This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52012DC0750
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Annual Growth Survey 2013
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Annual Growth Survey 2013
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Annual Growth Survey 2013
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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Annual Growth Survey 2013 /* COM/2012/0750 final <EMPTY> */
Introduction The on-going economic and
financial crisis in the EU has been a catalyst for deep change.
Its impact can be seen in the profound restructuring of our economies which is currently
taking place. This process is disruptive, politically challenging and socially difficult
– but it is necessary to lay the foundations for future growth and
competitiveness that will be smart, sustainable and inclusive. In order to continue with
the necessary reforms, the EU needs to be able to show that our policies are
working, that they will deliver results over time and that they will be
implemented fairly in terms of the impact on our societies. Correcting the
problems of the past and putting the EU on a more sustainable development path
for the future is a shared responsibility of the Member States and the EU
Institutions. Recognising that our economies are closely intertwined, the EU is
now reshaping its economic governance to ensure better policy responses to current
and future challenges. This Annual Growth Survey
launches the European Semester for 2013 and sets out how this shared
responsibility can be used to drive change across the EU, laying the
foundations for a return to growth and job creation. The context The economic situation in
the EU remained fragile in 2012. For the year as a whole, GDP is now expected
to contract by 0.3% in the EU and 0.4% in the euro area. It will take time to
move towards a sustainable recovery.[1] After several years of weak
growth, the crisis is having severe social consequences. Welfare systems
cushioned some of the effects at first but the impact is now being felt across
the board. Unemployment has increased substantially and hardship and poverty
are on the rise. These difficulties are particularly visible in the euro area,
but also extend beyond it. The duration of the crisis
has not helped Member States to press ahead with meeting their Europe 2020
targets on employment, R&D, climate/energy, education and the fight against
poverty, and overall Europe is lagging behind its objectives.[2] Yet, progress in all of these
areas is needed to move towards a smart, sustainable and inclusive European economy. While challenges vary
significantly across countries and inside the euro area, the prospect of a slow
recovery makes the situation difficult for the EU as a whole. The levels of
debt accumulated by public and private actors restrict the scope for new
activities and investments. Fiscal and monetary policy instruments have been
heavily mobilised and room for manoeuvre is now limited. Structural reforms are
an essential part of restoring Europe's competitiveness but these decisions are
often difficult to take. Transparency about the objectives of current policies
and attention to fairness in terms of impact on society will be very important
in sustaining the momentum for reforms. The short-term outlook is
still precarious but there are also more positive trends at play. Macro-economic
imbalances, which have accumulated over a long time, are now being corrected,
and parts of Europe are regaining competitiveness, even if there is still a
long way to go to eliminate divergences in performance.[3] Progress is being made in
consolidating public finances, and important steps have been taken to reduce
tensions in the financial markets. Importantly, for those countries which have
engaged in deep reforms, there are initial signs that they are beginning to
work, with indebtedness reducing in the public and private sector in a number
of Member States and exports increasing in several countries with previously large
trade deficits. Much has already been done
at the EU level in 2012 to break the vicious cycle between the weaknesses of
our financial systems, tensions on the sovereign debt market and low economic growth,
in order to create the conditions for a sustainable recovery: §
The establishment of the European Stability
Mechanism provides a credible backstop to assist euro area countries whose
access to finance is curtailed. §
The adoption of a Compact for Growth and Jobs by
the Heads of State or Government at the June 2012 European Council should
galvanise the efforts of the EU legislator and administrations at all levels to
mobilise the growth levers they have at hand - from the implementation of the
Single Market Acts to the more targeted use of EU Structural Funds. The
Commission has also recently proposed a strategy to improve the functioning of
energy markets, as well as measures for a reinforced industrial policy. §
New rules to strengthen economic governance,
notably within the euro area, are being implemented ("six pack"
legislation), agreed (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) or should
be agreed soon ("two pack" legislation). §
The European Central Bank has taken important
measures to safeguard financial stability in the euro area. Other key decisions are
being discussed, which will influence Europe's future: §
We still need to find an overall agreement on
the EU's multi-annual financial framework for 2014-2020. This will be essential
in restoring growth and competitiveness across Europe and in achieving our Europe 2020 goals. §
Important steps are being considered to reinforce
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In parallel to this Survey, the
Commission is presenting a blueprint for a genuine EMU. The 2012 December European
Council will also discuss these issues. The annual
country-specific recommendations adopted in July 2012[4] should be the basis for action
by the Member States. Implementation is the subject of a continuous dialogue
between the Member States and the Commission and progress will be assessed next
spring. As shown by the report from the European Parliament on the European Semester[5], monitoring at the EU level
plays an important role in coordinating and supplementing Member States' own efforts.
The priorities The purpose of this Annual
Growth Survey is to set out the economic and social priorities for the EU in
2013, by providing overall guidance to the Member States and the EU in
conducting their policies. It launches the third European Semester of policy
coordination, through which national performances and priorities are reviewed
collectively at the EU level in the first half of each year. The European
Council will issue guidance in March 2013 and Member States are due to present updated
national programmes by mid-April 2013, following which the Commission will
present its country-specific recommendations. The short-term challenge is to restore confidence and stabilise the economic
and financial situation, while carrying out structural reforms which will lay
the foundations for a sustainable job-rich recovery and will allow the economy
to transform itself in the medium-term. Such an adjustment will take time, so action
is needed now. Building on positive signs
that the reforms already initiated are having an impact,
the Commission considers that the priorities identified in last year's Survey
remain broadly valid and that efforts at national and EU level in 2013 should again
be concentrated on the following five priorities: §
Pursuing differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal
consolidation §
Restoring normal lending to the economy §
Promoting growth and competitiveness for today
and tomorrow §
Tackling unemployment and the social
consequences of the crisis §
Modernising public administration 1.
Pursuing
differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation As a result of the crisis,
the sovereign debt ratio has increased in just a few years from 60% to 90% of
GDP on average in the euro area. Public finances urgently need to be overhauled
to sustain welfare systems and public services, to limit the costs of
re-financing for the State and other public authorities, and to avoid negative
spill-overs for the rest of the economy, including possible contagion effects
on other countries. Demographic developments will also continue to add pressure
on age-related expenditure. Particular attention needs to be paid to fiscal
policy in the euro area, where the impact of unsustainable national
fiscal policies on other Member States is much stronger than
elsewhere. The overall trend of
fiscal consolidation currently taking place indicates that progress is being
made: government deficits in the euro area are expected to fall from an average
of over 6% of GDP in 2010 to just over 3% in 2012. Public debt is expected to
peak at about 94.5% next year in the euro area and in 2014 across the EU, and should
then to start to decline as a percentage of GDP. Fiscal consolidation may
have a negative impact on growth in the short term. This effect is likely to be
stronger during financial crises when financing conditions for other economic
actors are also tight. However, this is not the only factor which matters for
growth: depending on the choices made about the composition of the adjustment,
the "multiplier effect" of fiscal policy will be different. For instance,
experience has shown that in countries with relatively high shares of public
expenditure in GDP, and relatively high tax rates, fiscal consolidation
achieved through a reduction of expenditure rather than a further increase in
taxation revenue is more supportive to growth in the long run. Between 2009 and
2012 fiscal consolidation was achieved by using both expenditure and revenue
measures to a broadly similar extent: expenditure is forecast to have
diminished by 2 percentage points of GDP and revenue to have increased by 1.3
percentage points. Moreover, the alternative
scenario of postponing fiscal adjustment would prove much more costly. Several
Member States are unable to finance their needs by going to the markets or are
struggling to contain rising spreads on their bonds because of doubts about the
sustainability of their public finances. To restore the confidence of
investors, reduce the costs of debt repayment and create fiscal room for
manoeuvre, what is needed in these countries is a determined effort, at an
appropriate pace, to put public finances on a sustainable path. The negative
impact on growth can be largely mitigated, provided fiscal adjustment is well
designed. Regaining fiscal sustainability will benefit both public and private
actors in these countries and will contribute to the overall financial
stability of the EU. Each Member State is in a different fiscal and economic position and this is why the Commission advocates a
differentiated fiscal consolidation effort, appropriate for each country. In
line with the Stability and Growth Pact, these strategies should focus on
progress achieved in structural rather than purely nominal terms, and include a
composition of adjustment which supports both growth and social fairness. Such
a differentiated approach also helps in readjusting current account imbalances. The Stability and Growth
Pact provides the appropriate framework for a flexible and efficient fiscal
adjustment. The fiscal targets are expressed in nominal terms, and this is what
often dominates the headlines. However, the Pact puts emphasis on the
underlying budgetary position and the consolidation effort recommended by the
Council is therefore expressed in structural terms.[6] Accordingly, if these
conditions are met, a Member State may be given a longer time to correct its
excessive deficit if a worse-than-expected economic situation prevents it from
reaching its agreed objective. For example, during 2012, the deadlines set for
Spain and Portugal to bring their government deficits back below 3% of GDP were
extended by one year, giving them until 2014 to achieve this goal. Once
excessive deficit situations are corrected, Member States should reach their
medium-term budgetary objective, which will ensure that public finances are
maintained at sustainable levels. For those Member States
which have lost market access for the refinancing of their debt,
a rapid pace of fiscal adjustment is required to urgently restore investors'
confidence.
A concentrated effort, as agreed under the economic adjustment programmes, will
also facilitate the necessary correction of macro-economic imbalances. This evidence
is supported by the positive adjustment taking place in Ireland, Portugal and Romania. In Greece, however, the process has been longer and more costly due
to a combination of factors, including the recurrent uncertainty regarding the
implementation of the programme. For Member States with
greater fiscal room for manoeuvre, automatic stabilisers can play their role fully,
in line with the Pact. The pace of consolidation can support growth, but Member
States should bear in mind possible fiscal risks arising from delaying
consolidation in view of the challenges of high debt levels, the prospect of an
ageing population and the relatively low growth potential in some countries, as
well as the negative consequences that a change in market sentiment would
create. The Commission will
continue to be attentive to developments in the real economy.
In particular, the forthcoming Commission winter forecasts, scheduled for early
next year, will show whether Member States are respecting the agreed path for
the reduction of their structural deficit and whether adjustments in the
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficits would be justified, in
full respect of the spirit and the letter of the Stability and Growth Pact. Restoring sound public
finances is a long process. Strong EU governance rules and national fiscal
frameworks, as foreseen in EU legislation, will help to anchor these efforts
over time. Such rules include the setting of numerical fiscal rules, the
recourse to independent fiscal institutions and medium-term planning, with multi-lateral
surveillance of progress. On the expenditure side of
government budgets, it is essential to look at the overall efficiency and
effectiveness of spending. While the situation differs across countries, the
Commission has recommended being selective where cuts are envisaged so as to
preserve future growth potential and essential social safety nets. In
particular, the Commission considers that: §
Investments in education, research, innovation
and energy should be prioritised and strengthened where possible, while
ensuring the efficiency of such expenditure. Particular attention should also
be paid to maintaining or reinforcing the coverage and effectiveness of
employment services and active labour market policies, such as training for the
unemployed and youth guarantee schemes. §
The modernisation of social protection systems
should be pursued to ensure their effectiveness, adequacy and sustainability.
Reforms of pension systems should be stepped up to align retirement age with
life expectancy, restrict access to early retirement schemes, and enable longer
working lives. Also in the context of the demographic challenges and the pressure
on age-related expenditure, reforms of healthcare systems should be undertaken
to ensure cost-effectiveness and sustainability, assessing the performance of these
systems against the twin aim of a more efficient use of public resources and access
to high quality healthcare. On the revenue side of government
budgets, recent trends show that many Member States have increased
personal income taxes and/or VAT rates.[7] There is, however, still scope to shift the
overall tax burden towards tax bases that are less detrimental to growth and
job creation, and to make tax systems more efficient, competitive and fairer. Such
a shift requires a package approach which ensures equitable redistribution and
is adapted to the circumstances of individual Member States. This is why the
Commission recommends that: §
The tax burden on labour should be substantially
reduced in countries where it is comparatively high and hampers job creation.
To ensure that reforms are revenue-neutral, taxes such as consumption tax,
recurrent property tax and environmental taxes could be increased. §
Additional revenue should be raised preferably
by broadening tax bases rather than by increasing tax rates or creating new
taxes. Tax exemptions, reduced VAT rates or exemptions on excise duties should
be reduced or eliminated. Environmentally harmful subsidies should be phased
out.[8] Tax compliance should be improved through systematic action to
reduce the shadow economy, combat tax evasion[9] and
ensure greater efficiency of tax administration. §
The corporate tax bias towards debt-financing
should be reduced. §
Real estate and housing taxation should be
reformed to prevent the recurrence of financial risks in the housing sector. In
particular, aspects of tax schemes which increase the debt bias of households, typically
through tax relief for mortgages, should be reviewed. On most of these
measures, detailed country-specific recommendations have been issued and peer
review activities are organised at the EU level to review progress and best
practice. Implementation is now the major challenge. 2.
Restoring
lending to the economy The crisis has had a
lasting impact on the financial situation of many public and private actors,
affecting the confidence of investors and lenders and the effectiveness of the
financial sector. The tensions in sovereign debt markets and within the banking
sector have fed each other, creating severe funding problems for many borrowers.
These developments have also led to the fragmentation of the financial system
along national borders, with a retrenchment of financial activities to national
domestic markets. The resulting limited or costly access to funding for many businesses
and households wishing to invest has been a major obstacle to recovery across Europe to date. At the same time, high levels of indebtedness mean that many economic
actors need to reduce their financial exposure or increase their savings. Such "deleveraging"
can also hamper recovery in the short term. The problems are particularly acute
in the vulnerable euro area Member States. Action is under way at the
EU level to address risks to the financial sector and correct the former weaknesses
of our regulation and supervision systems: §
A coordinated effort has been made to assess the
risks of the banking sector and to recapitalise the banks. Recognition of
losses and the cleaning-up of banks' balance sheets are crucial to improving
confidence in the markets and must be completed without delay. §
New EU supervisory authorities have been in
place since January 2011 and are working to develop a single rulebook for
strengthening the legal framework applicable to financial institutions. A swift
agreement on the Commission's proposals on bank capital and liquidity, deposit
guarantee schemes and bank resolution is needed to provide a more coherent
framework for the prevention and management of financial crises. §
Closer monitoring of the levels of private debt
and associated financial risks, such as real estate bubbles, is now taking
place through the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the new EU procedure
to tackle macro-economic imbalances. §
As one of the building blocks to strengthen Economic
and Monetary Union, the Commission has proposed a banking union, including a
Single Supervisory Mechanism, under the authority of the European Central Bank,
to further integrate arrangements for the supervision of banks at EU level. The
establishment of such a mechanism will also create the conditions for the
European Stability Mechanism to directly recapitalise banks that fail to raise
capital on the markets. At the national level,
Member States can do more to promote alternative sources of financing, increase
liquidity and reduce companies' traditional dependence on bank financing, for
instance by: §
Promoting new sources of capital, including business-to-business
lending, providing more possibilities to issue corporate bonds and facilitating
access to venture capital. §
Reducing late payments by public authorities, since
their average duration has further deteriorated in the crisis and this creates
particular burdens for SMEs in an already difficult business environment. The
EU late payment directive which must be transposed by March 2013 will reduce delay
to 30 days and improve compensation in case of late payment. §
Developing the role of public banks and guarantee
institutions in the financing of SMEs. This can cover some of the risks taken
by private investors and can compensate for the lack of equity or for the small
size of the company to be financed, including through new forms of securitisation. §
Supporting innovative schemes such as public schemes,
which allow banks to borrow at a lower rate if they increase their long-term lending
to businesses or provide cheaper and more accessible loans to SMEs. §
Ensuring a balanced approach to foreclosures in
case of mortgage lending, protecting vulnerable households while avoiding banks'
balance sheets from becoming overburdened. This includes measures to introduce
personal insolvency regimes allowing modifications of the terms of mortgages to
avoid foreclosures. Moreover, it is important
to make full use of existing or new EU financial instruments to act as a
catalyst for targeted investment, in particular for key infrastructures: §
The provision of an extra EUR 10 billion to the
European Investment Bank (EIB) will enable it to provide EUR 60 billion of
additional financing over the next three to four years and will unlock up to
three times this amount from other providers of finance. §
The deployment of project bonds represents an
important new risk-sharing instrument to unlock private funding, for example
from insurance companies and pension funds, thus complementing traditional bank
lending. Several projects are now at an advanced stage of preparation by the
EIB. §
As part of the Compact for Growth and Jobs, the
Commission continues to work with Member States to re-programme and accelerate
the use of EU structural funds to support growth, notably for SMEs. Moreover, Member States are invited to indicate in their National
Reform Programmes how they intend to use Structural Funds to promote growth
enhancing priorities for the next round of programmes (2014-2020). Full use should also be made of the
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme facilities which have already
mobilised EUR 2.1 billion in venture capital funds and provided EUR 11.6
billion of loans to SMEs. 3.
Promoting
growth and competitiveness for today and tomorrow The crisis is accelerating
shifts in the economy with some more traditional sectors particularly hard hit
and newer ones finding it difficult to thrive. The rapid pace of the
restructuring is challenging but also presents an opportunity to tap potential
new sources of growth and jobs.[10] Such adjustments come on top
of, and often serve to correct, longer-term competitiveness challenges faced by
many of our economies. The Alert Mechanism Report adopted alongside this Survey
shows that developments in price and non-price competiveness are contributing
positively to improving external imbalances, although with some time lags. Those
Member States under intense market pressure have undertaken significant reforms
but more needs to be done to improve internal and external competiveness across
a wide range of Member States. As illustrated in the
country-specific recommendations, there is no "one-size-fits-all"
agenda but there are common goals, a range of reforms to consider and many examples
of best practice – including examples of European world leaders – to draw from.
While some reforms may take time to show their effects, others can offer more
immediate results. Some framework conditions
need to be in place at the national level and priorities include: §
Driving innovation, new technologies and raising
levels of public and private R&D investment. Targeted support by public
authorities and greater competition for research grants will play an important
role in this. §
Raising the performance of education and training systems
and overall skill levels, linking the worlds of work and education more closely
together. §
Improving the business environment, by relaxing the
formalities required to start a business, simplifying authorisation, licensing and
tax compliance procedures, and lowering the overall administrative burden on
enterprises. Particular obstacles to activities in job-rich sectors such as
construction, business services, logistics, tourism and wholesale trade should be
overcome. §
Tapping the potential of the green economy by
setting a predictable regulatory framework and promoting the emergence of new
markets and technologies. In particular, more ambitious energy efficiency
renovation programmes – including, but not limited to, the requirements of the EU
energy efficiency directive – can bring important savings and job creation, in
addition to environmental benefits. Improved waste management, water management
and recycling also have strong potential to create new jobs, while helping to secure
the supply of scarce resources and materials. The European single market
offers many opportunities for businesses to develop and for consumers to
benefit from better services and products. In the field of services, many gains
can be reaped if Member States improve implementation of the services directive
by: §
Complying with their obligations to eliminate restrictions
based on nationality or residence of the service provider. §
Reviewing the necessity and proportionality of regulation
of professional services, in particular fixed tariffs, and limitations on
company structures and capital ownership. §
Reviewing the application of the clause on the freedom
to provide services in order to remove unjustified double regulation in sectors
such as construction, business services and tourism, and ensuring transparent
pricing in healthcare services §
Strengthening competition in the retail sector by
reducing operational restrictions, in particular by eliminating economic needs
tests. The performance of network
industries across Europe also has a critical knock-on effect on the rest of the
economy and can be significantly improved by: §
Developing the right incentives for the rapid country-wide
roll-out of high-speed internet infrastructure and the development of mobile
data traffic. Frequency bands for wireless broadband need to be freed up by governments.
§
Ensuring the full transposition and implementation
of the third energy package, in particular unbundling networks, securing the independence
and necessary powers of national regulators and phasing out gradually regulated
energy prices, while protecting vulnerable consumers. §
Accelerating the implementation of the Single European
Sky by reducing the fragmentation of air traffic management and improving the
organisation of airspace. §
Opening up domestic rail passenger services to
competition, in particular through equal access to infrastructure. §
Integrating ports better into the logistic chain,
by removing entry barriers to port services. §
Removing remaining cabotage restrictions to improve
the matching of supply and demand in international transport. §
In line with the e-commerce directive, applying
harmonised rules on transparency and information requirements for businesses
and consumers. The performance of product markets would also be greatly improved if
national standardisation bodies deliver the objectives set at the EU level, in
particular to move from national to European-level standards. Full use should
be made of the notification of technical rules for ICT products and services to
facilitate their circulation in the single market. 4.
Tackling
unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis Over the last twelve
months, the number of unemployed people has increased by 2 million,
to reach more than 25 million. The unemployment rate is up to 10.6% in the EU
and 11.6% in the euro area. Long-term unemployment is increasing and nearly one
in two unemployed people have been without a job for more than a year. The
situation varies very significantly across Europe, with national unemployment
rates ranging on average from less than 5% to more than 25%. Young people have
been particularly badly hit, with youth unemployment rates reaching more than
50% in certain countries,[11]
but other age groups are also affected. Given the length of
unemployment periods, the rapid restructuring of the economy and the
difficulties of finding a job, there is a risk that unemployment will become increasingly
structural and that a growing number of people withdraw from the labour market.[12] There are also clear
indications that risks of poverty and social exclusion are increasing in many
Member States.[13] Additional pressures on social
protection systems also affect their capacity to perform their welfare
functions. The weak growth prospects
and the time lag between economic recovery and recovery in the labour market means
that there is no prospect of immediate or automatic improvement in the employment
situation. This poses a major challenge for the EU as a whole, as well as for
those countries most affected, and calls for more determined action by the
public authorities and the social partners. In addition to the impact
of the current crisis, the structural trend towards an ageing and, before long,
a shrinking working-age population in parts of Europe creates particular
challenges. Encouraging the early retirement of older workers in the hope that
young people will be recruited in their place is a policy that has proven largely
ineffective and very costly in the past, and should not be repeated. In spite of the high
levels of unemployment, there is also evidence of skills bottlenecks and
mismatches, with certain regions or sectors lacking employees who fit their
needs. Raising participation in the labour market, improving skill levels and
facilitating mobility remain urgent priorities. Several ambitious reforms
are being implemented across Europe. In countries under financial pressure,
measures have been taken to facilitate flexible working arrangements within
firms, reduce severance pay for standard contracts and simplify individual or
collective dismissal procedures. Steps have also been taken to enhance
flexibility in wage determination, such as easing the conditions for firms to
opt out of higher-level collective bargaining agreements and the review of
sectoral wage agreements. Preparing for a
job-rich recovery Further efforts to improve
the resilience of the labour market and invest in human capital are essential to
help companies to recruit and adapt, and to allow more people to remain active
and take up opportunities. Social partners have a key role to play alongside
public authorities. This is why the Commission recommends, in particular: §
To limit the tax burden on labour, notably for the
low-paid, as part of broader efforts to shift tax burden away from labour. Temporary
reductions in social security contributions or job subsidy schemes for new
recruits, notably the low-skilled and long-term unemployed, could also be
considered to promote job creation, provided they are well targeted. §
To continue modernising labour markets by
simplifying employment legislation and developing flexible working arrangements,
including short-time working arrangements and work environments conducive to
longer working lives. Reducing the gaps in employment protection between
different types of work contracts should also help to reduce labour market
segmentation, as well as undeclared work, in several countries. The impact of
unemployment benefits should be monitored to ensure appropriate eligibility and
effective jobseeking requirements. §
To monitor the effect of wage-setting systems, in
particular indexation mechanisms, and if necessary to amend them, respecting
national consultation practices, in order to better reflect productivity
developments and support job creation. It is important that minimum wage levels
strike the right balance between employment creation and adequate income. §
To tap the job potential of expanding sectors, such
as the green economy, healthcare and ICT, through a future-oriented and
reliable legal framework, the development of adequate skills and targeted
public support.[14] Improving employability
levels, in particular of young people At the same time, Member
States should do more to fight unemployment, improve employability and support
access to jobs or a return to the world of work, in particular for the
long-term unemployed and young people. This includes measures: §
To boost public employment services and step up
active labour market measures, including skills upgrading, individualised jobseeking
assistance, support for entrepreneurship and self-employment, and mobility
support schemes. Despite some additional resources devoted to these activities
or efforts to improve their efficiency, the support provided hardly matches the
surge in the number of registered jobseekers experienced in several countries. §
To reduce early school-leaving and facilitate the
transition from school to work by developing quality traineeships, apprenticeships
and dual learning models - classroom-based education combined with hands-on
experience in the work place. Efforts to develop entrepreneurial skills are
needed to support new business creation and improve employability levels of the
young[15]. §
To develop and implement "youth guarantee"
schemes whereby every young person under the age of 25 receives an offer of
employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within four
months of leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. Such schemes can be
co-financed by the European Social Fund.[16] §
To facilitate labour market participation and
access to jobs for second earners through adequate tax-benefit incentives and
the provision of quality affordable childcare. §
To improve access to lifelong-learning systems
throughout working life, including for older workers, by strengthening partnerships
of public and private institutions involved in the provision, application and
updating of specific skills. §
To improve the connection between education and lifelong-learning
systems and labour market needs. Short-cycle tertiary qualifications of two
years, focused on areas where a skills shortage has been identified, as well as
targeted mobility schemes, can prove particularly effective in current circumstances.
§
To encourage cross-border labour mobility by
removing legal obstacles and facilitating the recognition of professional
qualifications and experience. Cooperation between employment services should
be reinforced, and the EURES platform can provide the basis for a more
integrated European labour market. Promoting social inclusion
and tackling poverty In addition to these measures,
additional efforts are needed to ensure the effectiveness of social protection
systems in countering the effects of the crisis, to promote social inclusion
and to prevent poverty: §
Active inclusion strategies should be developed,
encompassing efficient and adequate income support, measures to tackle poverty,
including child poverty, as well as broad access to affordable and high-quality
services, such as social and health services, childcare, housing and energy
supply. §
The link between social assistance and activation
measures should be strengthened through more personalised services
("one-stop shop") and efforts to improve the take-up of measures by
vulnerable groups. Once the labour market recovers, it will be important to
phase out crisis-related measures, while ensuring that essential safety nets
are preserved. 5.
Modernising
public administration The squeeze on
public finances has created renewed momentum for the modernisation of public
administration. In the EU, public expenditure accounts for almost 50% of GDP
and the public sector represents about 17% of total employment. Over the years,
many Member States have undertaken measures to increase the efficiency of their
public services as well as the transparency and quality of their public
administration and judiciary. Such reforms have been particularly far-reaching
in countries in financial distress. Examples include reorganising local and
central government, the rationalisation of the public sector pay system and of
the governance of state-owned enterprises, reform of public procurement
processes, regular comprehensive expenditure reviews and the promotion of efficiency
measures across the public sector, such as a greater use of shared services and
information technology solutions. In several instances, Member States and the
Commission have cooperated through the provision or exchange of technical
assistance. Various measures already outlined
above – such as the full and correct transposition of EU law, the efficiency of
the tax collection and healthcare systems, the need to reduce delays in
payments and the role of public employment services – can have a significant
positive impact and should be pursued. In addition, the Commission considers
the following to be particular contributors to growth: §
Employing sound financial management by making full
use of public procurement opportunities in support of market competition and developing
e-procurement capacities across the single market. Such actions not only
contribute to greater efficiency and fairness but also help to combat
corruption. §
Simplifying the regulatory framework for businesses
and reducing the administrative burden and red tape, particularly at national
level. §
Ensuring the widespread, interoperable
digitalisation of public administration, aimed at fostering user-friendly
procedures for service providers and recipients, as well as administrative
simplification and transparency. Cross-border interoperability of online
services and research centres throughout the EU is particularly important. §
Improving the quality, independence and efficiency
of judicial systems as well as ensuring that claims can be settled in a reasonable
time frame and promoting the use of alternative dispute mechanisms. This should
reduce costs for businesses and increase the attractiveness of the country to
foreign investors. §
Making better use of EU structural funds by stepping
up administrative capacity efforts this year to ensure speedier distribution of
unused funds. Conclusion The EU economy is slowly emerging from the deepest financial and
economic crisis in decades. Member States are starting from different
positions, the nature and size of the challenges they face are not the same and
the pace of reforms varies. The situation remains fragile. The implementation
of reforms is underway and important adjustments are still taking place, but
there are signs that in the course of next year we will begin to see a recovery.
In those Member States which have undertaken deep reforms, efforts are starting
to bear fruit: imbalances are being reduced and competitiveness is improving. This process is not only about a return to growth but is also about
building the basis for a different quality of growth following the crisis.
Structural reforms at national and EU level must strengthen the EU's ability to
compete globally, generating growth at home through activities which are
sustainable and which equip the EU with the policies and instruments needed to
secure a prosperous, inclusive and resource efficient future. Solidarity and
fairness – within countries but also across Europe – will be essential elements
in ensuring that the efforts undertaken will be politically and socially
acceptable and of benefit to all. Many important decisions have already been taken in the Member
States and at the EU level. Now is the time to hold the course and implement
what has been agreed. To restore confidence and return to growth, it is also
crucial to maintain the pace of reforms, particularly in the following areas: ·
Public finances must be brought back on track to
restore their sustainability. This is important not only for the confidence of
investors in the short term but also to meet the needs of an ageing society and
preserve the prospects of future generations. The pace and nature of fiscal
consolidation may vary: while some Member States need to reduce deficits
rapidly, others have more room for manoeuvre. Any negative impact on growth in
the short term can be mitigated by appropriate measures on the expenditure and
revenue sides of government budgets. ·
Efforts to repair the financial sector must
continue to restore financial stability and deliver better financing conditions
for the economy, including through alternative sources of finance. Further
progress at the EU level is necessary to build an integrated supervision
framework and to reinforce the legal framework applicable to financial
institutions. ·
Structural reforms must be reinforced to promote
growth and boost competitiveness. There is still a wide range of measures to
be considered at the national level, with EU legislation in place to serve as
catalyst for change. A lot can be learned from best practices in Member States and third countries. ·
The labour market situation and social situation
call for an urgent response. Stepping up active labour market policies,
reinforcing and improving public employment services, simplifying employment
legislation and making sure that wage developments support job creation are
essential elements of such a strategy. The situation of young people requires
particular attention. Furthermore, efforts should be stepped up to promote
social inclusion and prevent poverty by reinforcing essential safety nets. ·
National and EU level growth strategies can only
be implemented with the help of effective public administrations. More can done
to modernise, for instance in the fields of public procurement, the
digitalisation of public administration, improving the quality and independence
of judicial systems and the effective and efficient deployment of EU structural
funds. The guidance provided in this Annual Growth Survey will be discussed
at the EU level to prepare for the spring European Council next March and to
help in the preparation of the updated sets of national programmes and country-specific
recommendations. The Commission will work closely with national authorities, including
national parliaments, EU Institutions and other stakeholders to create a shared
sense of ownership and steer progress as part of wider EU efforts to exit from
the crisis and to lay the foundations for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth across the EU. [1] More information on the economic and employment situation can be
found in the Commission autumn economic forecasts published on 7 November 2012
and in the documents accompanying this Survey. [2] For an overview of progress towards the Europe 2020
targets, see: "Europe 2020 Strategy – towards a smarter, greener and more
inclusive EU economy?", Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 39/2012. [3] The second annual Alert Mechanism Report (COM(2012)751)
to identify macro-economic imbalances is adopted by the Commission alongside
this Survey. [4] The country-specific recommendations can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm
[5] European Parliament, "Report on the European
Semester for economic policy coordination: implementation of 2012 priorities [2012/2150(INI)],
October 2012. [6] Fiscal balance is expressed in structural terms when
it is corrected for the impact of the economic cycle and one-off and temporary
measures. [7] European Commission, "Tax reforms in EU Member States
2012", European Economy, 6/2012. [8] In 2013 Member States will also start receiving new
revenues from the emission allowances auctions under the third phase of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme. [9] The Commission will shortly present an action plan to
strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, together with guidance
to ensure good governance in the tax area. [10] The first edition of the Single Market Integration Report (COM(2012)752)
accompanying this Survey presents cases of untapped sources of growth. More
information can also be found in the forthcoming Commission's study on
"The cost of non-Europe: the untapped potential of the Single
Market". [11] Over the last year, the Commission has set up action teams to assist countries with the highest rates of
youth unemployment in the re-programming of EU funds to support training and
job opportunities for young people. See first results at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/council_
dinner/youth_action_team_en.pdf [12] The Draft Joint Employment Report annexed to this
Survey provides more detailed information. [13] The number of people at risk of poverty and social
exclusion has increased since 2008 in 13 out of the 23 Member States for which
data are available in 2011. [14] The Commission spelled out ways to tap this potential
in its Communication "Towards a job-rich recovery" (COM(2012)173) of
18 April 2012. [15] The Commission adopted on 20 November 2012 a
"rethinking education" communication (COM (2012) 669) [16] The Commission will shortly present a "youth
employment package". INTRODUCTION The draft Joint Employment
Report, mandated by Article 148 TFEU, is part of the Annual growth Survey (AGS)
package to launch the 2013 European Semester. As key input to strengthened
economic guidance, the JER underpins the key employment messages contained in
the AGS. The analysis it contains is based on the employment and social
situation in Europe, on the implementation of the Employment Guidelines[1], on the examination of the
National Reform Programmes that led to the country-specific recommendations
adopted by the Council in July 2012 and on the assessment of their
implementation so far. The report is being issued at a time
when: The employment recovery has come to a
halt. Employment is
decreasing and the prospects are bleak for 2013. Job creation has remained
subdued and has worsened despite unexploited potential in some job-rich sectors
and throughout the single market. Labour market segmentation has continued to
rise with an increase in temporary contracts and part-time work. Taxation on
labour remains high and has further increased in a number of Member States. Unemployment is rising again and has
reached unprecedented levels in the euro area, with
long term unemployment reaching alarming highs, especially in Member States
under strong fiscal consolidation. More than one in five young people in the
labour market are unemployed and there is a risk of a lost generation. The disparity in unemployment rates between
Member States has dramatically grown and reflects the effects of asymmetric shocks and the different resilience of labour markets to crises.
Wages and labour costs have started to adjust but the effects of reforms are
not fully visible yet. Signs
of deterioration in the job
matching process on the
European labour markets are confirmed and there is a risk that increasing
structural unemployment will become entrenched. Average household incomes are declining
in many Member States and recent data points to a trend of higher levels and
deeper forms of poverty and social exclusion with in-work poverty and social
polarisation on the rise in many Member States. The effects of social protection as an
automatic stabiliser have been weakened since 2010 and resulted in higher
poverty rates. There are
significant differences among Member States in the efficiency of their spending
when it comes to poverty
reduction. The employment and labour
market situation in Europe, and in particular in some Member States, calls for
more determined action by the public authorities and the social partners. Ambitious
reforms are being implemented but further efforts are needed to modernise our
labour markets and invest in human capital to create the conditions for a
job-rich recovery
1.
Recent labour market and social developments trends
The
economic and employment outlook is negative and has worsened in recent months.
If 2012 will be a negative year from the perspective of employment and the
small increases in GDP forecasted for 2013 will be insufficient to create
employment and reduce unemployment. A more positive outlook for the labour
markets is expected in 2014. The EU is currently the only major region in the
world where unemployment is still rising. The employment recovery
has come to a halt and employment is decreasing. The
number of people aged 20-64 in employment in the EU has decreased by 0.2 % from
Q2 2011 to Q2 2012. In the 2008 – 2011 period employment shrank by 1,7 %, showing
more resilience than the US during the same period (-5,8). However the decline
has been more pronounced in the euro area, especially in those countries which
undertook more substantial fiscal consolidation. Since the start of the
economic and financial crisis in 2008, the number of jobs lost now totals 5
million, of which 4 million were lost in the euro area. The fluctuations in overall
employment since the outset of the crisis have been mainly driven by part-time
work and temporary contracts, but permanent contract jobs have also been
affected. Figure 1: Employment and unemployment in the EU 27,
2005-2012 Source:
Eurostat, National Accounts and EU LFS A positive feature is
that the employment rate of older workers increased
by 1.8 p.p. between 2008 and 2011 compared to a 1.5 p.p. decline in the general
employment rate. Women have also weathered the economic crisis relatively
better than men with employment rates virtually at the same level as in 2008
while the employment rate of men has declined by 2.6p.p. during the same
period. At the same time, the youth employment rate declined by 3.8 p.p. Unemployment is rising
again and has reached unprecedented levels in the euro area. The overall unemployment rate of the EU is currently at 10.6%, while
in the euro area it reaches 11.6 %, the highest level since the birth of the
EMU. In May 2012 the number of unemployed in the EU exceeded 25 million people
for the first time ever and has increased by an additional 0.75 million in
the quarter since then, which represents a total increase of almost 9million
since 2008. The trend in unemployment is upward in the majority of the Member
States, with only six countries showing a decrease in unemployment during the
last 12 months to August 2012. Long term unemployment
has reached alarming highs. In the second quarter
of 2012 11.1 million unemployed Europeans had been unemployed for more than 12
months, accounting for 4.6 % of the active population[2]. This represents an increase of
4.8 million in comparison to 2008. In 2011, 70% of all long-term unemployed in
the EU-27 were concentrated in the 6 largest Member States, with Spain accounting
for more than 21% of the total number of long term unemployed in the EU and contributing
1.6 million to the 3.7 million increase in the number of long-term unemployed
over 2008-2011. The probability for
unemployed people to find a job has decreased in most Member States since the outbreak of the crisis, both for short and long term
unemployed. This decrease has been particularly pronounced for Member States
subject to significant fiscal consolidation measures. In Spain the probability decreased from 50% to 30% and in Greece it dropped from 25% to 15% while it
remained stable in the Netherlands and improved in the Czech Republic and Estonia. Figure
2: Long-term unemployment rate in % of active population, 2008 and 2011 Source:
Eurostat, EU-LFS Long term unemployment
has increased for all groups but mostly for young people and those with lower
education levels. However the risk of becoming
long-term unemployed for older workers in 2011 was more than 55% while it was
only about 30% for young people. In 2011 long term unemployment among low
skilled workers was four times as high as it was for high skilled workers. Also
third-country nationals recorded twice as high long term unemployment as the
average EU worker in 2011. Some Member States have been able to limit the
extent of long term unemployment either because the recession has been shorter
or due to effectiveness of labour market institutions. More than one in five
young people in the labour market are unemployed.
The situation of youth in the labour market represents both an economic and a
social emergency with 5.52 million young people unemployed. Over the last 12
months, the unemployment rate for young people increased in the large majority
of Member States and in two Member States has remained in levels above 50% and
above 30 % in six. In 2011 the employment rate of young people aged between 20
and 34 and graduating from at least upper-secondary education decreased by 4.2
percentage points to 77.2% compared to 2008, pointing to the growing
difficulties in the transition from education to employment. Early
school-leavers face bleak employment prospects. Early school leavers are
arguably the most vulnerable subgroup of Europe's young workforce. Across the
EU, more than half of young people dropping out of school are unemployed. The
share of early school leavers dropped from 14.1% in 2010 to 13.5% in 2011. Wide
disparities in ESL rates continue to exist between Member States but those who introduced
effective and comprehensive policies to combat early school leaving have also experienced
significant improvements. Early school leaving remains more frequent among
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, among migrants and ethnic
minorities such as Roma and among boys. The
proportion of young people who are neither in employment, education, nor in
training (NEET) continues to increase. More
worryingly, increases were higher in those Member States which already had
higher levels. In spite of the larger increase
registered by young men, youth NEET rates remain higher for young women in
almost all European countries. Figure 3: Share of NEETs among the 15-24 year old (%) Source: Eurostat, LFS The
dispersion of unemployment rates between Member States has markedly increased
in recent years, particularly in the euro area. The
diversity is also marked at regional and local levels with pockets of very high
youth and long term unemployment at subnational level. In August 2012 unemployment
was lowest in AT at only 4.5% while it has reached 25.1% in ES. A large share
of unemployment is concentrated in relatively few countries. In effect, the
number of unemployed in IT, ES and those countries with financial support
programmes (EL, IE, PT, RO) represent almost half of all unemployment in the EU
and this share has increased significantly during the crisis. Figure
4: Change in
unemployment rate (% points) over the last 12 months and the last three months
to August 2012 and evolution of distribution of unemployment rates between Aug.
2009 and Aug. 2012 Source:
Eurostat Notes:
Eurostat. 2nd
Graph: Missing data for 08'2012 for 5 MS. Data used: June for EE and LV, July for EL, HU and UK The gap between Member States in employment and social indicators is widening.
This is particularly visible between the Southern and peripheral European
countries. The Member States which have shown better resilience so far are mostly
the Northern and central European countries. The shocks appear to be asymmetric
but very often countries with relatively un-segmented labour markets, strong
welfare systems and an ability to temporarily adjust working hours and working
time (internal flexibility) have fared better. Recent
data show that wages and labour costs have started to support external
re-balancing. In 2011, European labour markets
showed clear signs of improved wage dynamics, with nominal unit labour costs
rising moderately following real declines in 2010. Real compensation per
employee declined in about half of the Member States in 2011 and expanded at a
rate below that of productivity, confirming the trend initiated in 2010 of a
declining wage share. Nominal unit labour costs developments differ somewhat
across Member States. In general, unit labour cost developments are
increasingly following patterns supportive of external re-balancing with an increasingly
clear differentiation between countries with stronger needs to reduce
unemployment and rebalance external positions and countries with a more
sustained recovery and current account surpluses. Figure 5: Annual growth rate of the nominal unit
labour cost (2011Q2/2012Q2) and trend across eight selected Member States
(those that received a Country Specific Recommendation on the issue of wages),
2008Q2-2012Q2 Note:
Quarterly data seasonally adjusted Source:
Eurostat. 1st Graph: For the case of CY the comparison is with 2011q1 and
2012q1 (there is no data on 2012q2) Source: Eurostat The
pre-crisis pattern of stronger real wage dynamics in countries with poor
unemployment outcomes has been reversed since 2010. These developments have contributed to the gradual improvement of
the competitiveness of export-oriented sectors. Labour demand and wages appear
to be more sustained in the tradable sector in countries having clearly started
or nearly completed a process of correction of current account deficits.
Moreover, evidence shows that until 2009 real wage dynamics were stronger, but
that this pattern has been reversed since 2010. Average household
incomes are declining in many Member States. Between
2009 and 2011 gross household disposable income fell in two out of three Member
States and the situation between countries diverged further. In most Member
States, the protracted economic and labour market crisis combined with the need
to pursue fiscal consolidation (involving cuts in benefits and increases in
taxes) weakened the protective effect of national automatic stabilizers over
time as beneficiaries reached the end of benefit entitlement or faced declines
in benefit levels. As a result, household incomes declined especially in those Member
States where the recession was prolonged. Fiscal consolidation measures
implemented since 2010 seem to have contributed to reduce significantly
household disposable incomes. Figure 6: Change in gross household disposable income
during the crisis Source:
Eurostat, National accounts The
share of the EU population reporting that their households are experiencing
financial distress remains historically high, having generally edged up further over recent months. The 2012 year-on-year increase in the financial stress indicator
among the lowest quintile was especially strong in Spain and Italy (up 10 pp) while decreases were reported in 6 Member States. Recent data point to
higher levels and deeper forms of poverty and social exclusion. The proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has
risen in a number of Member States since 2008, outnumbering those in which it
decreased. Some groups have been particularly hit (including children, single
parent households, the active age population and more specifically youth). The
evolution of the depth of poverty confirms that those at risk of poverty are
getting poorer in many countries, especially those where the overall risk of
poverty rates is high. In 2010 in the EU, the median income of people at risk
of poverty was 22% lower than the poverty threshold, evidencing a deepening of
the poverty gap in most Member States since 2008. Figure 7: Development in the number of people at risk
of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) across EU Member States between 2008 and
2011 Source: EU-SILC;
* data: SILC 2011(2010) In-work poverty and
social polarisation is on the rise in many Member States. Working poor represented one third of the working age adults at risk
of poverty in 2011. In 2010, 8.4% of the people in employment were living under
the poverty threshold and the risk was significantly higher for families with
dependent children (10.7%). The incidence of in-work poverty rose among women,
but remains higher for men. In-work poverty significantly increased in one out
of three Member States between 2006 and 2010, including some of the wealthiest
Member States with more resilient economies and labour markets. Factors such as
wage adjustments, reduction of working hours, short-time working arrangements
and increased part-time and temporary contracts may have contributed to this.
2.
Major labour market challenges
The recent labour market
trends are partly the result of cyclical movements, and notably of the deep
economic crisis, but they are also due to structural and institutional labour
market challenges affecting economic activity and the performance of labour
markets. Net job creation
(employment growth) has consistently decreased both at EU level and across
Member States, with the exception of 2010. Since
the mid-2011 Europe as a whole has gone back to negative employment growth rate
values. This is the net result of the declining trend of job findings (unemployed
getting into jobs) and increasing trends in job separations, calling for
policies to stimulate labour demand and a more jobs-rich growth pattern.[3] At the same time however, job
creation programmes supported by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds
report significant positive progress both in terms of gross jobs creation and
start-ups supported. Figure 8: Unemployment rate and job finding rate in
the EU-27, 2007Q1-2011Q4 Source:
Commission Services calculations based on Eurostat data The potential of job
creation in some key sectors could be further exploited if skills shortages
were addressed. The eco-industry is estimated to
create about 8 million jobs by 2020, with up to 2.8 million of these jobs
originating from resource efficiency measures, 2 million from the
implementation of energy efficiency policies, and a further 3 million from the
development of the renewable energy sector[4].
In 2012, the number of people projected to work in eco-industries specifically
across the EU is expected to be 3.4 million, an increase from 2.7 million in
2008, demonstrating that even in the current economic climate there is job
growth potential in the green sector. Between 2005 and 2009 the renewables
sector contributed to the creation of more than 300,000 new jobs. During the
2008-2011 period, the 'health and social work' sector created about 1 866 000 new
jobs. Moreover, the demand for new positions in this sector is expected to
increase with a projected 8 million of total job openings between 2010 and
2020. As for the ICT sector, by 2015, it is expected that up to 700 000
unfilled vacancies will be available for ICT practitioners. Both sectors face
similar challenges to replace an ageing workforce with younger workers. Significant
skill shortages are generally reported within the sectors of the green economy,
the ICT sector and the healthcare especially for occupations with a high degree
of technical specificity. Taxation on labour
remains high and has even increased in a number of Member States, but changes
in the composition are reducing the cost of labour. A high tax wedge is a disincentive to work for secondary earners and
for low-income and low-skilled workers and may have a negative impact on their
employment rates at aggregate level. In 2011 the average tax-wedge for the EU
27 was 39.6 % compared to 21 % in Switzerland, 29.5 % in the US and 30.8 % in Japan and Canada. On average, the tax-wedge in Europe increased by 0.3 percentage
points between 2010 and 2011, affecting also low-wage earners. The increases
have generally been highest in the Member States already concerned by high tax
wedges. However, this has been mainly due to changes in the personal income
taxes and in a number of cases accompanied by reductions in the social security
costs of employers thereby reducing the labour costs. Figure 9: Total tax wedge for low earners (using 67 %
of the average wage as a proxy for this group) in 2011 and annual change
2010-2011 Short
description: *Data for non-OECD-EU countries (BG, LV, LT, MT and RO) are
only available for 2010; **CY data for 2007. For these countries, changes in
tax wedge refer to period 2009-2010 (for CY to period 2006-2007). Source: OECD Labour market
segmentation has continued to rise with temporary contracts and part-time work
expanding. Between 2007 and 2011 the share of
employees working in involuntary fixed-term or part-time jobs increased in 21 out
of 27 Member States. There are large divergences across Member States but Mediterranean
countries and Poland are characterised by the strongest segmentation. The
asymmetric employment protection legislation between permanent jobs and fixed
term/temporary ones is the main cause of labour market segmentation. In 2011,
60.4 % in the 15-64 year-olds working on temporary contracts did so
involuntarily. The likelihood of being employed on a permanent contract is lower
in Member States with stricter employment protection legislation. Figure
10: Share of employees working in involuntary fixed-term or part-time contracts
(in 2007 and 2011) and transitions from temporary to permanent employment (2010data) Short
description: *Data for SI refers to 2011; **IE data are only available for
2007. Source:
Eurostat, LFS and SILC Young people are
strongly over-represented in temporary work on the EU labour markets and their situation has been worsening through time. In 2011, some
42.5 % of young employees in the EU were working on temporary contracts, compared
to 14.0 % of the average working-age population. Evidence shows that among
young people, temporary jobs may to some extent serve as a stepping stone for
permanent employment, but this is not the case in a number of other Member
States, where the transition rates from temporary to permanent contracts are
particularly low. Figure 11: Employees in permanent and temporary work,
self-employment and total employees (15-64), 2007Q1-2012Q1 Source:
Eurostat Part-time employment
has accounted for a significant share of the job growth experienced during the
crisis. While total employment contracted between
2008 and 2010 and the number of full-time workers shrank by 6.2 million, the
number of part-timers increased by 1.1 million in that same period. The
expansion of part-time work has been steady in recent years and reached 18,8%
in 2011. About one third of women in employment are part-timers compared to
only 8,1% of men, reflecting the fact that childcare services only cover 28% of children under the age of 3 and 84% of children over 3. There are recent signs
of deterioration in the job matching process on European labour markets. For most Member States the Beveridge curve, linking unemployment and
vacancies rates, has shifted further outward to the right. However,
three Member States have moved along the Beveridge curve (BE, AT and FI) since
the beginning of 2008 and for one Member State the curve has shift inwards (DE),
showing the improvement of the labour markets and the matching process. The
deterioration might be the consequence of mismatches between skills and educational
qualifications required for a certain job, rising long term unemployment,
inadequate response to demographical changes and inefficiencies in the services
offered by employment services, It may also however, be the consequence of
frictions and barriers to geographical and occupational mobility and asymmetric
information between employers and employees. European citizens still face legal,
administrative and practical obstacles when moving across borders. Further
reforms are foreseen to transform Eures[5] into a
demand-driven tool for intra-EU recruitment, placement and job matching, allowing
Member States to develop their EURES services according to their specific
economic needs, for example through supporting under-serviced occupations and
specific groups of workers, including young people. Figure 12: Beveridge curve, EU-27, 2008 (Q1) — 2012 (Q3) Source:
Eurostat, the data used are: (i) the unemployment rate (UR, %), and (ii) the labour shortage indicator (LSI, %), derived from EU business survey
results Persistent structural
unemployment risks becoming entrenched. The
registered outward shift of the Beveridge curve might be temporary, as the
labour market seeks to react and adapt to changing economic activity for
example through changes in wage dynamics, retraining or intensified active
labour market policies. However, the shift may also point to more long-lasting
structural problems threatening to increase permanently the structural
unemployment level. Data show that the level of structural unemployment
measured by the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) has risen in
most EU countries since the outset of the crisis and that this increase has
co-evolved with the deterioration of the Beveridge curve. Figure 13: Non-accelerating wage rate (%) of
unemployment (NAWRU) per Member State Source:
AMECO Recently there has been
a decline in the expenditure on active labour market policies per unemployed
person. Evidence shows that active labour market
policies have a positive effect on employment rates, particularly for women and
low-skilled population. Those Member States with the
lowest level of long term unemployment are also amongst those where the level
of participation in active labour market policies is the highest, although
other factors may have contributed to this good performance. However, the
decline in actual ALMP resources per unemployed has declined by more than 20%
between 2007 and 2010.[6]
Figure
14: Participation in ALMP 2010 and long term unemployment rate 2011 Source:
Eurostat The cushion effect of social protection system on households income as an automatic
stabiliser has started weakening after 2009. In the
first phase of the crisis, social benefits played an important role in
sustaining household incomes. In the Eurozone, net social benefits and reduced
taxes contributed positively to the change in gross household disposable income
during 2009 and in the first two quarters of 2010. However, in the second phase
of the economic crisis this effect started weakening. At the end of 2010, the
contribution of social benefits to the change in gross household income has
started becoming negative.In some countries more and
more people are not covered by any scheme at all. The weakening
is related to the reduction of the benefit entitlements over time, the phasing
out of initial discretionary income support measures, and, in some countries, to
the cutbacks in social spending that were part of fiscal consolidation
programmes. There
are significant differences among Member States in the efficiency of their
spending, namely in the outcomes and poverty reduction
effect they achieve per unit of spending when the patterns of spending and structures in social protection
provisions are similar. Tax and benefit systems, are
among the most important instruments to prevent and address income poverty. In
2010, expenditure on social protection benefits (excluding pensions) reduced the
poverty rate in the EU from 26% to 16%, i.e. by 37%. Yet,
Member States spending similar amounts on social protection obtain rather
different results, and vice versa. Some countries manage to reduce poverty
rates among children and the old or absence due to sickness with less spending
than others. Some countries can have better benefits levels for people because
they manage to reduce the time they spend on benefits by bringing them quickly
back to work. Striking a balance between universal and means tested benefits
and between benefits in cash and kind could contribute to activating people to
work. Measuring social protection expenditure against
the poverty reduction suggests that some systems are more efficient than
others. BG, LV, PL and RO are clustered in the area of low spending with low
impact; ES, IT, PT, CY (and EL) show similar results but for higher spending.
They also perform below the EU average in terms of reducing child poverty. Major
challenges remain in the full implementation of active inclusion strategies, focusing concomitantly on adequate income support, inclusive labour
markets, and access to quality services. A move towards
active welfare policies and tackling financial disincentives to work is now
visible in many Member States. Still, persisting differences exist in the level
of coverage of social assistance and minimum income schemes across Member
States and challenges remain to reach out to groups experiencing the deepest
forms of poverty (such as the homeless and Roma). Ensuring adequate income support is an effective tool for
smoothing the transition into work, promoting social inclusion and spurring
aggregate demand. Quality and
affordable childcare supports parents' participation in the labour market and give
children the best chances in life, but evidence shows that the most vulnerable
families have generally lower rates of participation due to factors such as
availability and access, affordability, eligibility, and parental choice.
3.
Implementing structural labour market reforms
The European Council of
1-2 March 2012, based on the Commission 2012 AGS, set out the policy guidance
for Member States to submit their national reform programmes containing their
plans for labour market reforms to achieve the EU headline targets set in the
employment guidelines. Based on proposals of the Commission, the Council
adopted country-specific recommendations underlining areas in which Member
States should undertake policy reforms within the overall framework of the
guidelines for Employment Policies. The following section
reflects the policy measures taken by Member States in view of their NRP and
the priorities set out in the AGS 2012.
3.1.
Mobilising labour for growth
Several
Member States (BE, CZ, EE, HU, IE and PT) are taking steps to reinforce active labour
market policies (ALMPs) and public employment services (PES). In BE, wage
subsidies for employees considered as ‘knowledge employees’ (i.e. researchers
in the private or public sectors) have been increased. In CZ, community service
is used as an activation measure, coordinated by the Labour Office. In EE the
new Employment Programme for 2012-2013 offers a broader selection of ALMPs and
expands the target group entitled to different measures. In HU the ALMPs have
been reinforced by focusing on training of PES employees, development of
client-oriented service models, service package to micro- and SMEs, expansion
of the functions of the PES portal and e-services and transformation of public
work schemes. In IE conditionality is being reinforced to ensure that part time
workers are encouraged to take up full time employment. Finally, in PT measures
are taken to increase the effectiveness of PES and wage subsidy schemes have been introduced for the unemployed. In
2011 and 2012, the tax burden on labour remains high with an overall increase
in labour cost even if some progress has been made for some categories of
vulnerable workers such as low-skilled / low-income jobholders. Many
Member States (BE, DK, CY, FI, EL, ES, IE, IT, FR, LU, NL, PT, SL, UK) recently increased personal income tax, often through increased statutory
rates. This was often done on a temporary basis in the form of general
surcharges or solidarity contributions for high-income earners (GR, IT, CY, LU,
PT, SP). AT and CZ also plan to shortly introduce similar measures. Social
security contributions were also increased in many countries (AT, BG, CY, FR,
EL, HU, LV, PL, and PT, UK). Measures
to reduce the tax on labour were mainly targeted to increase work incentives
for specific groups and generally involved changes in the tax base. In BE for example, a whole set of social security reductions is
targeted at young people, low wage and older employees, and new hiring in SMEs
or self-employed. Tax relief measures were also granted to low and medium
income earners by increasing tax credits and basic allowances in FI and HU. SE
raised basic income allowances for labour income of people older than 65 aiming
to increase life spent at work. A variety of measures are being taken to
promote business creation and self-employment (AT, BE, BG, EE, ES, IE,
MT, HU, PL, PT, UK). In AT, a pilot project provides
additional support to apprentices and companies offering apprenticeship places including
legal advice services and mediation. In BE, measures are taken to improve the access to credit for
companies, promote administrative simplification, or reduce social security
contributions in the Horeca sector. In BG, self-employment is promoted through guidance,
training and assistance to start up own businesses or through granting equipment
and repairs of newly established small enterprises. In ES business creation is
being simplified through reducing administrative burdens on smaller businesses
and allowing extended opening hours in tourist areas. In IE, a range of aids are
provided involving capital grants, loan funds and guarantees, incentives for
business start-ups etc. In MT, measures are being taken to reduce bureaucracy
for the self-employed and a new “Micro Guarantee Scheme” has been announced to
help self-employed people and small businesses obtaining guarantees for bank
loans. In PL, entrepreneurship, self-employment and business activity is
promoted through the ESF. In PT access to credit is provided to entrepreneurs
and self-employed, and a technical support is provided to unemployed who wants to
create their own business. In the UK, the National Loan Guarantee Scheme
was bolstered to encourage banks to lend more freely to SMEs. Some Member States have taken measures adapting
unemployment benefits to facilitate the return to work (BE, ES, IE, IT,
SE). In BE, the adopted reform of the unemployment benefit system implies that
allowances are decreasing earlier and faster than previously. In ES, the unemployment benefit has been reduced for several groups. In PT a new law reduces the maximum duration and amounts of unemployment benefits with the view to
reduce the risk of benefit dependency and long-term unemployment. In SE, more strict eligibility
rules, lower income replacement rates and maximum durations for unemployment
benefits have been introduced. More efforts to reinforce mutual
responsibility are being made in ES, by linking conditionality to participation
in ALMP. In IE, a clearer focus on conditionality for jobseekers with
particular focus on long-term unemployed has been introduced. In IT, the new
system of social insurance for employment will gradually substitute the current
unemployment benefit system. A
number of Member States have taken measures to address wage setting to
ensure that wages develop in line with productivity (EL, ES, PT). In ES, the
recent labour market reform gives priority to company-level decisions on
working hours and wages and makes it easier for companies to opt out of
sectoral agreements. In PT wage developments consistent with firm-level
conditions are ensured by exempting collective agreements where the employer’s
associations cover less than a 50 % of the total work force. In DE, the sector-based minimum wage
system is encompassing more and more sectors. In HU, the
new Labour Code took effect as of 1 July 2012, implying a rise in the minimum
wage of 19%. Wage-setting measures are introduced in EL with the decision to
reduce minimum wages and introduce differentiated minimum wage for youth. Measures to enhance labour mobility
have been taken by a number of Member States (AT, BG, DE, ES, LV, HU). In AT, the
introduction of the Red-White-Red Card, a criteria-based score system for
labour market access of third-country nationals, was completed by opening it
also to skilled workers in shortage professions. In BG, the adoption of a
National Qualification Framework will ensure transparency of vocational
training of students and workers and employer requirements concerning the
education and training systems. In DE, a law was approved which lowers the
income threshold for university-educated immigrants from outside of the EU. In LV, a scheme has been proposed for a re-settlement benefit to compensate workers for moving
from where they live to work in another locality/municipality. In HU the
Government supports mobility by giving financial
support for covering rental fees to registered unemployed people who move 100
km from their place of origin. Member
States are taking measures to reduce early exit from the labour
market (AT, BE, ES, DK, IE, NL, HU, UK). In AT, reforms have been
introduced to reduce the number of invalidity pensions. In BE, the age limit
for older employees to access the time-credit system has been increased and the
system of part-time early-retirement has been discontinued. In DK, disability
pension reform plans require that activation possibilities are depleted before
early retirement can be considered. In ES, the schedule for increasing the
statutory retirement age will be accelerated, the early retirement age will
increase from 61 to 63 with increased penalties for early retirement, and a
suspension of access to partial retirement for two years. In IE new initiatives
will allow people receiving an Illness or Invalidity payment to both work and
receive income support and the legal retirement age will increase to 68 by
2028. In NL, steps are being taken to gradually raise the pension age to 67 by
2023 and hereafter it may be linked to life expectancy. In HU early retirement
has been abandoned as a general rule. The UK government has recently announced
plans to link pension age with life expectancy. Measures
also focus on the promotion of longer working lives (AT, BE, BG, DE, EE,
FI, LU, PL, UK). In AT, active labour market measures, professional reintegration
measures and re-training, part-time allowances and employment subsidies are
made available for older workers with health impairments. In BE, by collective
dismissals, companies with more than 20 employees are forced to apply the same age
structure in their dismissals to the age structure of the firm and they will be
obliged to develop an annual plan for employees aged 45 and more. In CZ, the
pensionable age will be raised by 2 months every year with no upper limit
following the pension reform adopted at the end of 2011. In EE, the focus is on
older workers, participation in lifelong learning and ensuring their health. In
FI, efforts are being made to improve the quality of working life and wellbeing
at work as a mean of extending working lives. In LU companies with more than
150 employees are being forced to provide more support to older workers in
companies. In PL, efforts are being made to increase learning opportunities for
older people and improve the quality of education for older persons. In the UK, the default retirement age was abolished in October 2011. Some
Member States have taken measures not supportive of the extension of working
lives. In CZ, there
will be an increase in the taxation of labour provided by pensioners, which is
likely to lower the participation of older people in the labour market. In FR the
possibility to retire at 60 years for those who have begun to work at 18 years
old, if they have adequately contributed to the welfare system has been re-opened.
In HU the retirement age of all public employees, excluding those working in
the medical sector, was made mandatory.
3.2.
Supporting employment especially of young
A number of measures have
been taken to support the employment of young people especially those who are
not in employment, education or training. FI is launching a comprehensive Youth
Guarantee to offer young people work, a traineeship, or a study, workshop
or labour market rehabilitation place within 3 months of unemployment. A group of countries (BE,
BG, ES, CY, IE, PL, PT, SE and SI) are promoting initiatives aiming at enhancing
the quality apprenticeship and traineeship contracts. In BE a large scheme
of in-companies traineeship has been introduced for unemployed people under 25
who didn't find a job after the six months of occupational integration. In BG traineeships are promoted in the central and
regional offices of the public administration giving priority to young people
with disabilities. In IE, initiatives are taken to activate and up-skill young
people through 5,000 internships of 6 to 9 months duration. In ES, steps have
been taken to develop a contract for education and apprenticeship, and
establish a dual vocational training system. In PL a pilot
project target unemployed less than 30 years of age by individual tutor support,
internship and training vouchers. In PT occupational traineeships and job placements
are supported. In SI young unemployed under 30 years of age are offered
employment for a period of 15 months and the government is promoting voluntary
apprenticeship within the Tax Administration and the Prevention of Corruption
institutions. In SE, the government grants companies up to EUR 2,750, per pupil
and year, to stimulate the provision of apprenticeship positions in work places,
and the state grant is proposed to further increase in 2014-16 Other concrete actions to
support young people not in employment, education or training include
programmes focused on the vocational training dimension (DE, LV, FI), on-the-job training (LT) and on financial support (HU). In DE young people from
migrant backgrounds now have improved opportunities to enter a vocational
training programme. In LT the project "Increasing Youth Employment", targeted
at people aged less than 29 subsidises wages and expenses for organising
acquisition of skills within the workplace. In LV, 15-24 year old unemployed
are offered the opportunity during a nine week period to try their hand at
three different vocations in a vocational training institution. In HU the "first job guarantee" has been introduced, providing full wage compensation to the employers including
gross wage and social security contribution. In a number of Member
States partnerships have been established with the social partners
to promote quality apprenticeship or traineeship contracts (BG, CZ, FR, IE, IT,
LU, RO and SK). In BG measures aim at providing or at
supporting investment costs and labour costs for the creation of jobs for young
people. In CZ, an ESF-funded project, supports the costs of internships
to companies notably graduates and people who lack work
experience and need to complete their skills profiles.
In IE new measures provide additional training places
for unemployed by means of collaboration and engagement between employers and
enterprise and education and training providers. In RO,
enterprises hiring young workers below the age of 25 will receive for each
worker hired a one-year exemption from the payment of social insurances
contributions In SK, jobs in the private sector will be
subsidised up to the level of the minimum wage for one year while employers
should contribute for at least six months.. Measures to reform the employment
protection legislation have only been taken in few countries (HU, SK and IT). In HU changes include regulations of holding multiple jobs, regulation of
flexible working-time arrangements and simplification of firing rules. PT has reduced severance payments to 20 days per year of work for
both open-ended and fixed-term contracts and eased the definition of individual
dismissals for economic reasons. In IT the legislation
regulating wrongful individual dismissals in firms with more than 15 employees,
has been revised to increase the flexibility on exit from the labour market and
measures have been introduced to limit the abuses of
atypical labour contracts. In SK measures are taken to restrict the maximum
duration and number of successive fixed-term contracts and remove exceptions
for temporary work agencies. Only few Member States are
making progress concerning adapting education and training systems to
reflect labour market needs (BE, IE, LT, MT and SK). In IE measures aim at
helping unemployed and previously self-employed people to remain as close as
possible to the labour market by accessing part-time higher education and
training opportunities to up-skill or re-skill in areas where sustainable
employment opportunities are likely to arise In LT, qualifications will be
mapped in several stages in order to provide better information to people on
the structure of skills demand and to identifyn the specialities that are most
demanded. In MT, students are encouraged to further their education through
qualifications required by industry and through a tax credit covering up to 80%
of the course fees incurred. In SK the recently adopted Act on vocational
education and training aims at reinforcing links between VET and labour market
requirements. Also in BE all communities have taken measures to reform
vocational training in view of reinforcing its quality, flexibility and links with
labour market requirements A number of measures have
been taken to review the quality and funding of the universities (IT, LV and MT). IT has taken steps to decrease the generosity as tuition fees set to increase
by between 25% and 100%. As regards scholarships, only MT has announced the
continuation of the two scholarship schemes. LV has undertaken a large scale
assessment of more than 800 higher education study programmes and a number of
reforms are in the pipeline, including reform of the accreditation process,
development of a new financing model of the universities and reform of the
management of the universities. Despite the European
Semester's call to prioritise growth-friendly public expenditure, there is
evidence that cuts are being made at the detriment of investment in
education. A significant number
of Member States decreased education spending in consecutive years in 2011 and
2012 (EE, IT, LV, LT, UK) or in either 2011 or 2012 (BE, BG, IE, FR, CY, HU,
PL, RO, SK, FI). Discussions on budget consolidation focus on education issues
also in ES. In contrast, budgets remained stable or increased in CZ, DK, LU,
MT, AT.
3.3.
Protecting the vulnerable
A number of Member States
have taken steps to address the effectiveness of social protection systems
(EE, LV and ES). In EE, the availability of unemployment insurance benefits
will be significantly increased as from 2013 onwards accompanying and
counterbalancing the employment legislation reform of 2009. In IE, despite
general cuts of social benefits, vulnerable people still receive income
support, albeit at a lower level. In LV unemployment benefits will no longer
depend on seniority insurance scheme but will be based on decreasing coverage
of up to 9 months. In ES the activation of the minimum income scheme will be
linked to the length of the working career of a claimant. Some Member States have
made progress regarding the implementation of active inclusion strategies
focusing on adequate income support, inclusive labour
markets, and access to quality services (AT, DK, FI,
FR, MT, PL and SE). In AT an action plan for disability has been adopted
covering measures in the fields of anti-discrimination, accessibility, care,
education, employment, self-determined life. In DK, a major reform of
disability pensions was agreed in June 2012 restricting access to those above
40 and envisaging rehabilitation teams to support health, employment, education
and social services. In MT, voluntary organisations are
encouraged to employ disadvantaged persons through the allocation of financial
help. In SE the Government intends to further strengthen the position of
vulnerable groups in the labour market by increasing active labour market
measures for long-term unemployed and people with a weak foothold in the labour
market. In PT a rental social market was created aiming at ensuring
access to affordable and quality housing for the most vulnerable. Only few measures are
being taken concerning access to services supporting integration in the
labour market and in society (CZ, IE and PL). In CZ a pilot small-scale
program offering better housing and retraining to those socially excluded
families (especially the Roma) who ensure full attendance of their children in
elementary schools is being launched at local level. In IE, the ESF supports
programmes aiming at making immigrants financially independent and more
socially integrated through employment or further education and training. In PL
the income criteria has been increased to support working poor and the amount
of cash benefits from social assistance has been increased including for
foreigners and refugees taking part in language training. [1] Official Journal L308/46, 24.11.2010, “Council
Decision of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the
Member States (2010/707/EU)” [2] Long-term unemployed represents currently more than
44% of the people unemployed. [3] See European Commission's "Employment
Package" of April 2012 [4] SWD (2012) "Exploiting the Employment Potential
of Green Growth", 92final, 18.4.2012 [5] The network of 31
European Employment Services which supports the mobility of workers between Member States, EEA countries and Switzerland. [6] OECD
estimates based on the OECD Labour Market Programmes and OECD Main
Economic Indicators Databases. Introduction The EU economy continues
to struggle with the post-financial crisis correction. Financial tensions have continued in the euro area before the
summer, while the global economy has decelerated reducing the potential
contribution of exports to recovery. Therefore, the short-term outlook for the
EU economy remains weak, but a gradual return to growth is projected for 2013
and a further strengthening in 2014. This outlook creates additional challenges
for the necessary adjustment in many EU Member States. In particular, low
growth prospects hold back investment, job creation and accelerate labour
shedding, as the margins to use flexibility in work patterns are now reduced. The challenges facing the
EU economy continue to be daunting. In particular,
several Member States' economies continue to face large deleveraging of the
private and public sectors. This deleveraging reflects the unwinding of
accumulated financial imbalances linked to previous unsustainable expenditure
levels financed by credit, in some cases promoted by asset price bubbles in the
private sector and in others by the lack of fiscal rigour in the public sector.
This is now weighing on growth, as spending is reduced and income directed to
debt repayment. On the positive side,
there are signs that the adjustment in the EU economies is progressing. Financial market situation has improved after the summer on the
back of the steady implementation of the reform agenda, including the
advancements in the EMU architecture, and by the important policy decisions in
the euro area, including by the ECB. The significant reform efforts in the
vulnerable Member States are also bearing fruit: leveraging has decreased in
the private and public sectors and competitiveness is improving in countries
with large competitiveness gaps creating conditions for further adjustment
going forward. Exports are contributing increasingly to improvements in large
current account deficits, which bodes well for the lasting nature of the
correction. The large growth differences among the EU countries are also a
reflection of the ongoing adjustment: temporarily lower or negative growth is often
a feature of deep adjustments, but they open the way for more sustainable
growth and convergence, which should be visible already in 2014. The deleveraging and
adjustment process is inevitable and the main task of policy makers is to
manage it and alleviate the associated economic and social consequences. Fiscal adjustment has
to continue along the path of a differentiated growth-friendly consolidation
strategy in view of the high debt levels and
long-term challenges to public finances. However, as fiscal consolidation
can have negative growth effects in the short term, it should be conducted in a
growth-friendly manner, that is: –
the speed of consolidation has to be
differentiated across countries according to their fiscal space, to strike the
right balance between potential negative growth effects and the risks to debt
sustainability. The Stability and Growth Pact and the central role of
structural budget balances therein offer the appropriate framework to guide the
differentiated speed of adjustment; –
while focusing the consolidation on the
expenditure side, there is a need to devise an overall growth-friendly mix of
revenue and expenditure, with targeted measures within available fiscal space
to protect key growth drivers while ensuring efficiency of expenditure. Additionally, credibility
of consolidation and its positive effects are enhanced if it is anchored in a
credible medium-term fiscal framework and accompanied by reforms addressing the
long-term sustainability issues stemming from an ageing population. Orderly deleveraging in
the private sector requires a robust and efficient financial sector. Therefore, financial repair and restructuring has to continue in
particular in the banking sector in view of its important role in the EU
economy, but also new sources of funding have to be promoted. A coherent and
effective micro- and macro-prudential policy framework is crucial to restore confidence
in the stability of the banking sector, foster a sustainable flow of capital
into productive activities and to ensure stable financing of the economy. Structural reforms are
necessary to facilitate adjustment and improve the framework conditions for growth. Structural reforms, which improve competitiveness, wage
responsiveness and price flexibility are key to improving adjustment
capabilities and to stimulating the transfer of resources from declining to
growing sectors. Reforms promoting job creation, investment in innovation, skills
and inclusive growth are necessary to tackle the risk of hysteresis and
alleviate the negative impact of the crisis on social conditions. A fair
distribution of the adjustment burden across society is important for sustained
growth. Ultimately, however, a coherent policy mix encompassing both
macro-financial and structural policies is indispensable for growth to resume.
Hence a determined policy action on all these fronts is necessary to counter
the negative dynamics and improve the economic situation in a sustainable
manner. The countries of the
euro area are in a specific situation due to their stronger financial and
economic interlinkages and the resulting spillovers. Private capital flows
within the euro area have turned around abruptly, flowing away from vulnerable
countries. The external financing gap that
emerged as a result was bridged through the provision of liquidity by the official
sector, which prevented a disorderly adjustment. However, as a result of an increasing
home bias, financing conditions for both the public and private sectors have
been diverging increasingly within the euro area. This has led to a very tight
policy mix in the vulnerable euro-area Member States, as tight financing
conditions add to the necessary fiscal consolidation. This is hampering
adjustment, contributing further to divergent economic outcomes between
euro-area countries and undermining the stability of the whole currency area. The main priority for the
euro area is to continue on the path of structural reform and to reverse
financial fragmentation, improve financing conditions in the vulnerable countries
and to encourage the inflow and efficient allocation of capital to support
adjustment. This is indispensable for growth and
adjustment. Also, the need to reduce macroeconomic imbalances highlights the
need for a differentiated pace of public deleveraging between the surplus and
the deficit countries. Finally, in view of the single monetary policy,
structural reforms to increase wage and price flexibility and facilitate
adjustment play an even greater role in the euro area. Continuous perseverance
in reforms is of the utmost importance to meeting the challenges. The European Stability Mechanism has become operational on 8
October 2012 and the ECB has decided to introduce the Outright Monetary
Transactions in September 2012. These are important contributions to tackling
the most immediate challenge of stabilising the financial situation and
restoring confidence. Restructuring and rebalancing of the economies will be
materialising over the medium term, as the structural reforms usually take time
to have full effect. Finally, the vision of genuine EMU is being developed as a
long-term goal, for which tangible steps are already being taken to support
reform momentum. As a result, financial market tensions have eased somewhat
recently, but markets remain fragile and have become dependent on the
continuation of supportive policies. Therefore, any stalling in reform efforts
could immediately lead to a re-emergence of tensions and undo the recent
improvements. 1. growth-friendly
fiscal consolidation Sound and sustainable
public finances are an essential prerequisite for macroeconomic stability and
hence for growth. This is particularly the case in
the euro area, where the single monetary policy cannot react to
country-specific circumstances, and national budgets need to regain their
ability to assume a stabilisation function in the event of country-specific shocks.
At the same time, euro-area Member States share much stronger spillovers from
unsustainable fiscal policies, chiefly through the financial channel, as
clearly demonstrated by the current crisis. This calls for greater
responsibility in terms of budgetary developments at national level. This is at
the root of the rules-based fiscal governance provided for in the Treaty and
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The respect of these rules is essential
for a smooth functioning of EMU. Fiscal consolidation
has negative effects on growth in the short term as fiscal retrenchment reduces
aggregate spending, but benefits accrue in the medium-term. During financial crises, the impact of fiscal policy on growth can
be larger than usual, as the so-called fiscal multipliers are thought to be larger
than in normal economic conditions[1].
In the short-term, this could also entail adverse effects on debt-to-GDP ratios
from consolidation if initial debt ratios, and hence consolidation needs, are
high. Nevertheless, in some
Member States there is no viable alternative to consolidation, as its absence
could lead to even more negative consequences. In the
presence of high and rising debt levels, it is necessary to look at debt
sustainability, which is a medium-term concept. The Commission’s analysis[2] shows that only under rather
implausible assumptions (very high degree of myopia in the markets, very
unusual reactions of risk premia) would consolidation lead to adverse debt
effects in the medium term. Moreover, creating conditions for, and expectations
of, a permanent consolidation is an important part of avoiding adverse debt
effects, as expectations of a reversal in consolidation can cancel out its
potential positive effects on risk premia. At the same time, for Member States
with reduced market access, the assessment of the costs of consolidation, also
in the short term, depends on the alternative scenario considered. When fiscal
sustainability is at risk, the lack of consolidation can result in higher risk
premia or the loss of any market access, which could prompt a much more
dramatic adjustment, with consequences for growth that are far worse than in
the case of consolidation and improved fiscal sustainability. While some EU countries
enjoy more room for manoeuvre, the risks stemming from slowing fiscal consolidation
should be carefully assessed. Some EU Member States
currently enjoy record-low interest rates on their public debt and hence could
seemingly increase their borrowing without running into risks of unsustainable
dynamics. However, also in those countries debt is at peacetime highs.
Moreover, in almost all of them, public expenditure is projected to increase
due to ageing, and in some cases, low growth prospects. Therefore, it cannot be
excluded that a loosening of the commitment to sustainable fiscal policies would
lead to a switch in market sentiment. This would have serious repercussions not
only for the countries concerned but also for the crisis-management capacity of
the euro area as a whole, which relies on the creditworthiness of these
countries. Graph 1. Government debt and deficit in EU Member States (forecast for 2012, % of GDP) Source: Commission Services, European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2012 EU public finances face
great challenges, and fiscal stability must be restored in a permanent manner (Graph 1). The challenges stem from the need to reduce
high debt levels in an environment of low growth prospects, long-term spending
pressures and an already relatively high tax burden. Thus, the overarching
principle of growth-friendly fiscal consolidation remains valid. The strategy
advocated by the Commission in the previous Annual Growth Survey, has proved
successful, even if short-term negative consequences could not be avoided, as
argued above, and the full benefits can become visible only in the medium term. The effect of consolidation on growth can be influenced by its composition. Additionally, to
guarantee the permanent nature of consolidation and improve expectations of
fiscal sustainability, consolidation should be accompanied by reforms
strengthening the long-term sustainability of public finances and supported by
a robust institutional framework. The pace of
consolidation The pace of
consolidation should continue to be differentiated across countries according
to fiscal space. In particular, in view of the persistent
market pressure on the high-debt countries, countries which have lost access to
financial markets or are under severe market pressure must continue to
implement the agreed fiscal commitments. Other Member States should continue to
respect their commitments under the SGP, which allows automatic stabilisers to
work around the agreed path of structural fiscal adjustment while ensuring the
long-term sustainability of public finances. The Stability and
Growth Pact offers a flexible and efficient framework to guide the
differentiated pace of consolidation. The rules of
the SGP allow for the pace of consolidation to vary according to the particular
characteristics of the Member States. Within the SGP countries are assigned
nominal targets, for the benefit of transparency and anchoring budgetary
policies. However, the Council recommendations also specify the necessary
structural effort, which should capture the underlying budgetary positions
without taking into account cyclical effects and one-off measures. If a country
had delivered the agreed structural effort, but fails to achieve its targets only
as a result of worse-than-expected growth, the deadline for correction of the excessive
deficit can be extended. This option has been taken up on several occasions in
the past, most recently for Spain and Portugal. The composition of
consolidation While expenditure-led
consolidations should be favoured, the focus should be on an overall efficient
and growth-friendly mix of expenditure and revenue measures. Analysis of past episodes of consolidation suggests that
expenditure-based consolidations are more likely to succeed. Also, given the
relatively high tax burden in the EU, further tax increases could impact
negatively on future growth and should therefore be introduced with caution. Overall,
in order to limit the short-term negative effects on growth, the composition of
consolidations should find the right mix of growth-friendly measures on the
expenditure side and the revenue side. The efficiency of
spending and the quality of public finance in general is becoming increasingly
important in view of the long-term challenges to public finance. In the light of historically high debt levels and the long-term
impact of ageing populations, pressure on public expenditure is likely to remain
beyond the current fiscal adjustment. Therefore reviewing expenditure
efficiency becomes increasingly important in reconciling the need for
sustainable public finances and the provision of public services at a
satisfactory level. International best practices show that in many EU countries
there is significant room for savings of public resources for unchanged levels
of services. The pursuit of
government sector reforms and the introduction of best practices in performance-oriented
budgeting could be instrumental in increasing the efficiency of public spending. There is significant cross-fertilisation between public
administration reforms spurred by spending reviews and performance-based
budgeting, in terms of objectives and timeframes. While performance-oriented
budgeting favours a holistic approach and requires long-term vision for both
introduction and delivery of results, public administration reforms can
generate fast and significant results in terms of efficiency of public spending
and savings, provided that they are prepared by rigorous spending reviews and
included in longer-term strategies. Public administration reforms could
usefully focus on extracting savings where indicators, including cross-country
and within-country comparisons, suggest the largest scope for saving (see also
Section 3). Other measures relevant for spending efficiency may reflect the
variety of socio-economic goals of different spending items, including
distributional concerns, such as improved design and targeting of social
transfers and state aid or other subsidies, identification of most productive
public investment projects or improved efficiency in the provision of public
goods and services. However, whatever the instrument chosen to strengthen
public spending efficiency, it has to be accompanied by performance management at
all levels of public administration. Expenditure savings
should avoid items, which have a positive impact on growth and growth potential. Where cuts are envisaged, they should be minimised in areas related
to the development of human capital and technological advances. For public
investments in fixed assets the situation is less clear-cut. Such investment
contributes to potential growth only as far as the new infrastructures are
inputs to private investment, which applies mainly to investment in transport,
communication and certain public utilities. Secondly, public investment in
fixed assets is beneficial only up to a certain level, and for Member States
with an already satisfactory level of infrastructure, the focus should rather
be on maintenance and possibly upgrading. On
the revenue side of the budgets, despite recent reforms, many Member States
still face substantial tax policy challenges. Some EU
Member States could benefit, albeit to varying degrees, from revenue-side
measures to consolidate their public finances and ensure sustainability. Such
measures must, however, aim at improving the efficiency of tax systems while
ensuring a fair distribution of the consolidation burden across all parts of
society. Additional revenue would preferably be raised by broadening tax bases rather
than increasing rates or creating new taxes. This may involve a need actively
to review tax expenditure and other loopholes in personal and corporate income
taxation, while cutting the scope for VAT reduced rates or exemptions or
raising reduced rates to a level closer to the standard rate. Excise duty exemptions
could also be reviewed with a view both to raising revenue and contributing
effectively to other public policies (e.g. health and environment policy). Improved
tax governance could also usefully complement revenue-raising measures. Some measures to address tax evasion, such as lifting the banking
secrecy, seems to have brought significant additional tax revenue already in
the short term. However, the gain in revenue from better tax governance is
often difficult to estimate ex-ante and should therefore not be overestimated
in the context of prudent fiscal policy, especially in the short term. Enhancing
tax compliance could take various forms, such as reducing the shadow economy,
combating potential VAT fraud and evasion, or promoting the efficiency of the
tax administration. Improving the tax administration is a challenge many Member
States face to raise additional revenue, reduce the high cost per net revenue
collected and lighten the heavy administrative burden for small and medium-size
companies. With
respect to increasing the growth and jobs potential of European economies, revenue-neutral
reforms could be considered. This is the case
especially for Member States that have both the margin and the need for a shift
from labour taxes to less distortionary taxes (consumption taxes, recurrent
property taxes, environmental taxes). A tax composition with a high share of
direct taxes and social security contributions alongside a low share of
indirect taxes might indicate scope for such a tax shift. Revenue-neutral
reform could also involve reducing high corporate income tax rates. The
designing of the consolidation and tax reforms strategy should take account of other
issues relating to the design of specific taxes. First,
corporate taxation is often biased toward debt financing instead of equity
funding. Secondly, housing taxation is based too much on transaction taxes rather
than less harmful recurrent taxes on immovable property, while tax- deductibility
of mortgage interest generates a debt bias and a risk of overinvestment in
housing. Finally, environmental taxes could play an important role in meeting
agreed environmental objectives and should over time provide appropriate
incentives to reduce harmful emissions, in particular of greenhouse gasses. Tax
reforms will have to reflect both economic efficiency and social equity, according
to collective preferences. Distributional effects will have to be taken into
account when designing tax reforms. Addressing long-term
sustainability The need for
consolidation is heightened by the challenges posed to public finances by an
ageing population. The Fiscal Sustainability Report
2012[3] shows debt in the EU remaining
stable until 2020, thanks to recent fiscal consolidation efforts and reform
progress that nearly stabilize age-related spending. However, from 2021
onwards, the ageing costs take hold more firmly and debt in the EU starts to rise
again, coming close to 90% of GDP by 2030. This dynamic can be reversed only through
sustained efforts by Member States. If the improvement of the structural
balance by 0.5% of GDP per year until the medium-term objective were to be achieved
and maintained over the long-term, in line with the SGP, the debt level would
be brought close to 60% of GDP by 2030. While some countries
are already addressing age-related pressure on spending, more remains to be
done, in addition to delivering on current plans.
Substantial efforts to reform pension systems have already been made in many
Member States in the last decade, with visible positive budgetary impact. In
the long run, however, a further increase in public pension expenditures in the
long run is still to be expected at aggregate EU level[4] (+1.5 p.p. of GDP by 2060).
This calls for enhanced efforts to reform pension systems, especially in
countries where increases in pension expenditure are projected to be far above the
EU average and where the reform process has not yet started in earnest. In
2012, a majority of Member States were given recommendations to adapt pension
policy in 2012. While good progress has been made in a number of countries,
including through restricting access to early retirement and harmonising the
retirement age between men and women, in other Member States the reform agenda
needs to be either intensified or activated. Linking the retirement
age to life expectancy would help stabilise the balance between working years
and years in retirement. To avoid recurrent
difficult negotiations, the link should preferably follow automatic rules. This
measure is an effective way of reducing longevity risk, addressing
sustainability and adequacy concerns at the same time, by giving incentives to
work longer and thus to accrue higher pension entitlements. To contribute
successfully to higher effective retirement ages, reforms in pension systems
need to be underpinned by policies that develop employment opportunities for
older workers and support active and healthy ageing, complemented by tax and
benefit policies giving incentives to stay longer at work and giving access to
life-long learning. Graph 2. Budgetary developments – euro area Source: Commission Services Member States have
shown determination in pursuing fiscal consolidation and have reduced deficits significantly. According to the 2012 Commission Autumn Forecast, average general
government deficit in the EU is expected to decline by 0.8 p.p. in 2012 and
reach 3.6% of GDP. For the euro area, the picture is broadly similar with the
deficit falling to 3.3% of GDP. With continuing fiscal consolidation in 2013,
general government deficit in the euro area is expected to fall below 3% of GDP
for the first time since 2008 (Graph 2). In a majority of Member States,
the composition of consolidation can be assessed as overall growth friendly and
broadly balanced between revenue and expenditure. Between 2007 and 2012 the
main expenditure savings have been recorded in investment spending,
intermediate consumption and the public wage bill. At the same time the share
of social transfers has generally increased, particularly so in countries more
strongly hit by the economic crisis. Fiscal consolidation
appears to have been even stronger in structural than in nominal terms. The structural adjustments for 2012 are forecast to exceed 1 p.p.
both in the EU and in the euro area. To reach such an outcome, Member States
have on average stuck to their nominal targets, undertaking corrective measures
in the course of the year in the context of a deteriorating macroeconomic
background. The consolidation path is expected to remain steady in 2013, since
Member States either have to implement the fiscal effort required under their Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP) or have still to converge towards their medium-term
objectives. This is expected to bring structural deficit down by more than 0.5
p.p. in the EU in 2013. Fiscal governance and
budgetary institutions Solid national budgetary
frameworks are central for sound fiscal decision-making. Under the Treaties, final budgetary decisions remain with national
authorities. It is thus key that Member States take action at national level to
enhance predictability and the credibility of their commitments to prudent
fiscal policy. The Directive on national budgetary frameworks and the Treaty on
Stability, Convergence and Governance (TSCG) improve national fiscal frameworks
considerably. Proper transposition of the Directive by the end of 2013 should
ensure robust budgetary frameworks across EU Member States, including timely
and comprehensive statistics, medium-term planning, reliance on realistic
forecasts and definition of national fiscal rules promoting compliance with
budgetary obligations under the Treaty. In addition, through the TSCG, 25
Member States have committed themselves to enshrining in binding national law
the objective of a budget in balanced or in surplus, thus anchoring a founding
principle of the SGP at the heart of national frameworks. Compliance should be
further enhanced by national automatic correction mechanisms, to be designed in
line with common principles and activated in well-defined circumstances, should
enhance compliance. Fiscal governance at
European level has been strengthened and the Commission has submitted more improvements
to the co-legislators. The Six-Pack[5] has reinforced the preventive arm
of EU fiscal surveillance and the ability to spot and correct fiscal imbalances
at an early stage. It has introduced new tools such as an expenditure benchmark
and a numerical debt rule. As the fiscal policies of the Member States sharing
the same currency share increased budgetary spillovers, the financial sanctions
for non-compliant euro-area Member States have been strengthened, but are now also
applied more gradually and at an earlier stage. The Commission has proposed further
improvements in fiscal surveillance for euro-area Member States in the two
Regulations that form the Two-Pack. The Regulation on enhanced surveillance
streamlines and reinforces the fiscal surveillance applicable to Member States threatened with or experiencing financial difficulties, while the Regulation
on enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies creates a closer monitoring of
Member States in EDP to ensure a timely correction of excessive deficits. It
also reinforces preventive action at EU level by laying cornerstones for
genuine budgetary policy coordination in the EMU, e.g. a common budgetary
timeline, a coordinated submission of annual national budgetary plans to the
Commission ahead of their parliamentary adoption. 2. restoring financial
stability Over the past year,
financial tensions in the EU financial markets have continued, but there are
signs of an improvement recently. The negative feedback
loops between euro-area sovereigns, banks and growth continued to fuel
financial stress and weighed on confidence. Strong policy actions by EU and
national policy makers have recently led to improvements, but the sovereign
spreads in vulnerable countries remain high and volatile. At the same time,
some other EU countries have enjoyed large inflows of private capital and
witnessed record-low, including negative, interest rates on their sovereign
bonds. The tight interlinkages between sovereign markets and the EU banking
sector continue to pose major risks to financial stability in the EU and the
euro area in particular. Liquidity and structural
funding problems have persisted in the EU banking sector. Particularly in the vulnerable Member States, access to market
funding for a number of banks has remained hampered. Downgrades of sovereign
ratings have reduced collateral available for banks' operations with the
Eurosystem and triggered downgrades of banks' own credit rating, leading to an
increase in banks’ funding costs. In the first half of 2012, funding pressures
in the vulnerable euro-area Member States have been compounded by deposit outflows,
while higher-rated Member States have witnessed deposit inflows. Also, banks’ internal
funding has come under pressure due to reduced growth prospects and thus lesser
earnings potential. The response of banks to funding pressure was to turn from
unsecured to secured lending and to the issuing of covered bonds. This has
resulted in a significant increase in the amount of encumbered assets in banks’
balance sheets, which represents an additional source of concern. Graph 3. Bank lending to households and non-financial corporations – euro area Source: Commission Services The scarcity of
market-based funding and rising credit risks due to stagnant growth hamper the
capacity of banks to lend to the real economy. Financing
constraints are particularly high for small and medium-sized enterprises, which
are the backbone of the EU economy and provide the bulk of employment. The lending
difficulties are greatest in the vulnerable countries where distressed banks
have been reducing lending, although weak growth prospects and the need to
reduce corporate and household debt also reduce the demand for credit
(Graph 3). At the same time, while banks have continued the
necessary adjustments of their balance sheets, there have been no signs of a
disorderly or excessive deleveraging. The capital flows from public sources,
which have mitigated the outflow of private capital, as well as the coordinated
recapitalisation exercise led by the European Banking Authority have played a
key role in this regard. Still, the need of deleveraging has varied across
countries, with banks in vulnerable Member States adjusting their balance
sheets faster than elsewhere. In view of these factors, it is a positive
sign that in the euro area as a whole bank
lending to the private sector has stabilised in 2012 and the latest ECB Lending
Survey has shown some easing in funding concerns. The re-emergence of
sovereign risks has reversed the process of financial integration in the euro
area. The introduction of the euro, but also the
global pricing of credit risk before the crisis, have spurred financial market
integration in the euro area and facilitated credit flows between euro-area
countries. With the bursting of the asset bubbles in some countries and the eruption
of the sovereign debt crisis, cross-border flows diminished dramatically and
capital retrenched behind national borders. In particular, private capital
flowing over the previous decade from the Northern to the Southern euro-area
Member States has been falling dramatically, as banks have been reduced their
cross-border exposure vis-à-vis both governments and the private sector in
vulnerable countries. The external financing gap that emerged as a result was
bridged through liquidity drawn from the Eurosystem and in the later stages
through EU/IMF loans under financial assistance programmes. Also, the home bias
in sovereign debt holdings increased, strengthening the negative feedback loop
between weak sovereigns and weak banks. Financing conditions
across the euro-area countries have diverged. Higher risk premia in cross-border lending have led to growing financial fragmentation and thereby to widening gaps in
interest rates on loans to enterprises and households across euro-area
countries. The private sector now faces significantly higher interest rates in
vulnerable countries than in other Member States, in particular in those, which
have been perceived as "safe haven" markets (Graphs 4 and 5). Graph 4. Interest rates on loans to enterprises || Graph 5. Loans to enterprises || Note: New businesses, maturity up to 1 year Source: Commission Services || Note: Index of national stocks y-o-y growth rate Source: Commission Services The dysfunctionality of
credit markets across the euro area poses significant challenges for the
functioning of monetary union. The ongoing
adjustment and restructuring in the vulnerable euro-area Member States weighs
heavily on growth. Their adjustment process depends on the restoration of
normal lending conditions by the banking system, which presently does not play
its proper intermediation role in the single market. Micro- and
macro-prudential supervision with a cross-border dimension, should contribute
to the integrated banking system to restore its function as financial
intermediary. Restoring the
conditions for a normal lending to the economy requires addressing the
underlying root of banks’ distress. Bold policy responses have been adopted at the EU level to
break the vicious cycle between weak banks and their sovereigns, address the
funding difficulties, financial fragmentation and broken monetary transmission
mechanisms in the euro area. As part of a road
towards genuine EMU, the EU Heads of State agreed in June 2012 to move towards
a Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as a first
tangible step. Following the agreement, the
Commission presented proposals to establish the SSM and grant the European Central
Bank supervisory powers. At the same time, the European Banking Authority would
be aligned to the new framework for banking supervision in order to ensure
consistency at EU level. The SSM aims at removing the differences in
supervisory practices, which contributed to the trend towards fragmentation of
the European financial market and put the banking sector at risk. The SSM will
ensure that all participating Member States have full confidence in the quality
and impartiality of banking supervision. This is important to guarantee that
capital flows will support rebalancing in the short term and will not lead to
new imbalances in the future (See also Section 3). With the establishment
of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the euro area has been equipped with
a strong permanent firewall. The large funding
capacity (EUR 500 bn) and a set of flexible instruments make the ESM well
equipped for breaking the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns
and helping to restore confidence. In addition to disbursing loans and credit
lines for liquidity-constrained euro-area Member States, the ESM has an
extensive set of instruments and can, if certain pre-conditions are met,
intervene on primary and secondary bond markets, under conditionality that do
not necessarily imply the request for a fully-fledged macroeconomic adjustment
programme. The possibility of using
the ESM to recapitalise banks directly will be a powerful tool for ultimately breaking
the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns in the euro area. The ESM can also provide loans specifically targeted at bank
recapitalisation. Until now, however, these loans could be granted to Member
States only, which would in turn use them for recapitalisations of their
distressed banks. Although bringing some relief to liquidity-constrained
governments, this approach has been a second-best solution to the problem of interconnection
between banks and sovereigns. In particular, such loans would be recorded in Member
States’ fiscal accounts and increase their public debt. To overcome this
problem, the Euro Area Summit decided in June 2012 to allow the ESM to
recapitalise banks directly, once the SSM has been effectively established. This
will go a long way towards de-linking the risks of banks and sovereigns in the
euro area and will be a major step towards successful resolution of the euro
area-crisis. The European Central
Bank has taken effective measures to alleviate banks’ funding constraints and
repair the monetary transmission mechanism. The two
3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations carried out by the ECB in December 2011
and February 2012 filled acute refinancing gaps for euro-area banks by
guaranteeing banks’ access to low cost medium-term funding. However, as funding
pressure persisted and in some euro area Member States signs of severe
disruptions in the monetary transmission mechanism became apparent, the ECB has
introduced a new tool - Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) - to safeguard
the proper transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. OMTs are outright
transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets subject to strict and
effective conditionality in connection with an ESM-financed adjustment
programme. While the tool has not yet been used, its announcement has already
led to improvements in the euro-area sovereign bond markets and, together with
the plans to implement the Banking Union, it has great potential to mitigate
financial tensions in the euro area and restore conditions for healthy lending
to the economy. While strong policy actions
have eased market tensions, markets remain very dependent on the continuation
of supportive policies and the implementation of commitments. Underlying vulnerabilities are still present in the EU and
particularly the euro-area financial system. At the same time, the duration of
the crisis in the euro area has led to high dependence of market developments
on policy measures. Therefore, certainty on policy actions and forceful
implementation of the agreed measures and national reform policies is crucial to
containing market volatility. The commitment to build genuine EMU, and a full
Banking Union in particular, will restore financial stability on a permanent
basis. 3. structural reforms to
support growth and correct imbalances Improving confidence
and reviving growth in the short run while creating conditions for sustainable
growth in the future is the main challenge at the current juncture. In a context of constrained macroeconomic policies, structural
reforms are a crucial element of the growth and rebalancing strategy, aimed at
tapping the potential of EU economies. Significant reform efforts have been
made in the vulnerable countries as the crisis progressed. Although the need
for action in these Member States is more pressing, growth in both the short and
medium-to-long term is an EU-wide problem which requires a collective response.
Despite significant differences in the economic situation across Member States,
a co-ordinated approach to reforms across the Member States and at the EU level
would trigger political momentum, relax political economy constraints and so
facilitate the reform process. Graph 6. Current-account balances – euro area and Member States || Graph 7. Unit labour costs and nominal compensation per employee – euro-area || Source: Commission Services || Source: Commission Services Growth in the EU
economy is currently constrained by persisting macroeconomic imbalances and the
need to adjust past excesses in borrowing and consumption. Temporarily lower growth is an inherent feature of deep adjustment,
as economies undergo restructuring, resources are transferred from non-tradable
to tradable sectors and balance sheets in all sectors of the economy have to
adjust. The required adjustment has continued over the last year, in spite of
the difficult economic context, and is bearing fruit. Headline figures for
current account balances, trade data and domestic demand show that adjustment
is on-going in the EU, including among the euro-area countries, but further
progress is needed (Graph 6). Adjustment is also currently underway in
programme and other vulnerable countries, including those where progress
appeared limited until recently. Not only are current-account imbalances
narrowing, but also unit labour cost developments are supportive of more rebalancing
in the future (Graph 7). In some deficit countries, nominal wages are adjusting
in both the public and private sectors. Graph 8. Current-account and net international investment position (NIIP) surplus and deficit countries Source: Commission Services The ongoing adjustment
in external positions appears to be largely structural. Deficit countries have experienced a large compression in imports
and some expansion in exports. While the import compression has been dominant
so far, the gains in competitiveness prepare the ground for future export
expansion and – according to the Commission Autumn Economic Forecast – export
contribution to rebalancing is expected to rise over the forecast horizon.
Provided that the competitiveness gains are sustained, the increase in exports
should lead to development of the export-oriented industries and to the
permanent nature of the adjustment. Nonetheless, the external rebalancing in
current account flows is not yet sufficient to change unsustainable trends in
stocks (net international investment position and external debt) (Graph 8). In
most deficit countries, the external debt-to-GDP ratios keep on increasing; if
they are declining, this is mainly due to large revaluation of liabilities.
Sizeable adjustment will be needed, the cost of which – particularly in
employment terms – will depend on the Member State’s adjustment capacity. The
progress in reducing bilateral current-account imbalances between surplus and
deficit countries has been much more visible. For the surplus countries, there
are also signs of rebalancing towards domestic demand, though the adjustment of
current-account surpluses also reflects that the current account of the whole
euro area has moved into surplus. While the full effect
of structural reforms on growth and rebalancing is likely to materialise in the
medium-to-long run, gains can also emerge in the short term. Reform processes are usually associated with adjustment and
transition costs in the short term, partly because of their generally uneven
distribution across firms and individuals. However, structural reforms might
also have immediate expansionary effects, insofar as they improve confidence
and expectations across economic actors. Priority should be given to reforms
entailing the lowest impact on budgetary costs (such as competitiveness and competition-enhancing
reforms in product markets or reduction in regulatory and administrative burden
for enterprises), while emphasis should also be placed on achieving the best
framework conditions (e.g. enhanced social dialogue) to support action in
policy areas which are traditionally more difficult to reform, such as the
labour market. Furthermore, synergies across different reform areas need to be
considered. For instance, labour market reforms aimed at moderating unit labour
costs might be more effective in driving competitiveness if coupled with
product-market reforms aimed at increasing competition and squeezing margins.
In general, interactions among different reform areas and the appropriate
timing should be studied carefully, taking into account specific conditions in
each Member State. Financial regulation
and supervision have an important role to play in ensuring orderly rebalancing
and preventing damaging boom-and-busts cycles. The
necessary deleveraging process taking place in the private sector in some EU
countries, also linked with the tight financial conditions described in
Section 2, might negatively affect growth in the short run. However, it is
a pre-condition for the correction of excessive internal and external
imbalances. In parallel, excessive credit growth and leverage in the financial
sector, as witnessed before the crisis, leads to a build-up of vulnerabilities
in the sector that bear a high risk of a disorderly correction, with massive
negative consequences for economic growth. In this context, the development of
effective macro and micro prudential tools is crucial to guarantee that, once
financing conditions across the EU normalise, rebalancing will continue on the
basis of sustainable capital flows towards the most productive activities and
long-term investment needs of the EU economy, and that that excessive imbalances
will not build up again. Productivity-enhancing
structural reforms remain a priority to foster medium-term growth prospects and
ensure a lasting rebalancing of the EU economy. Empirical
evidence shows that reforms aimed at increasing efficiency in product, service
and labour markets can spur productivity, innovation and increase output and
employment levels. Structural reforms oriented specifically at supporting
innovation, investment in, and the use of, ICT and further increasing trade
liberalisation also can have a direct impact on productivity. Such reforms also
favour the reallocation of labour and capital, allowing for shifts towards
sectors with high growth potential (including green growth sectors and digital
economy). Moreover, this type of structural reform can play a key role in
reducing internal and external imbalances, e.g. through improving competitiveness
and export performance. Structural reforms are particularly relevant in the
euro area, where relative prices cannot be influenced by nominal exchange-rate
movements. Fostering the
opportunities for green growth could translate into better performance at both
macro-economic and micro-economic levels. A shift
to low-carbon and resource-efficient production patterns will alleviate the
pressure of commodity price shocks on cost levels and inflationary expectations.
It will reduce resource and energy dependence and thus also the energy trade
deficit and enhance the competitiveness of the EU economy over the long term.
The EU has developed policies to improve efficiency in the use of resources,
including ambitious targets which will have implications for all Member States.
The full rewards of these policies will be reaped only if they are accompanied
by a stable and predictable regulatory framework to steer investment, tax
shifts away from labour towards environmental and consumption taxes, a phasing-out
of environmentally-harmful subsidies, measures to promote the emergence of new
green markets and technologies, and the greening of existing production and
consumption patterns. The momentum of product
and service market liberalisation should be maintained. Further action is needed to remove unjustified restrictions and
improve competition in product and service markets, including in the areas of retail
trade, regulated professions, construction, tourism and business services as
well as network industries. This also requires action at EU level, where
a well-functioning Single Market can both improve growth potential and
contribute to the unwinding of imbalances. In order to realise its full
potential, the development of the Single Market requires ambitious improvements,
both by strengthening enforcement and by increasing reform efforts at country
level, as laid down in Single Market Acts I and II. In this context, Member
States are called upon in particular, to take ambitious measures to implement the
Services Directive, given its growth and adjustment capacity potential.[6] Graph 9. Government Effectiveness Index, EU Member States, 2011 Note: The World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index shows the population’s perception of the quality of public and civil services and their degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The index attains values in the range -2.5 to 2.5. Source: World Bank Improving the business
environment, inter alia by seeking ways to increase public sector
efficiency, is a key priority. An open and
effective business environment is a catalyst for growth, as it promotes
business activity and reduces unnecessary costs for enterprises. Evidence shows
that administrative complexity or ‘red tape’ has a significant negative impact
on the level of entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness, and the
inward FDI flows which could play a significant role in addressing imbalances.
Moreover, an excessive regulatory burden tends to stimulate the shadow economy.
An efficient public administration should deliver services to the whole economy
without imposing disproportionate bureaucratic burdens on economic operators (Graph
9). Addressing problems in the public administration would contribute both to
fiscal consolidation and to competitiveness and growth prospects. In
particular, reforms of the judicial system would reduce the risks and
uncertainty of starting and doing business, leading to investment and
contributing to reduce transaction costs and strengthen competition. To this end,
several Member States have already adopted measures to shape a more streamlined
and effective public service. Key reform areas include judicial systems and enhanced
use of e-government and e-procurement. Unemployment has become
a very serious issue in a number of EU countries, with
increasing economic, social and political implications (Graph 10). Rising
unemployment is accompanied by a major increase in the degree of divergence
across EU labour markets. While unemployment has increased in most countries,
reaching record-high levels in some cases, in some Member States it has been falling.
Longer periods out of work and worse matching between labour demand and supply
in many EU countries, also due to sectoral shifts in some countries, imply that
unemployment may become increasingly structural with a negative effect on
long-term growth potential. Graph 10. Employment growth and unemployment rate – EU Source: Commission Services Structural reforms play
a key role in tackling unemployment while improving growth and promoting
adjustment. If unemployment rates are to be reduced
significantly, the conditions must be created for renewed confidence and stable
labour demand. At the same time, reducing joblessness
will be key to strengthening confidence and ensuring the social and political
sustainability of current reforms. Nonetheless, the
immediate challenge is to manage high and persistent jobless rates under
subdued growth conditions and, in some countries, against the background of
ongoing deleveraging and external rebalancing. In the light
of the different labour market conditions across the EU, the policy response
needs to be coordinated but adapted to the specific circumstances of each
country. Since the start of the
crisis, several EU countries have taken an active approach to labour reform. In some cases, ambitious reform plans have been adopted, with the
aim of creating more favourable conditions for employment (Graph 11). Recent
reform activity appears to be largely in line with the priorities set at
European level, notably with measures that help to make labour markets more
dynamic, reducing precariousness and improving competitiveness. Some countries
with high unemployment and large external imbalances have taken up the
challenge of improving the responsiveness of wages and their labour market
adjustment capacity, notably by reforming employment protection legislation (EPL)
and the wage-setting system. Income protection, activation and job search assistance
policies have been adapted to the growing labour market challenges. However, not
all countries have so far taken the necessary steps to rise to the policy
challenges they are facing. Graph 11. Number of labour market measures by domain, total EU Note: ALMPs exclude training. Source: Commission services, DG ECFIN LABREF database. Tackling unemployment and support for job creation should be high on
the policy agenda. The momentum in labour market
reform should be maintained, particularly in countries
characterised by major labour market challenges. The extent to which potential growth can
sustainably resume to a large extent depends on how successfully labour market
bottlenecks are addressed and the risk of unemployment hysteresis is tackled. Appropriate policy responses are urgently
needed in order to address structural and institutional labour market
challenges (labour market segmentation, deterioration in the job matching
process and persistent structural unemployment). Efforts
aimed at ambitious structural reform favouring adjustment (EPL, wage setting) and
the proper implementation of enacted measures need to be maintained in
countries with major labour-market challenges. Specific measures can also be
considered to boost labour demand by reducing taxation
on labour – notably on low-paid groups – when fiscal conditions allow, and
supporting entrepreneurship and the social economy. In
addition, there is a need for targeted measures to promote the hiring of
specific groups of workers at risk of dropping out from the labour force (such
as the long-term unemployed or young workers with no previous experience),
including by means of cost-effective active labour
market policies and by exploiting the potential of job-rich sectors. Annex. Selected
macro-economic indicators [1] Although, there is no evidence supporting some recent
propositions about very large size of the multipliers, see e.g. Box I.5
"Forecast errors and multiplier uncertainty" in European Economic
Forecast, Autumn 2012, European Economy 7/2012 [2] See European Commission (2012) Report on Public
finances in EMU 2012, European Economy 4/2012 DG Economic and Financial Affairs. [3] See European Commission (2012) "Fiscal
Sustainability Report 2012", European Economy 8/2012. [4] See European Commission and Economic Policy Committee
(2012) "2012 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 27
EU Member States (2010-2060)", European Commission, European Economy, No
2. [5] A legislative package of five regulations and a
directive, which entered into force on 13th December 2011. The legislation reinforced
the Stability and Growth Pact and introduced a new set of rules for the
surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. See also: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm
[6] Commission services estimate that gains associated
with the current implementation of the Services Directive in Member States are of
the order of 0.8% of EU GDP, while a slightly more ambitious implementation, with
each country achieving EU-average level of barriers to the cross-border
provision and establishment of service activities, would bring additional gains
worth 0.4 percentage points of GDP. Under an extremely ambitious scenario,
where each Member State would reach the average of the five best-performing
countries, an additional 1.8% growth of GDP could be achieved at EU level.