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Document 62006CJ0010

    Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 29 November 2007.
    Rafael de Bustamante Tello v Council of the European Union.
    Case C-10/06 P.

    European Court Reports 2007 I-10381;FP-I-B-2-00039
    European Court Reports – Staff Cases 2007 II-B-2-00317

    ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2007:727

    JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

    29 November 2007

    Case C-10/06 P

    Rafael de Bustamente Tello

    v

    Council of the European Union

    (Appeal – Officials – Remuneration – Expatriation allowance – Condition laid down by Article 4(1)(a), second indent, of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations – Concept of ‘work done for another State’)

    Appeal: against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 25 October 2005 in Case T-368/03 De Bustamente Tello v Council  [2005] ECR-SC I‑A‑321 and II‑1439, seeking the annulment of that judgment.

    Held: Appeal dismissed.

    Summary

    1.        Appeals – Grounds – Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the Court of First Instance – Error of law relied on not identified – Inadmissibility – Challenge to the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance – Admissibility

    (Art. 225 EC)

    2.        Officials – Remuneration – Expatriation allowance – Conditions for granting

    Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VII, Art. 4(1)(a))

    1.        An appeal is inadmissible if, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the decision under appeal, it merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance. By contrast, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose.

    2.        Even if the distribution of responsibilities at intra-State level varies according to the institutional make-up of each State, that State must be considered to be a unitary subject of public international law. In the light of that approach, it is essential that the State be represented, vis-à-vis other States and international organisations, by a system of a single diplomatic representation, which reflects the unitary nature of the State concerned, at international level.

    Although it is not essential, in order for the official concerned to be considered to have worked for ‘another State’, that he should have been employed by the central administration of that State, his functional integration within the permanent representation of that State constitutes a decisive factor.

    In that regard, both those who work for a State through the intermediary of its central administration and those who work for an autonomous community through its administration must be considered to be in a situation of expatriation within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, as long as they are formally integrated into the permanent representation of that State.

    Accordingly, for the purposes of interpreting the expression ‘work done for another State’ used in the second indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, the only fact to be considered relevant is that the work is done within a permanent representation of a State. Therefore, work done for governments of political subdivisions of States cannot be regarded as work done for a State if the person concerned has not been formally integrated into the permanent representation of the State.


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