(i)

Is it possible to apply the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law to Article 23(4) of [Directive (EU) 2019/1023 (1)] where the facts (as in the present case, in view of the date of the application for discharge of debt) occurred during the period between the entry into force of the directive and the deadline for its transposition, and the applicable national legislation (the consolidated text of the Ley Concursal (Insolvency Law), as amended by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2020) is not the legislation which transposes the directive (Law 16/22)?

(ii)

Is national legislation, such as the Spanish legislation established in the consolidated text of the Insolvency Law (as amended by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2020), which provides no justification for excluding claims governed by public law from discharge of debt, compatible with Article 23(4) of the directive and its underlying principles concerning discharge of debt? In so far as that legislation excludes claims governed by public law from discharge of debt and is not duly justified, does it compromise or jeopardise the attainment of the objectives established in the directive?

(iii)

Does Article 23(4) of the directive contain an exhaustive, closed list of categories of claims which can be excluded from discharge, or is the list instead merely illustrative, with the national legislature enjoying absolute discretion to establish such categories of excludable claims as it sees fit, provided that they are duly justified under national law?