—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 50 and Article 8 thereof,

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having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 218 thereof,

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having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

—

having regard to the notification of 29 March 2017 by the UK to the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union and from the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to Article 50(2) TEU and to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

—

having regard to the European Council (Article 50) guidelines of 29 April 2017 following the UK’s notification under Article 50 TEU, of 15 December 2017 for the second phase of the Brexit negotiations, and of 23 March 2018 on the framework for the future EU-UK relationship,

—

having regard to the Council Decision of 22 May 2017 which lays down the directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, and to the Council Decision of 29 January 2018 supplementing the Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, setting out supplementary directives for the negotiation,

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/266 of 25 February 2020 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement (1) and the directives set out in the addendum thereto for the negotiation of a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which have been made public,

—

having regard to its resolutions of 5 April 2017 on negotiations with the United Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union (2), of 3 October 2017 on the state of play of negotiations with the United Kingdom (3), of 13 December 2017 on the state of play of negotiations with the United Kingdom (4), of 14 March 2018 on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship (5), of 18 September 2019 on the state of play of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (6), of 15 January 2020 on implementing and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement (7), and of 12 February 2020 on the proposed mandate for negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (8),

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having regard to its recommendation of 18 June 2020 on the negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (9),

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having regard to its legislative resolution of 29 January 2020 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (10),

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having regard to the Commission Declaration for the European Parliament plenary of 16 April 2019,

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having regard to the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (11) (‘the Withdrawal Agreement’) and to the accompanying political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom (12) (‘the Political Declaration’),

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having regard to European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 of 28 June 2018 establishing the composition of the European Parliament (13),

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having regard to the judgment of 10 December 2018 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Andy Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, C-621/18, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999,

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having regard to the in-depth analysis of November 2020 of the European Parliamentary Research Service, entitled ‘Article 50 TEU in practice: How the EU has applied the “exit” clause’,

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having regard to the study of March 2021 commissioned by the European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, entitled ‘Interpretation and implementation of Article 50 TEU — Legal and institutional assessment’,

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having regard to the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998, signed by the Government of the UK, the Government of Ireland and the other participants in the multi-party negotiations (the ‘Good Friday Agreement’),

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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

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having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

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having regard to the letter from the Committee on International Trade,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0357/2021),

A.

whereas the objective of this report is to analyse the ways in which the provisions of Article 50 TEU have been interpreted and applied, and the way that the procedure for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU under that Article was organised and conducted, including the lessons drawn with respect to EU law and the functioning of the European Union;

B.

whereas reflections on the implementation of Article 50 TEU contribute to a better understanding of the key components of the EU’s constitutional identity, the principles underpinning European integration, the importance of decision-making autonomy and the right to regulate, all of which will be taken into account in future treaty changes;

C.

whereas Article 50 TEU addresses the pre-existing uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the right to withdraw from the EU by explicitly giving Member States the unilateral right to withdraw, subject to no conditions apart from compliance with their own national constitutional requirements;

D.

whereas Article 50 TEU, by providing explicitly for withdrawal under EU law, establishes the only procedure under which a Member State may lawfully withdraw from the EU;

E.

whereas Article 50 TEU is silent or not clear enough on several aspects of the procedure that arose during the withdrawal of the UK from the Union;

F.

whereas Article 50 TEU does not impose any formal requirements on the notification of the intention to leave the Union or on the time-limit or revocation of that notification; whereas Article 50 TEU does not explicitly provide for the possibility of transitional arrangements;

G.

whereas Article 50 TEU does not define specific requirements on the possible extension of the two-year period set out under Article 50(3) TEU, which therefore allows for flexibility in the negotiation process;

H.

whereas Article 50 TEU confirms that EU membership is voluntary, which implies that a Member State cannot be forced to stay or leave; whereas the decision to withdraw from the Union is a sovereign decision of a Member State made in line with that withdrawing state’s internal constitutional order;

I.

whereas the principle of sincere cooperation requires the handing in of the notification as soon as the decision to leave is taken;

J.

whereas in its judgment of 10 December 2018, in Case Andy Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the CJEU clarified that the withdrawing Member State is free to unilaterally revoke the notification of its intention to withdraw from the Union while the Treaties still apply to that Member State;

K.

whereas Article 50 TEU is not clear as regards the application of parts of Article 218 TFEU, other than its paragraph 3;

L.

whereas the will to leave the EU, as expressed by the British people despite a majority of citizens in Scotland and Northern Ireland voting in favour of remaining, was respected in line with the values of freedom and democracy, as referred to in Article 2 TEU;

M.

whereas the UK referendum was not accompanied by a sufficient number of awareness-raising campaigns, as citizens were never given a clear picture of the relationship that their country would have with the EU once it left, and were often misled about the implications of the withdrawal, especially as regards Northern Ireland, thus revealing the risks and challenges posed by misinformation;

N.

whereas Article 50 TEU confers on the Union institutions the exceptional horizontal competence to negotiate an agreement covering all matters necessary to arrange the withdrawal of a Member State;

O.

whereas the role of all EU institutions in the withdrawal procedure was key in the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of Article 50 TEU and in minimising institutional disruption, safeguarding the unity of Member States and ensuring an orderly withdrawal;

P.

whereas the two-phase approach adopted by Michel Barnier, the Chief Negotiator on behalf of the Commission, proved to be the correct one;

Q.

whereas under the TEU, citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament; whereas Parliament is part of the decision-making procedure under Article 50 TEU and exercises general political control, as provided for in Article 14 TEU, and should therefore be closely involved in withdrawal negotiations in order to be able to give its consent under Article 50 TEU;

R.

whereas, in the procedure provided for in Article 50 TEU and as in all cases of international agreements negotiated using the procedure laid down in Article 218(3) TFEU, Parliament plays a marginal role that is limited to approving a possible withdrawal agreement; whereas, despite these limitations, Parliament has engaged actively in the withdrawal process since the very beginning and has committed to protecting the interests of EU citizens and safeguarding the integrity of the European Union throughout the whole process;

S.

whereas Parliament played a crucial role in representing all EU citizens, both from the EU-27 and the UK, during the process;

T.

whereas the withdrawal of the UK had an impact on the composition of the European Parliament as provided for in Article 3(2) of European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937;

U.

whereas the withdrawal process has led to unpredictability and has constituted a challenge not only for the EU and the withdrawing Member State, but also and even more so for the citizens and entities most directly affected; whereas the economic and social costs of this uncertainty have proven to be very high and have also put pressure on the political relations between the EU and the withdrawing Member State; whereas greater certainty could be achieved during the separation process by, among other things, demanding that the notification of the decision to withdraw be accompanied by a blueprint of the future relationship that the withdrawing Member State has in mind;

V.

whereas the Union institutions have undertaken all efforts not to politicise the process of withdrawal, but withdrawal under Article 50 TEU is nevertheless inherently political as it stems from and is influenced by fundamental choices regarding membership of the EU and/or the relationship with the EU;

W.

whereas withdrawal from the European Union by a Member State constitutes a major political, economic and social shock of which the negative consequences can only partly be mitigated by carefully planned and negotiated orderly withdrawal arrangements;

X.

whereas the Political Declaration setting out a framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK establishes the parameters for an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership that encompasses foreign policy, security, defence and wider areas of cooperation;

Y.

whereas after the entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement, the only legal path for a re-accession to the EU is on the basis of Article 49 TEU;

Z.

whereas Article 8 TEU emphasises the special relationship between the EU and its neighbouring countries;

AA.

whereas according to Parliament’s rules of procedure, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs is responsible for the institutional consequences of withdrawal from the Union;

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