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Document 62016CN0623

    Case C-623/16 P: Appeal brought on 25 November 2016 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 September 2016 in Case T-220/13, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission

    OJ C 38, 6.2.2017, p. 17–17 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

    6.2.2017   

    EN

    Official Journal of the European Union

    C 38/17


    Appeal brought on 25 November 2016 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 September 2016 in Case T-220/13, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission

    (Case C-623/16 P)

    (2017/C 038/22)

    Language of the case: Italian

    Parties

    Appellant: European Commission (represented by: P. Stancanelli, D. Grespan, F. Tomat, acting as agents)

    Other parties to the proceedings: Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl, Italian Republic

    Form of order sought

    The appellant claims that the Court should:

    set aside the judgment under appeal to the extent that it declares the proceedings at first instance admissible for the purpose of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU;

    declare the action at first instance inadmissible for the purpose of the second and last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and consequently dismiss it in its entirety;

    order Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori to pay the costs incurred by the Commission in the proceedings before the General Court and in the present proceedings.

    Pleas in law and main arguments

    By a single plea in law, divided into three parts, the Commission claims that the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU was misinterpreted and misapplied, in that the General Court ruled that the applicant’s action at first instance was admissible on the basis of that provision. In particular, the General Court erred in law by finding that the contested act amounted to a regulatory act which was of direct concern to the applicant at first instance and did not entail implementing measures in respect of the applicant itself.


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