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Document 91998E002051

WRITTEN QUESTION No. 2051/98 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. Radioactive gas emission from the Acerinox factory, Cadiz, Spain

OJ C 96, 8.4.1999, p. 29 (ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

European Parliament's website

91998E2051

WRITTEN QUESTION No. 2051/98 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. Radioactive gas emission from the Acerinox factory, Cadiz, Spain

Official Journal C 096 , 08/04/1999 P. 0029


WRITTEN QUESTION P-2051/98

by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission

(30 June 1998)

Subject: Radioactive gas emission from the Acerinox factory, Cadiz, Spain

On 9 June 1998 the Acerinox steel factory informed the Spanish Council for Nuclear Security that radioactive gas had escaped from one of its melting furnaces, although radioactive contamination had already been detected in the smoke filtering system on 2 June. The apparent origin of the contamination was the presence of radioactive waste containing Cesium-137 in the scrap iron feeding the melting furnaces of the factory. Surprisingly, local authorities and public opinion were not informed until 12 June. The radioactive contamination has not only affected the surrounding area, but also other countries, including France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany, where an unusually high level of Cesium-137 had been detected by their national nuclear authorities and by the International Atomic Energy Agency since 25 May 1998!

In fact, the contaminated melting furnace had been kept working several days after the event and contaminated steel, ash and other remnants have been produced. This ash and these remnants may have been dumped at the site of El Cobre, Algeciras, where ash from this factory is normally dumped. This site is not suitable for receiving radioactive materials. Moreover, no emergency plan was put into action after the accident in the factory. The environmental organization Agaden has sent a claim to the Commission concerning this event on 14 June 1998.

Does the Acerinox factory receive financial aid from the European Union? If so, will this aid be suspended until it has been established who is responsible and environmental measures have been taken? Does the Commission intend to investigate whether the Spanish authorities have failed in applying those EU Directives preventing damage to the environment as well as on human health, for instance the EIA Directive 85/337/EEC(1) and the basic radiation standards Directive 84/467/Euratom?

Could this kind of contamination result from smelting radioactive materials permitted under the exemptions in the basic radiation standards Directive?

What measures have been taken to coordinate international action on this case of cross-border radioactive pollution?

Answer given by Mrs Bjerregaard on behalf of the Commission

(14 September 1998)

The Commission has not provided financial assistance to the installation concerned.

The Commission has been in contact with the Spanish authorities since the contamination at Acerinox was first notified and awaits the full results of the inquiries by these authorities. At this time there is no evidence of the basic safety standards or the environmental impact assessment (EIA) Directive having been infringed.

The incident bears no relation to the processing of iron scrap recovered from an installation of the nuclear fuel cycle, nor with the voluntary mixing of nuclear waste with ordinary metal scraps. The incident has therefore no link with the issue of exemption or clearance levels as defined in the basic safety standards.

At the end of May, and the beginning of June a temporary but significant increase of caesium 137 concentrations in air was detected in Italy, South-East France, and in Switzerland. The Commission has been collecting information from those concerned. This phenomenon was notified, as a precautionary measure by the Community emergency information system and by that of the International atomic energy agency on 11 June 1998 although the measured and announced levels did not represent any threat to public health. The two systems forwarded complementary information. No Member State nor the Commission was in fact bound to issue a notification as no "measures of a wide-spread nature to protect the general public" had been implemented, which criterion is set out in Article 1 of the Council Decision 87/600 Euratom on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency(2).

(1) OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40.

(2) OJ L 371, 30.12.1987.

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