92003E1360

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1360/03

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(10 April 2003)

Subject: Shipments of uranium and enrichment technologies by the Urenco company to Iran and other states seeking to develop nuclear weapons

1. Is the Commission aware that the Uranium Enrichment Company (Urenco), which is established in Capenhurst (UK), Gronau (D) and Almelo (NL), and which was set up in 1970 on the basis of a treaty by the governments of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands for the commercial development of ultracentrifuge technology, commands a 12 to 15 % share of the world market in enriched uranium?

2. Is the Commission also aware that in the 1970s Urenco attracted controversy, not least for having supplied enriched uranium to the then Brazilian dictatorship, interested as it was in developing nuclear weapons, by going against the wishes of the United Nations in using uranium originating in the Rössing mine in what was then South-African occupied Namibia, and by unintentionally playing into the hands of the Pakistani government by creating the possibility for it to develop its own atomic bomb on the strength of industrial espionage by Abdul Qadeer Kahn, an employee of the Dutch FDO company working in cooperation with Urenco?

3. Can the Commission confirm that Urenco centrifuge technology and centrifuge rotors were found during inspections in Iraqi installations early in 1996, possibly shipped via Pakistan or Brazil?

4. Is Urenco now supplying Iran with centrifuge technology and other apparatus suitable for use in uranium enrichment, as brought to public attention by the government of the Russian Federation? Have such shipments always been registered by the IAEA in Vienna?

5. Does the Commission share the view of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the effect that Iran had a more aggressive nuclear programme than the International Atomic Energy Agency had thought?

6. What action will the Commission take to prevent Urenco from wittingly or unwittingly contributing to the further proliferation of the means of producing nuclear weapons to states with non-democratic regimes?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(6 June 2003)

1. The figures suggested by the Honourable Member concerning the market share of Urenco agree with the information available to the Commission.

2. The Commission does not have further information on the issues raised by the Honourable Member outside the public information released by the media.

3. The Commission has not participated in any inspection in Iraq; the public information released by the media is known to the Commission.

4. The Commission is not aware of such a case.

5. The Commission is aware of the concerns of the United States. Member States are discussing this specific issue in the appropriate fora, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on the basis of the preliminary report of Dr El Baradei. The final report is expected in June 2003.

6. The Commission undertakes, through a comprehensive safeguards system, to prevent any diversion of nuclear materials from the intended use as declared by the users within the Union. The Commission co-operates in this respect closely with the IAEA, supporting its international non-proliferation regime.

It should also be noted that the equipment and technology required for enriching uranium are expressly covered by the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). Accordingly, exports of such equipment and technology require an export authorisation from the competent authorities in each Member State. All EU Member States participate in the work of the NSG. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology(1) restates the need for an export authorisation and makes it a legal obligation at Community level.

(1) OJ L 159, 30.6.2000.