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Document 52013SC0233
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS concerning the added value of macro-regional strategies
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS concerning the added value of macro-regional strategies
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS concerning the added value of macro-regional strategies
/* SWD/2013/0233 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS concerning the added value of macro-regional strategies /* SWD/2013/0233 final */
Table of Contents Introduction 3 Chapter 1: an analysis of responses to questionnaire for the
survey on the added value of macro-regional strategies 4 Chapter 2: independent assessments of external experts 9 2.1 Added value of macro regional strategies: a governance
perspective 9 2.2 The added value of macro-regional strategies from the
perspective of spatial planning 24 2.3 Assessing the added value of macro-regional strategies –
Environment Discussion paper 45 2.4 Do macro-regional strategies
boost innovation and competitiveness? 54 Chapter 3: list of literature used by Commission 63 Chapter 4: key messages of literature review 63 Chapter 5: fact sheets of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR 63 5.1 The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 63 5.2 The EU Strategy for the Danube Region 63 Chapter 6: questionnaire for a survey on the added value of
macro-regional strategies (the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and EU
Strategy for the Danube Region) 63
Introduction
This document comes in support of report
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on the added value of two existing
macro-regional strategies (the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region (EUSBSR) and the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR)),
adopted in June 2013. It aims at providing more detailed
information concerning the evaluation of added value of macro-regional strategies.
It collects the contributions the Commission has received from the key
stakeholders of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR, independent external experts, as well
as the relevant academic and policy-development literature. More
information on the Strategies can be found on the EUSBSR and the EUSDR websites:
http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/ http://www.danube-region.eu/
Chapter
1: an analysis of responses to questionnaire for the survey on the added value
of macro-regional strategies
Questionnaires in total: 104 EUSBSR: 52 EUSDR 52 Rationale Received the highest response rate in the
both surveys 1a) 83% of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that objectives of the EUSBSR/EUSDR correctly addressed the main
challenges faced by respective region. 11 % were neutral on this statement and
only 2% disagreed. When we examine the responses, we find
that the EUSDR respondents are more in agreement than the EUSBSR respondents (3
percentage points difference). 1b) 60 % of respondents strongly agreed or
agreed that the number of priority areas/horizontal actions was reasonable in
macro-regional strategies, even though 27% were neutral and 14% disagreed or
disagreed strongly. However, taking into account the
difference of 13 percentage points, EUSDR respondents (70% agreed or agreed
strongly) were more positive on this statement than the EUSBSR respondents
(only 48 % agreed or agreed strongly, while 21% disagreed or strongly
disagreed.) 1c) 54 % of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that some priority areas were more important than others. However, 18 %
disagreed or disagreed strongly and 27 % were neutral. We find after examination of the results
that this agreement is stronger in the EUSBSR case (62% agreed or strongly
agreed) than in the EUSDR (46% agreed or strongly agreed; 17 percentage points
difference). 1d) 38% of respondents disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the statement that the political statements towards the macro
regional strategies in participating countries were high. However, a nearly
equal 30% agreed or agreed strongly and 32% were neutral. Given the difference of 33%, we find that
the opinions of the respondents of the two existing strategies differ in that
case. While 54% of the EUSDR respondents agreed or fully agreed with the
statement, EUSBSR respondents are less positive (21% agreed or strongly
agreed). The EUSBRS insider respondents were 43%
neutral, while 38% rather disagreed and 19% rather or strongly agreed. Of the
status categories the PAC respondents represented the most negative response
and the managing authorities of EU programmes represented the most positive.
The EUSBRS outsider respondents were 46% neutral, 27% rather or strongly agreed
and 27% rather or strongly disagreed. The pan-regional and regional
organizations represented the most positive response. The national institutions
represented the most negative. The EUSDR insider respondents were 46%
rather or strongly agreed, 22% neutral and 32% rather disagreed. Of the status
categories the NCP respondents represented the most positive response, while
the PACs represented the most negatives response. The EUSDR outsider
respondents were 77% rather or strongly agreed and of the majority were
national institution respondents. 1e) 63% of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that if implemented effectively, the macro-regional strategies were
contributing to social, economic and territorial cohesion. 28 % were neutral on
this statement and 9% disagreed or disagreed strongly. When we examine the responses, we find
that the EUSDR respondents are more in agreement than the EUSBSR respondents (9
percentage points difference). 2. Governance 2a) 51% of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the internal administrative, technical and institutional
organisations in all participating countries were still not effective enough to
implement the EUSBSR/EUSDR. However, 29% were neutral. The EUSBSR respondents are more positive
than the EUSDR respondents (7 percentage points difference). The EUSBRS insider respondents were 55%
rather or strongly disagreed, 19% neutral and 26% rather agreed. Of the status
categories the managing authorities on EU programmes respondents represented
the most negative response, while the PACs represented the most positive. The
EUSBRS outsider respondents were 46% rather or strongly disagreed and 36%
neutral. There are no outstanding groups in both response categories. The EUSDR insider respondents were 49%
rather or strongly disagreed, 37% neutral, 14% rather or strongly agreed. Of
the status categories the PAC respondents represented the most negative
response, the NCPs the most positive. The EUSDR outsider respondents were 50%
rather or strongly disagree, split of 25% for neutral and rather agree. There
were no majority status groups as most positive respondents; yet, the national
institution respondents were most negative. 2b) 35% of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed on the statement that the key stakeholders of the macro-regional
strategy (NCP, PAC) effectively coordinated their activities with other
stakeholders. However, 16 % disagreed or disagreed strongly and 50 % were
neutral. The EUSBSR respondents are less positive
(23 % of the disagreed or strongly disagree with this statement) than the EUSDR
respondents (46% agreed or strongly agreed), given the difference of
22percentages points. 2c) 31 % of the respondents disagreed or
strongly disagreed that the multilevel governance dimension was fully taken
into account in the actions and decisions taken for implementing projects,
actions or policies at Member States level/at project level. The stakeholders of the EUSBSR are less
positive than the EUSDR (17 percentage points difference). 31% of the respondents disagreed or
strongly disagreed that there is clear evidence that national, regional and EU
governance systems have improved thanks to the EUSBSR/EUSDR. However, 26 %
agreed or strongly agreed and 43% were neutral. The EUSDR respondents are less positive
(44% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement)
than the EUSBSR respondents (33% agreed or strongly agreed). 3. Funding 3a) 50 % of the respondents disagreed or
strongly disagreed with the statement that the alignment of national, regional
and EU policies and funding with the objectives of the EUSBSR/EUSDR had been
successfully achieved. When we examine the responses, we find
that the EUBSR respondents were more in agreement than the EUDSR respondents
(14 percentage points difference), 3b) 54.8% of the respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that technical assistance provided by European Commission
facilitated the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR. 36% though were neutral. The EUSDR respondents (62% agreed or
strongly agreed) were more positive than the EUDSR respondents (14%
difference), among whom 48% agreed or strongly agreed. 3c) 46% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that macro-regional strategies could contribute in mobilizing the existing
funding, to use it in more efficient and coordinated manner. When we examine the responses, we find
that the EUBSR respondents were more in agreement than the EUDSR respondents
(23 percentage points difference: while 56% of the EUSBSR stakeholder agreed or
strongly agreed, only 33% of the Danube respondents are of one of these
opinions). 3 d) According to 61% of the respondents
(agreed or strongly agreed) there is a need for additional funding only for the
project preparation stage and networking. This is especially in case in the EUSDR:
while 79% of the Danube respondents agreed or strongly agreed, 43% of the
EUSBSR did so. This fact corresponds to a difference of 37 percentage points. 4. Cooperation 4a) 37 % of the respondents disagreed or
strongly disagreed that at the absence of additional money favoured the
reinforcement of cooperation among partners and the main core partners (NCP,
PAC, HAL, and Commission). However, a nearly equal 33% agreed or agreed
strongly and 30% were neutral. 4b) 64% agreed or strongly agreed that the
cooperation mechanisms had improved thanks to the EUSBSR/EUSDR.
4c) 77% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR strengthened the existing
cooperation among and within participating countries, in particular among
ministries. 4d) 54% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the cooperation between EU Member States with neighbouring non-EU
countries expanded and improved thanks to the relevant macro-regional strategy.
However, the EUSDR respondents are more
positive than the EUSBSR respondents, taking into account the difference of
37%. 79% among the Danube respondents agreed or fully agreed with the
statement. In comparison to that, only 36% of the Baltic respondents agreed or
fully agreed (25% disagreement or strong disagreement). 4e) 27% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed to the statement that cooperation had led yet a tangible effect on
national policies such as those on environment, energy and etc. However, a
nearly equal 28% agreed or agreed strongly and 44.9% were neutral. When we examine the responses, we find
that the EUDSR respondents are less positive than the EUDSR respondents (8
percentage points difference regarding disagreement) 5. Policy orientations 5a) 60% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR helped to move from a
sectoral approach to a multi-sectoral, integrated one. EUSDR respondents are more positive than
the EUSBSR respondents (23 percentage points difference). 5b) 50% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that many successful projects and actions would not be implemented if
the EUSBSR/EUSDR would not have been endorsed. However, 24% disagreed or
disagreed strongly and nearly equal 25% were neutral. EUSBSR respondents are in more agreement
than the EUSDR respondents (24.2 percentage points difference). 5c) 62% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the macro-regional strategy helped to mobilize the existing
policies and create more synergies. EUSBSR respondents are in more positive
than the EUSDR respondents (10 percentage points difference). 5d) 20% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed to the statement that macro-regional strategies could lead changes in
policy developments in several areas in respective country. However, 32%
disagreed or disagreed strongly and 48% were neutral. 5e) Only 14% of the respondents agreed or
strongly agreed to the statement new policy developments had improved the situation
in the areas concerned, and that this improvement would be measurable or could
be described. However, 30.2% disagreed or disagreed strongly and more than the
half, that is 56%, were neutral. 6. Next programming period 6a) 94% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed to the statement that the objectives of the macro-regional strategy must
be firmly embedded in the 2014–2020 policy framework at EU, national and
regional level (high agreement among both groups: EUSBSR as well as EUSDR
respondents). 6b) 88% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the EUSBSR/EUSDR core partners (NCP, PAC, HAL) should be consulted
in/associated to the discussions of the next programmes in their respective
countries (high agreement among both groups: EUSBSR as well as EUSDR
respondents). The EUSBRS insider respondents were 89%
rather or strongly agreed and the EUSBRS outsider respondents were 84% rather
or strongly disagreed. The EUSDR insider respondents were 92%
rather or strongly agreed and the EUSDR outsider respondents were 100% rather
or strongly agreed. 6c) 75% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that relevant, actions or projects of the macro-regional strategy should
be clearly identified in the draft programmes submitted to the European
Commission. EUSDR respondents are more positive than
the EUSBSR respondents (18 percentage points difference). 6d) 64% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that that for each priority area/horizontal action, a cooperation
platform (where PAC/HAL, programmes authorities, projects managers, NGOs, etc.
can exchange) and a Steering Committee should be set up. EUSDR respondents are more positive than
the EUSBSR respondents (20 percentage points difference). Chapter 2: independent assessments of external experts 2.1 Added value of macro regional strategies: a governance perspective by Kai Böhme (Spatial Foresight GmbH) 08.03.2013 Some selected key
findings deriving from this paper §
Too
young.
Macro regional strategies are still rather new and have not been around long
enough to allow for solid conclusions about their actual added value. §
Transnationality. Macro
regional strategies offer a new governance framework for approaching
development challenges and potentials, which cannot be solved by the states
(independently from each other) and are too specific for the macro region to be
approached at EU level. However, there is a risk that the focus on issues
specific for a macro region is weakened by an increasing attention to more general
policy priorities. §
Multi-sector. Macro
regional strategies offer a new governance framework for brining together
various relevant sector policies to approach joint challenges or potentials. Bringing
together resources (financial and non-financial) of relevant sectors can
contribute to more efficiently approach development challenges and potentials.
However, there is a risk that the focus is rather on contributions in terms of
funding single projects that can be linked (vaguely) to the macro regional
challenges or potentials. §
Complexity. The
governance frameworks set up for macro regional strategies are rather complex and
rely on a wide range of stakeholders. The challenge is to keep all stakeholders
committed and motivated in the long-run. §
Political
backing.
The high political profile and backing of macro regional incl. attention at
Council Level is an important asset with regard to their standing as a platform
bringing together different policy sectors and levels. §
Action. Various
flagship projects have been linked to macro regional strategies. Whereas some
exist independently from the strategy, others show that stakeholders develop
new activities inspired by macro regional strategies. A lot of the actual added
value of macro regional strategies will be generated by their projects and their
ability to stimulate projects which would not have come about otherwise. A governance perspective Macro
regional strategies are integrated frameworks, which allow the EU and Member
States to identify needs and match them to available resources through
coordination of appropriate policies. The strategies shall contribute to better
governance of large territories confronted with similar problems. The basic
principle of macro regional strategies is therefore to rationalise existing
resources and use them more efficiently. The general objective of
the strategies is to address macro regional challenges. The specific
objective is to develop a framework for the individual challenges and address
deficiencies in governance structures to ensure that a range of strategic
actions to deal with the challenges are implemented in the most efficient,
effective and coherent way. (see COM 2009/REGIO/02) 3
No’s as framework conditions. From the beginning, three No’s have been spelled out clearly
(COM (2009) 0248 final), partly to avoid the risk of a high-spending,
ineffective and ‘vast contraption’ once the first enthusiasm over a new
strategy has faded: No new EU legislation. The driving moments are
Action Plans which also underline developments and regular updates and
adaptations to new developments. No additional new legislation is envisaged for
developing and implementing macro regional strategies. No new EU funds. There is no own budget for
macro-regional strategies. “Though this aspect maybe seen as a weakness, it
seems to constitute an innovative factor, given that all actors are stimulated
towards a greater degree of coordination and synergies of the various financial
resources available at different levels.” (Stocchiero 2010) The aim is to use
existing funds more effectively and in a more coordinated way. No additional EU formal
structures.
Instead of creating new institutions, the macro regional strategies are to be
supported by a multi-level and multi-actor governance approach. These
three No’s are however not uncontested, and there are even proposals for a
‘three yeses rule’: more complementary funding, more institutional coordination
and more new projects. (European Parliament, Committee on Regional Development
2011) Integrated
approach as potential.
The added value of the macro regional strategies is often seen in the
integrated approach, i.e. a collective action that strives towards a common
objective, providing a platform for bringing together various actors, policies
and financial resources. Consequently, the potential to mobilise a broad range
of stakeholders and create a broad and shared ownership is a key strength of
macro regional strategies. It
is argued that macro regional strategies offer a new pragmatic approach to
finding more efficient policy modalities and better coordination among existing
institutions and resources. Macro regional strategies aim at providing integrated
governance approaches addressing a pressing issue of policy making in Europe:
the need for better policy coordination in order to increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of policy making. Potential
to reduce the costs of non-coordination? Robert et. al (2001) pointed at the
costs of non-coordination of European policies. The question whether the integrated
governance approach used for the macro regional strategies can reduce these
costs would need to be subject to a specific study. This could investigate
whether the costs of non-coordination could be reduced and what are the costs
of the coordination procedures introduced by macro regional studies. Macro
regional strategies often are considered as an example of integrated
(territorial) governance, even advocating the idea of place based policy
making. The governance structures for drafting and also implementing the
strategies are rather complex and involve a wide range of different stakeholders.
The review of existing documents shows, that macro regional strategies have
good potentials to improve policy coordination in three different ways, i.e.
transnational (coordination between countries), multi-sector (coordination
between sectors), multi-level (coordination between levels). However, there are
also a number of obstacles, which suggest that these potentials are not fully
realised.
Transnational coordination Broaden
geographical perspective of sector policies. Many development challenges and
potentials cut across administrative boundaries and call therefore for joint
approaches. There is an increasing demand for shared implementation mechanisms.
Macro regional strategies stress the need to approach development challenges
and potentials in a wider geographical context, as appropriate responses
require joint approaches across national boundaries. This line of thought can
enrich European and national policy developments and there are indications that
the strategies function as ambassadors and manage to inspire other policy
developments to transnational approaches. A few examples are mentioned in the
below textbox as well as in other textboxes throughout this paper. Examples: Strengthening
transnational solutions The vision of the Clean
Water project is to create a vital Baltic Sea Region Clean Water Cluster,
a cooperation platform of different clusters for interaction of all triple
helix sectors in the BSR. The purpose of this platform is to develop water
protection with new and innovative technologies, products and services. The
cluster combines competences of BSR countries’ innovation milieus, clusters and
SME-networks around water protection (wastewater treatment, hazardous chemical
substitution), to bring business opportunities and boost competitiveness of the
Baltic Sea Region. (Source: http://www.bsrstars.se/project/clean-water/) “Develop and improve
coordination and cooperation among Member States and stakeholders” on fisheries
management in the Baltic Sea. A forum called Baltfish has been established to
enhance collaboration among Baltic Sea Member States as a first step towards
further regionalisation of fisheries management. The forum will elaborate with
relevant Baltic Sea organisations including the BS RAC and HELCOM how
integration of concerned stakeholders in fisheries management and policy
implementation can be strengthened and the forum be developed further in this
regard. (Source: SEC(2009) 712/2) Dubois
et al. (2009) go even one step further and suggest that macro regional
strategies may help avoiding cannibalistic competition between regions, and
rather foster competition on the basis of complementarities. To what degree
this happens is hard to tell at present. Despite
the positive examples, one needs to remember that transnational and
cross-border cooperation is not entirely new. Cooperation across national
borders (not only in the meaning of Interreg) has been promoted for a long time
in Europe and a range of institutions and platforms have been established
during the past decades. In parts these sub-regional cooperation groups do also
facilitate processes of European integration. In that sense macro regional strategies
are nothing new, but rather offer a platform for improved cooperation between
existing sub-regional groups or (as e.g. in the Alpine case) are perceived as
giving new stimulus or momentum to existing cooperation areas. Contributing
to working-level links with Third Countries. With regard to cross-border
coordination, the integration of Third countries is of particular interest (at
least for macro regions going beyond the EU). Macro regional strategies are a
flexible framework complementing existing EU and national policies. With
relation to Third countries, they can be seen as a tool for bridging European
Neighbourhood Policies and territorial development policies. The involvement of
non-EU partners in macro regional strategies may facilitate (a) the collaboration
between institutions and governments in and outside the EU, and (b) a gradually
economic integration and make EU’s external borders less of an obstacle to the
flow of goods, services, capital and persons within a macro-region. (see Dubois
et al. 2009). Examples: Cooperation
with Third countries “Implement fully the EU –
Russia Energy Efficiency Initiative”, particularly the annual work programmes
of the Joint EU – Russia Thematic Group on Energy Efficiency of the EU – Russia
Energy Dialogue, to be implemented jointly by the EU and Russian side. “Assessment of regional
nutrient pollution load and identification of priority projects to reduce
nutrient inputs from Belarus to the Baltic Sea”, in particular in the context
of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. The aim of this project is
to reduce the nutrient inputs from Belarus to the Baltic Sea in the context of
the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, with particular consideration
given to such key sectors and areas as agriculture, municipal waste water,
industry, and the production and use of detergents containing phosphorus. So
far, the terms of reference for an assessment and identification study have
been developed by the Central Research Institute for Complex Use of Water
Resources, the Ministry of the Environment, Finland, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and HELCOM, and agreed with the
Belarusian Ministries of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection and the
Ministry of Housing and Communal Services. (Source: SEC(2011) 1071 final) “Monitor implementation
of the priorities of the EU-Russia Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation”
for ensuring trade facilitation and the protection of citizens, and combating
fraud. The Strategic Framework is based on three broad priorities: a) Safe and
fluid trade lanes; b) Risk management and fight against fraud; c) Investment in
customs modernisation. (Source: SEC(2009) 712/2) At
the same time, the Baltic Sea Strategy has been developed with focus on
internal dynamics of EU integration and only little attention has been paid to
external relations. Although Russia is an important player for various
development in the Baltic Sea Region it is not part of the Strategy. The
involvement of Russia runs via the involvement of Russian partners in flagship
projects and existing frameworks such as the Northern Dimension. This
imbalanced involvement of EU and non-EU Member State may weaken the Baltic Sea
Strategy (see Dühr 2009 and Borg 2009). The situation is somewhat different in
the case of the Danube Strategy. Also here non EU Member States are not part of
the strategy, but play a larger role in the implementation activities, e.g. as
priority coordinators and by involving funding sources targeting non-EU areas,
e.g. WBIF[1] and ENPI CBC[2]. Overall,
macro regional strategies seem to increase the transnational dimension in
various policy sectors. They contribute to a better integration of countries
covered by a macro region as well as on developing joint approaches which are
more efficient than approaches taken by single countries independently. With
regard to the involvement of Third countries, there are a series of flagship
projects that address Third countries. The exact success is however hard to
tell from available information. In any case, approaches to integrating Third
countries in the work on macro regional strategies need to be detached from
sensitive diplomatic issues. Cross-sector coordination Platform
for stakeholders from different EU and national policy sectors. Macro regional strategies aim
at bringing together a wide range of different policy sectors and underline the
necessity that different policy sectors need to cooperate in order to firstly
define the most pressing issues for a macro region and thereafter develop and
implement a suitable strategy. In that sense macro regional strategies are a
valuable platform. To
a certain degree this approach has been successful as it has brought new
stakeholders to the table and made them thinking about the development of the
macro region outside their usual institutional context. Indeed, both at EU
level and in some Member States, the elaboration of the macro-regional
strategies implied major efforts of bringing together representatives from a
wide range of different policy sectors. For the Baltic Sea Strategy, DG Regio
coordinated the input of about 20 other DGs just at EU level, let alone the
wide range of national ministries involved in various consultations. However,
it would be naïve to believe that this goes without any conflicts between
different policy sectors and their ambitions to be the integrating or
coordinating body. Borg (2009) points at the challenge of how to achieve more
efficient cooperation in the case of overlapping policy agendas. One example from
the Baltic Sea Strategy is the Integrated Maritime Policy, which – similar to
macro regional strategies – aims at a better coordination of different policy
areas, albeit with focus on a more coherent approach to maritime issues. Another
example from the Danube Strategy concerns the work towards a more integrated
approach to the Danube river taking into account both the Danube as transport
axis and the environmental concerns related to the Danube river. Overall,
the multi-facetted policy platform provided by macro regional strategies
facilitates dialogue and mutual influence between different policy sector
policies. In the ideal case this may even go beyond their respective
contribution to the development and implementation of a strategy and even
result in mutual learning or dialogue with regard to other policy developments.
Next
to the wide governance arrangements used to develop and implement macro
regional strategies, also the non-existence of specific funds may play a
crucial role for keeping different sectors on board and in dialogue with each
other in order to continuously work on the implementation of the strategies. Macro
regional projects funded by a large number of sector instruments. Macro regional strategies
have been successful in bringing on board other sector policies. This been
illustrated e.g. with regard to the funding sources used financing flagship
projects of the strategies. The Action Plans provide examples of different
financing sources that are used, and illustrates the potential of the
strategies to contribute to a better coordination and alignment of funding. Next
to ERDF[3] programmes a wide range of
other funding sources from other European sector policies as well as non EU
sources contribute to funding flagship projects of macro regional strategies,
e.g. ESF[4], CPFI[5], EIB[6] & EIF[7], TEN-T[8], JRC[9], FP7[10] as well as national, regional and Nordic
sources fund projects. The below box provides some examples on project funded
via schemes from different EU sector policies. This shows that a wide range of
different EU sector policies contribute with their respective funding
instruments to implementing the macro regional strategy. At
the same time, experience form the Baltic Sea Strategy also shows that the
contribution of the different financing sources differs widely. SWECO (2011)
underlines, that there is a concentration to a few of over 100 (theoretically)
available funding opportunities: “The five most mentioned sources of funding
were the following, starting with the most mentioned; Baltic Sea Region
Programme, South Baltic Programme, TEN-T (different schemes), Central Baltic
Programme, Nordic Council of Ministers (different schemes).“ (SWECO 2011, p.
12). Examples: Sector policies
strengthening macro regional approach ESF. The Managing
Authority for the European Social Fund (ESF) in Sweden, will the coming years
strengthen the transnational cooperation between projects funded by the ESF in
the Member States. A particular focus will be on the cooperation between
projects and stakeholders in the Member States in the Baltic Sea Region. The
Baltic Sea Network ESF project will serve that purpose, for Sweden as well as
for the other Member States concerned. The intention is also to analyse the
relation and linkage between the ESF and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region (EUSBSR). Subsequently actions will be taken to encourage projects to be
better prepared to support the implementation of the social dimension in the
EUSBSR. A network of the Managing Authorities for the ESF between the Member
States concerned – Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
and Germany - has been consolidated and a number of joint activities will
be carried out: conferences, partner search forums and learning seminars in
Sweden as well as in the other Member States. (Source: http://www.inclusiveeurope.se) CPFI. The project
14.3 is financed with support from the European Commission through the EU Civil
Protection Financial Instrument. The project aims to develop scenarios and
identify gaps for all main hazards and the potential of such hazards in the
Baltic Sea Region, in order to anticipate disasters, thus enabling a rapid and
effective EU response through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. The
work will reinforce disaster prevention and response capacity as well as
coherence and coordination between different institutions. (Source: http://www.14point3.eu) TEN-T. The flagship
project conducted a feasibility study on LNG infrastructure for short sea
shipping was financed via TEN-T. The purpose of the project was to develop
recommendations for how to establish an infrastructure facilitating the use of
LNG as a ships’ fuel. However, other important areas have also been identified.
The project’s recommendations concentrate on five main areas: Bunkering of
ships with LNG, Economic and financial conditions, Safety, Technical and
operational conditions and finally Permits for an infrastructure ashore.
(Source: SEC (2009) 712/2 – status February 2013). JRC. The Joint
Research Centre has launched an initiative to provide scientific support to the
Danube Strategy, in cooperation with key partners from the Region. Work has
already started on the setting-up of Danube-wide reference scientific data
sets, which will allow policy makers and other stakeholders to access
comparable and harmonised data on common challenges, such as water and soil
quality, or landscapes. FP7. The 7th
Framework Programme for Research, has launched three calls specifically
addressing Danube Region challenges. Regional Example. The state of
Baden Württemberg has set aside funds to support the implementation of the EU
Strategy for the Danube Region, with a special focus on providing support for
the initial phase of projects with an explicit macro-regional impact. Whereas
the strategies as such are multi-sectoral the implement projects usually focus
on a specific issue within a specific policy sector in order to make progress
on concrete implementation tasks. To what degree single projects influence
other sectors than their own is hard to tell. In that sense one may conclude
that although the strategies set out to integrate different (sector) processes,
their orientation (in terms of projects) tends to remain rather sectoral. More
attention could be paid to sector-integrating or cross-cutting tools and
instruments. Nevertheless, going beyond single projects, macro regional
strategies provide a platform where resources from different sectors are used
to achieve common macro regional objectives.
Multi-level coordination European
and national level key players. Macro regional strategies aim also at bringing together
stakeholders from different policies levels. The work with macro regional
strategies relies on the capacity to bring together different policy levels and
funds from different policy levels in a transnational approach. When it comes
to strategy development, mainly the European level and the Member States are involved.
Overall, closer and better coordinated action at various levels of governance
is seen as a positive step towards further deepening of EU integration process.
(see Katsarova 2009, and Cugusi & Stocchiero 2010). “Bottom-up”
development of priorities. One
important aspect of the multi-level coordination is the development of thematic
orientations of a macro regional strategy. Macro regional strategies focus on
themes identified in a “bottom-up” process, were various consultations process
and in particular national representatives play an important role. The basic
idea is that, macro regional strategies work on themes which are perceived as
common and important to the participating countries. The
“bottom-up” approach may generate thematic orientations which are not (as
highly ranked) on European or national policy agendas, but which address actual
challenges of the region. It might even offer opportunities to become more
concrete and address pressing issues (incl. conflicts of interest) which in
EU-wide strategies might be covered by rhetoric because of the diversity of the
EU. (see Böhme & Zillmer 2010) Regional
and local level important implementers. There is a certain criticism that the
local and regional level is not sufficiently taken on board when it comes to
the development of the strategies. At the same time stakeholders from the local
and regional level can play a substantial role when it comes to the
implementation of the strategies, although not all are interested. On the one
hand regional stakeholders are e.g. involved in the implementation structures
of macro regional strategies, e.g. by taking on responsibilities as priority
area coordinators. On the other hand, a regional stakeholders are involved in
concrete projects. A wide range of projects bridges local or regional
action/responses with national policies in the countries involved and
development challenges or potentials at macro-regional level or even EU wide
policy approaches. Facilitating
the implementation of EU policies. Macro regional strategies comprise among others flagship
projects with a focus on improving or furthering the implementation of EU
policies in the countries or regions covered by the strategy. There are e.g.
projects linked to the EU chemicals regulation REACH (1907/2006/EC), European
Transport Networks (TEN-T), the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EG), as well as to the agreements
within the Helsinki Convention on the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP). Informing
European, national and regional policy processes. A wide range of projects also aim at
providing new evidence relevant for improving policy making at various levels
of decision making. Examples can be found with regard to many different policy
fields and the envisaged actions roughly be grouped in three categories (a)
providing new information through studies or monitoring exercise, (b) informing
relevant stakeholder, and (c) setting up transnational networks for increasing
information flows and efficiency by sharing resources. Examples: Implementing
and improving EU policies The project “Reduce the
Use of the Substances of Very High Concern in the Baltic Sea Region” aims at
including substances relevant for the environment in the Baltic Sea region,
such as the recommendations made through the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), to the
REACH candidate list. Selected substances will be assessed to see whether they
fulfil the REACH criteria of SVHCs. If that is the case, the substances will be
incorporated into an extended SIN-list and work for their later inclusion in
the candidate list will be carried out. (Source: http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu) The project “Implementing
European space for maritime transport without barriers in the Baltic Sea
Region” addresses several legislative measures, including a proposal aimed at
simplifying administrative formalities based on Community regulations and
recommendations to the Member States for reducing the administrative burden
imposed on shipping companies. (Source: SEC(2009) 712/2) The project “Complement
the agreed priority transport infrastructure” addresses a number of TEN-T
priority projects in the Baltic Sea Region. To the target group to be addressed
by the project belong national long-term infrastructures planners in the Baltic
Sea region, national, regional and local politicians, governments and
governmental agencies, public and private stakeholders in the transport sector
and transport networks in the Baltic Sea Region (Sources: SEC(2009) 712/2 and http://www.baltictransportoutlook.eu) Overall,
macro regional strategies strengthen multi-level coordination in different ways.
When it comes to strategy development a key aspect is the interaction between
the European and national level and potential to identify genuine priority
areas that require transnational cooperation but are not suitable for EU-wide
policies. Looking at single project, there is a large variety of specific
project activities focusing on multi-level aspects of policy design and
implementation in different policy areas. At this stage also the regional and
local level is included. Specific & focused or broad & inclusive? There
are a number of aspects which may hamper a clearer added value of macro
regional strategies. Overall, macro regional strategies have a tendency to
focus very broadly at a better coordination between sectors, levels and across
countries. This integrated approach to providing a new governance platform for
better policy coordination comes at a cost: complexity. Complex
structures and risks of fading ownership. Given the broad nature of the strategies
and the absence of single institutions for their implementation, they develop
rather complex implementation mechanisms. These rely on a wide range of
organisations that take over responsibilities and carry through coordination
tasks. The multiplicity of actors brings the risk that a strategy could lose
(a) focus and (b) the ownership and responsibility felt by the single
stakeholders. If the feeling of ownership and subsequently commitment and
responsibility towards the strategy declines, the entire strategy is weakened.
This leads ultimately to the question whether the complexity needed for the
elaboration and in particular for the implementation of the strategies is too
high to actually being able to make use of the manifold potentials for better
coordination offered by them. Potential stronger links
between macro regional strategies and ETC or EGTC Both cases are rather
risky. Many involved stakeholders may see them as opportunities to be freed
from their responsibility and obligations to contribute to the (implementation
of) macro regional strategies. Consequently macro regional strategies would be
downgraded to the level of the spatial strategies which where elaborated as
guiding documents of transnational cooperation 10 to 15 years ago. (see also
Zilmer et al. 2012) “Interreg solution”. The
transnational dimension of macro regional strategies implies that transnational
cooperation programmes often are seen as the most natural funding opportunity. Such
a development risks, that many other funding actors will reduce (their
partially already low) engagement / contribution to implementing macro regional
strategies and leave it all for transnational cooperation programmes. This in
turn will weaken the cross-sector coordination dimension of the strategies as
the implementation will be dominated by the Interreg Community. Furthermore,
territorial cooperation programmes might not be financially strong enough to
support all kinds of activities (e.g. infrastructure investments) needed to
achieve the aims of the strategies, nor is it guaranteed that all themes of the
macro regional strategies are eligible for territorial cooperation. Instead of
giving the impression that transnational programmes will be the main
implementer of macro regional strategies, efforts are needed to increase the
ownership and contribution of other sectors and their funding sources (incl.
other Structural Funds programmes). (see also Zillmer et al. 2012) “EGTC solution”. The idea to
set up an EGTC for implementing a macro regional strategy has been aired in
some informal discussions. Indeed, it may have the charm that there would be
finally a clear responsible for driving the processes and could possibly keep
the momentum in the implementation. However, this would be a clear deviation
from the announced “No” to new institutions. Furthermore, it would bring about
multiple questions as concerns the financing of such an EGTC, as well as the
membership and its implications for the broad governance approach on which the
strategies are currently based. There
are signs that the commitment is not always as high as might be desirable or
needed. SWECO (2011) points for the Baltic Sea case towards the need for
increased support and commitment by the Member States including a strengthening
of their National Contact Points and the Priority Area Coordinator. Along a
similar line stakeholders involved in the Danube case point out that they need
further political support from the European Commission to activate relevant
national or regional stakeholders (see e.g. Summary of the 3rhd meeting of the
EUSDR Contact Points and Area Coordinators, or EUSDR Report June 2012 Priority
Area 10 Institutional capacity and cooperation). High-level
political backing.
In comparison to other policy fields, macro regional strategies can refer to a
strong political backing. They are not just agreed and dealt with at informal
ministerial meetings, or meetings of transnational monitoring and steering
committees. They do have the attention and backing at the level of the European
General Affairs Council. This is an important asset with regard to their standing
as a platform bringing together different policy sectors and levels. What ever
is to be done in future, it should be ensured that this high-level political
backing remains and is not downgraded. Between
unique focus and collecting pond. There is a constant criticism that the strategies are
thematically too broad and not focused enough. Whereas a broad thematic
approach is seen as an advantage with regard to the possibility to involve a
wide range of different sectors, it may also be a hinder when it comes to
actually developing into a powerful tool. As outlined above, one strength of
the strategies is seen in the fact that they manage to point towards real
development challenges (which require joint action) in the respective
geographical area. At the same time there are also expectations that these
strategies reflect better the Europe 2020 aims and targets and cover most
aspects which are perceived as policy relevant. The question is to what degree
this suits a clear focus of the strategies on specific needs of the region. Overall,
the governance approach used for macro regional strategies focuses on a broad
involvement. This comes with a number of challenges and not all of them seem to
be solved at present. However, a quick fix and simple solution to solving these
governance challenges risks to become the beginning of the end of macro
regional strategies. Conclusions The
task of this paper was to provide input to a discussion on the added value of
macro regional strategies from a governance perspective. The following will
shortly summarise some key points. Main
achievements.
Macro regional strategies have the potential to contribute to improved
coordination between different policy sectors and policy levels and they also
do allow for increasing the efficiency of policy implementation by
strengthening transnational solutions. Whereas
macro regional strategies have potential at the level of the strategy itself
the main contributions are made at project level. As the strategies are still
rather young it is too early for counter factual assessments. At present it is
difficult to tell to what degree various projects would have been implemented
even without the existence of macro regional strategies. Dubois
et al. 2009 argue even that macro regional strategies may also be used to
accelerate the ‘catching up’ phase between the “new” and “old” Member States. To
further strengthen the role of macro regional strategies, it is necessary to continue
encouraging all EU funding sources in their geographical areas to contribute to
them. Otherwise, there is a risk that it will be mainly EU Cohesion Policy and
in particular territorial cooperation programmes that take the strategies on
board. This would certainly weaken the potential to contribute to a better
coordination of different policy sectors. Influence
on EU and national policy development. Macro regional strategies have a
potential to influence both EU and national policies. EU policies could be
influenced e.g. by the macro regional themes which are identified bottom-up and
therefore could also inform EU policy making with fresh ideas. At the same time
various flagship projects of the strategies focus on EU policies and on
informing policy design or improving policy implementation. As
for national policies it seems the main power of influence comes with the
various flagship projects which inform and improve policy development and
implementation in the countries and regions involved. This is done using
different types of funding. Furthermore, the strategies encourage stakeholders
in sector policies which usually operate at national or regional scale to
consider a transnational approach and investigate whether there are efficiency
gains by cooperating transnationally (see examples in textbox). Examples: Influencing
national policy making The MIMIC project has
comprehensive, holistic approach to risks related to maritime oil
transportation in the Baltic Sea. The final task of this project will be
carried out in order to consider, how the scientific findings of the other WP’s
and tasks could be implemented, in practise, in the society. Possible new
elements to legislation or international agreements are recommended. Also the
potential improvements of both safety and security related monitoring systems
(hard data, interviews, etc.) are suggested. In practice, a comprehensive seminar
for all managing organisations will be held during the project. In addition,
workshops will be organised: possible improvements to risk communication will
be discussed between managers. The risk model will also be discussed in a
workshop with the related actors (e.g. universities, Finnish Environment
Institute, Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Transport and
Communications, and maritime safety authorities). (Source: http://www.merikotka.fi) BRISK, a flagship project
under Priority Area Major Emergencies and co-financed by the Baltic Sea Region
programme, made headlines in both leading newspapers and TV news programs in
Denmark in late September. The project findings addressed the lack of response
capacity in case of, for instance, oil spills in the Baltic Sea. In this
respect, the Danish Defense Minister Nick Hækkerup has promised that this topic
gets top priority in discussions on the future Danish defense. (Source: EUBSR
News November 2012) Coordination
between different actors.
Macro regional strategies stress and support increased cooperation between
different stakeholders in order to increase the efficiency of public policy
making. In some cases this makes use of existing cooperation patterns and ways,
and in others new cooperation patterns emerge. Again, the strategies are too
young to engage in a counterfactual debate allowing to pinpoint details. With
regard to Third countries, macro regional strategies offer platforms for
increasing cooperation and reducing barriers at working level. Improving
governance structures.
Given the high complexity it also appears that the governance approach for
macro regional strategies does not necessarily serve as role model for
integrated policy making. At the same time, macro regional strategies are a
first step to improving the coordination of policy development and
implementation and may in the long-run also contribute to developing improved
governance structures going beyond single projects. There
are a range of projects that for concrete purposes and tasks work on
establishing joint solution across countries (and sometimes even across
sectors). Some of them may result in stable new governance structures. Main
drivers. At
the level of the strategy the main driver – next to the need to collaborate at
macro-regional level in order to solve certain challenges – seems the
enthusiasm for something new, at least in the beginning. In the long-run
however, it appears that the main drivers are the European Commission and a few
stakeholders in some Member States. There is a risk that the interest and
engagement of many national and regional stakeholders declines over time. The
projects create added value driven by single project partners. At large, three
different types of projects can be identified (a) strategic policy development
projects with rather broad and intangible impacts, (b) explorative pilot
projects often focusing on developing and testing new approaches and tools, and
(c) policy implementation projects e.g. focusing no how EU policies can be
better implemented in EU Member States. Overall,
challenges that only can be solved jointly at macro regional level are the key
driver. Recommendations Contributing
to EU2020 objectives as part of the hierarchy of policies Following
the above, macro regional strategies can work as a catalyst for improving the
implementation of European policies, directives and regulations in an area.
This can certainly also be true with regard to the Europe 2020 Strategy. However,
at the same time the text argues for a stronger focus of macro regional
strategies towards issues that require cooperation at macro regional level, as
they cannot be solved by each Member State individually and are too specific to
be solved by a EU-wide approach. Putting too much emphasis on macro regional
strategies as an instrument for achieving the Europe 2020 objectives might
contradict the need for a stronger focus. Building
blocks in reaching European objectives Macro
regional strategies can fill a vacuum between the Member State level and the
European level which is perceived by some people as the EU has grown large and
distant with its soon 28 Member States. There
are various different ways in which macro regional strategies can function as
building blocks in reaching European objectives: -
Macro
regional strategies can be important platforms for solving challenges and
utilising developing potentials more effectively than could be done individually
by each Member State or at EU level. -
Macro
regional strategies can function for increasing European integration, by
increasing the number of stakeholders and policy sectors that work at a
geographically wider scale than their usual national ore regional level. -
Macro
regional strategies can also facilitate the implementation of European
policies, directives and regulations in the Member States. Levels
of intensity in macro regional cooperation The
overall question is whether different levels of intensity in macro regional
cooperation are a problem, or not. Given the broad and inclusive character of
macro regional strategies and their implementation work there will always be
variations as concerns intensity and commitment. This
becomes problematic if the intensity and commitment for important parts of a
strategy decline to a degree that the implementation is at risk. To minimize
this risk, a stronger leadership and/or a stronger focus of the strategies may
help. A stronger leadership can help to keep a minimum of intensity and
commitment for all parts of a strategy, while a stronger focus may help to
reduce the complexity of the implementation mechanisms (as less it might
require the involvement of fewer stakeholders). Leadership
question and improving resilience To
increase leadership and reduce the fragility of the currently complex
implementation structures of macro regional strategies, two different options
can be imagined: -
Parametric
Governance Power.
Keeping the wide range of themes and stakeholders involved it seems necessary
to point out one “coordinating organisation” which gets a clear mandate to push
stakeholders that have taken over responsibilities where necessary. To do this
a clear and simple monitoring system would be needed at two levels: o
Priority
area level.
For all priority areas targets and related indicators need to be developed into
realistic and easily measurable targets (e.g. comparable to the Europe 2020
headline targets or ERDF programme indicators). The indicators presently used
are only partially suitable as clear measures on what progress has been made. The
development with regard to these targets needs to be monitored on annual basis
and the results need to be presented to the general public in an easily
understandable and communicative way. o
Stakeholder
level. To
strengthen the leadership and individual responsibility of every stakeholder
involved, there should be clear and measurable targets what each stakeholder
should achieve in each reporting period (e.g. year). These targets have to be
agreed upon with the stakeholders and should be developed based on each
stakeholder’s specific role in the implementation process (see e.g. document
such as one on rules and responsibilities developed for the Baltic Sea
Strategy). For both monitoring levels, the
“coordinating organisation” should regularly collect information on the
progress made to achieving the set targets, and remind or encourage
stakeholders to work towards their targets. By regularly publishing the
progress made on the website and pin pointing who has made good progress and
who not (naming, shaming and blaming), there would be a certain pressure /
incentive for everybody to try to work towards their targets. One may even
consider particular actions /penalties for stakeholders who have not achieved
their targets. This approach would follow the idea of parametric governance or
the open method of coordination. -
Exclusivity
Driver. Alternatively,
one might consider to reduce the number of stakeholders included in the implementation,
and make it a rather exclusive club. The rationale behind this would be that if
it is difficult and exclusive (honourable) to become part of the club of
stakeholders directly working with the implementation, this might motivate as
well as ensure commitment and efforts in the long-run. Recommendations
for future work Overall,
there are three main recommendations for future work that can arrive from the
above: -
Focus. As mentioned several times,
it might be wise to focus the strategies towards issues where there is a
genuine need or added value to cooperation at macro regional level (instead of
any other level). If it is necessary for political reasons to also include
other, broader policy fields, efforts should be undertaken to identify within
these policy fields particular actions with a clear macro regional rationale. -
Coordination
& monitoring.
Given the complex implementation mechanisms, it might be wise to appoint for
each strategy one stakeholder with a stronger coordination and monitoring responsibility
and the necessary resources, i.e. a “coordination organisation”. The monitoring
should also involve the activities carried out by the various stakeholders, and
the “coordinating organisation” need to have the standing to publicly present
which stakeholders have achieved a lot and which did not. -
Political
backing. The
high political profile and backing of macro regional incl. attention at Council
Level is an important asset with regard to their standing as a platform
bringing together different policy sectors and levels. The high level political
backing should be maintained. Literature Bengtsson, R.
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Challenges. In:
European Policy Analysis Issue 9-2009. Böhme, K. & S.
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europäischen Obstkörben und Papiertigern. In: Informationen zur
Raumentwicklung 2010 (8). COM (2009) Commission Staff Working
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Commission Staff Working Document concerning the European Union Strategy for
the Danube Region Impact Assessment Report. SEC(2010) XXX COM (2010)
Commission Staff Working Paper. Action Plan. European Union Strategy for the
Danube Region. SEC(2010) 1489 final. COM (2011)
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381 final. COM (2013)
Commission Staff Working Paper concerning the European Union Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region. SEC(2009) 712/2. Version of February 2013. Deabaltica
(2012) Expertise on information and communication issues for the European Union
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). Dubois, A., S.
Hedin, P. Schmitt & J. Sterling (2009) EU macro-regions and macro-regional
strategies – A scoping study. Nodregio electronic Working Paper 2009:4. Dühr, S.
(2011) Baltic Sea, Danube and Macro-Regional Strategies: A Model for
Transnational Cooperation in the EU? Notre Europe. European
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evolution of EU macro‐regional strategies: present practice and future
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Rapporteur: François Alfonsi, 21 October 2011. EUSBR
(2013) Roles and responsibilities of the implementing stakeholders of the EUSBSR
and a flagship project concept. Working document. Gløersen, E.,
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(2012) Strategy‐development
for the Alpine Space Second Draft Report. Grömar, W. (2010)
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Informationen zur Raumentwicklung 2010 (8). Katsarova, I.
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(EUSDR). Robert, J., T.
Stumm, J.M. de Vet, C.J. Reincke, M. Hollanders & M.A. Figueiredo (2001)
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(2009) Macro‐regional
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2.2
The added value of macro-regional strategies from the perspective of spatial
planning
Stefanie Dühr Nijmegen School of
Management Radboud University
Nijmegen, Netherlands Background
and introduction This
discussion paper was prepared as an input for the assessment of the added-value
of European Union (EU) macro-regional strategies from the perspective of
spatial planning. The European Council (Council 2011a) has invited the European
Commission to ‘clarify the concept of macro-regional strategies, to evaluate
their value added and submit the outcomes to the Council and the European
Parliament by June 2013’. The assessment of existing macro-regional strategies
should provide information on their effects to date and provide input for the
further development of the macro-regional strategies. Since its
inception, there has been considerable interest in the concept of EU
macro-regional strategies. The first macro-regional strategy – the European
Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) - was adopted in 2009 (CEC 2009a,
2010a, b),
followed by the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) in 2011 (CEC 2010c,
d).
Others are under discussion, e.g. for the Adriatic – Ionian region. Of a somewhat
different status, but relevant in a discussion on EU macro-regional strategies,
are other integrated policy frameworks of a transnational dimension, such as
the existing EU policy frameworks for the Northern Dimension[11]
and the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy[12]. The focus of macro-regional
strategies has from the beginning been on making more effective use of existing
funds, institutions / structures, and policies (local, regional, national, EU).
No new funding, legislation or institutions were supposed to be created. A macro-regional strategy has
been described as ‘an integrated framework’ (Samecki 2009: para 2.1), which is
expected to allow ‘the European Union and Member States to identify needs and
match them to the available resources through co-ordination of appropriate
policies’ (CEC 2010a: 2). This formulation places the spotlight on the key
ingredients of the EU macro-regional approach: the key actors (primarily the EU
institutions and the EU member states, as EU decisions don’t cover other
countries), a joint approach to identifying issues that require transnational
cooperation, and the role of the strategy as a framework for coordinating
policies and resources (including its governance arrangements for
implementation). Although EU
macro-regional strategies have not been presented as spatial planning
instruments (or as integrated spatial development frameworks),
reflecting the long-standing debate over an EU competence in this field, their
coordination objective and spatially-relevant goals and actions warrant this
paper’s focus on their added-value from the perspective of spatial planning.
The argument for considering whether macro-regional strategies offer
added-value for spatial planning in the Baltic Sea Region and Danube Region
derives from the core of their rationale, i.e. that large-scale landscape
features (the Baltic Sea, the Danube corridor), which each have their own very
specific characteristics and challenges, require a coordinated approach.
Coordination for such large-scale functional regions that cut across
administrative boundaries implies considerable political and governance
challenges, however, because of the great number of actors involved and because
each issue addressed at this level of scale may have a different functional
‘reach’ and therefore the boundaries of the macro-regions should be flexible in
response to the issue addressed. From a spatial planning perspective, and
respecting the principle of subsidiarity, this implies on the one hand that
macro-regional strategies should focus on ‘transnational issues’ only, i.e. issues
that countries or regions cannot address satisfactorily by acting alone. On the
other hand, it means that numerous actors at different levels of scale will be
involved in transnational spatial planning initiatives, and in different
geographical compositions depending on the issue considered. This implies great
complexity for governance arrangements in any policy area, but especially for
an area such as spatial planning which is in many countries not strongly
institutionalized at national level and where the argument for ‘upscaling’ a
spatial planning perspective to the transnational level may therefore not gain
much support. As this paper will show, indeed progress on injecting a spatial
planning perspective into the macro-regional strategies has been modest to
date, and the actual and potential added-value of macro-regional strategies for
spatial planning therefore requires further discussion. Objective of study and
approach The objective
of this study is to assess the added value of macro regional strategies from
the perspective of spatial planning. This is done through a review of publicly
available documents such as action plans, communications from the European
Council and the European Commission as well as other documents available on the
EUSBSR and the EUSDR websites. The assessment also refers to the impact assessments
that were completed prior to the launch of the two strategies. The questions
addressed in this paper are the following: ·
What are the main achievements in implementing the
macro-regional strategies and what contribution have they made to EU policies
and targets; national, regional, sectoral policies? The question of the
relevance of macro-regional strategies to EU Cohesion Policy[13]
and Europe 2020 Strategy objectives[14] particularly should be
addressed; ·
What concrete progress has been made in the priority
areas/horizontal actions/actions and flagship projects? ·
Do Macro regional strategies have the potential to influence
EU and national policy developments, e.g. through mobilization of existing
funding, and alignment of funding and policies with EU 2020 priorities and
programmes, and what evidence supports this? ·
What is the added value of macro regional strategies in terms
of coordination of activities between different actors; for example via
cooperation between EU Member States and Third countries, through improved
cooperation structures, development of new ways of cooperation or strengthening
existing ones? ·
What is the added value of the macro regional strategies in
terms of improving governance structures for the achievement of overall
objectives including interaction/links with other EU initiatives (such as the
Northern Dimension, Eastern Partnership, etc.)? ·
What are the main drivers to increase the added value of
macro-regional strategies for spatial planning in their establishment and in
their implementation? The
approach to this assessment requires setting out a few provisos. First,
macro-regional strategies are still very young and therefore ‘work in
progress’. The progress that has been made so far should be seen in this
context, especially considering the complexity of the task. Cooperation
structures need time to mature, so any assessment after a relatively short
period of time can only attempt to point out areas which may require further
attention in future, rather than allowing a comprehensive evaluation. Second,
this study relies on published sources (action plans, reports etc) that were
prepared by actors involved in the macro-regional strategies. While some
critical issues come to the fore in these papers, they are nonetheless by definition
to a certain extent self-referential and not based on external evaluation.
Moreover, macro-regional strategies were not presented as spatial
strategies, so the assessment of their added-value for spatial planning remains
somewhat hypothetical as evidence is scarce (and indeed there are relatively
few explicit references to spatial planning in the documents analysed). Definitions and conceptual
framework For a discussion of the added value of EU
macro-regional strategies from the perspective of spatial planning, it is
important to provide some definitions and a conceptual framework. The
traditionally land-based focus of spatial planning of EU member states has over
the past years been complemented by EU initiatives in the field of maritime
spatial planning (CEC 2008a). Maritime spatial planning is defined as ‘planning
and regulating all human uses of the sea, while protecting marine ecosystems.
It focuses on marine waters under national jurisdiction and is concerned only
with planning activities at sea’ (DG Mare website), thus it does not cover
management of coastal zones or spatial planning of sea-land interface. While
‘maritime spatial planning remains a prerogative of individual EU countries’
(ibid.), agreement at EU level should help to ensure that national, regional
and local maritime spatial plans are compatible and that conflicts can be
avoided and cross-border cooperation and investments are better coordinated.
While EU competences for maritime spatial planning are as weak as for
land-based spatial planning, the EU policy field has developed quickly and with
considerable support from the member states. In contrast to the fierce debates
over an EU involvement in land-based spatial planning since the end of the
1990s, seen as violating the sovereignty of nation-states and the subsidiarity
principle, the interest of EU member states and regions in coordinated
approaches to maritime spatial planning may at least be partly explained by the
novelty of this approach and the fact that domestic institutions had not been
well established (thus that resistance to change, as can be found in
established policy communities, is low). Reflecting the discussions
about the role of the EU in land-based spatial planning, in the academic
literature a distinction is now made between spatial planning at the
supra-national scale (e.g. for transnational spaces) and spatial planning
within nation-states, mirroring the distinction made between ‘spatial planning for
Europe’, and ‘spatial planning in Europe’ (Böhme and Waterhout 2008).
Spatial planning at a scale above the nation-state relies on different
mechanisms for achieving its goals than spatial planning within countries and
regions. Within nation-states, spatial planning is a sector of government activity alongside
others such as transport, agriculture and environment, and seeks to manage and
regulate spatial development and land uses in pursuit of agreed objectives. At
European level, spatial planning refers to creating
strategies and policies for the development of (parts of) the European
territory. What has been called the ‘European spatial planning approach’ concentrates
‘on establishing better co-ordination of spatial policy: horizontally across
different sectors; vertically among different levels of government; and
geographically across administrative boundaries’ (Dühr et al. 2010: 32). As
there is no explicit competence for spatial planning in the EU Treaties, and
reflecting the subsidiarity principle, spatial planning for Europe
focuses on the strategic dimension of spatial planning (as opposed to detailed
land use planning), and has relied on intergovernmental cooperation and
unanimous support of the participating governments for agreement on policy
objectives and to achieve the common goals. Spatial strategies for the EU
(such as the ESDP, TAEU or TA2020) or for transnational territories (such as
INTERREG IIC/IIIB transnational spatial visions) are thus by definition very
different instruments than ‘spatial plans’ prepared within the established
governance systems of sovereign nation-states. The scale, scope and range of
interests involved are much more diverse at the transnational level than for
the preparation of plans and strategies within member states. There is no law
or guidance that specifies the characteristics or content of transnational
strategies, nor are there clearly defined processes that would ensure their
implementation. Given their usually non-binding nature, transnational spatial
strategies are thus understood to function by ‘framing’ the understanding of
actors involved (e.g. sectoral actors who may have much stronger powers of
implementation) to particular problems and possible approaches, rather than
prescribing solutions. Such a shared understanding about the need for
collective action should then provide a lasting basis to ensure that the
strategy and its principles are applied in policy- and decision-making
processes (Dühr et al. 2010). Given the lack of strong
instruments, the communicative potential of transnational spatial strategies
requires particular attention. To ensure their continuing support and use,
transnational spatial strategies need to provide a vision ‘so powerful and
attractive that all those whose support is needed willingly range up behind it’
(Needham et al. 1997). Given the multitude of actors and interests involved and
the consensus-led process of preparing spatial development frameworks for the
European territory, this implies that spatial concepts are needed which are
‘capable of papering over the cracks between the various views prevailing’
(Faludi 2002: 904). Identifying issues for
cooperation at the supra-national scale inevitably involves struggles about the
prioritising of interests, rights and claims for policy attention. Yet the
filtering is a crucial process, because if strategies are to inspire and
motivate a range of actors over a long period of time, they need to be more
than merely an aggregation of issues. Moreover, the experience with the
transnational INTERREG programmes has shown that broad frameworks with largely
generic funding priorities rarely result in projects of real significance for
the transnational region (Panteia et al. 2010). It is therefore important that
policy priorities and actions are specific to the macro-region, and not merely
replicate EU policy objectives. Two types of truly transnational issues can be
identified, which offer real value for an ‘upscaling’ of policy responses: ·
Issues that are currently not dealt with appropriately within
a country and by nation-states acting alone, and ·
Issues that may in future not be dealt with satisfactorily by
nation-states acting alone as a consequence of changing framework conditions
(political, economic, environmental, social, or else). There are likely considerably
fewer issues that are usefully addressed at transnational level than the long
lists of actions and projects in the Baltic Sea or the Danube Region strategies would suggest. At present,
both the action plans for the Baltic Sea Region and for the Danube Region list
several issues that are of common concern or are not specific to the region. The need for cooperation among countries to
achieve effective coordination of all sea-related as well as land-based spatial
planning policies at the different decision-making levels when preparing comprehensive
and integrated plans is evident, and so is the link to the activities of EU
macro-regional strategies. While EU involvement in spatial
planning – certainly for the land-based component – has been critically viewed
by some member states, the inclusion of the objective of territorial cohesion
as a shared competence in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 has generally been
interpreted as providing an alternative approach to bringing the spatial
dimension into sectoral policy. However, there is to date no clear or
politically agreed definition of the objective of territorial cohesion which
would allow an assessment of whether the concept will be interpreted as a form
of European spatial planning (in the meaning presented above) in EU Cohesion
Policy 2014-2020 (cf. CEC 2008b). The EU Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region (EUSBSR) and spatial planning Littoral countries of the
Baltic Sea are eight EU member states (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany,
Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Belarus and Russia. Since the 1990s, the
countries surrounding the Baltic Sea have been cooperating at the transnational
level. Besides the political forum of the Council of the Baltic Sea States
(CBSS, also involving Norway and Iceland next to the littoral states), there
are other well-established forums of cooperation with influence on policy- and
decision-making, such as HELCOM[15] in the field of
environmental policy and VASAB[16] for transnational
spatial planning. Indeed, the ‘model’ for transnational spatial visions
prepared in the context of the transnational INTERREG IIC and IIIB Community
Initiative is commonly acknowledged to be the ‘Vision and Strategies around the
Baltic Sea 2010’ (VASAB2010 1994) document (Dühr 2011b). It was prepared by the
ministries for spatial planning and development of countries around the Baltic
Sea Region even before the INTERREG IIC initiative (which envisaged the
preparation of ‘transnational spatial visions’) was launched. The VASAB vision
sought to address shared concerns over environmental pollution of the shallow
sea and to consider policy responses for the somewhat peripheral transnational
region after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’. An action programme, entitled
‘From vision to action’ (VASAB2010 1996) proposed measures for the application
of the spatial vision. In 1997, INTERREG funding supported the process of
updating of the VASAB 2010 strategy (VASAB2010+ 2001). In 2009, the ‘VASAB
Long-term perspective for the Territorial Development of the Baltic Sea Region’
(VASAB LTP 2009) was adopted and is intended to provide strategic direction
until 2030. Main
achievements of the EUSBSR and contribution to EU, national and regional
policies It seems widely
accepted that the EU macro-regional strategy has at least partly succeeded in
overcoming the ‘stalemate’ of intergovernmental cooperation, given the high
political profile and EU involvement in many activities covered by the EUSBSR
(CEC 2010f). A report by the Commission
(CEC 2011a: 1) identified ‘commitment of partners at national, regional, and
civil society levels’. It further noted as main achievements that ‘the Strategy
has led to concrete action, with a more streamlined use of resources. New
working methods and networks have been established, and many initiatives
developed’, including the setting up of new projects (such as the designation
of marine protected areas in the Baltic Sea) and providing new momentum to
existing projects. The Commission report further finds that ‘the Strategy …
provides a common reference point for the many organisations in the Baltic Sea
Region’. Examples given to support this observation are the new framework for
the maritime community, which has brought together actors and initiatives
around the EUSBSR; and that ‘transport ministries in the Region now plan
infrastructure investments in a coordinated way’ (CEC 2011a). Despite
such positive signs, the Commission (CEC 2011a, b; CEC 2012a) highlights areas
for improvement, including: the need to reinforce the integrated nature of the
Strategy through closer alignment with the themes and flagships of Europe 2020;
to assure the European nature of the Strategy through regular discussions of
the Strategy at policy Councils; to establish targets to make the Strategy more
focused; to maximise efforts to align Cohesion Policy and other funding sources
in the Region with the objectives of the Strategy; to strengthen implementation
structures both financially and in terms of staff; and to develop a
“Communication initiative” to ensure broader participation in the Strategy, as
well as understanding of its overall achievements. A review of
the Action Plan was published in late February 2013.
The horizontal action on spatial planning (‘HA Spatial’) was maintained,
although with a more explicit focus on maritime spatial planning. In comparison
to the previous version, the new Action Plan has been broadened to include more
actions that are not directly spatial in focus, nor specific for the
macro-region. This implies a risk of watering down the initial intentions of
the macro-regional approach, and will certainly present further challenges to
applying a more explicit spatial planning perspective to the strategy, should
this be envisaged in future. Progress
on the priority areas/horizontal actions/actions and flagship projects While most of the
priority areas in the Action Plan are not explicitly spatial in focus, many can be expected to
either have direct, or at least indirect, spatial effects. There are isolated
examples where a reference to spatial planning is being made under individual
actions or flagship projects (e.g. Flagship project 2.1. (Fast Track) “Create
marine protected areas” (Lead: Germany)’) (CEC 2012b: 14). To date, progress on land-based spatial planning
within the EUSBSR in particular has been very slow, however. The implementation
report (CEC 2011b) refers to the LTP process and ministerial and stakeholder
meetings, and some relevant INTERREG IVB projects such as BaltSeaPlan,
Eco-Region, New Bridges, Baltmet Promo, TransBaltic and Rail Baltica Growth
Corridor. There is no clear evidence that these actions would not have taken
place also without the EUSBSR, and the current added-value of the EUSBSR for
land-based spatial planning is therefore doubtful. Furthermore, the question
could be asked whether such largely ‘soft measures’ will be sufficient to
achieve the ambition of providing horizontal coordination for the EUSBSR
priority actions and projects through spatial planning. There has been some
progress in the field of maritime spatial planning, with some projects (e.g. projects
‘Plan Bothnia’, ‘BaltSeaPlan Vision 2030’) completed, although only involving
EU member countries besides some international and transnational organisations
(CEC 2010f; CEC 2011b; Gee et al. 2011). The emphasis is on sharing data,
establishing joint principles and setting cooperation platforms, and on
supporting progress on national and regional maritime spatial plans. In the most
recent action plan (February 2013), the 17 priority areas (PAs) and 6
horizontal areas (HAs) are shown as contributing (in various degrees) to
achieving the three objectives (‘ to save the sea’, ‘to connect the region’,
‘to increase prosperity’) with related sub-objectives, thus seeking to
communicate the integrated approach. Indeed, Annex II of the Action Plan (CEC
2013: 191) shows that most priority areas that are presented as contributing to
achieving the defined sub-objectives are either explicitly or indirectly
spatial in focus (e.g. PA Ship, PA Transport, PA Energy, PA Nutri). This would
suggest that the HA on spatial planning would receive a more prominent role in
coordinating these PA’s and thus contributing to the objectives of the EUSBSR.
On the contrary, however, ‘HA Spatial’ is only shown to contribute directly to
sub-objective ‘Connecting People’ and to a lesser degree to the sub-objectives
of ‘Rich and healthy wildlife’ and ‘better cooperation’. In terms of
contributing to the EU2020 strategy, almost all PA’s and HA’s are shown to have
a relation. A notable exception is ‘HA Spatial’ which is not envisaged to make
a contribution to any sub-objectives of objective 3 to ‘Increase Prosperity’,
including the EU2020 strategy. In comparison to
the previous version of the Action Plan, which sought to give equal attention
to maritime and land-based spatial planning, the ‘HA Spatial’ in the Action
Plan of February 2013 almost exclusively focuses on maritime spatial planning. Land-based
spatial planning is mentioned in relation to the work of VASAB, noting that ‘the
VASAB Long Term Perspective for the Territorial Development of the Baltic Sea
Region (LTP) … should be taken into account by the coordinators of other
priority areas when they address spatial objectives, conditions and impacts of
their actions’ (CEC 2013: 170). It is doubtful that this reference will have
the desired effect of better coordinating land-based spatial planning around
the Baltic Sea, nor that it will achieve the overall goal of the horizontal
action, stated as ‘to achieve territorial cohesion perspective in the BSR by
2030, i.e. the region is a well-integrated and coherent macro-region, and it
has overcome the socio-economic development divides between its individual
parts and turned the global challenges into assets‘ (CEC 2013: 171). In the new
Action Plan, targets are only defined for the drawing up of maritime spatial
plans, whereas there are no indicators for land-based spatial planning.
Accordingly, only one flagship project is identified, ‘PartiSEApate –
Multi-level Governance in MSP (Maritime Spatial Planning) throughout the Baltic
Sea Region’, led by the Maritime Institute in Gdańsk, Poland. The updated action
plan seems to illustrate a trend of marginalizing spatial planning further,
rather than giving it a more prominent role by identifying the added-value for
the macro-regional strategy by seeking also spatial coordination. This may be a
flaw in the architecture, with allocating spatial planning to a ‘horizontal
action’, which seems added-on to the main priority areas rather than being
integrated throughout (something which would seem important to achieve the HA’s
ambitious goals). It may also be a problem of leadership and prioritisation,
despite the existence of VASAB in the BSR, which prevents considering the role
of transnational spatial planning for the BSR more explicitly, and especially
so for the land-based dimension. Evidence of the
potential of the EUSBSR to influence EU and national policy developments In terms of policy
development and coherence in areas of relevance to this paper, the Commission
report (CEC 2011a) takes positive
notice of the link between the regional implementation of the EU Integrated
Maritime Policy, and the progress on integration of maritime surveillance
systems which has been made in the BSR. There is no evidence that the
macro-regional strategy to date has provided any impetus for the review and
coordination of land-based spatial plans in the countries and regions around
the BSR, as it has for the development of maritime spatial plans. Indeed, the
EUSBSR does not seem to have made any substantial contribution to the ongoing
work of VASAB, nor does it seem to have revived the discussion on the role and
objectives for transnational spatial planning in the BSR. The need for a
better alignment of funding remains a key concern, and this is also of
relevance to the HA on spatial planning which may have fewer dedicated funding
sources to draw on, given the integrated nature of spatial planning and the
increasingly thematic orientation of many EU funding programmes (in pursuit of
the EU’s Growth and Jobs agenda). A recent study of ‘needs for financial
instruments in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’ (Savbäck et al. 2011:
3) concluded that ‘the implementation of the EUSBSR is perceived as a major
undertaking by the stakeholders. The development of partnerships and projects
is time demanding and real implementation requires financial resources. There
is still a certain hesitation regarding how the implementation is structured.
Many activities are in the start-up or early implementation phase and have a
preparatory or planning character rather than “real” implementation. However,
the implementation differs considerably between sectors as there are
differences of maturity in transnational cooperation. Currently, more than 20
different funding instruments are used as sources of financing, not including
national and regional co-financing sources. The implementation of most Priority
Areas is to a large extent dependent on EU Structural Funds… Despite the large
amount of available instruments it is clear that various financial and
non-financial needs are not sufficiently met.’ The European
territorial cooperation programmes, and especially the INTERREG IVB Baltic Sea
Region programme, are of particular relevance for the EUSBSR. The transnational Baltic Sea
Region Programme (INTERREG IVB) has contributed EUR 88 million to Flagship
Projects, and targeted its fourth call specifically to promoting the Strategy
(CEC 2011a). Yet, ‘when moving beyond projects covered by ETC programmes, all
other available instruments are perceived as difficult and non-accommodating
for transnational activities. This problem of funding is mainly related to
structural challenges, as many programmes (EU-funded, national and regional
alike) have difficulties to support transnational activities‘ (Savbäck et al.
2011: 4) In the Commission
report (2011a), several improvements to better align funding to the EUSBSR are
mentioned, including new selection criteria for several ERDF programmes in the
BSR. The recent review of the strategy has clarified the availability of
financial instruments for the main objectives (available as overview table on
the EUSBSR website). The main focus is on Cohesion Policy programmes, but
‘other programmes, funds and institutions’ are also listed. The ‘fit’ of
financial instruments with the EUSBSR has only been assessed in this table for
the main priority areas, however, and not for the horizontal actions which have
the most explicit focus on spatial planning. Yet, achieving spatial
coordination through a horizontal action as in the EUSBSR would clearly benefit
from some transparency about available funding. Added
value of macro regional strategies in terms of coordination of activities
between different actors and links with other EU initiatives Perhaps inevitably
given its ambition, the EUSBSR is characterized by a complex governance
structure, and in earlier reviews this prompted calls for an improved
organization structure. Recently, the roles and responsibilities of the
different actors have been clarified (Council 2012), and an overview made
available on the website of the EUSBSR. However, the focus has been on listing
contacts for (thematic) priority actions and flagship projects, rather than the
cross-cutting, ‘horizontal’, actions, where arguably a stronger lead and visibility
would be desirable. Moreover, the
governance arrangements are EU-centred, with scope for involving non-EU members
and other EU initiatives at the operational level (programmes, Flagship project
leaders) and the coordination level (Priority Area Coordinators, Priority Area
Focal Points, Horizontal Action Leaders), but not at the policy level (Council,
Commission, High Level Group). As
an EU initiative, the Strategy does not commit non-Member States. Existing
transnational bodies in the BSR, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States
(CBSS), the Nordic Council of Ministers or the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) or
VASAB, have well-established (intergovernmental) forms of cooperation between
EU and non-EU countries. The fact that the macro-regions are strategies of the
European Union has from the beginning put much weight on the need to establish
constructive cooperation with the external partners in the region, and in
particular Russia (CEC 2012b). The Northern Dimension, a common policy of the
EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, provides the basis for these external aspects
of the strategy. However,
Russia continues to seem to have limited involvement in the implementation of
the Strategy, either through specific projects or existing regional frameworks
such as the Northern Dimension. The implementation
of the Strategy through actions and projects is predominantly the task of
national ministries, national public agencies or transnational bodies, as
Annexe 1 shows. The Commission report notes efforts to involve more
sub-national actors and existing cooperative structures in the EUSBSR (CEC
2011a). Moreover, differences in the level of ambition (and achievements)
across the priority areas, depending on existing networks and the maturity of
cooperation arrangements on which the implementation could draw, has been noted
before (CEC 2010f). This may at least partly explain the differences in
achievements in relation to maritime spatial planning on the one hand, and
land-based spatial planning on the other. Main
drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies in their
establishment and in their implementation The Commission
Communication (CEC 2012a, later adopted by Council (2012)) proposed the
following key areas for improvement: ·
Improvements
to the strategic focus, by defining three key objectives for the EUSBSR and by
aligning the Strategy more clearly to the Europe 2020 objectives. ·
Alignment
of policies and funding, with a better coordination through the Common
Strategic Framework 2014-2020. ‘There must be a stronger transnational
dimension to national and regional programmes, as relying on territorial
cooperation programmes alone will not suffice…. When developing partnership
contracts and operational programmes, at the regional, national, cross-border
and transnational levels, macro-regional objectives and priorities must be
present’ (CEC 2012a). ·
Clarification
of responsibilities of different actors and improved governance arrangements.
The Strategy should be included on the agenda of the Council of Ministers in
its different formations as appropriate. Strategy considerations should be
reflected in budget and other discussions. Regional and municipal actors must
be more involved. Political commitment must be translated into administrative
commitment, with sufficient staffing and continuity of personnel. Involvement
of other stakeholders, including the private sector, and of third countries
should be improved. ·
Better
communication by promoting awareness of the Strategy and its results. Setting indicators
and targets and evaluating progress will be given increasing attention. While all of these
suggestions are sensible, they will arguably do little to strengthen the
coordination role of the horizontal action on spatial planning, given the
apparent focus on the main priority areas in clarifying the governance
arrangements and aligning funding. A closer connection to the EU2020
objectives, which are very thematic and largely non-spatial, will provide
further challenges for making sure the horizontal action on spatial planning
can live up to its stated goals. Overall, the
added-value of macro-regional strategies for spatial planning has been modest
and variable to date. An added-value is apparent for the area of maritime
spatial planning: as a new policy field both at EU level and in most countries,
and with a clear transnational focus on the maritime environment of the Baltic
Sea, the EUSBSR appears to have supported a constructive and cooperative
process for joint databases and cooperation on maritime spatial plans. These
may not be groundbreaking results yet, and have mostly been agreed between EU
member states only, but given the novelty of the EUSBSR they are a promising
start. This is especially so given what appears wide support by many actors in
the region (even if at present mostly from the EU), which may provide a lasting
basis for future (and more far-reaching) action. The same cannot be said for
land-based spatial planning, however. Indeed, the EUSBSR so far does not seem
to have brought any added-value to the work of VASAB. Given the EU-focus of
macro-regional strategies on the one hand and lack of EU competence for spatial
planning on the other, an intergovernmental approach such as pursued by VASAB
may seem more appropriate than a macro-regional strategy focused on spatial
planning. However, there are strong arguments for reconciling the maritime
spatial planning approach and the land-based dimension to a more comprehensive
and integrated approach, and the current trends in the BSR suggest that there
may be a danger of their lasting separation into different policy communities.
Spatial planning should be given a much more central role in the EUSBSR if such
cross-sectoral and multi-level governance coordination is to be achieved. The
coordination ambitions of the EUSBSR would make a case for more closely
involving VASAB and national and regional spatial planning ministries in the
actions and projects of the EUSBSR. Political commitment and appropriate
administrative capacity will be important to ensure EUSBSR initiatives on
spatial planning are well coordinated with those within the countries. First,
however, a clear definition of spatial planning (land-based and maritime, also
in relation to the EU objective of territorial cohesion) is required for a
discussion on the role of spatial planning in the BSR. The EU Strategy
for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and spatial planning The EU Strategy
for the Danube Region covers
eight EU
countries (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Bulgaria and Romania) and six non-EU countries (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova). While international cooperation
bodies exist for river basin management (e.g. the Danube Commission and the
International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River), there is no
transnational spatial planning institution for the Danube comparable to VASAB
for the BSR. The EUSDR (CEC
2010c: 6) places ‘emphasis on an integrated place-based approach. Good links
between urban and rural areas, fair access to infrastructures and services, and
comparable living conditions will promote territorial cohesion’. Based on the
many suggestions from the initial consultation (cf. CEC 2010g), four pillars
were defined to address the key issues for the region, with together eleven
thematic priority areas (see Annexe 2). There is no dedicated priority or
action for spatial planning, but it is mentioned in relation to some
initiatives such as the river basins management plan for the Danube (prepared
under the Water Framework Directive). Main
achievements of the EUSDR and contribution to EU, national and regional
policies In the First
Annual Forum on the EUSDR in November 2012 (Bayrische Staatsregierung 2012), it
was emphasised that the Strategy has strengthened cooperation in the region and at all
levels, and that numerous meetings and conferences were held. To date, over
seventy new projects have been recommended for funding, and several other
projects have been identified by the Priority Action Coordinators (PACs) as
contributing to achieving the targets of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region
(see EUSDR PA reports 2012). The reports note achievements in terms of
facilitating cooperation on concrete infrastructure investments (e.g. finalisation
of the Calafat-Vidin Bridge, Bulgaria-Serbia gas interconnector project), and
other spatially-relevant projects. For example, the DANUBE FLOODRISK project is
listed as having produced a ‘Manual of harmonized requirements on the flood
mapping procedures for the Danube River’, which should provide the basis for a
shared database. Progress
on the priority areas/horizontal actions/actions and flagship projects In the Impact
Assessment, albeit in a footnote, the European Commission referred to spatial
planning as an important means to achieve the objective of territorial cohesion
within the EUSDR. The report argued that ‘given the wide scope of these
objectives [of territorial cohesion], it requires a framework of multi level
governance for the integrated development of the area (namely through spatial
planning), horizontal coordination between sectoral plans and agendas (so as to
assure a coherence of sectoral policies); and vertical coordination between
levels (European Union, Member States and regional and local authorities)‘ (CEC
2010g). While this
consideration given to territorial cohesion and spatial planning has not
resulted in a dedicated priority (or horizontal action, as for the EUSBSR),
there are several actions with a spatial planning component (both maritime and
land-based) listed in the Action Plan under different priorities (CEC 2010d).
These are: ·
Priority
4) TO RESTORE AND MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF WATERS: Action - “To further
strengthen Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and Maritime Spatial
Planning (MSP) practices on the Western shores of the Black Sea”
In the PA 4 progress report (EUSDR
PA4 2012: 17), progress in the implementation of the action was reported as
follows: -
Development
of specific project regarding the improvement of the Integrated Coastal Zone
Management in the Black Sea Region: in progress, waiting for approval. -
Provide
contribution to the development of the ICZM Strategy for the Black Sea
coordinating with the Permanent Secretariat of the Black Sea Commission and its
Advisory: by 30 November 2013. -
Development
of a project proposal concerning Black Sea marine environment protection
including the planning of fishery, energy and transport activities: by 30 March
2013. ·
Priority 5) TO MANAGE ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS: Action - “To develop spatial planning and construction activities in the
context of climate change and increased threats of floods”, covering both
coordination and data exchange as well as coordination of land uses (also
taking account of expected climate change impacts).
In the progress report on PA5, it is reported that ‘No progress has been made under this
Action. We are looking for an organisation that can execute this Action.’
(EUSDR PA5 2012: 12) ·
Priority
6) TO PRESERVE BIODIVERSITY, LANDSCAPES AND THE QUALITY OF AIR AND SOILS: Action
- “To develop green infrastructure in order to connect different bio-geographic
regions and habitats (incl. Natura 2000 sites)”. ·
Priority
6) TO PRESERVE BIODIVERSITY, LANDSCAPES AND THE QUALITY OF AIR AND SOILS: Action
- “To prepare and implement transnational spatial planning and development
policies for functional geographical areas (river basins, mountain ranges
etc.)”. An example
of a project for this action is: “To implement the VASICA - Visions and
Strategies in the Carpathian area” (led by Carpathian Convention UNEP Office). ·
Priority 10) TO STEP UP INSTITUTIONAL
CAPACITY AND COOPERATION: Action - “To ensure
sufficient information flow and exchange at all levels”, including cooperation between planning institutes through the
development and implementation of cross-border cooperation in settlement and
regional planning. An example of a project that could be developed under this
action is mentioned: ‘To establish common guidelines for improving spatial
planning’ in order to ‘advise the local authorities on best practices for the
human settlements in the Danube Region and on the way to prioritise
infrastructure and other investments’ (CEC 2010d). This overview
shows that consideration of spatial planning as a coordination instrument is
rather selective under individual priorities, rather than consistently across
the EUSDR, and that progress have been variable to date. The approach taken
does not appear to lend itself to comprehensive spatial coordination and
remains partial. Indeed, the potential value of a stronger spatial planning
dimension in the EUSDR, or in any case the need for better coordination of the
spatial impacts of actions under different priorities, shines through in
several of the PAC progress review reports. Here it is acknowledged that ‘the
cross-sectoral cooperation between the different Priority Areas (e.g. transport
and environment) has just started in the first year of the EUSDR’s
implementation, but …. a more comprehensive cooperation form between the PACs
still needs to be developed’ (EUSDR PA1a 2012). Moreover, a need for ‘reliable and comprehensive data overview about planned,
on-going and existing projects along the Danube which …. allow to
identify the implementation status of the EUSDR’s PA 1a actions (including
gaps)’ has been identified (ibid.). For PA 1b, it is noted that ‘the
most important lesson so far is a general understanding of the contribution of
the EUSDR. It is important to coordinate activities beyond the actual
activities on the ground which has been initiated within different national
policies. As a critical element for the further work a need for the common
picture on the transport system in the region (common transport vision) was
identified. This picture should give a basis to the group to identify critical
projects for the region and to assure coordination with other priority Areas’
(EUSDR PA1b 2012: 3). Already work has begun on mapping the transport
infrastructure system of the Danube region (EU and non-EU Member States)in order
to identify bottlenecks and missing links (ibid.). Evidence of the potential of the EUSDR to
influence
EU and national policy developments The alignment
of funding has also appeared to be difficult for the EUSDR, and may have been
even more complicated by the later start of the Strategy, when ‘most of the
main funding programmes are exhausted or were undergoing or preparing their
last calls for projects, for which in many cases it was too late for new
project developments. .... As a consequence, main attention to align funding to
labelled projects had been given to the well known EU funding programmes,
mostly the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) programmes in general and
here the South East Europe Programme as the most prominent one’ (EUSDR PA6 2012:
13; see also EUSDR PA5 2012: 5-6). Moreover, ‘national
budget restrictions in several EUSDR countries’ have been identified for some
priority areas as presenting considerably challenges (EUSDR PA1a 2012). In the Annual Forum
(Bayrische Staatsregierung 2012), several initiatives to better align existing
funding to the EUSDR were reported. For example, the two transnational cooperation
programmes, South East Europe and Central Europe, have financed five new Danube
Strategy projects, with an overall budget of over EUR 10 million. The Danube
River is considered in its full length in the revised guidelines for the
Trans-European Transport Networks, allowing for funding in the TEN-T
programmes. However, it is emphasized that EU funding for the 2014-2020 should
be better aligned with the Danube Strategy (Bayrische Staatsregierung 2012). The Commission proposals to modify the
current geography of transnational cooperation programmes within the Structural
Funds, in order to create a future transnational cooperation programme for the
Danube Region (rather than two INTERREG ‘B’ programmes as currently) is
welcomed in the region, as it promises added value through ‘concrete financing
of Danube Region projects, as well as in providing technical assistance to the
governance structure of the Strategy’ (Bayrische Staatsregierung 2012). Added
value of macro regional strategies in terms of coordination of activities
between different actors including interaction/links with other EU initiatives In the Action Plan
for the Danube Region Strategy, non-EU countries are listed as co-coordinators
for several of the priorities (see Annexe 2), suggesting a more equal
involvement of all countries along the Danube than is currently the case for
the EUSBSR. Yet, also the EUSDR is faced with governance challenges. The reports from
the PACs highlight that participation in the Steering Groups varies
considerably and has not been satisfactory in several PAs, and that more
political and administrative support will be needed to ensure a representative
and stable cooperation (Bayrische Staatsregierung 2012). Moreover, it is rarely
senior-level administrators from the responsible ministries, able to take important decisions,
who participate in the meetings (EUSDR PA8 2012).
The embedding of the EUSDR in national settings
reportedly varies considerably and it has been noted that ‘national
coordination works better in those eight countries which have installed an
inter-ministerial working group for coordinating Danube work at the national
level. An even stronger support is assured in those three countries that have
introduced an additional coordination platform at the highest political level,
with a technical secretariat supporting this work’ (ibid.). The
implementation of the Strategy requires ‘ownership on national and regional
level’ although it remains a challenge ‘to motivate stakeholders to taking over
responsibilities’ (EUSDR PA10 2012). This seems to be also a particular
problem for actions in the field of spatial planning. The level of international
and transnational cooperation has been reportedly difficult to increase also in
some priority areas related to spatial planning, including the field of
biodiversity and nature protection (cf. EUSDR PA6 2012). Partly this may be a
consequence of the lack of political support in some countries, and resulting
weak capacity to strengthen cooperation in the required areas related to
spatial planning. Main
drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies in their
establishment and in their implementation The main barriers that stand
in the way of a better implementation of the EUSDR seem to be in relation to
better alignment of funding, and to ensure better political support for the
EUSDR in general and more coherently across all priority areas. In terms of the
role of spatial planning, while there are several relevant actions in the
Strategy across different priorities, these are rather dispersed, progress has
been modest to date and especially slow for land-based spatial planning initiatives.
A debate on the role of spatial planning in the context of the EUSDR would
therefore be useful, on which basis the various calls for a better and more
integrated and coordinated ‘spatial vision’ may be considered. EU macro-regional strategies
and spatial planning: concluding reflections and recommendations The EU macro-regional approach
appears to have helped to revitalise the process of transnational cooperation
in the Baltic Sea Region, and offered a platform for coordinated action in the
Danube Region. It has provided a forum for EU and national actors to discuss
those actions that groups of countries in both regions need to jointly
undertake, though this may have come at the expense of closely involving non-EU
members. Yet tensions and challenges remain, and these will also determine the
potential role of spatial planning in these regions which remains strongly
dependent on the support of nation-states and regions. The challenge of
reconciling the ambitions of the strategies to address functional relations
with the reality of the political commitment of actors that often remains
focused on their administrative territories may not easily be resolved. Given
the long time-scale of spatial developments and the need for continuing
political support, further institutionalisation at the transnational level
might be required to ensure that macro-regional strategies can offer an
added-value for spatial planning in future. Prioritisation is another test for
consensus-led processes, as will be the identification of spatial impacts of
different sector policies and at different levels of scale in the
macro-regions, which would benefit from spatial planning coordination. So far, thus, the added-value
of macro-regional strategies for spatial planning has overall been limited. It
has been almost non-existent for land-based spatial planning, although there
has been more enthusiasm and progress for maritime spatial planning for the
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. There are hardly any maps available for the two
strategies, neither to show an analysis of the current situation and trends or
to map proposed actions (e.g. transport infrastructure investments), nor in the
sense of policy proposals or seeking to provide a coordinated view on the
spatial effects of all the actions and projects envisaged under the MRS’s. The
strategies, thus, are at present largely non-spatial, which seems to be a
shortcoming given the evident spatial dimension of many of the proposed
initiatives. In the EUSBSR, the
understanding of spatial planning seems to be increasingly that of maritime
spatial planning alone, while the consideration of land-based spatial planning
is overall weak and seems to be diminishing. Indeed, there is no evidence of
added-value of the EUSBSR to the ongoing initiatives under VASAB. Also for the
EUSDR, although more recent and therefore more difficult to assess its
progress, the spatial planning contribution in the EUSDR seems to be understood
largely in terms of data sharing and soft coordination. Especially for land-based
spatial planning initiatives it has been difficult to find relevant lead
organizations that would be able to coordinate at transnational level. The slow
progress on spatial planning in both strategies stands in contrast to their
rhetoric that attaches great value to the coordinating powers of spatial
planning, but it may suggest that there is not currently a clear and shared
understanding in the two regions of what the role of transnational spatial
planning could be, and in particular within the context of the macro-regional
strategies. Yet while at the moment the
added-value is limited for spatial planning (possibly because so far most
energy went into setting up the more thematic actions in the macro-regional
strategies, where also better established policy communities are able to drive
progress), it may be useful to consider whether there could not be a stronger
added-value for spatial planning from the macro-regional strategies in future.
After all, many proposed actions and projects have either explicit or at least
indirect spatial impacts. The considerable energy that goes into setting up
coordination mechanisms and multi-level governance arrangements for the two
strategies suggests that there would be synergies in applying a spatial
perspective to the actions pursued, and to prioritise the transnational spatial
issues that would benefit from cooperation in the future. Before this may be
achieved, a number of key questions need to be addressed, however. Besides a
clear prioritisation (and political agreement) on transnational spatial issues,
these refer to the understanding of spatial planning at this level of scale;
the architecture of macro-regional strategies and the role of spatial planning
within; and the question of leadership on transnational spatial planning (both
land-based and maritime). In the first instance, a
discussion on the added-value of macro-regional cooperation for spatial
planning is needed among the actors in the regions, which should result in an
identification of the issues that require spatial coordination at the
transnational level. Despite the work of VASAB in the region, it is not clear
from the documents reviewed whether there is indeed a shared understanding of
what transnational spatial planning in the BSR, and in the context of the
EUSBSR in particular, should deal with. While the spatial impacts of EU sector
policies seem to be widely recognized, and are indeed a key driver for many
actions in the two macro-regional strategies, this does not seem to have led to
clear action on how to better coordinate spatial planning activities of the
involved countries. In terms of the role of
spatial planning within the MRS’s, for the EUSBSR there is a cross-cutting
action on spatial planning, but arguably this does not result in more attention
to spatially-relevant coordination within the different priority areas than in
the EUSDR, where spatial planning is considered under individual priorities.
While placing spatial planning in a ‘horizontal action’ may have great appeal
as it suggests a more cross-cutting approach, in practice it seems to increase
the coordination burden and (in the case of the EUSBSR) seems to effectively
marginalise spatial planning. The question of leadership on
spatial planning action is a challenge which will be difficult to address, as
even intergovernmental bodies (such as VASAB) still rely on the support of the
cooperating nation-states and require the backing of powerful sectoral
ministries, while in many countries national spatial planning is not strongly developed.
After identifying the key issues for transnational spatial planning in the
regions (e.g. inter-regional transport and energy connections, large-scale
agricultural and environmental issues – including those where pollution sources
have distant effects; large-scale economic effects through trade corridors,
R&D networks etc) and identifying the need for spatial coordination on
these issues, it may be useful to identify strong lead actors (possibly from
sectoral ministries) who can pursue such coordination in a more integrated way
throughout the strategy. Other governance arrangements, e.g. a central
coordination unit which can ensure dialogue with key actors on spatial impacts
and across different priorities, may be worth considering (although this would
imply a departure from the ‘no new institutions’ rule of EU macro-regional
strategies). For both existing strategies,
it would be important to give a stronger focus to land-based spatial planning,
alongside maritime and coastal zone management, in order to provide a more
comprehensive spatial development perspective for the entire region. After all,
many land-based activities also have an impact on the marine or fluvial
environments (e.g. run-offs from agricultural land uses or transport links),
and spatial planning activities on the territories of the countries around the
Baltic Sea and along the Danube should thus also be coordinated and the
maritime and land-based dimensions of spatial planning be reconciled. While the
added-value of a maritime spatial planning approach for the Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea seems to be more widely accepted, and progress may be facilitated by
the fact that this is a new policy area and therefore not yet firmly
institutionalized in most countries, there would also be value in coordinating
the spatial impacts of sector policies across different levels of governance
and across administrative borders on land. Mapping the proposals under the
different priorities may be a first start to better understand the spatial
implications of all activities and projects proposed under the macro-regional
strategies, and to identify the areas that would require or benefit from better
spatial coordination. For new EU macro-regional
strategies, it should be recommended that they are selective in their choice of
joint actions at the macro-regional scale, and that they prioritise those that
clearly require transnational cooperation and are specific to the particular
region. Identifying key actors who would be able to ensure coordination from a
spatial planning perspective, and to preferably do so for the maritime and
land-based spatial planning aspects in an integrated way, will be important. It
would be useful to ‘build in’ spatial planning as a central consideration in
future strategies from the beginning, as retrofitting such an important
coordination task to ongoing actions and projects seems to be a major
challenge. For future macro-regional strategies it could even be considered to
start arranging macro-regional strategies from a spatial planning perspective,
by identifying the large-scale spatial development trends and transnational
spatial impacts of sector policies, and agreeing on joint action on this basis.
This would ensure a stronger focus and clearer prioritization of the actions
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Long-Term Perspective for the Territorial Development of the Baltic Sea Region,
Riga: VASAB. Table 1: Priority areas (PA’s) and Horizontal
Actions (HA’s) of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region Priority areas || Coordinator(s) || Number of actions || Number of flagship projects (incl. Potentials) PA Agri – Reinforcing sustainability of agriculture, forestry and fisheries || Finland / Lithuania / Sweden || 7 || 11 PA Bio – Preserving natural zones and biodiversity, including fisheries || Germany || 2 || 4 PA Crime – Fighting cross-border crime || Finland / Lithuania || 2 || 4 PA Culture – Developing and promoting teh common culture and cultural identity || Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) / Poland || 5 || 13 PA Education – Developing innovative education and youth || Hamburg (Germany) / Norden Association (in Sweden) || 7 || 11 PA Energy – Improving the access to, and the efficiency and security of the energy markets || Denmark / Latvia || 2 || 9 PA Hazards – Reducing the use and impact of hazardous substances || Sweden || 4 || 6 PA Health – Improving and promoting people’s health, including its social aspects || Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being || 3 || 6 PA Innovation – Exploiting the full potential of the region in research and innovation || Sweden / Poland || 1 || 6 PA Internal Market – Removing hindrances to the internal market || Estonia || 3 || 4 PA Nutri – Reducing nutrient inputs to the sea to acceptable levels || Finland / Poland || 6 || 7 PA Safe – To become a leading region in maritime safety and security || Denmark / Finland || 7 || 8 PA Secure – Protection from emergencies and accidents on land || Sweden / the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Secretariat || 3 || 6 PA Ship – Becoming a model region for clean shipping || Denmark || 1 || 6 PA SME – Promote entrepreneurship and strengthen the growth of SMEs || Denmark || 4 || 9 PA Tourism – Reinforcing cohesiveness of the macro-region through tourism || Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) || 2 || 5 PA Transport – Improving internal and external transport links || Lithuania / Sweden || 4 || 5 Horizontal Actions || || || HA Involve – Strengthening multi-level governance including involving civil society, business and academia || Region Västerbotten and Kalmar / the Baltic Sea NGO Network || 8 || 5 HA Neighbours – To increase the co-operation with neighbouring countries to tackle joint challenges in the Baltic Sea Region || City of Turku (Finland) / the Council of Baltic Sea States Secretariat || 8 || 14 HA Promo – Boosting joint promotion and regional identity building actions || Baltic Metropoles Network / Baltic Development Forum || 2 || 2 HA Spatial Planning – Encouraging the use of Maritime and Land-based Spatial Planning in all Member States around the Baltic Sea and develop a common approach for cross-border cooperation || VASAB / HELCOM || (not further specified) || 1 HA Sustainable development and bio-economy || Council of Baltic Sea States Secretariat for sustainable development / Nordic Council of Ministers for bio-economy || 3 for sustainable development, none further specified for bio-economy || 10 for sustainable development, 3 for bio-economy Source: based on CEC
2013 Table 2: Pillars and priority areas of the EU
Strategy for the Danube Region Pillar/priority area || Coordinating country/-ies || Number of actions || Number of projects Pillar A: Connecting the Danube Region || || || 1. To improve mobility and multimodality || Inland waterways transport: Austria, Romania || 10 || 9 || Rail, road and air transport: Slovenia, Serbia, (Interest: Ukraine) || 7 || 6 2. To encourage more sustainable energy || Hungary, Czech Republic || 17 || 10 3. To promote culture and tourism, people to people contacts || Bulgaria, Romania || 14 || 20 Pillar B: Protecting the environment in the Danube Region || || || 4. To restore and maintain the quality of waters || Hungary, Slovakia || 14 || 7 5. To manage environmental risks || Hungary, Romania || 8 || 11 6. To preserve biodiversity, landscapes and the quality of air and soils || Germany (Bavaria), Croatia || 16 || 13 Pillar C: Building prosperity in the Danube Region || || || 7. To develop the knowledge society through research, education and information technologies || Slovakia, Serbia || 8 || 12 8. To support the competitiveness of enterprises, including cluster development || Germany (Baden-Württemberg), Croatia || 7 || 10 9. To invest in people and skills || Austria, Moldova || 8 || 7 Pillar D: Strengthening the Danube Region || || || 10. To step up institutional capacity and cooperation || Austria (Vienna), Slovenia || 9 || 8 11. To work together to promote security and tackle organised and serious crime || Germany, Bulgaria || 11 || 10 Source: Dühr 2011b,
based on CEC 2010d
2.3
Assessing the added value of macro-regional strategies – Environment Discussion
paper
Ágnes Kelemen Introduction The EU Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region (EUSBSR) and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) do not
provide for new funding or new legislation, and build to the extent possible on
existing institutional frameworks. This does not, however mean that
macroregional strategies have no added value. Macroregional strategies have
a general role in improving coordination among different actors, countries and
regions and priorities, decreasing the likelihood of duplication of efforts,
and increasing the likelihood that agreed actions will be implemented due to
increased political commitment and visibility. The Impact Assessment of the
EUSBSR states that “[i]ssues which have spillover effects into parts or the
whole of the macroregion and which are not already dealt with in the context of
EU policies are deemed to be of strategic relevance to the [macroregion]. For
issues which are of common concern (e.g. countries are facing similar problems
without spillover effects such as an ageing population) the relevance of the
macroregion is mainly limited to coordination and exchange of information
regarding experience gained from policy implementation.”[17]
This also reflects the extent to which a macroregional strategy can have an
added value: the potential for added value is greater for issues of strategic
relevance than for issues of common concern. Macroregional strategies can
have added value for actions specifically related to environmental issues,
despite the expansive volume of EU legislation in the field of environment, as
well as already existing EU funding sources for this purpose. Examples of
environmental issues where macroregional strategies can be of greatest added
value, i.e. issues where these strategies are of strategic relevance are: 1.
Addressing
issues relating to a shared approach to a particular ecosystem/landscape/ecological
corridor/other environmental feature reaching across borders which is specific
to a number of regions/MS but not the entire EU. This is the case for both
the EUSBSR and EUSDR, where due to the specific environmental, ecological, geological
features of the Danube and Baltic Sea, the issues affecting them can be best
addressed by surrounding MS and regions. 2.
Coordinating
action/policy response needed to achieve results in relation to cross-border
externalities at a macroregional level, especially if these externalities are not
sufficiently addressed by EU legislation because of the sensitivity of the
area, because there is ambition on the part of a few MS to go beyond what is
required by EU legislation, or because not all countries producing the
externality are EU Member States and therefore EU legislation does not apply to
them, but nonetheless causes external impacts in the EU. This is the case with
e.g. the Baltic Sea, where the MARE Nest Model has shown that implementing the
Water Framework Directive will not achieve good environmental status of the
sea. The Baltic Sea was also declared a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area by the
International Maritime Organisation. In such cases, action by a group of
countries (MS and non-MS) may be needed which goes beyond EU legislation.
Another example is the waste water discharge from ships representing 15% of the
world’s maritime traffic, taking place on a sea which is a designated as a
particularly sensitive area; here also, EU legislationis insufficient to
achieve the required results. With respect to the Danube region, cross-border
externalities include environmental risks posed by flooding, where upstream
management options influence downstream outcomes, as well as externalities
relating to water pollution and biodiversity. 3.
Promoting
the integration of environment into other activities resulting from the
integrated approach
of macroregional strategies. For example, the EUSBSR has enabled a
cross-sectoral approach to environmental issues. This has helped address
problems where previously HELCOM, which has an environmental focus, has not
been able to curb many of the sectoral interests (e.g. agricultural) which
drive environmental issues (eutrophication). Within the scope of this
paper, resources and time are scarce for an evaluation of the outputs or
results of the macroregional strategies in comparison with a counterfactual
scenario. Although e.g. the January 2012 version of the EUSBSR Action Plan
contains a number of targets and related indicators for measuring progress in
creating an environmentally sustainable region, there is a lack of monitoring
data. Often projects and actions are in the first phases of implementation.
Therefore the focus of the assessment is often on the aims and planned activities
of the actions and projects rather than outputs and results. In addition, due
to the ‘soft’ nature of macroregional strategies, it is difficult to establish
a counterfactual scenario, i.e. to know what would have happened in the absence
of the strategies, and to understand exactly to what extent the strategies have
given new impetus to cooperation. Within the scope of this paper time and
resources are also insufficient for an approach which assesses every priority
area and project. The assessment is further constrained by the fact that it
relies on publicly available information only. The approach taken in this
assessment is therefore to demonstrate the added value of macroregional
strategies through examples of positive developments in the widest sense. This
is similar to the approach taken by the Commission in its report of June 2011
on the implementation of the EUSBSR[18], where project examples
demonstrating the added value of the strategy were identified under the
following headings: ·
new
activity generated (new projects) ·
momentum
given to existing activity (more visibility, clustering of existing projects) ·
new networks,
better cooperation ·
policy
development and coherence ·
alignment
of funding with other instruments ·
cooperation
with non-EU states The focus of the assessment is
on a number of guiding questions provided by the Commission Services. Within the scope of this
paper, due to the information, timing and resource constraints of the current
assessment, a thorough assessment of the added value of macroregional
strategies was not possible. In future, there is need for a true evaluation of
the outputs and results of macroregional strategies, the use of resources and
methodologies which go beyond a synthesis of publicly available information. Achievements and
contribution to EU policies and targets, national, regional and sectoral
policies There is evidence to support
that both strategies are contributing to the sustainable growth pillar of the
EU 2020 Strategy, promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more
competitive economy, as well as to the smart growth and inclusive growth
pillars. The EUSDR
was already formulated with the aim to contribute to the EU 2020 Strategy. The
original EUSBSR was
formulated before the Europe 2020 Strategy. The Council called on the European
Commission to review the strategy at the end of 2011, and the review process
came to its conclusion at the end of 2012 when the Commission presented the new
EUSBSR, which now has several references to the Europe 2020 Strategy. The Sustainable Growth pillar
of the Europe 2020 Strategy has a very strong focus on the issues of the low
carbon economy, resource-efficiency and green growth, with targets of the
Sustainable Growth Pillar relating to renewable energy, energy efficiency and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Of these issues, not all lend themselves
equally well to be addressed within the scope of a macroregional strategy, as
e.g. climate change mitigation is generally not macroregionally specific. This
fact has been recognised by the review process of the EUSBSR. While the first
version of the strategy contained many references to renewable energy and
energy efficiency, the Communication on the EUSBSR adopted in December 2012
does not contain a reference to these issues. However, in a wider sense the
macroregional strategies both have a strong focus on sustainable growth.
Examples include: ·
The BONUS
joint Baltic Sea Research and Development Programme developed within the
context of the Strategy has a budget of EUR 100 million. It is a joint research
effort bz 8 MS to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Baltic Sea
Region's environmental research programming. ·
The
CleanShip and InnoShip projects both transform innovations into operations to
reduce emissions at sea while retaining the competitiveness of Baltic shipping. ·
The Blue
Danube project aims at providing improved framework conditions for fast track
eco-innovation in waste water treatment. Both macroregional strategies
have as their stated aims to contribute to the implementation of EU
environmental acquis, and sometimes going beyond what is required bz EU
legislation. This is supported by evidence from several projects: §
The
strategic action “Implement actions to reduce nutrients” of the EUSBSR concerns
the full implementation of key directives[19] related to reducing
eutrophication and the “Baltic Sea Action Plan” of HELCOM. §
Flagship
Project 2.1. “Create marine protected areas” has, in accordance with the Birds[20] and Habitats Directives[21] called on MS to designate of
a network of marine protected areas in the Baltic Sea. As a result an area of
10.3% of the Baltic Sea has been designated as protected; §
The
Flagship project “Development of HELCOM Core Set Indicators” aims to develop
core indicators to monitor Good Ecological Status (GES) as defined in the EU
Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Evidence of the contribution
of macroregional strategies to achieving targets of existing national, regional
and sectoral policies is less clear. One example is the CLISP project, which
has helped Italian provinces to ensure the coherence of territorial planning,
which by law is their responsibility. Due to the involvement of the Mountain
Community “Appenino Aleramico Obertengo” in the project, it was able to
transfer the main results of the project directly to different institutions and
associations which operate at different levels within the model region.[22] Potential to influence EU and national
policy developments (e.g. through mobilization and alignment of funding and
policy priorities with Europe 2020) Generally actions and projects
aim at influencing national policies. Examples of macroregional projects
wishing to influence EU policies exist, but are much more scarce. The way that projects have
tried influence national and regional policies differs. Practices include: §
Ensuring
involvement of policymakers: In the project: In the “CC WaterS - Climate Change
and Impacts on Water Supply” project government bodies are working with other
stakeholders which will make policy uptake of the recommendations more
probable. §
Preparation
of draft legislation: Action 7 of Priority Action 4 of the EUSDR “To legislate
at the appropriate level to limit the presence of phosphates in detergents”.
Similarly, in relation to phosphates, the EUSBSR Flagship project 1.1 “Remove
phosphates in detergents in countries where this is not yet the case” prepared
a draft proposal for a harmonised regulation regarding the use of phosphates
and other phosphorus compounds in households. §
Preparation
of concepts and strategies: the WANDA project elaborated national ship waste concepts in all partner countries. The
focus of BaltAdapt is on preparing a regional climate change adaptation plan.
The EUSDR project “CC-Ware – Mitigating Vulnerability of Water Resources” aims
to facilitate the development of national action plans for assuring sustainable
drinking water supply by setting up a transnational strategy. The SMIWASTRES
project elaborates guidelines and recommendations for policy level in relation
to waste disposal. For the EUSDR, according to
the implementation reports of June 2012, the funding for approved projects was
EUR 26 million for PA 4, 44.3 million for PA5 and 27.1 million for PA6. Most of
the funding came from EU funds (especially ERDF, but also IPA, ENPI and LIFE) with a small amount of funding coming
from private companies and foundations. For the EUSBSR Priority Areas 1-5 which
concern the environment, the total budget was EUR 43.6 million according to a
survey of projects in June 2012.[23] However, lack of cohesion
policy funding is an issue for the EUSBSR. “It should be noted that due to the
end of the current programming period (2007-2013), most of the financial resources
of the programmes have been already allocated. Therefore, it is difficult to
find open calls for territorial cooperation projects. However, financial
support for projects is provided by some organisations such as CBSS, Nordic
Council of Ministers or BONUS.”[24] Evidence from the EUSDR
suggests that there have generally been difficulties in mobilising funding, and
this has caused a widespread problem. Therefore actors are currently focused on
preparing projects for the 2014-2020 period and have put implementation on
hold. This is mentioned in several places in the implementation reports of
Priority Areas 4-6 of the EUSDR. The current level of funding
is of the magnitude which can sustain projects which promote best practices,
share information, conduct research, prepare guidelines, etc. However, in both
macroregions, addressing environmental issues will require a substantial volume
of physical investment. Reasons for lack of funding
are the timing of the strategies has meant that funds have already been
committed. This issue is therefore not a long-term challenge for the two
macroregional strategies, and will be addressed from 2014 onwards by the new
programmes. Added
value for coordination of activities between actors Macroregional strategies,
through their territorial scope and integrated approach, have the potential to
ensure coordination of activities between different regions and MS and between
representatives of different sectors and interests. For environmental issues
this is particularly important due to the existence of cross-border
externalities, and the need to integrate environmental considerations into all
activities. To avoid duplication with the assessment on governance, this assessment
focuses on the value of coordination between actors at the level of projects. Different projects realised
within the scope of the strategies take advantage of the possibilities for
coordination in different ways and to a varying degrees. Examples of different
types and levels of coordination include: ·
Coordination
of actors within a sector: The EUSDR Green Danube Network and Bavarian Network
projects both focus on building a network of environmental NGOs. ·
Coordination
between different sectors: The EUSBSR Flagship project “Develop and improve
coordination and cooperation among Member States and stakeholders” on fisheries
management in the Baltic Sea has established the Baltfish forum to investigate
how integration of concerned stakeholders in fisheries management and policy
implementation can be strengthened. This is viewed as a first step towards
regional management of fisheries. Various tools are used in
different projects to increase coordination and cooperation. Some projects
focus on bringing together different stakeholders, others on developing
strategies, action plans and legislation common to the entire area of the
macroregion. The effort to increase
coordination and cooperation is not a finished process but is ongoing. The
implementation report of Priority Action 6 of the EUSDR notes that “In dialogue
with stakeholders it was detected that the level of international/transnational
cooperation and the setting of existing networks in the field of biodiversity
and nature protection is quite weak, which is a precondition for EUSDR-related
activities and a big challenge to steer the process of capacity building.”[25] Added value for improving governance
structures, including interlinkages with EU initiatives (Northern Dimension,
Eastern Partnership) The Northern Dimension has
benefited from additional funding of EUR 20 million in 2010. The total funding
made available to environmental projects financed under the Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership from its establishment in 2001 until end of 2012 was
EUR 121.81 million, with the total cost of projects at EUR 3338.9 million.[26]
The additional funding of EUR 20 million makes up a sixth of the funding
available to the NDEP and is therefore significant. The funding is aimed at environmental
projects primarily. Project with Russia in water, wastewater, solid waste and
energy efficiency are implemented in the framework of the Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership.[27] The Northern Dimension Environmental
Partnership has also contributed to activities in Belarus under Flagship
Project 1.5. “Assessment of regional nutrient pollution load and identification
of priority projects to reduce nutrient inputs from Belarus to the Baltic Sea”. There is little evidence of
the contribution of the two macroregional strategies to the Eastern
Partnership, despite initial intentions. Main
drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies Although the added value of macroregional
strategies for the environment can be clearly demonstrated, there is scope for
further increasing added value. Due to the ‘soft’ nature of macroregional
strategies (especially the no new funding provision) it can be expected that
there will be some weaknesses in implementation. E.g. the EUSBSR “Cleaner waste
water” Flagship project includes information gathering, prioritisation related
to waste water treatment plants, and an identification of countries’
difficulties. It also aims to build/upgrade priority Waste Water Treatment
Plants around the Baltic Sea. However, as environmental infrastructure is
investment heavy and several countries around the Baltic Sea cannot finance
this type of infrastructure either from government revenues or from user fees
to the extent necessary, it is unlikely that this project alone, or even the
EUSBSR as a whole can lead to real results. Lack of is an even bigger issue for
the EUSDR. Here the implementation reports of the priority areas of the EUSDR
mention in several places the lack of funding and the missed opportunity to
align the strategy with EU funding due to the timing of the strategy. For the
added value of macroregional strategies to be truly realised, stronger
integration into cohesion policy programming is needed to ensure the necessary
funds for implementation will become available. The closer alignment of
cohesion policy programming with macroregional strategies in 2014-2020 is
therefore welcome, and will help to deliver results. Such funding will be
needed for upscaling of demonstration projects (e.g. delivered by the Baltic
Deal project in relation to best agricultural practices) or for implementing
guidelines (e.g. those delivered by SMOCS for the management of contaminated
sediments) as well as carrying out planned investments (e.g. Cleaner waste
water flagship project). In some cases, to ensure that there is
some kind of benefit to all MS and regions participating in a macroregional
strategy, actions and projects which seem to have less added value for the
macroregion as a whole, but are of high importance to a small group of regions and
MS have also been included in the strategies. However, a stronger focus on
actions and projects with true macroregional significance should be encouraged.
This means that the focus should be primarily on issues within the
environemntal theme which the EUSBSR Impact Assessment refers to as being of
strategic relevance. Projects which are relevant to a smaller territory within
the macroregion or address issues which are not specific to the macroregion
only but to the EU in general should have lower priority, as these can be
addressed through other approaches. This would also ensure stronger focus and
avoid fragmentation of efforts. The process of refocusing the EUSBSR on issues
of strategic relevance has already taken place through the review of the strategy.
However, the EUSDR is still very much an umbrella strategy for all activities
which take place in the Danube region and require cooperation, and is focused
on addressing many issues which are not of strategic relevance to the Danube
region. It is therefore not clear for every project how the EUSDR is
complementary to other territorial cooperation initiatives in the region, and
what the added value is. For certain project types, particularly
those that do not produce tangible results on their own, such as those focused
on gathering information, increasing scientific knowledge, preparing guidance
documents, etc., there should be an attempt to ensure that they feed into the
policy making process in some way. This does not always seem to be the case. Transitory governance structures are less
likely to follow-up activities, and provide feedback, and are therefore less
suited for projects which aim to provide long term results. Although the
macroregional strategies have, out of consideration for existing institutions
at the request of participating MS, focused on an approach which does not hinge
on new structures, these may in some cases be necessary, where they do not
exist already. The need for new structures is an issue addressed by the
Danubeparks II project. For future macroregional strategies and
for possible further reviews of the existing strategies a top-down
determination of specific targets related to the strategy should be avoided as
this may hinder ownership of the strategy in the macroregion. The EUSDR has set
specific targets related to the navigability of the river which does not have
the support of all MS and environmental organisations in the macroregion and
may prevent constructive discussions on trade-offs between transport and
environment between stakeholders and hinder progress by entrenching views on
the issue. An example of a project which is of true
added value in all respects and can be considered as a project which addresses
issues of strategic relevance to the macroregion is the Danubeparks II project.
It addresses an issue specific to the macroregion, is aimed at a direct
contribution to the goals of the macroregional strategy, in terms of governance
sets out to establish formal links between actors, ensures that results are
translated into action at the policy level, has an integrated approach across
different areas and themes, focuses also on implementation by building on
previous project results. According to the implementation report of PA6 of the
EUSDR, “[t]he project focuses on networking and cooperation processes of
protected areas alongside the Danube river. The activities stretch over eight
countries in the Danube Region and include member states and non-member states,
Lead Partner is Donau-Auen National Park, Orth a.d. Donau, Austria. Whereas the
first DANUBEPARKS project basically formed the network of relevant actors, the
follow-up projects aims to further anchor the network on international and
political level with the aim of a long-term and stable organisation as a binding
link between the policy level, the NGOs and the citizens. A direct contribution
to the implementation of the EUSDR is envisaged. Beside these policy oriented
activities, content-oriented activities focus on flagship species (Black
Poplar, White-tailed Eagle), River Morphology (cooperation with the ICPDR) and
Tourism.” The EUSBSR “Cleaner waste water” Flagship project similarly addresses
a true macroregional challenge and ensures that its findings are translated
into action by not onlz gathering information and prioritising investment in
waste water treatment plants, but bz aiming build/upgrade priority Waste Water
Treatment Plants around the Baltic Sea. Recommendations
on future work on macroregional strategies The added value of
macroregional strategies depends in part on how the strategy is initially
conceived and also on how it is implemented. The issues that macroregional
strategies focus on is already largely decided when these strategies are
formulated, through the identification of obejctives, priority areas, a list of
actions in the action plans, etc. Other areas where decisions at EU level have
a strong impact is the no new funding and no new institutions concept in
relation to these strategies. A lot of other issues (such as the extent to
which all relevant stakeholders are involved in projects or how the results of
the projects are fed into the policy process in the relevant MS and regions)
can be influenced during the implementation phase of macroregional strategies
rather than at EU level during the formulation of the strategy. The following recommendations
can be made for policy makers at the EU level: ·
Focusing
macroregional strategies on areas within the environmental theme which are of
strategic relevance to the particular macroregion and which are specific to the
macroregion would increase added value of these strategies. In the field of
environment these are easily identifiable and relate in particular to
macroregional level externalities and ecosystems common to the entire
macroregion. ·
Focusing
macroregional strategies on areas which are priorities for the EU, e.g. on
issues which are contained in the Europe 2020 Strategy, in the Environmental
Action Programme of the EU, or relate to addressing obligations contained in
the EU environmental Acquis where implementation is lagging behind could
promote macro-regional strategies as a link between the EU policy level and
implementation. ·
The rule
of no new institutions should not be applied too strictly. New institutions
have the potential to fill gaps where institutions do not currently exist,
which may be important for future macroregional strategies which do not have
the same kind of history of cooperation as e.g. the Baltic Sea region. New
institutions may also be necessary to ensure sustained results after projects
have been implemented. ·
It is
important to ensure that EU funding can be made available also for new
macroregional strategies which are developed during a programming period, and
that there are sufficient incentives to make funding available. It is also
important to ensure sufficient funding for the implementation of macroregional
strategies, either by increased the level of funding for these strategies, or
through ensuring that funding is made available from national and regional
programmes even if programming has taken place already. ·
Identify
good practices for projects (e.g. regarding involvement of stakeholders,
producing policy-relevant results, etc.) and encouraging/ensuring that these
are applied when projects are selected and implemented may promote added value
at the level of implementation, help minimise the number of projects which do
not have true macroregional added value due to less than optimal
implementation, and avoid an umbrella effect of macroregional strategies where
all projects taking place within the macroregion are sold under the banner of
the strategy without an examination of added value for the macroregion as a
whole. ·
The
potential of macroregional strategies to involve non-MS should be further
strengthened, as this can improve relations with these countries and regions,
and also improve outcomes for the macroregion as a whole. References Projects with a clear link to the EU
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region Based on the Action Plan SEC(2009) 712/2,
January 2012 version Updated 26.06.2012 HELCOM Ministerial Declaration on the
implementation of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan 20 May 2010, Moscow.
Helsinki Commission, Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission COM(2012) 128 final Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European
Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region SEC(2011) 1071 final Commission Staff
Working Paper on the implementation of the European Union Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region COM(2011) 381 final Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) SEC(2009) 712/2 JANUARY 2012 VERSION
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region COM(2009) 248 final Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European
Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region SEC(2009) 702 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING
DOCUMENT Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region Impact Assessment COM(2010) 715 final Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions European Union Strategy
for Danube Region Report to the European Commission
Implementation of the EUSDR Priority Area 6 to preserve biodiversity,
landscapes and the quality of air and soils Reporting period 13 April 2011 – 30
June 2012 Final EUSDR Report June 2012 Priority Area 4 TO
RESTORE AND MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF WATERS EUSDR Report June 2012 Priority Area 5 To
manage Environmental Risk SEC(2010) 1490 final COMMISSION STAFF
WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment Report Accompanying the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions European Union Strategy for
the Danube Region Conference Report 2012 Connecting Europe
– Smart and Green Partnerships 14th Baltic Development Forum Summit European
Commission’s 3rd Annual Forum on the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
Copenhagen, 17-19 June 2012 Web pages: http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/baltic/index_en.cfm http://www.danube-region.eu/ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/danube/index_en.cfm
2.4 Do
macro-regional strategies boost innovation and competitiveness?
Alasdair Reid Introduction This paper
was drafted at the request of Directorate General for Regional and Urban
Policy, Unit D1, Competence Centre for macro-regions and European territorial
cooperation. The paper forms part of the European Commission’s response to the
European Council’s request (April 2011) to “clarify the concept of
macro-regional strategies, to evaluate their value added and submit the
outcomes to the Council and the European Parliament by June 2013“. Based on
available documentation, the paper considers the value added of macro-regional
strategies for business competitiveness, research and innovation policies
addressing the following questions 1.
What
are the main achievements in implementing the macro-regional strategies and what
contribution have they made to EU policies and targets; national, regional,
sectoral policies? The question of the relevance of macro-regional strategies
to EU Cohesion Policy and Europe 2020 Strategy objectives particularly should
be addressed; 2.
Do
Macro regional strategies have the potential to influence EU and national
policy developments, e.g. through mobilisation of existing funding, and
alignment of funding and policies with EU 2020 priorities and programmes, and
what evidence supports this? 3.
What
is the added value of macro regional strategies in terms of coordination of
activities between different actors; for example via cooperation between EU
Member States and Third countries, through improved cooperation structures,
development of new ways of cooperation or strengthening existing ones? 4.
What
is the added value of the macro regional strategies in terms of improving
governance structures for the achievement of overall objectives including
interaction/links with other EU initiatives (such as the Northern Dimension,
Eastern Partnership, etc), and what concrete progress has been made in the
priority areas/horizontal actions/actions and flagship projects assessed?. 5.
What
are the main drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies
in their establishment and in their implementation? The European
Commission defines a macro-region as “an area including territory from a
number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common
features or challenges.[28]”. A macro-regional strategy
(MRS) does not provide additional funding or create new policy, legal and
institutional frameworks; rather the aim is to foster a better and more
effective use of existing funds, institutions/structures, (local, regional,
national, EU) policies, etc. Hence, the added value of a MRS is principally
through more effective trans-national coordination and creation of synergies
between national and regional policies. Two
macro-regional strategies have been approved: ·
the
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) in 2009 ·
the
EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) in 2011. Moreover, the
December 2012 Council conclusions invited the Commission to present a EU
Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region before the end of 2014. 1. The main
achievements of macro-regional strategies in the field of innovation It is still
early to draw robust, evidence-based, conclusions on the extent to which the
existence of a MRS creates added value (in the simplest terms,
was the intervention additional to what would other wise have taken place?)
with respect to existing regional, national and EU policies. Two approaches are
adopted towards assessing the potential achievements and added value of the two
existing MRS: ·
A
comparison of the expected impact of the two strategies on innovation and
competitiveness to what has been actually achieved to date. On this basis, it
may be possible to extrapolate the added value of the MRS in the future
programming period (2014-20) and the contribution to Europe 2020. ·
A
logical impact assessment, examining areas where concerted action at a
macro-regional level could have a greater added value than action at either
regional/national or European levels. 1.1
The expected impact of the macro-regional strategies This section
reviews the intervention logic in the strategies and action plans and the
expected impact on business competitiveness, research and innovation. 1.1.1
The EUSBSR: intervention logic in favour of innovation and competitiveness The EUSBSR
(European Commission, 2009) identified both a number of economic challenges
(notably wide disparities in R&D and innovation and practical obstacles to
trade in goods and services despite the internal market) as well as significant
potential that may be better used (very well-educated workforce, expertise in
innovation, a strong tradition of intra-regional cooperation, etc.). The
strategy noted that there was networking among research funding agencies from
all EU Baltic States, supported by the EU’s Research Framework Programme (FP7
currently, Horizon 2020 from 2014), which provides a sound basis for
collaboration in research and knowledge transfer. The 2009
strategy and action plan were structured in 15 priority areas grouped into four
thematic pillars plus a number of horizontal actions. The Action Plan
underlined that this structure was ‘only for ease of analysis’ since each
pillar relates to a wider range of inter-linked and interdependent policies and
will hence impact on other pillars. The 2012 review and revised EUSBSR led to
the adoption of three overall objectives: to Save the Sea; to Connect the
Regions; and to Increase Prosperity. However, this has not changed the
structure of the priority areas and pillars in the updated Action Plan. Under
the second pillar, ‘To make the Baltic Sea a Prosperous Place’, two priority
areas tackle the ‘innovation divide’ and ‘competitiveness’ challenges: Priority
Area 7 (PA7) To exploit the full potential of research and innovation and
Priority Area 8 (PA8) Implementing the Small Business Act: Entrepreneurship,
SMEs and human resources[29]. In the Baltic Sea
Region the general conditions for growth need to be strengthened. Hence, on a
‘macro-level, the EUSBSR intervention logic seeks to reduce “the East–West
division” in innovation capacity across the Baltic Sea. The assumption is
that “transfer of knowledge and competence and deepened cooperation from the
Nordic countries and Germany as innovation top-performers can help Poland and
the Baltic States to continue catching up”. Similarly, the strategy argues
that the obstacles to competitiveness[30] and hindrances to the
single market require more effective support for entrepreneurship and SME
development, as well as strengthened cooperation between business support
institutions. 1.1.2
The EUSDR: intervention logic in favour of innovation and competitiveness The
Communication establishing the EUSDR (European Commission 2010a) argues that by
‘building on considerable research and innovation perspectives, the Region
can be at the forefront of EU trade and enterprise.’ However, the DR is
also characterised by very wide disparities, with ‘some of the most
successful but also the poorest regions in the EU’. In particular, the
following weaknesses were pinpointed: ·
contacts
and cooperation are often lacking, both financially and institutionally. ·
enterprises
do not sufficiently exploit the international dimension of marketing,
innovation or research. ·
The
share of highly educated people is lower than the EU27 average. ·
internal
market bottlenecks and a need to improve the business environment. The
intervention logic assumes that innovation performance and the
intra-macro-region ‘polarisation’ can be tackled by ‘targeted support
for research infrastructure that will stimulate excellence and deepen
networking between knowledge providers, companies and policy-makers’. In
contrast to the BSR, the level of current co-operation in the fields of R&I
appears to start from a lower level of intensity with the strategy noting that
“existing bilateral agreements should lead to multilateral coordination”,
driven either by geographic proximity or by fields of excellence. Indeed, the
strategy argues, “developing regions downstream can benefit from the leading
- indeed world-class - innovative regions upstream”. Moreover, there is an
expectation that the EUSDR will help to “use national and regional funds
better, and benefit fully from the European Research Area”. In terms of
business development, the divide across the macro-region between
‘top-performing’ and ‘lagging’ region is also the focus of attention. The
latter are expected to benefit from connections between innovation and business
supporting institutions. In particular, the strategy assumes that ‘Clusters
and links between centres of excellence, binding them into existing education
and research networks, will extend the competitiveness of upstream enterprises
to the whole region’. The
accompanying actions plan sets out a total of 11 priorities grouped under four
pillars. The third pillar, entitled ‘Building Prosperity in the Danube Region’,
includes two priority areas (PA): PA7 To develop the Knowledge Society through
Research, Education and Information Technologies; and PA8: To support the
Competitiveness of Enterprises, including Cluster Development. In terms of
cross PA linkages, under the priority for energy, there is an identified need
for exchange of experience notably on smart grids, smart cities and
eco-innovation. 1.2
State of play: implementing the Baltic Sea and Danube strategies The
concrete implementation of the two current macro-region strategies is pursued
essentially via a number of flagship projects summarised in
Figure 1. The evidence on progress available in the
published implementation reports underlines that there is a rather variable
degree of progress both between the EUSBSR and the EUSDR (which is logical
given launch dates) but also between the various projects in each strategy. It
is also clear, that a large number of the flagship projects build on
pre-existing co-operation or networks supported under both the European
Territorial Co-operation (Interreg) programmes or supported under other EU
funding programmes (e.g. CIP, FP7: ERANETS, joint programming, etc.). In short, the
value added of the macro-region strategies at this initial phase appear to be
more about structuring and combining efforts than radically new initiatives. Figure 1 Flagship
projects of the EU Strategies for the Baltic Sea and Danube regions Priority area || EUSBSR || EUSDR Research and Innovation || · 7.1 BSR Stars (leader: Sweden and Lithuania) · 7.2 A Baltic Sea Fund for Innovation and Research (leader: Swedish Region Skâne) · 7.3 Baltic Sea Region strategy to promote services innovation (leader: Lithuania and Finland) · 7.4 ScanBalt Health Region (leader: Lithuania and Germany) · 7.5 Baltic Science Link (leader: Swedish Research Council) || · Danube Region Research and Innovation Fund (DRRIF) · Danube River Research and Management (DREAM) Competitiveness & entrepreneurship || · •8.1 Promote young entrepreneurs · 8.2 Develop deeper cooperation on environmental technology to create new business opportunities · 8.3 Implement the project Sustainable Production through Innovation in Small and Medium sized Enterprises · 8.4 Make the Baltic Sea an Eco-efficient region · 8.5 Baltic Supply · 8.6 Make the Baltic Sea region a leader in design · 8.7 Implement the Baltic Sea Labour Network project · 8.8 Cooperation between Public Employment services || Seven flagship projects (as of June 2012): · Cluster Atlas · South East Europe Centre for Entrepreneurial Learning (SEECEL) · SEE Management Forum · Centres of Excellence · Centres of Competence Smart and Innovative Rural Areas (SIRA DANUBE) · Blue Danube · Vocational Training (Seeged+Innoinfo and SEeDual) 1.2.1
The EUSBSR: achievements to date in field of innovation and competitiveness Based on the
2011 EUSBSR progress report, the projects that have made notable progress are: ·
BSR
Stars (7.1)[31] which supports a
programmed approach for innovation, clusters and SME-networks increasing the
joint innovation capacity in the region, significantly extending existing
networks and clusters, and creating new networks of innovation specialists,
companies, R&D organisations and policy makers ·
ScanBalt
Health Region[32] which aims to structure
co-operation between the Baltic Sea Health and Life science community, ·
Baltic
Science Link[33] which aims to ‘pool’ and
facilitate access to research facilities in the field of material science. In addition,
there are strong cross PA links between the Bonus[34]
programme (under priority area 1) and BSR Stars leading to the former to
include clean tech innovation and eco-innovation[35].
The 2011 progress report argues that “without the EUSBSR this would not have
been possible”, although it is not entirely clear why co-operation could not
have been generated in the absence of the macro-region strategy. The Baltic
Sea Region Programme is funding elements of each the flagship projects although
the 2011 report also underlines that national funds have been mobilised to
support specific actions. Moreover, a ‘cluster’ of SME innovation related
actions has been created with a view to fostering exchange and learning[36]
that could help to develop more structured future co-operation. 1.2.2
The EUSDR: achievements to date in field of innovation and competitiveness The June 2012
progress report for PA7 outlines progress to date, including: ·
a
main focus on the policy level recognition of the PA7 targets, actions and
possible funding, as well as on the networking with the most relevant
stakeholders able to support progress towards defined targets ·
discussions
on the creation of the Danube Region Research and Innovation Fund (DRRIF),
drawing on the ‘best practice of the BONUS programme’. The Conference of the
Ministers of the Danube Region agreed, in July 2012[37],
on the principles of a DRRIF with at least 10 million Euros: half coming from
national sources, half from the EU. Before launching the DRRIF, a feasibility
study will carried out to consider the legal, administrative and financial
pre-conditions. It is expected that the feasibility study will be completed by
end 2013, allowing the launch of DRRIF by mid 2014. Other actions
are still in a preliminary phase and reportedly face difficulties in mobilising
actors in the absence of additional dedicated funds from the EUSDR. Aside from
the two approved flagship projects, the PA7 progress report summarises actions
taken towards meeting other ‘milestones’ such as: the co-ordination of ‘Smart
Specialisation’ strategies; identifying centres of excellence, creation of a
Danube Region Reference-Data and Services Infrastructure (Danube RDSI), etc.
Actions under broadband, e-government, research infrastructure, etc. are still
at the stage of project design. Access to funding is a critical issue, notably
in south-East European countries where national funds for research and
innovation are extremely limited[38]. Under
PA8, the seven flagship projects listed in
Figure 1 are reported to be making progress. In order to
structure discussions across a wide range of stakeholders, four working groups
(WG) have been established: clusters of excellence, vocational training,
innovation and technology transfer and competitiveness in rural and urban
areas. These working groups have drawn up road-maps and have begun to identify
possible future actions (e.g. the WG clusters of excellence is investigating
the idea of an innovation voucher that would give companies access to expertise
in universities in the more advanced parts of the region). 1.3 A conceptual framework for
assessing the added value of macro-regional strategies for competitiveness and
innovation As can be
seen from the previous sections, the intervention logic of the two MRS are
broadly similar and there is also a degree of commonality between the types of
actions pursued. In order to consider the value added of a MRS for innovation
and competitiveness it is important to understand what the expected result and
the relationship (intervention logic) between the activities supported and the
targets set. Both the strategies have set a number of broad targets. The EUSBSR
targets were revised in 2012 (European Commission, 2012x) and detailed in the
annex to the Council Conclusions on the review of the EUSBSR. Two overall
‘policy indicators’ are proposed: increasing (by 15%) the volume of
intra-regional trade and cross-border services by 2020; increasing (by 20%)
the number of people participating in programmes of cultural, educational,
scientific exchange and co-operation by 2020. In addition, a number of context
indicators were set including that Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) should
be at least 3% of GDP (in line with the Europe 2020 target) across the BSR. The
detailed table annexed to the Council conclusions proposes a broader range of
indicators and details the baselines, which is useful. However, it is not
clear to what extent and how directly the EUSBSR is expected to influence these
context indicators. Although, the GERD/GDP target is defined as both an
average improvement and as a narrowing of the ‘divide’ between the most and
least R&D intensive regions in the macro-region, it remains a very ‘blunt’
measure of innovation activity, since it fails to take account of differences
in industrial structure, level of development, etc. It would
appear that the EUSDR targets in the field of R&I were set without any real
analysis of their relevance or realism (in numerical or temporal terms[39]).
The issue seems to be that the strategy is aligned in a ‘mechanistic’ way with
the Europe 2020 headline targets without due consideration of their ‘bottom-up’
realism. For instance, for PA7, the target of spending 3% of GDP on R&D is
not coherent with the average of the national targets (currently 2.23%). Even
if the targets were achievable, they are not necessarily directly related to
the intervention logic nor do they contribute per se to the expected impact.
For example, the target of increasing patents by 50% in the macro-region is a)
not guaranteed to reduce polarisation b) not directly linked to any priority
action c) nonsensical unless there is a proven causality between increased
patenting and increased competitiveness (which there is not[40],
rather the commercial value of a limited number of patents plays a role in
restructuring economies). In contrast,
PA8 of the EUSDR proposed a set of targets that describe the outcome of a
‘process’ rather than a set of quantified targets. These ‘targets’ include:
establishing a cluster network for the EUSDR (identification of the founded
institutions in this connection, as well as the existing networks) by 2014; or
improvement of technological transfer through establishing measures like
consulting services by chambers and other institutions or organisations. In order to
set realistic targets, that consider the value added from a formative as well
as a summative perspective, there is a need for a clearer intervention logic
where the MRS objectives are more closely related to the expected results of
the flagship projects. To this end, sets out a range of possible ‘added value’
effects of a macro-regional strategy on innovation and competitiveness.
Figure 2 Potential types of value added of macro-region strategies on
innovation Accordingly,
it is recommended to further refine the indicators used to measure progress and
assess the value added of the MRS. Whilst the indicator framework for the
EUSBSR is not perfect, it is recommended, firstly, that a similar process of
contextualising the indicators should take place for the EUSDR. This should
lead to the adjustment of specific targets (e.g. lowering the 3% of GDP on
R&D target to the average national targets for all Danube region countries)
but also to the introduction of targets that measure the reduction of
differentials in performance between the regions/countries that make up the
macro-region. Secondly, for
both the current MRS and any future strategies, more operational targets and
accompanying indicators directly linked to the intervention logic should be
set. As an example, considering the impact of MRS on ‘optimising
public-private investments in R&I infrastructure’, the expected outcomes
could be an increase in joint investments by several countries/regions in
research infrastructure facilities (either new or investment by one or more
countries in existing facilities in another) labelled as ‘strategic’ for
macro-region development priorities. The target could that a minimum percentage
(taking account of the baseline situation but realistically no less than 10% if
the target is to be meaningful) of national research infrastructure funds
invested during 2014-20 are jointly invested in ‘macro-region’ research
facilities. 2.
Influence of macro-regional strategies on EU and national policy Given the
absence of a dedicated financial envelope for the implementation of the MRS, it
is clear that a main element of ‘added value’ is the extent to which such a
strategic framework helps to align and mobilise existing funds or leverage
additional public (but also potentially private) funding. Aside from the
Structural Funds (and notably the transnational co-operation programmes), the
Member States are expected “to examine funding projects and actions aligned
with the Strategy priorities from their own resources” (EUSBSR). Moreover, the
European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and regional financial institutions, such as the Nordic Investment Bank, are
also expected to be involved. From an
innovation and competitiveness perspective, the potential influence of MRS on
both national (regional) and EU policies is significant. Hypothetically, MRS
could help fill the ‘missing middle’ between broad European objectives (such as
those set out in European Research Area (ERA) or Innovation Union (IU)
communications), funding programme and partnerships (such as the new European
Innovation Partnerships[41]) and the diverse
national and regional policies. This is particularly the case as the
“polarisation” in capacities and performance implies that the potential to
participate in European level programmes and initiatives is equally variable. In the field
of innovation and competitiveness, the most relevant EU instruments are: ·
The
Structural Funds programmes, both national operational programmes and European
Territorial Co-operation programmes, which provide a significant opportunity
for funding the types of initiatives identified in the strategies. ·
The
European Commission’s research and innovation programmes and initiatives
including notably, the Research Framework Programme (currently FP7, Horizon
2020 from 2014) but also joint-programming and joint investment planning such
as through the European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI). ·
Financial
institutions and funds, notably those managed through the European Investment Bank
(EIB), but also the EBRD in the Danube Region. In addition,
within the BSR, the Nordic Council institutions have historically played a
major role in structuring and funding, to some extent, co-operation between the
Nordic Countries, including in the fields of research and innovation
(NordForsk, Nordic Innovation Centre, etc.). Nothing similar exists in the
Danube Region. Error! Reference source not found. explores the potential
role of MRS as ‘alignment’ mechanisms with respect to
multi-national/inter-regional policy co-operation and EU level policies. Five
broad areas of potential influence are suggested through which the MRS may help
align both national/regional policies and contribute to influencing EU level
policies ·
Enhancing
participation in European partnerships for research and innovation ·
Contributing
to joint R&I programming and investment ·
Optimising
the effectiveness of Structural Fund operational programmes ·
More
effective use of funds available through the ETC programmes ·
Leveraging
finance in and into the macro-region It is clear
that there remains considerable room for further ‘gains’ to be made. Considering
the first two themes, the real or potential influence of the macro-region
strategies needs to be judged in terms of the additional structuring effect on
R&D activities, cluster programmes, etc. with respect to what can be
achieved through other EU instruments. Following the adoption of the ERA
concept the Commission introduced a number of instruments including ERA-NET,
ERA-NET Plus and Article 185[42] initiatives to help
develop the ERA. In 2008 the Commission introduced the Joint Programming[43]
approach in order to make better use of public R&D funds through enhanced
cooperation. The expected benefits include: eliminating wasteful duplication,
developing scale and scope, promoting scientific excellence, and pooling data
and expertise scattered across Member States. Both of the
macro-regions have common interests and potential in specific fields of research
and innovation which create scope for a more (cost-)effective mobilisation of
available human, infrastructural and financial resources for research. A
mapping of innovation policy priorities in the Baltic Sea region (Technopolis
Group, 2011) identified a number of common areas where national funding is
focused, including: ICT, Life science (notably biotechnology), Healthcare (and
‘wellness’) services, Agro-food, ‘cleantech’ (notably in Denmark and Finland);
Energy (notably renewables), materials (ranging from nanotech, through plasma
to more traditional materials). Similarly, in
the Danube region, the potential for research cooperation in a joint
programming framework appears to be particularly strong in the field of
renewable energy: geothermal energy in the Pannonian basin, renewable energy
for mobility, smart grids, energy efficient cities and regional planning,
biomass, environmentally and socially compatible development of the energy
system The BSR has
been a precursor in the EU’s joint programming initiative through the BONUS
programme[44] which can be viewed as a
‘best-practice’ for other macro-regions, It serves as a model for the DRRIF,
which intends to build on “existing European network projects, such as the
INCO.NET for the Western Balkan countries (WBC-INCO.NET)…and in the near future
the INCO-NET Danube Region”. Figure 3
Potential links between macro-region strategies, national and EU policies However, the
achievements to date are still sub-optimal despite a multitude of projects that
have sought to explore various fields of R&D and innovation co-operation in
fields such as life science, energy, environment, mobility, etc. The current
co-operation is too often a response to calls for project from EU funded
programmes rather than being driven by ‘demand’ (public or private) for R&D
and innovation within the macro-region. Hence, there is a need to move beyond
project-based co-ordination of research activities to more structured
co-operation over a longer time-frame. There is also
significant scope, in a time of restricted public budgets, to optimise
investments in the field of research infrastructure. The ESFRI agenda is ‘top
down’ and focused on a number of single site major European research
infrastructures or distributed infrastructures. There is a need to structure
research infrastructures of an intermediary level in the macro-regions that are
coherent with the societal challenges and socio-economic development factors
specific to the macro-region. A macro-region road-map for research infrastructure
that built on, but that is more than the sum of, national road-maps would be a
major step forward in informing investment decisions during the up-coming
2014-20 period. Despite the efforts of initiatives like Science Link in the
BSR, there is still no significant co-ordination of research infrastructure
investments or mechanism to facilitate ‘open access’ for researchers to
facilities in neighbouring regions. This leads to a duplication of research
infrastructure (equipment) and a non-optimal utilisation intensity of installed
equipment (often co-funded by the ERDF). In the field
of clusters policy, the BSR has also been a precursor with an initial project
funded under the CIP (Europe Innova/Pro-Inno Europe) leading to the development
of BSR Stars and the Star Dust project. A key element of the BSR Stars approach
is the adoption of a longer-term strategic programming approach that should
help to foster a greater sustainability of the cluster co-operation. Concerning
the main stream Structural Funds, the two MRS were launched well after SF
programmes adopted and too late in the programming cycle to have scope for
significant leverage or mobilisation of existing funding. When the EUSBSR was
adopted, programming authorities were invited to review the allocation criteria
and facilitate the selection of projects aligned with the strategy. The
Commission also indicated that it would welcome appropriate modifications of
the programmes where necessary. However, in the Baltic Sea Region, this did not
occur to any significant extent, at least in the field of innovation policy
(see Technopolis Group, 2011). Indeed, INTERACT (2010) concluded that “many
programmes are concerned about the timing for implementation of upcoming
macro-regional strategies – too late for the current programming period and
still too early for the next one”. Hence, to
date, partly due to the lack of additional finance, the macro regional
strategies have had limited influence on national (regional) innovation and
competitiveness policies. The progress reports do underline that non Cohesion
Policy countries like Sweden or Finland in the BSR or the region of
Baden-Württemberg in the DR have mobilised own resources to implement
initiatives in the framework of the macro-region strategies. However, this
remains the exception rather than rule. Given the limited mobilisation of
national funds to support MRS, the ETC programmes are the main source of
funding for implementation of flagship projects. There is not
yet a clear break with past practice of cross-border and inter-regional
programmes to fund ‘soft’ projects, only rarely combined with physical
investments, with little significant effect on territorial development. Indeed,
Panteia (2010) found that “substantial trans -national co-operation in the
fields of R&D and innovation was rare and focussed mostly on furthering
polycentric and urban development or on improving access to information
society”. INTERACT (2010) found a resistance to use cross-border and
transnational cooperation programmes for co-financing MRS, as this neglects
‘the achievements so far and the value of bilateral co-operation at smaller
scale’. INTERACT suggest a danger of a macro-regional ‘labelling
virus’, whereby promoters sell their projects as ‘macro-regional’ without sound
justification. On the other
hand, macro-regional strategies are seen to offer new opportunities and
perspectives for successful ideas on a larger scale, as well as providing the
impetus for know-how transfer beyond the respective programme areas. This
conclusion is particularly relevant for research and innovation initiatives
where either scale of investment, range of know-required or skills and
expertise in business value chains increasingly can be found only at the level
of a wide group of countries. In this context, the MRS may provide a framework
for more sustainable transnational public-private innovation partnerships, that
are accessible by macro-region participants from ‘’weaker innovation performing
countries’; and that can provide a stepping stone to participation in European
level partnerships. Finally, in
terms of financial engineering, the scope for creating seed/early-stage and
venture funds in the macro-regions is considerable, since few countries (even
the Nordic countries) have a sufficient ‘deal flow’ of viable start-ups to
sustain specialised funds. Indeed, NICE (2010) argued that much was to be
gained by benchmarking and sharing best practices among Nordic public investors
and financers. Hence, the macro-region may provide a sufficient critical mass
through pooling national early stage investment resources. For example, the
three Baltic States have joined forces with the support of the EIB to create
the Baltic Innovation Fund[45]. This example could be
extended to early-stage co-investment funds at macro-region level that support
the growth of specific emerging clusters or technology based sectors. 3.
Added value of macro-regional strategies on co-ordination In both the
BSR[46] and Danube Region[47],
a range of existing transnational or multi-country (e.g. the Nordic Council in
the BSR) co-ordination structures existed prior to the launch of the MRS.
Indeed, in the BSR, there are so many structures that some experts have called
for a rationalisation[48]. Both the strategies
underline that the need to build on existing co-operation structures and the
2011 EUSBSR review noted, “as a result of the Strategy, the Nordic Council of
Ministers has extended its networks to cover the entire Baltic Sea Region”. In the field
of innovation and competitiveness, a number of specific co-ordination
structures exist, most notably in the BSR[49] (see
Technopolis Group, 2011) but also in the Danube Region, such as the Danube
Rectors conference or the INCO-NETs. However, while the EUSBSR 2011
implementation report argued that the strategy “provides a common reference
point for the many organisations in the Baltic Sea Region. Increasingly, people
and structures are basing their work on the priorities set out in the Action
Plan”, there is little evidence backing up this view in the field of
innovation and competitiveness policies. Moreover, in comparison to the public
sector networks, the business sectors, seems however to be less organised and
represented in the macro-region cooperation landscape (Technopolis Group, 2011). Few if any of
the national or regional strategies in the BSR refer in more than a fleeting
way to co-ordinating policies or investments. This may change as the Member
States draft ‘smart specialisation’ strategies in the run up to the 2014-20
period and there is some anecdotal evidence of an increased awareness of the
need to adopt a more ‘open’ approach to policy design and planning leading to
joint initiatives (e.g. the Latvian proposal for a Baltic Innovative Research
and Technology Infrastructure[50]). However, at national
level, the macro-region dimensions of innovation policy remain very much a
secondary consideration even in countries playing a leading role in flagship
projects. Secondly, in
the absence of additional financial resources, the question of the extent to
which the macro-regional strategies can effectively influence existing
transnational co-ordination networks needs to be raised. Again the EUSBSR 2011
report argued “there are many examples of new networks emerging to promote
green public procurement, to cooperate on the full implementation of the
Internal Market, to boost research and innovation, and even in areas of
traditional rivalry like tourism”. However, aside from the specific
activities of the flagship projects, there is little evidence of enhanced
co-ordination between different actors. This may be
because the potential scope of co-operation partners and funding source for
universities, technology based firms, innovation centres, etc. is much wider
than the macro-region. Considering co-ordination of research activities,
assuming excellence or complementary skills of partners is the main criteria
for project selection, it is not self-evident that a partner from the
macro-region will be the best choice when bidding into European programmes.
Indeed, the EUSDR PA7 progress report (June 2012) argued that “…for some
countries and stakeholders the “Three No” of the EUSDR, mainly the one in
connection with the financing of the activities within the Danube Strategy, has
raised doubt on the subject of the assets of the Strategy and evoked questions
due to the facts that even without the Strategy
scientific-research projects did apply for support (more or less successfully)
from existing European grant schemes. To overcome these issues the strong
support and understanding of the Strategy on behalf of national policymakers
are precondition for better utilization of the present legislative, existing
supportive institutions as well as the available (and not always utilized)
financial mechanism”. Indeed, if
national (or regional) programmes do not amend selection criteria to allow
macro-region partners to be involved in projects, then despite the best
intentions stated in strategies, intra-macro-region co-operation may remain
limited. Hence, to
enhance the added value of the MRS on co-ordination of innovation and
competitiveness policies there is a need to introduce considerably more
‘incentives’ to co-operate. The existing flagship projects in the BSR do
suggest that there is a value added in the enhanced co-ordination on specific
research fields, clusters and life science policies or research
infrastructures. However, the co-ordination remains fragile, dependent on ETC
project funding and poorly linked to national policies. 4. Added
value of macro-regional strategies on governance Strategic
governance in a macro-region formed of countries of different scale and
constitutional structures (from ‘single region’ to highly federal countries) is
clearly a significant challenge. The experience of the EUSBSR has led to
changes being made in the overall governance procedures for the macro-regions
and this ‘learning by doing’ is available for other macro-regions as they
develop. The
governance structures for research and innovation policies are becoming increasingly
complex, involving public-private partnerships at all levels from the
local/regional level up through Member States to European level. Potentially,
the MRS support the creation for research, innovation and competitiveness
policies of: ·
a
multi-partner - the so-called triple of public-business-academic sectors,
recently extended to the ‘quadruple helix’ by adding civil society as users,
and ·
a
multi-level governance (regional-national-European-International) framework. Within a
macro-region the potential range of actors that could be mobilised is large.
Technopolis Group (2011) identified 490 main organisations active in the field
of innovation or an average of 20 per BSR region. Similarly, the EUSDR PA7
progress report underlines that the steering group discussions on ‘project
labelling’ led to the conclusion that the scale, number and possible funding
sources of the projects is more extensive in the research and innovation field
than in other infrastructure oriented priority areas. In particular, “it became
obvious that the list of stakeholders and possible project leaders includes not
only relevant ministries and governmental institutions from the Danube Region
countries, but the long list of education institutions, research organisations,
clusters, civil society and business organisations from the entire region”. Hence,
governance can be viewed at least in two dimensions: ·
cross-organisational
governance where various thematic (e.g. life science, environmental research,
etc.) or organisational (e.g. clusters, science parks, incubators, early-stage
funders, etc.) networks create or further develop longer-term ‘institutional’
arrangements to support pooling of resources, joint R&D, value chain
management, etc. Such governance structures will only develop if they are
based on a clear understanding of the core missions of each partner and of the
‘business case’ for sharing responsibilities and resources. ·
Policy
governance, where the co-management of strategies, flagship projects, funding
programmes, etc. leads to a need to create linkages between national and
regional governance structures towards the emerging macro-region management
bodies and upwards to link to European level initiatives. This raises the
issue of how to handle multi-level governance across Member States with varying
levels of decentralisation. In this context, the progress
reports underline the difficulties of mobilising stakeholders, a lack of
support for experts involved in the MRS from senior decision makers; as well as
a variable geometry of involvement (some Member States/regions are heavily
involved, others largely absent). At the current time, there is not a single
governance forum for research, innovation or competitiveness policy discussions
within the macro-regions that has enough power and influence to significantly.
Both the current macro-regions have plans to develop an innovation strategy and
the Danube Region has a specific action aimed at peer-reviewing smart
specialisation strategies. Some countries, e.g. Finland and Estonia, have begun
holding joint sessions of their high-level advisory councils on research and
innovation. One option might be to extend such bilateral co-operation and
formalise a macro-region research and innovation council, ideally supported by
a secretariat (or at least by an existing organisation such as NICE in the BSR
or the INCO-NET in the Danube Region). The experience of the Northern
Dimension in developing partnerships for Public Health and Social Well-being
and Transportation and Logistics Partnership could be usefully extended to a
research and innovation partnership. 5.
Drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies A number of
suggestions can be made in terms of the drivers that could increase the added
value of macro-regional strategies both in terms of establishment and
implementation. In our view, the following drivers could be exploited: ·
The
Commission should ensure the Member States to explain how the 2014-20 national
strategies will contribute to implementing the macro region strategies; SF;
either through specific strategic orientations but most importantly through
investment plans in joint projects or initiatives. In particular, the European
Commission should require the Member States and regions to explain in their smart
specialisation strategy (an ex-ante conditionality for ERDF funding for
research and innovation), how they will mobilise to the maximum extent possible
the option to invest up to 10% Structural Funds in other regions (Article 60 of
the new Structural Fund regulations for the 2014-20 period).[51] ·
The
Member States (and regions) should commission one or more studies on the
possibility of extending the joint programming experience of BONUS to ‘pool’
available R&D and innovation funding in a broader range of fields. ·
There
is significant scope for enhancing critical mass and reducing overlap through
improved co-ordination of national research infrastructures investments: ·
The
Commission should ask Member States to include in their research infrastructure
road maps, to be submitted as part of the ex-ante conditionality for future
ERDF funding, to explicitly assess the extent to which the same facilities
exist in other regions of the macro-region. ·
The
Commission and Member States should support the development of ‘research
pooling’ initiatives[52], like Science Link, to
draw up an inventory of infrastructure in the macro-region in their field,
develop open access policies to available facilities and design a research road
map for the scientific field. ·
The Member
States should consider an ‘open-access’ grant scheme providing support for
macro-region researchers to travel and conduct research in designated research
infrastructures (notably, but not exclusively those which have received support
under Structural Fund programmes). ·
The
Commission should consider focusing future ETC funding for research, innovation
and clustering towards innovation platforms/partnerships and avoid funding ad
hoc projects. The models of the European Innovation Partnerships, European
Technology Platform, the Knowledge and Innovation Communities of the European
Institute of Technology, etc. or the experience of the BSR Stars and Scan Balt
projects are useful in this respect. ·
The
PA coordinators and steering groups should consider launching a macro-regions
innovation voucher programme to enable companies from the ‘weaker’ innovation
regions to access specialised expertise in universities and research and
technology organisations in more advanced regions. Ideally the vouchers would
be managed by a ‘neutral broker’ (e.g. the Enterprise Europe Network), which
would assist companies to develop project ideas and identify the best source of
expertise. ·
In
terms of governance and co-ordination, the macro regional dimension could be
promoted more widely, since, despite claims to the contrary, the MRS exist
mainly in the minds of a small circle of government and public officials and
actors involved in the flagship projects. There is little resonance in the
national research and innovation policy-making circles, to date. Without
necessarily creating a formal new ‘institution’, a macro-region research and
innovation council, could be formed by 2-3 representatives of similar
national/regional councils, would reinforce the current disparate efforts to
structure transnational research and innovation activities. Such a council
could supported by a secretariat (a role that could be tendered out or
allocated to an existing organisation such as NICE in the Baltic Sea region)
that would commission supporting studies and evaluations To conclude,
this report has been based on documentary evidence and there is need for
further analysis and stock-taking work, in order to: ·
review
in more depth the potential for macro-regional co-operation in specific
economic sectors and enterprise related policies such as tourism, agro-food,
etc.; as well as the potential synergies and ‘conflicting objectives’ between
innovation and competitiveness policies and other strategic objectives such as
in the environmental field or maritime policies. ·
design
a strategic approach to co-ordinating research and innovation investments and
programmes in the macro-regions. This could include studies on technological
and societal challenges, trends and drivers that are specific to, or have
specific impacts on, the development of the macro-region; the development of a
mapping or inventory of available research and innovation equipment and
infrastructures to inform national and macro-regional investment plans, etc. ·
develop
solutions to ensure that the MRS institutional structures are sufficiently
robust to ensure a representative (both in terms of geographical spread but
also range of actors) involvement in flagship project and co-ordination
structures. As noted in this paper, the creation of macro-regional level ‘platforms’
or ‘partnerships’ could provide a better basis for both co-ordinating actions
in the macro-region as well as providing a ‘building block’ or ‘stepping stone’
towards EU level objectives and platforms. The PA coordinators could consider
both mapping relevant organisations for specific R&I themes but also
commission a study to examine the potential for such macro-region innovation
partnerships. ·
enhance
the operational linkages between the ‘non-funded’ MRS and the main streams of
funding available at the European level. The ex-ante conditionalities for the
2014-20 programming period provide an opportunity for ensuring that regional
and national strategies and funds are better aligned and focus on maximising
joint investments and reducing duplication of effort. The Commission could
consider establishing an expert group, or tender a study, to review the draft
smart specialisation strategies and make recommendations to ensure maximum
alignment and linkages. ·
Ensure
that non-EU countries and regions are fully integrated in the research and
innovation activities of the MRS. The ‘unequal’ playing field in terms of
access to funding for research and innovation activities and the less advanced
‘innovation systems’ of these countries require specific recognition and should
be studied in more depth. Appendix
A References A.1 EU Baltic Sea Strategy European
Commission (2009, January 2012 Version) Commission Staff Working
Document accompanying the communication from the Commission concerning the
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region - Action Plan European
Commission (2011a) Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). COM(2011) 381 final. European
Commission (2011b) Commission Staff Working Paper on the implementation of the
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. SEC(2011) 1071 final. European
Commission (2012a) Communication concerning the European Union Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region. COM(2012) 128 final Falck S., F.
Snickars, H. Westlund (2011) Research Hubs in the Baltic Sea Region: an
Explorative study about Research Cooperation and the Usage of Research
Facilities in Physics and Life Sciences. Royal Institute of Technology (KTH),
Stockholm. Technopolis
Group (2011) Innovation in the Baltic Sea region. Final Report to the European
Commission, Directorate-General Regional Policy. Brussels A.2 EU
Danube Strategy European
Commission (2010a) Communication from the Commission on the European Union
Strategy for Danube Region. COM(2010) 715 European
Commission (2010b) Commission Staff Working Document. Action Plan. Accompanying
document to the Communication from the Commission on the European Union
Strategy for the Danube Region. SEC(2010) 1489 EUSDR Report
June 2012 Priority Area 8 Competitiveness of enterprises, including cluster
development EUSDR Report
June 2012 Priority Area 7 To develop the Knowledge Society through Research,
Education and Information Technologies METIS (201?)
Analysis of needs for financial instruments in the EU Strategy for the Danube
Region (EUSDR) A.3 Other references INTERACT
(2010) INTERACT study towards cross-programme evaluation. Joint summary.
Thematic and operational aspects of cross-border cooperation in Central and
South-Eastern Europe Panteia and
Partners (2010) INTERREG III Community Initiative (2000-2006) Ex-Post
Evaluation. Executive Summary.
Chapter 3: list of
literature used by Commission
The EU
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 1. Communication
– concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. COM(2009)
248. 2. The revised
Action Plan of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. SEC(2009) 712.
(February 2013 version). 3. European
Commission Communication – concerning the European Union Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region. COM(2012) 128. 4. European
Commission Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region (EUSBSR). COM(2011) 381. 5. European
Commission Staff Working Paper on the implementation of the European Union
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. SEC(2011) 1071. The EU Strategy
for the Danube Region 6. European
Commission Communication on the European Union Strategy for Danube Region.
COM(2010) 715. 7. Action Plan
of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. SEC(2010) 1489. 8. Reflection
paper on the implementation of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, 27-28
November 2012. 9. Draft Report
on the Implementation of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. Council
Conclusions 10. European Council
Conclusions of 14 December 2007. 11. European Council
Conclusions of 18-19 June 2009. 12. European Council
Conclusions 29/30 October 2009. 13. Council conclusions on
the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region of 13 April 2011. 14. Council Conclusions on
the review of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region of 15 November 2011. 15. Council conclusions on
the completion of the review of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region of 26
June 2012. 16. European Council
Conclusions 13/14 December 2012. European
Parliament and Committee of the Regions: 17. European Parliament
resolution on a Baltic Sea Region Strategy for the Northern Dimension (2006). 18. European Parliament,
Committee on Regional Development: Report on the European Union Strategy for
the Baltic Sea Region and the role of macro-regions in the future cohesion
policy (June 2010). 19. European Parliament,
Committee on Regional Development, Report: Evolution of EU macro-regional
strategies: present practice and future prospects, especially in the
Mediterranean (2012). 20. Opinion of the Committee
of the Regions on ‘Revised EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region’ (October 2012). 21. Opinion of the Committee
of the Regions on the ‘The Danube Region Strategy’ (2011). 22. European Parliament,
Committee on Regional Development: Report: on optimising the role of
territorial development in cohesion policy (December 2012). 23. Opinion of the European
Economic and Social Committee on ‘Developing a macro-regional strategy in the
Mediterranean — the benefits for island Member States’ (February 2013). Other: 24. Drafting and
implementing macro-regional and sea basin strategies (MRS and SBS), CPMR (March
2013). 25. R. Bengtsson, An EU
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Good Intentions Meet Complex Challenges.
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2009. 26. A. Dubois, S. Hedin, P.
Schmitt, J. Sterling. EU macro-regions and macro regional strategies – A scoping
study. Nordregio 2009. 27. M. Salines. Success
Factors of Macro-Regional Cooperation: The Example of the Baltic Sea Region.,
2010. 28. State of the Region
Report, 2012. 29. State of the Region
Report, 2011. 30. Guidelines for drafting
and implementation of macro-regional strategies, CRPM, September 2012. 31. S. Duhr. Baltic Sea,
Danube and Macro-regional Strategies: A Model for Transnational Cooperation in
the EU? 32. G. Braun, Z. L. Kovács.
Macro-Regional Strategies: Experiment for the Renewal of Economic Policy of the
EU. 33. A. Stocchiero. The
geopolitical game of the European Union strategy for macro-regions: Where does
the Mediterranean stand? CeSPI (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale)
Working Papers No. 74/2010, July 2010. 34. Macro-regional
strategies in the EU – A Discussion Paper presented by Commissioner Pawel
Samecki in Stokholm on 18 September 2009. 35. Metzger, P. Schmitt.
When soft spaces harden: the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Environment
and Planning A 2012, volume 44. 36. What role for the
Regions in the Baltic Sea Strategy? Summary of the Enquiry, CRPM (July 2010) 37. Policy Recommendations
for Regional Co-operation, BDF, 2010. 38. Analysis of needs for
financial instruments in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, SWECO,
2011.
Chapter 4: key messages
of literature review
European Parliament, Committee on Regional
Development, Report: Evolution of EU macro-regional strategies: present
practice and future prospects, especially in the Mediterranean (2012) ‘Importance to ensure the involvement of local
and regional authorities and of the greatest possible number of partners and
stakeholders, such as representatives of civil society, universities and
research centres, in both the elaboration and the implementation of
macro-regional strategies in order to increase their ownership at local and
regional level’. ‘It necessary, if this strategy
is to be fully successful, to retain the governance structure in the long term,
extending it to include local and regional authorities, by including it in the
upcoming programming period 2014–2020.’ ‘Macro-regional strategy could steer the
European Neighbourhood Policy and/or pre-accession policy towards being more
effective.’ Drafting and implementing macro-regional
and sea basin strategies (MRS and SBS), CPMR (March 2013) ‘It is necessary for Regions to be
involved in all stages of preparation and implementation of these Strategies so
that the realities on the ground can be actually taken into account’. ‘The transnational strand of European
Territorial Cooperation is the most obvious instrument for implementing MRS and
SBS. However, given the limited budgets allocated to ETC it is crucial to
utilise funds from other EU sectoral programmes such as Horizon 2020 for
research, the Connecting Europe Facility for transport, as well as national,
regional and local funding’. ‘Although the ‘Three Nos’ rule is
currently accepted by most parties, it is necessary in the start-up phases of
MRS to allocate a relatively small but specific initial budget, designed to
help establish contacts and identify core projects’. Guidelines for drafting and
implementation of macro-regional strategies, CRPM, (September 2012) ‘MRS as a new type of territorial
cooperation at the interregional and transnational level to meet the European
objectives defined in the Europe 2020 strategy, cohesion policy, the integrated
maritime policy and external cooperation policies’. ‘MRS provide an integrated framework
within which to facilitate and coordinate policies and resources within a
defined area that is both geographical (going beyond national borders),
horizontal (going beyond sectoral policies) and vertical (ranging through
various levels of governance)’. ‘The other European funds should also be
used to achieve macro-regional priorities. As an example, for transport, Connecting Europe Facility
and the Trans-European Networks – Transport (TEN-T); For fisheries, the EMFF
(European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, for neighbourhood and pre-accession, the
new European neighbourhood instruments (ENI) and instruments for pre-accession
assistance (IPA II) and etc.’
What role for the Regions in the Baltic Sea Strategy? Summary of the Enquiry,
CRPM (July 2010) ‘The new approach of cooperation would
allow a better use of each actor’s resources, including the civil society,
local and regional authorities, in a cross-border and international context’. ‘Governance patterns should be clarified
and allow for an effective association of regional and local authorities in
terms of implementation, advice and expertise. Continued multi-level governance
and dialogue are key factors for the success of the Strategy, especially in
some policy areas’. Opinion of the Committee of the Regions
on ‘Revised EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region’ (October 2012) ‘The EUSBSR seeks to improve policy
coordination and cohesion between the regions in the area with a view to
solving common problems affecting the Baltic Sea region and strengthening the
region's prosperity on a sustainable basis’. ‘There should also be ‘three yeses’:
jointly agreed application and monitoring of existing rules in the
macro-region; creation of a platform, network or territorial cluster of
regional and local authorities and Member States which also brings in
stakeholders; agreed use of existing Union funding for developing and
implementing macro-regional strategies’. ‘In order to strengthen economic cohesion
and competitiveness there must be stronger links between research, innovation
and industry stakeholders’. ‘The success of macro-regional strategies
across Europe depends largely on the commitment and contribution of local and
regional stakeholders to meeting objectives. Getting the private sector
involved is also crucial’. R. Bengtsson. An EU Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region: Good Intentions Meet Complex Challenges. Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies, 2009. The need for an integrated approach to
ensure impact. ‘The strategy has the potential for
success in the form of added value, both regarding concrete improvements of the
current situation and development prospects of the Baltic Sea region and
regarding the making of a new mechanism for functional cooperation elsewhere in
the EU. the strategy will yield added value also in the form of an enhanced
Baltic Sea identity.’ A. Dubois, S.
Hedin, P. Schmitt, J. Sterling. EU macro-regions and macro regional strategies
– A scoping study. Nordregio, 2009. ‘Macro-regional
strategies may be seen as a tool of European integration and increased
territorial cohesion. The elaboration of macro-regional strategies makes it
possible to promote the territorial dimension of EU policies and cooperation.
Tailor-made solutions for each macro-region are needed in order to ensure that
the macro-regional approach delivers added-value and helps to release
undeveloped potential within a macro-region’. ‘Organisational capacity and willingness
to cooperate of the various stakeholders involved will play a crucial role in
ensuring that the macro-regional approach can deliver a measure of
‘added-value’.
M. Salines. Success Factors of Macro-Regional Cooperation: The Example of the
Baltic Sea Region, 2010. ‘Given the increasing heterogeneity
within the EU due to the successive enlargements over the last years, such an
empowerment of macro-regions might be an innovative and effective way to bring
the European integration process forward’. ‘Macro-regions can offer a higher
problem-solving capacity than the EU-27 in a number of fields such as
innovation policy, environmental protection, etc., as it might be easier to
achieve common understanding and mutual trust at this level’. State of the Region Report, 2012. ‘The EUSBSR has significantly
enhanced co-ordination across existing organisations, networks, projects, and
financing tools. This has been achieved be ‘repurposing’ the existing structure
of institutions and policies that were mostly developed in a different context.
If the ambition is to accomplish more, more fundamental changes in this
institutional architecture are needed’. ‘The Strategy provides the focal point
for the relevant efforts in the Region, and all networks and organisations have
found it the natural platform to coordinate their individual activities. This
has led to more coherence and more effectiveness in the way available
structures and resources are being utilized’. State of the Region Report, 2011. ‘The EUSBSR has played a very positive
role in enhancing the effectiveness of collaboration. It has so far been less
impactful in introducing new participants, topics, or solutions to address
regional issues’. Private sector engagement remains
limited. ‘The EUSBSR has proven effective in
coordinating the efforts of many existing cross-regional organizations and
networks’. Analysis of needs for financial
instruments in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, SWECO, 2011 ‘The implementation of the EUSBSR is to a
large extent dependent on EU Structural Funds, in particular European
Territorial Cooperation Programmes are widely used. However, in total there are
more than 100 programmes available plus a wide range of national and regional
instruments’. In the preparatory phase there is a
widely perceived lack of funding (seed money is needed). S. Dühr. Baltic Sea, Danube and
Macro-regional Strategies: A Model for Transnational Cooperation in the EU?
2011 ‘The expectation is that the added-value
of macro-regional strategies lies in the coordination of actions across policy
areas, which should lead to more effective outcomes and ensure a more efficient
use of resources than individual initiatives ’. ‘The potential added-value of an EU
macro-regional strategy to existing cooperation arrangements should be
carefully considered. For the Alpine Region, for example, actors in the region
have emphasised that a macro-regional strategy should only be developed if it
helps to reinforce, rather than replaces, existing agreements and instruments’. ‘Given the large number of actors
involved at different levels this has led to rather complex governance
arrangements’. “The savings through better coordination
will far exceed the coordination costs”. There is a need of technical assistance
for coordination activities. G. Braun, Z. L. Kovács. Macro-Regional
Strategies: Experiment for the Renewal of Economic Policy of the EU. ‘More tightened fiscal and sectoral
coordination through macro-regions can give a new impulse to the cooperation on
EU level and improve EU’s competitiveness’. ‘Macro-regional strategies can serve as
an important instrument to deepen integration and strengthen territorial
cohesion’. ‘The Union has not yet set a limit for
the number of macro-regions, and there might even be overlaps between them’. A. Stocchiero. The geopolitical game of
the European Union strategy for macro-regions: Where does the Mediterranean
stand? CeSPI
(Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale) Working Papers No. 74/2010, July 2010 ‘The macro-regional strategy added value
is the integrated approach, namely the multi-level and trans-national governance for an
effective coordination of EU, national and regional instruments and financing of flagship projects. The
innovation concerns the building of a new governance for achieving more efficacy in facing common
challenges and opportunities’. J. Metzger,
P. Schmitt. When soft spaces harden: the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.
Environment and Planning A 2012, volume 44. ‘The macro-regional concept, as
elaborated in the EUSBSR, appears to build upon and promote ideas of
territorial cohesion, coherence, and cooperation’. Policy Recommendations for Regional
Co-operation, BDF, 2010 ‘With the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region, the EU countries of the region have a unique opportunity to link
national and European growth initiatives to a regional context’. European
Parliament, Committee of the Regions: Report on the European Union Strategy for
the Baltic Sea Region and the role of macro-regions in the future cohesion
policy (2010). ‘The EU2020 Strategy, which is consistent
with the goals set on the Baltic Sea Strategy, can act as an efficient
framework for the implementation and strengthening of the Baltic Sea Strategy’. ‘Strategy’s territorial dimension will
lead to the concrete development of the idea of territorial cohesion, which the
Treaty of Lisbon places on an equal footing with economic and social cohesion’. ‘The European added value of macro-regions
lies in greater cooperation between states and regions’. European
Parliament, Committee on Regional Development: Report: on optimising the role
of territorial development in cohesion policy (December 2012). ‘Territorial cooperation and macro-regional
strategies could be useful instruments for identifying and combating regional
disparities, e.g. in access to education and employment, and for promoting
convergence between European regions’.
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Developing a
macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean — the benefits for island Member
States’ (February 2013) ‘The approach to macro-regional
strategies hitherto has been limited to implementing EU internal policies.
However, to be effective, such a strategy in the Mediterranean where many
non-EU countries are involved requires implementation of elements of external
policy, obviously with the emphasis on EU ‘good neighbour’ policy ’. ‘Funding is needed for technical
assistance to collect data and promote the necessary structural projects’. ‘They [macro-regional] also facilitate
convergence between the resources of the regions and those of the various
Member States, based on the implementation of coordinated ‘governance’, and the
creation of ‘mutual benefit" for all parties’.
Chapter 5: fact sheets
of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR
5.1 The EU Strategy for
the Baltic Sea Region
The European Union Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region (EUSBSR) is the first macro-regional strategy in Europe. It aims at
reinforcing cooperation within this large region in order to face several
challenges by working together as well as promoting a more balanced development
in the area. The Strategy also contributes to major EU policies and reinforces
the integration within the area. The Baltic Sea Region counts 85 million
inhabitants (17 percent of EU population) and eight countries (Sweden, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) which share
common features and challenges. Hence there is a clear need for joining forces
and working in cooperation. Against this background, the Strategy intends
to increase the levels of environmental sustainability, prosperity,
accessibility and attractiveness and safety and security. The Strategy was approved by the European Council in 2009 following a communication from the European
Commission. In this respect, it provides an integrated framework for
improving the environmental condition of the sea, transport bottlenecks and
energy interconnections as well as facilitating the development of competitive
markets across borders and common networks for research and innovation. Milestones §
December
2007: the European Council invites the European Commission to present an
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region no later than June 2009 §
June 2009:
European Commission presents the Action Plan and Communication for the EUSBSR §
October
2009: European Council endorses the EUSBSR §
June 2011:
Commission publishes the first implementing report of the EUSBSR §
November
2011: Council Conclusions calls the European Commission to review the EUSBSR by
early 2012 §
March
2012: Commission publishes the Communication specifying the three overall objectives
for the Strategy: Save the Sea, Connect the Region and Increase
Prosperity §
June 2012:
General Affairs Council endorses Commission’s Communication and calls for the
review of the EUSBSR Action Plan §
February
2013: the update Action Plan reflecting the three objectives of the Strategy is
adopted How does it work in practice? The Strategy aims at bringing
together initiatives in different sectors (growth, sustainable development etc.) as
well as promoting cooperation between stakeholders in the Baltic Sea region. The Strategy also promotes flagship projects
and contributing projects funded in the Baltic Sea region. These projects have
a macro-regional impact and start from joint initiatives involving partnership
from different countries. Implementation of the Strategy requires
active participation by all the actors and stakeholders implicated in the
process not only at a national level but at a macro-regional level. Governance and actors in the strategy Each participating state in
the strategy has a national contact point that is the main contact for
implementing the strategy on the national level. The objectives of the strategy
are operationalized through priority areas and horizontal actions. Each of
these are coordinated by one or more country or organisation in the macro-region.
An overview of the 17 priority areas and 5 horizontal actions in the EUSBSR can
be found below: Priority Area AGRI (Finland, Sweden, Lithuania) Priority Area NUTRI (Poland, Priority Area Hazards (Sweden) Priority Area BIO (Germany) Priority Area SHIP (Denmark) Priority Area SAFE (Denmark, Finland) Priority Area SECURE (Sweden, Council of Baltic Sea
States) Priority Area TRANSPORT (Lithuania, Sweden) Priority Area ENERGY (Denmark, Latvia) Priority Area CULTURE (Schleswig-Holstein, Poland) Priority Area CRIME (Finland, Lithuania) Priority Area TOURISM (Mecklenburg Vorpommern,
Germany) Priority Area INTERNAL MARKET (Estonia) Priority Area INNOVATION (Sweden, Poland) Priority Area SME (Denmark) Priority Area EDUCATION (Hamburg, Norden Association) Priority Area HEALTH (Northern Dimension
Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being) Horizontal Action SPATIAL PLANNING (VASAB and HELCOM) Horizontal Action NEIGHBOURS (Council of Baltic Sea States
and City of Turku) Horizontal Action INVOLVE (Region Västerbotten, Kalmar,
Baltic Sea NGO Network) Horizontal Action Sustainable Development and BioEconomy (Council of Baltic Sea States
and Nordic Council of ministers) Horizontal Action PROMO (Baltic Metropoles Network,
Baltic Development Forum)
5.2 The EU Strategy for
the Danube Region
The EU Strategy for the Danube Region
(EUSDR) is a second macro-regional strategy adopted by the European Commission
in December 2010 and endorsed by the European Council in 2011. The Strategy was
jointly developed by the Commission, together with the Danube Region countries
and stakeholders, in order to address common challenges together. The EUSDR
seeks to create synergies and coordination between existing policies and
initiatives taking place across the Danube Region.
Background and Objective In 2009, the European Council formally
asked the European Commission to prepare an EU Strategy for the Danube Region
(EUSDR). ‘The importance of the Danube Basin for the EU cannot be
underestimated. Our policies and the investments we are making in the Basin
through the EU's cohesion policy in particular have an impact on the
livelihoods of 20 million citizens. The Danube needs a specific strategy
comparable to the strategy we are developing for the Baltic Sea Region. A
one-size-fits all approach doesn't work in an EU of 27 Member States and 271
regions. We need a targeted policy for the Danube that meets its ecological,
transport and socio-economic needs,’ said Commissioner Hübner on the open day
in October 2008. Governance – How does it work? The priority area coordinators (PACs)
ensure the implementation of the Action Plan by agreeing on planning, with targets,
indicators and timetables, and by making sure there is effective cooperation
between project promoters, programmes and funding sources. They also provide
technical assistance and advice. The coordinators work in consultation with the
Commission, and relevant EU agencies and national/regional bodies.
The national contact points (NCPs) coordinate and keep an overview of the
participation of their country in the implementation of the EUSDR including all
11 Priority Areas. The role of the NCP is to promote the Strategy and inform
relevant stakeholders on the national level of key developments. NCPs
also assist the European Commission in its facilitation role.
Milestones §
19 June
2009: The European Council invites the European Commission to develop a strategy
for the area around the Danube. §
July
2009-December 2010: Preparation of the Strategy by the European Commission,
including public consultation and consultations with participating countries. §
8 December
2010: European Commission adopts the Action Plan and Communication for the
EUSDR. §
3 February
2011: Commissioner Hahn designates the Prioritiy Area Coordinators. §
13 April
2011: Adoption of the Council Conclusions by the EU Council for General
Affairs. §
24 June
2011: Official endorsement of the EUSDR by the European Council and launch of
the implementation phase. More information on the Strategy: The
Strategy is defined in a Communication, accompanied by a
detailed Action Plan, which presents
the operational objectives and concrete projects and actions of the EUSDR.
Chapter 6: questionnaire
for a survey on the added value of macro-regional strategies (the EU Strategy
for the Baltic Sea Region and EU Strategy for the Danube Region)
Who
are you? (tick the right one) a) Priority Area Coordinator (PAC) || b) Horizontal Action Leader (HAL) || c) Project/Flagship Project Leader (FPL) || d) National Contact Point (NCP) || e) Priority Area/Horizontal Action Focal Point/ Steering Group Member || f) Private sector, economic and social partners || g) NGO || h) Managing Authority of EU programmes || i) National Institution || j) Pan-regional and regional organization || k) European institution || l) Other (please specify) || Overall assessment Question || Answer What in your experience has the impact of the macro-regional strategy been? What concrete differences has the macro-regional strategy made? What is the added value of the EUSBSR/EUSDR? || What positive processes / initiatives have been stimulated by the EUSBSR/EUSDR? || Question || Yes || No || Comments Are you aware that policy (local, national, regional, EU) has been aligned with the objectives / priorities of the macro-regional strategy? If yes, please specify. || || || Are you aware that funding (national, regional, EU) has been aligned with the objectives / priorities of the macro-regional strategy? If yes, please specify. || || || 1 || Strongly disagree 2 || Rather disagree 3 || Neutral 4 || Rather agree 5 || Strongly agree 1. Rationale Please evaluate the following statements
on a scale from 1 to 5 and justify your choice or provide proposals in the
column “comments”. Rationale || Scale || Comments || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || a) Objectives of the EUSBSR/EUSDR correctly address the main challenges faced by respective Region; || || || || || || b) The number of Priority Areas and Horizontal Actions is reasonable; || || || || || || c) Some priorities in the EUSBSR/EUSDR are more important than others to reach the objectives of the macro-regional strategy; || || || || || || d) There is high political commitment towards the EUSBSR/EUSDR in the participating countries; || || || || || || e) The implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR effectively is contributing to social, economic and territorial cohesion. || || || || || || 2. Governance Process Governance Process || Scale || Comments || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || a) The internal administrative, technical and institutional organisation in all participating countries is already effective enough to implement the EUSBSR/EUSDR; || || || || || || b) The key stakeholders of the macro-regional strategy (NCP, PAC, HAL) effectively coordinate their activities within and with other stakeholders; || || || || || || c) The multilevel governance dimension is fully taken into account in the actions and decisions taken for implementing projects, actions or policies at Member States level/at project level; || || || || || || d) There is clear evidence that national, regional and EU governance systems have improved thanks to the EUSBSR/EUSDR. || || || || || || 3. Funding Funding || Scale || Comments || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || a) The alignment of national, regional and EU policies and funding with the objectives of the EUSBSR/EUSDR has been successfully achieved; || || || || || || b) The technical assistance provided by European Commission significantly facilitated the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR; || || || || || || c) The EUSBSR/EUSDR helps to mobilize the existing funding, to use it in more efficient and coordinated manner; || || || || || || d) There is a need for additional funding only for the project preparation stage, networking. || || || || || || 4. Cooperation Cooperation || Scale || Comments || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || a) The absence of additional money favours the reinforcement of cooperation among partners and the main core partners (NCP, PAC, HAL, Commission) fully play their role of cooperation and coordination with other key partners; || || || || || || b) There is a clear evidence that cooperation mechanisms have improved thanks to the EUSBSR/EUSDR; || || || || || || c) The implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR strengthened the existing cooperation among and within participating countries, in particular among ministries; || || || || || || d) The cooperation between EU Member States with neighbouring non-EU countries expanded and improved thanks to the macro-regional strategy; || || || || || || e) Cooperation has led a tangible effect on national policies such as those on environment, energy and etc. || || || || || || 5. Policy orientations Policy orientations || Scale || Comments || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || a) The implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR helps to move from sectoral approach to multi-sectoral, integrated one; || || || || || || b) Many successful projects and actions would not be implemented if the EUSBSR/EUSDR would not be endorsed; || || || || || || c) The macro-regional strategy helped to mobilize the existing policies and create more synergies; || || || || || || d) The implementation of the macro-regional strategy has led the new policy developments in several areas in your country; || || || || || || e) The new policy developments have improved the situation in the areas concerned, and this improvement is measurable or can be described (eg. a trend). || || || || || || 6. Next programming period Next programing period || Scale || Comments || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || a) The objectives of the macro-regional strategy must be firmly embedded in the 2014–2020 policy framework at EU, national and regional level; || || || || || || b) The EUSBSR/EUSDR core partners (NCP, PAC, HAL) must be consulted in/associated to the discussions of the next programmes in their respective countries; || || || || || || c) Where relevant, actions or projects of the macro-regional strategy must be clearly identified in the draft programmes submitted to the European Commission; || || || || || || d) For each Priority Area/Horizontal Action, a cooperation platform (where PAC/HAL, programmes authorities, projects managers, NGOs, etc. can exchange) and a Steering Committee must be set up. || || || || || || [1] Western Balkan Investment
Framework [2] European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes [3] European Regional Development
Funds [4] European Social Funds [5] Civil Protection Framework
Programme [6] European Investment Bank [7] European Investment Fund [8] Trans-European Transport
Networks [9] Joint Research Centre [10] Seventh Framework Programme
for Research and Technological Development [11]
http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/index_en.htm [12]
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/publications_en.html [13] The EU
Cohesion Policy for the programming period 2007-13 responded to the EU
objectives as set out in the Lisbon-Gothenburg Agenda (2000/2001) and the
relaunched Agenda
in 2005, which put emphasis on directing EU funding programmes (including the
Structural Funds) towards growth and jobs. For the 2007-2013 programming
period, EU Cohesion Policy is organised in three ‘objectives’: the
‘convergence’ objective (for regions with a GDP per inhabitant of less than 75%
of Community average), the ‘regional competitiveness and employment’ objective
(for all other regions), and the ‘European territorial cooperation’ objective.
The European territorial cooperation objective includes the former INTERREG
Community Initiative programmes and has three strands: cross-border
cooperation, transnational cooperation and interregional cooperation. According
to the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion 2007-2013, all programmes
had to earmark a certain proportion of the resources for investments linked to
the Lisbon strategy for Growth and Jobs, such as research and innovation,
infrastructures of European importance, industrial competitiveness, renewable
energies, energy efficiency, eco-innovations, entrepreneurship and human
resources. [14] ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ was adopted in March
2010 by the European Council (CEC 2010e), and was prepared in response to the
economic crisis. It is the successor of the ‘Growth and Jobs Agenda’ and
focuses on three key areas: •
Smart
growth:
developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation •
Sustainable
growth:
promoting a more efficient, greener and more competitive economy •
Inclusive
growth:
fostering a high-employment economy, where all communities and regions
participate and flourish. The EU 2020 strategy sets
out five goals, which are to be broken down into national targets: •
75%
of the population aged 20-64 in employment •
3%
of the EU‘s GDP invested in research and development •
Successful
implementation of the EU‘s environmental goals, i.e. a 20% reduction in CO2
emissions and a 20% increase in renewable energies •
A
minimum of 40% of the younger generation to obtain a tertiary degree, and 10%
fewer early school leavers •
20
million fewer people should be at risk of poverty In the European Council
conclusions (June 2010), it was expressed that ‘all common policies, including
the common agricultural policy and cohesion policy, will need to support the
strategy’. The EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 will be focused on the EU 2020
objectives. [15] The Helsinki Commission
(HELCOM) is an intergovernmental organization (Denmark, Estonia, the European
Union, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden) working
to protect the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. [16] VASAB - Vision and
Strategies around the Baltic Sea - is an intergovernmental network of 11
countries of the Baltic Sea Region promoting cooperation on spatial planning
and development in the Baltic Sea Region. [17] SEC(2009) 702 Commission
Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commuication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region Impact Assessment. [18] COM(2011) 381
final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
Implementation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). [19] Water
Framework Directive, Nitrate Directive and the Urban Waste Water Directive [20] Council
Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds. [21] Council
Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and
of wild fauna and flora. [22] Final Results
Booklet CLISP www.clisp.eu%2Fcontent%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FCLISP_Model%2520Region%2520Report_Alessandria.pdf [23] http://eu.baltic.net/redaktion/download.php?type=file&id=1298 [24] EUSBSR
Newsletter November 2012 [25] Report to the
European Commission Implementation of the EUSDR Priority Area 6 to preserve
biodiversity, landscapes and the quality of air and soils Reporting period 13
April 2011 – 30 June 2012 Final [26] http://www.ndep.org/projects.asp?type=nh&cont=prjh&pageid=4 [27] SEC(2009) 712/2 Januarz
2012 version Commission Staff Working Document Accompanzing the Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region Action Plan [28] See: http://www.interact-eu.net/macro_regional_strategies/macro_regional_strategies/283/3921
[29] The other two priority
areas in this pillar are PA6 To remove hindrances to the internal market in the
Baltic Sea Region and PA9 To reinforce sustainable agriculture, forestry and
fishing. [30] For an up to date
overview, see the 2012 Competitiveness in BSR report http://www.bsr2012.eu/wp-content/uploads/BDF_SoRR_2012.pdf [31] http://www.bsrstars.se/ [32] http://www.scanbalt.org/ [33] http://www.science-link.eu/ [34] http://www.bonusportal.org [35] http://www.bsrstars.se/project/bonus-call-2012-innovation/ [36] http://eu.baltic.net/Innovation.21800.html and http://www.bsr-innovation.eu/ [37] http://bit.ly/VFyHtq [38] See the
annual ERAWATCH country reports available at http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/information/reports/ [39] For instance, how could
a macro-region strategy adopted in 2010 possibly contribute to the target of
“Broadband access for all EU citizens in the Region by 2013”. [40] See for instance: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf for a survey
of the literature on the link between patenting, innovation and productivity. [41] http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?pg=eip [42] See: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/art185/about-185_en.html [43] Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards Joint Programming in
Research”. COM(2008) 468. Brussels, 15.7.2008 [44] The BONUS Programme was
established under Article 185 in September 2010, with a budget of €100m. Its
objective is to support joint programming and targeted research to tackle the
most important issues facing the Baltic Sea. Its full implementation phase
began in November 2011. [45] http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/resources/BIF/index.htm [46] Technopolis
Group (2011) stated “it is striking to see the significant number of
inter-intergovernmental forums and political networks established in the BSR. [47] The
International Convention for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), the
Danube Commission, the Regional Cooperation Council, the Danube Cooperation
Process (DCP), the Council of Danube Cities and Regions, the Danube Tourism
Commission, etc. [48] The NB8 Wise
Men report (2010) noted ‘there is no need for new regional structures; indeed,
there are voices advocating the dissolution of many of the existing ones which
some find to be redundant or inefficient”. [49] Such as the
Baltic Development Forum (BDF) which publishes a competitiveness report, The
Baltic Metropoles Network (BaltMet), the Nordic Innovation Centre, etc. [50] http://www.birti.eu/en/about-birti
[51] Article 60 Eligibility of operations depending on location 1. Operations supported by the CSF Funds, subject to the
derogations referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, and the Fund-specific rules,
shall be located in the area covered by the programme under which they are
supported (the 'programme area'). 2. The managing authority may accept that an operation is
implemented outside the programme area but within the Union, provided that all
the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the operation is for the benefit of the programme area; (b) the total amount allocated under the programme to
operations located outside the programme area does not exceed 10 % of the
support from the ERDF, Cohesion Fund and EMFF at the level of the priority, or
3% of the support from the EAFRD at the level of the programme. [52] For a
national level example of research pooling see the Scottish Funding Council
supported initiatives: http://www.sfc.ac.uk/research/researchpools/researchpools.aspx