1.

Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as Article 47b(5) and (6) of the Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. — Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 27 July 2001 on the system of ordinary courts), in conjunction with Articles 30(1) and 24(1) thereof, under which a body of a national court, such as the college of a court, has the power to release a judge of that court from the obligation to hear some or all of the cases assigned to him or her, in the case where:

2.

Must the provisions referred to in Question 1, and also the principle of primacy, be interpreted as empowering (or obliging) a national court hearing a case in criminal proceedings coming within the scope of Directive 2016/343, (1) the judge dealing with which has been released from the obligation to hear cases in the manner described in Question 1, and all public bodies, to disregard an act of the college of a court and other acts issued subsequently, such as an order reassigning cases, including the case in the main proceedings, without the consent of the judge who has been released, so that he or she can continue to sit on the panel hearing that case?

3.

Must the provisions referred to in Question 1, and also the principle of primacy, be interpreted as requiring the existence in the national legal order, in criminal proceedings coming within the scope of Directive 2016/343, of remedies of the kind which ensure that the parties to the proceedings, such as the defendant in the main proceedings, can secure a review of, and appeal against, decisions such as those referred to in [Question 1], which are intended to bring about a change in the composition of the panel hearing the case and consequently to release the judge hitherto assigned to hear the case from the obligation to do so, in the manner described in Question 1?