92003E1030

WRITTEN QUESTION P-1030/03

by André Brie (GUE/NGL) to the Council

(20 March 2003)

Subject: The first CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) Review Conference

With the approach of the first CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) Review Conference, scheduled for April 2003, I'd like to draw the attention of the Council to reliable information that the US military has initiated research and development of so-called non-lethal chemical agents for a wide range of possible civilian and military purposes. Moreover, during a meeting of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee (on 5 February 2003) Mr Donald Rumsfeld not only announced his wish to use chemical weapons in a possible war against Iraq but also attacked the straitjacket imposed by bans in international treaties on using those weapons. This would be illegal under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention which prohibits development, production and use of chemical weapons and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons as a method of warfare.

In the light of these developments:

- Is the Council aware of this problem?

- What is its position towards such an anachronistic position (when on the one hand UN Resolution 1441 tries to disarm Iraq of exactly those weapons (among others), and on the other hand the US Government threatens to use them)?

- What does it intend to do to encourage the active defence of the CWC against attempts to undermine this unique international disarmament instrument and to uphold the rule of law?

Reply

(22 July 2003)

The Council considers that the first Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention is a key event in the life of this multilateral instrument, which is virtually unique in many respects.

Member States have reiterated their commitment to several key aspects of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Among these key aspects are the universality of the Convention, the principle that all countries having ratified the Convention must adopt national implementing legislation for the Convention which is as complete as possible, and the principle of compliance (and possible use of challenge inspections).

The Conference also provides for the opportunity to uphold the prohibition on use, as defined by Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. The prohibition is the very basis of the Convention. Member States are of the view that there can be no room for compromise in this area. This means that monitoring compliance with the Convention, even by countries that are not States parties, is a key and irreplaceable task.