the salary-related child-raising benefits. Under the new law (BEEG), this situation has not changed. There is a broad consensus in literature, that this is so (Otting in Hauck/Noftz, EU-Sozialrecht, 2015, VO 883/04, K Art. 1, Note 68, K Art. 3, Note 42; Spiegel in Fuchs, Europäisches Sozialrecht, 6th edition 2012, Art. 1 VO 883/04, Notes 16, 41; even authors, who do not agree with the Hoever Zachow judgment in general, agree to this, see e.g. Eichenhofer in Hauck/Noftz, EU-Sozialrecht, 2015, E 010, Note 157).

Greece

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	1.According to the National General Collective Labour Agreement of 2000/2001, insurance cover for child-raising is provided by IKA both for women who are insured directly with IKA and for indirectly insured women (non-working spouses of employed men). Directly insured women are protected both during the pregnancy and for the birth and a post-natal period. Indirectly insured women are protected only for the birth. The assistance is in the form of a maternity benefit. There are no available official statistics about the total number of the beneficiaries per year, but it is estimated that a big majority of insured women exercise this specific right. 2.Moreover, May 2008 saw the publication of new legislation in Greece introducing six months of special maternity protection leave, in addition to normal maternity leave and the existing entitlement of working mothers to reduce their working hours. This initiative was seeking to promote the reconciliation of work and family life. More specifically, on 9 May 2008, a Ministerial Decision (No. 33891/606/2008) implementing and establishing the terms and conditions for the granting of the special maternity leave, introduced by Law 3655/2008 (article 142, as amended afterwards by article 36 Law No. 3996/2011), was published in the Greek Official Gazette (FEK). There are no available official statistics, but it is estimated that a minority of insured women exercises this specific right, as not adequate information or enough guidelines are given by the competent institutions about the time and the conditions of entitlement.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	1.The amount of the maternity benefit is 50% of the estimated daily wage of the insurance class she belongs to, based on the average wage of the last 30 days of the previous year, plus a child benefit of 10% of the above amount, for each child with a maximum of 40%. The minimum amount she can obtain is 2/3 of her wage. 2.OAED has to pay to the working mother a monthly amount equal to the minimum wage, as determined each time in the National General Collective Labour Agreement (EGSEE), as well as the equivalent percentages of Christmas, Easter, and vacation bonuses, as these are determined on the basis of the aforementioned amount. In case the beneficiary works for up to 4 hours per day or up to 13 days per month on average during the six months before her pregnancy leave, the amount paid equals half the aforementioned amount.
	Conditions of entitlement	1.The maternity benefit is paid to insured women who have worked at least 200 days in the two years prior to the expected delivery date. 2.Under the rules, governing OAED benefit, the following conditions must be met: Α) The insured woman must be in active employment at the time her maternity leave commences. Β) She must also have received maternity allowances from ΙΚΑ-ΕΤΑΜ or from the Special Hotel Employees Fund. The beneficiary, either in person or by representative, submits her application to the relevant OAED service, within a period of 60 days after the end of the maternity leave (labour and confinement), or the leave equivalent to part-time work or, finally, her annual leave. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS I) An employer’s certificate clearly indicating the active employment relationship existing at the commencement of the maternity leave, the type, form and duration of the beneficiary’s employment relationship, her monthly salary, the average number of her part-time work hours, hiring date and, for fixed-term employment contracts, the expiry date, the number of annual leave days that may have been granted after the confinement leave or the leave equivalent to part-time work, as well as the beneficiary’s supplementary insurance body, and the amounts of employer’s and employee’s social security contributions. II) A copy of the maternity allowance (pregnancy – confinement) certificate issued by ΙΚΑ-ΕΤΑΜ or the Special Hotel Workers’ Fund. III) Solemn declaration in which the beneficiary commits herself to notify the relevant OAED service within 8 days about any change in her employment relationship, and she also states her IKA registration number and her VAT number. IV) National Bank of Greece account number (ΙΒΑΝ), in which she must appear as the first beneficiary. Finally, this leave is not available to working mothers who are employed under private-law employment contracts in the public sector, in legal entities governed by public law or local administrative units. Women who already receive additional leave of equal duration under the terms of their employer’s internal company regulations or a sectoral collective agreement are also excluded from the new entitlement.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	1.As described above, the maternity benefit is 50% of the estimated daily wage of the insurance class the insured woman belongs to, based on the average wage of the last 30 days of the previous year, so it can be noted that it is partially calculated with respect to salary (there are flat-rate elements). 2.It can be said that OAED benefit is partially calculated with respect to salary, as the existence of a part-time/flexible working (e.g 4 hours per day/13 days per month), which is accompanied, of course, by a reduced salary, activates the relevant half reduction of the benefit to an amount of 295,00 Euros approximately, as a minimum level (from a maximum level of 586,00 Euros approximately).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	1.The maternity benefit applies to directly insured women for 56 days before the birth and for 63 days after the birth. Women who do not take the entire 56 days prior to the birth may take it after the birth. 2.The OAED benefit is granted till six months after the expiry of the maternity leave.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	1.Only women can claim the maternity benefit from IKA. 2.Only women can claim the OAED benefit.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	1.Yes, even in partial reduction, IKA maternity benefit must, at least, equal the earnings a directly insured woman would have received if she had worked during that period. 2.Yes, in case of part-time/flexible working, OAED special benefit can be also claimed.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	The maternity benefit is indeed regarded to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive), as employed mothers are also entitled to an additional six months of maternity protection leave and reduced working hours leave at the end of their maternity leave. In other words, the receipt of the maternity benefit constitutes an obligatory, direct and unavoidable link to the receipt of a parental leave.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either “off-set” or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	According to IKA’s Regulation, during the first year of work, the employer continues to pay the woman’s wage for 15 days during her maternity leave, provided the woman has completed at least ten days of work. If the woman has completed the first year of work, the employer may continue to pay her wage for one month, during her maternity leave. The employer can deduct any amounts that the woman receives from her insurance fund for the same period.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	According to the current legislative framework, it is not possible for both parents to claim the above mentioned salary-related child-raising benefits.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	According to the current legislative framework, due to the fact that the beneficiaries of the already mentioned child-raising benefits are only women, it is not yet provided that a salary-related child-raising benefit can be granted in favour of the other parent, who is responsible for taking care of the child despite being subject to the legislation of another Member State.

Hungary

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	In general, there are two types of financial subsidies for parents with children: the subsidies that are only eligible for parents being employed (insurance-based benefits), and those allowances (generally with smaller amounts) that are eligible for all parents irrespective of their employment status (universal-type, tax-financed benefits). More precisely, there are two forms of insurance-based family benefits and four universal-type family benefits. I. Social insurance type benefits: (legal source: Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the Benefits of Compulsory Health Insurance) 1. infant care allowance (in Hungarian: csecsemőgondozási díj) and 2. child-care fee (in Hungarian: gyermekgondozási díj) II. Universal-type benefits [These are not the topic for this survey. Just in case, to show the whole picture I inserted here.] 1. family allowance (including the parental leave benefit, and education allowance for school aged children), 2. child home-care allowance (GYES), 3. child raising support (GYET) and 4. birth grant.
	Conditions of entitlement	1. Infant care allowance is due to anyone who was insured for 365 days within two years prior to giving birth, and who gives birth during the insurance term or within 42 days after the termination of insurance. Infant care allowance is provided for 168 days (24 weeks). Infant care allowance equals 70 percent of the daily average gross salary; there is no upper limit to the allowance, tax and pension insurance contributions are deducted, and the disbursement term is deemed to be a period of service with pension entitlement. 2. Child-care fee (insurance-based) Following expiry of the infant care allowance, the insured parent is entitled to a child-care fee. The child-care fee is provided for the period of insurance in the two years preceding birth, but no longer than until the child reaches the age of two. The amount of the child care fee (gyermekgondozási díj): 70% of the daily average gross earnings. The amount depends on the average gross earnings in the previous 180-day period. Maximum 70% of the double of the minimum wage, i.e. 70% of HUF 210,000 (€666). For higher education students (including MA students), 70% of the amount of the minimum wage, i.e. 70% of HUF 105,000 (€333) (in case of BA or PhD students, 70% of the amount of the guaranteed wage minimum, i.e. 70% of HUF 122,000 (€387)). Child care fee (gyermekgondozási díj) is subject to pension insurance contribution as well as taxation. Child-care fee extra (GYED Extra) Another important provision of the government in the field of the reconciliation of work and family life was the package of measures called “GYED Extra” which had been introduced since the 1st of January, 2014. This package contained a bunch of complex measures intended to foster livebirths, including that since that date, parents are no longer prohibited to work while receiving family allowances like the child-care allowance (called “GYES” in Hungarian) and the child care fee (called “GYED” in Hungarian, hence the name of the whole package) after the first birthday of their child. (Before that, employment was completely forbidden while receiving GYED, and only part-time work was possible during GYES.) This measure was a very important step forward in stimulating parents with young children to return to their workplaces in an earlier period; statistics show that in the second quarter of 2014 the number of women working while receiving child-care benefits increased by about 12,500, which means a growth of no less than 37 percent compared to the same period of 2013. It is also important to note that these women are working mostly in full-time employment. Special rule for multiple benefits: Since 1 January 2014, multiple child care benefits (infant care allowance, child care fee, child home care allowance) can be claimed in case of having more than one child within the eligibility period, provided that the youngest child in the family was born after 31 December 2013.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Infant care allowance (csecsemőgondozási díj): 70% of the daily gross earnings, paid during 24 weeks. The amount depends on the gross earnings in the previous 180-day period. No ceiling. Subject to taxation. No contribution paid from this allowance. Child-care fee is equal to 70 percent of the average salary per calendar day, but not more than 70 percent of double the prevailing monthly minimum wage (currently HUF 130,200). It is exclusively calculated with respect of salary.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Infant care allowance is provided for 168 days (24 weeks). The child-care fee is provided for the period of insurance in the two years preceding birth, but no longer than until the child reaches the age of two. The benefit is paid after the expiry of infant care allowance (csecsemőgondozási díj) until the child reaches 2 years of age, but not longer than the insurance period of the claimant. In case of twins the eligibility period is extended by one year.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	1. Infant care allowance (csecsemőgondozási díj): Employees and self-employed and assimilated groups. Basically, the insured woman (pregnant and after giving birth) are entitled to claim the infant care allowance. There are some exceptional cases: a) father also can apply for it if the mother dies or (because of health reasons) cannot take care of the child b) woman or man who adopted the child c) guardian who is taking care of the child If the insured person receives his/her full salary, he/she is not entitled to the allowance. If he/she receives partial salary, the allowance will be reduced accordingly (proportionally). 2. Child care fee (gyermekgondozási díj): Gainfully employed persons (employees and self-employed) and assimilated groups. Basically both parents can claim the child care fee. At the same time only one parent can apply for the benefit. They cannot split the benefit. Students fulfilling certain conditions: Mothers who would not be entitled to child care fee under the general rules, but who have completed at least two active semesters in higher education, and whose child is born after 31 December 2013 while the mother is studying or during the year after graduation are entitled to child care fee until the child reaches 1 year of age. The amount of the child care fee is equal to the yearly set guaranteed wage minimum. Fathers are entitled to this form of child care fee if the mother dies or is not entitled to the benefit.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Yes In case of maternity leave the complementing social security benefit is the infant care allowance. In case of unpaid leave at the times requested by the worker for the purpose of taking care of his/her child, until the child reaches the age of three the complementing social security benefit is the child care fee. [NB.: there are more universal family benefits which can be claimed during the period, but they are not in the focus of this questionnaire.]
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	In brief: employers do not pay any salary/wage during maternity leave. Maternity leave is provided by the Hungarian Labour Code: 24 weeks for the mother (4 weeks before and 20 weeks after planned date of birth, or 24 weeks after the date of birth, depending on the mothers' choice). The employer is obliged to provide this maternity leave, but he/she does not pay any salary/compensation, etc. during this period. Instead, the period of maternity leave (first 24 weeks by infant care allowance, after this child-care fee benefit) is covered by the social (health) insurance system. The full range of the relevant provisions of the Labour Code is under Sections 127-130 of the Labour Code (hereinafter: LC). Section 127 says: mothers shall be entitled to twenty-four weeks of maternity leave. Maternity leave shall also be provided to a woman who has been given custody of a child for the purpose of adoption. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, maternity leave shall be allocated so as to commence four weeks prior to the expected time of birth. If the child receives treatment in an institute for premature infants, the unused portion of the maternity leave may be used after the child has been released from the institute up to the end of the first year following birth. The duration of maternity leave, except where entitlement is specifically connected to work, shall be recognized as time spent at work. Complementing social security benefit is the infant care allowance. Section 128 of LC: employees shall be entitled to unpaid leave at the times requested by the worker for the purpose of taking care of his/her child, until the child reaches the age of three. Complementing social security benefit is the child care fee. [NB.: there are more universal family benefits which can be claimed during the period, but they are not in the focus of this questionnaire.] Section 129 of LC: The periods of leave referred to in Sections 127-128 shall end: a) if the child is stillborn; b) if the child dies, on the fifteenth day following death; c) on the day following placement of the child - according to the provisions set out in specific other legislation - into temporary custody, temporary or permanent foster care, or in a social institution with room and board for over thirty days. In the cases described above the period of leave shall be no less than six weeks from the date of birth. Section 130 of LC: In addition to what is contained in Section 128, employees shall be entitled to unpaid leave for providing care for a child in person until the child reaches the age of ten, during the period of receiving child-care allowance (tax financed, universal type benefit). Furthermore, according to the Labour Code, fathers are entitled to paternity leave: 5 working days and 7 working days in case of twins. This period is paid by the employer. He/she does not receive any compensation from the Health Insurance Fund. This is fully covered by the employer. Adoptive parents are entitled to the same paid maternity/paternity leave.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	If both parents fulfil the preconditions of the child care fee, theoretically both of them can claim the benefit. However, in practice only one parent can receive the benefit at the same time. They cannot split the benefit. If both parents are eligible (both have the required previous insurance period) they can claim from the relevant authority to terminate for the mother and start to pay to the father. They can replace each other. For example, the mother stays at home for a certain period and then the father will apply and stay with the child.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Basically, only that parent can apply for child care fee who fulfils the required preconditions. For example, if the father is insured and fulfils the required eligibility conditions (insured at least for 365 days within the previous 2 years), he can claim the benefit. If the mother is not insured, she cannot claim the benefit. (This is an insurance based benefit.) Therefore, only the father will be entitled. In addition, the Hungarian legislation requires that the child must be raised in the household of the parents. However, in fact, Hungarian child care fee is falling under the scope of Article 1 (z) of the 883/2004/EC Regulation which says "family benefit means all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses” therefore the social security coordination rules and EUCJ (ECJ) decisions are applicable for such benefit as well.

Iceland

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The history of salary related child raising benefits goes back to the year 1975. In 1984 benefits were calculated both by income and assets. In 1996 child benefits were calculated to income-related and the amount granted calculated to income of both parents or for single parent only the income of that parent. In 1998 an additional payment was authorized to parents with young children, under 7 years old. The situation today is that all child raising benefits are now only calculated by income but not to assets.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The benefits are paid by the Directorate of Internal Revenue (Ríkisskattsjóri in Iceland)
	Conditions of entitlement	Individual who has a) residence in Iceland a least 183 days per calendar year b ) income in Iceland c) and has a child to support, (child registered with same residence as the applicant)
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	All child benefits (100%) are exclusively calculated with respect to salary today.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Child benefits are paid to parents of children 18 years of age. Full benefits are paid for the year of birth of the child, but none is paid for the year which the child reaches 18 years of age.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Parents can claim for benefits together but if the parents doesn´t live together the child benefits goes to the parent were the child lives and where the domicile of the child is registered.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Benefit can be claimed in case of partial reduction of income.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	This is a special category of benefits.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	Vinnumálastofnun (VMST) in Iceland is responsible for parental leave payments in Iceland. The parent apply directly to the VMST and in most cases the employer can claim reimbursement from VMST for salary paid during parental leave.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	According to Icelandic laws both parents can claim salary-related child raising benefits if the live together and they are both supporting the child. If the parents are divorced only the parent who is registered with the child can claim for salary-related child raising benefits.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	In Iceland child benefits are paid to parents of children under 18 years of age who do not have residence in Iceland but are supported by a citizen of the EEA, member states of EFTA and Faeroe Islands. Citizens of the EEA, member states of the EFTA Convention or the Faeroe Islands, who have been employed in Iceland and have children to support who do not have permanent residence in Iceland, may have right to child benefit in Iceland. This is only if they are taxable according to Article 1 of Act. No. 90/2003 (tax law) or are insured on the basis of Articles 12,13 or 14 of Act No. 100/2007 on the Icelandic social security system.

Ireland

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	There is no provision made currently for a salary- related child – raising benefit under Irish legislation. There is provision for a range of cash benefits for parents unrelated to parental leave. These include Maternity and Adoptive benefit, which are salary related to an extent, universal child benefit, payable monthly, weekly means tested payments mainly for lone parents and those with children with disabilities or long term illnesses and supplements for families on low incomes. I can provide details on these if required. There is provision for statutory parental leave. I provide details of these provisions below, in case they may be of assistance. Should salary – related child-raising benefit be introduced it is likely it would complement these provisions. However, the provision of such benefit does not appear to be in prospect at present. The main focus in this regard is on the possibility of extending State financed child care and after school care. Parental Leave The Parental Leave Act 1998, as amended by the Parental Leave (Amendment) Act 2006, allows parents to take parental leave from employment in respect of certain children. A person acting in loco parentis with respect to an eligible child is also eligible. On 8 March 2013 the European Union (Parental Leave) Regulations 2013 increased the amount of leave to each parent per child from 14 to 18 working weeks per child. Where an employee has more than one child, parental leave is limited to 18 weeks in a 12 months period, but can be longer if the employer agrees. Parents of twins and triplets can take more than 18 weeks of parental leave in a year. Leave can be taken in respect of children up to 8 Years, which can be extended up to 16 years in the case of a child with a disability or long term illness. The 18 weeks per child can be taken in one continuous period or in 2 separate blocks of a minimum of 6 weeks. There must be a gap of at least 10 weeks between the 2 periods of parental leave per child. However, if the employer agrees the leave can be separated into periods of days or even hours. Both parents have an equal separate entitlement to parental leave. Unless both parents work for the same employer, each parent can only claim his/her own parental leave entitlement (18 weeks per child). If both parents work for the same employer and the employer agrees, one parent can transfer 14 weeks of his/her parental leave to the other parent.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit (parental leave)	Parents are not entitled to pay from their employer while on parental leave nor are they entitled to any social insurance payment equivalent to Maternity Benefit or Adoptive Benefit. However, employment rights are retained, as if no parental leave had been taken. This means, for example, that time spent on parental leave can be used to accumulate an employee’s annual leave entitlement. The legislation only provides for the minimum entitlement. An employee’s contract may give more extensive rights. Social Welfare Regulations also provide for the preservation of social insurance (PRSI) records for employees who take parental leave, on application by the employer, by means of credited PRSI contributions.
	Conditions of entitlement (parental leave)	To qualify for the leave an employee must be working for an employer for at least 12 months. Pro rata arrangements can be made where this period is more than 3 months and the child is near the age threshold. This is one week’s leave for each month of employment completed. In the case of a change of job where some parental leave had been taken in the previous job, the balance can be taken after 12 months in the new job provided the child is still under the qualifying age. An employer may postpone the leave for up to 6 months. Grounds for such a postponement include lack of cover for an absent employee or the fact that other employees are on parental leave. Normally one postponement is allowed, but it may be postponed twice if the reason is regional variations in the work. Parental leave can be used only to take care of the child concerned. If the parental leave is taken and used for another purpose the employer is entitled to cancel the leave. Employees are entitled to return to their own job, unless it is not practicable for the employer to allow for this. If this is the case, the employee must be offered a suitable alternative on terms no less favourable compared with the previous job including any improvement in pay or other conditions which occurred while the employee was on parental leave. Since 8 March 2013, an employee on return to work after taking parental leave, is entitled to ask for a change in work pattern or working hours for a set period. The employer must consider the request, but is not obliged to grant it. The legislation also protects parents who take parental leave for unfair dismissal.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	N/A, as no cash benefit payable.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Details on the duration of parental leave are given in the first section above. As no benefit is payable, this question does not arise in relation to benefit payments.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	This is explained in the first section above, in relation to parental leave.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Different arrangements for the taking of parental leave outside the standard periods set down can be made with the agreement of the employer. (See sections 1 and 3 above)
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	As no benefit is currently payable, this issue does not arise. However, if provision were to be made for parental cash benefits it is likely that they would complement the exercise of parental leave rights, which are well established at this stage.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	As there is no requirement on the part of employers to pay the salary during these statutory periods of parental leave, this question does no arise.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	As no cash payments are made during periods of parental leave, this issue does not arise.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	As no such benefit is payable in Ireland, this issue does not arise.

Italy

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The optional supplementary parental leave (“congedo parentale facoltativo”) is intended to exempt parents from work in order to raise the child during the first months or years of his/her life. It was launched for the first time by the Law No. 860 of 1950. At the moment, it is regulated by Legislative Decree No. 151 of 26 March 2001 on protection in case of maternity and paternity (Articles 32-38), as amended by Law No. 92 of 28 June 2012 (Article 4, paragraphs 24 to 26) and lastly by Legislative Decree No. 80 of 15 June 2015 (Articles 7-10). Unfortunately, neither the ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, National Institute of Statistics) nor the INPS (Istituto Nazionale della previdenza sociale, National Institute for Social Security) publish data or statistics concerning the number of claimants of the optional supplementary parental leave.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	After the expiry of the compulsory paid maternity and paternity leaves, a reduced paid leave may be claimed by either the mother or the father. The optional supplementary parental leave is covered with a compensation amounting to 30% of pay or of “standard pay” and it is payable for an overall maximum, for both parents, of 6 months in the child’s first 6 years (for adopted and foster children, the first 6 years that the child is within the family). The benefit is subject to taxation, and it is also paid in case of adoption and fosterling. Once the 6 months have elapsed, the benefit can be claimed for further 5 months, at most, till the child is 12 years old, but the relevant cash benefit can only be paid upon condition that the claimant parent’s salary does not exceed 2,5 times the amount of the minimum retirement pension as established by law for the current year. In other words, each parent is entitled to a period up to 6 months, and the total period may not exceed 10 months (11 months if the father uses at least 3 months of optional supplementary parental leave), but the benefit is normally paid only for an overall maximum, for both parents, of 6 months. From 2012, vouchers are also granted to help meeting the additional expenses of raising children (baby-sitting or other child care services) after the expiry of the compulsory maternity leave (congedo di maternità), within 11 months following the compulsory maternity leave and as an alternative to the optional supplementary parental leave. Monthly amount of up to € 300,00 is granted for a maximum period of 6 months.
	Conditions of entitlement	Insured active population (employees and assimilated groups; self-employed) is entitled to claim the benefit. There are no qualifying conditions of entitlements, except for some specific categories of workers (farming industry employees, domestic workers, self-employed, professionals and atypical workers registered with the INPS separate pension fund).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	The optional supplementary parental leave is calculated exclusively with reference to salary (see box no. 1, Level of the benefit).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	The optional supplementary parental leave it is payable for an overall maximum, for both parents, of 6 months in the child’s first 6 years (for adopted and foster children, the first 6 years that the child is with the family). Special conditions apply to self-employed.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Both parents (who are in paid employment) are entitled to a total period of up to 6 months paid leave until a child is 12 years old, at the same time if they wish (this is also available to parents of adopted and foster children). In case of split entitlement between the parents, each parent can claim the benefit for a maximum of 6 months. Fathers can take leave even while the mother is on mandatory maternity leave or nursing leave. Applications for maternity, paternity and parental leaves are to be addressed to both the employer and to the INPS.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	The optional supplementary parental leave can also be claimed in relation to partial reduction of income (e.g. part-time working).
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	The optional supplementary parental leave is intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The continued payment of wages is made by the employer on behalf of the INPS (only in special cases the optional supplementary parental leave is directly paid by the INPS). The amount of the wages paid is then deducted from the owed contributions.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Both parents (who are in paid employment) may claim salary-related child-raising allowance. The optional supplementary parental leave is payable for an overall maximum, for both parents, of 6 months in the child’s first 6 years; each parent can claim the benefit for a maximum of 6 months. These rights can be exercised simultaneously.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	As we have seen (see box no. 8), the continued payment of wages is made by the employer on behalf of the INPS (only in special cases the optional supplementary parental leave is directly paid by the INPS). The amount of the wages paid is then deducted from the owed contributions. At the moment, the INPS practice does not provide the option of paying the optional supplementary parental leave in favour of the other parent, who is responsible for taking care of the child despite being subject to the legislation of another Member State.

Latvia

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Parental benefit was introduced in 2008 within the social security system. Benefit - 70% of the recipient’s average wage subject to insurance contributions. From 01/07/2009 until 02/05/2010 benefit was paid in the amount of 50% of the benefit granted (calculation: 70% of the recipient’s average wage subject to insurance contributions) for recipients’ who is not on the leave for child care or during the childcare period receives income as self-employed person. From 02/05/2010 entitlement to the parents’ benefit is valid as of the day, from which the parental leave is granted. From 03/11/2010 until 31/12/2012 the limitation was set on the benefit amount received per day. The sum was 11.51 LVL (16.26 EUR) per day. If granted benefit was up to 11.51 LV (16.26 EUR) per day, it was granted in full amount, but if the granted benefit exceeded 11.51 LVL (16.26 EUR) per day – per one day 11.51 LVL (16.26 EUR) was granted + 50% from the sum that exceeded 11.51 LVL (16.26 EUR). The minimum amount of the parents’ benefit was 171.00 EUR (from 03/11/2010 until 31/12/2012 – 63.00 LVL (89.64 EUR)). Until 31/12/2014 - if granted benefit was up to 32.75 EUR per day, it was granted in full amount, but if the granted benefit exceeded 32.75 EUR per day – per one day 32.75 EUR was granted + 50% from the sum that exceeded 32.75 EUR. Benefits granted prior to 30 September 2014 Conditions of entitlement: Any socially secured person taking care of a child or several children born in the same labour until the age of 1, if the person is employed on the day of granting the benefit (considered as employee or self-employed person pursuant to the Law On State Social Insurance). Entitlement to the parents’ benefit is valid as of the day, from which the parental leave is granted.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Benefits granted as of 1 October 2014 – (1) until the child reaches the age of 1 – in the amount of 60% of the recipient’s average wage subject to insurance contributions or (2) until the child reaches the age of 1.5 – in the amount of 43.75% of the recipient’s average wage subject to insurance contributions. The recipient of the parents’ benefit, who resumes work, discounting the parental leave, or resumes earning income as a self-employed, the benefit it paid in the amount of 30% of the benefit granted. Minimum amount is no set for the benefits granted as of 1 October 2014.
	Conditions of entitlement	Parent’s benefit is granted and paid to socially insured person who is taking care of a child or several children at one delivery (one of child's parents, one of adoptive parents who take care for and supervision of a child before approved adoption in court with a decision from the orphan's court to place the adoptable child the family, a member of the foster family who has signed a contract with the local government, custodian or other person who, pursuant to the decision of orphan's court, is actually taking care and raising the child). Granting of benefit applies to: 1. Person who is employed on the day of granting the benefit (considered as employee or self-employed person pursuant to the Law On State Social Insurance). 2. Person who is employed on the day of granting the benefit (considered as employee or self-employed person pursuant to the Law On State Social Insurance) and is employed during the childcare period but is not on the leave for child care or unpaid vacation which has been granted due to necessity to take care of a child or who receives income during the childcare period as a self-employed person.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Exclusively calculated with respect to salary
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Person can choose length of parental benefit payment – up to the age of 1 of the child or up to the age of 1.5. Person in entitled to choose one benefit period for one child which cannot be changed after final decision.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Only one of parents can claim the benefit.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	The recipient of the parents’ benefit, who resumes work, discontinuing the parental leave, or resumes earning income as a self-employed, the benefit is paid in the amount of 30% of the benefit granted. Also for a person who, on the day of requesting the benefit, is not on the parental leave or earns income as a self-employed person the benefit is calculated in the amount of 30% of the benefit granted (depending on what duration of receiving the benefit has been chosen by the recipient).
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Yes.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Only one of parents can claim the benefit.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	No.

Lithuania

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	In Liechtenstein, the child-raising leave was introduced on January 1st 2004. It was introduced in order to fulfil the obligations following from the EEA-Agreement. The right to get a child-raising leave is guaranteed by § 1174 BGB (articles 34a - 34 c Civil code). It is not salary-related.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The child-raising leave is unremunerated.
	Conditions of entitlement	The labour contract has had a duration of more than one year or was concluded for more than one year. The parent must live in the same household with the child and predominantly take care of the child.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	XXX
	Maximum duration of the benefit	4 month (art. 34a I) - but without pay.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	There is one child-raising leave for each parent, per child, since the worker has to show that he/she is predominantly taking care of the child.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	N/A
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	N/A
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	N/A
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	N/A
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	N/A

Lithuania

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Parental leave was covered by social insurance legislation in the first after the restoring of independence Lithuanian Law on State Social Insurance. The Law was adopted on May 21, 1991. Then the level of benefit was established as 100 percent of minimal subsistent level (MSL) during first 18 months after the child birth and 50 percent of MSL during following 18 months. It means that the benefit was not really "salary related". Amendment of the law from November 3, 1994 changed the benefit level to 60 percent of compensatory salary of one of parents who used the parental leave, but no less than minimal wage. The benefit was paid until the first birthday of the child. From year 2001 (by amendment of December 21, 2000) the benefit was defined by another Law on Sickness and Maternity Insurance. It remained at the level of 60 percent of compensatory salary, but minimal amount was established as 1/3 of current "insured income" approved by Government. The law also established requirement of 7 months of recipient's insurance during last 24 months before parental leave. From the year 2004 the benefit level was increased to the level of 70 percent of compensatory salary. From July 1, 2007 the level was changed to 100 percent of compensatory salary during first 6 months and to 85 percent during following 6 months. From the year 2008 (amendment of December 4, 2007) the period of payment of benefit was extended until second birthday of the child: 100 percent of compensatory salary during the first year and 85 percent during the second year. in the case of multiple birth the level of the benefit was multiplied accordingly. The abuse of benefit forced the legislators to calculate compensatory salary as an average of longer period (12 months instead of former one quarter) before parental leave, also the requirement of recipient's insurance period from October 1, 2009 was extended to 12 months during last 24 months before parental leave (amendment of December 18, 2008). The crisis forced to decrease the level of benefit: from July 1, 2010 it was granted 90 percent of compensatory salary during the first year and 75 percent during the second year (amendment of September 22, 2009) From July 1, 2011 the current way of payment of benefit (see below) was introduced (amendment of July 2, 2010). Average monthly number of beneficiaries in year 2009 was 45.9 thousand, in year 2010 – 47.8 thous., in year 2011 – 43.8 thous., in year 2012 – 38.8 thous., in year 2013 – 35.6 thous., in year 2014 – 36.3 thous., in the first half of year 2015 – 37.5 thousand. Percentage of men is increasing from around 6 per cent in 2009 until more than 20 per cent in mid 2015.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Parents of the child are allowed to choose one of the two options how to receive the benefit. The first option is to receive benefit from the end of mother's maternity leave until the first birthday of the child. Then 100 percent of so-called compensatory salary is paid. The second option is to receive benefit from the end of mother's maternity leave until the second birthday of the child. Then 70 percent of compensatory salary is paid during the first year and 40 percent of compensatory salary is paid during the second year. Compensatory salary is an average recipient's salary (in the law named as personal "insured income") of 12 months before the month preceding the month when parental leave begins. If this average is below 1/3 of actual co-called "insured income" approved by Government, the latter amount is applied as compensatory salary. If mentioned average is above 320 percent of "insured income" approved by Government, then this maximal amount is applied as compensatory salary. "insured income" approved by Government in August 2015 was €434. In the case of adoption of a child 70 percent of compensatory salary is paid during three months.
	Conditions of entitlement	The basic conditions of entitlement are: a person must be insured by sickness and maternity insurance, has to take parental leave and must be insured during 12 months by sickness and maternity insurance during last 24 months before parental leave. Some exceptions are foreseen by law . Obligatory insurance period (12 months) is not required if a person is before 26 years old and had graduated from school or university 12 or less months before parental leave. Obligatory insurance period also is not required if a person recently changed insurance status from military or police system into general social insurance. A benefit is continued to pay even if in a time of payment the labour (or similar) contract ends. A benefit is also granted if the a labour contract is ended, but a person has required insurance period.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Exclusively calculated with respect to salary, no flat-rate part. However, the "floor" of the benefit is not below than 1/3 of "insured income" approved by Government . The "ceiling" of the benefit is also applied due to the rule of "ceiling" on compensatory salary (see above).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	According to the choice of parents the benefit is paid from the end of mother's maternity leave until the first or second birthday of the child (see above). In the case of the adoption of the child the benefit is paid during three months.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Both parents can claim the benefit, but only one of them can receive the benefit at the same time. During the payment period (one or two years) parents can change each other. If another child is born in the period of benefit payment, then both parent can receive the benefits: each for one child.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes, but during the first year of the payment of benefit only the difference between benefit and salary is paid (if a salary is above the benefit, the latter is not paid at all). During the second year of benefit payment (if this option was chosen) the full amount of benefit is paid regardless of recipient's salary.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Yes, the benefit can be seen as implementing Parental Leave Directive. The conditions of granting and paying parental benefit are quite generous and usually stimulate intention of employees to use parental leave: minimum compensabel parental leave period is almost one year; both parents can change in using parental leave and benefit at any time and unlimited number of times; the amount of benefit is high comparing to other benefits of social insurance.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The employers are not obliged to pay salary during parental leave if an employee does not work.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	No. The benefit is granted only to one of parents at the same time. In the case of multiple birth one of parents can claim the benefit for one child, other parent for another child.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	According to Lithuanian legislation the right to parental benefit is strictly individual. Person who claims for benefit must fulfil requirements himself/herself. At the same time in order to take care of the child another parent can take his/her own parental leave but he/she has no right to benefit. And the other parent has no possibility to transfer his/her right to benefit. And only in case the first refuses his/her right to benefit, individual conditions and requirements of the second parent can be evaluated and benefit granted.

Luxembourg

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Luxembourg transposed the Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC by Law of 12 February 1999 on the national action plan for employment (in the framework of the European Employment Strategy) (Memorial A N°13 of 23 February 1999 - Website: http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/1999/0013/a013.pdf). First, the Government asked the social partners to find a compromise and to negotiate an agreement on parental leave. As they did not succeed, the Government decided to include it into the NAPE. The legal regime of parental leave underwent an important reform in 2006 by Law of 22 December 2006 (Memorial A N°242 of 29 December 2006 p. 4838 - Website: http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2006/0242/a242.pdf) and will undergo another reform in next months. Regarding future reform, a bill has not yet been introduced into the Parliament for discussion. But, orientations have been presented to the public in April 2015. Especially, the new benefit will be calculated with reference to the salary of the beneficiary of the parental leave (salary of the last 12 months). It will be of a minimum of 1,9922.96 EU, which is the Minimum Wage, and of a maximum of 3,200 EU for a full-time job. In practice, it will also be much more flexible for the parents and for the employers. Parental leave is part of the Labour Code (Articles L. 234-43 to 234-49) regarding the relationship between parents and employers and part of the Social Security Code (Articles 306 to 308) regarding parental leave benefit.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	There is still a flat-rate parental leave benefit in Luxembourg. Monthly gross full-time benefit is 1,778.31 EU , whereas monthly net full-time benefit is 1,710.90 EU. Difference is due to the payment of health and long-term care contributions (48.01 EU and 19.40 EU). Monthly gross part-time benefit is 889.15 EU, whereas monthly net part-time benefit is 855.44 EU. Difference is due to the payment of health and long-term care contributions (24.01 EU and 9.70 EU). Notice that Minimum Wage was 1,922.96 EU per month (on 1st January 2015). Moreover, parental leave benefit is free from contributions and taxes, except for contributions regarding health insurance and long-term care insurance.
	Conditions of entitlement	It must be noted that parental leave is an individual right for each parent working in Luxembourg. There are two types of conditions: 1. linked to the family situation of the claimant 2. linked to the professional situation of the claimant 1. Conditions linked to the family situation of the claimant. The claimant: 1.1. must be the parent of a child under 5, who is entitled to family benefits 1.2. must educate the child in the household since he/she is born (for the first parental leave - see below) or since at least 6 months (for the second parental leave) + must dedicate his/herself to the education of the child 1.3. must have no other job during parental leave or only a part-time job in case of a part-time parental leave 1.4. must reside in Luxembourg. Frontier workers are also entitled to parental leave if the work in Luxembourg. 2. Conditions linked to the professional situation of the claimant. The claimant: 2.1. must work in Luxembourg under a labour contract, as a civil servant or as a self-employed. This condition has to be fulfilled at the date when the child is born, at the moment of the claim, at the beginning of the parental leave and during the entire duration of the parental leave 2.2. must work under the direction of an employer who is legally established in Luxembourg , must be registered under a health care regime and the job must take place in Luxembourg . In case of posting abroad, the worker is entitled to parental leave as if he/she would work in Luxembourg. 2.3. The monthly duration of labour must be at least a half-time job (20 hours).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Not calculated with respect to salary (see under level of the benefit and future reform)
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Parental leave and parental leave benefit are granted for 6 months per child. Partial parental leave and partial parental leave benefit may be granted for 12 months. There is no flexibility!
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Both parents can claim parental leave. The first parental leave has to be taken directly after maternal leave or welcome leave (congé d'accueil), otherwise parental leave will be lost for both (except in case of lone parents). The second parental leave can be taken by the other parent until the child is 5 years old. It must be noted that employers cannot refuse a full-time parental leave. Full-time parental leaves cannot be taken at the same time by both parents. But half-time parental leaves can be taken at the same time by both parents, under the condition that they educate alternatively the child. Half-time parental leave must be accepted by the employer. If one parent does not work in Luxembourg, the parent working in Luxembourg may choose between the first parental leave and the second one.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Not applicable
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	Employers do not have to compensate parental leave by paying a child-raising benefit to the parent. This is paid directly by CNPF, the National Fund for Family Benefits.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Yes, both parents can claim a parental leave benefit. Rights cannot be divided, because both parents are entitled to a benefit on their own. If one parent does not take a leave, it cannot be transferred to the other one (see also under who can claim the benefit?)
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	If one parent works in Luxembourg and the other one does not work there, only the parent working in Luxembourg will be entitled to a parental leave benefit under Luxemburgish legislation. The parent working in Luxembourg has the right to choose either a first parental leave, directly connected to maternal leave, or a second parental leave until the child will be 5 years old.

Malta

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	N/A
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	N/A
	Conditions of entitlement	N/A
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	N/A
	Maximum duration of the benefit	N/A
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	N/A
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	N/A
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	N/A
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	N/A
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	N/A
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	N/A

The Netherlands

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The Dutch salary-related child-raising benefits consist of two kinds of benefits: A family benefits B benefits in the case of combining work and care. A. Family benefits The Dutch system provides for 4 family benefits: the child benefit, the child-related allowance, the child-care benefit and a tax credit for working parents caring for at least one child under the age of 12. The number of family benefits was recently reduced by the Act on the reform of family benefits (Wet hervorming kindregelingen). This act reduced the number of family benefits from 11 benefits to 4 benefits. A tax credit for employees taking parental leave was one of the benefits that was abolished as of 2015. For this ad hoc request the child related allowance and a special supplement of the child benefit are of interest. The Act on Child-related Allowance (Wet op het kindgebonden budget, WKB) was launched in November 2007. In 2015 an estimated number of 828.000 households will receive a child-related allowance for 1,5 million children in total. As of January 2015 the General Child Benefit Act (Algemene Kinderbijslagwet, AKW) provides for an income-related supplement for single parents or families with only one breadwinner. This supplement is only available for people who take care at home of a disabled child in the age of 3 – 18. Before January 2015 this supplement was part of the Regulations governing Contributions towards the Upkeep of Disabled Children living at Home (Tegemoetkoming Onderhoudskosten Thuiswonende gehandicapte kinderen, TOG). The AKW also provides for benefits that are not income-related, but a description of these benefits falls outside the scope of this ad hoc request. Less than 3000 people claim the income-related supplement in the AKW. B Benefits in the case of combining work and care The Work and Care Act (Wet arbeid en zorg, Wazo) lists different types of leave (paid and unpaid) that aim at a balanced combination of work and care. These concern measures granting leave related to pregnancy, childbirth, adoption and foster care; calamities and other sorts of short leave, including paternity leave; short- and long-term carer’s or “filial” leave and parental leave. Here, two of these measures are relevant, namely paternity leave (kraamverlof) and the short-term carer’s leave (kortdurend zorgverlof). Provisions granting leave related to pregnancy and childbirth are outside the scope of this request for information, as is long-term carer’s or “filial” leave which is a type of unpaid leave. Parental leave (ouderschapsverlof) is, too, in principle a form of unpaid leave – and the Dutch government does not intend to change this. During the parliamentary debate on the legislative changes for the implementation of Directive 2010/18/EU, the government highlighted that concerning matters regarding income, provided for in Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, these are for the determination either by the Member States or the social partners. In this respect, the Netherlands’ position is that paid parental leave is to be categorised as a condition of employment (een arbeidsvoorwaardelijke regeling) and, therefore, something to be regulated by the social partners (Parliamentary Proceedings/Kamerstukken II, 2011-2012, 33107, nr. 3, p. 8). A recent study shows that 15% of the collective agreements in the Netherlands include such a provision stipulating that the salary will continue to be paid during the period of parental leave. The level of continued pay for hours of leave varies between 25% and 75% of the wage. Paternity leave (kraamverlof) following childbirth already exists for a long time. This refers to paid leave of two days. Since 1 January 2015, this legal right has been extended by 3 days – denoted as a specific form of parental leave (ouderschapsverlof), also referred to as “partner’s leave” (partner verlof). For these three additional days of leave, there does not exist an obligation of continued wage payment. But the government has announced to reserve funds for this purpose in the budget for 2016. The right to paid, short-term carer’s leave exists since 2001. This measure is intended for the care of sick persons provided by partners and children. Since 1 July 2015, it also applies to the care of siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, cohabitants and acquaintances.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	A. Family benefits The amount of the child-related allowance (Wet op het kindgebonden budget, WKB) depends on the income of the parent(s), the number of children and the age of the children. The basic amount of the child-related allowance is €1032 in the case of one child; €1823 in the case of two children, €2006 in the case of three children; in the case of more than three children: an additional amount of €106 is payable for every child that exceeds the number of three children. For children between 12 and 16 there is a supplement of € 231. For children aged 16 or 17 the amount of the supplement is €412. Single parents with a child aged up to 18 receive a supplement of €3050. These amounts of child-related allowance are all maximum amounts that are only payable when the collective income of the parent(s) does not exceed the threshold of € 19.767. If the collective income does exceed this threshold, the allowance is reduced if the by 6,75% of the difference between this collective income and € 19.767. The level of the supplement in the AKW is a fixed amount of €1460. B Benefits in the case of combining work and care The provision on paternity leave imposes an obligation upon employers to continue pay of the full salary. The provision on short-term carer’s leave imposes an obligation upon employers to continue pay of 70% of the salary, curbed by a statutory ceiling.
	Conditions of entitlement	A. Family benefits One qualifies for child-related allowance if one meets the following requirements: -receiving child benefit; -having a household income below a certain ceiling; -not having capital exceeding €103,423 for a single person or €124,753 for partners (amounts differ for persons who have reached the retirement age). The right to a supplement in the AKW is restricted to single parents or families with only one breadwinner who receive twice the amount of child benefit because they take care of a disabled child in the age of 3 – 18 at home. B Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave applies to the partner of the newborn’s mother. Paternity leave can be taken within the 4 weeks following the childbirth after a home confinement (birth at home) and the 4 weeks from the day the baby has come home after a birth at the hospital. It is a legal right, which an employer must not deny. The right to short-term carer’s leave applies to the necessary care required in case of sickness. This type of leave can only be taken when the applicant is the only person who can provide that care. It does not apply, if a sick child can be taken care of by the partner, another person or in the hospital. The right is hence explicitly intended for situations where there is no alternative solution. An employer must honor a request for such a leave (or the continuation thereof), unless he demands the employee’s availability because of a pressing business interest which he has reasonably weighed against the employee’s interest.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Family benefits The child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW are exclusively calculated with respect to the income of the parent(s). They do not comprise a flat-rate element. Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave: only the full salary. Short-term carer’s leave: only 70% of the salary
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Family benefits The maximum duration of the child-related allowance is linked to the age of the youngest child. A parent can qualify for an allowance until the youngest child is 18 years of age. The supplement in the AKW is also linked to the age of the child. The supplement is payable for a disabled child in the age of 3 – 18. Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave: maximum 2 days of paid leave (afterwards 3 days of unpaid leave). Short-term carer’s leave: 2 times the weekly working hours for every period of 12 months. This type of leave does not have to be taken at once, it can be spread out.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Family benefits Only one parent can claim the child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW. This right is linked to the parent that receives child benefit. In the case of co-parenting arrangements parents can split the payment of the entitlement to child benefit, but they cannot split their entitlement to child-related allowance or to the supplement in the AKW (only one co-parent can claim the child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW). Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave applies exclusively to the partner of the woman who has given birth, i.e. the husband, the registered partner, the non-marital cohabiting partner and persons who have legally recognised the child. Short-term carer’s leave can be taken for a child with whom the applicant has a legal family relationship or parentage; namely, the child of the husband, registered partner or the non-marital cohabitating partner, and for a foster child who lives at the same address. The right to take this paid leave exists for both parents.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Family benefits The child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW are payable regardless of the type of contract and the number of working hours. Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave applies to 2 days on which work is habitually conducted. Short-term carer’s leave applies to those days on which work is habitually conducted.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Family benefits The child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW are not linked to the exercise of parental leave rights. Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paid paternity leave (kraamverlof) is different from parental leave (ouderschapsverlof). The additional 3 days (partner’s leave) represent a specific form of parental leave (which is equally unpaid). Since the partner’s leave is classified as a form of parental leave, the Act stipulates that those three days will be subtracted from the total amount of statutory parental leave (which amounts to 26 times of the weekly working hours). Short-term carer’s leave: only 70% of the salary
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	An employer’s recourse to the social security system for reimbursement for salary paid during leave is NOT possible in any case. This is because with regard to parental leave the Netherlands do not have a legal right to paid parental leave.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Family benefits The payment of one right to child benefit can split in the case of co-parenting arrangements, but split payment of the child-related allowance or the supplement in the AKW is not possible. Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave: not applicable. Short-term carer’s leave can be taken by both parents, but not simultaneously. Please refer to the eligibility criteria.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Family benefits The right to child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW is linked to the parent that receives child benefit. In the case of a child that lives in a household with both parents, the parents can decide for themselves which parent will actually receive the child benefit. This means that it’s also possible for the parent who does not take the child-raising task upon him/herself, to receive the child-related allowance and the supplement in the AKW. However, if the parents live separately the child benefit will be paid to the parent that lives in a household with the child. Benefits in the case of combining work and care Paternity leave: not applicable. Short-term carer’s leave can be taken by both parents.

Norway

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Norway does not have a salary related child benefit (nor any other income related Due to the universal citizenship nature of the Norwegian welfare state, the child benefit has, since its introduction, been a flat rate benefit. The information given relates to this scheme. The Norwegian Child Benefit was introduced in 1946. According to the rules only lone parents were entitled to receive benefit for the first born child and onwards, while married parents were entitled to benefits for the second child and onwards. In 1970, the law was changed, married or cohabiting parents were now entitled to receive the benefit for the first child as well in accordance with the national insurance Act, and the allowance rates was considerably increased. Since 2006 the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration administer the social security benefits. In all 671 763 persons receive
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	In Norway the benefit is a standard rate for each child. The ordinary child benefit amounts to NOK 970 per child per month for married and cohabiting parents. The extended benefit for lone parents amounts to NOK 970 extra per child per month
	Conditions of entitlement	The ordinary child benefit is non-income tested (i.e. not salary-related) but varies with family type. Parents registered in the population register are granted the child benefit automatically, as a general rule. To be entitled the child must live in Norway. A child is generally regarded as living in Norway if he/she has been in Norway for at least 12 consecutive months Parents that arrive from an EEA country however and have paid work in Norway, are entitled to receive the child benefit even if they have been residing in Norway for less than 12 months. The child benefits are assessed according to the rules of the EEA agreement and other national insurance agreements. Lone parents are entitled to the’ extended child benefit’ if they are separated, divorced, widowed or unmarried and do not live with the child’s other parent. A mediation certificate must be produced in the event of cohabitants with joint children under the age of 16 years splitting up.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Both the ordinary child benefit and the extended benefit for lone parents is non-income tested and therefore not salary-related, but varies with family type.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Members of the National Insurance Scheme are entitled to child benefit for children up to the age of 18.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Most parents do not need to apply for the ordinary child benefit. If the child is born in Norway, the mother is automatically granted entitlement to child benefit from NAV roughly two months after the child is born. Both the child’s mother and father can claim the extended child benefit if they are lone parents. If the child’s parents have a dual domicile agreement for the child, the benefit can be split equally between them the whole period (0-18 years). Foster parents, another carer or a child-care institution may claim the child benefit if the child lives there permanently (for more than three months).
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	The child benefit is non-income related and thus not affected by any changes in working hours or income.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	No. The Norwegian child benefit is not intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The parental leave rights are exclusive and offered in terms of a “child home care allowance” (kontantstønad) or through the paid paternity leave benefit that is linked to previous earnings (a pensionable income for at least six of the ten months prior to the benefit period). These parental benefits are intended to ensure parents an income in connection with the birth or adoption of a child and independent of the national child benefit.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	If the child’s parents have a dual domicile agreement for the child, the ordinary (non-income) child benefit can be split equally between them the whole period (0-18 years).
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Any changes in the family situation or moving abroad may affect the payment and must be reported to the Labour and welfare administration, if not the recipients of benefits may be charged the wrong amount and the payment will stop. The entitlement to receive the extended child benefits for lone parents is family related and therefore needs documentation. In the case of changes in marital status marriage or cohabiting with a new partner for more than 12 months, the lone parent no longer fulfil the conditions of entitlement according to the national Insurance Act and loose the access to benefit allowances.

Poland

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	It has to be mentioned that Polish legal system distinguishes two kinds of benefits which role is to replace income during child-raising periods. The essential difference between them relates to sources of financing. 1. The maternity allowance (zasiłek macierzyński) during the parental leave (urlop rodzicielski) which has been introduced to the Polish legal system in 17 June 2013. The maternity allowance is a part of a compulsory social insurance scheme. The conditions and principles of granting this benefit are regulated by the Act on Social Insurance Cash Benefits in Cases of Sickness and Maternity (Ustawa o świadczeniach pieniężnych z ubezpieczenia społecznego w razie choroby i macierzyństwa) of 25 June 1999. The maternity allowance is payable during the 26 weeks’ parental leave. 2. There is also the child-raising supplement allowance (dodatek z tytułu opieki nad dzieckiem w okresie korzystania z urlopu wychowawczego) paid to people on childcare leave (urlop wychowawczy), regulated by the Act on Family Benefits (Ustawa o świadczeniach rodzinnych) of 28 November 2003. This benefit is a part of a tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit as a supplement to Family Allowance. In 2013 was granted in average 68,5 thousands supplements per month (16% less than in 2012 – 81,6 thousand). In 2012 the number of people using the child-raising leaves has decreased by 16%. Decrease of number of people exercising the child-raising leave is due to the introduction of parental leave from social insurance 89 .
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Monthly materinity allowance during the parental leave (zasiłek macierzyński) amounts to 60% or 80% of the ‘reference wage’ per month. The reference wage is calculated on the basis of gross earnings during the 12 months preceding the start of the maternity leave (urlop macierzyński) for which contributions were paid. The child-raising supplement allowance is tax financed universal scheme providing a flat-rate benefit as a supplement to Family Allowance. The allowance amounts to 400 PLN per month (€93) and is not subject of any differentation.
	Conditions of entitlement	The maternity allowance is a part of a compulsory social insurance scheme providing earnings-related benefits to all employees. Voluntary membership for self-employed women and other assimilated groups (eg. contractors). Maternity allowance is granted to an insured woman who within the period of sickness insurance or within the period of child care leave: gave birth to a child, took in a child under 1 year of age and applied for a legal adoption at the custody court, took in a child under 1 year of age to be raised in a foster family. The conditions for eligibility for maternity allowance during the parental leave are, in principle, to use: 1. the maternity allowance during the maternity leave (urlop macierzyński) which lasts 20 weeks (31 to 37 for multiple births, depending on the number of children born), 2. the maternity allowance during the additional maternity leave (dodatkowy urlop macierzyński) which may last: up to 6 weeks - in case of birth of one child during one delivery, up to 8 weeks - in case of a multiple birth. The child-raising supplement (means tested) is granted during the child-raising leave, which may be taken by an employee employed for at least 6 months, in order to take care of her/his child personally. The right to the child-raising leave is envisaged in the Polish Labour Code. The child-raising supplement may be claimed by a person who meets following conditions: will reside within Poland for the period for which she/he will receive the benefits; family income does not exceed PLN 539.00 (€ 124) per person in the family, or PLN 623.00 (€ 144) if one of the family members is a disabled child.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	The maternity allowance is calculated exclusively with respect to salary. As it was mentioned, the maternity allowance is calculated on the basis of gross earnings during the 12 months preceding the start of the maternity leave (urlop macierzyński) for which contributions were paid. The child-raising supplement is tax-financed, means tested and provides a flat-rate benefit as a supplement to Family Allowance. It has no relation to remuneration.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	The maternity allowance during the parental leave is paid to either parent for 26 weeks following the end of maternity leave (the maternity leave of 20 weeks [or 31-37 for multiple births] and additional maternity leave). The child-raising supplement may be granted for a period of up to 24 months, extended to 36 months where the person concerned provides care for more than one child delivered in the same multiple birth, or to 72 months for a disabled child. Not every day of parental leave may be a day of excersising the right to the child-raising supplement. The maximum duration of child-raising leave leave is up to 36 months while the supplement may be granted for a maximum period of – in principle – 24 months.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Parents using their parental leave corresponding to 26 weeks, receive during this period the maternity allowance. The maternity allowance can be taken either at once by one of the parents or in two or three parts following each other directly and not shorter than 8 weeks. Mather and father may share it between themselves. The maternity allowance during the parental leave both parents may use in the same time provided that the total length of parental leave and allowance granted to both parents do not exceed the period of 26 weeks. It means that if parents use the parental leave and maternity allowance during the parental leave at the same time, both parents can take such leave and allowance up to 13 weeks (13 weeks of parental leave and allowance paid during this period for mother and 13 weeks of parental leave and allowance paid during this period for father, which makes 26 weeks). The child-raising leave is granted on the employee’s request. Such leave can be taken in separate parts, maximum 5. The use of child-rising leave by both parents in the same time is possible for uninterrupted period of maximum 4 months. If the child-rising leave is used by both parents, they have right to only one child-rising supplement. Each parent has an exclusive right to one month of child-raising leave during the period of child-rising leave. This right might not be transferred to the other parent or guardian.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Act on Social Insurance Cash Benefits in Cases of Sickness and Maternity allows an employee on parental leave to undertake paid work for an employer who granted that leave of not more than half time employment. In this case, the amount of maternity allowance during the parental leave is decreased proportionally to the working time in which employee works during the use of parental leave. This applies to employees only and does not apply to insured persons who are not employees (eg. self-employed). The Act on Family Benefits (Ustawa o świadczeniach rodzinnych) allows an employee on child-raising leave, who receives a supplement at this time, to undertake paid work for current or a different employer or to undertake other gainful activity, as well as education and training, if it does not exclude the possibility of personal care of the child.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Both maternity allowance during the parental leave and child-raising benefit are intended to take care of a child and – when needed – to combine childcare with work.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The maternity allowance during the parental leave is paid from the social insurance fund by the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), not by an employer. The child-raising supplement is tax financed and paid by public authorities.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	See the information above.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	As it was already mentioned above, in Poland we distinguish two groups of benefits aimed at replacing income during – broadly speaking – the child-raising periods: the maternity allowance which is a part of a compulsory social insurance scheme and may be granted exclusively to insured person – both employees and other related groups. The last amendments to the Act on Social Insurance Cash Benefits in Cases of Sickness and Maternity introduced the possibility of excersising the right to maternity allowance by an insured father of the child (or other immediate insured family member) in cases of: death of mother of the child; abandonment of the child by a mother; if the mother is unable to take care of the child in a situation when she is unable to eg. live independently also in a situation when a mother of the child in not insured. Still, a person aquiring the allowance must be the subject of social insurance in Poland. Family benefits, including the child-raising supplement, are of a different nature. They are means tested and has no connection with the previous remuneration and professional activity of the beneficiary. The child-raising supplement may be granted only to an employee using the child-raising leave.

Portugal

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	In Portugal, until 1984, the parental allowance was restricted to mothers and the leave was for a short period. The institution of a first form of child´s raising benefit occurred in 1937, when a short leave of 30 days was created to female workers: the leave, though, was optional and could be given by the employer to the worker being entirely supported by him. With the reform of the welfare system in 1962, a truthfully maternity allowance, relying in a social insurance scheme, was instituted (60 days of leave fully paid). Mothers could also enjoy a half hour per day of work as breastfeeding period. After the democratic revolution of 1974, and with the new Constitution of 1976, the maternity allowance was finally considered a universal right of the female workers, and the leave entirely paid by the Social Security System increased up to 90 days. After 1984, with the approval of the Decree 4/84 (the new legal regime of maternity and paternity allowances), fathers were able to share the maternity allowance, but only in case of death or incapacity of the mother after giving birth. Only in 1995, this possibility of sharing the initial maternity leave was extended to fathers, irrespectively of the cause, although mothers should necessarily take a period of 14 days within the overall 90 days leave. In this occasion, fathers were also given the possibility of enjoying two days after the child´s birth, of absence from work, but this was not mandatory. Also notice that in 1984 had also been created a new special leave of six months/two years that could be taken until the child completed 3 years old, but this new leave was not paid by Social Security. In 1998-99, the maternity leave was increased up to 120 days, being entirely paid by the Social Security given that six weeks of that leave should be an exclusive right of mothers. In 1999, it was created a leave of paternity of 5 days, fully paid by Social Security, and created a subsequent parental leave of 15 days (to the fathers), entirely paid by Social Security, as long as taken immediately after the end of the maternity leave. Other special parental leaves were also created and could be taken in the first years of the child´s life. With the Labour Code of 2003-2004, the paternity allowance of 5 days became mandatory, and the maternity leave could now be of 120 days, being fully paid (100% of the worker´s salary), or of 150 days, with a reduction (80% of the worker´s salary). The current system, described infra, results from the new Labour Code (approved by Law 7/2009) and of Decree 91/2009. Both have suffered changes in the last years. The latest alterations were most recently approved in the Portuguese Parliament, the 1st September of 2015. A significant innovation introduced by the new Labour Code is that the current regime does not distinguishes, as in the past, between maternity and paternity leaves, but uses commons expressions of ‘parental leaves’ that can be shared, within certain conditions, between mothers and fathers. The idea of equal treatment between women and men was hence reinforced in the Portuguese regime.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Parental leave in Portugal is understood to be the period of time during which working mothers and fathers are entitled to stay at home following the birth or adoption of a child. The amount of the benefits corresponding to each form of parental leave is as follows: For initial parental leave (after birth or adoption) as selected by the parents: 100% of the reference salary for leave of 120 days; 80% of the reference salary for leave of 150 days; 100% of the reference salary for leave of 120 days with an additional 30 days in the event of sharing (120+30); 83% of the reference salary for leave of 150 days with an additional 30 days also in the event of sharing (150+30). For parental leave exclusive to the father (10 mandatory days plus 10 optional days) this sum is: 100% of the reference salary. For extended parental leave (that integrates the so-called supplementary leave to care for a child under the age of 6) is paid by the social security in the following circumstances and as follows: The daily amount of the extended child benefit corresponds to 25 % of the worker’s reference salary as long as taken immediately after the period during which they were receiving the initial child benefit or during which the other parent was receiving the extended child benefit. The Portuguese social security system does not pay for any other benefits for child raising leaves, even though non paid special leaves or part-time work, or both, are allowed to workers by the Labour Code. In fact, once they have exhausted their entitlement to supplementary parental leave, parents are entitled to take up to two years (consecutively or interspersed) of leave for childcare. For third and subsequent children, this leave is limited to three years. There is, though, a special leave to care for children with a disability or chronic illness, whose benefit corresponds to 65% of the beneficiary’s reference salary, capped at twice the IAS (indexante dos apoios sociais, Index of Social Support). The IAS corresponds to € 419.22. The Decree 91/2009 has also created the so-called social parental (initial) leaves, whose amounts are as follows: 80% of 1xIAS (€419,22), for leave of 120 days; 64% of 1xIAS (€419,22), for leave of 150 days; 80% of 1xIAS (€419,22), for leave of 120 days with an additional 30 days in the event of sharing (120+30); 66% of 1xIAS (€419,22), for leave of 150 days with an additional 30 days also in the event of sharing (150+30).
	Conditions of entitlement	For parental leaves Only workers may be recognised as being entitled to take leave, unpaid leave or equivalent periods of absence under the Labour Code. This is different from the social protection scheme, which requires the beneficiary to have been in gainful employment for a guarantee period of six calendar months, consecutive or interspersed, at the date of the occurrence justifying the benefit. When counting the six months we take into account the non-overlapping periods of gainful employment under other social protection schemes, completed in Portugal or elsewhere, that cover this form of benefit, including for workers in the public services. Self-employed workers and persons covered by the voluntary social security scheme must have paid their social security contributions in full up until the end of the third month immediately preceding the month of the occurrence preventing them from working. For social parental leaves For workers who do not work or pay for the Social Security system, or for those that, although paying, haven´t fulfilled the abovementioned guarentee period of six months. Conditions: - Legal residence in Portugal; - These are means-tested benefits.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Parental leaves are exclusively calculated with respect to salary. Social parental leaves are partially calculated with respect to salary (which may not even exist), because since they the benefits are means-tested they consider other sources of income.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	For initial parental leave (including social leave), the maximum duration of the benefit is of 180 days, which is given in case of shared leave. For extended parental leave the benefit is paid for a period of three months.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Both can claim the benefit. Notwithstanding, there are exclusive periods of paid leave (mothers are exclusively entitled to take parental leave of up to 30 days before the birth, but must take 6 consecutive weeks of leave following the birth; fathers are required to take ten working days of parental leave, five of which must be consecutive, within the 30 days immediately following the birth of the child, the remaining days may be taken in a single stretch or at intervals).
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	There are no paid benefits in case of part-time work.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Yes. Benefits for parental leaves are one aspect of the labour regime that intents to promote the conciliation between work and family needs.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Yes. Parental leaves can be shared by parents and in that case the amount of the benefit will be higher (see above ‘level of the benefits).
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	According to the Portuguese law, a worker only benefits of social protection whether the conditions of the Labour Code are fulfilled (being a worker is one of them, and having a minimum period of insurance the other one). As for non-workers, and in order to benefit from social parental leave, the residence condition and the means-test condition should be fulfilled.

Romania

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	The child-raising benefit was established in Romania in January 1990 and faced in last 25 years several changes. By Decree-Law 31 / 01.19.1990 is established the right to the child-raising benefit and leave for the child aged up to 1 year, after the end of the maternity benefit of 112 days. Women affiliated to the social insurance scheme were entitled. The amount of the benefit was 65% of the monthly wage rate. The benefit was paid by the social insurance scheme. No specific contribution was established for finance the benefit. The Law 120 / 07.09.1997 on child-raising benefit bring some changes: -women affiliated to the social insurance scheme received a leave for the child aged up to 2 years and the amount of the child-raising benefit was raised to 85% of the basic salary and other salary income; - women affiliated to the farmers insurance scheme received a benefit of 80% of the average monthly insured income calculated for the last 6 months of contribution paid. Financial unsustainability of this benefit makes the Law no.19/ 2000 on public pension system and other social insurance rights to change the calculation basis. The monthly amount child –raising benefit was 85% applied to the average monthly income in the last 6 months and may not exceed the ceiling of 3 times the gross average salary per economy. No specific contribution was collected for this benefit. A new change appears by GEO (Government Emergency Ordinance) 9/2003 amending and supplementing Law no. 19/2000 on public pensions and other social insurance rights by extending the calculation basis and increases the ceiling. Thus, the condition for entitlement was raised at last 10 months preceding the child birth, on which was paid individual contribution to social insurance system. The amount of the benefit could not be less than 85% of the average net annual forecast by the state social insurance budget law and not exceed the ceiling of 5 times the average gross wage. Two months later, by GEO no. 23 of 10 April 2003 amending and supplementing Law no. 19/2000, rights, are established after 31 December 2003 the amount of the benefit was set at 85% of gross average wage in the state social insurance budget and approved by the state social insurance budget law. Due to the deficit of the pension budget, through GEO 148/2005, the child raising benefit was financed by the state budget and removed from the scope of the social insurance system. The eligibility criterion was 12 months of professional income subject to income tax according to Law no. 571/2003 on the Fiscal Code, before the child birth. There were taken into account and assimilated periods (unemployment, sick leave, college attending, etc.). The amount of the benefit was set at 800 RON in 2006. In 2007 the amount of the benefit was split as: 600 RON the child-raising benefit and 200 RON the state allowance for children up to 2 (3, for disabled children) years. A new benefit was introduced, in the form of monthly incentive of 100 RON lei for parents who return to work before the child turns the age of 2 or 3 years, if disabled. In 2008, two changes of GEO 148/2005, Law no. 257/2008 of 1 January 2009 changes the amount of benefit fixed at of 85% of the average net monthly income of the person entitled and by GEO 226/2008, a ceiling is set at 4,000 RON. Due to the financial crisis, by Law no.118 / 2010 the amount of the benefit is reduced by 15%, but not less than 600 RON. The last important change was through the Government Emergency Ordinance no.111 / 2010 on child raising benefit which introduced the possibility of option for the duration and accordingly for the amount of the benefit until the child is aged 1 year, 2 years or 3 years for a child with disabilities. Thus, if the parent chooses to stay in the child -raising leave until the child is ages 1 year, he/she received a monthly allowance of 75% of the average net income of the last 12 months, which cannot be less than RON 600 or more than RON 3,400. If the parent returns at work until the child turns 1 year of age, the incentive was 500 RON and is paid until the child turns 2 years old. If the parent does not return to the labor market, it may choose to grant unpaid leave to care for children aged 1 year and 2 years. If the parent chooses to stay in the parental leave until the child is aged 2 years, the parent receive a monthly allowance of 75% of the average net income of the last 12 months, but not less than 600 RON and a maximum of 1,200 RON; In this case the incentive for work returning is not available. If a parent has twins, the amount of the benefit is supplemented with 600 RON. Number of beneficiaries: 2006: 186,342 2007: 189,990 2008: 179,070 2009: 191,174 2010: 206,264 2011: 196,680 2012: 160,028 2013: 142,170 2014: 130,579
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	The beneficiary is entitled to opt for the duration of the benefit: - child-raising leave and indemnity for the child aged up to one year, or - child-raising leave and indemnity for the child aged up to two years. The amount of the benefit varies according to the duration of the benefit and the previous incomes of the claimant. 1)If the option is child-raising leave and indemnity for the child aged up to one year, the amount of the benefit is 85% of the average net income earned during the last 12 months preceding the contingency, but not less than 1.2 RSI and not more than 6.8 RSI, where RSI = Reference Social Indicator = RON 500 (EUR 111) The amount of the benefit is between 600 and 3400 RON (EUR 133-756) 2)If the option is child-raising leave and indemnity for the child aged up to two years, the amount of the benefit is 85% of the average net income earned during the last 12 months preceding the contingency, but not less than 1.2 RSI and not more than 2.4 RSI, where RSI = Reference Social Indicator = RON 500 (EUR 111) The amount of the benefit is between 600 and 1200 RON (EUR 133-267) If the child is disabled, the benefit is paid until the child aged up to three years. In this case the amount is 85% of the average net income earned during the last 12 months preceding the contingency, but not less than 1.2 RSI and not more than 6.8 RSI, where RSI = Reference Social Indicator = RON 500 (EUR 111). The amount of the benefit is between 600 and 3400 RON (EUR 133-756).
	Conditions of entitlement	• 12 months period of taxable personal income before the child birth, • take leave to raise the child, • living with the child, being responsible for him/her • fulfilment of the fiscal obligations owed to the local budgets (this requirement does not apply to single-parent families). For entitlement, there are taken into account assimilated periods when the persons: -Received social security benefits (unemployment, pensions, sickness, child raising benefits) -temporary interrupted the activity, at the employer's initiative, without termination of the contract -3 months between the date of termination of an employment contract for a definite term and the date of beginning of another employment contract of limited duration; -accompanied the husband / wife sent in permanent mission abroad; -performed military service on a voluntary basis, were concentrated, mobilized or prisoner; -attended without interruption day courses of postgraduate education or, if applicable, graduate level university masters, organized by law in the country or in another Member State of the European Union in a recognized field Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports, unless discontinuation rates for medical reasons; -had the status of doctoral student, as provided by art. 20 and 21 of Government Decision no. 567/2005 on the organization and development of doctoral studies, with subsequent amendments; -was in the period between the end of a primary and secondary education and start in the same calendar year to another form of school education, at day courses organized by law, frequented without interruption; -was in vacation between the study years; -received professional incomes in other EU Member State
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	The benefit is calculated taking into account professional incomes (salary, incomes as self-employed and incomes from agricultural activity).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	If the child is disabled, the benefit is paid until the child is aged three years.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Both parents can claim the benefit, if they fulfil the conditions, but not simultaneoulsly. The benefit has to be split between the two parents, at least one month. Is the option of the parents how they split the benefit.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes, all the incomes received are taken into account.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	The benefit is intended to help the family raising the child, improve the reconciliation of work, private and family life, improve the natality and exercise the parental leave rights.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	The benefit is paid directly by the local authorities, from the state budget. It is not considered a social insurance benefit.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	It is possible for each parent to claim the benefit, if they are entitled, but not simultaneoulsly. It is the option of the parents how they split the benefit. When a parent take the child-raising benefit, during that period (1 year or 2 years), the other parent has to take at least 1 month child-raising benefit. If not, that month cannot be claimed by the long term beneficiary of the benefit. In case that the mother takes child raising leave for the child aged up to 1 year, she is entitled to only 11 month of benefit. If the father doesn’t claim the benefit, 1 month of the benefit is lost. Each parent receives the benefit according to his/her previous incomes.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	The entitlement to the benefit is individual. Conditions to entitlement for the parent are to leave the professional activity in order to raise the child and to live with the child, to be responsible for his/her maintenance.

Slovakia

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	First law: 1888. 2003 – social insurance, implemented in 2004, 2003 (income replacement) implemented in 2004, Number of accounted benefit claimants of maternity benefit – monthly average 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 20531; 13526; 16382; 16807; 17114; 18183; 19774; 20092; 23212; 24221; 23858; 23132
	Level of the benefit	The only salary related child raising benefit is maternity benefit. ( parental benefit, child benefit are not salary related benefits) 65% of the daily assessment basis. The daily assessment basis is the earnings in the last year before the expected date of childbirth. (daily earnings calculated on the basis of the previous year, with a monthly ceiling of one and a half times the national average monthly wage)
	Conditions of entitlement	The entitlement to maternity benefit is conditioned by the continuance of sickness insurance for a minimum of 270 days in the last two years prior the childbirth, as well as by the existence of sickness insurance at the time of commencement of the maternity leave and/or upon the expiry of the protective period as of that date. Moreover,, self-employed persons and voluntary insured persons are obliged to pay their sickness insurance contributions on time. Sickness insurance is mandatory for: Employee with regular income Self-employed person meeting conditions regarding the income out of business. An employee shall be an individual in a legal relation with a right to a regular monthly income and also a person performing activities on the basis of agreements on work performance besides work contract with a regular monthly income, except for a person: -Performing activities on the basis of a Contract for part-time work of students and -- performing activities on the basis of an agreement on the performance of work or contract for services, if the person is granted the old-age, disability, retirement pension and has reached the old age, disability, retirement age. Conditions: -Pregnancy or the care for a new-born child -Valid sickness insurance -Being covered by sickness insurance for not less than 270 days during the last 2 years preceding childbirth (delivery) -After termination of sickness insurance – being in period of entitlement to sickness benefits or within the duration of the protective period. The duration of the protective period for a female insured person, whose sickness insurance terminated at the time of her pregnancy, is 8 months.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Calculated with the respect to sickness insurance contributions from salary (minimum and maximum). – see conditions
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Is paid from six to eight weeks before the expected date of childbirth for a total of 34 weeks; 37 weeks for a single mother and for multiple births; 22 weeks for a substitute caregiver; 43 weeks for a single parent or substitute caregiver raising at least two newborn children; or at least 14 weeks if the child is stillborn. Maternity leave granted in connection with the birth must not be shorter than 14 weeks and may not be terminated or interrupted before the lapse of six weeks from the date of the birth.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Other insured persons are also entitled to maternity benefits, e.g. the child`s father or a person caring for the child based on a decision of a competent authority. Always only one person – there is no split between parents. If another insured person is taking care of a child, such a person shall be entitled to maternity benefit as from the date of assuming the care of the child for a period of 28 weeks from the commencement of entitlement to maternity benefit ( or, if is a single person, until the end of the 31st week from the commencement of the entitlement to maternity benefits, or if assuming care of 2 or more children, until the end of 31st week from the commencement of the entitlement to maternity benefit.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	See conditions of sickness insurance: insured person has to contribute 1,4% of covered monthly earnings, voluntarily insured persons contribute 4.4% of declared monthly earnings. The minimum earnings used to calculate contributions for maternity benefit is the legal monthly minimum wage. So, doesn´t matter, what kind of work, but contributions minimum 270 days and from legal monthly minimum wage. There is also maximum earnings used to calculate contributions for maternity benefits, in the 2014 1,153.50 Euros. Voluntary sickness insured person can be a person after age of 16 years, having permanent residence on the territory of the SR, temporary residence permit or permanent residence permit (EU/EEA/Swiss citizens fulfil this condition if they have residence in EU/EEA/Switzerland), if the person: is not granted the old-age pension, early retirement or disability pension because of a decline of earning capacity by more than 70%; is not granted disability pension when reaching the retirement age and; at the same time is voluntarily pension insured.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	The benefit is increasing – period and amount – and the plan is further increase to 75% from monthly earnings. There is additional payment to the Maternity benefit up to amount of the Parental Allowance if the amount of the maternity benefit is less than the Parental Allowance
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	For the purposes of extended care of children, employers are obliged to grant women and men who so request, parental leave until the day the child turns three years old (it can be requested at any time up to the age of 3 years, (in case of children with long-term poor health requiring special care until six years), even if the mother/father has been working after the maternity/paternity leave). An employer must excuse the employee´s absence from work on the grounds of incapacity for work due to illness or injury, periods of maternity and parental leave, quarantine, attending to a sick family member or caring for a child younger than 10 years of age who for important reasons, cannot be left in the care of a childcare establishment or school that the child normally attends, or in case of medical examination of the person who otherwise takes care of the child. An employer has to contribute to sickness insurance (maternity) 3% of covered monthly earnings . Equalisation benefit during the pregnancy and maternity: -Affiliation to the sickness insurance system -Transfer to another job in respect of pregnancy or maternity -Reduced earnings as a consequence of the transfer. Equalisation Benefit during pregnancy and maternity: -55% of the difference between previous and actual wage after transferring to another job ( up to 55% of the national average wage). The benefit is granted for a period of pregnancy or maternity, at longest until the end of the 9th month after confinement
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Parental leave – maternity benefit can be taken by the mother or the father until the child is three years old. For children with long-term health problems, parental leave can be extended until the child reaches six years of age. Who will use parental leave depends on parent´s decision. Father has a right for 28 months for maternity benefit. After 34 or 43 weeks of maternity benefit for mother, father can start with parental leave maximum 28 weeks ( condition is sickness insurance, and mother is not apply for parental allowance.). So, together maximum is 62 – 71 weeks on maternity benefit (without Parental allowance). So both parents can use maternity benefit, but not simultaneously, but continuously.After this period parent can claim parental allowance. The parental leave is to a great extent used by women (1 – 2% of men take parental leave)
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Yes, under the conditions of voluntary sickness insured person

Slovenia

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Introduction Salary-related-child-raising benefits are provided by the parental care insurance, i.e.: - maternity benefit (materinsko nadomestilo), paternity benefit (očetovsko nadomestilo) and parental benefit (starševsko nadomestilo), provided during maternity paternity and parental leaves, - payment of social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood (pravica do krajšega delovnega časa in pravica do plačila prispevkov za socialno varnost zaradi starševstva), or for leaving the labour market in case of four or more children (pravica do plačila prispevkov za socialno varnost v primeru štirih ali več otrok), - and the new benefit or payment of social security contributions during breast-feeding break (nadomestilo v času odmora za dojenje in pravica do plačila prispevkov za socialno varnost v času odmora za dojenje). Next to this (social) insurance non-contributory family benefits are provided. They are granted - at birth of a child as parental allowance, (starševski dodatek) and birth grant (pomoč ob rojstvu otroka), - for raising of a child as child benefit (otroški dodatek) and large family supplement (dodatek za veliko družino), - for disabled children child as child-care supplement (dodatek za nego otroka), and partial payment for lost income (delno plačilo za izgubljeni dohodek). Some of family benefits are salary-related. Salary (or proportion of it) is used either as a qualifying condition or for calculating the benefit level. Parental allowance (for those not entitled to parental care insurance benefits) is calculated as a flat-rated amount set at 55% of minimum salary, but should from 2016 onward be set as a fixed amount of 252.04 euro monthly, which fully corresponds to 55% of minimum salary). Birth grant (otherwise excluded from coordination rules) was transformed from universal to selective benefit during the crisis. It is provided to families whose income per family member does not exceed 64% of average salary in Slovenia There are 8 income brackets (during the times of crisis only 6, i.e. without the two highest) for the entitlement to a child benefit. They are set with the relation to average salary in Slovenia (the highest income bracket, i.e. the 8th bracket is for families whose income does not exceed 99% of average salary per family member, if it does, there is no entitlement; during the crisis the 6th bracket, i.e. 64% of average salary, is applied). Also large family supplement was transformed from universal to selective benefit during the crisis. It is provided to families whose income per family member does not exceed 64% of average salary in Slovenia. Partial payment for lost income is paid to one of the parents who leaves the labour market or works part-time. It amounts to 734.15 euro (or its proportionate part in case of part-time work). This amount corresponds exactly to the minimum wage in the first half of 2010. Child-care supplement is a flat-rate benefit, not salary-related. Family benefits will not be explained further, since they are not related to the individual salary, but rather to minimum or average salary in Slovenia. Historical development Family benefits were introduced in 1993 with the Family Benefits Act (Zakon o družinskih prejemkih, ZDPre). Family benefits were: - benefit during the maternity leave (leave was regulated under labour law). It was an insurance based benefit, since (low, but nevertheless) contributions had to be paid, and it was salary-related (calculated as 100% of beneficiary’s average salary in the preceding 12 months), - parental allowance, - birth grant, - child benefit (at first envisaged as universal benefit, but at first deferred and later amended, so it was never universal in practice, but the threshold was rather high). In the year 2001 the Parental Care and Family Benefits Act (Zakon o starševskem varstvu in družinskih prejemkih– ZSDP) was introduced. It was composed of two parts. In the first parental care insurance was regulated and in the second one family benefits. Parental care insurance provided the rights to: - parental leave (composed of maternity, paternity, and child-care leaves), - parental benefit (composed of maternity, paternity, and child-care leaves), - part-time work due to parenthood with partial payment of social security contributions. All these benefits were individualised and salary-related. Family benefits were provided: - at birth: parental allowance and birth grant, - for raising of a child: child benefit and large family supplement, - for disabled children: child-care supplement and partial payment for lost income. Average or minimum salary was used to either set the entitlement conditions or for calculating the benefit. In the year 2014 new Parental Care and Family Benefits Act (Zakon o starševskem varstvu in družinskih prejemkih– ZSDP-1, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 26/2014) was passed. It follows the structure of former ZSDP (affected also with several anti-crisis laws), with some modifications. The latter concern different names of benefits, longer paid paternity benefit (after the crisis), transferability of parental benefti and some other. Benefits are described above (under Introduction). Statistical information Statistical information was kindly provided by the Slovenian Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities All benefits (maternity, paternity, child-care/parental benefits) Payment of social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood Payment of social security contributions during leaving the labour market in case of four or more children Parental allowance Birth grant Child benefit Large family supplement Child-care supplement Partial payment for lost income No statistical data is available yet for the new benefit or payment of social security contributions during breast-feeding break.
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Maternity benefit is 100% of the basis from which the contributions for parental protection insurance have been calculated in consecutive 12 months, by taking into account a month before the last month prior to the submission of the first application for parental leave. The payment of maternity benefit may not be higher than two times the average monthly wage and cannot be less than 55%% of minimum wage as set in 2006 and adjusted by the Act Regulating Adjustments of Transfers to Individuals and Households in the Republic of Slovenia (such minimum wage is lower than then the actual minimum wage in 2015). Paternity benefit and parental benefit (also for adoptive parents) are: 90% of the basis from which the contributions for parental protection insurance have been calculated in consecutive 12 months, by taking into account a month before the last month prior to the submission of the first application for parental leave (100% when the basis does not exceed €763.06). Payment of paternity and parental benefit may not be higher than two times the average monthly wage and cannot be less than 55%% of minimum wage as set in 2006 and adjusted by the Act Regulating Adjustments of Transfers to Individuals and Households in the Republic of Slovenia (such minimum wage is lower than then the actual minimum wage in 2015). Social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood, or for leaving the labour market in case of four or more children are paid from minimum salary (or its proportionate part in case of part-time work). Benefit or payment of social security contributions during breast-feeding break is provided as proportionate part of minimum salary (for one hour daily), until the child reaches nine months. From nine to 18 months only contributions from the proportionate part of minimum salary are paid (by the State).
	Conditions of entitlement	The beneficiaries of maternity benefit, paternity benefit or parental benefit must be covered by the Parental Care Insurance and be insured prior to the first day of the leave. To maternity/paternity/parental benefit are entitled also persons not entitled to the leave, if they were insured for at least 12 months in the last three years before claiming the benefit. This is advantageous for the persons with career breaks. One of the parents taking care of a child is entitled to payment of social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood or for leaving the labour market in case of four or more children. In the latter case parental care insurance in the last 12 months is required. Benefit/contributions for breast-feeding break are provided to full-time employed mothers.
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Exclusively calculated with respect to salary: 100% (maternity benefit) and 90% (parental and paternity benefit, could be 100% when the basis does not exceed €763.06) of the basis from which the contributions for parental protection have been calculated in consecutive 12 months, by taking into account a month before the last month prior to the submission of the first application for parental leave. Calculated with respect to minimum salary are (proportionate) social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood or for leaving the labour market in case of four or more children and benefit/contributions for breast-feeding break.
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Maternity benefit 105 calendar days, of which 28 days before the confinement. Use of 15 days before and/or after the birth is mandatory. Paternity Benefit Paid leave of 15 days, to be used during the first 6 months of the child’s life. Exceptionally during the first 12 months when: a child is continuously in a hospital; father is continuously absent due to work assignments; adoption is after six months of child age. Further unpaid leave of 75 days, to be used until the child’s 3rd birthday, during which the State pays social security contributions for the father. When the GDP rises above 2,5% the paternity leave for the fathers will last 30 days (15 days until the age of the child of six/in some cases 12 months and 15 days after the parental leave-until the end of child’s first grade of elementary school), all with wage compensation. Parental benefit The right to parental leave/benefit may be exercised by both parents and under legally specified conditions also by other persons. Each parent has the right to 130 days of parental leave (together 260 days). Mother can transfer to a father 100 days of parental leave and a father can transfer to a mother 130 days of parental leave. Parental leave follows immediately after maternity leave and is intended for the further care and protection of the child. Parental leave shall be used in a continuous series in the form of full or partial absence from work. In exceptional cases, parental leave may be prolonged: leave is extended by 90 days for the birth of twins, for each additional live born child, leave is extended by a further 90 days, for a premature birth, leave is extended by the number of days that the pregnancy was shorter than 260 days, for the birth of a child needing special care and protection leave is extended by 90 days (on the basis of the opinion of a medical commission), in a case in which the parents at the time of the birth are already providing care and protection to 2 children, not finished the first grade of elementary school, leave is extended by 30 days, in a case in which the parents at the time of the birth are already providing care and protection to 3 children, not finished the first grade of elementary school, leave is extended by 60 days, in a case in which the parents at the time of birth are already providing care and protection to 4 or more children, not finished the first grade of elementary school, leave is extended by 90 days. Part of the parental leave of children lasting a maximum of 75 days may be transferred and used up until the child finishes the first grade of elementary school. Adoptive parents have the right to parental leave, under same conditions as biological parents. Social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood are paid until one child reaches three years of age, or in case of two or three children the youngest finishes the first grade of elementary school. Contributions for leaving the labour market in case of four or more children are paid until the youngest child finishes the first grade of elementary school. Benefit/contributions for breast-feeding break are paid until the child reached nine months or 18 months, respectively.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Maternity leave/benefit is intended for preparation for giving birth and care and protection of the child immediately after birth. The mother has the right to maternity leave. This right may only exceptionally be exercised by the father or another person, e.g. if the mother dies, leaves the child or is temporarily/permanently unable to care for a child). This right is as a rule not transferable. Paternity leave/benefit is intended for fathers to be able to share with the mother the child's care and protection during the child’s most sensitive period. Exceptionally it may be used by another person, mother’s spouse or extramarital or same-sex partner, if s/he is actually carrying for a child and up to the duration not yet used by the father. This right is as a rule not transferable. Parental leave The right to parental leave/benefit may be exercised by both parents and under legally specified conditions also by other persons. Each parent has the right to 130 days of parental leave (together 260 days). This right is transferable. Mother can transfer to a father 100 days of parental leave and a father can transfer to a mother 130 days of parental leave. One of the parents (a mother or a father) taking care of a child may claim the payment of social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood or for leaving the labour market in case of four or more children. In case of two children payment of contributions for part-time work is non-transferable for one year (mother) and one year (father). Benefit/contributions for breast-feeding break may be claimed by a mother.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Maternity leave/benefit has to be used in a form of in a continuous series with full time absence from work. Paternity and pa parental leaves/benefits may be used in the form of full or partial absence from work. In the latter case, there is a possibility to work-part time and receive corresponding part of the benefit. One of the parents taking care of a child may claim the payment of social security contributions during part-time work due to parenthood.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Maternity, paternity and parental benefits are paid during maternity, paternity and parental leave. New law has been adopted in 2014 (ZSDP-1) also to meet the requirements on (non-) transferability of benefits. Although the Parental Leave Directive leaves social security matters to the Member States, in Slovenia, social security benefits are provided during mentioned leaves.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	Employers do not have to pay salary during maternity, paternity and parental leave. Benefits are financed by contributions and taxes and are paid from the social security system (parental care insurance) directly to the beneficiaries.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Parental benefit can be exercised simultaneously by both parents only for the periods, that the parental benefit is prolonged (for example 90 days extension is provided for the birth of twins, of which both parents can exercise simultaneously 45 days each).
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	No. Maternity, paternity and parental benefits are personal benefits. The parent, who is entitled to the benefit, must be insured prior to the first day of the leave (or at least 12 months in the preceding three years).

Spain

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	In Spain, since 2011, there has been a salary-related (income replacement) child-raising benefit. 90 The purpose of the benefit is to support parents that take care of children (under 18 years) affected by cancer or any other serious illness. The benefit allows one of the working parents to reduce his/her working hours for said reason. The proportional reduction in salary is compensated by this benefit. Obviously the scope of this benefit is not raising every child only sick children, but it is the only child raising benefit with an income replacement goal in Spain. 91 This benefit is rarely used. The last available statistics (July 2015 92 ) show that currently there are merely 1970 active beneficiaries. The average duration of the benefit is less than one year (308 days).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Up to 100% of the contribution base for professional risks (the benefit is proportional to the reduction of the working hours). The contribution base for professional risks is the monthly proportional share of the gross annual salary including overtime. The base is capped up and down (the current minimum contribution base is 756,00 €/month and the maximum is 3.606,00 €/month).
	Conditions of entitlement 93	The conditions of entitlement are the following Being a parent 94 (by birth or adoption) of a child under 18 years of age that suffers cancer or any other serious illness, requires long term hospitalization and direct and continuous care. Both parents are active workers insured in a Social Security scheme and up to date on her/his contribution obligations The beneficiary (only one parent) reduces the working hours at least by 50% of the full time working hours and fulfills the minimum contribution period requirement. 95
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	It is not calculated with respect to salary but with respect to the reference contribution base instead. The reference contribution base is the one for professional risks. The contribution base for professional risks is the monthly proportional share of the gross annual salary including overtime. The base is capped up and down (the current minimum contribution base is 756,00 €/month and the maximum is 3.606,00 €/month).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	The benefit is granted initially for 1 month and extended on a 2 months period basis as long as the illness persists, the beneficiary wants to maintain the reduction of the working hours and the child is under 18 years of age.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	Only one of the working parents can claim the benefit (but both parents have to be active workers)
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes precisely it is necessary a minimum reduction of the working hours (50%) to be entitled to this benefit. The benefit only covers for the proportional reduction of the salary (top ups apply) Part time workers could be also entitled to this benefit but only if the working hours are no less than the 25% of the fulltime working hours. For fulfilling this requirement, in case the part time worker is simultaneously hired by different employers, it is necessary to have into account total amount of working hours.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	No, this is an independent benefit.
	Are employers who offer pay during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No. On the one hand, as stated in the previous answer, parental leave benefit and raising an ill child benefit are independent. On the other hand, during parental leave payment is made by the Social Security. The collective agreement may oblige the employer to complement the statutory benefit when the salary tops the contribution base, but compensation or reimbursement by the Social Security is not envisaged.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Both parents cannot claim the benefit simultaneously. If both parents fulfill the entitlement requirements, they can alternate the right.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Only the parent that fulfils the requirements is entitled to the benefit.

Sweden

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Salary-related maternity benefit was introduced in the mid 1950:s, containing 90 days of income-related benefit ( Act on maternity support 1954:266). When the Act on social insurance (1962:381) was launched in 1962, the number of days with income-related benefit increased to 180. In 1974, maternity benefit was replaced by parental benefit, which still today is the salary-related child-raising benefit. The main novelty was that the parent taking care of the child, irrespective of gender, was entitled to benefit. The number of days with income-related benefit was initially the same (180), but gradually increased during the years to come. In 2014, 425 067 women received parental benefit and 344 947 men. The average number of days taken out by women was 94 and the average number of days taken out by men was 39. The average amount paid to men was 35 per cent higher than for women (Social Insurance Agency: Socialförsäkringen i siffor 2015).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	80 per cent of the income of the parent, with a ceiling for income at 445 000 SEK (10 times the price base amount of 44 500 SEK) Chapter 12, paragraphs 25-26 of the Social Security Code, SCC
	Conditions of entitlement	In order to be granted salary-related benefit for the first 180 days, the parent must have been insured for sickness benefit at a level exceeding 180 SEK per day for at least 240 days before the birth of the child. Being insured for sickness benefit presupposes having income in Sweden. In order to be granted the following days of salary-related benefit, the parent must be insured in the work-based insurance (having income from work in Sweden). There is thus no qualification time for these days (Chapter 12 paragraphs 35, 39 SCC).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Partially; 390 of 480 days are calculated with respect to salary (for those with no salary, flat-rate guaranteed benefit is granted for these days, amounting to 225 SEK per day). 90 days of flat-rate basic benefit, amounting to 180 SEK per day, are granted to all residents (Chapter 12 paragraphs 18-24 SCC).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	The total number of days with parental benefit is 480, but the number of days with salary-related benefit is 390. 96 days may be taken out after the child is 4 years old and may be taken out until the child is 12 years old (Chapter 12 paragraphs 12,13 and 19 SCC).
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	The parent taking care of the child can claim benefit. Days may be transferred between parents, except for 60 days (so called fathers months) (Chapter 12 paragraphs 15, 17 SCC).
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	Yes, the benefit may be taken out in parts: 1/8, ¼, ½ and ¾. It is thus common to reduce working hours and claim parental benefit part time (Chapter 12 paragraph 9 SCC)
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	According to the Act on parental leave (1995:584) a person has a right to parental leave when taking out parental benefits, full-time or in parts (paragraphs 5-6). The right to leave during the first 18 months is however irrespective of taking out parental benefit. Also, a parent always has a right to reduce working hours up to ¼ for a child under eights years old (paragraphs 5 and 7).
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	No issues.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	The parents may take out benefit for one child each. Also, 30 days of benefit may be taken out by the parents at the same time for the same child during the child´s first year (Chapter 12 paragraph 4a SCC).
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	According to national law, the right to salary-related benefit is strictly connected to the parent him/herself fulfilling the conditions. ¨ As parental benefit is classified as a maternity/paternity benefit as of September 1, 2011, the view is that it is only when the family members are not entitled to any equivalent benefits in the other Member State that they may receive parental benefit from Sweden (article 67 of R 883/2004 is not applicable), see Social Insurance Board Legal guidance 2011:01 . http://www.forsakringskassan.se/wps/wcm/connect/21778b4b-d5ae-49c8-82b2-b45682eef263/rattsligt_stallningstagande_2011_01.pdf?MOD=AJPERES

Switzerland

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	There have been some tries to introduce benefits for child-raising benefits in Switzerland. The most recent was a proposal, which was made by a member of the Federal parliament (see 11.3492 - Postulat “Congé parental et prévoyance familiale facultatifs” introduced by Anita Fetz); this proposal had no success. The Federal legislation only includes maternity leave benefits for women during 14 weeks (introduced on July 1st 2005); men cannot claim maternity leave benefits (Federal court ATF 140 I 305). In certain enterprises and public administrations (federal and community level) parents are allowed to take an unremunerated paternity leave (Report of the Government from October 2013 as a response to the above mentioned proposal 11.3492, p. 12: “Congé de paternity et conge parental - état des lieux et presentation de divers modèles”).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	XXX
	Conditions of entitlement	XXX
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	XXX
	Maximum duration of the benefit	XXX
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	XXX
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	XXX
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	XXX
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	XXX
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	XXX
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	XXX

United Kingdom

	Reply
History of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) was introduced in 1987. The principal statutory provisions for Statutory Maternity Pay are contained in: The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (as amended). Part XII of the Act covers SMP The Statutory Maternity Pay (General) Regulations 1986 (SI 1986 No 1960) The Statutory Maternity Pay (Compensation of Employers) and Miscellaneous Amendment Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No 1882) The Statutory Maternity Pay and Statutory Adoption Pay (Curtailment) Regulations 2014 Employees may have a right to 1 or 2 weeks paternity leave and Statutory Paternity Pay. Prior to 5 April 2015 employees were eligible for Statutory Additional Paternity Leave and Additional Statutory Paternity Pay if their partner returned to work before the end of their maternity (or adoption) leave or pay period. On 1 December 2014, the government introduced Shared Parental Leave (SPL) and Shared Parental Pay (ShPP) and abolished Statutory Additional Paternity Pay. This change applies to mothers whose babies are due on or after 5 April 2015 (see below).
Description of the salary-related child-raising benefit	Level of the benefit	Statutory Maternity Pay is paid at 90% of a person’s average weekly earnings (before tax) for the first 6 weeks £139.58 or 90% of average weekly earnings (whichever is lower) for the next 33 weeks SMP is paid in the same way as wages (e.g. monthly or weekly). Tax and National Insurance are deducted. Statutory Paternity Pay is paid at either £139.58 a week or 90% of their average weekly earnings (whichever is lower). Tax and National Insurance are deducted.
	Conditions of entitlement	To be eligible for Statutory Maternity Pay it is necessary to satisfy two conditions: The Continuous Employment Rule and the Earnings Rule. To satisfy the continuous employment rule a person must have been employed by their employer for a continuous period of at least 26 weeks into the qualifying week (which is the 15th week before the week in which the baby is due). This period must include at least one day in the qualifying week. Although continuous employment usually means employment by the same employer without a break, there are some circumstances when breaks in employment can be disregarded. The employment rule may be modified slightly if the baby is born prematurely. To satisfy the earnings rule a person’s average weekly earnings must be at least equal to the lower earnings limit for National Insurance (NI) purposes (£112 a week for 2015/16 before tax). Further qualifying conditions for Statutory Maternity Leave are that the woman must: be an employee not a ‘worker’ give her employer at least 28 days notice and proof of pregnancy.  If employed by an agency, in each of the 26 weeks into the qualifying week, a person will satisfy the continuous employment rule as long as they did some work during any week which counts as a full week. Whether continuity of employment is deemed to be broken if weeks are not worked when working for an agency depends in general on whether the agency was able to offer work that week. If a person changes jobs during pregnancy they are unlikely to be able to meet the SMP continuous employment rule although there are exceptions.  A person who has a visa that allows them to live and work in the United Kingdom but includes the condition that they have “no recourse to public funds” may still get SMP if they satisfy the qualifying conditions as SMP is not defined as public funds. To be eligible for Statutory Paternity Pay an employee must be either the baby’s biological father or the partner of the mother, and take responsibility for the child’s upbringing. SPP is only payable while the employee is on paternity leave. The conditions of entitlement to Statutory Paternity Pay require that a father must: - have worked for their employer continuously for at least 26 weeks by the end of the 15th week before the expected week of childbirth - be employed by their employer up to the date of birth - have average weekly earnings that are at least equal to the lower earnings limit for National Insurance (NI) purposes (£112 a week for 2015/16 before tax).
	Exclusively or partially calculated with respect to salary	Statutory Maternity Pay is paid at 90% of average weekly earnings (before tax) for the first 6 weeks and £139.58 or 90% of average weekly earnings (whichever is lower) for the next 33 weeks. Statutory Paternity Pay is paid at either £139.58 a week or 90% of their average weekly earnings (whichever is lower).
	Maximum duration of the benefit	Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) is paid for up to 39 weeks. Statutory Paternity Pay is payable fora maximum of 2 weeks but see below for Additional Statutory Paternity Pay (now abolished) and Shared Parental Pay (ShPP) effective since 5 April 2015.
	Who can claim the benefit (one or both parents?) and for how long in case of split entitlement between the parents?	On 1 December 2014, the government abolished Additional Statutory Paternity Pay and introduced Shared Parental Leave (SPL) and Shared Parental Pay (ShPP). This change applies to mothers whose babies are due on or after 5 April 2015. Mothers can convert a portion of their Statutory Maternity Leave and Statutory Maternity Pay into ShPP to share with the other qualifying parent. Similar changes have been introduced with reference to adoption. Each parent qualifies separately for Shared Parental Leave (SPL) and Statutory Shared Parental Pay (ShPP). A person can get ShPP if they’re an employee and one of the following applies. They are: eligible for Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) (or Statutory Adoption Pay (SAP)) eligible for Statutory Paternity Pay (SPP) and their partner is eligible for SMP, Maternity Allowance (MA) or SAP A person can also get ShPP if they’re a worker and they’re eligible for SMP or SPP. A couple who choose to take Shared Parental Leave receive Statutory Shared Parental Pay (ShPP). ShPP is £139.58 a week or 90% of average weekly earnings, whichever is lower.
	Can the benefit be claimed in case of partial reduction of income pursuant to part-time/flexible working?	A person may work under their contract of service for the employer paying their Statutory Maternity Pay for up to 10 days during their Maternity Pay Period without losing any SMP. These days are known as Keep In Touch (KIT) days. Any work done as a KIT day, however brief, will count as a whole day for KIT purposes. Once the 10 KIT days have been used any further work undertaken will incur a loss of a week’s SMP for the week in the Maternity Pay Period in which that work has been undertaken.
	Is the benefit intended to complement the exercise of parental leave rights (within the meaning of the Parental Leave Directive)?	Maternity leave and pay are two separate entitlements.
	Are employers who have to pay the salary during statutory periods of parental leave entitled to either "off-set" or claim reimbursement from the social security institution for salary paid to the employee during parental leave?	Employers can reclaim 92 per cent of the Statutory Maternity Pay they pay to an employee. This is usually through deduction from payments of tax and National Insurance contributions to HMRevenue and Customs (the tax authority). Small employers who qualify for Small Employers’ Relief can recover 103 per cent which includes compensation for employer’s National Insurance contributions paid on the Statutory Maternity Pay.
	Is it possible that both parents claim salary-related child-raising benefits and if so, how are such rights divided between parents; can these be exercised simultaneously?	Each parent qualifies separately for Shared Parental Leave (SPL) and Statutory Shared Parental Pay (ShPP). If the mother gives notice to reduce her entitlement before she has received it for the full 39 weeks then any remaining weeks could become available as ShPP. To be qualify for ShPP the mother must be eligible for Statutory Maternity Pay, Maternity Allowance or Statutory Adoption Pay and the partner must be eligible for Statutory Paternity Pay. If both parents qualify for ShPP they can decide who will receive it, or how it will be divided. SPL and ShPP can be taken in three separate blocks and the arrangements can be changed for each block of leave/pay.
Can a parent receive a salary-related child-raising benefit regardless of which parent factually fulfils the conditions of entitlement under national law and if so how?	Each parent qualifies separately for Shared Parental Leave (SPL) and Statutory Shared Parental Pay (ShPP). If the mother gives notice to reduce her entitlement before she has received it for the full 39 weeks then any remaining weeks could become available as ShPP. To be qualify for ShPP the mother must be eligible for Statutory Maternity Pay, Maternity Allowance or Statutory Adoption Pay and the partner must be eligible for Statutory Paternity Pay. If both parents qualify for ShPP they can decide who will receive it, or how it will be divided. SPL and ShPP can be taken in three separate blocks and the arrangements can be changed for each block of leave/pay.

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[Catalogue number]

ANNEX XXVI - HIVA UPDATE OF 2013 ANALYSIS: Long-Term care and Unemployment Benefits

Annex XXVI

Update of the analytical studies for an impact assessment for revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009

Coordination of LTC benefits and unemployment benefits

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Directorate B - Employment and Social Legislation, Social Dialogue

Unit B.4 — Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes

Contact: Andrea Pontiroli

E-mail: andrea.pontiroli@ec.europa.eu

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

Update of the analytical studies for an impact assessment for revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009

Coordination of LTC benefits and unemployment benefits

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Introduction

The "Revision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2010" forms part of the Labour Mobility Package, included in the Commission's 2015 Work Programme.

Already in 2013 and 2014 an impact assessment and a draft proposal for legislation was prepared. The proposal was drafted in response to the 2011 Council’s call for a revision of the rules on unemployment benefits in order to strengthen the link between contributions and benefits, and in view of the need to respond to the introduction of a new type of “long-term care benefit” at national level in view of population change. The adoption of the proposal was originally scheduled for spring 2014. However, in view of the European Parliament elections and the need for a political level playing field, the initiative was put ‘on hold’ and action to follow it up was left to the new Commission. In its Work Programme for 2015, the Commission announced to adopt a 'Labour Mobility Package', of which the revision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 forms part. In this revision, the elements that were under consideration in 2014 will be combined with new policy initiatives.

As the studies were delivered in 2013, the figures used therein may call for an update in the light of newly available data. The purpose of the assignment is to provide the European Commission with updated data and statistics for the impact assessment report for the Revision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2010, in the fields of long-term care benefits, coordination of unemployment benefits for frontier workers and export of unemployment benefits, which can be directly integrated in the analytical part of the Impact Assessment Report.

The original Impact Assessment Report was based on three studies, which provided among others socio-economic data and indicators to evaluate the mobility trends of the insured persons and their family members, as well as the related (administrative) costs for the Members States’ social security schemes:

Doherty R., Vandresse B., Bulté S., Bardaji Horno M., Ulrich M., Pacolet J., De Wispelaere F. 2013. Study for an impact assessment for revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009. DG EMPL (see also Annex V)

Pacolet J., De Wispelaere F. 2013. Additional analysis for the partial revision of the provision on the coordination of social security systems in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. DG EMPL (see also Annex IX)

Pacolet J., De Wispelaere F. 2013. Analysis of the characteristics and the duration of employed activity by cross-border and frontier workers for the purposes of coordinating unemployment benefits. DG EMPL (see also Annex X)

The original calculation of the different options was not based on available administrative information but based on the composition of different variables (number of cross-border workers, unemployment rates, average annual unemployment benefit, number of pensioners living abroad, number of dependents receiving LTC benefits in kind and/or in cash, LTC spending per user in kind and/or in cash, etc.) coming from different data sources such as the Labour Force Survey, Eurostat, Eurostat Migration and migration population statistics, the 2012 Ageing Report and a limited ad hoc survey with 11 Member States. Most of the data applied to 2010 or 2011. In this report, we make an update of the different options by using data for 2013 or even 2014. In the meantime, also administrative information became available on the export of unemployment benefits (PD U2 Questionnaire) and a new Ageing Report (2015) has been published.

This report provides an overview of the updated tables by referring to the original numbering of the tables. The footnotes of these updated tables refer to the Annexes where these original tables are published. Moreover, the original tables are published in the Annexes of this report.

Unemployment benefits

Based on Labour force Survey (LFS) data, an estimation of the number of cross-border workers has been made. In the further analysis we considered all workers who worked in another country than the country of residence as cross-border workers. Workers who worked in a neighbouring country are considered as frontier workers. This is different from the legal definition. National unemployment rates were applied to the number of cross-border workers in order to estimate the number of unemployed cross-border workers. The unemployment rates of the country of employment and not of the country of residence have been applied on the number of cross-border workers. In order to estimate the budgetary impact of the baseline scenario, the estimated number of unemployed cross-border workers are multiplied by the annual unemployment benefit per unemployed by taking into account the annual average duration of the payment of the unemployment benefit.

Table 2.2a UB: Main parameters for estimating the baseline scenario and the different options, 2013/2014

	Number of incoming cross-border workers (in ,000)	of which: incoming frontier workers (in ,000)	% share	Impact on national employment	Number of outgoing cross-border workers (in ,000)	of which: outgoing frontier workers (in ,000)	% share
BE	72	55	76.6%	1.6%	98	94	96.1%
BG	2	0	0.0%	0.0%	22	4	16.1%
CZ	52	50	97.2%	1.0%	33	27	82.7%
DK	36	28	77.4%	1.3%	6	4	63.6%
DE	273	171	62.7%	0.7%	159	139	87.2%
EE	2	1	66.7%	0.3%	19	16	83.7%
IE	17	6	36.4%	0.9%	6	5	94.0%
EL	7	4	46.8%	0.2%	0	0
ES	37	12	33.0%	0.2%	45	12	27.7%
FR	64	38	59.4%	0.2%	172	163	94.8%
HR	0	0		0.0%	23	5	21.1%
IT	77	7	8.7%	0.3%	32	8	25.2%
CY	3	0	0.0%	0.8%	0	0
LV	0	0	41.5%	0.1%	9	1	13.8%
LT	1	0	32.6%	0.1%	2	0	3.9%
LU	159	157	98.7%	41.2%	4	3	77.9%
HU	8	6	80.6%	0.2%	93	47	50.3%
MT	1	0	0.0%	0.8%	1	0	0.0%
NL	103	75	72.6%	1.2%	35	30	85.2%
AT	150	136	90.7%	3.5%	33	29	90.1%
PL	7	5	69.2%	0.0%	117	72	61.4%
PT	6	4	59.4%	0.1%	25	8	29.5%
RO	3	1	17.8%	0.0%	86	0	0.0%
SI	8	7	93.8%	0.8%	15	13	85.2%
SK	6	5	86.1%	0.3%	129	85	66.0%
FI	18	16	90.5%	0.7%	2	1	68.2%
SE	15	3	20.9%	0.3%	26	20	79.2%
UK	85	5	6.4%	0.3%	21	6	29.6%
Total	1,213	793	65.4%	0.5%	1,213	793	65.4%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and Eurostat [nama_aux_pem]. For the original Table 2.2 see Annex IX

Table 2.2b UB: Main parameters for estimating the baseline scenario and the different options, 2013/2014

	Incoming cross-border workers longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	% of total incoming cross-border workers	Incoming cross-border workers no longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	% of total incoming cross-border workers	Outgoing cross-border workers longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	% of total outgoing cross-border workers	Outgoing cross-border workers no longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	% of total outgoing cross-border workers
BE	60.0	83%	12.3	17.0%	85.9	88%	12.2	12%
BG	1.1	67%	0.5	33.4%	10.4	47%	11.7	53%
CZ	45.9	89%	5.8	11.1%	25.4	77%	7.4	23%
DK	29.0	80%	7.0	19.5%	4.3	77%	1.3	23%
DE	195.0	71%	78.0	28.6%	136.0	85%	23.4	15%
EE	1.6	74%	0.6	26.0%	14.7	79%	3.9	21%
IE	12.3	71%	5.1	29.2%	4.9	86%	0.8	14%
EL	4.4	59%	3.1	41.1%	0.0		0.0
ES	22.9	61%	14.3	38.5%	22.6	51%	21.9	49%
FR	42.3	66%	22.1	34.3%	148.5	86%	23.7	14%
HR	0.0		0.0		17.9	76%	5.5	24%
IT	54.6	71%	22.8	29.4%	20.6	64%	11.7	36%
CY	2.3	78%	0.6	22.1%	0.0		0.0
LV	0.3	67%	0.2	33.4%	6.2	69%	2.8	31%
LT	1.1	84%	0.2	15.9%	0.7	31%	1.6	69%
LU	137.6	87%	21.3	13.4%	3.0	78%	0.9	22%
HU	6.5	86%	1.1	14.5%	67.3	72%	25.8	28%
MT	0.8	58%	0.6	42.4%	0.5	79%	0.1	21%
NL	86.0	84%	16.8	16.3%	30.2	85%	5.2	15%
AT	120.1	80%	29.5	19.7%	25.9	79%	6.7	21%
PL	5.8	83%	1.2	16.7%	83.1	71%	33.6	29%
PT	4.8	81%	1.1	19.3%	12.0	47%	13.5	53%
RO	2.8	81%	0.7	18.8%	47.0	55%	39.2	45%
SI	6.8	88%	0.9	11.5%	11.8	78%	3.2	22%
SK	5.1	85%	0.9	14.5%	110.2	85%	18.8	15%
FI	14.2	79%	3.8	21.2%	1.5	68%	0.7	32%
SE	10.9	75%	3.7	25.2%	19.9	77%	5.9	23%
UK	52.6	62%	32.3	38.1%	16.4	77%	5.0	23%
Total	926.8	76%	286.5	23.6%	926.8	76%	286.5	24%

Source Estimate based on data LFS. For the original Table 2.2 see Annex X

Table 2.2c UB: Main parameters for estimating the baseline scenario and the different options, 2013/2014

		Baseline scenario				Option 4
	Unemployment rate (20-64)	Estimated number incoming unemployed cross-border workers (in ,000)	Of which: Estimated number incoming unemployed frontier workers (in ,000)	Estimated number outgoing unemployed cross-border workers (in ,000)	Of which: Estimated number outgoing unemployed frontier workers (in ,000)	Estimated number unemployed incoming cross-border workers longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	Estimated number unemployed incoming cross-border worker no longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	Estimated number unemployed outgoing cross-border workers longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	Estimated number unemployed outgoing cross-border worker no longer than 12 months employed (in ,000)	Annual average expenditure per unemployed person (in €)
BE	8.3	6.0	4.6	6.7	6.1	5.0	1.0	5.7	0.9	15,113
BG	12.7	0.2	0.0	2.6	1.0	0.1	0.1	1.2	1.4	442
CZ	6.8	3.5	3.4	2.2	1.6	3.1	0.4	1.7	0.5	929
DK	6.5	2.3	1.8	0.4	0.2	1.9	0.5	0.3	0.1	12,310
DE	5.3	14.5	9.1	11.0	8.4	10.3	4.1	9.3	1.7	9,606
EE	8.6	0.2	0.1	1.4	1.2	0.1	0.0	1.1	0.3	540
IE	12.8	2.2	0.8	0.4	0.4	1.6	0.6	0.3	0.1	11,999
EL	27.7	2.1	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.9	0.0	0.0	1,071
ES	25.9	9.6	3.2	3.9	1.4	5.9	3.7	2.1	1.7	4,155
FR	9.6	6.2	3.7	11.9	11.2	4.1	2.1	10.2	1.7	10,889
HR	14.5	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.4	607
IT	12	9.3	0.8	3.1	0.7	6.6	2.7	2.0	1.0	3,618
CY	16.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	2,394
LV	11.9	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	378
LT	11.9	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	345
LU	5.7	9.1	8.9	0.3	0.2	7.8	1.2	0.2	0.1	21,189
HU	10	0.8	0.6	5.4	2.4	0.7	0.1	3.8	1.5	439
MT	5.8	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2,115
NL	6.2	6.4	4.6	2.5	2.0	5.3	1.0	2.1	0.4	21,712
AT	4.7	7.0	6.4	2.2	1.9	5.6	1.4	1.7	0.4	12,151
PL	10.3	0.7	0.5	7.2	3.9	0.6	0.1	5.1	2.1	366
PT	16.5	1.0	0.6	3.5	1.9	0.8	0.2	1.8	1.7	2,969
RO	7.1	0.2	0.0	10.6	0.0	0.2	0.0	6.0	4.5	291
SI	10.2	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.1	0.8	0.2	2,214
SK	13.9	0.8	0.7	8.7	5.2	0.7	0.1	7.4	1.2	465
FI	7.5	1.3	1.2	0.2	0.1	1.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	15,408
SE	7.1	1.0	0.2	1.9	1.3	0.8	0.3	1.4	0.5	4,227
UK	6.7	5.7	0.4	2.3	0.8	3.5	2.2	1.7	0.6	2,623
Total	10.6	91.7	53.5	91.7	53.5	68.3	23.4	68.3	23.4

Source Estimate based on data LFS, 2015 Ageing Report and ESSPROS. For the original Table 2.2 see Annexes IX and X

Table 2.3 UB: Estimated reimbursement claims and impact of maximum reimbursement country of last activity (baseline scenario), 2013/2014

	Member State of residence			Member State of last activity
MS	Reimbursement claimed by the Member State of residence	Reimbursement received by the Member State of residence	% difference	Claimed from the Member State of last activity	Reimbursement paid by the Member State of last activity	% difference
BE	25,134	21,296	-15%	15,718	13,708	-13%
BG	109	109	0%	433	20	-95%
CZ	376	331	-12%	841	409	-51%
DK	1,133	459	-60%	2,787	2,738	-2%
DE	25,971	20,959	-19%	16,983	11,989	-29%
EE	160	159	-1%	184	16	-91%
IE	1,160	281	-76%	564	549	-3%
EL	0	0		1,295	265	-80%
ES	3,081	2,271	-26%	8,648	4,083	-53%
FR	32,066	27,667	-14%	9,886	7,697	-22%
HR	78	78	-1%	0	0
IT	1,472	1,047	-29%	3,446	1,344	-61%
CY	0	0		229	87	-62%
LV	11	11	-2%	43	5	-88%
LT	1	1	0%	147	14	-91%
LU	1,588	755	-52%	25,853	25,851	0%
HU	261	259	-1%	507	83	-84%
MT	1	0	-79%	112	26	-77%
NL	13,650	7,212	-47%	14,007	14,007	0%
AT	6,277	3,406	-46%	4,824	4,779	-1%
PL	360	359	0%	1,407	66	-95%
PT	1,568	1,526	-3%	956	552	-42%
RO	0	0		347	18	-95%
SI	456	454	0%	450	190	-58%
SK	602	597	-1%	1,009	95	-91%
FI	643	146	-77%	318	303	-5%
SE	1,585	1,486	-6%	1,174	405	-66%
UK	644	589	-9%	6,218	2,161	-65%
EU-28	118,387	91,459	-23%	118,387	91,459	-23%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.3 see Annex IX

Table 2.4 UB: Estimated budgetary impact baseline scenario and options, in € ,000, 2013/2014

	Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)					Option 2: Right of choice: cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest amount)					Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity					Option 4: 'cut-off' of 12 months
	Annual expenditure UB based on average duration payment UB (in €. 000)	Actual claims paid to country of residence (3 months) (in € .000)	Actual claims received from country of last activity (3 months) (in € .000)	Total expenditure (in € .000)	%	Annual expenditure UB based on average duration payment UB (in €. 000)	Actual claims paid to country of residence (3 months) (in € .000)	Actual claims received from country of last activity (3 months) (in € .000)	Total expenditure (in € .000)	%	Annual expenditure UB based on average duration payment UB (in €. 000)	Actual claims paid to country of residence (3 months) (in € .000)	Actual claims received from country of last activity (3 months) (in € .000)	Total expenditure (in € .000)	%	Annual expenditure UB based on average duration payment UB (in €. 000)	%
BE	75,066	13,708	21,296	67,478	100%	68,131	4,626	5,721	67,036	99%	55,963	0	0	55,963	83%	55,044	82%
BG	325	20	109	236	100%	14	20	2	33	14%	66	0	0	66	28%	480	203%
CZ	995	409	331	1,073	100%	2,175	42	41	2,177	203%	2,066	0	0	2,066	193%	2,102	196%
DK	5,063	2,738	459	7,342	100%	15,655	99	459	15,295	208%	13,691	0	0	13,691	186%	11,709	159%
DE	94,722	11,989	20,959	85,752	100%	90,363	8,402	5,777	92,988	108%	84,556	0	0	84,556	99%	70,428	82%
EE	452	16	159	309	100%	57	8	3	62	20%	68	0	0	68	22%	159	51%
IE	16,301	549	281	16,569	100%	23,643	20	281	23,382	141%	20,183	0	0	20,183	122%	14,818	89%
EL	413	265	0	678	100%	1,192	158	0	1,350	199%	1,666	0	0	1,666	246%	981	145%
ES	21,337	4,083	2,271	23,148	100%	24,233	2,637	1,392	25,478	110%	25,337	0	0	25,337	109%	20,162	87%
FR	89,790	7,697	27,667	69,820	100%	54,109	4,688	6,664	52,133	75%	39,234	0	0	39,234	56%	36,868	53%
HR	246	0	78	168	100%	5	0	1	4	3%	0	0	0	0	0%	182	108%
IT	23,541	1,344	1,047	23,838	100%	22,779	1,157	469	23,467	98%	23,516	0	0	23,516	99%	19,221	81%
CY	426	87	0	513	100%	426	87	0	513	100%	615	0	0	615	120%	479	93%
LV	29	5	11	24	100%	10	4	2	11	48%	14	0	0	14	58%	66	276%
LT	3	14	1	15	100%	6	12	0	18	115%	38	0	0	38	245%	59	382%
LU	4,405	25,851	755	29,501	100%	102,313	74	755	101,632	345%	99,183	0	0	99,183	336%	86,596	294%
HU	696	83	259	520	100%	16	83	4	95	18%	223	0	0	223	43%	640	123%
MT	49	26	0	75	100%	49	26	0	75	100%	114	0	0	114	153%	79	106%
NL	48,550	14,007	7,212	55,344	100%	101,360	0	7,212	94,148	170%	72,694	0	0	72,694	131%	65,275	118%
AT	14,679	4,779	3,406	16,051	100%	33,822	3,949	338	37,432	233%	38,448	0	0	38,448	240%	33,257	207%
PL	887	66	359	594	100%	0	66	0	66	11%	163	0	0	163	27%	606	102%
PT	4,709	552	1,526	3,735	100%	807	552	81	1,278	34%	1,966	0	0	1,966	53%	4,968	133%
RO	0	18	0	18	100%	0	18	0	18	100%	44	0	0	44	247%	849	4728%
SI	1,238	190	454	975	100%	891	107	8	990	102%	1,147	0	0	1,147	118%	1,276	131%
SK	1,965	95	597	1,463	100%	297	74	64	307	21%	315	0	0	315	22%	730	50%
FI	1,598	303	146	1,755	100%	8,806	81	146	8,741	498%	7,963	0	0	7,963	454%	6,633	378%
SE	3,640	405	1,486	2,559	100%	1,383	405	75	1,713	67%	1,755	0	0	1,755	69%	2,100	82%
UK	4,868	2,161	589	6,440	100%	3,704	2,161	60	5,805	90%	8,206	0	0	8,206	127%	5,919	92%
EU-28	415,995	91,459	91,459	415,995	100%	556,247	29,554	29,554	556,247	134%	499,233	0	0	499,233	120%	441,686	106%

Source Estimate based on data LFS, 2015 Ageing Report and ESSPROS. For the original Table 2.4 see Annex X

Table 2.5 UB: Comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared to other options, 2013/2014

	Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario)	Option 2: Right of choice	Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity	Option 4: 'cut-off' of 12 months
BE	100%	99%	83%	82%
BG	100%	14%	28%	203%
CZ	100%	203%	193%	196%
DK	100%	208%	186%	159%
DE	100%	108%	99%	82%
EE	100%	20%	22%	51%
IE	100%	141%	122%	89%
EL	100%	199%	246%	145%
ES	100%	110%	109%	87%
FR	100%	75%	56%	53%
HR	100%	3%	0%	108%
IT	100%	98%	99%	81%
CY	100%	100%	120%	93%
LV	100%	48%	58%	276%
LT	100%	115%	245%	382%
LU	100%	345%	336%	294%
HU	100%	18%	43%	123%
MT	100%	100%	153%	106%
NL	100%	170%	131%	118%
AT	100%	233%	240%	207%
PL	100%	11%	27%	102%
PT	100%	34%	53%	133%
RO	100%	100%	247%	4728%
SI	100%	102%	118%	131%
SK	100%	21%	22%	50%
FI	100%	498%	454%	378%
SE	100%	67%	69%	82%
UK	100%	90%	127%	92%
EU-28	100%	134%	120%	106%

Source Estimate based on data LFS. For the original Table 2.5 see Annex X

Table 2.6 UB: Comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact, 2013/2014

	Lowest budgetary impact				Highest budgetary impact
	Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario)	Option 2: Right of choice	Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity	Option 4: 'cut-off' of 12 months	Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario)	Option 2: Right of choice	Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity	Option 4: 'cut-off' of 12 months
BE				X	X				BE
BG		X						X	BG
CZ	X					X			CZ
DK	X					X			DK
DE				X		X			DE
EE		X			X				EE
IE				X		X			IE
EL	X						X		EL
ES				X		X			ES
FR				X	X				FR
HR			X					X	HR
IT				X	X				IT
CY				X			X		CY
LV		X						X	LV
LT	X							X	LT
LU	X					X			LU
HU		X						X	HU
MT	X						X		MT
NL	X					X			NL
AT	X						X		AT
PL		X						X	PL
PT		X						X	PT
RO	X							X	RO
SI	X							X	SI
SK					X				SK
FI	X					X			FI
SE		X			X				SE
UK		X					X		UK
Total	11	9	1	7	6	8	5	9	Total

Source Estimate based on data LFS. For the original Table 2.6 see Annex X

Tables 2.7 and2.8 UB: Estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence and impact of reimbursement, baseline scenario and option 4, 2013/2014

	Baseline scenario							Option 4
	Expenditure			Cost without reimbursement		Cost with reimbursement		Expenditure		Share of cost
MS of last activity	Estimated expenditure by the Member State of residence (in ,000)	Estimated expenditure by the Member State of last activity (in ,000)	Reimbursement by the Member State of last activity (in ,000)	Share of cost country of residence	Share of cost country of last activity	Share of cost country of residence	Share of cost country of last activity	Estimated expenditure by the Member State of residence (in ,000)	Estimated expenditure by the Member State of last activity (in ,000)	Share of cost country of residence	Share of cost country of last activity
BE	61,998	13,068	13,708	83%	17%	70%	30%	5,141	46,436	10%	90%
BG	317	7	20	98%	2%	92%	8%	193	44	81%	19%
CZ	952	43	409	96%	4%	68%	32%	365	1,836	17%	83%
DK	2,152	2,911	2,738	43%	57%	28%	72%	1,004	11,016	8%	92%
DE	63,195	31,527	11,989	67%	33%	59%	41%	6,482	60,393	10%	90%
EE	439	13	16	97%	3%	94%	6%	132	50	73%	27%
IE	3,520	12,782	549	22%	78%	21%	79%	1,423	14,296	9%	91%
EL	0	413	265	0%	100%	0%	100%	1,038	981	51%	49%
ES	7,805	13,532	4,083	37%	63%	31%	69%	7,218	15,581	32%	68%
FR	74,820	14,970	7,697	83%	17%	77%	23%	6,405	25,778	20%	80%
HR	246	0	0	100%	0%	100%	0%	0	0
IT	4,120	19,420	1,344	18%	82%	17%	83%	2,647	16,596	14%	86%
CY	0	426	87	0%	100%	0%	100%	228	479	32%	68%
LV	29	0	5	100%	0%	85%	15%	12	9	56%	44%
LT	3	0	14	100%	0%	15%	85%	9	32	22%	78%
LU	3,282	1,122	25,851	75%	25%	11%	89%	8,147	85,868	9%	91%
HU	696	0	83	100%	0%	89%	11%	208	190	52%	48%
MT	2	47	26	4%	96%	3%	97%	46	66	41%	59%
NL	28,665	19,884	14,007	59%	41%	46%	54%	4,112	60,811	6%	94%
AT	11,298	3,380	4,779	77%	23%	58%	42%	2,257	30,855	7%	93%
PL	887	0	66	100%	0%	93%	7%	554	136	80%	20%
PT	4,234	475	552	90%	10%	80%	20%	417	1,586	21%	79%
RO	0	0	18			0%	100%	168	36	82%	18%
SI	1,200	38	190	97%	3%	84%	16%	154	1,014	13%	87%
SK	1,965	0	95	100%	0%	95%	5%	266	269	50%	50%
FI	986	612	303	62%	38%	52%	48%	287	6,272	4%	96%
SE	2,535	1,105	405	70%	30%	63%	37%	513	1,313	28%	72%
UK	1,417	3,452	2,161	29%	71%	20%	80%	5,236	5,082	51%	49%
EU-28	276,766	139,228	91,459	67%	33%	55%	45%	54,661	387,025	12%	88%

Source Estimate based on data LFS. For the original Tables 2.7 and 2.8 see Annex X

Table 2.9 UB: Estimated administrative burden, 2013/2014

Source Estimate based on data LFS. For the original Table 2.9 see Annex X

Table 8 and 9 Estimated number of PD U1 received and yearly estimated amount paid to these unemployed persons with a PD U1 (broad definition), in €, 2013/2014

	Migrant workers	Cross-border workers	Total	Average annual expenditure (in €)
BE	2,196	6,653	8,849	82,463,845
BG	4,118	991	5,109	1,636,643
CZ		1,619	1,619	952,291
DK	54	368	422	2,467,995
DE		10,815	10,815	63,195,240
EE	174	1,189	1,363	502,720
IE		387	387	3,519,655
EL		0	0	0
ES	2,471	2,966	5,437	14,307,601
FR	8,338	11,779	20,117	127,782,285
HR	16	517	533	253,134
IT		1,627	1,627	4,120,460
CY	3	0	3	3,890
LV	19	114	133	34,291
LT	225	11	236	55,593
LU	48	300	348	3,807,976
HU	1,149	2,378	3,527	1,032,910
MT	8	1	9	12,921
NL	160	2,515	2,675	30,489,302
AT		2,066	2,066	11,298,103
PL	1,517	3,934	5,451	1,229,128
PT		2,113	2,113	4,234,284
RO	12	0	12	2,157
SI		823	823	1,199,841
SK	1,160	5,174	6,334	2,406,075
FI	135	167	302	1,783,734
SE	457	1,500	1,957	3,308,207
UK	30	982	1,012	1,460,064
Total	22,290	60,986	83,276	363,560,345

Source Estimate based on PD U1 Questionnaire, LFS, the 2015 Ageing Report and ESSPROS. For the original Tables 8 and 9 see Annex V

Table 15 Estimated administrative cost – PD U2 (issued), 2013

MS	Number of PD U2 issued	Administrative cost
BE	1,431	6,440
BG	80	360
CZ	354	1,593
DK	1,240	5,580
DE	3,200	14,400
EE	82	369
IE	1,072	4,824
EL
ES	6,257	28,157
FR	3,019	13,586
HR	54	243
IT	974	4,383
CY	312	1,404
LV	408	1,836
LT	146	657
LU	186	837
HU	54	243
MT	12	54
NL	1,904	8,568
AT	1,738	7,821
PL	280	1,260
PT	3,501	15,755
RO	6	27
SI	65	293
SK	84	378
FI	212	954
SE	336	1,512
UK	284	1,278
EU28	27,291	122,810

Source Estimate based on PD U2 Questionnaire and data provided during the workshops on the administrative burden. For the original Table 15 see Annex V

Long-term care benefits

The fact there is no specific coordination regime and a common definition, made it difficult to collect data on LTC. Member States did not explicit collect data on LTC and had no common understanding of LTC benefits. Administrative data on LTC are only available in specific forms dealing with the coordination rules of the sickness chapter. The number of those insured for health care living in another country than the competent country – which sometimes includes long-term care or to which LTC-insurance is closely linked – can be calculated based on the number of PD S1. However, no data are currently collected on the number of PD S1 within the framework of the Administrative Commission. The number of PD S1 was estimated by the sum of 3 categories:

• Cross-border workers (and their family members);

• Retired former cross-border workers (and their family members);

• Other mobile pensioners (and their family members).

Firstly, by way of using the LFS, the number of cross-border workers were estimated. Secondly, we assumed in the calculation model that 20% of the cross-border workers will have an insured family member. Thirdly, to estimate the total number of retired former cross-border workers, we applied the percentage of cross-border workers on the labour market to the number of pensioners in 2013 and this by individual (former) working Member State and assumed that 1 in 5 retired cross-border workers always had worked in the same Member State of employment. Fourthly, an estimation of the number of migrant pensioners was calculated by using the LFS. Finally, we assumed in the calculation model that 25% of the pensioners will have also an insured family member. The sum of all these categories results in an estimate of the number of PD S1. As next step we have estimated the cross-border expenditure on long-term care in kind and in cash based on figures from the 2015 Ageing Report. Here we have applied the average LTC benefits in cash and in kind per dependent user. It is as mobile citizens (workers, pensioners, their family members) are using this system of LTC as if they were nationals. This involves a ‘potential’ overestimation of the number of users of cross-border LTC benefits and the related expenditure due to fact some Member States consider their LTC benefit as not exportable. At the same time these estimates assume a complete ‘take-up’ of rights by mobile citizens which will not be the case in the baseline scenario.

Table 2.17 LTC: Estimated number of PD S1 issued and received, by category, in ,000, 2013/2014

	Competent Member State				Member State of residence
	Incoming cross-border workers + 20% family members	Retired cross-border workers only worked abroad + 25% family members	Migrant pensioners + 25% family members	Estimated number of PD S1 issued	Outgoing cross-border workers + 20% family members	Retired cross-border workers only worked abroad + 25% family members	Migrant pensioners + 25% family members	Estimated number of PD S1 received
BE	87	8	12	106	118	9	16	142
BG	2	0	3	5	26	3	0	29
CZ	62	5	1	68	39	3	1	43
DK	43	3	2	48	7	1	0	7
DE	328	29	31	388	191	15	28	234
EE	3	0	1	4	22	3	0	26
IE	21	1	5	27	7	1	7	15
EL	9	1	4	14	0	0	3	3
ES	45	4	3	52	53	5	75	133
FR	77	8	12	97	207	16	42	264
HR	0	0	2	2	28	3	0	31
IT	93	11	16	119	39	3	8	51
CY	3	0	0	4	0	0	7	7
LV	1	0	1	1	11	1	0	12
LT	2	0	1	3	3	0	0	3
LU	191	12	3	205	5	0	2	7
HU	9	1	1	11	112	10	2	124
MT	2	0	0	2	1	0	1	2
NL	123	9	17	149	42	4	1	47
AT	180	17	2	199	39	3	13	55
PL	8	1	8	17	140	12	1	153
PT	7	1	6	14	31	3	3	36
RO	4	0	11	15	103	11	0	114
SI	9	1	0	10	18	2	0	20
SK	7	0	2	10	155	13	0	168
FI	22	3	0	25	3	0	0	3
SE	18	2	3	22	31	2	4	37
UK	102	9	88	199	26	2	20	47
EU-28	1,456	127	235	1,817	1,456	127	235	1,817

* The assumptions made in order to estimate the number of ‘retired cross-border workers’ differs from the assumptions reported in Annexes V and IX. We assumed that 1 in 5 retired cross-border workers always had worked in the same Member State of employment while the original calculation assumes that all retired cross-border workers have worked in the same Member State of employment. This new assumption is based on administrative data from Luxembourg and avoids an overestimation of the number of retired cross-border workers with a PD S1. As a result, the number of retired cross-border workers taken into consideration is much lower compared to the original table (127 thousand compared to 503 thousand).

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.17 see Annex IX but also Table 21 Annex V

Table 25 % cross-border users LTC in kind or in cash and average amount per dependent person using LTC in kind or in cash (in ,000 €), 2013/2014

	% users in kind total population	Public expenditure per user - Services in kind (in €)	% users in cash total population	Public expenditure per user - Services in cash (in €)
BE	7.8%	9,614	0.0%
BG	1.7%	1,366	0.0%
CZ	4.2%	990	3.1%	2,256
DK	2.6%	40,267	2.3%	2,610
DE	1.3%	24,878	1.7%	8,759
EE	1.6%	1,951	1.1%	4,357
IE	2.0%	12,543	0.0%
EL	0.1%	5,010	2.6%	2,792
ES	2.1%	7,060	1.1%	6,679
FR	3.0%	19,371	0.7%	9,502
HR	0.8%	5,080	2.5%	190
IT	1.7%	14,575	3.0%	7,567
CY	0.7%	2,793	0.9%	3,716
LV	1.0%	6,164	0.5%	2,434
LT	4.3%	2,435	3.6%	1,604
LU	2.4%	47,342	0.3%	23,862
HU	1.6%	4,868	0.0%
MT	2.2%	7,410	0.8%	4,542
NL	5.5%	28,499	0.0%
AT	2.8%	7,184	5.4%	6,211
PL	0.5%	8,733	4.1%	884
PT	0.4%	21,314	2.6%	20
RO	2.0%	2,527	2.3%	27
SI	3.0%	5,506	2.3%	3,928
SK	2.0%	1,218	3.2%	232
FI	3.9%	20,163	5.7%	2,250
SE	3.1%	51,957	2.3%	2,556
UK	2.0%	16,398	2.4%	1,748
EU28	2.1%	20,167	2.0%	5,560

* Please notice that the user percentages have changed for some Member States based on the 2015 Ageing Report compared to the 2012 Ageing Report. For instance, on the basis of the 2012 Ageing Report none of the Member States had a user percentage of zero for LTC benefits in cash while on the basis of the 2015 Ageing Report Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Ireland and Hungary have apparently no LTC benefits in cash.

Source Estimate based on data LFS, 2015 Ageing Report and additional data provided by DG ECFIN. For the original Table 25 see Annex V

Table 2.18 LTC: Estimated number of users baseline scenario, in ,000, 2013/2014

	In kind		In cash		Total
	MS of residence	Competent MS	MS of residence	Competent MS	MS of residence	Competent MS
BE	11,065	3,109	854	0	11,918	3,109
BG	489	110	550	0	1,039	110
CZ	1,811	1,209	1,153	2,128	2,964	3,336
DK	252	1,126	196	1,104	448	2,231
DE	3,134	8,976	4,277	6,630	7,411	15,606
EE	415	62	1,293	41	1,709	103
IE	302	533	346	0	648	533
EL	3	260	41	372	45	632
ES	2,854	1,019	2,497	543	5,351	1,562
FR	7,811	3,019	2,397	631	10,208	3,650
HR	236	38	729	52	965	90
IT	883	2,499	822	3,616	1,704	6,116
CY	49	68	152	35	200	103
LV	117	35	225	6	342	41
LT	144	53	62	115	205	168
LU	177	7,395	99	715	276	8,109
HU	1,951	226	4,294	0	6,245	226
MT	40	40	42	14	82	54
NL	2,582	5,148	499	0	3,081	5,148
AT	1,563	3,575	1,043	10,753	2,605	14,328
PL	810	408	2,894	705	3,705	1,113
PT	128	338	401	362	528	700
RO	2,249	349	2,736	354	4,985	703
SI	590	124	869	232	1,459	356
SK	3,327	273	5,351	310	8,678	584
FI	108	437	60	1,429	168	1,866
SE	1,131	441	843	504	1,974	945
UK	932	4,282	620	4,694	1,552	8,976
EU-28	45,152	45,152	35,344	35,344	80,496	80,496

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.18 see Annex IX but also Table 26 Annex V

Table 27 Estimated number of cross-border users LTC benefits in kind or in cash, projections 2020 and 2030

	In kind			In cash			Total
	2013	2020	2030	2013	2020	2030	2013	2020	2030
BE	3,109	3,496	4,067	0	0	0	3,109	3,496	4,067
BG	110	123	141	0	0	0	110	123	141
CZ	1,209	1,332	1,581	2,128	2,425	2,965	3,336	3,758	4,546
DK	1,126	1,261	1,520	1,104	1,252	1,522	2,231	2,513	3,042
DE	8,976	9,962	11,526	6,630	7,422	8,079	15,606	17,384	19,605
EE	62	67	78	41	47	51	103	114	129
IE	533	592	673	0	0	0	533	592	673
EL	260	281	313	372	408	427	632	689	740
ES	1,019	1,114	1,247	543	635	713	1,562	1,749	1,960
FR	3,019	3,325	3,791	631	644	636	3,650	3,969	4,426
HR	38	43	50	52	54	56	90	97	105
IT	2,499	2,743	3,053	3,616	3,972	4,439	6,116	6,714	7,492
CY	68	75	84	35	40	49	103	115	133
LV	35	38	41	6	5	5	41	44	46
LT	53	60	68	115	120	120	168	180	188
LU	7,395	8,126	9,175	715	888	1,110	8,109	9,014	10,285
HU	226	249	293	0	0	0	226	249	293
MT	40	43	49	14	15	14	54	58	63
NL	5,148	5,632	6,401	0	0	0	5,148	5,632	6,401
AT	3,575	3,956	4,568	10,753	12,049	14,495	14,328	16,005	19,063
PL	408	454	521	705	772	873	1,113	1,227	1,394
PT	338	382	434	362	396	437	700	778	871
RO	349	386	441	354	379	403	703	764	844
SI	124	134	148	232	275	325	356	409	473
SK	273	302	352	310	339	386	584	642	738
FI	437	519	592	1,429	1,582	1,842	1,866	2,101	2,434
SE	441	494	575	504	566	684	945	1,059	1,259
UK	4,282	4,850	5,544	4,694	5,171	6,115	8,976	10,021	11,659
EU28	45,152	50,040	57,324	35,344	39,454	45,747	80,496	89,494	103,071

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 27 see Annex V

Table 27bis Estimated number of cross-border users LTC benefits in kind or in cash, projections 2020 and 2030, difference compared to 2013 (= 100%)

	In kind			In cash			Total
	2013	2020	2030	2013	2020	2030	2013	2020	2030
BE	100%	112%	131%				100%	112%	131%
BG	100%	112%	128%				100%	112%	128%
CZ	100%	110%	131%	100%	114%	139%	100%	113%	136%
DK	100%	112%	135%	100%	113%	138%	100%	113%	136%
DE	100%	111%	128%	100%	112%	122%	100%	111%	126%
EE	100%	109%	126%	100%	113%	124%	100%	111%	125%
IE	100%	111%	126%				100%	111%	126%
EL	100%	108%	120%	100%	110%	115%	100%	109%	117%
ES	100%	109%	122%	100%	117%	131%	100%	112%	126%
FR	100%	110%	126%	100%	102%	101%	100%	109%	121%
HR	100%	113%	130%	100%	104%	107%	100%	108%	117%
IT	100%	110%	122%	100%	110%	123%	100%	110%	123%
CY	100%	109%	123%	100%	114%	140%	100%	111%	129%
LV	100%	109%	118%	100%	96%	89%	100%	107%	114%
LT	100%	113%	128%	100%	105%	105%	100%	107%	112%
LU	100%	110%	124%	100%	124%	155%	100%	111%	127%
HU	100%	110%	130%				100%	110%	130%
MT	100%	109%	123%	100%	102%	97%	100%	107%	116%
NL	100%	109%	124%				100%	109%	124%
AT	100%	111%	128%	100%	112%	135%	100%	112%	133%
PL	100%	111%	128%	100%	110%	124%	100%	110%	125%
PT	100%	113%	128%	100%	110%	121%	100%	111%	124%
RO	100%	111%	126%	100%	107%	114%	100%	109%	120%
SI	100%	108%	119%	100%	118%	140%	100%	115%	133%
SK	100%	111%	129%	100%	109%	124%	100%	110%	126%
FI	100%	119%	135%	100%	111%	129%	100%	113%	130%
SE	100%	112%	130%	100%	112%	136%	100%	112%	133%
UK	100%	113%	129%	100%	110%	130%	100%	112%	130%
EU28	100%	111%	127%	100%	112%	129%	100%	111%	128%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 27 see Annex V

Table 28 LTC: Estimated budgetary impact of the baseline scenario, in €, 2013/2014

	In kind		In cash		Total
	MS of residence	Competent MS	MS of residence	Competent MS	MS of residence	Competent MS
BE	106,371,811	66,999,143	8,433,389	0	114,805,200	66,999,143
BG	668,371	1,575,563	2,988,226	0	3,656,597	1,575,563
CZ	1,792,708	3,297,837	7,091,467	4,800,168	8,884,175	8,098,005
DK	10,139,564	46,811,431	834,030	2,882,870	10,973,595	49,694,302
DE	77,966,014	108,653,903	24,915,711	58,067,092	102,881,724	166,720,995
EE	810,366	1,098,591	2,991,140	179,826	3,801,506	1,278,417
IE	3,784,243	6,831,891	650,687	0	4,434,930	6,831,891
EL	17,009	2,800,908	264,683	1,038,354	281,692	3,839,262
ES	20,151,419	12,499,967	8,237,475	3,625,619	28,388,893	16,125,586
FR	151,314,225	35,320,389	19,629,925	5,996,470	170,944,150	41,316,859
HR	1,197,549	561,766	4,699,969	9,914	5,897,517	571,680
IT	12,865,844	17,457,218	3,850,154	27,362,439	16,715,999	44,819,657
CY	135,564	581,166	282,240	129,765	417,805	710,931
LV	719,566	471,026	694,817	13,501	1,414,382	484,528
LT	349,893	937,194	176,225	184,201	526,118	1,121,395
LU	8,380,086	112,362,390	528,527	17,057,660	8,908,613	129,420,050
HU	9,498,343	1,292,585	26,621,282	0	36,119,625	1,292,585
MT	295,893	562,338	116,884	65,595	412,777	627,933
NL	73,586,150	61,883,234	3,774,618	0	77,360,768	61,883,234
AT	11,227,909	26,334,894	6,874,372	66,783,604	18,102,280	93,118,499
PL	7,077,037	6,241,740	18,941,739	622,922	26,018,777	6,864,662
PT	2,721,464	4,564,573	2,485,080	7,300	5,206,544	4,571,873
RO	5,684,499	5,356,398	20,211,480	9,674	25,895,979	5,366,072
SI	3,247,428	947,993	5,628,040	911,762	8,875,467	1,859,754
SK	4,050,284	1,779,019	26,218,883	71,879	30,269,167	1,850,898
FI	2,172,737	3,725,004	167,217	3,215,287	2,339,954	6,940,291
SE	58,757,802	7,297,470	2,428,445	1,287,880	61,186,248	8,585,350
UK	15,283,234	52,021,378	2,793,130	8,206,051	18,076,364	60,227,429
EU-28	590,267,011	590,267,011	202,529,835	202,529,835	792,796,846	792,796,846

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 28 see Annex V but also Table 2.19 Annex IX

Table 2.19 LTC: Estimated budgetary impact of the baseline scenario and options, in €, 2013/2014

	Baseline scenario				MS of residence is providing LTC				Competent MS is providing LTC
	In kind	In cash	Total	%	In kind	In cash	Total	% difference baseline scenario	In kind	In cash	Total	% difference baseline scenario
BE	66,999,143	0	66,999,143	100%	66,999,143	5,724,308	72,723,452	109%	79,247,594	0	79,247,594	118%
BG	1,575,563	0	1,575,563	100%	1,575,563	558,238	2,133,801	135%	109,996	0	109,996	7%
CZ	3,297,837	4,800,168	8,098,005	100%	3,297,837	1,516,435	4,814,272	59%	2,810,438	4,800,168	7,610,606	94%
DK	46,811,431	2,882,870	49,694,302	100%	46,811,431	3,734,028	50,545,459	102%	50,323,363	2,882,870	53,206,233	107%
DE	108,653,903	58,067,092	166,720,995	100%	108,653,903	26,196,507	134,850,409	81%	128,972,910	58,067,092	187,040,003	112%
EE	1,098,591	179,826	1,278,417	100%	1,098,591	206,741	1,305,332	102%	116,067	179,826	295,893	23%
IE	6,831,891	0	6,831,891	100%	6,831,891	1,573,976	8,405,867	123%	6,799,894	0	6,799,894	100%
EL	2,800,908	1,038,354	3,839,262	100%	2,800,908	815,660	3,616,569	94%	96,349	1,038,354	1,134,703	30%
ES	12,499,967	3,625,619	16,125,586	100%	12,499,967	2,314,137	14,814,104	92%	7,813,649	3,625,619	11,439,268	71%
FR	35,320,389	5,996,470	41,316,859	100%	35,320,389	5,686,276	41,006,665	99%	55,527,417	5,996,470	61,523,886	149%
HR	561,766	9,914	571,680	100%	561,766	386,802	948,568	166%	80,121	9,914	90,035	16%
IT	17,457,218	27,362,439	44,819,657	100%	17,457,218	3,779,718	21,236,936	47%	30,288,126	27,362,439	57,650,565	129%
CY	581,166	129,765	710,931	100%	581,166	140,004	721,170	101%	81,460	129,765	211,225	30%
LV	471,026	13,501	484,528	100%	471,026	97,919	568,945	117%	75,124	13,501	88,625	18%
LT	937,194	184,201	1,121,395	100%	937,194	249,837	1,187,031	106%	339,036	184,201	523,237	47%
LU	112,362,390	17,057,660	129,420,050	100%	112,362,390	14,485,979	126,848,368	98%	233,568,908	17,057,660	250,626,568	194%
HU	1,292,585	0	1,292,585	100%	1,292,585	646,312	1,938,897	150%	813,323	0	813,323	63%
MT	562,338	65,595	627,933	100%	562,338	119,265	681,603	109%	302,509	65,595	368,105	59%
NL	61,883,234	0	61,883,234	100%	61,883,234	10,709,102	72,592,336	117%	234,796,930	0	234,796,930	379%
AT	26,334,894	66,783,604	93,118,499	100%	26,334,894	10,099,263	36,434,157	39%	40,438,657	66,783,604	107,222,261	115%
PL	6,241,740	622,922	6,864,662	100%	6,241,740	1,906,445	8,148,185	119%	792,941	622,922	1,415,863	21%
PT	4,564,573	7,300	4,571,873	100%	4,564,573	932,242	5,496,815	120%	1,057,890	7,300	1,065,190	23%
RO	5,356,398	9,674	5,366,072	100%	5,356,398	1,881,939	7,238,337	135%	765,631	9,674	775,305	14%
SI	947,993	911,762	1,859,754	100%	947,993	709,247	1,657,239	89%	1,658,619	911,762	2,570,380	138%
SK	1,779,019	71,879	1,850,898	100%	1,779,019	1,450,959	3,229,978	175%	234,445	71,879	306,324	17%
FI	3,725,004	3,215,287	6,940,291	100%	3,725,004	1,306,423	5,031,426	72%	19,659,968	3,215,287	22,875,255	330%
SE	7,297,470	1,287,880	8,585,350	100%	7,297,470	1,270,009	8,567,479	100%	34,275,376	1,287,880	35,563,256	414%
UK	52,021,378	8,206,051	60,227,429	100%	52,021,378	12,089,150	64,110,528	106%	64,443,977	8,206,051	72,650,027	121%
EU-28	590,267,011	202,529,835	792,796,846	100%	590,267,011	110,586,920	700,853,931	88%	995,490,718	202,529,835	1,198,020,553	151%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.19 see Annex IX

Table 2.20 LTC: comparisons of the options between Member States, estimated budgetary impact baseline scenario (=100%) compared to other options, breakdown by type of LTC benefit, 2013/2014

	Baseline scenario			MS of residence is providing LTC			Competent MS is providing LTC
	In kind	In cash	Total	In kind	In cash	Total	In kind	In cash	Total
BE	100%		100%	100%		109%	118%		118%
BG	100%		100%	100%		135%	7%		7%
CZ	100%	100%	100%	100%	32%	59%	85%	100%	94%
DK	100%	100%	100%	100%	130%	102%	108%	100%	107%
DE	100%	100%	100%	100%	45%	81%	119%	100%	112%
EE	100%	100%	100%	100%	115%	102%	11%	100%	23%
IE	100%		100%	100%		123%	100%		100%
EL	100%	100%	100%	100%	79%	94%	3%	100%	30%
ES	100%	100%	100%	100%	64%	92%	63%	100%	71%
FR	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	99%	157%	100%	149%
HR	100%	100%	100%	100%	3902%	166%	14%	100%	16%
IT	100%	100%	100%	100%	14%	47%	173%	100%	129%
CY	100%	100%	100%	100%	108%	101%	14%	100%	30%
LV	100%	100%	100%	100%	725%	117%	16%	100%	18%
LT	100%	100%	100%	100%	136%	106%	36%	100%	47%
LU	100%	100%	100%	100%	85%	98%	208%	100%	194%
HU	100%		100%	100%		150%	63%		63%
MT	100%	100%	100%	100%	182%	109%	54%	100%	59%
NL	100%		100%	100%		117%	379%		379%
AT	100%	100%	100%	100%	15%	39%	154%	100%	115%
PL	100%	100%	100%	100%	306%	119%	13%	100%	21%
PT	100%	100%	100%	100%	12771%	120%	23%	100%	23%
RO	100%	100%	100%	100%	19453%	135%	14%	100%	14%
SI	100%	100%	100%	100%	78%	89%	175%	100%	138%
SK	100%	100%	100%	100%	2019%	175%	13%	100%	17%
FI	100%	100%	100%	100%	41%	72%	528%	100%	330%
SE	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	470%	100%	414%
UK	100%	100%	100%	100%	147%	106%	124%	100%	121%
EU-28	100%	100%	100%	100%	55%	88%	169%	100%	151%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.20 see Annex IX

Table 2.22 LTC: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact, 2013/2014

	Lowest budgetary impact			Highest budgetary impact
Debtor	Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario)	Option 3.1: LTC provided by the MS of residence (without supplement)	Option 3.2: LTC provided by the competent MS	Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario)	Option 3.1: LTC provided by the MS of residence (without supplement)	Option 3.2: LTC provided by the competent MS	Debtor
BE	X					X	BE
BG			X		X		BG
CZ		X		X			CZ
DK	X					X	DK
DE		X				X	DE
EE			X		X		EE
IE			X		X		IE
EL			X	X			EL
ES			X	X			ES
FR		X				X	FR
HR			X		X		HR
IT		X				X	IT
CY			X		X		CY
LV			X		X		LV
LT			X		X		LT
LU		X				X	LU
HU			X		X		HU
MT			X		X		MT
NL	X					X	NL
AT		X				X	AT
PL			X		X		PL
PT			X		X		PT
RO			X		X		RO
SI		X				X	SI
SK			X		X		SK
FI		X				X	FI
SE		X				X	SE
UK	X					X	UK
Total	4	9	15	3	13	12	Total

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.22 see Annex IX

Table 2.23 LTC: impact estimated cross-border expenditure on total expenditure LTC, by option, 2013/2014

	Total expenditure LTC in 2013 (in million €)	Estimated cross-border expenditure: Baseline scenario (in million €)	% impact	Estimated cross-border expenditure: option 3.1: provided by the MS of residence (in million €)	% impact	Estimated cross-border expenditure: Option 3.2: provided by the competent MS (in million €)	% impact
BE	8,369	67	0.8%	73	0.9%	79	0.9%
BG	166	2	0.9%	2	1.3%	0	0.1%
CZ	1,177	8	0.7%	5	0.4%	8	0.6%
DK	6,181	50	0.8%	51	0.8%	53	0.9%
DE	39,258	167	0.4%	135	0.3%	187	0.5%
EE	106	1	1.2%	1	1.2%	0	0.3%
IE	1,164	7	0.6%	8	0.7%	7	0.6%
EL	879	4	0.4%	4	0.4%	1	0.1%
ES	10,334	16	0.2%	15	0.1%	11	0.1%
FR	41,760	41	0.1%	41	0.1%	62	0.1%
HR	186	1	0.3%	1	0.5%	0	0.0%
IT	28,887	45	0.2%	21	0.1%	58	0.2%
CY	46	1	1.5%	1	1.6%	0	0.5%
LV	145	0	0.3%	1	0.4%	0	0.1%
LT	481	1	0.2%	1	0.2%	1	0.1%
LU	663	129	19.5%	127	19.1%	251	37.8%
HU	758	1	0.2%	2	0.3%	1	0.1%
MT	85	1	0.7%	1	0.8%	0	0.4%
NL	26,399	62	0.2%	73	0.3%	235	0.9%
AT	4,570	93	2.0%	36	0.8%	107	2.3%
PL	3,183	7	0.2%	8	0.3%	1	0.0%
PT	779	5	0.6%	5	0.7%	1	0.1%
RO	1,004	5	0.5%	7	0.7%	1	0.1%
SI	519	2	0.4%	2	0.3%	3	0.5%
SK	170	2	1.1%	3	1.9%	0	0.2%
FI	4,947	7	0.1%	5	0.1%	23	0.5%
SE	15,794	9	0.1%	9	0.1%	36	0.2%
UK	23,341	60	0.3%	64	0.3%	73	0.3%
EU28	221,331	793	0.4%	701	0.3%	1,198	0.5%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.23 see Annex IX

Table 55 Estimated administrative cost and burden baseline scenario and options where country of residence or competent country is providing LTC benefits, 2013/2014

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 55 see Annex V

Table 2.24 LTC: estimated budgetary impact of paying a SUPPLEMENT (option 3.1 – with and without supplement), in € ,000, 2013/2014

	Option 3.1: LTC provided by the MS of residence (without supplements)			Supplement			Option 3.1bis: LTC provided by the MS of residence (with supplement)			% difference option 3.1
Debtor	In kind	In cash	Total	In kind	In cash	Total	In kind	In cash	Total	Total
BE	66,999,143	5,724,308	72,723,452	28,680,164	0	28,680,164	95,679,307	5,724,308	101,403,616	139%
BG	1,575,563	558,238	2,133,801	6,013	0	6,013	1,581,576	558,238	2,139,814	100%
CZ	3,297,837	1,516,435	4,814,272	925,573	3,753,035	4,678,607	4,223,410	5,269,470	9,492,880	197%
DK	46,811,431	3,734,028	50,545,459	17,633,951	278,438	17,912,389	64,445,382	4,012,465	68,457,847	135%
DE	108,653,903	26,196,507	134,850,409	71,317,808	40,106,587	111,424,395	179,971,711	66,303,094	246,274,804	183%
EE	1,098,591	206,741	1,305,332	0	63,191	63,191	1,098,591	269,932	1,368,523	105%
IE	6,831,891	1,573,976	8,405,867	1,797,534	0	1,797,534	8,629,425	1,573,976	10,203,401	121%
EL	2,800,908	815,660	3,616,569	0	613,412	613,412	2,800,908	1,429,072	4,229,981	117%
ES	12,499,967	2,314,137	14,814,104	2,861,922	2,322,027	5,183,950	15,361,889	4,636,164	19,998,053	135%
FR	35,320,389	5,686,276	41,006,665	27,897,918	3,142,558	31,040,476	63,218,308	8,828,834	72,047,142	176%
HR	561,766	386,802	948,568	0	0	0	561,766	386,802	948,568	100%
IT	17,457,218	3,779,718	21,236,936	18,636,120	23,860,942	42,497,061	36,093,338	27,640,660	63,733,998	300%
CY	581,166	140,004	721,170	3,286	55,978	59,264	584,452	195,982	780,434	108%
LV	471,026	97,919	568,945	6,517	1,989	8,506	477,543	99,908	577,451	101%
LT	937,194	249,837	1,187,031	42,620	38,876	81,496	979,814	288,713	1,268,527	107%
LU	112,362,390	14,485,979	126,848,368	121,362,130	6,143,288	127,505,418	233,724,520	20,629,266	254,353,786	201%
HU	1,292,585	646,312	1,938,897	391,685	0	391,685	1,684,270	646,312	2,330,582	120%
MT	562,338	119,265	681,603	107,718	31,114	138,832	670,056	150,379	820,435	120%
NL	61,883,234	10,709,102	72,592,336	172,919,861	0	172,919,861	234,803,095	10,709,102	245,512,197	338%
AT	26,334,894	10,099,263	36,434,157	21,302,411	56,684,341	77,986,752	47,637,306	66,783,604	114,420,910	314%
PL	6,241,740	1,906,445	8,148,185	17,910	83,113	101,023	6,259,650	1,989,558	8,249,208	101%
PT	4,564,573	932,242	5,496,815	48,679	598	49,278	4,613,252	932,841	5,546,093	101%
RO	5,356,398	1,881,939	7,238,337	7,895	1,849	9,744	5,364,292	1,883,788	7,248,081	100%
SI	947,993	709,247	1,657,239	920,891	652,818	1,573,709	1,868,883	1,362,065	3,230,948	195%
SK	1,779,019	1,450,959	3,229,978	0	12,504	12,504	1,779,019	1,463,463	3,242,482	100%
FI	3,725,004	1,306,423	5,031,426	17,172,281	1,926,119	19,098,400	20,897,285	3,232,542	24,129,827	480%
SE	7,297,470	1,270,009	8,567,479	26,977,906	381,672	27,359,578	34,275,376	1,651,682	35,927,058	419%
UK	52,021,378	12,089,150	64,110,528	28,998,816	2,293,198	31,292,015	81,020,195	14,382,349	95,402,543	149%
EU28	590,267,011	110,586,920	700,853,931	560,037,609	142,447,648	702,485,257	1,150,304,620	253,034,568	1,403,339,188	200%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.24 see Annex IX

Table 2.24bis LTC: estimated budgetary impact of paying a SUPPLEMENT (option 3.1 – with and without supplement), in € ,000, 2013/2014

	% difference baseline scenario
Debtor	kind	cash	Total
BE	143%		151%
BG	100%		136%
CZ	128%	110%	117%
DK	138%	139%	138%
DE	166%	114%	148%
EE	100%	150%	107%
IE	126%		149%
EL	100%	138%	110%
ES	123%	128%	124%
FR	179%	147%	174%
HR	100%	3902%	166%
IT	207%	101%	142%
CY	101%	151%	110%
LV	101%	740%	119%
LT	105%	157%	113%
LU	208%	121%	197%
HU	130%		180%
MT	119%	229%	131%
NL	379%		397%
AT	181%	100%	123%
PL	100%	319%	120%
PT	101%	12,779%	121%
RO	100%	19,472%	135%
SI	197%	149%	174%
SK	100%	2,036%	175%
FI	561%	101%	348%
SE	470%	128%	418%
UK	156%	175%	158%
EU28	195%	125%	177%

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2015 Ageing Report. For the original Table 2.24 see Annex IX

Annex – original tables

Unemployment benefits

Table 2.2 UB: Main parameters for estimating the baseline scenario and the different options

* The annual unemployment benefit per unemployed person= unemployment benefit spending in 2010 prices / unemployed persons (20-64)

Source LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 16)

Table 2.2 UB: Main parameters for estimating option 4

Source LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 14)

Table 2.3 UB: estimated reimbursement claims and impact of maximum reimbursement country of last activity (baseline scenario)

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 17)

Table 2.4 UB: estimated budgetary impact baseline scenario and options, in € .000 (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)

* The annual expenditure (12 months) is estimated without taking into account national legislation and as such the possible limitation in time of the payment of UB.

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 16)

Table 2.5 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared to other options (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)

* Green: lowest budgetary impact; Red: highest budgetary impact

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 17)

Table 2.6 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 17)

Table 2.7 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, option 4, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)

* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 19)

Table 2.8 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, baseline scenario, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence and impact of reimbursement (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)

* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 20)

Table 2.9 UB: Estimated administrative burden (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex X p. 22)

Table 8: Estimated number of received PD U1 in the EU-27: 2010, 2015 & 2020

Source: Estimate based on collected administrative data and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex V p. 42)

Table 9: Yearly estimated amount paid to unemployed persons who received a PD U1 2010, 2015 & 2020 (in EUR)

Source: Estimate based on estimated number of PD U1 and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex V p. 43)

Table 15: Estimated administrative Cost –PD U2 (‘issued’), EU-27, EUR, 2010

Source: Estimate based on collected administrative data and 2012 Ageing Report and data provided during the workshops on administrative burden (Poland). (See Annex V p. 57)

Long-term care benefits

Table 2.17 LTC: Estimated number of PD S1 issued and received, by category, in .000

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 32)

Table 25: % cross-border users LTC in kind or in cash (or only informal care) of total population and average amount per dependent person using LTC in kind or in cash (thousand €)

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS, 2012 Ageing Report and additional data delivered by DG ECFIN (See Annex V p. 77)

Table 2.18 LTC: Estimated number of users baseline scenario, in .000

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 33)

Table 27: Estimated number of cross-border users from LTC in kind or in cash, projections 2020 and 2030 (in thousand)

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS, 2012 Ageing Report and additional data delivered by DG ECFIN (See Annex V p. 79)

Table 28: Estimated LTC cross-border expenditure baseline scenario (in € billion), by country of residence*

* Amounts are paid by the competent countries

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS, 2012 Ageing Report and Lipszyck, B., Sail, E. & Xavier, A. (2012), Long-term care: need, use and expenditure in the EU-27, EU (See Annex V p. 80)

Table 2.19 LTC: estimated budgetary impact baseline scenario and options, in € .000

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 35)

Table 2.20 LTC: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared to other options, breakdown by type of LTC-benefit

* In option 3.1 LTC benefits in cash are provided by the MS of residence. This will cause an important budgetary increase for some competent MS without or with few national social rights related to LTC benefits in cash (e.g. RO, SK, BG …). This explains the high percentages of these MS.

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 36)

Table 2.22 LTC: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 36)

Table 2.23 LTC: impact estimated cross-border expenditure on total expenditure LTC*, by option

* Total expenditure LTC: data 2012 Ageing Report

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 38)

Table 55: Estimated administrative cost and burden baseline scenario and options where country of residence or competent country are providing LTC benefits

Source: Estimate based on data from LFS, 2012 Ageing Report, additional data delivered by DG ECFIN input from the work shops (See Annex V p. 184)

Table 2.24 LTC: estimated budgetary impact of paying a SUPPLEMENT (option 3.1 - with and without supplement), in € .000

* The budget needed for option 3.1bis (with supplement) increases with 34% compared to the baseline scenario.

Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report (See Annex IX p. 39)

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[Catalogue number]

(1)

trESS Analytical Study 2012, Legal impact assessment for the revision of Regulation 883/2004 with regard to the coordination of long-term care benefits, to be consulted at: http://www.tress-network.org/tress2012/EUROPEAN%20RESOURCES/EUROPEANREPORT/trESS_Analytical%20Study%202012.pdf.

(2)

The mapping is based on the sources at the Commission's disposal (see below) and additional desk research. It provides the state of play at the end of May 2013 and may not have taken into account most recent changes to national legislation.

(3)

Declaration by Bulgaria 2013 pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(4)

trESS Think Tank Report (2012) on Coordination of Unemployment Benefits , Annex III.

(5)

Information on Croatia provided by the Croatian Employment Service 29.04.2013.

(6)

However, in the future self-employed persons may also covered. If proposed changes to Croatian national legislation are adopted by the Parliament, they will enter into force on 01.01.2014 at the earliest.

(7)

Note AC 503/12 from Italy to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes.

(8)

Declaration by Lithuania 2013 pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.

(9)

trESS Think Tank Report (2012) on Coordination of Unemployment Benefits.

(10)

Note AC 026/13 of 27.04.2013 from Portugal to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

(11)

HM Revenue& Customs www.hmrc.gov.uk/working/intro/employed.htm and www.hmrc.gov.uk/ni/volcontr/basics.htm

(12)

HM Revenue& Customs www.hmrc.gov.uk/working/intro/class2.htm and www.hmrc.gov.uk/ni/volcontr/basics.htm

(13)

According to declarations made by Member States in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004

(14)

Please note that this is not an exhaustive list. For information on common main conditions for maintaining the entitlement to unemployment benefits common conditions and sanctions, see for example the EC-funded project PES-Benchmarking Conditionality questionnaire on conditions to receive services and/or benefits on conditions to receive services and/or benefits www.pes-benchmarking.eu/uploaddoc4852/235_WS_Vienna_Feb13_Whitepaper_Conditionality_WIFO_AT.pdf . Common conditions include: voluntary or involuntary unemployment; registration at the employment services; be fit for work and not prevented from taking up suitable work; be available for work; be below retirement age; be actively seeking employment; cooperate with the employment services (e.g. draw up a plan and report to them as agreed); and be ready to accept any offer of suitable work, as defined in national legislation.

(15)

Missoc country guide, Your social security rights in Belgium, available on DG EMPL Social Security Coordination website , last updated July 2012

(16)

Belgian National Employment Office (ONEM/RVA) www.onem.be/D_Opdracht_W/Werknemers/T67/InfoFR.pdf on daily amounts of unemployment benefits as from 1 April 2013.

(17)

Declaration by Bulgaria 2013 pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004

(18)

Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs www.mpsv.cz/en/1604#loe

(19)

SSE-MOVE: Social Security on the Move: Promoting coordination on the transferability of welfare benefits within a cluster of social security institutes (2013), p. 28

(20)

Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs www.mpsv.cz/en/1604#loe

(21)

Danish government portal for citizens https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Arbejdsloeshedsdagpenge.aspx?NavigationTaxonomyId=00f2b35b-88e5-4ed5-a98c-fb062df75f0f

(22)

German Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_25634/zentraler-Content/A07-Geldleistung/A071-Arbeitslosigkeit/Allgemein/Anwartschaftszeit.html

(23)

German Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_25648/Navigation/zentral/Buerger/Arbeitslos/Alg/Nebenverdienst/Nebenverdienst-Nav.html

(24)

PES-Benchmarking Conditionality questionnaire on conditions to receive services and/or benefits, information on Germany

(25)

German Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_25638/Navigation/zentral/Buerger/Arbeitslos/Alg/Dauer-Anspruch/Dauer-Nav.html

(26)

German Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_549740/Navigation/zentral/Buerger/Arbeitslos/Grundsicherung/Arbeitsuchend/Arbeitsuchend-Nav.html

(27)

German Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_549712/zentraler-Content/A07-Geldleistung/A071-Arbeitslosigkeit/Allgemein/Alg-II-Minijob.html

(28)

German Bundesagentur für Arbeit www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_549712/Navigation/zentral/Buerger/Arbeitslos/Grundsicherung/Grundsicherung-Nav.htm and www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_426242/EN/Navigation/zentral/Leistungen/Arbeitslosengeld-II/Arbeitslosengeld-II-Nav.html

(29)

Estonian Eesti töötukassa www.tootukassa.ee/index.php?id=14033

(30)

Greek OAED www.oaed.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=718&Itemid=693&lang=en#A0 .

(31)

Note AC 496/12 of Greece to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

(32)

Greek OAED www.oaed.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=887&Itemid=817&lang=en#A0
Note AC 496/12 of Greece to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes

(33)

Spanish Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal www.sepe.es/contenido/prestaciones/pdf/cuadriptico_prestaciones_nivelcontributivo.pdf

(34)

Spanish Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal, www.sepe.es/contenido/prestaciones/ag00i.html and www.sepe.es/contenido/prestaciones/pdf/guia_cese_actividad.pdf

(35)

For more details see www.sepe.es/contenido/prestaciones/ag00d.html

(36)

French Pôle emploi www.pole-emploi.fr/file/mmlelement/pj/0e/c3/5f/77/interimairevotreallocation5432331543433869476.pdf

(37)

French Pôle emploi www.pole-emploi.fr/candidat/l-allocation-d-aide-au-retour-a-l-emploi-are--@/index.jspz?id=77160 and http://www.pole-emploi.fr/file/mmlelement/pj/0e/c3/5f/77/interimairevotreallocation5432331543433869476.pdf

(38)

Pôle emploi www.pole-emploi.fr/file/mmlelement/pj/7a/14/85/6f/assjuillet1796189398955717949.pdf

(39)

Pôle emploi: www.pole-emploi.fr/candidat/allocation-temporaire-d-attente-ata--@/suarticle.jspz?id=48606

(40)

All information on Croatia provided by the Croatian Employment Service 29.04.2013. Also see www.hzz.hr/docslike/ACT_ON_EMPLOYMENT_MEDIATION_AND_UNEMPLOYMENT_RIGHTS.pdf

(41)

However, in the future self-employed persons may also be covered. If proposed changes to Croatian national legislation are adopted by the Parliament, they will enter into force on 01.01.2014 at the earliest.

(42)

Note AC 503/12 of Italy to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes
Italian Istituto Nazionale Previdenza www.inps.it/portale/default.aspx?itemdir=8292
SSE-MOVE: Social Security on the Move: Promoting coordination on the transferability of welfare benefits within a cluster of social security institutes (2013), p. 13

(43)

Note AC 503/12 of Italy to the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes
Italian Istituto Nazionale Previdenza (INPS) www.inps.it/portale/default.aspx?sID=%3b0%3b5673%3b8126%3b&lastMenu=8126&iMenu=1&iNodo=8126&p4=2&bi=22&link=Indennità di disoccupazione Mini-ASpI
SSE-MOVE: Social Security on the Move: Promoting coordination on the transferability of welfare benefits within a cluster of social security institutes (2013), p. 13

(44)

Luxembourg government www.guichet.public.lu/citoyens/fr/sante-social/chomage/indemnite-chomage/indemnite-chomage-resident/index.html

(45)

PES-Benchmarking Conditionality questionnaire on conditions to receive services and/or benefits, information on Hungary

(46)

Maltese government website https://secure3.gov.mt/socialpolicy/SocProt/social_benefits/sa/unemployment_assist/info_unemploy_ass.aspx

(47)

Dutch government website www.government.nl/issues/pensions-and-benefits/documents-and-publications/leaflets/2011/10/20/q-a-unemployment-insurance.html

(48)

Dutch government website www.government.nl/issues/pensions-and-benefits/documents-and-publications/leaflets/2011/10/20/q-a-unemployment-insurance.html

(49)

PES-Benchmarking Conditionality questionnaire on conditions to receive services and/or benefits, information on Austria

(50)

Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS) www.ams.at/english/14609.html

(51)

Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS): www.ams.at/sfa/14080_18648.html

(52)

SSE-Move: Social Security on the Move, p. 44

(53)

PES-Benchmarking Conditionality questionnaire on conditions to receive services and/or benefits, information on Slovenia

(54)

Slovak Social Insurance Agency www.socpoist.sk/social-insurance-system-in-slovakia/24533s

(55)

Finnish Kela www.kela.fi/web/en/basic-unemployment-allowance_amount-and-taxation (information on basic allowance) and Finnish Federation of Unemployment Funds www.tyj.fi/eng/earnings-related_allowance/amount_of_allowance/effect_of_earned_income/ (on earning-related allowance)

(56)

Finnish Federation of Unemployment Insurance Funds: www.tyj.fi/eng/earnings-related_allowance/amount_of_allowance/

(57)

Finnish Kela www.kela.fi/web/en/labour-market-subsidy_eligibility

(58)

Finnish Federation of Unemployment Insurance Funds: www.tyj.fi/eng/earnings-related_allowance/amount_of_allowance/

(59)

Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen): www.arbetsformedlingen.se/Globalmeny/Other-languages/Financial-support-for-jobseekers.html

(60)

In addition, as from 1 September 2013 persons receiving UB will be required to report jobseeking activities to the Public Employment Service, using a web-based tool, once a month.

(61)

Activity grant (aktivitetsstöd) is a type of benefit, paid by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (i.e. not paid by the unemployment insurance funds responsible for paying unemployment benefits) to participants in labour market programmes, based on referral by the Swedish Public Employment Service. The benefit, which is not covered by Regulation (EC) No 883, is coordinated nationally with unemployment benefit as regards level and duration of benefits. For information in English, see www.forsakringskassan.se/sprak/eng/unempoyed/!ut/p/b1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOItjAx8nZwMHQ38zUxMDDwt3fwMnXx8PA2CjIEKIoEKDHAARwO8-n1MofrxKCBgf7h-FFgJPhcQcoOfR35uqn5BbmiEQZaJIgAVygy_/dl4/d5/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SmtFL1o2XzMxMDA5QjFBMDg2UTcwSVQ5STdNTzUxUzc3/ . A parliamentary inquiry on social insurance is currently investigating how unemployment benefits and benefits provided for participation in a labour market programme can be harmonised and streamlined, and their final report is due on 31 January 2015: www.psfu.se .

(62)

For England, Scotland and Wales https://www.gov.uk/jobseekers-allowance/what-youll-get and for Northern Ireland www.nidirect.gov.uk/index/information-and-services/money-tax-and-benefits/benefits-and-financial-support/employed-or-looking-for-work/jobseekers-allowance.htm

(63)

Due to be replaced by a new single benefit Universal Credit from October 2013.The Universal Credit will replace several UK social security benefits www.gov.uk/universal-credit The UK government considers that Universal Credit is outside the scope of Regulation 883/2004, see www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/9780108512155/9780108512155.pdf

(64)

(65)

Based on information in www.missoc.org.

(66)

Icelandic Directorate of Labour (Vinnumálastofun) www.vinnumalastofnun.is/atvinnuleysisbaetur/

(67)

Icelandic Dirctorate of Labour (Vinnumálastofun) www.vinnumalastofnun.is/atvinnuleysisbaetur/fjarhaedir-atvinnuleysisbota/

(68)

Landesverwaltung Fürstentum Liechtenstein www.llv.li/merkblatt-kua-wirtsch-neu-ab_2011-2.pdf

(69)

Landesverwaltung Fürstentum Liechtenstein www.llv.li/merkblatt-kua-witterung-2012.pdf

(70)

Based on information on www.missoc.org.

(71)

Landesverwaltung Liechtenstein www.llv.li/amtsstellen/llv-avw-arbeitslosenversicherung/llv-avw-arbeit-arbeitslosenversicherung-ale.htm

(72)

www.llv.li/merkblatt-kua-wirtsch-neu-ab_2011-2.pdf and http://www.llv.li/merkblatt-kua-witterung-2012.pdf

(73)

Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) www.nav.no/Arbeid/Arbeidss%C3%B8ker/Inntektssikring/Dagpenger www.nav.no/English/Social+security/Unemployment+benefit+for+EEA+citizens.102098.cms

(74)

Source: trESS network, Coordination of

Long-term Care Benefits- current situation and future prospects: Think Tank report 2011, available at:

http://www.tress-

network.org/tress2012/EUROPEAN%20RESOURCES/EUROPEANREPORT/trESSIII_ThinkTankReport-LTC_20111026FINAL_amendmentsEC-FINAL.pdf

(75)

This table only roughly characterizes national systems. The boundaries between the different categories of benefits blurred and therefore the tabelshould only help

Table should only help with an initial orientation on which benefits could be regarded as long-term care benefits.

(76)

Source: trESS network, Coordination of Long-term Care Benefits- current situation and future prospects:

Think Tank report 2011, available at: http://www.tress-

network.org/tress2012/EUROPEAN%20RESOURCES/EUROPEANREPORT/trESSIII_ThinkTankReport-LTC_20111026FINAL_amendmentsEC-FINAL.pdf

(77)

It is remarkable that none of the Member States solely allow for the allocation of benefits in kind provided by state-run or only private institutions. The few Member States that only provide benefits in kind offer services through the combination of both public and private institutions.

(78)

The Flemish care insurance is the only scheme that provides a fixed allowance to be spent freely by the beneficiary. Care is provided by private service providers, or informal caregivers.

(79)

The Member State of residence, which then provides unemployment benefits on the basis of Article 65(5) REGULATION (EC) NO 883/2004, shall then be reimbursed by the Member State to whose legislation the person was last subject (see Article 65(6) and (7) REGULATION (EC) NO 883/2004).

(80)

Judgment in Hoever and Zachow v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-245/94 and C-312/94, EU:C:1996:379.

(81)

Judgment in Commission v Luxembourg, C-519/03, EU:C:2005:234

(82)

Spanish legislation in particular, however, only reserves such benefits intended for the raising of a child with a serious illness.

(83)

The table includes all the Member States which have a salary-related child-raising benefit irrespective of the qualification thereof in the respective national legal order.

(84)

Henceforth, the report will be limited to those Member States which have indicated that salary-related child-raising benefits are provided for.

(85)

See the Hoever Zachow judgment (C-245/94 and C-312/94) as well as the Dodl Oberhollenzer judgment (C-543/03). As the current practice, pursuant to the aforementioned case law, is under review and potentially subject to amendments, we are interested in understanding whether a Member State which is competent for one parent, who factually speaking does not take the child-raising task upon him/herself, would grant the salary-related benefit in favour of the other parent, who is responsible for taking care of the child despite being subject to the legislation of another Member State.

(86)

Council directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding

(87)

https://www.mpips.gov.pl/gfx/mpips/userfiles/_public/1_NOWA%20STRONA/Polityka%20rodzinna/statystyka/Informacja%20swiadczenia%20rodzinne%202013-popr.pdf

(88)

Codified Text of the General Law on Social Security (Royal Legislative Decree 1/1994 Article 135 quarter) developed by Royal Decree 1148/2011.

(89)

The following benefits have not been considered relevant to the purpose of this questionnaire:

- non contributory flat rate family benefits

- maternity benefit linked with parental leave (normally 16 weeks for one of the parents although it can be shared)

- paternity benefit (usually 13 days for the father for attending the mother and/or the baby)

- breastfeeding benefit (in case that there is a breastfeeding health risk because of the type of work performed by the mother during the first 9 months of the baby’s life)

(90)

http://www.seg-social.es/Internet_1/Estadistica/Est/Otras_Prestaciones_de_la_Seguridad_Social/EstadisticasCUME/Riesgoduranteelembarazo2015/index.htm

(91)

Royal Decree 1148/2011 Articles 2, 3 y 4

(92)

Or have the child under pre-adoption or permanent fostering

(93)

The period varies depending on the age of the worker. For workers over the age of 26, the minimum contribution period is 180 days in the last 7 years or 360 days in total

Top

Policy Option 1: The competent Member State provides long-term care benefits in cash and reimburses the cost of benefits in kind provided by the Member State of residence
Social impacts
Clarification	++	This option will coordinate long-term care benefits under a separate umbrella, taking into account their specific characteristics. The creation of a common EU definition of long-term care benefits and a concrete list of the benefits is an important step towards more clarity and a uniform approach will lead to greater clarity and a uniform approach, while preserving the method currently applied to sickness benefits.
Simplification	+	This option will not fundamentally change the principles of the baseline as regards the differences between benefits in kind and in cash. However, the proposed option will make it easier for Member States and citizens to understand and apply the coordination provisions on national long-term care benefits. The option also offers a greater stability as it maintains the main principles currently applied under the baseline scenario.
Protection of rights	+	This option will contribute to expediting the process by which persons that require care receive the benefits by removing much of the uncertainty over the status of the various long-term care benefits. There will be no doubt about which benefits can be claimed in a cross-border situation. Nevertheless, the actual receipt of the benefits remains dependent on the distinction between benefits in cash and in kind and the limitation that benefits in kind cannot be exported. Theoretically, an insured person could still be excluded from their benefits, for example, when the competent Member State only grants long-term care benefits in kind and the State of residence only has benefits in cash.
Financial impact	0	This option would involve no economic impact in comparison to the baseline scenario, as Member States will continue to pay the long-term care benefits under the same coordination rules as before. The impact would only manifest itself if benefits that are currently outside the scope of the existing rules would be included in the list. For detailed budgetary impact for individual Member States see Tables 2.19-2.23 in Annex XXVI.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	This option will contribute to a smoother application of the coordination provisions for long-term care benefits and hence to freedom of movement and residence (Article 45), and facilitate the access to social security and social assistance (Article 34). It would ensure that citizens, despite any vulnerability or care-need they might have, are not disadvantaged in exercising their right to free movement within the EU in accordance with the rights of the elderly (Article 25) and the integration of persons with disabilities (Article 26). There is no impact on the right of property, as rights acquired under the national legislation of the competent Member State and the State of residence are maintained on the same footing.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	0	The information obligations for institutions and citizens under this option will remain the same as under the baseline scenario as no new obligations will be introduced. The option facilitates the comparison of benefits in kind and in cash and could lead to fewer disputes between institutions. In an initial phase the new legal definition may increase the administrative burden for Member States and impact the exchange of information between Member States. In the long term the clarification would save time and money for Member States, especially in light of increasing demand for long-term care benefits.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	In general, additional clarifications will always make the legal situation clearer for the persons concerned and the institutions Specifying the national benefits concerned will reduce the risk of overlapping payments.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	0	There are no fundamental changes in comparison to the current situation. Depending on the definition of long-term care benefits and the benefits to be included in the list, some benefits which would currently not be coordinated under the Sickness Chapter could be more or less beneficial for a Member State.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Establish a stable regime appropriate to long-term care benefits;  Ensure a fair and equitable sharing of the financial burden between Member States; Bring legal clarity and transparency for citizens, institutions and other stakeholders on coordination rules applicable to them.	+	This option, by introducing a legal basis for the already applicable rules, leads to stability of the already applied regime appropriate to long-term care benefits, while remaining compatible with the system currently applied under the baseline scenario. In parallel, it achieves legal clarity and transparency on the rules applicable both for citizens and institutions as well as other stakeholders. Although benefits in kind are provided by the residence State, costs of all cash and in kind benefits provided are at the expense of the competent Member State which ensures a fair distribution of the financial burden. This option however will not solve existing mismatches in case the competent Member State has no benefits in cash and the State of residence has no benefits in kind.

Policy Option 2a: The benefits are provided by the Member State of residence without a supplement by the competent Member State even if the benefits in the Member State of residence, or the amount of reimbursement, are at a lower level than in the competent Member State
Social impacts
Clarification	++	Under this option, the same clarifying measures will be provided as under option 1 so that the person will always know that he or she needs to claim the benefits under the legislation of the Member State of residence. There will be no doubts even if it is not clear under the relevant legislation whether a certain benefit is a benefit in cash or in kind.
Simplification	+	Only one Member State is exclusively competent to provide long-term care benefits to the person concerned. Priority rules against overlapping will be superfluous, which will simplify the procedure for mixed-type systems but there will need to be an additional reimbursement procedure for cash benefits.
Protection of rights	+/-	This option would ensure that the persons concerned are always protected at the same level as all other persons in the Member State of residence. Affiliation to the system of the State of residence needs to be assimilated in cases where a person is not covered by the legislation of the State of residence. This in itself can be seen as positive in comparison to the baseline scenario. However, depending on the system or level of long-term care benefits in the Member State of residence, a person might be better or worse of in comparison to the level of benefits in the competent Member State as the level of protection will depend solely on the level of benefits in the residence State.
Financial impact	+	Long-term care benefits in cash shall be provided by the State of residence and no longer by the competent Member State. This implies a considerable decrease of the budget which is needed to finance the cross-border use of long-term care benefits in cash (from € 203 Million to € 111 Million or a decrease of 45% (Annex XXVI– Tables 2.19 and 2.20)). The details of the estimates reveal that whereas more persons are using long-term care benefits in cash, the average amount is much lower. The total budgetary impact is estimated at € 701 million, which corresponds to a decrease of 12% in comparison to the baseline scenario (Annex XXVI – Tables 2.19 and 2.20). On the level of Member States an especially positive impact (less spending) is observed for Austria (decrease of 61% of expenditure on long-term care benefits in comparison to now), Italy (-53%) and Czech Republic (-41%) (Annex XXVI – Table 2.20). Primarily, a negative impact (more spending) in comparison to the other options is observed for the Slovak Republic (increase of 75% of expenditure on long-term care benefits in comparison to the baseline scenario), Croatia (+66%) and Hungary (+50%). These countries have a rather low level of sickness benefits in cash. They also have a rather low user rate of long-term care benefits in their country. Under this option, Member States will have to reimburse benefits in kind and in cash provided to persons who are insured under their social security systems, but who reside in another Member State where the level of long-term care benefits is higher. This could entail paying more than permitted under national legislation. Member States in which no crucial negative or positive financial impact is observed are: Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, Cyprus and France. For detailed budgetary impact for individual Member States see Tables 2.19-2.23 in Annex XXVI.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+/-	The impact is the same as for option 1 however; the impact on the right of property will vary as depending on the system or level of long-term care benefits in the Member State of residence, a person might be better or worse of in comparison to the level of benefits in the competent Member State.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	-	As only one Member State is competent for providing long-term care benefits, this option does not require further implementing arrangements or priority rules to avoid overlapping. The competent Member State and the State of residence will however need to set up a new reimbursement mechanism for benefits in cash. This option may be difficult to implement in Member States where the system providing long-term care benefits is decentralised. The State of residence will have to assume entitlement for benefits in cash for a person who is insured in another Member State and will be confronted with an increase in cases (from 45.000 to 80.000 per year, based on current estimations of recipients of cross-border long-term care - table 2.18 - Annex XXVI). The administrative costs for long-term care are expected to diminish in comparison to the baseline scenario, but the relative share of the regulatory costs in the total budget for long-term care could increase slightly (combined impact for both benefits in cash and in kind - table 55 - Annex V).
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	The risk of fraud and abuse is slightly higher than in the baseline scenario. Member States with more generous long-term care benefits warned that this option could lead persons to move to a Member with a higher level of benefits and claim long-term care benefits there. This in itself is not fraud or abuse, but it can contribute to the perception of so-called 'opportunistic behaviour'.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	Both the competent Member State and the Member State of residence contribute to the costs of granting the benefit to the person concerned. The competent Member State will have to reimburse the costs made in the Member State of residence, according to the level of the State of residence – even if this is higher or the Member State of residence would anyhow provide the benefits on the basis of its national legislation. This may entail a higher or lower share of burden depending on the respective level of benefits in the Member States concerned.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Establish a stable regime appropriate to long-term care benefits;  Ensure a fair and equitable sharing of the financial burden between Member States; Bring legal clarity and transparency for citizens, institutions and other stakeholders on coordination rules applicable to them.	+	This option introduces a stable regime appropriate to long-term care benefits. The regime however differs from the currently applied rules and thus will require adaptation before full stability is achieved. In parallel, the option brings legal clarity and transparency on the rules applicable both for citizens and institutions as well as other stakeholders. Although the overall costs for the spending on long-term care benefits in cash is decreased, this option might be less effective at achieving the objective of a fair and equitable distribution of financial burden between Member States as the costs are always reimbursed at the level of the residence State. Also, introducing a separate reimbursement procedure for long-term care benefits in cash which will require setting up of a new system for the exchange of information between Member States will entail additional regulatory costs compared to the baseline scenario.

Policy Option 2b: The competent Member State provides a supplement to the beneficiary in the event that the benefits in the Member State of residence, or the amount of reimbursement, are at a lower level than in the competent Member State
Social impacts
Clarification	+	Under this option, the person will always know that he/she needs to claim the benefits under the legislation of the Member State of residence. However, the person may also need to introduce a claim for paying the supplement in the competent Member State, which can only be done after the initial claim has been paid by the Member State of residence.
Simplification	--	This option is more complex than the baseline scenario as it opens simultaneous entitlements under the legislation of several Member States. Priority rules will have to be drawn up and a procedure will need to be developed for the calculation of the supplement and how the supplements shall be settled. 100 Moreover, the option deviates from currently applied sickness logic which is consistent with the Court’s case-law.
Protection of rights	++	The social impact is the same as for option 1 and in addition the insured person will always receive the highest benefit to which he/she would have been entitled to in the competent Member State.
Financial impact	--	It is estimated that the total expenditure for long-term care benefits would increase to € 1.4 billion, of which € 1.15 billion is for benefits in kind (an increase of 95% in comparison to the baseline scenario) and € 253 million for benefits in cash (an increase of 25%) (Annex XXVI – Table 2.24). The differences are caused by the supplement, which is estimated at € 560 million for long-term care benefits in kind and € 142 million for long-term care benefits in cash which come from the account of the competent Member State. This option has no positive budgetary impact on any of the Member States. The highest increase in comparison to the current scenario is estimated to take place in Sweden (+318%), the Netherlands (+297%) and Finland (+ 248%). For detailed budgetary impact for individual Member States see Tables 2.19-2.23 in Annex XXVI.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	The impact is the same as for option 1 and in addition the insured person will always receive the highest benefit to which he/she would have been entitled to in the competent Member State.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	--	This option is more complex than the baseline scenario as it opens simultaneous entitlements under the legislation of two Member States: one to be provided with the actual benefit and the other for receiving the supplement. A procedure to compare the level of benefits between the competent Member State and the State of residence needs to be set up, as well as a procedure to settle the payment of the supplement. It will necessitate an additional exchange of information between the Member State of residence and the Member State competent for paying the supplement.
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	The risk of fraud and abuse is slightly higher than in the baseline scenario. Member States with more generous long-term care benefits warned that this option could lead persons to move to a Member with a higher level of benefits and claim long-term care benefits there. This in itself is not fraud or abuse, but it can contribute to a perception of so-called 'opportunistic behaviour'.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	As the supplement is paid directly to the person concerned, it will not contribute to even burden sharing between Member States, but will only increase the total costs of the benefits provided by these Member States. Both the competent Member State and the Member State of residence have their share in granting the benefit to the person concerned. The competent Member State will have to reimburse the costs made in the Member State of residence, according to the level of the State of residence –even in this is higher or the Member State of residence would anyhow provide the benefits on the basis of its national legislation. If the level of benefits in the State of residence is lower, the competent Member State will also have to 'top up' the benefits to the level applicable under its own legislation.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Establish a stable regime appropriate to long-term care benefits;  Ensure a fair and equitable sharing of the financial burden between Member States; Bring legal clarity and transparency for citizens, institutions and other stakeholders on coordination rules applicable to them.	+	This option introduces a stable regime appropriate to long-term care benefits and offers the maximum level of protection to the person. The regime however differs from the currently applied rules and thus will require adaptation before full stability is achieved. In parallel, the option brings legal clarity and transparency on the rules applicable both for citizens and institutions as well as other stakeholders. The payment of the supplement for benefits provided in residence State increases the costs for the competent Member State. This option is thus less effective at achieving the objective of a fair and equitable distribution of financial burden between Member States. Furthermore, the priority rules and calculation rules for the reimbursement of the benefits and provision of the supplement need to be introduced as well as an administrative procedure for settling supplements.

Type of impact	Clarification	Simplification	Protection of rights	Fundamental rights	Economic impacts	Regulatory costs	Risk of fraud and abuse	Equitable burden sharing Member State	Coherence with General, Specific and EU objectives	Overall Effectiveness	Overall Efficiency (cost vs effectiveness
Baseline Scenario	0	0	0	0	0 163	0 164	0	0	0	0	0
Option 1	+	+	+	+	0	+/-	-	-	-	++	++
Option 2a	+	+	+	+	+/- 165	+/-	+	+	+	0	+
Option 2b	+	+/-	+	+	+/-	+/-	+	++	0	0	++
Option 3a	+/-	+/-	+/-	+	- 166	- 167	+	-	0	+	-
Option 3b	+/-	-	+	+	- 168	+/- 169	+	-	+	+	-
Horizontal Option	+	+	+/-	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+

Policy Option 1: Formalisation of the “one-day-rule”
Social impacts
Clarification	+	Clarity of the legal rule on aggregation will be improved by eliminating the divergent interpretations on the application of the aggregation rule, thereby increasing legal certainty.
Simplification	+	A uniform interpretation of the rules on aggregation will contribute to simplifying the aggregation procedure for the institutions concerned as they will all apply it as from the same moment. A limited number of Member States (Denmark, Finland) would have to change their national legislation.
Protection of rights	+	Uniform application of the principle, that aggregation takes place after one day of insurance, employment or self-employment in the competent Member State will faciltate access for mobile EU citizens to their rights to unemployment benefits, as Member States will apply a consistent approach to aggregation of periods completed in another Member State.
Economic impacts
Financial impact	0	On average, 0.11% of the total unemployment spending (around € 100m) by the reporting Member States is related to aggregation of periods. This option is likely to entail a slight increase of expenditure for those Member States 170 which currently require in a longer period of insurance or(self-)employment before aggregation is applied in accordance with their national legislation. However, as 26 Member States currently apply the one day rule as the 'standard' period for triggering aggregation the overall impact is expected to be negligible. 171
Impact on fundamental rights	+	This option aims to facilitate the exercise of to the right to engage in work in another Member State (Article 15 of the Charter), as well as to a better protection of rights for workers who have made use of their right to free movement (Article 45 of the Charter). The right to property (Article 17 of the Charter) will be respected as well, as periods acquired in a previous Member State can be added to periods of insurance or (self-)employment as of the first day of insurance or (self-) employment in the host Member State and no 'gap' in the protection of the worker can occur. The principle of equal treatment (Article 21 of the Charter) is also respected as nationals and non-nationals are subject to the same conditions as regards their rights to unemployment benefits.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+/-	This option will not have a significant effect on the administrative burden of institutions as it will reflect existing practice in 26 of the 28 Member States. A marginal increase of aggregation cases and the corresponding regulatory costs may occur in those Member States that today require a longer period of work than one day before aggregation of previous periods of employment can take place (Denmark and Finland).
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	In principle, the requirement of one day of employment may be used by some mobile workers or employers to engage in bogus employment, although there is no evidence in this respect.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	-	This option does not contribute to a fairer sharing of burden between Member States as a Member State may become responsible for providing unemployment benefits even in cases where they have received a relatively (very) small part of the social security contributions.
Mobility	0	In terms of mobility flows, it is estimated that a formalisation of the "one day rule" could result in a negligible increase in workers and jobseekers movements towards those countries that today require a longer period of work than one day before aggregation of previous periods of unemployment can take place. Considering the low number of aggregation cases even in countries that apply the one day rule, the increase in flows is expected to be very limited. 172
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a uniform and consistent application of the aggregation and calculation rules reflecting the degree of integration in the Member State. Ensure mobile EU workers benefit from protection of rights  Ensure a proportionate distribution of financial burden between Member States	-	This option introduces legal clarity and simplicity for unemployed persons and is easy to implement from an administrative point of view for the majority of Member States. It also has negligible budgetary impact On the other hand; it fails to require a genuine link with the unemployment insurance system in the State of last activity. This option in itself is therefore not the most effective option to strike a balance between the aims of protecting mobile workers and requiring a certain degree of integration in the labour market and insurance system of the State of last activity, before it becomes responsible for the payment of benefits. It is neutral in relation to coherence with wider EU policy objectives.

Policy Option 2: Introduction of a minimum period of insurance or (self-)employment of one month (sub option 2a) or three months (sub option 2b)
Social impacts
Clarification	+	Clarity of the legal rule on aggregation will be improved by elminating the divergent interpretations.
Simplification	+	A uniform interpretation of the rules on aggregation will contribute to simplifying the aggregation procedure for the institutions concerned as they will all apply it as from the same moment. A limited number of Member States (Denmark, Finland) would have to change their national legislation. A small number of citizens, who do not have the requisite minimum period of insurance may experience a change in the competent Member State responsible for their unemployment benefits as competence would revert to the Member State of previous activity. However, such administrative arrangements would be largely dealt with by the competent institutions.
Protection of rights	+	Uniform application of the principle, that aggregation takes place after one month (option 2a) or three months (option 2b) of insurance, employment or self-employment in the competent Member State can affect those mobile EU citizens who claim their right to unemployment benefits within a period of one (option 2a) or three (option 2b) months. As a consequence, a group of 6.742 (1month) or 10.082 (3 months) mobile EU workers concerned would not be entitled to unemployment benefits in the last State of activity as long as they have not fulfilled this minimum period meaning they would have no right to unemployment benefits from the competent State. This would negatively affect their right to free movement. However, this disadvantage will to a large extent be compensated by an export of unemployment benefits from the Member State of previous activity.
Economic impacts
Financial impact	+/-	This option is likely to entail a slight increase of expenditure for the Member States of previous emploment (to a larger extent under sub option 2b than under sub option 2a), but a corresponding decrease of expenditure for the Member States of last activity (37% for option 2a vs 51% for option 2b). Overall, there will be a positive impact with a decrease of the expenditure of €21 million (22%) for 2a) and of approximately € 29 million (42%) for 2b) 173 The most significant reductions will occur in Belgium (€ 6.8 million for 2a and €12.8million for 2b ), Spain (€ 3.1 million for 2a and €4.5million for 2b) and France (€ 25 million for 2a and €33 million for 2b) 174 , being the Member States with currently the highest number of aggregation cases. While increases in public employment expenditure in the Member States of previous employment: of € 3.4 million in respect of option 2a and €6.5 million in respect of option 2b (both calculations assuming an entitlement for 3 months), with the Netherlands (€ 1 million in respect of option 2a and €2million in respect of 2b ) and France (€ 0.4 million in respect of 2a and €0.6 million in respect of 2b) being the most affected countries 175 . Furthermore, there could be a shift in the competence for other social security benefits (in particular for family and sickness benefits) for the 6,471 (one month) or 10,082 (3 months) cases from the Member State of last employment to the Member State of previous employment. However, insufficient data is available to quantify the economic impact resulting therefrom.
Impact on fundamental rights	+	Under option 2, the rights of mobile EU workers will be protected through securing export from the previously competent Member State. Limiting the time for the export of unemployment benefits is one of the conditions which are permitted 176 . In terms of respecting the principle of proportionality, the introduction of a minimum period of work and (self-) employment the objective of establishing a sufficient link to the social security system of the host Member State 177 is balanced with safeguards to ensure continuity of protection for the worker. 178 The right to property (Article 17) is respected by ensuring that the person can receive unemployment benefits from the previously competent Member State, at least during the period of export.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+/-	This sub option does not impose new information obligations on unemployed persons or require new implementing arrangements for the institutions. It does however result in shifting the responsibility between Member States. Where previously an unemployed mobile EU worker could apply for aggregation in the State of last activity to claim unemployment benefits there, he/she now needs to apply for an export of unemployment benefits from the previously competent Member State. To that end there may be additional administrative tasks for the respective Member States of most recent employment and previous employment. On the basis of the interviews conducted with national administrations, it is estimated that the administrative tasks for the institutions of the Member State of last employment would remain almost unchanged. Interviewees from Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and United Kingdom expect a reduction in the number of cases – see also mobility below – which would translate into a marginal reduction of the total regulatory costs in Germany (€300 for option 2a and €400 for 2b), Denmark (€200 for 2a and 2b) and Poland (€350 for 2a and €2700 for 2b) 179 . In the Member States of previous employment, a corresponding increase is to be expected, though it was not possible to quantify it 180 .
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	In particular option 2b ensures a clearer link between the State responsible for awarding benefits and where contributions have been paid, but could also provide for an incentive to accept part-time or low-paid employment in the Member State of last activity just for the purpose of being able to claim unemployment benefits.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	++	This option – in particular sub option 2b - contributes to a fairer sharing of burden between Member States as their institutions become responsible for providing unemployment benefits only to those mobile workers who had been a member of the scheme and who had therefore contributed to the financing of the schme for a substantial period. In comparison to the baseline scenario, a reduction of approximately € 3.6 million (37%) in the expenditure for unemployed benefits for people needing aggregation for 23 reporting Member States can be estimated.
Mobility	0	An estimation (on the basis of the case studies aimed at measuring the effects generated by this option in terms of intra-EU mobility) 181 , which did not take into account the fact of making the Member State of previous employment competent, concluded that a reduction in the mobility flows could occur, notably towards Denmark (up to 6%), Italy (up to 4.5% for 2a and 6% for 2b), France (up to 2.5% for 2a and 3.4% for 2b) and Germany (up to 2.5% for 2a and 3.3% for 2b). In the United Kingdom, the impact of option 2a could be rather moderate (a decrease of 0.6%) 182 . These results are driven by the country-specific figures on migration flows, average levels of unemployment benefits and income differentials 183 . However, these reductions are likely to disappear if, as proposed now under this option, the Member State of previous employment would become responsible for paying unemployment benefits. 184
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a uniform and consistent application of the aggregation and calculation rules reflecting the degree of integration in the Member State. Ensure mobile EU workers benefit from protection of rights Ensure a proportionate distribution of financial burden between Member States	+	This option (whether applied for one or three months) more effectively strikes a balance between the protection of workers and the protection of unemployment insurance schemes in the Member State of last activity as they require a certain degree of integration in the labour market and the insurance system of the State of last activity before benefits become due. This applies in particular for option 2b. The rights of the workers remain safeguarded if they become entitled to unemployment benefits from the Member State of previous activity although such export shall be limited to a period of six months. Both options are coherent with the wider EU objective of supporting fair mobility (fair for both jobseekers and tax-payers) and increasing access to employment opportunities throughout the Union.

Policy Option 3: Taking into account of previous earnings if a person has worked less than one (sub option 3a) or three months (sub option 3b) in the competent Member State
Social impacts
Clarification	+/-	Clarity of the legal rule on aggregation will be improved in combination with the baseline scenario.
Simplification	+/-	In combination with the baseline scenario, a uniform interpretation of the rules on aggregation will be achieved. On the other hand, the options would also result in an increase in the administrative burden for workers applying for unemployment benefits, as they would have to wait longer before receiving benefits, and they would face increased requirements to provide the relevant information themselves.
Protection of rights	+/-	This can be to the advantage of the unemployed person concerned, for example when he or she moves from a Member State with a higher wage to a Member State with a lower wage. But it could also cause a disadvantage in the reverse situation, where the worker could be faced with a lower level of unemployment benefits but is residing in a Member State with a comparatively higher cost of living. However, there is a risk that the additional information exchanges between Member States required to determine the correct salary may lead to delays for the determination of the average level of reference earnings and payment of benefits to the disadvantage of the unemployed person.
Economic impacts
Financial impact	-	Option 3a would result in a reduction of 3.2% of the budget devoted to the aggregation of unemployment benefits in comparison to the baseline scenario for the 14 reporting Member States; option 3b would result in a reduction by 4.1% in the budget devoted to the aggregation of unemployment benefits. It would have a positive budgetary impact on Belgium (€ 1.4 million for 3a or € 2.3 million for 3b), Denmark (€ 80.000 for 3a or €78.000 for 3b), the Netherlands (€26.000 for 3a or €40.000 for 3b) and Finland (€34.000 for 3a or €90.000 for 3b), being Member States with a higher level of wages, compared to the Member States where the mobile EU workers were previously working. There could be a negative financial impact for Bulgaria (€ 36.000 for 3a or €230.000 for 3b), Latvia (€ 5.000 for 3a and 3b), Hungary (€ 5.000 for 3a or €6.000 for 3b), Slovakia (€ 200.000 for 3a or €370.000 for 3b) and Sweden (€25.000 for 3a and €50.000 for 3b), as relatively low wage Member States, compared to the Member State of previous employment. There would be no impact for those Member States which do not use previous earnings as reference for the calculation of unemployment benefits. 185
Impact on fundamental rights	+	These options aim to facilitate the exercise of to the right to engage in work in another Member State (Article 15 of the Charter), as well as to take a balanced approach to free movement and the right to social security (Articles 34 and 45 of the Charter). Taking into account a previously earned salary or professional income does not compromise the right to equal treatment (Article 21 of the Charter), as the unemployment benefit paid to national workers is generally calculated over their average income during a certain reference period. The right to property (Article 17 of the Charter) is also respected as this sub option does not affect the entitlement to unemployment benefits as such.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	-	These option will have a significant effect on the administrative burden of institutions, as they may become obliged to deal with a variety of different salary statements of other Member States and to interpret the content thereof. The options would also lead to an increase in man hours devoted to collect information on the income earned in the previous Member State and to calculate the amount of unemployment benefits. It is estimated that there will be an increase by 28-9% in the administrative tasks of Member States of last employment, mainly due to an increase in man hours devoted to collect information and calculate unemployment benefit. This may translate into an increase in the total annual cost of handling aggregation of unemployment benefits for Germany (€ 8,700 for 3a or €43,000 for 3b), Denmark (€ 700 for 3a or €900 for 3b) and the Netherlands (€ 1,300 for 3a or €1000). 186 Also, a further increase could be expected for Germany (€ 4,800 for 3a and b) and Denmark (€ 900 for 3a and b) which as Member State of previous employment have to provide the Member State responsible for aggregating periods and calculating the unemployment benefits with additional information. 187 This option would also result in an increase in the administrative burden for workers as they would face increased requirements to provide the relevant information themselves 188 .
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	From the point of view of the Member States, changing to the calculation mechanism in such a way could contribute to reducing 'possible’ artificial conduct to obtain an unfair advantage 189 . On the other hand, this sub option could also provide a disincentive for a person to accept employment in a lower wage Member State if this person receives an unemployment benefits which are based on a much higher salary or professional income. 190
Fair burden sharing between Member States	-	This option does not contribute to a fairer sharing of burden between Member States. Although it could for higher wage Member States mean that the amount of the unemployment benefits would be lower, lower-wage Member State may be required to pay a higher amount than under national law. This may also happen in cases where the beneficiaries have paid a relatively small part of the contributions.
Mobility	-	A moderate reduction in the mobility flows could occur as a result of this option, notably in Denmark (up to 1.9% for 3a and b) and in Italy (up to 1.7% for 3a and 2.2% for 3b) 191 . These results mainly concern flows of mobile EU citizens coming from Poland and Romania towards Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and coming from the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy towards France. 192
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a uniform and consistent application of the aggregation and calculation rules reflecting the degree of integration in the Member State. Ensure mobile EU workers benefit from protection of rights  Ensure a proportionate distribution of financial burden between Member States	0	Options 3a and b aim at establishing a better reflection of the previously earned reference salary or professional income in calculating the level of the unemployed benefits. Thereby would avoiding ‘random’ results in levels of unemployment benefits based on extreme short periods of insurance which disrupt the balance of financial burden. However, they would also entail an increase of regulatory costs, as it would require more exchange of information between the institutions of the Member States to receive information on the last earned salary or professional income, and would thus lead to potential delays in providing the unemployment benefits to the detriment of workers' rights. In addition, these options would possibly provide a financial advantage only for Member States with a high level of earnings, not for those with a comparatively lower wage level. The uncertain outcomes means this option therefore may be considered less coherent with the wider EU objective of supporting fair mobility and increasing access to employment opportunities throughout the Union.

Horizontal Policy Option: clarification regarding the recognition of periods for the purpose of aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or self-employment
Social impacts
Clarification	+	Clarity of the legal rule on aggregation will be improved by elminating the complications introduced by divergent interpretation of the rules.
Simplification	+	Whilst differences between the nature of the periods continue to exist, a uniform interpretation of the rules on aggregation will contribute to simplifying the aggregation procedure for the institutions concerned.
Protection of rights	+/-	A uniform application of the rules on aggregation would partially improve the protection of rights. It would ensure equal treatment in all cases where the rules will have to be applied and there is no risk that a person might lose out on rights due to existing different interpretations. On the other hand, if it were to be decided that periods of (self-) employment are only those periods that provide for cover under the legislation of the Member State in which they were fulfilled, this means a restriction in comparison to the baseline scenario (although this restriction is already applied by a majority of Member States). Nevertheless, the person that pursues an activity which does not afford any cover under an unemployment scheme in the competent State does not (and cannot) have any legal expectation that such period should give rise to an entitlement to unemployment benefit from an unemployment scheme of a different State. On the contrary, the result that such uninsured period will not be taken into account by any other State preserves the principle of equal treatment and puts national and mobile workers on exactly same footing.
Economic impacts
Financial impact	0	This option will not have a substantial budgetary impact for Member States. If there is any marginal impact to be noticed, this would be positive. The social security coordination provisions will take into account insured periods only reflecting contributions or levies paid to the social scheme or public finance.
Impacts on fundamental rights	0	As regards option 3, taking into account a previously earned salary or professional income does not compromise the right to equal treatment (Article 21), as the unemployment benefit paid to national workers is generally calculated over their average income during a certain reference period. The right to property (Article 17) is also respected as this sub option does not affect the entitlement to unemployment benefits as such.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+	The impact is expected to be positive, as Member States will not be required to investigate periods of insurance not normally recognised or recorded under their national legislation. Thereby the clarification could lead to fewer disputes between Member States.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	The clarification reduces the risk of abuses claims made with reference to periods of employment in respect of which no record exists.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+	This option could contribute to a fairer sharing of burden between Member States if it were clear that all periods under all circumstances need to confer an entitlement to unemployment benefits in the country in which they are fulfilled.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a uniform and consistent application of the aggregation and calculation rules reflecting the degree of integration in the Member State. Ensure mobile EU workers benefit from protection of rights  Ensure a proportionate distribution of financial burden between Member States	+	The horizontal option responds to the general objective as it provides for a clear and uniform rule for the recognition of periods completed in another Member State for aggregation purposes. the purpose of aggregation providing ention the acquisition of unemployment benefits. This option is also considered efficient and coherent with the wider EU objective of supporting fair mobility and increasing access to employment opportunities throughout the Union.

Policy Option 1: extension of the export period up to a minimum of 6 months
Social impacts
Clarification	+	This option eliminates the uncertainty derived from the degree of flexibility applied by the national institutions. There would be a clear and uniform standard for all persons wishing to take their unemployment benefits with them when looking for a job in another Member State.
Simplification	+	This option would make an end to the widely varying practices that currently exist across Member States. The period of six months also coincides with the periods that was seen as appropriate for jobsearch within the framework of freedom of movement and in which persons can find a job independently of active labour market assistance 227 .
Protection of rights	+	This option would ensure that the persons concerned can retain their entitlement to unemployment benefit for a longer period than under the existing rules. It would also allow them to make better use of the possibilities offered by the host Member State to find suitable employment.
Economic impacts
Financial impact	+/-	This option does not affect substantially the duration, nor the amount of unemployment benefits paid by the competent Member State. It does not have any significant financial impact on the Member States, either at an individual or aggregate level, as it does not create a right for unemployment benefits, but only maintains an existing right to benefit in case of search of employment in another Member State.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	This option contributes to the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work in another Member State (Article 15), as well as to a better protection of rights for workers who have made use of their right to free movement (Article 45). There is no impact on the right to property (Article 17) as acquired rights to unemployment benefits are maintained.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	-	Improving and standardising unemployment benefit export between Member State, including introducing a new co-operation and control mechanism, will contribute to reducing the administrative burden that is often cited by Member States as being experienced by their competent institutions. Currently the length of time for which Member States will export unemployment benefit varies between Member States, necessitating separate processes for granting an extension of the period of export. Setting up the reinforced cooperation mechanism requires an increased effort in comparison to the baseline scenario, for the person concerned to inform the employment services and for the employment services to communicate the follow-up on the unemployed person’s job searching activities. It is not expected that this will have a substantial impact on the administrative burden of the individual Member States. The total number of PD U2 forms issued is still rather moderate and varies between 0,001% and 1,26% of the total population of unemployed persons in 2013.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	Combined with the intended introduction of a reinforced cooperation mechanism, it is expected that this option will entail a lower risk of fraud and abuse than the current rules.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+	During the export period, the person concerned remains covered by the legislation of the Member State which provides the benefit. This reduces the risk that the person concerned has to rely on welfare benefits from the host Member State if he stays there beyond the current minimum export period of three months. Moreover, the investment that an employment service in the host state may make in cooperation activities may pay itself back when the person actually succeeds in finding a job in that country, starts working and paying social security contributions.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a uniform and consistent application of the export rules. Offer jobseekers the best chance of (re)integrating into the labour market Provide for a systematic and easy to administer cooperation and control mechanism to monitor the fulfilment of obligations by the jobseeker in exchanges between Member States	++	By setting a minimum period for the export of unemployment benefits that is longer than the current three months, option 1 is effective in providing opportunities for job searching activities in another Member State supporting better allocation of labour force (and human capital) within the internal market and indirectly resulting in savings in terms of public funds devoted to payments of unemployment benefits and social assistance. 228 A new cooperation mechanism that would be more effective and efficient than the current one would reduce the fear of fraud and error. This option may therefore be considered coherent with the wider EU objective of supporting fair mobility and increasing access to employment opportunities throughout the Union while limiting the time in which a jobseeker does not have direct access to activation measures and support from the competent Member State. It is also aligned with 2013 citizenship report (COM(2013)269) which as its key action 1 refers to the proposal to extend the export of unemployment benefits to six months.

Policy Option 2: extension of the period of export of unemployment benefits until the end of the entitlement period.
Social impacts
Clarification	+	The adoption of this option could have positive effects in comparison to the baseline scenario, as the period of export will be subject to a uniform rule with no room for differing interpretation or practices.
Simplification	+	A direct link between the export and the entitlement period will be aligned with national rights in a way mobile workers may find easier to understand.
Protection of rights	+	This option would ensure that the persons concerned retain their entitlement to unemployment benefit for the whole period in case of search for work in another Member State. It would also allow them to make full use of the possibilities offered by the host Member State to find suitable employment. Figure 2.1 in Annex IX shows that 55.5% jobseekers exit unemployment after 12 months and 75% after 24 months. The increases are proportionally not as substantial as between 3 and 6 months.
Economic impacts
Financial impact	+/-	The impact is the same as for option 1.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	The impact is the same as for option 1.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	-	The impact of this option on the administrative burden is the same as for option 1.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	Combined with the intended introduction of a reinforced cooperation mechanism, it is expected that this option will entail a lower risk of fraud and abuse than the current rules.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	The effect is the same as for option 1, although potentiallly for an even longer period.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a uniform and consistent application of the export rules. Offer jobseekers the best chance of (re)integrating into the labour market Provide for a systematic and easy to administer cooperation and control mechanism to monitor the fulfilment of obligations by the jobseeker in exchanges between Member States	+	Extension until the end of the entitlement period under option 2 will allow a person to perform jobseeking activities in another Member State throughout the full entitlement period and it complies with the 2013 citizenship report (COM(2013)269) proposal to extend the export of unemployment benefits to six months. However, the effects on length of time spent unemployed are in the long-term unclear and it is uncertain longer entitlement to unemployment benefits actually increases likelihood of reintegration into the labour market. It could increase the administrative burden for the State of destination, through needing to actively monitor the person's employment situation over a longer period. Moreover, there will be little incentive for the country to which the person has gone to provide active labour market assistance throughout the full period of the payment of the unemployment benefit, if that institution has no power to control the payment of unemployment benefits or is not compensated financially by the competent Member State. This measure may therefore be considered less effective in achieving the wider EU objective of supporting fair mobility (fair for both jobseekers and tax-payers) and increasing access to employment opportunities throughout the Union and promoting access to labour market activation measures.

Policy Option 1: Introduce a right of choice for frontier workers to receive unemployment benefits either in the State of last activity or the State of residence
Social impacts
Clarification	-	For the workers and public institutions, this option will cause a significant increase in uncertainty as the choice is only made at the moment when a person falls unemployed.
Simplification	-	In comparison to the baseline, this option does not lead to a simplification, as the right of choice is only made at the moment when the person claims unemployment benefit. It also requires effective follow-up of the jobseeking activities of the unemployed person who does not reside in the Member State paying the benefit.
Protection of rights	++	This option contributes to optimise a frontier worker's chances of resuming employment under the most favourable conditions by providing the worker with the maximum amount of freedom to decide where they have the best chances of finding work
Financial impact	-	This option will lead to an overall increase of the annual unemployment benefit expenditure for cross-border workers of 34% (€ 556 million instead of € 416 million under the baseline scenario 272 ) due to the fact that the persons concerned are likely to choose the scheme providing the highest benefit (Annex IX – Table 2.10 and Annex XXVI – Table 2.4). The estimated effect differs for the individual Member States depending on the average amount of benefits paid by the Member States concerned. For 8 Member States 273 this is the most expensive option and the least expensive option for 9 Member States 274 .
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	This option contributes to the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work in another Member State (Article 15), as well as to a better protection of rights for workers who have made use of their right to free movement (Article 45). There is no incidence on the right to property (Article 17) as acquired rights to unemployment benefits are maintained.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+	This option will reduce the number of reimbursement cases between Member States, as they will be distributed between the State of last activity and the State of residence. The unemployed person makes his/her choice explicit by applying for unemployment benefits, thereby providing all the information required under the national legislation. If the unemployed person wishes to receive the unemployment benefit from the State of residence, they can request a PD U1 from the State of last activity and submit it to the institution where they claim unemployment benefit. If the unemployed person opts to receive unemployment benefits from the State of last activity, this will result in a ‘permanent export’ of the unemployment benefits by that State, necessitating information exchange between the institution in the State of residence and in the competent Member State on the follow-up of the jobseeking activities of the person concerned. The administrative cost for the State of residence is estimated at € 4.9 million (Annex XV - Table 15 and Annex XXVI – Table 2.9). This is a decrease of 50% in comparison to the baseline scenario (of € 9.9 million euro). The costs for issuing PD U1s by the State of last activity drops from € 51.400 to € 18.500; a decrease in the administrative burden of 64% (Annex XV -Table 14 275 ).
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	This option itself does not lead to an increased risk of fraud and abuse, as the person concerned is subject to the same obligations as any other unemployed person in the Member State of which he or she chooses to receive the unemployment benefits. The risk of 'opportunistic behaviour' rather relates to the choice from which country to receive unemployment benefits. As was indicated by many public authorities in the stakeholder consultation, the labour market chances may frequently not outweigh the choice for the most generous unemployment benefits.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	-	This option is likely to put a additional burden in particular on the Member States with comparatively high unemployment benefits and will therefore not lead to a more equitable distribution of the financial burden for Member States.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the same protection of rights in case of unemployment. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the best available opportunities of reintegration in the labour market. The financial burden for paying unemployment benefits shall be distributed between the competent Member State of last activity and the Member State of residence in a manner that corresponds to contributions or taxes received in a way which is easy to administer and achieves fair results.	+	The unemployed frontier worker is offered the greatest flexibility to re-integrate into the labour market of their choice. It will eventually reduce the administrative burden of processing reimbursement and will shift a part of the financial burden from the State of residence to the State of last activity. However, this is fully dependent on the choice that the person makes and this option entails great uncertainty for the Member States. This option also entails an overall increase in budgetary costs. It could also encourage the unemployed person to choose the State with the most generous unemployment benefits, rather than the one with the best prospects for re-integration. However, this may still be considered coherent with the wider EU policy objective to promote greater support and labour activation measures to promote reintegration into the labour market.

Policy Option 2a: Introduce the rule in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 according to which the Member State of last activity provides the unemployment benefits to frontier workers and other cross-border workers – requirement to register with the employment services in the Member State of last activity
Social impacts
Clarification	+	This option will bring more clarity for the unemployed cross-border workers and the institutions, as it will always be the institution in the Member State of last activity that pays out the benefit. The person will receive all benefits from the same source, which will provide welcome clarification in relation to cases where a person receives another benefit from the of last State (i.e. a partial invalidity benefit).
Simplification	+	One system will apply to all unemployed persons and there will no longer be a distinction between frontier and other cross-border workers. A direct link will be established between benefits and contributions and there is no need for a reimbursement mechanism. Persons residing at a large distance from the Member State of last activity may face more difficulties in meeting the eligibility conditions, as they will have to travel a longer way for this purpose to their competent employment service, but these could be mitigated by an option to claim an export of their unemployment benefits to their Member State of residence. This means that persons who prefer to orientate to the labour market of the State of residence can return to that State by using the right to export their unemployment benefits. This means that the unemployed person can be more responsive to the relative likelihood of finding a job in the different Member States, and can direct his or her efforts to the Member State with the best job opportunities in their particular field.
Protection of rights	+	This option ensures that cross-border workers are not treated differently from other workers in the same situation, who work and reside in the same Member State. It also ensures that unemployment benefits are paid under the conditions and at the amount acquired by the payment of contributions.
Financial impact	-	The total expenditure on unemployment benefits will increase from € 415 million to € 499 million; an increase of 20% in comparison to the current scenario. This is due to the fact that cross-border workers use to work in countries with comparatively heigher wages and correspondingly higher benefits (see (Annex XV - Table 2.2 and Annex XXVI – Table 2.4). The estimated effect differs for the individual Member States depending on the average amount of benefits paid and depending on the relation of frontier works to other cross-border workers residing in the Member State concerned. 276 From a Member States' perspective, very short period of employment can have a negative financial impact, when no contributions were received in proportion to the cost for paying the unemployment benefit.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	This option eliminates differences in treatment between frontier workers and other cross-border workers and contributes to the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work in another Member State (Article 15) as well as to a better protection of rights for workers who have made use of their right to free movement (Article 45). The right of property (Article 17) is protected, as the person directly receives the benefits from the State to which he/she lastly paid contributions.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+	Only one Member State will be competent for paying unemployment benefits and monitoring the availability of the person to the labour market. The unemployed person can apply directly to the institution in the Member State in which he/she was insured during the last employed activity. Reimbursement arrangements are no longer necessary. Member States will have to waive residence conditions for persons registering with their employment services and may have to make changes to their administrative procedures to check upon persons residing outside their territory. It is also the cheapest option, as the total regulatory costs are reduced from around € 9.9 million to € 3.7 million, i.e. to 37% of the costs under the baseline scenario (Annex XXVI – Table 2.9).
Risk of fraud and abuse	+/-	This option itself does not lead to an increased risk of fraud and abuse, as all unemployed persons are subject to the same obligations as any other unemployed person in the Member State of last activity.However, in the case of export of unemployment benefits there may be a perceived risk that jobseeking obligations are not fully complied with (see section 5.3.1).
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	This option will lead to a more equitable distribution of the costs related to the payment of benefits for Member States who have a relatively large number of unemployed frontier workers residing in that Member State. It will also remove the obligation to reimburse the Member State of residence. However, it may also lead to the situation that benefits have to be provided by a Member State after a relatively short period of insurance.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the same protection of rights in case of unemployment. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the best available opportunities of reintegration in the labour market. The financial burden for paying unemployment benefits shall be distributed between the competent Member State of last activity and the Member State of residence in a manner that corresponds to contributions or taxes received in a way which is easy to administer and achieves fair results.	++	This option restores the direct link between receiving unemployment benefits and availability for the labour market. The financial and administrative burden shifts to the State of last activity, leading to an absolute increase in terms of financial and administrative burden in States that have a high number of incoming cross-border and frontier workers, although overall in fewer Member States this option has the lowest budgetary impact. Moreover, this option does not prevent the Member State of last activity becoming competent even after a very short period of activity there, which would in reality not contribute to an even burden sharing. This option provides for some flexibility for the person concerned, who can continue looking for work in the State of last activity or, by making use of the export of benefits, can return to the Member State of residence to look for employment there. However, where the person is residing far away from the place where he/she is registered with the employment services, he/she can experience difficulties in following up on the jobseeking activities. This therefore may not be considered entirely coherent with the wider EU policy objective to promote greater support and labour activation measures to promote reintegration into the labour market.

Policy Option 2b: Introduce the rule in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 according to which the Member State of last activity provides the unemployment benefits to frontier workers – choice to register with the employment services in the Member State of last activity, or the Member State of residence
Social impacts
Clarification	+	This option will bring more clarity for the unemployed person and the institution, as it will always be the institution in the Member State of last activity that pays out the benefit for all unemployed persons. On the other hand, it contributes to optimise a frontier worker's chances of resuming employment under the most favourable conditions, either in the Member State of last activity, or in the State of residence
Simplification	+/-	One system will apply to all unemployed persons and there will no longer be a distinction between frontier and other cross-border workers. A direct link will be established between benefits and contributions and there is no need for a reimbursement mechanism. However, the split of competences between the payment of the benefits and the responsibility to follow-up on the jobseeking activities of the person concerned calls for new arrangements between the competent Member State and the State of residence.
Protection of rights	+	This option ensures that all cross-border workers are treated equally. They would also get the same benfits under the same conditions as workers who work and reside in the Member State in which they pursued their activity. From the point of view of the Member States this is also positive; as it is in their interest to allow their unemployed persons to look for work in the Member State where they are most likely to find it. Therefore, the impact in comparison to the baseline scenario is considered as being positive.
Financial impact	-	The economic impact is the same as for option 2a. The costs for the introduction of the cooperation mechanism will depend on the specifics of the mechanism and could therefore not be quantified.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	The impact on fundamental rights is the same as for option 2a.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	-	The impact on regulatory costs is the same as for option 2a. However, additional cooperation and control mechanisms need to be established, as the responsibility for paying unemployment benefits and checking availability for work can lie with different institutions. The cooperation mechanism should not only include regular reporting on the situation of the unemployed person, but also provide for incentives for the employment services in the State of residence to actively follow-up on the jobseeking activities, and possible financial compensation for providing active labour market measures on behalf of another Member State. This could have a negative impact on the administrative burden in comparison to the baseline scenario, depending, in each case, on the actual measures taken.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+/-	This option itself does not lead to an increased risk of fraud and abuse, as all unemployed persons are subject to the same obligations as any other unemployed person in the Member State of last activity. There may be a need to incentivise the employment services in the State of residence to actively follow-up on the jobseeking activities.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	From the perspective of providing the unemployment benefits, this option establishes a direct link between receiving contributions and providing unemployment benefits. It will also remove the obligation to reimburse the Member State of residence. Active labour market assistance measures will, in the first place, be at the expense of the employment services in the State of residence. However, it may also lead to the situation that benefits have to be provided by a Member State after a realtively short period of insurance.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the same protection of rights in case of unemployment. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the best available opportunities of reintegration in the labour market. The financial burden for paying unemployment benefits shall be distributed between the competent Member State of last activity and the Member State of residence in a manner that corresponds to contributions or taxes received in a way which is easy to administer and achieves fair results.	+	This option offers the person concerned the opportunity to register with employment services in the State of residence. This option provides the unemployed persons a right of choice as regards their registration which may be convenient for them in particular in those situations where their place of residence is far away from the place where the competent institution in the Member State of last activity is located. They may also prefer to deal with their local institution for linguistic reasons. There is however also a drawback to this option as the current rules only provide for an export of cash benefits, but not necessarily also for the provision of training and reactivation measures in a country different from the one where the competent institution is located. This therefore may not be considered coherent with the wider EU policy objective to promote greater support and labour activation measures to promote reintegration into the labour market. The institution in the State of residence may want to be compensated for these type of activities provided to the person concerned.

Policy Option 3a: Introduce a rule in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 that the State of last activity only pays unemployment benefit if the person has worked there for a sufficiently representative period , i.e. for 12 months – registration with the State of last activity
Social impacts
Clarification	+	This option establishes a direct causal link between the level of integration in the labour market of a Member State and compensation for lost employment periods. The link with the labour market arises from the length of the contributions paid in the State of activity and will provide a balanced reflection of the relationship between the contribution period and acquiring the right to unemployment benefits.
Simplification	+	There will be a 'switch' between the competent Member State and the State of residence dependent on the employment duration of the former cross-border workers. The impact for persons residing at a large distance from the Member State of last activity will be the same as 2a.
Protection of rights	+	The unemployed person will always receive unemployment benefits from the State with which he/she has the closest link with the labour market, either from the State of last activity or the State of residence.
Financial impact	-	This option will lead to an increase of 6% in budgetary costs for Member States from € 416 million to € 442 million (Annex IX – Table 2.10 and Annex XXVI – Table 2.4 277 ). For 6 Member States , this option has the lowest budgetary impact, whereas for 5 Member States, it is the most costly option (Annex X– Table 2.6 and and Annex XXVI – Table 2.4). Many 'outgoing' (seasonal) workers have their place of residence in these countries. They are mostly employed less than 12 months, which means that they will have to claim unemployment benefits in their State of residence. When looking at the distribution of unemployment benefits for incoming cross-border workers, under this option 12% of the total unemployment benefit will be paid by the State of residence and 88% by the State of last activity (Annex XXVI – Table 2.7). The Member State of last activity thus has a higher share in the payment of unemployment benefits than under the current scenario (68%), but it is guaranteed that it has received contributions corresponding to at least 12 months of insurance. Based on 2.2c of Annex XXVI, 53.800 unemployed frontier workers would receive unemployment benefits in the State of last activity on the basis of their insurance for at least 12 months there. In the baseline scenario, only the 28.500 cross-border workers can claim unemployment benefits from the State of last activity (73.700 – 45.200 frontier workers). This explains why the 70-30% division between the State of last activity and the State of residence moves to 88%-12% under this option, as more frontier workers will receive unemployment benefits from the State of last activity.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	The impact on fundamental rights is the same as for option 2. The right to property (Article 17) is protected, as the person will always have an entitlement to unemployment benefits corresponding to the period of contributions paid into a system.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+	Depending on the employment history of the person during the last 12 months, the competence for paying unemployment benefits will switch between the State of last activity and the State of residence. Member States do not have to apply the aggregation rules for determining the period of 12 months (it concerns a minimum period that the person must have worked in the State of last activity) and hence there is additional information exchange needed between the competent Member State and the State of residence as regards the reference period of 12 months. For the opening of the right to unemployment benefits the information obligations for the person and the information exchanges between Member States or the purposes of aggregation will be the same as under the baseline scenario. In combination with the annulment of the reimbursement procedure, this option has a postive impact on administrative burden for the institutions in comparison to the baseline scenario. The total amount of the regulatory costs for this option are estimated at around € 5.1 million, a reduction of approximately 4.8 million or 51% of the baseline scenario. As verification of jobseeking activities and benefit payment will both be dealt with by the same institution in the State of last activity, this option can help reduce administrative burden caused by 'cross-border' monitoring of the benficiary.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	This option itself does not lead to an increased risk of fraud and abuse. There is no incentive for 'opportunistic behaviour' due to the binding effect of the conflict rule. Moreover, this option excludes the possibility that a person can claim unemployment benefit in a Member State after having worked there for only one day, or too short a period to have a genuine link with the labour market of the State of last activity. Periods of insurance in other Member States cannot be aggregated for the calculation of the 12 month period to avoid 'forum shopping'. Verification of jobseeking activity and benefit payment are linked and carried out by the same institution. This makes ensuring applicable jobseeking activities are being carried out easier for the institutions of the State of last activity.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+	This option ensures that the cost of the unemployment benefits are divided between the relevant Member State in a way that is proportional to level of contributions or income tax received by the competent Member State. A reimbursement mechanism is no longer needed.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the same protection of rights in case of unemployment. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the best available opportunities of reintegration in the labour market. The financial burden for paying unemployment benefits shall be distributed between the competent Member State of last activity and the Member State of residence in a manner that corresponds to contributions or taxes received in a way which is easy to administer and achieves fair results.	++	This is a 'compromise' solution. It not only restores the direct link between receiving contributions and paying unemployment benefits, but also guarantees a ‘sufficiently close link’ in terms of received contributions and labour market integration. It may therefore be considered to promote greater efforts by the worker to reintegrate into the labour market by requiring the worker to register with the employment services in this location in a manner aligned to wider EU policy objectives on active labour market policy. This can meet the objective of proportionate sharing of the burden between Member States.

Policy Option 3b: Introduce the rule in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 that the State of last activity only pays unemployment benefit if the person has worked there for a sufficiently representative period – choice of registration
Social impacts
Clarification	+	This option establishes a direct causal link between the level of integration in the labour market of a Member State and compensation for lost employment periods. The link with the labour market arises from the contributions paid in the State of activity and will provide a balanced reflection of the relationship between the contribution period and acquiring the right to unemployment benefits.
Simplification	+/-	Member States' institutions may have to apply a greater amount of flexibility when it comes to recognising the availability for the labour market in another Member State with availability in the competent Member State and procedures need to be set up for that purpose for both the citizen and the national authority.
Protection of rights	+	This option will be beneficial for persons receiving unemployment benefits from the State of last activity and residing far away from the State of last activity. It will contribute to optimising the unemployed person's chances of resuming employment under the most favourable conditions, either in the State of residence or in the State of last activity.
Financial impact	-	The impact is the same as for option 3a. The costs for the introduction of the cooperation mechanism will be dependent on the specifics of the mechanism and could therefore not be quantified.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+	The impact on fundamental rights is the same as for option 2a.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	-	Depending on the employment history of the person during the last 12 months, responsibility for paying unemployment benefits will switch between the State of last activity and the State of residence. Member States do not have to apply the aggregation rules for determining the period of 12 months and the Member State of last activity only needs to take into account the periods effectively fulfilled within its territory. A reimbursement procedure is no longer necessary, but additional cooperation and control mechanisms need to be established, as responsbility for paying the unemployment benefits and checking the availability for work lie with different institutions. The cooperation mechanism should not only include regular reporting on the situation of the unemployed person, but also provide for incentives for the employment services in the State of residence to actively follow-up on the jobseeking activities of the person, and possible financial compensation for providing active labour market measures to the person on behalf of another Member State. This will have a negative impact in comparison to the baseline scenario.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	This option itself does not lead to an increased risk of fraud and abuse. There is no opportunity for the unemployed person to go 'forum shopping' due to the binding effect of the conflict rule. Moreover, this option excludes the possibility that a person can claim an unemployment benefit in a Member State after having worked there for only one day, or too short a period to have a genuine link with the labour market of the State of last activity. The employment services in the State of residence may need to be incentivised to actively follow-up on the jobseeking activities without the responsibility for the payment.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+	From the perspective of providing the unemployment benefits, this option establishes a direct link between receiving contributions and providing unemployment benefits. There is no need for reimbursement of the unemployment benefits. Active labour market assistance measures will, in the first place, be at the expense of the employment services in the State of residence.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the same protection of rights in case of unemployment. Frontier and other cross-border workers, who reside in another Member State than the State of last activity, shall benefit from the best available opportunities of reintegration in the labour market. The financial burden for paying unemployment benefits shall be distributed between the competent Member State of last activity and the Member State of residence in a manner that corresponds to contributions or taxes received in a way which is easy to administer and achieves fair results.	+	This option offers the person concerned the opportunity to register with the employment services in the State of residence. From the point of view of the need for a sufficiently close link with the labour market, is seems more difficult to justify why payment of benefits should be separated from availability for the labour market. Without a cooperation and reimbursement mechanism, the incentive for the institution in the State of residence to actively support the unemployed person could be low. This therefore may not be considered coherent with the wider EU policy objective to promote greater support and labour activation measures to promote reintegration into the labour market. This option is more effective for the unemployed person concerned, but has as an important drawback in that it necessitates setting up a new cooperation mechanism, which may increase regulatory burden contrary to the objective of establishing an easy to administer system.

Policy Option 1a: Amendment of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to make a dynamic reference to the limitations to equal treatment in Directive 2004/38/EC
Social impact
Clarification	+	The codification of existing case-law would clarify the rights of EU mobile citizens and would enable citizens to make an informed choice when exercising their rights to move to another Member State.
Simplification	+	The codification of existing case-law would also simplify the process whereby EU mobile citizens and national institutions could verify their respective rights and obligations by making explicit the relationship between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and the Directive 2004/38/EC. As this measure contains a dynamic reference to the Directive, it is anticipated that it will not require further amendment even if the case law of the CJEU continues to evolve.
Protection of Rights	+	By increasing clarity the application of the case law of the CJEU, legal certainty is also increased thereby facilitating greater uniformity in application by Member States and facilitating the ability of citizens to enforce their rights.
Financial impact	0	There will be no direct impact on Member States' budgets as this measure simply reflects codification of the case-law of the Court.
Impacts on fundamental rights	0	Mere codification of the case-law of the Court. Any impact on fundamental rights already exists in EU law – the amendment to the Regulation will merely reflect this.
Other impacts
Regulatory costs	+/0	Costs related to lack of clarity/transparency/legal certainty (for instance litigation costs, legal advice, elaboration of administrative guidance) for both citizens and public authorities could be reduced. However, as this option sets out the limits on the equal treatment principle only in very general terms, it is likely that some litigation on the relationship between the Regulation and the Directive would continue. Public administrations may additionally decide themselves to improve clarity by producing detailed guidance at national level (although such measures will be at their own discretion).
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	This option gives greater visibility to the safeguards in EU law against abusive behavior including the need to prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State's welfare system to fund their means of subsistence, which may act as a deterrent to such conduct.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	0	As codification of the case-law this option is not anticipated to have a direct impact on the distribution of financial burden between Member States.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. to ensure legal clarity and transparency on the distinctions between the rights of workers, jobseekers and economically inactive mobile EU citizens, including the extent to which Member States’ social security institutions are permitted to limit the equal treatment principle for economically inactive mobile EU citizens and jobseekers who claim certain social benefits.	+	This option will increase legal clarity and transparency on the rights of economically inactive mobile EU citizens and jobseekers and also on the extent to which Member States’ social security institutions are permitted to limit the equal treatment principle for such persons in relation to access to certain social benefits. It is anticipated to thereby improve administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules.

Policy Option 1b: Amendment of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to make a dynamic reference to the limitations to equal treatment in Directive 2004/38/EC and extend the limitations by analogy
Social impact
Clarification	+	The option would clarify the rights of EU mobile citizens and would enable citizens to make an informed choice when exercising their rights to move to another Member State.
Simplification	+	The option would also simplify the process whereby EU mobile citizens and national institutions could verify their respective rights and obligations by making explicit the relationship between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and the Directive 2004/38/EC. As this measure expressly defines the material scope to which the conditions of the Directive apply it is possible that it may require further amendment if the case law of the CJEU continues to evolve.
Protection of Rights	-	In relation to any extension of the potential derogation to non-contributory family benefits, long-term care benefits and sickness benefits there will be a loss of rights compared to the baseline scenario. The affected population of economically inactive citizens is estimated at 70.700 of whom approximately 14.000 live in a household with at least one child and of whom 2.500 are aged 65 or older)
Financial impact	0	In relation to an extension of the existing case-law to non-contributory family benefits, there would be a total estimated decrease for the EU-28 of between €37.7 and 79.2 million (equivalent to a reduction of 0.03% to 0.06% of total expenditure on child benefits) 302 in the case of long-term care benefits there would be an average estimated decrease of €31.5 million (equivalent to 0.014% of total expenditure on long-term care benefits) 303 and in relation to sickness benefits there would be an average estimated decrease of €185.1 million (equivalent to 0.017% of total expenditure on sickness benefits) 304
Impacts on fundamental rights	-	The option is expected to adversely affect the best interests of the child (Article 24), the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work in another Member State (Article 15), as well as protection of rights for jobseekers who have made use of their right to free movement but who do not retain worker status (Article 45). There may also be an adverse impact on the right to social security and social assistance (Article 34) when compared with the baseline scenario.
Other impacts
Regulatory costs	-/0	The assessment is likely to be similar to option 1a. However, by extending the limitations of Directive 2004/38/EC by analogy to a wider range of benefit decisions, there may be additional regulatory costs for case handlers in public authorities. Conversely, there may be a reduced risk of ongoing litigation costs as the legislature will have resolved the question of whether or not the limitations of the Directive apply also to tax-financed social security benefits.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	This option gives greater visibility to the safeguards in EU law against abusive behavior including the need to prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State's welfare system to fund their means of subsistence, which may act as a deterrent to such conduct.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	0	This option is not anticipated to have a direct impact on the distribution of financial burden between Member States.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. to ensure legal clarity and transparency on the distinctions between the rights of workers, jobseekers and economically inactive mobile EU citizens, including the extent to which Member States’ social security institutions are permitted to limit the equal treatment principle for economically inactive mobile EU citizens and jobseekers who claim certain social benefits.	+/-	This option may be considered coherent with the wider EU objective of supporting fair mobility (fair for both mobile citizens and tax-payers in the State of destination) but is less coherent with objectives to promote a social agenda in particular in relation to mobility for more vulnerable groups within the Union.

Policy Option 1c: Amendment of Article 70 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to make reference to the limitations in Directive 2004/38/EC in the context of benefits that provide a minimum subsistence income
Social impact
Clarification	+	The codification of existing case-law would clarify the rights of EU mobile citizens and would facilitate citizens to make an informed choice when exercising their rights to move to another Member State. In particular, it is specified that in accordance with the jurisprudence of the CJEU, derogation of the principle of equal treatment solely applies to SNCBs providing for a minimum level of subsistence as listed in Annex X of the Regulation, thereby achieving a greater level of legal certainty.
Simplification	+/-	As per option 1a, the codification of existing case-law would also simplify the process whereby EU mobile citizens and national institutions could verify their respective rights and obligations. The precise nature of the codification ensures the scope of application is clear, however, it is possible further amendments may be necessary if the case law of the CJEU continues to evolve leading to trade-offs between clarity and simplicity.
Protection of Rights	+	As Option 1a and for the same reasons.
Financial impact	0	There will be no direct impact on Member States' budgets as this measure simply reflects codification of the case-law of the Court.
Impacts on fundamental rights	0	Mere codification of the case-law of the Court. Any impact on fundamental rights already exists in EU law – the amendment to the Regulation will merely reflect this.
Other impacts
Regulatory costs	+/0	Costs related to lack of clarity/transparency/legal certainty (for instance litigation costs, legal advice, elaboration of administrative guidance) for both citizens and public authorities could be reduced. However, as this option sets out the limits on the equal treatment principle only in very general terms, it is likely that some litigation on the relationship between the Regulation and the Directive would continue. Public administrations may additionally decide themselves to improve clarity by producing detailed guidance at national level (although such measures will be at their own discretion).
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	As with Option 1a
Fair burden sharing between Member States	0	As with Option 1a
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. to ensure legal clarity and transparency on the distinctions between the rights of workers, jobseekers and economically inactive mobile EU citizens, including the extent to which Member States’ social security institutions are permitted to limit the equal treatment principle for economically inactive mobile EU citizens and jobseekers who claim certain social benefits.	+	As with Option 1a although it is foreseen that if the case law of the CJEU continues to evolve there may be trade-offs between clarity and simplicity.

[Policy Option 2: Remove SNCBs providing subsistence income from Regulation (EC) No 883/2004
Social impact
Clarification	++	This option achieves clarity by clearly delineating between social security rights which fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 in respect of which citizens retain a full right to equal treatment and those to which the limitations in Directive 2004/38/EC apply. This would facilitate citizens to make an informed choice when exercising their rights to move to another Member State.
Simplification	++	This option also achieves simplicity by separating the material scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 from Directive 2004/38/EC apply in a manner which means both citizens and institutions only need to refer to one legal instrument at a time.
Protection of Rights	-	A significant disadvantage of this option is that some of the rules in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, which can be beneficial for mobile EU citizens (e.g. for example, the rule that social security institutions may not reject documents submitted to them in an official language of another Member State; 305 or the rule of assimilation of facts which requires Member States to take into account facts or events occurring in any Member States as though they had taken place on their own territory. 306 ), would no longer apply. It seems likely that it may become more difficult for mobile EU citizens to claim such benefits in other Member States. Some EU citizens could be discouraged from exercising their free movement rights as a result.
Financial impact	0	There will be no direct impact on Member States' budgets as this measure simply reflects codification of the case-law of the Court.
Impacts on fundamental rights	0	Mere codification of the case-law of the Court. Any impact on fundamental rights already exists in EU law – the guidelines will merely reflect this.
Other impacts
Regulatory costs	--	While there may be some savings for both citizens and public authorities related to lack of clarity/transparency/legal certainty(for instance litigation costs, legal advice, elaboration of administrative guidance) There would be some noticeable administrative costs for Member State social security institutions arising as a result of (a) changes to procedures and (b) being unable to benefit from the existing cooperation procedures for information exchange and verification provided under the Regulation, (for example, to check with institutions in other Member States the validity of documents or accuracy of facts supplied to them). 307 In addition, institutions would not be able to benefit from the efficiencies of the EESSI electronic information exchange platform due to be launched by the end of 2016 with full implementation by 2018. As institutions may be required to separately establish mechanisms for information exchange to ensure rights and obligations are respected.
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	There may be an increased risk of fraud and abuse because Member States would not be able to benefit from the existing cooperation procedures for information exchange and verification provided under the Regulation, if this option were followed. In addition, the provisions in the Regulation concerning recovery of benefits that are paid in error could also not be used. 308
Fair burden sharing between Member States	0	As with Option 1a.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. to ensure legal clarity and transparency on the distinctions between the rights of workers, jobseekers and economically inactive mobile EU citizens, including the extent to which Member States’ social security institutions are permitted to limit the equal treatment principle for economically inactive mobile EU citizens and jobseekers who claim certain social benefits.	-	As with Option 1a although it is foreseen that there may be trade-offs between clarity and simplicity of establishing a clear separation between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC and the protection of rights for citizens and regulatory burden/risk of fraud and error for national institutions arising from the loss of application of the Regulation to SNCBs.

Policy Option 3: Provide administrative guidance
Social impact
Clarification	+/0	Guidance could provide detailed explanations on when limitations on the equal treatment principle could be applied and circumscribe closely the group of benefits which are affected (namely special non-contributory cash benefits providing a minimum subsistence income). Although guidance is not legally binding it is more flexible and easier to update and modify and allows to better explain the legal rules to citizens. However, the non binding character of guidance limits its impact.
Simplification	++	Guidance may be provided in a range of accessible formats, giving precise guidance on specific scenarios which may be easier for citizens to understand than legal text.
Protection of Rights	+/0	By increasing clarity the application of the case law of the CJEU, legal certainty is also increased thereby facilitating greater uniformity in application by Member States and facilitating the ability of citizens to enforce their rights.
Financial impact	0	There will be no direct impact on Member States' budgets as this measure simply reflects codification of the case-law of the Court.
Impacts on fundamental rights	0	Mere codification of the case-law of the Court. Any impact on fundamental rights already exists in EU law – the guidelines will merely reflect this.
Other impacts
Regulatory costs	+/0	Costs related to lack of clarity/transparency (for instance litigation costs, legal advice) for both citizens and public authorities could be reduced. It is anticipated that these savings may be achieved sooner in the light of the relative ease of implementing guidance compared with a legislative measure. But given the non binding character of guidance this measure in isolation may not entirely reduce litigation risk.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	As with Option 1a although the benefits are anticipated to be greater in light of the increased transparency of the guidance.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	0	As with Option 1a.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. to ensure legal clarity and transparency on the distinctions between the rights of workers, jobseekers and economically inactive mobile EU citizens, including the extent to which Member States’ social security institutions are permitted to limit the equal treatment principle for economically inactive mobile EU citizens and jobseekers who claim certain social benefits.	+	As with Option 1a although it is foreseen that there may be trade-offs between clarity and simplicity of establishing clear and accessible guidance and the non-binding nature of guidance which may not be the most effective means of achieving legal certainty or reducing litigation risk.

Policy Option 1a: Adjustment to standard of living: upwards and downwards
Social impacts
Clarification	-	This option is less transparent than the baseline scenario. There is a significant risk that mobile workers would be less aware of the level of benefits they are entitled to as the amount of the family benefit received would be subject to fluctuations depending on various factors, such as macro-economic criteria or the country of residence of the children during the life-cycle of a family benefit claim. This may affect the citizens' ability to assert and enforce their rights.
Simplification	--	In comparison to the baseline, this option is more complex to apply as it imposes additional obligations for mobile workers and public administrations to state and verify the Member State of residence of the children. Possible changes in the Member State of residence of the children or macro-economic changes would result in additional administrative obligations for the mobile worker and public authorities in changes in the amount of the benefit granted by one and the same Member State.
Protection of rights	--/+	This option will result in EU mobile families receiving either a lower or higher level of family benefits than would normally be awarded by the exporting Member State depending on the cost of living in the country where the child resides. It can be anticipated that the most likely situation is that the family benefits will be lower. Firstly, because trends in labour mobility patterns show a bias in mobility from lower wage destinations towards higher wage destinations. Secondly, because the existing rules relating to the differential supplement already ensure that a family will receive a "top-up" from the secondary competent Member State to the level awarded by that Member State. This existing provision under the baseline scenario already mitigates against the potential disadvantage that a family who resides in a high-cost of living destination but workers in a lower cost of living destination might otherwise experience meaning the positive financial impact for the mobile worker arising from this option are expected to be marginal.
Financial impact	+/-	The adjustment of the amount of exported family benefits could decrease the total expenditure on exported family benefits by € 150 million (15.9%). Member States with a higher cost of living compared to the countries where they currently export family benefits will experience a reduction in their expenditure on exported family benefits – by more than 30% in the case if Germany (€34 million) and Ireland (€4 million), by 13% in the case of Luxembourg, . By contrast, Member States with a lower cost of living compared to the countries where they currently export family benefits will experience an increase in their expenditure on exported family benefits to a level that is higher than permitted under their own national rules. This increase would be above 70% for Poland (€ 4 million) and above 40% for Latvia (€ 50,000) 416 , 37% for Estonia, 35% for Slovakia, 21% for Hungary. Extending this analysis to the EU-28, in principle, all Member States with the exception of Denmark (the State with the highest index for comparative price levels 417 ) would have to raise its family benefits at least in respect of export of family benefits to a child resident in Denmark.
Impacts on fundamental rights	-	In the case of a lower adjustment, this option may adversely affect the right to property (in this case social security benefits) (Article 17); the right to equal treatment (Article 21) and the best interests of the child (Article 24) and the right to social security and social assistance (Article 34) when compared with the baseline scenario. In particular, compared to the baseline scenario, workers would receive lower or higher levels of family benefits that their co-workers even though they pay the same taxes and social security contributions. Likewise Member States with a lower cost of living would be required to export family benefits at a higher rate than is awarded to national citizens resident within their territory. Even though there is precedence for deductions from family benefits in the context of the anti-accumulation rules, the fact that these options do not guarantee that the family of a mobile worker will receive a sum at least equivalent to the highest rate available under the overlapping applicable legislation also gives rise to concerns of interference with the right to Property under Article 17.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	--	This option would increase the administrative burden compared with the current rules. The running cases would need further administrative processes as e.g. the updating of the adjustment factors has to be made on a regular basis (even if national amounts do not change). Processing times between the claim being filed and benefit being received could be increased due to the verification of residence. In addition, as application of indexation to rights deriving from worker-status or which exist independently of the application of the Regulation would violate primary law, there will be additional administrative tasks, for example, to distinguish between contributory and non-contributory family benefits in each Member State. On the basis of the interviews conducted with national administrations, it is estimated that the administrative tasks as primarily competent may increase by around one man-hour per case (+49%), mainly due to the increase in the time devoted to the calculation of benefits and the reimbursement activities 418 : The total cost will thus increase of a sum ranging from €12,900 in Romania (+300%) to 1,068,100 (+60%) in Germany 419 . The administrative tasks of secondarily competent Member State, will also increase by around one man-hour per case (+60%), mainly due to the increase in the time devoted to the calculation of benefits, as it becomes more complex. this will translate into an increase in the cost per case (ranging from €1.4 in Romania to €58.3 in Denmark). It is not estimated that this option would increase the administrative burden for citizens, though longer processing times of the cases may well have a negative impact in increasing delays between application and receipt of family benefits 420 .
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	Families could be tempted to declare that their children live in a Member State with a higher factor of adjustment (or even in the Member State with primary competence), as far as the amount of the benefits would depend on the children’s place of residence. For the Member State with primary competence, the children’s place of residence is usually more difficult to determine than, for example, the place of work, so the risk of abuse could increase necessitating additional activities by Member States to counter this risk. Further, the greater complexity entailed in indexation may increase the risk of administrative error by public authorities.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	This option shifts the burden from the Member States with a higher factor of adjustment, i.e. those where income and costs are higher, to Member States with lower factors of adjustment. In particular, it will require Member States with lower costs of living to export family benefits at a higher rate than payable to national citizens within their own territory. This shift in burden is exacerbated due to the effect of the differential supplement. As compared with the baseline scenario, more Member States with lower income and costs may be required to pay a differential supplement than under the current rules. Taking into account that migration patterns usually are from Member States with lower living standards to those with higher standards, this option would probably shift the burden from the latter to the former. This could result in a certain disruption of the economic logic that assigns the obligation to pay the family benefits to the Member State receiving the contributions and taxes.
Mobility	-/+	This option could entail a moderate reduction of mobility flows of one-earner married persons who would move without his/her family towards Member States with relatively higher cost of living with subsequent consequences for the skills availability to those labour markets. 421 On a sample of six Member States when all factors are neutral it may be expected to have the following impact: Netherlands (-4%), Germany (-3%), Belgium (-1.%), Spain (-0.9%) and Ireland (-0.7%) – and an increase towards Member States with relatively lower cost of living – Poland (3%) and Romania (8%) 422 . This would entail consequent reductions/increases in the budget devoted to exported family benefits 423 . However, another possible secondary effect could also be that dependent family members would reunite with the working partner/parent working in another (with higher living cost) Member States, which would counterbalance the effects of the option 424 . The impact of such reunification may potentially have consequences for the education, health, housing and other systems of the Member State of the economically active citizen. In the context of the low flows anticipated no estimates have been carried out for the economic impact of this. This analysis ignores other variables that may influence a family's decision about whether or not to relocate and needs to be viewed accordingly.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives: Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing family benefits and the recipients of those benefits Remove barriers or disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market Ensure family benefits are processed as efficiently as possible	--	This option achieves a greater correlation between family benefits and the cost of living in a manner likely to address the perceptions of unfairness held by some critics. However, it does not fully achieve the aim of achieving a fair distribution of financial burden as it disrupts the economic logic that the State that receives taxes and social security contributions should have responsibility for paying benefits by transferring the economic burden from the Member State of Work to the State of Residence. It also does not achieve a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing a benefit and the families in receipt of such benefits as Mobile workers will receive lower level of family benefits than nationals notwithstanding the fact they pay the same level of tax and social security contributions (conversely Member States with comparatively lower costs of living may be required to export family benefits at a higher level than payable to citizens resident on their territory in a manner likely to be perceived as unfair by nationals of that State). The option also reduces clarity and legal certainty compared to the baseline particularly in relation to level of entitlement and which benefits may be subject to indexation. It is likely to be administratively burdensome for both citizens and national authorities to apply. This option may increase rather than reduce disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market during periods of child-raising (at least in relation to non-contributory benefits) as such benefits will not only be subject to the anti-accumulation rules but also subject to reductions based on place of residence of the child. It may also increase delays in processing family benefits.

Policy Option 1b: Adjustment to standard of living: only downwards
Social impacts
Clarification	--	As with Sub-option 1a, and for the same reasons, this option is less clear or easy to understand than the baseline scenario. In addition, changes in the relative cost of living between different Member States means it may be even less clear to workers whether they can expect family benefits to be exported at the national level or indexed at a lower level.
Simplification	-	As with Sub-option 1a, and for the same reasons, this option is less clear or easy to understand than the baseline scenario.
Protection of rights	--	This option is anticipated to have the same social impact as option 1a, exacerbated further compared to the baseline scenario because it does not improve the protection of rights of beneficiaries residing in a Member State with a higher standard of living and further may increase the lack of clarity concerning the level of family benefits payable as indexation will not be applied consistently in all cases
Financial impact	+	There is expected to be a moderate, decrease of € 156 million (16.6%) in the expenditure on exported family benefits would occur. It is predicted that all reporting Member States would now experience either a reduction or no change to their expenditure on exported family benefits compared to the baseline, which will be nearly 40% for Ireland (€ 4.5 million) and above 30% for Germany (€ 36 million) 425 the change is more negligible for Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic where the estimated impact ranges from 0-0.5% (€0-8,230).
Impacts on fundamental rights	-	This option is anticipated to have the same impact upon fundamental rights as option 1a, exacerbated further because it does not improve the protection of rights of beneficiaries residing in a Member State with a higher standard of living.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	--	As with sub option 1a and for the same reasons, this option is more complex to apply, however, the complexity is anticipated to increase because as opposed to uniformly applying a standard co-efficient across all Member States, national administrations will need to analyse in each case whether the relationship between cost of living requires a Member State to export the national level of benefit or whether a downward adjustment should be applied. It is anticipated that these procedures would fluctuate along with changes to the relative cost of living across the EU-28. As per option 1a, it is estimated that the administrative tasks as primarily competent will increase by around one man-hour per case (+49%), mainly due to the increase in the time devoted to the calculation of benefits and the reimbursement activities 426 this will translate into an increase in the cost per case (ranging from €0.8 in Romania to €58.3 in Denmark). Moreover, a change in the number of cases of export of family benefits could also occur as a result of the introduction of this option 427 - see also mobility below. The total cost will thus increase of a sum ranging from €8,700 (+20%) in Romania to 1,063,500 (+60%) in Germany 428 . Administrative tasks as secondarily competent, are also expected to increase by around one man-hour per case (+55%), mainly due to the increase in the time devoted to the calculation of benefits, as they become more complex: this will translate into an increase in the cost per case (ranging from €1.4 in Romania to €58.3 in Denmark).
Risk of fraud and abuse	-	As with Sub-option 1a, and for the same reasons, this option may increase incentives for fraud while the greater complexity may increase the risk of administrative error thereby necessitating greater action by public authorities to mitigate these risks.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	++/-	As with option 1a, this option shifts the burden between Member States due to the effect of the differential supplement. However, this option would bring a financial relief for the Member State with a higher factor of adjustment (as they could reduce their family benefits for children living in Member States with lower factors of adjustment, while Member States with lower factors of adjustment would not see any change in their situation in cases where they have to grant benefits for children residing in Member States with higher factors of adjustment.
Mobility	+/-	Like option 1a, this option could also entail a moderate reduction of mobility flows of the target population (one-earner married persons who would move without his/her family) towards Member States with relatively higher cost of living. For example, in a sample of six Member States, this is expected to impact the Netherlands (-4%), Germany (-3.2%), Belgium (-2.2%), Spain (-0.9%) and Ireland (-1.7%), while no increase would occur towards Member States with relatively lower cost of living 429 . This would entail reductions (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland and Netherlands) in the budget devoted to exported family benefits 430 . However, as per option 1a, another possible secondary effect could also be that dependent family members would reunite with the working partner/parent working in another (with higher living cost) Member States, which, again, would nullify the effects of the option 431 . As stated above, this analysis ignores other variables that may influence a family's decision about whether or not to relocate and needs to be viewed accordingly.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing family benefits and the recipients of those benefits Remove barriers or disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market Ensure family benefits are processed as efficiently as possible	--	For the same reasons as Option 1a this option is not considered effective at achieving the General and Specific EU objectives, while it may be considered generally neutral in relation to the wider EU objectives, with the exception of the Fresh Start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced by working families, where it is considered to be likely to be incoherent

Policy Option 2: Member State of Residence of the child always has primary competence
Social impacts
Clarification	++	As the Member State which is competent by priority is always the Member State of residence of the children, it is clear which Member State has to start granting its benefits and means the EU rules are aligned with the residence system in place in the majority of Member States. Many disputes which today’s coordination could cause (if Member States do not agree on which Member State is the primarily competent one) could be avoided.
Simplification	+	On the one hand this option could be regarded as simpler, as it is always the same Member State that primary competence. There is also likely to be a greater stability in order of competence as the Member State of Residence of the child will remain competent irrespective of the economic status of their parents or the place where the parents work. On the other hand, this option could lead to more cases with differential supplements than today (if we assume that in general the family benefits in Member States to which workers migrate are higher than in the Member State of residence of the children) which may lead to ongoing delays in families receiving the full entitlement to family benefits even if benefits from the State of Residence are processed more rapidly.
Protection of rights	+	Families will receive the same level of benefits as under the baseline, but it is expected that benefits which are provided for by the Member State of residence will be processed more rapidly. In residence-based systems this will ensure a greater alignment between the normal rules for entitlement under national legislation and the EU social security rules. It also in part responds to the perception of some Member States and EU citizens that the State that should have primary responsibility for paying family benefits is the one where the children reside (although the obligation remains for the Member State of Employment to pay a differential supplement where the level of benefits in this State may be higher).
Financial impact	+/-	This option will have the effect of shifting the financial burden from the Member State of work to the Member State of residence in cases of export where only one parent in a EU mobile family is economically active (in cases where both parents are economically active the place of residence of the child already has priority under the current rules). It is estimated that, because of a shift of the expenditure from the Member State of residence of the worker towards the Member State of residence of the children, a decrease of approximately €213 million (approximately 29%) in the expenditure on exported family benefits could occur. 432 However, there would also be an increase in the expenditure of the Member State of residence of the child by up to 120%. 433 A case study analysis of the impact on two of the main flows of exported family benefits for which data are available, notably from Luxembourg to France (33% of reported total expenditure for export of family benefits) and from Germany to Poland (11% of reported total expenditure for export of family benefits): the application of this option to these flows would result in a reduction in the expenditure for Luxembourg (€60 million) and Germany (€25 million), and an increase in that of France (€60 million) and Poland (€25 million) 434 .
Impacts on fundamental rights	0	The proposed changes to the rules of priority engages consideration of the right to equal treatment (Article 21), as a workers in the State of Employment will receive lower benefits compared to national workers in that Member State. This may give rise to concerns about discrimination in particular in relation to Member States with either tax and contribution based systems or solely contribution based systems. However, there is already precedence for the Member State of Residence of the Child to assume priority in the case of overlapping entitlement on the same basis (both in the case of economic activity and pension rights). This solution may still be considered proportionate in the context of the legitimate aim to reduce accumulation of benefits particularly as the family will receive the same level of benefits overall and so the right to property (Article 17) and the rights of the child (Article 24) are respected.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+/-	Although not fully supported by the qualitative interviews 435 conducted with national administrations, in general, this option is likely to reduce regulatory costs for national authorities as it provides greater certainty for which Member State has primary competence and therefore takes away the obligation under the current rules of this Member State to grant provisional benefits in the event of dispute of competences. 436 This also safeguards that not so many cases of recovery of overpayments will occur (which is often the case today when the final competence differs from the provisional competence and thus overpayments have to be recovered (Article 6(5) and Title IV, Chapter III of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009) and which may entail administrative burden. However, on the other hand, it is anticipated that this option may result in more cases of the need to calculate a differential supplement than under the current rules (taking into account the incentives for mobility from lower wage to higher wage destinations of employment). Furthermore, this option may increase the importance of verifying the child's place of residence (currently only required in cases of overlapping benefits on the same basis – estimated as being 64% of cases 437 ) for both national authorities and citizens. 438 On the basis of the interviews conducted with national administrations, it is estimated that the administrative tasks as primarily competent will increase by around one man-hour per case (50%). 439 This will translate into an increase in the cost per case ranging from €0.6 in Romania to €58.3 in Denmark, and an increase of the total cost ranging from €5,600 (+13%) in Romania to €642,700 (+37%) in Germany 440 . Looking at administrative tasks as secondarily competent, these will also increase by around 0.8 man-hours per case (47%), mainly due to the increase in the time devoted to the calculation of benefits, as it becomes more complex 441 . This will translate into an increase in the cost per case ranging from approximately €0.6 in Poland to €50 in Denmark, and in an approximate increase of the total cost ranging from €3,500 (+81%) in Romania to €214,800 (+12%) in Germany 442 .
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	The Member State of residence will check the family in the same way as any other family resident there. Usually checking and evaluating the situation is easier in the same Member State than abroad and also if all residents are subject to the same checking procedures. Problems experienced under the baseline scenario, where sometimes the work of a parent in another Member State has not been reported would no longer be an issue, as the Member State of residence is the competent one in all cases.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	This option shifts the burden in cases of only one working parent abroad from the Member State of work to the Member State of residence. In case of a residence-based scheme this could be regarded as fairer, as already without the Regulation all residents would be entitled to the benefits. This would change if the State of residence has a contributory scheme and, has to grant also benefits for persons not contributing to the scheme. This could result in a certain disruption of the economic logic that the Member State receiving the contributions and taxes pays the benefit.
Mobility	0	As this option envisages a redistribution of competence for funding between Member States, with no change in the benefits paid to the recipients, it is not envisaged that it would entail any mobility change 443 .
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing family benefits and the recipients of those benefits Remove barriers or disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market Ensure family benefits are processed as efficiently as possible	+	Option 2 introduces legal clarity and simplicity for families and public administrations by establishing a closer alignment between the EU rules and national legislation which generally require residence of a child as a condition of entitlement for family benefits. The rights of families are respected as they will receive the same level of benefits as under the current rules. The rules create a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing a benefit and the families in receipt of such benefits while retaining the rights deriving from the Member State of Employment. However, it may be regarded as less effective in achieving the general objective of fair and equitable distribution of financial burden between Member States as the effect of this option is to redistribute financial burden away from the Member State of economic activity (which receives a mobile worker's tax and social security contributions) towards the Member State of Residence. In relation to cases where national administrations are not currently required to investigate residence of the child (cases of one economically active parent one economically inactive parent) there may be a slight increase in administrative burden which may in the short term contribute to delays for family members. This option is neutral in relation to wider EU objectives including the Fresh Start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced by working families.

Horizontal Option a: Different coordination rules for salary-related child-raising allowances: mandatory derogation from anti-overlapping rules
Social impacts
Clarification	++	A parent claiming a child-raising allowance will always be entitled to the full level of benefit permitted under national legislation regardless of whether the State where he or she works has primary or secondary competence for family benefits. The question of who has entitlement to claim such benefits is also clarified as it becomes clear there are no derived rights reducing the number of disputes over this issue. This provides greater clarity for parents and national authorities compared with the baseline. However, some parents may find the application of anti-overlapping rules to the maximum duration of child-raising allowances difficult to understand
Simplification	+	This option is simpler to administer for both parents and public authorities compared with the baseline scenario as such benefits are no longer subject to the anti-accumulation rules so the level of benefit to be awarded will be aligned with calculations under national legislation. In addition, the prohibition of claims on the basis of a derived right will means benefits will be calculated on the basis of actual salaries or professional income earned in the competent Member State. It will no longer necessary to undergo a hypothetical assessment of potential earnings in that State.
Protection of rights	+/-	Under this option, salary-related child raising allowances would be exempt from the anti-accumulation rules, thereby having the advantage that workers would not experience deductions from entitlement under the applicable legislation of the Member State with secondary competence even if the other parent was receiving similar benefits from the Member State with primary competence. In such cases, parents may receive more in benefits than under the current rules in a manner that removes existing disincentives from sharing child-raising responsibilities. However, this option also provides that salary-related child raising allowances would be treated as individual and personal rights which may only be claimed by the parent who is subject to the applicable legislation in question (not by other members of their family). This may have the consequence that some parents currently in receipt of such a benefit as a derived right would no longer have entitlement (although would retain entitlement to any flat-rate child-raising allowances or flat-rate components). The maximum adverse impact could be up to 40% of the number of entitled persons. 444 However, as only a limited number of Member States are currently complying with the requirement to recognise derived rights to employment-related family benefits 445 the adverse effects are likely to be limited in practice.
Financial impact	--	Member States with secondary competence may be required to pay more than under the current rules because they will be required to pay a salary-related child-raising allowance in full as they will no longer be entitled to take such benefits into account when calculating the differential supplement. In the absence of comprehensive information on exported child-raising benefits from the Member States 446 , analysis has been conducted using ESSPROS data for Member State expenditure on parental benefits for children aged 0-3. This analysis suggests that this option will lead to an average increase in expenditure of 62% for those Member States who provide a child-raising benefit calculated wholly or partially with reference to salary or professional income exporting benefits to the EU-28 (increasing to an average increase of 81% if only the Member States of residence which have an salary-related child-raising benefit are selected). 447 The extent of the increase may range from 37% (46%) in Slovenia to 210% (432%) in Sweden. 448 It should be noted that this analysis is based on the assumption all Member States concerned are fully complying with the EU social security rules and is made with reference to ESSPROS figures for parental benefits awarded for children aged 0-3 regardless of whether or not the benefit is indexed to salary or professional income or is classified as a family benefit for the purposes of the EU social security rules. The estimations must be construed in light of these limitations. More widely it may also be anticipated that excluding salary-related child-raising allowances from the anti-accumulation rules will increase the level of export for Member States with flat-rate child when acting as the secondary competent Member State. Using the same model of calculation the increase in expenditure compared to the status quo in this case is on average 58% (increasing to an average increase of 84% if only the Member States of residence which have a salary-related, flat-rate or mixed type child-raising benefit are selected). 449 A case study on export by Germany as secondary competent Member State of its parental allowance (Elterngeld) to a family of two working parents with two children residing other Member States that also have a salary-related child-raising allowance assuming that such a family is in receipt of the average personal net income for that Member State (one at 100% and the other at 67% of the average wage) anticipates the increase in Germany's expenditure would range from 24% to Poland (increase from €383 to €476) to more than 250% in the case of Austria (increase from €405 to €1428 paid to the family). 450 It is also to be envisaged that some Member States may make savings as a result of this option as they will no longer be obliged to pay salary-related child-raising allowances on the basis of a derived rights, although once again as a number of Member States do not comply with the requirement to grant salary-related benefits on the basis of derived rights the anticipated savings in this regard are limited.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+/-	This option offers superior protection in relation to the rights of the family (Article 33(2)) to reconcile family and professional life by reducing potential disincentives to exercising the right to parental leave. Exempting salary-related child raising allowances from the anti-accumulation rules ensures the right to equal treatment in respect of such benefits as it guarantees mobile citizens working in the Member State of secondary competence would receive a benefit calculated in the same as national workers without deductions and in a manner that promotes the reconciliation of family and professional life. Likewise the right to property (Article 17) is also respected in relation to these workers. While it is noted that some parents may lose entitlement to salary-related child raising allowances currently awarded as a derived right the rights of the family as a whole are protected through the preservation of entitlement for the parent with primary entitlement.
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+/-	In general, this option is likely to reduce administrative burden for national administrations as Member States will be entitled to award salary-related child-raising allowances to EU mobile citizens subject to the applicable legislation in accordance with the normal rules under national legislation. There will no longer be a requirement to include such benefits (which can be subject to fluctuation according to earnings) within the calculation of the differential supplement nor would there be a need to apply a hypothetical calculation in relation to a parent who does not have relevant income or earnings within the competent Member State but who asserts a derived right to benefits. However, it may be anticipated that there will be some increase in administrative tasks for Member States who seek to verify whether or not a benefit available in another Member State should be considered a salary-related child-raising allowance or who wish to exchange information about entitlement to or claims for salary-related child-raising allowance for the other parent in another Member State for the purposes of applying anti-accumulation principles to the duration of a benefit. This will also entail additional administrative tasks for citizens. As this option was developed after commissioning the analysis of regulatory costs at the time of drafting this report it has not possible to draw direct comparisons with the baseline scenario in the same manner as with Options 1a, 1b and 2.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	Removal of derived rights is likely to reduce the risk of fraud and abuse as Member States will be able to assess and verify entitlement to salary-related child raising allowances according to their national legislation and normal procedures. However, there will be a need to establish clear policies and procedures to ensure exchanges of information to assess the other parent's entitlement to a benefit in order to apply anti-accumulation principles to the duration of a benefit.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	This option shifts the burden in cases child-raising allowances to the Member State of work as benefits will be required to be paid in full and for the maximum duration permitted under national legislation (except in cases where there is simultaneous entitlement in another Member State meaning increases to duration may be limited). However, such a change in burden may be considered consistent with the economic logic that assigns the obligation to pay the family benefits to the Member State receiving the contributions and taxes.
Mobility	+	This option may have a slight impact on mobility by removing potential disincentives for parents to move to a different Member State because of the risks that a change in primary competence may have a negative impact on the level of their salary-related child-raising allowances. 451 As noted above there are a range of variables that may influence a family's decision about whether or not to relocate and this prediction needs to be viewed accordingly. As this option was developed after commissioning the analysis of regulatory costs at the time of drafting this report it has not possible to draw direct comparisons with the status quo in the same manner as with Options 1a, 1b and 2.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing family benefits and the recipients of those benefits Remove barriers or disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market Ensure family benefits are processed as efficiently as possible	++	The horizontal options provide greater protection for mobile EU parents in the field of child-raising allowances (calculated by reference to salary/professional income). In general, exempting these benefits from the application of derived rights and the anti-accumulation rules is likely to remove disincentives for parents to share child-raising responsibilities increasing ongoing labour market participation. Other potential disadvantages for EU transnational families concerning duration of a right to benefit are also mitigated (with safeguards to protect over-compensation of families). This option is also likely to decrease regulatory costs for public authorities in administering these benefits by removing the need to calculate the differential supplement and calculate claims on the basis of derived rights increasing administrative simplicity and reducing delays for families in processing claims. By preventing claims on the basis of derived rights to be made in respect of family benefits intended to replace an individual worker's income during periods of child-raising the aim of achieving a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing the benefit and the recipient is achieved. Although there may be an increase in the economic costs for secondary competent Member States, such an increase is aligned to costs that would otherwise be incurred under national legislation. This option supports the wider EU objectives including in relation to the Fresh Start on maternity and parental leave.

Horizontal Option b: Different coordination rules for all child-raising allowances (salary-related and flat rate): mandatory derogation from anti-overlapping rules
Social impacts
Clarification	++	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the advantages would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances (both salary-related and flat rate)
Simplification	+	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the advantages would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances.
Protection of rights	+/-	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the costs and benefits would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances.
Financial impact	--	The financial impact is similar to horizontal option a, however, the number of Member States affected and the range of economic costs is likely to be greater as a result of the extension to all child-raising allowances. Based on ESSPROS data for Member State expenditure on parental benefits it may be anticipated that this option will lead to an average increase in expenditure for secondary competent Member States with child-raising allowances of 58% exporting benefits to the EU-28 (increasing to an average increase of 84% if only the Member States of residence which have an salary-related, flat rate or mixed child-raising benefit are selected). 452 The extent of the increase may range from 32% (43%) in Luxembourg to 210% (474%) in Sweden. 453
Impacts on fundamental rights	+/-	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the impact would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+/-	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the anticipated reduction in regulatory burden would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances (and conversely the scope of additional administrative tasks to verify duration of leave taken in another Member State could increase for both national authorities and citizens)
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the advantages would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	The impact would be the same as horizontal option a, although the benefits would be greater as this would apply to all child-raising allowances.
Mobility	+	The impact is likely to be similar to horizontal option a
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing family benefits and the recipients of those benefits Remove barriers or disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market Ensure family benefits are processed as efficiently as possible	++	For the same reasons as horizontal option a this option may be considered effective at achieving the General and Specific EU objectives and also the wider EU objectives, the Fresh Start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced by working families. Further, as this horizontal option encapsulates both salary-related and flat rate child-raising allowances it is slightly more effective at achieving these aims.

Horizontal Option c: Different coordination rules for all child-raising allowances (salary-related and flat rate): optional derogation from anti-overlapping rules
Social impacts
Clarification	+/-	The impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although the effects would be mixed depending on whether a member state chooses to disapply the anti-accumulation rules or not. Some citizens may find this confusing.
Simplification	+	The impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although the effects would be mixed depending on whether a Member State chooses to disapply the anti-accumulation rules or not. Some citizens may find this confusing.
Protection of rights	+/-	The impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although the effects would be mixed depending on whether a member state chooses to disapply the anti-accumulation rules or not. In addition, as this option does not envisage a measure to ensure that where only one parent in a family is subject to the legislation of a Member State, that parent shall be able to claim the allowances for the maximum duration, some mobile families may face disadvantages in national systems which are designed to incentivise parents to share child-raising allowances by limiting the duration that an individual parent can claim a benefit.
Financial impact	--	The maximum impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although it may be anticipated that not all Member States will choose to derogate from the anti-overlapping rules. In cases where there is no derogation there will be no change from the baseline.
Impacts on fundamental rights	+/-	The impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although the effects would be mixed depending on whether a Member State chooses to disapply the anti-accumulation rules or not
Other impacts
Regulatory Costs	+/-	The impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although the effects would be mixed depending on whether a member state chooses to disapply the anti-accumulation rules or not. However, no additional administrative tasks are envisaged under this option as competent authorities will not be required to exchange information about the duration of claim for child-raising allowances taken by a parent in another Member State. This will also not entail any additional administrative tasks for citizens.
Risk of fraud and abuse	+	The impact would be the similar to horizontal option b.
Fair burden sharing between Member States	+/-	The maximum impact would be the similar to horizontal option b, although it may be anticipated that not all Member States will choose to derogate from the anti-overlapping rules.
Mobility	0	No material impact on mobility is anticipated as a result of this measure.
Coherence with General, Specific and wider EU Objectives Continue the modernisation of the EU Social Security Coordination Rules by further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while at the same time ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States involved and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. Ensure a clear and transparent link between the Member State issuing family benefits and the recipients of those benefits Remove barriers or disincentives to parents' ongoing participation in the labour market Ensure family benefits are processed as efficiently as possible	+/-	This option has the potential to be just as effective at achieving the General and Specific EU objectives and also the wider EU objectives, the Fresh Start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced by working families as horizontal option b with slightly increased simplicity as it does not entail any additional administrative tasks, meaning it is even more simple to apply. However, as the derogation from the anti-accumulation rules is optional rather than mandatory in practice it is likely to be less effective at achieving the goals and the problems identified concerning disincentives to ongoing labour market participation may continue to subsist.

Table - overview of impact of preferred options (impacts grouped per objective)
General Objective	Facilitate the exercise of citizens' rights	Ensure legal clarity and transparency for citizens, institutions and other stakeholders on coordination rules applicable to them	Ensure a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden between Member State	Ensure administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules
Relevant Impact	-Protection of rights	-Clarification	-Financial impact -Fair burden sharing	-Simplification -Regulatory Costs -Risk of fraud and abuse
Long-term care benefits	+	++	0	+
The competent Member State provides long-term care benefits in cash and reimburses the cost of benefits in kind provided by the Member State of residence	The inclusion of a common definition for long-term care benefits and uniform criteria for classifying these benefits will bring clarity and consistency to the system. Receipt of benefits will remain subject to national conditions of entitlement and so a move to another Member State may be more or less advantageous depending on the allocation of benefits in kind and cash in the Member States concerned.	This option takes into account the specific characteristics of long-term care benefits, distinguishing them from sickness benefits and other branches of social security, while maintaining the current method of coordination.	No significant economic impact in comparison to the baseline is foreseen as the same rules will continue to apply. No fundamental changes in burden sharing, but some benefits not currently coordinated as Long-Term Care Benefits could become subject to the rules. This may lead to some additional cases of export, but also contribute to greater efficiencies by avoiding duplication in the allocation of benefits.	The option will make it easier for citizens to identify and understand the application of the coordination provisions on national long-term care benefits. Information obligations for national administrations will remain the same as under the baseline scenario. The option facilitates the comparison of benefits in kind and in cash and could lead to fewer cases of duplication and also fewer disputes between institutions concerning reimbursement.
Unemployment benefits: Aggregation	+	+	++	++
introduction of minimum insurance requirement of 3 months	No substantive loss of rights. Approximately 10,082 mobile EU workers will receive export of unemployment benefits from the Member State of previous activity instead of the last State of activity.	Improved clarity of the EU rules on aggregation, elminating divergent interpretations between Member States.	Slight increase of expenditure for the Member State of previous employment, but corresponding decrease of expenditure on unemployment benefits for Member States of last activity. Overall decrease of expenditure amounting to approximately € 29 million is expected.	A uniform interpretation of the rules on aggregation will contribute to simplifying the aggregation procedure. A clearer link between the award of benefits and contributions paid diminishes the risk of random results. Overall regulatory costs will remain unchanged.
Unemployment benefits: Export	+	+	+	0
Extend period of export of Unemployment Benefits to minimum period of 6 months and possibility of further extension for whole period of entitlement.	About 24,000 persons will have the possibility to retain their rights to unemployment in case of job search in another Member State for a period of six instead of three months.	Clearer and uniform standards for all persons wishing to take their unemployment benefits with them when looking for a job in another Member State.	The extension of the export period is not expected to have any significant financial impact on the Member States, either at individual or aggregate level, as it only maintains an existing right to unemployment benefits in case of job search in another Member State. Extended export reduces the risk that a jobseeker has to rely on welfare benefits from the host Member State.	Clear and uniform rules regarding the expot period will simplify the procedure for citizens and national administrations. The introduction of a reinforced cooperation mechanism will reduce the risk of fraud and abuse by ensuring that the jobseeker remains subject to supervision in the host State and so cases of non-compliance with activation measures may be detected.
Unemployment benefits: Frontier Workers	+	+	+/-	++
State of last activity only pays Unemployment Benefits after sufficient (at least 12 months) work history and frontier worker registers there. The current reimbursement procedure is abolished.	This option will result in greater consistency in the treatment of frontier and other cross-border workers. It will also contribute towards an even stronger link between benefits and contributions, creating better chances for the worker to reintegrate into labour market.	Clear and uniform rules for frontier and other cross-border workers	Across the EU-28, there will be an increase of 6% of the overall expenses for unemployment benefits from € 416 million to € 442 million. This is because frontier workers tend to work in countries with (on the average) higher wages and higher benefits. It contributes to a shift in burden sharing as the cost of the unemployment benefits will be reallocated in a way that is proportionate to level of contributions or income tax received.	Clear and uniform rules for frontier and other cross-border workers will simplify the administrative procedure and thus facilitate enforcement of existing rules for citizens. Additional information exchanges are needed between the Member State of last activity and the State of residence as regards the reference period of 12 months. However, in combination with the annulment of the reimbursement procedure, this option has an overall positive impact on administrative burden (-50%).
Access for economically inactive persons and jobseekers to social benefits	+	+	0	+
Dynamic reference to Directive 2004/38/EC in equal treatment provisions & Commission guidance	Greater uniformity in the application of rules by Member States and the ability of citizens to enforce their rights thanks to more clarity in the application of the CJEU case law, leading to greater legal certainty.	The codification of existing case-law combined with clear guidance would clarify the rights of EU mobile citizens and would enable citizens to make an informed choice when exercising their rights to move to another Member State.	No direct impact on Member States' budgets as this measure simply reflects codification of the case-law of the Court. No direct impact on the distribution of financial burden between Member States.	It will be more straightforward to verify rights and obligations. Costs related to lack of legal certainty for both citizens and public authorities could be reduced Greater visibility to the existing safeguards in EU law against "welfare tourism" may act as a deterrent to such conduct.
Export of Family Benefits	0	0	0	0
Baseline: Family benefits payable in full by Member State of Work including for children living in another Member State.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Horizontal Option: Child-Raising Allowances	+/-	+/-	-	+
Different coordination rues for all child-raising allowances: optional derogation from anti-overlapping rules	Where Member States choose to disapply the anti-accumulation rules, workers will not experience deductions to child-raising benefits facilitating the right for both parents to share child-raising responsibilities. However, this advantage is limited as not all Member States will apply the derogation A limited number of family members will lose entitlement on the basis of derived rights.	In cases where a Member State applies the derogation, entitlement will be aligned to national law, making it clearer for parents to understand. However, this advantage is limited as not all Member States will apply the derogation. Doubts about who has entitlement to claim such benefits are resolved reducing the number of disputes over derived rights.	The maximum financial impact would be an average increase in expenditure on exported child-raising benefits for secondary competent Member States of 84% (in practice this is expected to be more limited as not all Member States will apply the derogation). Where applied, there would be a shift in the burden to the Member State of work as child-raising allowances benefits will be paid in full by the secondary competent Member State.	The removal of derived rights is likely to reduce administrative burden and the risk of fraud and abuse as Member States will be able to assess and verify entitlement to child raising allowances according to their national legislation and normal procedures.

	Long-Term Care Benefits			Unemployment Benefits									Access to Social Benefits for Economically Inactive Citizens and Jobseekers			Family Benefits
	The competent Member State provides long-term care benefits in cash and reimburses the cost of benefits in kind provided by the Member State of residence			Frontier workers: Provide for the payment of unemployment benefits by the Member State of last activity only in situations where the cross-border worker has worked there for a sufficiently representative period (12 months). The unemployed person shall register with the employment services in the State of last activity			Export of Unemployment Benefits: Extend the period for export of unemployment benefits to a minimum period of 6 months (or end of entitlement period if shorter)			Aggregation of Unemployment Benefits: Introduction of a minimum period of insurance or (self-)employment of three months before aggregation of unemployment benefits			The amendment of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to make reference to the limitations in Directive 2004/38/EC. This could be combined with guidance to provide a more detailed explanation of the rules.			Status quo with individual rights for all-child raising allowances (flat rate and salary-related): and optional derogation from the anti-overlapping rules)
	Baseline Annual expenditure (in € ,000)	Option Annual Expenditure (in € ,000)	% change	Baseline Annual expenditure (in € ,000)	Option Annual Expenditure (in € ,000)	% change	Baseline Annual expenditure (in € ,000)	Option Annual Expenditure (in € ,000)	% change	Baseline Annual expenditure (in € ,000)	Option Annual Expenditure (in € ,000)	% change	Baseline Annual expenditure (in € ,000)	Option Annual Expenditure (in € ,000)	% change	Baseline Annual expenditure (in € ,000)	Option Annual Expenditure (in € ,000)	% change
BE	66,999	66,999	-	67,478	55,044	-18%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20,466	9,692	-53%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	83,567	83,567	-
BG	1,576	1,576	-	236	480	103%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,319	1,264	-4%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
CZ	8,098	8,098	-	1,073	2,102	96%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	951	951	-
DK	49,694	49,694	-	7,342	11,709	59%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	316	117	-63%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	24,384	24,384	-
DE	166,721	166,721	-	85,752	70,428	-18%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	105,760	105,760	-
EE	1,278	1,278	-	309	159	-49%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	64	29	-55%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	573	573	-
IE	6,832	6,832	-	16,569	14,818	-11%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11,577	11,577	-
EL	3,839	3,839	-	678	981	45%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
ES	16,126	16,126	-	23,148	20,162	-13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6,503	1,953	-70%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11	11	-
FR	41,317	41,317	-	69,820	36,868	-47%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	52,962	19,735	-63%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
HR	572	572	-	168	182	8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8	7	-6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
IT	44,820	44,820	-	23,838	19,221	-19%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
CY	711	711	-	513	479	-7%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4	4	0%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LV	485	485	-	24	66	175%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5	3	-42%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	107	107	-
LT	1,121	1,121	-	15	59	293%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	53	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU	129,420	129,420	-	29,501	86,596	194%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	525	438	-17%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	476,900	476,900	-
HU	1,293	1,293	-	520	640	23%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	337	326	-3%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	336	336	-
MT	628	628	-	75	79	5%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11	8	-25%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
NL	61,883	61,883	-	55,344	65,275	18%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,824	1,220	-33%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	35,622	35,622	-
AT	93,118	93,118	-	16,051	33,257	107%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	147,323	147,323	-
PL	6,865	6,865	-	594	606	2%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	342	220	-36%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,995	3,995	-
PT	4,572	4,572	-	3,735	4,968	33%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
RO	5,366	5,366	-	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2	1	-33%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
SI	1,860	1,860	-	975	1,276	31%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
SK	1,851	1,851	-	1,463	730	-50%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	441	275	-38%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,545	1,545	-
FI	6,940	6,940	-	1,755	6,633	278%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	797	366	-54%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	19,359	19,359	-
SE	8,585	8,585	-	2,559	2,100	-18%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	773	303	-61%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
UK	60,227	60,227	-	6,440	5,919	-8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	43	17	-60%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
EU-28	792,797	792,797	-	415,995	441,686	6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	86,794	35,979	-59%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	912,010	912,010	-

Operational objective	Indicator	Definition/Unit of Measurement 458	Existing data/Sources
Bring legal clarity and transparency for citizens, institutions and stakeholders by introducing a definition for long-term care benefits, group the rules under a separate Chapter and establish a list of long-term care benefits under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.	Complaints from citizens on Long-term care benefits	- number of queries and complaints from citizens and institutions about difficulties in exercising their rights.	Yes: Incoming correspondence Commission (annually)
	EU litigation on LTC	No. of national and CJEU cases on the interpretation of EU law on long-term care benefits.	Yes: National Courts/ CJEU
	Complaints from national authorities on Long-term care benefits	Experiences from national institutions with the application of the revised legal framework.	No: Survey in the Administrative Commission
Reduce administrative costs and cases of double payments by providing clear rules of when long-term care benefits in cash and in kind are provided for the same purpose and for the same time frame.	Cases of overlapping payments	amount of benefits in cash and the reimbursement for benefits in kind in Euros.	Yes: Survey in the Administrative Commission/ Data collection consortium HIVA, Milieu Ltd, IRIS University Ghent (annually)
	Administrative costs for public authorities	administrative costs per case for processing claims for long-term care benefits in Member State of residence.	Yes: Survey in the Administrative Commission/ Data collection consortium HIVA, Milieu Ltd, IRIS University Ghent (annually)
	Complaints from national authorities on Long-term care benefits	Experiences from national institutions with the application of the revised legal framework.	No: Survey by the Administrative Commission
Reduce the number of conflict situations between institutions, resulting in l individual complaints, and fewer preliminary or infraction procedures to be dealt with by the CJEU.	Complaints from citizens on Long-term care benefits	Number of complaints from citizens about difficulties in exercising their rights.	Yes: Incoming correspondence Commission (annually)
	EU Litigation on LTC	No. of national and CJEU cases on the interpretation of EU law on long-term care benefits.	Yes: National Courts/CJEU

Operational objective	Indicator	Definition/Unit of Measurement	Existing data/Sources
Reduce the number of complaints concerning access to unemployment benefits by frontier workers and cross-border workers	Complaints on coordination of unemployment benefits by frontier workers/cross-border workers	- number of queries and complaints from frontier workers/cross-border workers about difficulties in exercising their rights	Yes: Incoming correspondence Commission (annually)
	EU Litigation on UBs for frontier/cross-border workers	Number of national and CJEU cases on the interpretation of EU law on unemployment benefits for the frontier and cross-border workers	Yes: National Courts/ CJEU
Ensure a better correlation between the level of the unemployment benefits paid and the contributions received for the frontier, cross-border and mobile EU citizens	Level of contributions received vs level of unemployment benefits paid	overall amounts of contributions received and paid per Member State	Yes: Data collection consortium HIVA, Milieu Ltd, IRIS University Ghent (annually)
Increase the number of persons exporting their benefits	Number of cases of export of unemployment benefits	Number of persons applying for a PD U2	Yes: Data collection consortium HIVA, Milieu Ltd, IRIS University Ghent (annually)
Establish common ground for extending the period of export of unemployment benefits and establish a systematic cooperation and control mechanism to monitor the fulfilment of rights and obligations by the unemployed person when exporting benefits.	Number of exchanges on control measures between Member States	Number of exchanges between Member States in the EESSI system concerning the monitoring of rights and obligations of unemployed person, report on delays and other communication problems	No: Data collection consortium HIVA, Milieu Ltd, IRIS University Ghent (annually)
	Concerns/Recommendations from national authorities on unemployment benefits	Exchange of (best) practices between Member States	No: Survey in the Administrative Commission (2-3 years)
	Number of cases of fraud and error in field of unemployment benefits	Reported number of cases of 'fraud and error'	Yes: Annual discussion on fraud and error in the Administrative Commission (annually)
	Concerns/Recommendations from national authorities on unemployment benefits	Feedback from communication activities	Yes: Survey in the Informal Communication Network (annually)
	Concerns from national authorities on aggregation of unemployment benefits	Survey on use of PD U2	Yes: Survey in the Administrative Commission (annually)
Reduce the number of complaints and infringements by establishing clear rules on the aggregation of periods	Complaints on aggregation of unemployment benefits	- Number of Queries and complaints from citizens about difficulties in exercising their rights	Yes: Incoming correspondence Commission (annually)
	Infringement proceedings	Number of Infringement procedures on aggregation of	Yes: European Commission (annually)
Increase the integration of workers in the insurance system of a Member State	Unemployed mobile persons applying for aggregation of insurance periods	Number of applications for the aggregation of periods by wholly unemployed persons	Yes: Survey in the Administrative Commission on Document PD U1 (annually)
	Concerns/Recommendations from national authorities on unemployment benefits	Exchange of (best) practices between Member States	No: Survey in the Administrative Commission (every 2-3 years)
Reduce administrative costs for public administrations between Member States connected the administrative cooperation and control mechanism for monitoring the fulfilment of rights and obligations of unemployed persons who are exporting their unemployment benefits.	Administrative costs for public authorities	For all Member State: Unemployment rate of cross-border and frontier workers, total yearly expenditure on unemployment benefits for frontier and cross-border workers having worked in that Member State and distribution effects between national and cross-border workers	No: Survey in the Administrative Commission Data collection consortium HIVA, Milieu Ltd, IRIS University Ghent (annually)

Operational objective	Indicator	Definition/Unit of Measurement 459	Existing data/Sources
Reduce the number of complaints concerning access to certain social benefits	Complaints from citizens on access to social benefits	- number of queries and complaints from citizens and institutions about difficulties in exercising their rights.	Yes: Incoming correspondence Commission (annually)
	EU Litigation on relationship between Social Security Rules and Directive 2004/38/EC	No. of national and CJEU cases on the interpretation of EU law on long-term care benefits.	Yes: National Courts/ CJEU (annually)
	Complaints from national authorities on access to social benefits	Experiences from national institutions with the application of the revised legal framework.	No: Survey in the Administrative Commission (every 2-3 years)

Stakeholder category	Number of replies	Percentage
National administration	67	67%
Social partner / Trade union	19	19%
Civil society / Non-governmental organisation	11	11%
Company	2	2%
Unknown	1	1%

Options	Number of replies	% of Individual replies
The Member State where the person last worked and paid social security contributions, even if he/she lived in another Member State.	72	40,22%
The Member State where the person has lived, even if he/she last worked and paid social security contributions in another Member State.	13	7,26%
The person should be allowed to choose to claim the benefit either in the Member State of last employment or in the Member State where the person has lived (if these Member States were different).	87	48,60%
Other solution	7	3,91%

Opinions on the competent Member State and on the level of LTC to be provided	Number of requested records	% Requested records(127)
Should continue receiving benefits as it is today (depending on the Member States' legislation the person might end up in a win or in a lose situation).	23	18,11%
Should be treated equally in the Member State where he/she is insured and should not have his/her care benefits reduced if he/she moves to another Member State.	49	38,58%
Should be treated equally in the Member State where he/she lives and receive the care benefits there (including the cash benefits), in accordance with the national legislation.	25	19,69%
Should get care benefits in cash from the Member State of insurance, supplemented by the Member State of residence in case of more advantageous conditions (top-up).	18	14,17%
Should get care benefits in cash from the Member State of residence, supplemented by the Member State of insurance in case of more advantageous conditions (top-up).	8	6,30%
Other solution	4	3,15%

	Option A	Option B	Option C	Option D	Option E	Option F
National administration	12	4	2	3	1	1
social partner / trade union	2	4	2	1	3	0
civil society / non-governmental organisation (NGO)	1	2	4	1	0	0
Company	0	0	1	0	0	0
unknown	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total	16	10	9	5	4	1
Total (%)	35,56%	22,22%	20,00%	11,11%	8,89%	2,22%