This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52011DC0613
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Future of the European Union Solidarity Fund
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Future of the European Union Solidarity Fund
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Future of the European Union Solidarity Fund
/* COM/2011/0613 final */
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Future of the European Union Solidarity Fund /* COM/2011/0613 final */
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1........... The results of eight years of
Solidarity Fund intervention................................................... 3 2........... Issues and Questions...................................................................................................... 4 2.1........ A disproportionate number
applications based on "exceptional" criteria............................ 4 2.2........ Unclear regional criteria and
lack of transparency............................................................ 4 2.3........ Responsiveness and visibility........................................................................................... 4 2.4........ Scope............................................................................................................................ 6 2.5........ Financing........................................................................................................................ 6 3........... The 2005 proposal for an amended
Solidarity Fund with an enlarged scope..................... 7 4........... The special report form the
Court of Auditors (performance audit)................................... 7 5........... Results of the 2010 COCOF survey............................................................................... 8 6........... Adjusting the Regulation.................................................................................................. 8 6.1........ A clearly defined scope for the
Solidarity Fund................................................................ 9 6.2........ A simple new definition for
regional disasters................................................................. 10 6.3........ Speeding up payments and
introducing advances........................................................... 11 6.4........ Responding to slowly unfolding
disasters....................................................................... 11 6.5........ Merging grant decisions and
implementation agreements................................................ 12 6.6........ Making the Fund a more effective
instrument for disaster and climate change resilience... 12 7........... The Solidarity Clause in Art 222
TFEU......................................................................... 13 8........... Summary and conclusions............................................................................................. 13 Annex 1: Thresholds for major disasters
applicable in 2011.......................................................... 15 Annex 2: EU Solidarity Fund Applications 2002
- 2010............................................................... 16 Annex 3: Statistical overview of Solidarity
Fund applications........................................................ 19 Annex 4: Regional GDP Simulation (n-3)..................................................................................... 20 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Future of the European Union
Solidarity Fund
1.
The results of eight years of Solidarity Fund
intervention
The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)[1]
was created in 2002 to provide the EU with an instrument which would allow
responding effectively to major natural disasters affecting Member States or
countries negotiating their accession to the EU[2]. Previously,
no such instrument existed for internal action. Until the end of 2010 the Commission
received 85 applications for financial assistance from 23 different countries:
27 of these applications fall within the category of "major natural
disaster" which is the main field of application of the Fund. The
Regulation defines major disasters as having caused damage exceeding a
threshold specific to each country and defined as the lower of 0,6% of Gross
National Income (GNI) or EUR 3 billion in prices of 2002 which in
2011 corresponds to EUR 3,536 billion[3]. Thresholds
applicable to individual countries in 2011 are given in Annex 1. Almost two thirds of all applications
received since the creation of the Fund related however to the two exceptions
laid down in the Regulation which allow mobilising the Fund even if damage
remains below the threshold. 53 applications were presented as so-called
"extraordinary regional disasters" and 4 under the criteria for
disasters in a "neighbouring country". In the latter case an eligible
country affected by the same disaster as another eligible country where the
occurrence of a major disaster has been accepted may also benefit from the Fund
irrespective of the size of the damage. Extraordinary regional disasters are
defined as having affected the major part of the population in the region
concerned and having serious and lasting repercussions on the living conditions
and the economic stability of the region. Overall, between the creation of the
Solidarity Fund in 2002 and the end of 2010, 42 applications were approved with
financial aid totalling more than EUR 2,4 billion[4].
During this period the Commission had to reject 35 requests for aid, all of
which were presented as "extraordinary regional disasters" as they
were found not to meet the exceptional criteria. Two applications were
withdrawn by the applicant States once it had become clear that they would not
be successful. At the end of December 2010 the decision on six applications was
still pending. As natural disasters within Europe have continued to grow both
in size and frequency, the requests have concerned a variety of different types
of natural disasters including storms, floods, mudslides, earthquakes, volcanic
eruption, forest fires and drought, the most serious case being the 2009
earthquake at L'Aquila in Italy with over EUR 10 billion damage and
tens of thousands people made homeless where the Fund intervened with over
EUR 492 million, the highest grant paid out so far. Annexes 2 and
3 give an overview of all applications received since 2002 up until the end
of 2010. It has been widely recognised that the
Solidarity Fund - judged against the purpose for which it was set up - is very
successful. Assistance from the Fund has helped to alleviate the financial
burden on disaster-stricken countries. Offering help and additional resources
at times of particular hardship created a positive image for the Union in the
eyes of its citizens. Nonetheless the experience gathered shows that there are
limitations and weaknesses in the operation of the Fund.
2.
Issues and Questions
2.1.
A disproportionate number applications based on
"exceptional" criteria
As pointed out above, the experience since
2002 has shown that the majority of applications for Solidarity Fund assistance
are not presented for major disasters as intended by the legislator, but under
the exceptional criteria for regional disasters. For such cases the Regulation
calls for a special focus on remote and isolated regions and imposes that these
criteria are to be examined by the Commission “with the utmost rigour”.
Moreover it limits the maximum financial allocation per year for regional
disasters to no more than 7,5% of the maximum amount of EUR 1 billion
that may be mobilised under the Solidarity Fund in any given year, i.e.
EUR 75 million. This underlines the legislator's intention that regional
disasters should only be accepted in truly exceptional cases. The rate of unsuccessful applications under
the regional criteria of almost two-thirds continues to be very high. By
contrast, major disaster applications for which only a single quantitative
criterion applies have been accepted so far at a rate of 100%.
2.2.
Unclear regional criteria and lack of
transparency
The definition of "extraordinary
regional disasters" in the Regulation is rather vague and conditions for
activating the Fund under this category are - as intended by the legislator -
difficult to meet: the Fund can be mobilised only exceptionally if an
extraordinary regional disaster affects the majority of the population of a
region and if it has serious and lasting effects on its economic stability and
living conditions. Evidence for these conditions is burdensome to provide and
difficult to assess. As a result, applicant States and the Commission invest
considerable time and effort in preparing and assessing applications for
smaller disasters that in the majority of cases turn out not to qualify. It
seems that in spite of detailed advice and guidance provided by the Commission
many Member States feel obliged vis-à-vis their regions to present applications
even if they are aware of the small chances of success. Rejected applications
in return lead to frustration in the States and regions concerned and are
detrimental for the image of the EU.
2.3.
Responsiveness and visibility
The issues raised with regard to the time
necessary to pay out Solidarity Fund grants are inherent to the conditions and
procedures imposed by the Regulation. The Fund is often mistaken for a rapid
response instrument for crisis management, for which it was not conceived. It
is an instrument to help re-finance emergency operations financed initially by
the public authorities in the affected country. Nevertheless, the Commission
shares the view of those that call for making aid available more quickly than
is currently the case. A number of factors limit the
responsiveness of the Fund, the most important of which are the following: –
In the event of a disaster, the Commission may
not act upon its own initiative; it has to wait for a formal application from
the national authorities which regularly need the full 10 weeks from the start
of the disaster to prepare their application. Moreover, in many instances
applicants update their application after its formal submission. In some cases
the assessment requires the Commission to request complementary information
which is sometimes received only months later. –
Appropriations for Solidarity Fund grants are
not directly available in the EU budget. The funds need to be raised by an
extra financial effort of the Member States, over and above their normal EU
contributions. Before any aid can be paid the Commission has to ask the
European Parliament and the Council to approve an amending budget, which
usually involves a rather lengthy procedure of between two and three months,
sometimes longer. –
The mobilisation of the Fund under the current
Regulation involves a whole series of steps from the receipt of the application
until - in the event of a positive assessment - the grant can be paid out. No
less than four Commission decisions are required in each case: –
acceptance of the application as an eligible
case meeting the criteria of the Regulation based on the assessment of the
application by the Commission services, –
adoption of an amending budget proposal in order
for Council and the European Parliament to approve the mobilisation of the Fund
and to make the budget appropriations for proposed amount of aid available, –
adoption of a Commission decision addressed to
the beneficiary State awarding the aid (Grant Decision), –
adoption of the Agreement for the implementation
of the grant specifying the conditions for using the grant and laying down in
particular the types of emergency operations to be financed from the aid and
nominating the responsible authorities (Implementation Agreement). –
Implementation Agreements can in principle be
concluded as soon as the amending budget has been approved and the Commission
has adopted the Grant Decision. The Commission systematically requests
beneficiary States to provide the necessary input (particularly on the types of
operations for which they intend to use the grant) as soon as it has proposed
to mobilise the grant and while the amending budget procedure is ongoing. In
many instances, however, this input is received from the applicant States only
weeks or even months after the Amending Budget has been adopted. –
The Agreements have to be signed by the
responsible Commissioner and the designated representative of the beneficiary
State, usually a government minister. –
Applications are not always submitted in one of
the main working languages of the Commission so that translations have to be
requested in order for the Commission to be able to process the applications.
Translations may require up to six weeks. In addition, the requirement to
translate all official documents to be decided by the Commission or addressed
to the applicant State adds further delays. This leads to the cumulated effect that in
many instances grants can be paid out only 9 to 12 months after the disaster,
sometimes longer. Grants may be used retroactively to re-finance emergency
operations already carried out during or in the immediate aftermath of the
disaster and therefore maintain their intended effect of alleviating Member
States' budgets and helping regions overcome the financial burden inflicted on
them by the disaster. On the other hand such delays largely impair the
visibility of the Solidarity Fund grant with the affected population in
particular as the Regulation contains no publicity rules and not all Member
States widely communicate the origins of the aid received.
2.4.
Scope
Responding with the current Fund
appropriately to major crises of other than natural origin is extremely
difficult if not impossible, as illustrated by industrial accidents such as the
Prestige oil spill, the explosion of the Buncefield oil depot or terrorist acts
such as the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005. Likewise, it is not
possible at present to provide assistance from the Solidarity Fund in the event
of a serious public health crisis - such as the spreading of an epidemic like
SARS to Europe or caused by a major nuclear accident - which could easily
surpass the response capacities of the individual States. Nevertheless, there
have been calls, for instance from within the European Parliament, that such
events required a response at European level, specifically invoking the
Solidarity Fund in such contexts.
2.5.
Financing
Solidarity Fund grants are financed outside
the normal EU budget with additional amounts money over and above the relevant
headings as foreseen by the Inter-institutional Agreement. Grants therefore
have to be approved upon proposal from the Commission on a case by case basis
by the European Parliament and the Council. The annual ceiling is
EUR 1 billion. Since the creation of the Fund in 2002 this amount has
never been insufficient with the maximum amount of EUR 728 million
paid out in one single year (2002) followed by EUR 622 million in
2009. In all other years cumulated payments were considerably lower. There
seems to be thus no need to increase the budget ceiling. Individual grants are paid out following the
adoption of the Commission's corresponding amending budget proposal for the
case in question and the completion of the trilogue between the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission. The procedure would normally
require two readings but has been streamlined by applying a simplified
procedure with only one reading. The time necessary to have the budget
appropriations approved in each case varies depending on the circumstances but
usually takes between six and twelve weeks. The Commission uses this time to
prepare the formal grant decision and to negotiate with the beneficiary State
the Agreement on the implementation of the grant that has to be concluded
before the grant can be paid out.
3.
The 2005 proposal for an amended Solidarity Fund with
an enlarged scope
In 2005 the Commission presented a
legislative proposal for a new EU Solidarity Fund Regulation[5].
Building on the existing Fund this proposal aimed for –
an enlarged scope and wider eligibility of
operations, to enable the Community to react to disasters other than of natural
origin, e.g. industrial accidents and other man-made disasters, threats to the
public health (pandemics etc) and major terrorist actions; –
the possibility to make advance payments, to
accelerate the rate of response and the visibility of Union support; –
simplification, by introducing clearer criteria
for the activation of the Fund (lowering of the major disaster threshold while
abandoning the exceptional criteria). The proposal was very favourably received
by the European Parliament. It adopted the proposal in first reading on 18 May
2006. In the Council, however, the proposal met
with widespread scepticism and opposition among a vast majority of Member
States concerning almost all new elements in the proposal, and in particular,
in light of their potential implications for the budget. After a series of
intense rounds of examination and negotiation with the Commission the relevant
Financial Counsellors working group decided in May 2006 to discontinue
examining the proposal. In spite of considerable and repeated efforts on behalf
of the Commission the Council did not wish to put the proposal back on the
agenda. Similarly, repeated appeals of the Parliament to Council to resume
examination of the text bore no fruit.
4.
The special report form the Court of Auditors
(performance audit)
In June 2008, the European Court of
Auditors presented the results of a performance audit on the Fund[6].
The audit examined whether the Fund was rapid, efficient and flexible in
providing assistance and whether beneficiary States were satisfied with the
Fund. To this end, the Court had reviewed all applications up to the end of
2006 and carried out a survey by addressing questionnaires to the applicant
States. The report draws similar conclusions on the
functioning of the Solidarity Fund as described above in respect of the 2005
Commission proposal. While overall the Court concluded that the Fund is meeting
its underlying objective of demonstrating solidarity with Member Sates in times
of disaster it was, however, noted that conditions for a successful application
for smaller 'regional disasters' (as opposed to 'major disasters') were more
difficult to meet, not least because of the rather vague definition of regional
disasters in the Regulation leading also to a possible lack of clarity in the
rejection of such disasters. The Court reserved its main criticism to the lack
of rapidity of the instrument.
5.
Results of the 2010 COCOF survey
In 2010, in order to better understand
under which conditions the Member States would be prepared to continue the
discussions/negotiations the Commission presented the Solidarity Fund to the
members of COCOF[7], highlighting its
strengths and weaknesses and the key elements of the 2005 proposal. Three
specific questions were asked: –
Which are the elements under the current
Regulation where Member States feel that the Fund does not or not fully meet
their expectations? –
Which of the elements in the 2005 proposal for a
new Regulation could be subject for further deliberations (whether in the way
proposed by the Commission or other)? Which elements appear unrealistic or
undesirable? –
Are there issues/elements that you would like to
see addressed/covered by the Fund that are contained neither in the current
Regulation nor in the 2005 proposal? This resulted in a significant number of
Member States expressing their continued opposition to adopting a new
Regulation while some Member States seemed to see some limited scope for
adjustments of selected items of the current Regulation, e.g. to include
droughts or to soften the criteria for regional disasters (which the Commission
had initially proposed to abolish). Any modification leading to potentially
higher spending was however totally opposed by a vast majority of Member
States. Six Member States declared to be generally favourable and open to
discussions.
6.
Adjusting the Regulation
From the above it appears clear that in the
current political climate characterised in particular by the difficult
budgetary situation in many Member States, the vast majority of Member States
are not prepared to accept any major changes to the legal base and functioning
of the Solidarity Fund. The Commission therefore abandons the idea of reviving
the 2005 proposal. Still, the Solidarity Fund as it exists today should become
more effective as was demonstrated above. It would therefore be appropriate to
withdraw the 2005 proposal and to explore other possibilities to address at
least the most important of the issues described above. The Commission considers that significant
improvements to the operation of the Solidarity Fund could be achieved by
introducing only a minimum of adjustments to the current Regulation while
maintaining its rationale and character and without touching on its finances
and the volume of spending. Any adjustment of the Regulation would not touch on
the eligibility criteria for operations financed from the aid such as the
immediate repair of vital infrastructures and the costs of deploying response
assets. Elements of the 2005 proposal such as the widening of the scope, the
modification of the thresholds or abandoning regional disasters would no longer
be pursued. Measures for enhancement of the visibility
through information and publicity rules should also be explored.
6.1.
A clearly defined scope for the Solidarity Fund
The intention in creating the Solidarity
Fund was to set up a financial instrument allowing to respond at EU level to
major natural disasters affecting one or several Member States or countries
involved in accession negotiations. The wording of the Article 2 (1)
of the Regulation which says "assistance from the Fund may mainly
be mobilised when a major natural disaster […] occurs" nevertheless seems
to suggest that the Fund could also be activated in other cases. It is not
clear, however, whether "mainly" is intended to relativise the
limitation of the Fund's scope to "major disasters", i.e. pointing to
the exceptions for certain smaller disasters laid down in paragraph 2 of the
same Article; or whether it is intended to open the Fund's scope also to
disasters of other than natural origin. Further examination of the provisions of
the Regulation reveals that mobilising the Fund for non-natural disasters would
meet with serious legal difficulties. Article 3 specifies that
"payments of the Fund are in principle limited to finance measures
alleviating non-insurable damages". The Commission has from the outset
interpreted and applied this provision as meaning to exclude private damages
from assistance. Moreover, the polluter pays principle and the affected State's
obligation to seek compensation from third parties (third party liability)
would seem to exclude other than natural disasters from the Fund. These
considerations have, for example, led to the non-acceptance of the Hungarian
application relating to the red sludge spill disaster of 2010. The Commission's proposal for a new
Solidarity Fund Regulation presented in 2005 among other elements aimed at
widening the scope of the Fund to include other than natural disasters. While
this proposal was welcomed by the European Parliament a vast majority of Member
States in the Council were and continue to be strongly opposed to any attempt
at widening the scope of the Fund beyond natural disasters. For the sake of clarity the wording of the
current Regulation should therefore be adjusted rendering it clear that the
Fund applies to disasters having a natural cause only. This would eliminate any
possible ambiguity about the Fund's scope and thus save potential applicants
from expectations that the Commission would inevitably have to deceive - not to
mention the considerable effort necessary for the applicant State to prepare an
application and for the Commission to assess it. At the same time the Regulation should set
out that this limitation to natural disasters would not exclude from the outset
cases where a natural disaster has 'cascading' effects and leads also to an
industrial disaster (e.g. a flood affecting a chemical plant) or to a public
health disaster [e.g. earthquake that disrupts water
supplies triggering a (water
borne) epidemic; or that destroys hospital facilities jeopardising the
provision of care to those injured by the natural disaster.]
6.2.
A simple new definition for regional disasters
As was shown above the conditions for
exceptionally mobilising the Solidarity Fund in the event of an
"extraordinary regional disaster" laid down in Article 2 (2) third
subparagraph of the Solidarity Fund Regulation are not sufficiently clear and
primarily based on "soft" criteria that require interpretation
("serious and lasting repercussions on living conditions and the economic
stability"). Demonstrating and verifying whether they are met is very
burdensome and time-consuming, both for the applicant as for the Commission.
This ambiguity leads to a high number of applications that subsequently have to
be rejected which creates false expectations and subsequently frustration in
the countries and regions concerned. The high number of cases that are not
accepted is bad for the image of the EU. It might therefore be appropriate to
redefine the criteria for regional disasters in a simple, objective and
transparent manner, similar to those for major disasters, with no more than one
or two easy to verify "hard" indicators. These should be set in a
manner that would easily be met in the case of really serious regional
disasters, in principle by those types of regional disaster for which the Fund
has been mobilised exceptionally under the current Regulation. At the same time
redefining the regional criteria in this manner would have the effect that
potential applicants would be able to assess with great certainty in advance
whether a disaster will qualify for aid. Applicants would thus be spared the
big effort of preparing an application where no positive response could reasonably
be expected. The Commission suggests defining regional
disasters in a way similar to the definition of major disasters, i.e. as having
caused damage above a certain threshold. The threshold would be a percentage
rate of regional GDP at NUTS 2 level. NUTS 2 as the regional reference level
offers itself as it is well established in cohesion policy, is sufficiently big
to exclude merely local events and statistical data is readily available. If a
disaster affects several NUTS 2 regions, the same threshold (i.e. % rate) would
be applied in relation to the average regional GDP of the regions concerned.
The specific conditions of outermost regions would be catered for as all
outermost regions are defined at NUTS 2 level. In case
of natural disasters cascading into public health disasters, additional
criteria should be set up together with Member States. Not only would such a solution put the
criteria for regional disasters on a simple and objective basis, it would also
eliminate the difficulties to activate the Fund for disasters like forest fires
(provided they have created sufficiently big damage) which by their nature
currently rarely meet the regional disaster criteria. For the purpose of testing the feasibility
of such an approach the Commission has done a simulation by applying the single
criterion of damage exceeding 1,5% of regional GDP at NUTS 2 level to all
regional disaster applications received since 2002 and decided before the end
of 2010. The reference value of regional GDP is the year n-3 whereby n
represents the year of application (n-3 is the most recent year for which
harmonised regional data is generally available). The results are shown in Annex
4. Of the 37 regional disasters examined only two cases that were
previously accepted would not have qualified whereas one case that was not
accepted would have qualified; in one case there are doubts over the amount of
damage caused. All other cases would have led to the same result, with the
significant difference that 23 applications for smaller disasters that had to
be rejected would not have been presented in the first place as Member States
would not have been in doubt about their non-eligibility. This demonstrates that in applying a
single, simple GDP-based criterion it would be possible to arrive at an almost
identical result while achieving considerable simplification as potentially
eligible applications would no longer need to demonstrate compliance with the
complicated criteria for regional disasters imposed by the current Regulation.
In return this would considerably facilitate the Commission's assessment of
such applications, free it of the obligation to assess applications that in all
likelihood would not be successful and therefore considerably help speeding up
decision-making and paying out grants. Moreover, the above-mentioned new regional
criterion would overall have no financial impact.
6.3.
Speeding up payments and introducing advances
Under the provisions of the current
Regulation and budgetary rules it appears difficult to significantly shorten
the time necessary to make Solidarity Fund grants available without modifying
the way in which the instrument is financed (cf. paragraph 2.5 above). The
Commission is therefore exploring new ways that would allow making financial
aid intended to alleviate emergency situations in Member States more rapidly
available. This is particularly important in the case of cross-border disasters
where the Commission is confronted with a situation where it is not in the
position to apply equal level of solidarity vis-à-vis an EU Member State as
compared to a third country to which an immediate financial assistance can be
granted[8]. The responsiveness and visibility of the
Solidarity Fund could be improved by introducing into the Regulation the
possibility to pay advances. This would allow the Commission to take immediate
action by making a down-payment as soon as the affected State has applied for
assistance. The down-payment would be treated as an advance on the expected
amount to be granted once the assessment and budgetary procedure are completed.
In the event that the application is not accepted the applying State would
repay the advance to the Commission. The amount of the advance could be
calculated as a percentage rate (e.g. 10%) of the expected grant and be limited
in absolute terms (e.g. to EUR 5 million). Advances would only be
paid upon specific request of the applicant State and be limited to cases of
major disasters as defined by the Regulation. As the likelihood of aid for a
major disaster being approved is very high (until present 100%) the risk for
the Commission of having to recover any advance payments because of the
non-acceptance of an application would be very limited. A similar provision was
already included in the 2005 proposal.
6.4.
Responding to slowly unfolding disasters
On a number of occasions applicant States
have experienced difficulties in meeting the application deadline where
disasters were of a slowly unfolding nature. The current Regulating provides
that applications must be presented to the Commission within 10 weeks of the
date of the first damage. Droughts are a typical example for such disasters
which are not only characterised by the long period of time over which they
develop but also by the difficulty to determine exactly when the first damage
occurred. While the general 10 week deadline should
be maintained the issue could be solved by introducing a specific provision
into the Regulation stipulating that in such cases the application deadline
would start with the date of the first action taken by the public authorities
in response to the phenomenon in question; for example, in the case of
droughts, when water consumption restrictions are put in place or when specific
measures to assist agriculture are taken. Such a provision would largely correspond
to what applies to "normal" suddenly occurring disasters where public
intervention usually starts within hours of the event.
6.5.
Merging grant decisions and implementation
agreements
Paragraph 2.3 above highlights the
potential sources of delay in making grants available. As the Fund is financed
outside the normal EU budget, the Commission has to seek the approval of the
European Parliament and the Council for the amount of aid proposed in each
case. The Commission considers that the currently applicable procedure should
not be changed. There is nevertheless considerable scope
for streamlining, cutting administrative procedures and gaining time for
providing assistance under the Solidarity Fund if only a single Commission act
were necessary before a grant can be paid out once the European Parliament and
the Council have made the financial resources available. As far as Member
States are concerned, i.e. the vast majority of potential beneficiaries, there
is no added value in dividing up the act granting the aid and the act laying
down the conditions for using the grant (grant decision and implementation
agreement). Merging the two, for example by including the provisions currently
contained in the agreement with the grant decision or by making them an annex
to the grant decision appears a rather simple solution with great time-saving
effect. It is estimated that in this way - by a simple amendment of the
relevant Article of the Regulation - aid to disaster stricken countries could
be paid out four to eight weeks earlier than under the current system.
Obviously, the two elements of core interest to beneficiaries, i.e. the
definition of eligible operations and the designation of competent authorities
would continue to be done based on the proposal by the beneficiary State. For eligible non-Member States, i.e. the
limited number of countries in the process of negotiating their accession to
the EU this separation would have to be maintained as a unilateral act of the
Commission such as the grant decision alone would not be binding for them. In
such cases a financing or implementation agreement would continue to be
required.
6.6.
Making the Fund a more effective instrument for
disaster and climate change resilience
In a Union of solidarity it is equally
important for each Member State to make the requisite efforts to prevent
emergencies and disasters from occurring. A fundamental objective of any policy
of disaster management is to prevent disasters happening and, when they do
occur, to limit damages as far as possible. Closer linking of the
operation of the fund to the EU's disaster management and climate change
policies has the potential[9] to reduce the damages and
costs caused by disasters considerably and ultimately reduce the number of
applications for assistance. The Regulation already contains an
obligation for the beneficiary State to detail in the implementation report the
measures introduced or proposed in order to limit damage and to avoid, to the
extent possible, a recurrence of similar disasters. It is proposed to
strengthen this provision, which is of a relatively general nature, to make it
more specific. The beneficiary State would be requested to detail in the report
the status of the implementation of relevant EU legislation on assessment,
management and disaster prevention, lessons learned from the disaster and
commit to measures to ensure climate change and disaster proven resilience. The Commission will also explore with
stakeholders the feasibility of modulating payments under the Solidarity
Fund according to the degree of implementation of relevant EU legislation on
disaster prevention, the preparation of disaster management plans and the
uptake of available EU funding for investments in disaster prevention measures.
7.
The Solidarity Clause in Art 222 TFEU
Article 222 TFEU
introduces for the first time into the Treaty a provision that the Union and
its Member States must act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State
is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.
Article 222 provides that the Union must mobilise all instruments at its
disposal: (a)
to prevent a terrorist threat in the territory
of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian
population from any terrorist attack, assist a Member State in its territory,
at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist
attack; and (b)
to assist a MS in its territory, at the request
of its political authorities, in the event of natural or man-made disaster. Implementation of the Solidarity Clause
will encompass all existing response instruments including the Solidarity Fund
fully respecting their specific procedures and functioning under the new
Multi-Annual Financial Framework. The present Communication is without prejudice
to these broader reflections.
8.
Summary and conclusions
While it can rightfully be said that since
its creation the Solidarity Fund has generally been working well - in
particular when considering the specific purpose for which it was created - the
experience gained over the past eight years shows that there are some important
limitations and weaknesses in the operation of the Fund. These relate
essentially to the lack of rapidity with which aid from the Fund is made
available and the transparency of the criteria for mobilising the Fund. Given that a majority of Member States have
serious reservations about any major changes to the principles and functioning
of the Solidarity Fund, in particular if these could lead to higher spending
the Commission is withdrawing its proposal from 2005 for a revised and widened
Fund. On the other hand, the Commission believes
that the functioning of the Solidarity Fund should be improved and that limited
adjustments to the current Regulation bear serious potential for simplifications,
clarification and in particular for improving the responsiveness of the Fund in
order to make financial aid to disaster stricken countries available much more
rapidly. The purpose of the present Communication is
to highlight this potential as a basis for discussion with the European
Parliament, Member States in the Council, the regions and other stakeholders
and to aim for a possible legislative proposal amending the current Regulation
at a later stage, taking account of the results of this discussion. Annex 1:
Thresholds for major disasters applicable in 2011
(based on 2009 figures for Gross National
Income) Council Regulation
(EC) No 2012/2002 setting up the EU Solidarity Fund defines the
threshold for the mobilisation of the Fund for a given country as damage exceeding
0,6% of GNI or EUR 3 billion in 2002 prices. The lower of the two
applies. || || || (million €) Country || GNI 2009* || 0.6% of GNI* || Major disaster threshold 2011* AT || ÖSTERREICH || 271 459 || 1 628.756 || 1 628.756 BE || BELGIË/BELGIQUE || 342 261 || 2 053.566 || 2 053.566 BG || BULGARIA || 33 113 || 198.678 || 198.678 CY || KYPROS || 16 641 || 99.845 || 99.845 CZ || ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA || 129 046 || 774.274 || 774.274 DE || DEUTSCHLAND || 2 430 940 || 14 585.640 || 3 535.904** DK || DANMARK || 226 447 || 1 358.684 || 1 358.684 EE || EESTI || 13 538 || 81.230 || 81.230 EL || ELLADA || 226 644 || 1 359.863 || 1 359.863 ES || ESPAÑA || 1 029 541 || 6 177.246 || 3 535.904 FI || SUOMI/FINLAND || 171 383 || 1 028.298 || 1 028.298 FR || FRANCE || 1 922 845 || 11 537.070 || 3 535.904 HR*** || HRVATSKA || 43 572 || 261.431 || 261.431 HU || MAGYARORSZÁG || 88 291 || 529.747 || 529.747 IE || ÉIRE/IRELAND || 132 601 || 795.607 || 795.607 IS*** || ICELAND || 7 787 || 46.723 || 46.723 IT || ITALIA || 1 494 576 || 8 967.457 || 3 535.904 LT || LIETUVA || 27 010 || 162.057 || 162.057 LU || LUXEMBOURG (G.D.) || 26 765 || 160.590 || 160.590 LV || LATVIJA || 19 954 || 119.723 || 119.723 MT || MALTA || 5 451 || 32.704 || 32.704 NL || NEDERLAND || 556 518 || 3 339.108 || 3 339.108 PL || POLSKA || 299 518 || 1 797.108 || 1 797.108 PT || PORTUGAL || 162 331 || 973.986 || 973.986 RO || ROMÂNIA || 113 652 || 681.913 || 681.913 SE || SVERIGE || 296 151 || 1 776.908 || 1 776.908 SI || SLOVENIJA || 34 704 || 208.224 || 208.224 SK || SLOVENSKO || 62 575 || 375.452 || 375.452 TR*** || TÜRKIYE || 330 413 || 1 982.480 || 1 982.480 UK || UNITED KINGDOM || 1 587 886 || 9 527.315 || 3 535.904 * Rounded
figures ** In
2011 EUR 3 535.904 million corresponds with € 3 billion
in 2002 prices *** Eligible
Non-Member State involved in accession negotiations with the EU Annex 2:
EU Solidarity Fund Applications 2002 - 2010 Year || Country || Nature of the disaster || Damage (million €) || Category[10] || Aid granted (million €) 2 0 0 2 || 1 || AT || Flooding || 2 900 || major || 134 2 || CZ || Flooding || 2 300 || major || 129 3 || FR || Flooding (Le Gard) || 835 || regional || 21 4 || DE || Flooding || 9 100 || major || 444 Total aid for 2002 applications || 728 2 0 0 3 || 1 || ES || Oil spill (Prestige) || 436 || regional || 8.626 2 || IT || Earthquake (Molise/Apulia) || 1 558 || regional || 30.826 3 || IT || Volcanic eruption (Etna) || 894 || regional || 16.798 4 || IT || Flooding (North Italy) || (1 900) || (regional) || Rejected 5 || GR || Adverse winter weather || (not clear) || (regional) || Rejected 6 || PT || Forest fires || 1 228 || major || 48.539 7 || FR || Forest fires (Southern France) || 531 || (regional) || Rejected 8 || ES || Forest fires (Portuguese border) || 53 || neighbouring || 1.331 9 || MT || Flooding || 30 || major || 0.961 10 || IT || Flooding (Friuli-Venezia-Giulia) || (525) || (regional) || Rejected Total aid for 2003 applications || 107.081 2 0 0 4 || 1 || FR || Flooding (Rhone delta) || 785 || regional || 19.625 2 || ES || Flooding (Malaga) || (73) || (regional) || Rejected 3-9 || ES || Forest fires (7 applications cumulated) || (480) || (regional) || all 7 rejected 10 || SK || Flooding || (29) || (regional) || Rejected 11 || SI || Earthquake || (13) || (regional) || withdrawn Total aid for 2004 applications || 19.625 Year || Country || Nature of the disaster || Damage (million €) || Category[11] || Aid granted (million €) 2 0 0 5 || 1 || SK || Storm (Tatras) || 203 || major || 5.668 2 || IT || Flooding (Sardinia) || 223 (amount over-estimated) || (regional) || Rejected 3 || EE || Storm || 48 || major || 1.29 4 || LV || Storm || 193 || major || 9.487 5 || SE || Storm "Gudrun" || 2 297 || major || 81.725 6 || LT || Storm || 15 || neighbouring || 0.379 7 || GR || Evros flooding || (112) || (regional) || Rejected 8 || RO || Spring flooding || 489 || major || 18.798 9 || BG || Spring flooding || 222 || major || 9.722 10 || BG || Summer flooding || 237 || major || 10.632 11 || RO || Summer flooding || 1 050 || major || 52.4 12 || AT || Flooding (Tirol/Vorarlberg) || 592 || regional || 14.799 Total aid for 2005 applications || 204.905 2 0 0 6 || 1 || UK || Buncefield oil depot explosion || (700) || (regional) || withdrawn 2 || GR || Evros flooding || 372 || regional || 9.306 3 || HU || Flooding || 519 || major || 15.064 4 || ES || Galicia forest fires || (91) || (regional) || Rejected Total aid for 2006 applications || 24.370 2 0 0 7 || 1 || DE || Storm "Kyrill" || 4750 || major || 166.9 2 || FR || La Réunion, Cyclone "Gamède" || 211 || regional || 5.29 3 || ES || El Hierro flooding || (18) || (regional) || Rejected 4 || ES || La Mancha flooding || (66) || (regional) || Rejected 5 || UK || Flooding || 4 612 || major || 162.387 6 || CY || Forest fires || (38) || (regional) || Rejected 7 || ES || Forest Fires Canary islands || (144) || (regional) || Rejected 8-16 || IT || 9 applications for forest fires in 9 regions || - || (regional) || not admissible, deadline missed 17 || FR || Storm Dean/Martinique || 509 || regional || 12.78 18 || GR || Forest fires || 2 118 || major || 89.769 19 || SI || Flooding || 233 || major || 8.254 Total aid for 2007 applications || 445.380 Year || Country || Nature of the disaster || Damage (million €) || Category[12] || Aid granted (million €) 2 0 0 8 || 1 || CY || Drought || 165.4 || major || 7.605 2 || RO || Floods || 471.4 || regional || 11.785 Total aid for 2008 applications || 19.390 2 0 0 9 || 1 || FR || Storm Klaus || 3 805.5 || major || 109.377 2 || IT || Abruzzo earthquake || 10 212.0 || major || 493.771 3 || GR || Forest fires 09 || (152.8) || (regional) || Rejected 4 || CY || Storms 09 || (2.6) || (regional) || Rejected 5 || GR || Evia floods || (83.2) || (regional) || Rejected 6 || IT || Messina Mudslide || (598.9) || (regional) || Rejected Total aid for 2009 applications || 603.148 2 0 1 0 || 1 || IE || Flooding 09 || 520.9 || regional || 13.022 2 || IT || Tuscany flooding 09 || (211.7) || (regional) || Rejected 3 || ES || Andalusia flooding 10 || (709.7) || (regional) || Rejected 4 || PT || Madeira flooding || 1 080 || major || 31.256 5 || FR || Storm Xynthia || 1 425 || regional || 35.636 6 || SK || Flooding 10 || 649.9 || major || 20.431 7 || PL || Flooding 10 || 2 993.7 || major || 105.567 8 || CZ || Flooding 10 || 204.5 || neighbouring || 5.111 9 || HU || Flooding 10 || 719.3 || major || 22.486 10 || HR || Flooding 10 || 153.04 || neighbouring || 3.826 11 || FR || Var flooding 10 || 703-778 || (regional) || Rejected 12 || RO || Flooding 10 || 875.75 || major || 24.968 13 || CZ || August Flooding 10 || 436.5 || regional || 10.911 14 || DE || Sachsen Flooding 10 || 937.7 || regional || Rejected 15 || HR || September Flooding 10 || 47 || neighbouring || 1.175 16 || SI || September Flooding 10 || 251.3 || major || 7.459 17 || HU || Red Sludge 10 || 174.32 || regional || Rejected Total aid for 2010 applications || 281.848 Grand total of aid approved since 2002 || 2 433.757 Annex 3:
Statistical overview of Solidarity Fund applications || || || state of play: 31/12/2010 || || || Total n° of applications received since 2002 || 85 || || of which based on criteria for || || || major disasters || 27 || 32% || of all applications regional disasters || 53 || 62% || of all applications “neighbouring country” criterion || 5 || 6% || of all applications Applications accepted by COM || 42 || 49% || of all applications of which || || || major disasters || 26 || 96% || of “major disaster” applications regional disasters || 12 || 23% || of "regional disaster” applications neighbouring country criterion || 4 || 80% || of "neighbouring country" applications Applications rejected by COM || 35 || 41% || of all applications of which || || || regional disasters || 35 || 66% || of “regional disaster” applications Applications withdrawn || 2 || 2% || of all applications Decision pending || 6 || 7% || of all applications Annex 4:
EU Solidarity Fund - Applications for Funding for Extraordinary Regional
Disasters 2002-2010
Regional GDP Simulation (n-3) || Regional Disasters Since 2002 || Year || Damage claimed (€ million) || Remarks || GDP Reference Year (n-3) || NUTS 2 Regions Concerned || Regional GDP || Average GDP || Damage Rate (% of regional GDP) || Outcome under current criteria (€ million granted) || Outcome under new criteria FR || Flooding (Le Gard) || 2002 || 835 || || 1999 || Languedoc-Roussillon || 40806.3 || 40806.3 || 2.05% || 21 || identical ES || Oil Spill (Prestige) || 2003 || 436 || || 2000 || Galicia || 34966.5 || 25191.8 || 1.73% || 8.626 || identical || || || || || || Principado de Asturias || 14968.9 || || || || || || || || || || Cantabria || 8488.3 || || || || || || || || || || País Vasco || 42613.3 || || || || IT || Earthquake (Molise/Puglia) || 2003 || 1558 || || 2000 || Molise || 4913.9 || 30206.0 || 5.16% || 30.826 || identical || || || || || || Puglia || 55498.1 || || || || IT || Volcano Eruption (Sicily) || 2003 || 894 || || 2000 || Sicilia || 65549.2 || 65549.2 || 1.36% || 16.798 || no application IT || Flooding (North Italy) || 2003 || not clear || || 2000 || || || || || rejected || identical FR || Forest Fires (Southern France) || 2003 || 531 || not continuous region || 2000 || PACA || 99642.6 || 71225.4 || 0.75% || rejected || no application || || || || || || Rhone-Alpes || 137674.2 || || || || || || || || || || Languedoc-Roussillon || 42847.3 || || || || || || || || || || Corse || 4737.6 || || || || IT || Flooding (Friuli-Venezia-Giulia) || 2003 || 525 || (damage probably overestimated) || 2000 || Friuli-Venezia-Giulia || 27552.6 || 27552.6 || 1.91% || rejected || not clear FR || Flooding (Rhone Delta) || 2004 || 785 || || 2001 || Languedoc-Roussillon || 45250.3 || 75084.7 || 1.05% || 19.625 || no application || || || || || || PACA || 104919.2 || || || || ES || Flooding (Malaga) || 2004 || 73 || || 2001 || Andalucía || 90644.8 || 90644.8 || 0.08% || rejected || no application ES || Forest Fires || 2004 || 480 || 7 applications cumulated || 2001 || || || || || rejected || no applications SK || Flooding || 2004 || 29 || || 2001 || Vychodne Slovensko || 5220.4 || 5220.4 || 0.56% || rejected || no application IT || Flooding (Sardinia) || 2005 || 223 || (damage probably overestimated) || 2002 || Sardinia (ITG2) || 27538.1 || 27538.1 || 0.81% || rejected || no application EL || Flooding (Evros) || 2005 || 112 || || 2002 || Antoliki Makedonia, Thraki || 5983.2 || 5983.2 || 1.87% || rejected || acceptance AT || Flooding (Tirol/Vorarlberg) || 2005 || 592 || || 2002 || Tirol || 18814.7 || 14426.9 || 4.10% || 14.798589 || identical || || || || || || Vorarlberg || 10039.1 || || || || EL || Flooding (Evros) || 2006 || 372 || || 2003 || Antoliki Makedonia, Thraki || 6466.1 || 6466.1 || 5.75% || 9.306527 || identical ES || Forest Fires (Galicia) || 2006 || 91 || || 2003 || Galicia || 39906.9 || 39906.9 || 0.23% || rejected || no application FR || Cyclone (La Réunion) || 2007 || 211 || Remote region || 2004 || Réunion || 11650.8 || 11650.8 || 1.81% || 5.29 || identical ES || Spain - Flooding (El Hierro) || 2007 || 18 || || 2004 || Canarias || 34188.3 || 34188.3 || 0.05% || rejected || no application ES || Spain - Flooding (La Mancha) || 2007 || 66 || || 2004 || Castilla-La Mancha || 28338.7 || 28338.7 || 0.23% || rejected || no application CY || Forest Fires || 2007 || 38 || || 2004 || Cyprus || 12728.1 || 12728.1 || 0.30% || rejected || no application ES || Forest Fires (Canary Islands) || 2007 || 144 || || 2004 || Canarias || 34188.3 || 34188.3 || 0.42% || rejected || no application FR || Storm (Dean) || 2007 || 509 || || 2004 || Guadeloupe || 7202.9 || 7133.3 || 7.14% || 12.78 || identical || || || || || || Martinique || 7063.6 || || || || RO || Floods || 2008 || 471.4 || || 2005 || Nord-Vest || 9480.0 || 9330.5 || 5.05% || 11.785377 || identical || || || || || || Nord-Est || 9181.1 || || || || EL || Forest Fires || 2009 || 152.8 || || 2006 || Attiki || 101759.4 || 101759.4 || 0.15% || rejected || no application CY || Storms || 2009 || 2.6 || || 2006 || Cyprus || 14673.2 || 14673.2 || 0.02% || rejected || no application EL || Flooding (Evia) || 2009 || 83.2 || || 2006 || Sterea Ellada || 10072.1 || 10072.1 || 0.83% || rejected || no application IT || Mudslide (Messina) || 2009 || 598.9 || || 2006 || Sicilia || 81623.6 || 81623.6 || 0.73% || rejected || no application IE || Flooding || 2009 || 520.9 || || 2006 || Border, Midland and Western || 32566.0 || 32566.0 || 1.60% || 13.0225 || identical IT || Flooding (Tuscany) || 2009 || 211.7 || || 2006 || Toscana || 99985.2 || 99985.2 || 0.21% || rejected || no application ES || Flooding (Andalusia) || 2010 || 709.7 || || 2007 || Andalucía || 144874.3 || 144874.3 || 0.49% || rejected || no application FR || Storm (Xynthia) || 2010 || 1425 || Total damages of € 2.5 billion || 2007 || Pays de la Loire || 93594.4 || 68384.9 || 2.08% || 35.63575 || identical || || || || || || Poitou-Charentes || 43175.3 || || || || [1] Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, 11 November
2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311 of 14.11.2002,
p. 3) [2] Currently Croatia, Turkey and Iceland [3] In 2011, the EUR 3 billion threshold
applies to France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, for all other
countries the 0.6% of GNI threshold applies, ranging in absolute terms from
EUR 32,7 million for Malta to EUR 3,339 billion for the
Netherlands. For reasons of availability of harmonised statistical data from
EUROSTAT, GNI-figures for year n-2 are used. [4] Including payments in 2011 for eight cases approved
in 2010. [5] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund, COM(2005)
108 final of 6.4.2005 [6] Special Report No 3/2008 "The European Union
Solidarity Fund: how rapid, efficient and flexible is it?" (OJ C 153,
18.6.2008) [7] Coordination Committee of the Funds created under Council
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion
Fund. [8] Following the floods in Central Europe in May and
June 2010, Commission approved immediate emergency funding to assist the floods
victims in Moldova while Solidarity Fund assistance related to the floods in
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia and Romania has been granted
10 months after the disaster. [9] A 1% reduction in damages from disasters would save
Europe EUR 150 million a year, source: EM-DAT
database [10] Applications relating to disasters with damage below
the threshold for which the criteria for regional disasters were assessed as
not being met are marked regional in parenthesis "(regional)" [11] Applications relating to disasters with damage below
the threshold for which the criteria for regional disasters were assessed as
not being met are marked regional in parenthesis "(regional)" [12] Applications relating to disasters with damage below
the threshold for which the criteria for regional disasters were assessed as
not being met are marked regional in parenthesis "(regional)"