1

Under Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), concerning the processing of confirmatory applications:

‘1.   A confirmatory application shall be handled promptly. Within 15 working days from registration of such an application, the institution shall either grant access to the document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 10 within that period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal. In the event of a total or partial refusal, the institution shall inform the applicant of the remedies open to him or her, namely instituting court proceedings against the institution and/or making a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the conditions laid down in Articles [263 TFEU] and [228 TFEU], respectively.

2.   In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large number of documents, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given.

3.   Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall be considered as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the relevant provisions of the [FEU] Treaty.’

2

The applicants, ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europe, Stichting FERN and Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory, are non-governmental organisations active, in particular, in the field of environmental protection.

3

By letter of 22 October 2010, sent via electronic mail, the applicants submitted to the European Commission, under Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001, an application for access to several documents relating to the voluntary certification schemes for seeking recognition from the Commission under Article 18 of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16) (the ‘initial application’).

4

By electronic mail of 12 November 2010, the Commission informed the applicants that the initial application of 22 October 2010 had been registered and that the period for a reply to that application had been extended by 15 working days.

5

By letter of 7 December 2010, sent by electronic mail, the Commission replied to the initial application by disclosing one document and refusing access to the other documents covered by the initial application.

6

By letter of 15 December 2010, sent by electronic mail, the applicants submitted a confirmatory application to the Secretary-General of the Commission, pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (‘the confirmatory application’).

7

By letter of 12 January 2011, sent by electronic mail, the Commission informed the applicants of the registration of the confirmatory application on 15 December 2010 and of the extension by 15 days, under Article 8(2) of Regulation No 1049/2010, of the prescribed period for a reply, that is, until 4 February 2011. As reasons for that extension, the Commission cited the large number of documents to which access was requested, the technical nature of the data contained in them, and the need to re-consult third parties.

8

By letter of 3 February 2011, sent by electronic mail, the Commission informed the applicants that it was unable to provide a final reply within the extended period expiring on 4 February 2011, on the ground that the required analysis of the documents and consultations with the services concerned within the Commission had taken more time than the usual. It added that it aimed to send such a reply within the shortest possible time-limit.

9

By electronic mail sent to the Secretary-General of the Commission on 23 February 2011, the applicants expressed their concern regarding the lack of a reply from the Commission to the confirmatory application, and invited the Commission to provide them with an exact date for its reply.

10

By letter of 28 February 2011, sent by electronic mail, the Commission informed the applicants that the confirmatory application was being dealt with and that it would do its utmost to provide a final reply by the end of March 2011.

11

By letter of 7 April 2011, sent by electronic mail, the applicants pointed out to the Commission that they had still not received a final reply to the confirmatory application and they invited the Commission to provide access to the documents requested within a period of 10 working days from 7 April 2011, adding that, unless that reply was received before 22 April 2011, they would bring an action before the General Court challenging the implied decision refusing their confirmatory application.

12

By letter of 14 April 2011, sent by electronic mail, the Commission informed the applicants that, because of new developments in the case at stake and the closure of the Commission’s offices ‘for Easter from 21 to 25 April [2011]’, it would not be in a position to provide a final reply to the confirmatory application before 22 April 2011, but that the applicants could expect to receive a reply shortly after that date.

13

By letter of 18 April 2011, sent by electronic mail, the applicants indicated to the Commission that the intervention of the Easter holidays was immaterial, given that the confirmatory application had been submitted and registered on 15 December 2010, and that 83 working days had transpired since that application was made, that is, 68 working days beyond the maximum period provided to process a confirmatory application and 53 working days beyond any potentially lawful extension of that period under the terms of Regulation No 1049/2001.

14

By decision of 19 September 2011, the Commission adopted an express decision in response to the confirmatory application of 15 December 2010, which related to some of the documents requested (‘the first express decision’).

15

By document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 25 May 2011, the applicants brought the present action against the implied decision refusing their confirmatory application which was made, it is claimed, on 22 April 2011 (‘the contested decision’).

16

On 2 April 2012, the decision of the General Court to open the oral procedure and to fix a date for a hearing on 5 June 2012 was notified to the parties.

17

By letter of 17 April 2012, the Commission informed the General Court that, by letter of 3 February 2012 (‘the second express decision’), received by the applicants by registered post on 8 February 2012, it had adopted a second express decision with regard to the documents requested which had not been dealt with by the first express decision. According to that letter, the Commission formally contends that the applicants no longer have any legal interest in bringing proceedings, so that there is no need to adjudicate in the present case, and alleges, moreover, that the action against the contested decision is manifestly inadmissible. That action, it is contended, was brought after the expiry of the period allowed for bringing an action for annulment. The contested decision, as it is an implied decision, was made upon the expiry of the prescribed period referred to in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that is, on 4 February 2011.

18

By letter of 4 May 2012, the applicants, at the request of the Court, submitted their observations with regard to the Commission’s application for a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate.

19

By letter of 29 June 2012, the applicants, at the request of the Court, submitted their observations with regard to the Commission’s incidental plea of inadmissibility in its letter of 17 April 2012, on the ground that the action was brought out of time.

20

The applicants claimed initially that the Court should:

21

The Commission initially contended that the Court should:

22

In its letter of 17 April 2012, the Commission contended that the Court should:

23

In the letter of 4 May 2012, the applicants claimed that the Court should:

24

Under Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure, where the action is manifestly inadmissible, the General Court may, by reasoned order and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action. Furthermore, under Article 113 of those Rules, the General Court may at any time, of its own motion, after hearing the parties, decide whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding. In the present case, the General Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents before it and from the explanations provided by the parties during the written and oral procedure, and finds that there is no need to take any further steps in the proceedings.

25

In the letter of 17 April 2012, lodged with the Court as an application for a decision that there is no need to adjudicate on the action, the Commission contends, first, that following the second express decision, notified to the applicants on 8 February 2012, as those applicants did not bring an action for annulment against that decision within the prescribed time-limit and did not amend their application with regard to that decision, they lost their interest in bringing proceedings against the contested decision, so that the Court should find that there is no need to adjudicate in the present case.

26

Secondly, without raising an objection of inadmissibility by separate document, within the meaning of Article 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission submits, in the alternative, a plea of manifest inadmissibility of the action in that it was brought after the expiry of the period within which the applicants can challenge the legality of the contested decision. In that regard, the Commission contends that that period expired on 14 April 2011.

27

In their observations on the Commission’s application for a decision that there is no need to adjudicate on the action, as set out in their letter of 4 May 2012, the applicants argue, first, that the action is brought against an implied decision of the Commission set at the date of 22 April 2011, based on exchanges of correspondence with the Commission between 14 and 18 April 2011. Secondly, they deny that the second express decision was notified to them on 8 February 2012. Only one of the applicants received that notification. Thirdly, in essence, they acknowledge that they no longer have any interest in obtaining access to the documents that they had requested and that the Commission had refused to grant them in the second express decision. Fourthly, the applicants argue that the Commission is wrong to contend that the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment against the second express decision had expired. In any event, it is claimed, they are entitled to amend the claims and pleas in law set out in the application in this case following the adoption of that second express decision. However, the applicants confirm that they acknowledge that they no longer have any practical interest in obtaining a judgment and, therefore, there is no longer any need to adjudicate in the present case.

28

In their reply to the General Court’s measure of organisation concerning compliance with the time-limit for bringing an action in the present case, the applicants argue, in essence, that it is apparent from their exchange of correspondence with the Commission between 3 February and 18 April 2011, and particularly the undertakings made and renewed on those occasions by the Commission to adopt an express decision as soon as possible, that they could legitimately believe that the implied decision was not made upon expiry of the prescribed time-limit on 4 February 2011, but on a subsequent date which they set at 22 April 2011.

29

The Court decides, after hearing the parties, to examine of its own motion, notwithstanding the application for a decision that there is no need to adjudicate on the action, raised formally by the Commission in its letter of 17 April 2012, the admissibility of the present action having regard to the period within which the applicants had to bring an action.

30

First, the Court observes that, according to settled case-law, the time-limit for bringing actions is a matter of public policy, since it was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice, and that it is for the European Union courts to ascertain, of their own motion, whether it has been complied with (Case C-246/95 Coen [1997] ECR I-403, paragraph 21, and order of 4 April 2008 in Case T-503/07 Kulykovska-Pawlowski and Others v Parliament and Council, not published in the ECR, paragraph 6).

31

According to settled case-law the time-limits for bringing proceedings are at the discretion of neither the Court nor the parties (Case T-514/93 Cobrecaf and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-621, paragraph 40; Case T-119/95 Hauer v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II-2713, paragraph 22; and Case T-287/02 AIT v Commission [2003] ECR II-2179, paragraph 20).

32

Secondly, the Court observes that, according to settled case-law, in principle, both the Court of Justice and the General Court refuse to accept — since to do so would call into question the system of remedies instituted by the FEU Treaty — that mere inaction on the part of an institution can be deemed to be equivalent to an implied decision, unless there are express provisions laying down a deadline after which an implied decision will be deemed to have been taken by the institution which has been asked to state its position and prescribing the content of that decision (Case C-123/03 P Commission v Greencore [2004] ECR I-11647, paragraph 45; Joined Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96 SGA v Commission [1999] ECR II-3587, paragraph 27; and Case T-437/05 Brink’s Security Luxembourg v Commission [2009] ECR II-3233, paragraph 55).

33

Under Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, failure by the institution to reply, within the prescribed time-limit, to a confirmatory application within the meaning of Article 8(1) and (2) of that regulation, shall be considered as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings against the institution in accordance with the provisions of the FEU Treaty.

34

In the present case the parties agree, moreover, that the contested measure is an implied negative decision, within the meaning of the provisions of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001. In that regard, the Court observes that, as is apparent from the documents in the file, on the date on which the action for annulment was brought, namely 25 May 2011, the Commission had not replied to the applicants’ confirmatory application of 15 December 2010 and that, on the basis of the provisions of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the applicants sought, by lodging their application, to challenge the legality of what constituted a negative reply from the Commission.

35

Thirdly, it should be noted that, according to the provisions of the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, actions for annulment must be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the applicant, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the applicant, as the case may be.

36

With regard to the abovementioned provisions of the Treaty, it is appropriate, first, to determine the date on which the contested decision was legally made and, secondly, to calculate the period of time within which the applicants had to bring an action to challenge the legality of that decision.

37

With regard to determining the date on which the contested decision was legally made, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recital 13 in the preamble to Regulation No 1049/2001, in order to ensure that the right of access of the public to documents falling within the scope of that regulation is fully respected and, therefore, fully effective, the legislature has made provision for the two-stage administrative procedure, referred to, respectively, in Articles 7 and 8 of that regulation, to be accompanied by the possibility of bringing court proceedings. That is specifically the case with implied negative decisions, within the meaning of Article 8(3) of that regulation.

38

It should be added that the reference, in the provisions of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the concept of prescribed time-limit, instead of a reference to a fixed period, is explained by the fact that, under the provisions of Article 8(1) and (2) of that regulation, the duration of the processing period of a confirmatory application can vary between a minimum of 15 working days and a maximum of 30 working days from registration of the application. Consequently, the duration of the prescribed time-limit, within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, must be calculated in each specific case, having regard to the course of the processing, by the institution concerned, of the confirmatory applications before it, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

39

In the present case, first, the Court notes that it is common ground between the parties that the time-limit within which the Commission had to reply to the confirmatory application, registered by the Commission services on 15 December 2010, after extending it by 15 working days on the basis of the provisions of Article 8(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, expired on 4 February 2011. Having regard to the provisions of Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time-limits (OJ, English Special Edition 1971 (II), p. 354), to the schedule of public holidays for 2010 (OJ 2008 C 166, p. 18) and to that of public holidays for 2011 for European Community institutions (OJ 2009 C 230, p. 10), it must be held that that calculation of the time-limit for replying to the confirmatory application is not vitiated by any error. Consequently, the prescribed time-limit, within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, expired in the present case on 4 February 2011.

40

It follows from all the considerations set out in paragraphs 35 to 39 above that the contested decision, taking the form of an implied negative decision, was made on 4 February 2011.

41

With regard to the calculation of the period within which the applicants had to bring their action for annulment against the contested decision, the prescribed time-limit referred to in Article 263 TFEU time began to run, in accordance with Article 101(1) of the Rules of Procedure, on 5 February 2011 and expired, in accordance with Article 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure, on 14 April 2011, that is, more than one month before the action was brought on 25 May 2011.

42

That finding cannot be altered in the light of the arguments of the applicants.

43

It should be noted, first of all, that the Commission indeed expressly indicated, in the letter of 3 February 2011, that it aimed to send a final reply to the confirmatory application within the shortest possible time-limit, and then, in the letter of 28 February 2011, that it would do its utmost to provide such a reply by the end of March 2011 and, finally, in the letter of 14 April 2011, that it intended to send such a reply shortly after 22 April 2011. Having regard to the express undertakings made in writing by the Commission, the latter thus expressly indicated to the applicants that it intended to adopt, within a short period during the first six months of the year 2011, a final reply to the confirmatory application.

44

The Court notes that, in their letter of 7 April 2011, the applicants expressly indicated to the Commission that, in the absence of a final reply to their confirmatory application before 22 April 2011, they would bring an action for annulment against the implied decision that was made, according to them, on that date.

45

However, the Court finds that neither of the two circumstances referred to in paragraphs 43 and 44 above could have the effect, as the applicants seem to have considered at the time and which they claimed both in their observations on the application for a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate and in their letter of 29 June 2012, of postponing until 22 April 2011 the date when the implied decision was made.

46

As the Court observed at paragraph 31 above, it is settled case-law that the time-limits for bringing proceedings are at the discretion of neither the Court nor the parties. In considering, as is apparent from the letters of 4 May and 29 June 2012, having regard to the exchange of correspondence between the applicants and the Commission, that the implied negative decision, within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, was made on 22 April 2011, the applicants clearly intended to adjust the period allowed for bringing actions for annulment by postponing the date when the said decision was made and, consequently, the date from which the limitation period for bringing that action began to run, as well as that on which it expired.

47

It follows from all the above considerations that the action must be rejected in its entirety as manifestly inadmissible, on the ground that it was out of time.

48

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Court may, where the circumstances are exceptional, order that the costs be shared.

49

In that regard, the Court considers that the multiple express undertakings made by the Commission, in its letters of 3 February, 28 February and 14 April 2011, as observed by the Court in paragraph 43 above, could have given rise to legitimate expectations, on the part of the applicants, that a final reply to the confirmatory application of 15 December 2010, was imminent. Therefore, as is apparent from their observations on the application for a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate, the applicants could have thought, wrongly but understandably in light of the express undertakings made by the Commission, that the processing of that application was ongoing and that the expiry date of the prescribed time-limit had been postponed.

50

Furthermore, it should be noted that, contrary to the express undertakings made by the Commission, in its letters of 3 February, 28 February and 14 April 2011, to adopt a final reply to the confirmatory application within a short period, that reply was not finally made until 3 February 2012, that is, the day before one year had passed after expiry of the prescribed time-limit provided in Article 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001. Therefore, the Commission clearly and seriously exceeded that limitation period.

51

Having regard to the exceptional circumstances in which the Commission processed the confirmatory application, it is fair that the latter should pay, in addition to its own costs, three quarters of the costs incurred by the applicants. The applicants shall bear one quarter of their own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby orders: