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Document C2006/326/51

    Case C-413/06 P: Appeal brought on 10 October 2006 by Bertelsmann AG, Sony Corporation of America against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 July 2006 in Case T-464/04: Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala, international association) v Commission of the European Communities.

    OJ C 326, 30.12.2006, p. 25–26 (ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, NL, PL, PT, SK, SL, FI, SV)

    30.12.2006   

    EN

    Official Journal of the European Union

    C 326/25


    Appeal brought on 10 October 2006 by Bertelsmann AG, Sony Corporation of America against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 July 2006 in Case T-464/04: Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala, international association) v Commission of the European Communities.

    (Case C-413/06 P)

    (2006/C 326/51)

    Language of the case: English

    Parties

    Appellants: Bertelsmann AG, Sony Corporation of America (represented by: P. Chappatte, J. Boyce, Solicitors, N. Levy, Barrister, R. Snelders, avocat, T. Graf, Rechtsanwalt)

    Other parties to the proceedings: Commission of the European Communities, Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala, association internationale), Sony BMG Music Entertainment BV

    Form of order sought

    The applicant claims that the Court should:

    annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 13 July 2006 in Case T-464/04;

    reject Impala's application for annulment of the Commission's decision or, alternatively, refer the case back for reconsideration to the Court of First Instance; and

    order Impala to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

    Pleas in law and main arguments

    The appellants make seven pleas on appeal:

    First, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by using the Commission's statement of objections as a benchmark for its substantive assessment of the decision.

    Second, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by requiring the Commission to conduct a new market investigation following the notifying parties' response to the statement of objections.

    Third, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by applying an erroneous and excessively high standard of proof for merger clearance decisions.

    Fourth, that the Court if First Instance exceeded the scope of judicial review by substituting its own assessment for that of the Commission and, in doing so, itself committed manifest errors and fundamentally misconstrued the evidence.

    Fifth, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by misapplying the criteria developed in Airtours for the assessment of the feasibility of tacit collusion.

    Sixth, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by applying an erroneous and excessive standard of reasoning for merger clearance decisions.

    Seventh, that the Court of First Instance erred in law by relying on evidence that was not disclosed to the applicants and that was not before the Commission at the time it adopted its decision.


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