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Document 02006R0765-20240228

Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/765/2024-02-28

02006R0765 — EN — 28.02.2024 — 040.001


This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document

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▼M46

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 765/2006

of 18 May 2006

concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

▼B

(OJ L 134 20.5.2006, p. 1)

Amended by:

 

 

Official Journal

  No

page

date

 M1

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1587/2006 of 23 October 2006

  L 294

25

25.10.2006

 M2

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006

  L 363

1

20.12.2006

►M3

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 646/2008 of 8 July 2008

  L 180

5

9.7.2008

►M4

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 84/2011 of 31 January 2011

  L 28

17

2.2.2011

 M5

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 271/2011 of 21 March 2011

  L 76

13

22.3.2011

 M6

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 505/2011 of 23 May 2011

  L 136

48

24.5.2011

►M7

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 588/2011 of 20 June 2011

  L 161

1

21.6.2011

►M8

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 999/2011 of 10 October 2011

  L 265

6

11.10.2011

 M9

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1000/2011 of 10 October 2011

  L 265

8

11.10.2011

 M10

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1320/2011 of 16 December 2011

  L 335

15

17.12.2011

 M11

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 114/2012 of 10 February 2012

  L 38

3

11.2.2012

 M12

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 170/2012 of 28 February 2012

  L 55

1

29.2.2012

 M13

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 265/2012 of 23 March 2012

  L 87

37

24.3.2012

►M14

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 354/2012 of 23 April 2012

  L 113

1

25.4.2012

►M15

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 1014/2012 of 6 November 2012

  L 307

1

7.11.2012

 M16

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1017/2012 of 6 November 2012

  L 307

7

7.11.2012

 M17

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 494/2013 of 29 May 2013

  L 143

1

30.5.2013

 M18

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013

  L 158

1

10.6.2013

 M19

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013

  L 288

1

30.10.2013

 M20

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 46/2014 of 20 January 2014

  L 16

3

21.1.2014

 M21

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 740/2014 of 8 July 2014

  L 200

1

9.7.2014

 M22

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1159/2014 of 30 October 2014

  L 311

2

31.10.2014

 M23

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1133 of 13 July 2015

  L 185

1

14.7.2015

 M24

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1326 of 31 July 2015

  L 206

16

1.8.2015

 M25

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/1948 of 29 October 2015

  L 284

62

30.10.2015

 M26

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1949 of 29 October 2015

  L 284

71

30.10.2015

 M27

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/276 of 25 February 2016

  L 52

19

27.2.2016

►M28

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2016/277 of 25 February 2016

  L 52

22

27.2.2016

 M29

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2017/331 of 27 February 2017

  L 50

9

28.2.2017

 M30

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/275 of 23 February 2018

  L 54

1

24.2.2018

 M31

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019

  L 182

33

8.7.2019

 M32

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1387 of 2 October 2020

  L 319I

1

2.10.2020

 M33

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1648 of 6 November 2020

  L 370I

1

6.11.2020

 M34

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/2129 of 17 December 2020

  L 426I

1

17.12.2020

►M35

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/339 of 25 February 2021

  L 68

29

26.2.2021

►M36

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/907 of 4 June 2021

  L 197I

1

4.6.2021

►M37

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/996 of 21 June 2021

  L 219I

1

21.6.2021

►M38

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/997 of 21 June 2021

  L 219I

3

21.6.2021

 M39

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/999 of 21 June 2021

  L 219I

55

21.6.2021

►M40

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/1030 of 24 June 2021

  L 224I

1

24.6.2021

►M41

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/1985 of 15 November 2021

  L 405

1

16.11.2021

►M42

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/1986 of 15 November 2021

  L 405

3

16.11.2021

►M43

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/2124 of 2 December 2021

  L 430I

1

2.12.2021

►M44

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/212 of 17 February 2022

  L 37

4

18.2.2022

►M45

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/300 of 24 February 2022

  L 46

3

25.2.2022

►M46

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/355 of 2 March 2022

  L 67

1

2.3.2022

►M47

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/398 of 9 March 2022

  L 82

1

9.3.2022

►M48

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/577 of 8 April 2022

  L 111

67

8.4.2022

►M49

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/595 of 11 April 2022

  L 114

60

12.4.2022

►M50

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022

  L 153

1

3.6.2022

►M51

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/877 of 3 June 2022

  L 153

11

3.6.2022

►M52

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1231 of 18 July 2022

  L 190

5

19.7.2022

►M53

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/419 of 24 February 2023

  L 61

20

27.2.2023

►M54

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/1591 of 3 August 2023

  L 195I

1

3.8.2023

►M55

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2023/1594 of 3 August 2023

  L 196

3

4.8.2023

►M56

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/768 of 26 February 2024

  L 768

1

27.2.2024


Corrected by:

 C1

Corrigendum, OJ L 299, 17.10.2014, p.  32 (46/2014)

 C2

Corrigendum, OJ L 328, 13.11.2014, p.  60 (740/2014)

 C3

Corrigendum, OJ L 176, 7.7.2015, p.  40 (740/2014)

 C4

Corrigendum, OJ L 057, 18.2.2021, p.  94 (2020/1648)

►C5

Corrigendum, OJ L 002, 6.1.2022, p.  9 (2021/2124)

►C6

Corrigendum, OJ L 079, 9.3.2022, p.  38 (2021/1030)

►C7

Corrigendum, OJ L 083I, 10.3.2022, p.  2 (2022/398)

►C8

Corrigendum, OJ L 189, 18.7.2022, p.  24 (2022/355)

 C9

Corrigendum, OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, p.  107 (2021/997)

 C10

Corrigendum, OJ L 071, 9.3.2023, p.  42 ((EU) 2023/419)

►C11

Corrigendum, OJ L 090, 28.3.2023, p.  65 ((EU) 2023/419)




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▼M46

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 765/2006

of 18 May 2006

concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

▼B



Article 1

For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

1. 

‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including but not limited to:

(a) 

cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;

(b) 

deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;

(c) 

publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;

(d) 

interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;

(e) 

credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;

(f) 

letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale;

(g) 

documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources.

2. 

‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the use of the funds, including portfolio management.

3. 

‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services.

4. 

‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them.

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5. 

‘territory of the Community’ means the territories of the Member States, including their airspace, to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty.

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6. 

‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services; including verbal forms of assistance.

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7. 

‘belarusian air carrier’ means an air transport undertaking holding a valid operating licence or equivalent issued by the competent authorities of Belarus;

▼M46

8. 

‘dual-use goods and technology’ means the items listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 );

▼C6

9. 

‘investment services’ means the following services and activities:

(i) 

reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments;

(ii) 

execution of orders on behalf of clients;

(iii) 

dealing on own account;

(iv) 

portfolio management;

(v) 

investment advice;

(vi) 

underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis;

(vii) 

placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis;

(viii) 

any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility.

▼C7

10. 

‘transferable securities’ means the following classes of securities, including in the form of crypto-assets, which are negotiable on the capital market, with the exception of instruments of payment:

(i) 

shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect of shares;

(ii) 

bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in respect of such securities;

(iii) 

any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities.

▼C6

11. 

‘money-market instruments’ means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment;

12. 

‘credit institution’ means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account;

▼M44

13. 

‘brokering services’ means:

(i) 

the negotiation or arrangement of transactions for the purchase, sale or supply of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including from a third country to any other third country; or

(ii) 

the selling or buying of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including where they are located in third countries for their transfer to another third country;

14. 

‘public corporation’ means an undertaking, other than a credit institution, established in Belarus with over 50 % public ownership, or under public control, as of 1 June 2021;

15. 

‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before, on or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:

(i) 

a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;

(ii) 

a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;

(iii) 

a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;

(iv) 

a counterclaim;

(v) 

a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;

16. 

‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose, ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;

▼M46

17. 

‘financing or financial assistance’ means any action, irrespective of the particular means chosen, whereby the person, entity or body concerned, conditionally or unconditionally, disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources, including but not limited to grants, loans, guarantees, suretyships, bonds, letters of credit, supplier credits, buyer credits, import or export advances and all types of insurance and reinsurance, including export credit insurance; payment, as well as terms and conditions of payment, of the agreed price for a good or a service, made in line with normal business practice, does not constitute financing or financial assistance;

18. 

‘partner country’ means a country applying a set of export control measures substantially equivalent to those set out in this Regulation, as listed in Annex Vb;

19. 

‘consumer communication devices’ means devices used by private individuals such as personal computers and peripherals (including hard drives and printers), mobile telephones, smart televisions, memory devices (USB drives), and consumer software for those devices;

▼M47

20. 

‘central securities depository’ means a legal person as defined in point 1 of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 2 );

21. 

‘deposit’ means a credit balance which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and which a credit institution is required to repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, including a fixed-term deposit and a savings deposit, but excluding a credit balance where:

(i) 

its existence can only be proven by a financial instrument as defined in Article 4(1)(15) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 3 ), unless it is a savings product which is evidenced by a certificate of deposit made out to a named person and which exists in a Member State on 2 July 2014;

(ii) 

its principal is not repayable at par;

(iii) 

its principal is only repayable at par under a particular guarantee or agreement provided by the credit institution or a third party;

22. 

‘investor citizenship schemes’ (or "golden passports") means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to acquire its nationality in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments;

23. 

‘investor residence schemes’ (or "golden visas") means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to obtain a residence permit in a Member State in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments;

24. 

‘trading venue’, as defined in Article 4(1)(24) of Directive 2014/65/EU, means a regulated market, a multilateral trading facility or an organised trading facility;

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25. 

‘road transport undertaking’ means any natural or legal person, entity or body engaged with a commercial purpose, in the transport of freight by means of motor vehicles or combinations of vehicles.

▼M7

Article 1a

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(b) 

to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in point (a).

2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and helmets, temporarily exported to Belarus by United Nations (UN) personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or humanitarian and development workers and associated persons exclusively for their personal use.
3.  
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment which might be used for internal repression, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is intended solely for humanitarian or protective use.

▼M40 —————

▼M7

Article 1b

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List of the European Union ( 4 ) (‘Common Military List’), or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(b) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(c) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List or in Annex III, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(d) 

to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) to (c).

2.  

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the prohibitions referred to therein shall not apply to:

(a) 

non-lethal military equipment, or equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian purposes or protective use or for institution building programmes of the UN and the Union, or for EU or UN crisis management operations; or

(b) 

non-combat vehicles fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for the protective use of personnel of the Union and its Member States in Belarus,

provided that the provision thereof has first been approved by the competent authority of a Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II.

3.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Belarus by UN personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or humanitarian and development workers and associated persons exclusively for their personal use.

▼M40 —————

▼M55

Article 1ba

1.  
Without prejudice to Article 1a of this Regulation, it shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition as listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ), and firearms and other arms as listed in Annex XVI to this Regulation, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
2.  

It shall be prohibited to:

(a) 

provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus; or

(b) 

provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.

▼M40

Article 1c

1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment, technology or software identified in Annex IV, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus, unless the competent authority of the relevant Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II, has given prior authorisation.
2.  
The competent authorities of the Member States, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II, shall not grant any authorisation under paragraph 1 if they have reasonable grounds to determine that the equipment, technology or software in question would be used for repression by the Belarusian Government, public bodies, corporations or agencies, or any natural or legal person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction.
3.  
Annex IV shall include equipment, technology or software intended primarily for use in the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.
4.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.

Article 1d

1.  

Unless the competent authority of the relevant Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II, has given prior authorisation in accordance with Article 1c(2), it shall be prohibited to:

(a) 

provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex IV, or related to the installation, provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of the equipment and technology identified in Annex IV or to the provision, installation, operation or updating of any software identified in Annex IV, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(b) 

provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex IV to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(c) 

provide any telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services of any kind to, or for the direct or indirect benefit of, the Belarusian Government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any natural or legal person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction.

2.  
For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1, "telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services" means those services that provide, in particular using equipment, technology or software as identified in Annex IV, access to and delivery of a subject's incoming and outgoing telecommunications and call-associated data for the purpose of its extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis or storing, or any other related activity.

▼M55

Article 1e

1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
2.  

It shall be prohibited to:

(a) 

provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus; or

(b) 

provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.

3.  

Without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or to the related provision of technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for:

(a) 

humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment or as a response to natural disasters;

(b) 

medical or pharmaceutical purposes;

(c) 

temporary export of items for use by news media;

(d) 

software updates;

(e) 

use as consumer communication devices; or

(f) 

personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus or members of their immediate families travelling with them, and limited to personal effects, household effects, vehicles or tools of trade owned by those individuals and not intended for sale.

With the exception of point (f) of the first subparagraph, the exporter shall declare in the customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from the date when the first export took place.

4.  

By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are:

(a) 

intended for cooperation between the Union, the governments of Member States and the government of Belarus in purely civilian matters;

(b) 

intended for intergovernmental cooperation in space programmes;

(c) 

intended for the operation, maintenance, fuel retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, as well as civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development;

(d) 

intended for maritime safety;

(e) 

intended for civilian non-publicly available electronic communications networks which are not the property of an entity that is publicly controlled or with over 50 % public ownership;

(f) 

intended for the exclusive use of entities owned, or solely or jointly controlled, by a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State or of a partner country;

(g) 

intended for the diplomatic representations of the Union, Member States and partner countries, including delegations, embassies and missions; or

(h) 

intended for ensuring cyber-security and information security for natural and legal persons, entities and bodies in Belarus except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government.

5.  
By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or such related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 3 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that the authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.
6.  
All authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.
7.  

When deciding on requests for authorisations referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, the competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation if they have reasonable grounds to believe that:

(i) 

the end-user might be a military end-user, a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex V, or that the goods might have a military end-use, unless the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is allowed under Article 1fa(1), point (a); or

(ii) 

the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is intended for aviation or the space industry, unless such sale, supply, transfer or export or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is allowed under paragraph 4, point (b).

8.  
The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.

Article 1f

1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or to the development of its defence and security sector, as listed in Annex Va, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
2.  

It shall be prohibited to:

(a) 

provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus; or

(b) 

provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.

3.  

The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the related provision of technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for:

(a) 

humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters;

(b) 

medical or pharmaceutical purposes;

(c) 

temporary export of items for use by news media;

(d) 

software updates;

(e) 

use as consumer communication devices; or

(f) 

personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus or members of their immediate families travelling with them, and limited to personal effects, household effects, vehicles or tools of trade owned by those individuals and not intended for sale.

With the exception of point (f) of the first subparagraph, the exporter shall declare in the customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from the date when the first export took place.

4.  

By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are:

(a) 

intended for cooperation between the Union, the governments of Member States and the government of Belarus in purely civilian matters;

(b) 

intended for intergovernmental cooperation in space programmes;

(c) 

intended for the operation, maintenance, fuel retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, as well as civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development;

(d) 

intended for maritime safety;

(e) 

intended for civilian non-publicly available electronic communications networks which are not the property of an entity that is publicly controlled or with over 50 % public ownership;

(f) 

intended for the exclusive use of entities owned, or solely or jointly controlled, by a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State or of a partner country;

(g) 

intended for the diplomatic representations of the Union, Member States and partner countries, including delegations, embassies and missions; or

(h) 

intended for ensuring cyber-security and information security for natural and legal persons, entities and bodies in Belarus except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government.

4a.  
Without prejudice to paragraph 4, point (e), and by way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are intended for the wind-down by 6 February 2024 of contracts and operations which are ongoing on 5 August 2023 and which are necessary for the provision of civil telecommunication services to the Belarusian civilian population.
5.  
By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 3 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that the authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.
5a.  
By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authority of a Member State may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN codes 8536 69 , 8536 90 , 8541 30 and 8541 60 as listed in Annex Va until 6 February 2024, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, insofar as this is necessary for the processing of those goods in Belarus by a joint venture in which a company established in the Union has a majority ownership on 5 August 2023, for the purpose of subsequent import into the Union and subsequent production in the Union of goods destined for use in the health or pharmaceutical sector, or in the area of research and development.
6.  
All authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.
7.  

When deciding on requests for authorisations referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, the competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation if they have reasonable grounds to believe that:

(i) 

the end-user might be a military end-user, a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex V, or that the goods might have a military end-use, unless the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is allowed under Article 1fa(1); or

(ii) 

the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is intended for aviation or the space industry, unless such sale, supply, transfer or export or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is allowed under paragraph 4, point (b).

8.  
The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.

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Article 1fa

1.  

With regard to the entities listed in Annex V, by way of derogation from Article 1e(1) and (2) and Article 1f(1) and (2), and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authority may only authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology and goods and technology listed in Annex Va, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are:

(a) 

necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment; or

(b) 

due under contracts concluded before 3 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that such authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.

2.  
Authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. Such authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.
3.  
The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraph 1 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.

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Article 1fb

1.  
The notification to the competent authority referred to in Articles 1e(3) and 1f(3) shall be submitted by electronic means, whenever possible, on forms containing at least all the elements of, and in the order provided for in, the models set out in Annex Vc.
2.  
All authorisations referred to in Articles 1e and 1f shall be issued by electronic means, whenever possible, on forms containing at least all the elements of, and in the order provided for in, the models set out in Annex Vc.

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Article 1fc

1.  
The competent authorities shall exchange information on authorisations granted and denials issued pursuant to Articles 1e, 1f and 1fa with the other Member States and the Commission. Such exchange of information shall be carried out using the electronic system provided pursuant to Article 23(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821.
2.  
Information received as a result of the application of this Article shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested, including the exchanges mentioned in paragraph 4. Member States and the Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information acquired in the application of this Article in accordance with Union law and the respective national law. Member States and the Commission shall ensure that classified information provided or exchanged under this Article is not downgraded or declassified without the prior written consent of the originator.
3.  
Before a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with Article 1e, 1f or 1fa for a transaction which is essentially identical to a transaction which is the subject of a still valid denial issued by another Member State or by other Member States, it shall first consult the Member State or Member States which issued the denial. If, following such consultations, the Member State concerned decides to grant an authorisation, it shall inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof, providing all relevant information to explain the decision.
4.  
The Commission, in consultation with the Member States, shall, where appropriate and on the basis of reciprocity, exchange information with partner countries, with a view to supporting the effectiveness of export control measures under this Regulation and the consistent application of export control measures applied by partner countries.

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Article 1g

1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer, or export the goods listed in Annex VI, whether such goods originate or not in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.

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1a.  
It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in paragraph 1

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2.  
Annex VI shall include goods used for the production or manufacturing of tobacco products.

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Article 1h

▼M44

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to import, directly or indirectly, ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII into the Union if they:

(i) 

originate in Belarus; or

(ii) 

have been exported from Belarus;

(b) 

to purchase, directly or indirectly, ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

(c) 

to transport ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country.

(d) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

2.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to purchases in Belarus of ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII which are required in order to meet the essential needs of the purchaser in Belarus or of humanitarian projects in Belarus.

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▼M44

4.  
Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the freedom of transit through Belarus of ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII which originate in a third country.

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Article 1i

1.  
It shall be prohibited to import, purchase or transfer, directly or indirectly, potassium chloride ("potash") products as listed in Annex VIII from Belarus, whether or not originating in Belarus.

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1a.  
It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in paragraph 1.

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Article 1j

It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 29 June 2021 by:

▼M44

(a) 

the Republic of Belarus, its Government, its public bodies, corporations or agencies;

(b) 

a major credit institution established in Belarus with over 50 % public ownership, or under public control, as of 1 June 2021, as listed in Annex IX;

(c) 

a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity referred to in point (a) or (b) of this Article; or

(d) 

a natural or legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this Article.

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Article 1ja

1.  
Transactions related to the management of reserves as well as of assets of the Central Bank of Belarus, including transactions with any legal person, entity or body acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the Central Bank of Belarus, are prohibited.
2.  
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise a transaction provided that it is strictly necessary to ensure the financial stability of the Union as a whole or of the Member State concerned.
3.  
The Member State concerned shall immediately inform the other Member States and the Commission of its intention to grant an authorisation under paragraph 2.

Article 1jb

It shall be prohibited to list and provide services as of 12 April 2022 on trading venues registered or recognised in the Union for the transferable securities of any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus and with over 50 % public ownership.

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Article 1k

1.  

It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly make or be part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 90 days, after 29 June 2021, to:

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(a) 

the Republic of Belarus, its Government, its public bodies, corporations or agencies;

(b) 

a major credit institution established in Belarus with over 50 % public ownership, or under public control, as of 1 June 2021, as listed in Annex IX;

(c) 

a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity referred to in point (a) or (b) of this paragraph; or

(d) 

a natural or legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

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2.  
The prohibition shall not apply to loans or credits that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the Union and any third State, including the expenditure for goods and services from another third State that is necessary for executing the export or import contracts.
3.  

The competent authority of a Member State may also grant, under such terms as it deems appropriate, an authorisation to make or be part of the loans or credits referred to in paragraph 1 if it has determined that:

(i) 

the activities concerned are for the purpose of providing support for the Belarusian civilian population, such as humanitarian assistance, environmental projects, and nuclear safety or the loan or credit is necessary to comply with legal or regulatory minimum reserve or similar requirements to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for financial entities in Belarus which are majority-owned by financial institutions of the Union; and

(ii) 

the activities concerned do not entail funds or economic resources being made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a person, entity or body referred to in Article 2.

When applying the conditions under points (i) and (ii), the competent authority shall require adequate information as regards the use of the authorisation granted, including information concerning the purpose of, and the counterparts to, the activities concerned.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.

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Article 1l

1.  

It shall be prohibited to provide insurance or re-insurance to:

▼M44

(i) 

the Republic of Belarus, its Government, its public bodies, corporations or agencies; or

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(ii) 

any natural or legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of a legal person, entity or body referred to in point (i).

2.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the provision of compulsory or third party liability insurance to Belarusian persons, entities or bodies where the risk insured is situated in the Union or to the provision of insurance for Belarusian diplomatic or consular missions in the Union.

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Article 1m

▼M47

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities whose object or effect is, directly or indirectly, to circumvent the prohibitions set out in this Regulation.

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Article 1n

In addition to the prohibitions set out in Article 1k, the European Investment Bank (EIB) shall:

(a) 

be prohibited from making any disbursement or payment under or in connection with any existing agreements entered into between the Republic of Belarus or any public authority thereof and the EIB; and

(b) 

suspend all existing Technical Assistance Service Contracts relating to projects financed under the agreements referred to in point (a), and which are intended for the direct or indirect benefit of the Republic of Belarus or any public authority thereof to be performed in Belarus.

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Article 1o

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to import, directly or indirectly, wood products as listed in Annex X into the Union if they:

(i) 

originate in Belarus; or

(ii) 

have been exported from Belarus;

(b) 

to purchase, directly or indirectly, wood products as listed in Annex X which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

(c) 

to transport wood products as listed in Annex X if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

(d) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

2.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

Article 1p

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to import, directly or indirectly, cement products as listed in Annex XI into the Union if they:

(i) 

originate in Belarus; or

(ii) 

have been exported from Belarus;

(b) 

to purchase, directly or indirectly, cement products as listed in Annex XI which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

(c) 

to transport cement products as listed in Annex XI if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

(d) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

2.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

Article 1q

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to import, directly or indirectly, iron and steel products as listed in Annex XII into the Union if they:

(i) 

originate in Belarus; or

(ii) 

have been exported from Belarus;

(b) 

to purchase, directly or indirectly, iron and steel products as listed in Annex XII which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

(c) 

to transport iron and steel products as listed in Annex XII if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

(d) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

2.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

Article 1r

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to import, directly or indirectly, rubber products as listed in Annex XIII into the Union if they:

(i) 

originate in Belarus; or

(ii) 

have been exported from Belarus;

(b) 

to purchase, directly or indirectly, rubber products as listed in Annex XIII which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

(c) 

to transport rubber products as listed in Annex XIII if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

(d) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

2.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

Article 1s

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, machinery as listed in Annex XIV, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(b) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in point (a).

2.  

The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of the machinery referred to in paragraph 1 or to the related provision of technical and financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for:

(a) 

humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters;

(b) 

medical or pharmaceutical purposes;

(c) 

temporary use by news media;

(d) 

software updates;

(e) 

use as consumer communication devices;

(f) 

ensuring cyber-security and information security for natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in Belarus except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government; or

(g) 

personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus, and limited to personal effects, household effects, vehicles or tools of trade owned by those individuals and not intended for sale.

With the exception of points (f) and (g), the exporter shall declare in its customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from that first export.

3.  
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

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Article 1sa

1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XVII, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
2.  
It shall be prohibited to provide insurance and reinsurance, directly or indirectly, in relation to goods and technology listed in Annex XVII to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
3.  
It shall be prohibited to provide any one or any combination of the following activities: overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect rectification of an aircraft or component, with the exception of pre-flight inspection, in relation to the goods and technology listed in Annex XVII, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
4.  

It shall be prohibited to:

(a) 

provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus; or

(b) 

provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.

5.  
The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 4 shall not apply to the execution until 4 September 2023 of contracts concluded before 5 August 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.
6.  

By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the national competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the execution of an aircraft financial lease concluded before 5 August 2023 after having determined that:

(a) 

it is strictly necessary to ensure lease re-payments to a legal person, entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State which does not fall under any of the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation; and

(b) 

no economic resources will be made available to the Belarusian counterpart, with the exception of the transfer of ownership of the aircraft after full reimbursement of the financial lease.

7.  
By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN codes 8517 71 00 , 8517 79 00 and 9026 00 00 listed in Annex XVII, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is necessary for medical or pharmaceutical purposes, or for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations.

When deciding on requests for authorisations for medical, pharmaceutical or humanitarian purposes in accordance with this paragraph, the national competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the goods might have a military end-use.

8.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.
9.  
The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to Articles 1e(4), point (b), and 1f(4), point (b).
10.  
The prohibition in paragraph 4, point (a), shall not apply to the exchange of information aimed at establishing technical standards in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization in relation to goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1.

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Article 1t

1.  
It shall be prohibited to provide public financing or financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Belarus.
2.  

The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to:

(a) 

binding financing or financial assistance commitments established prior to 10 March 2022;

(b) 

the provision of public financing or financial assistance up to the total value of EUR 10 000 000 per project benefiting small and medium-sized enterprises established in the Union; or

(c) 

the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade in food, and for agricultural, medical or humanitarian purposes.

Article 1u

1.  
It shall be prohibited to accept any deposits from Belarusian nationals or natural persons residing in Belarus, or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Belarus, if the total value of deposits of the natural or legal person, entity or body per credit institution exceeds EUR 100 000 .
2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to nationals of a Member State, of a country member of the European Economic Area or of Switzerland, or to natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State, in a country member of the European Economic Area or in Switzerland.
3.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to deposits which are necessary for non-prohibited cross-border trade in goods and services between the Union and Belarus.

Article 1v

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 1u(1), the competent authorities may authorise the acceptance of such a deposit, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the acceptance of such a deposit is:

(a) 

necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 1u(1) and their dependent family members, including payments for food, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) 

intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) 

necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or

(d) 

necessary for official purposes of a diplomatic mission or consular post or international organisation.

2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under points (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

Article 1w

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 1u(1), the competent authorities may authorise the acceptance of such a deposit, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the acceptance of such a deposit is:

(a) 

necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations; or

(b) 

necessary for civil society activities that directly promote democracy, human rights or the rule of law in Belarus.

2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

Article 1x

1.  
It shall be prohibited for Union central securities depositories to provide any services as defined in the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 for transferable securities issued after 12 April 2022 to any Belarusian national or natural person residing in Belarus or any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus.
2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to nationals of a Member State or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State.

Article 1y

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1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell transferable securities denominated in any official currency of a Member State issued after 12 April 2022 or units in collective investment undertakings providing exposure to such securities, to any Belarusian national or natural person residing in Belarus or any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus.

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2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to nationals of a Member State or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State.

Article 1z

Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, credit institutions shall:

(a) 

supply to the national competent authority of the Member State where they are located or to the Commission by no later than 27 May 2022, a list of deposits exceeding EUR 100 000 held by Belarusian nationals or natural persons residing in Belarus, or by legal persons, entities or bodies established in Belarus. They shall provide updates regarding the amounts of such deposits every 12 months.

(b) 

supply to the national competent authority of the Member State where they are located information on deposits exceeding EUR 100 000 held by Belarusian nationals or natural persons residing in Belarus who have acquired the citizenship of a Member State or residence rights in a Member State through an investor citizenship scheme or an investor residence scheme.

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Article 1za

1.  
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export banknotes denominated in any official currency of a Member State to Belarus or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, including the government and the Central Bank of Belarus, or for use in Belarus.
2.  

The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of banknotes denominated in any official currency of a Member State provided that such sale, supply, transfer or export is necessary for:

(a) 

the personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus or members of their immediate families travelling with them; or

(b) 

the official purposes of diplomatic missions, consular posts or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

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Article 1zb

1.  
It shall be prohibited to provide specialised financial messaging services, which are used to exchange financial data, to the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV or to any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex XV.
2.  
For each legal person, entity or body referred to in Annex XV, the prohibition set out in paragraph 1 shall apply as of the date mentioned for it in that Annex. The prohibition shall apply as of that same date to any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex XV.

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Article 1zc

1.  
It shall be prohibited for any road transport undertaking established in Belarus to transport goods by road within the territory of the Union, including in transit.
2.  
The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to road transport undertakings transporting mail as a universal service.
3.  

The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply until 16 April 2022 to the transport of goods that started before 9 April 2022, provided that the vehicle of the road transport undertaking:

(a) 

was already in the territory of the Union on 9 April 2022, or

(b) 

needs to transit through the Union in order to return to Belarus.

4.  

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the transport of goods by a road transport undertaking established in Belarus if the competent authorities have determined that such transport is necessary for:

(a) 

the purchase, import or transport into the Union of natural gas and oil, including refined petroleum products, as well as titanium, aluminium, copper, nickel, palladium and iron ore;

(b) 

the purchase, import or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers whose import, purchase and transport is allowed under this Regulation;

(c) 

humanitarian purposes; or,

(d) 

the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

5.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 4 within two weeks of the authorisation.

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Article 2

1.  
All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
2.  
No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I.
3.  
The participation, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is, directly or indirectly, to circumvent the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be prohibited.
4.  
Annex I shall consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (a) of Article 4(1) of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus ( 6 ), have been identified by the Council as being responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, or any natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them, as well as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them.
5.  
Annex I shall also consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (b) of Article 4(1) of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime, as well as legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by them.

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6.  

Annex I shall also consist of a list of:

(a) 

the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies who, in accordance with Article 4(1), point (c), of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as organising or contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate:

(i) 

the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union; or

(ii) 

the transfer of prohibited goods and the illegal transfer of restricted goods, including hazardous goods, into the territory of the Union; and

(b) 

the legal persons, entities or bodies who, in accordance with Article 4(1), point (d), of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

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Article 2a

Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to liability of any kind on their part, if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

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Article 2b

1.  
►M15  Annex I ◄ shall include the grounds for the listing of listed persons, entities and bodies.
2.  
►M15  Annex I ◄ shall also include, where available, information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

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Article 3

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1.  

By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are:

(a) 

necessary to satisfy the basic needs of persons listed in Annex I and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) 

intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) 

intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

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(d) 

intended exclusively for:

(i) 

humanitarian purposes, including the operation of flights for the evacuation or repatriation of persons, or for initiatives providing support to victims of natural, nuclear or chemical disasters;

(ii) 

the operation of flights in the framework of international adoption procedures;

(iii) 

the operation of flights required for attending meetings with the objective of seeking a solution to the crisis in Belarus or promoting the policy objectives of the restrictive measures; or

(iv) 

an emergency landing, take-off or overflight by an EU air carrier;

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(e) 

necessary to deal with critical and clearly identified air safety matters and after prior consultation of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

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2.  
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the Member State concerned has notified the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks before the authorisation.
3.  
Member States shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 or 2.

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Article 3a

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 2(1), the competent authorities may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, if the following conditions are met:

(a) 

the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was listed in Annex I, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

(b) 

the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

(c) 

the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

(d) 

recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

▼B

Article 4

1.  

Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of

(a) 

interest or other earnings on those accounts; or

(b) 

payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this Regulation,

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to Article 2(1).

2.  
Article 2(2) shall not prevent financial or credit institutions in the EU from crediting the frozen accounts, if they receive funds transferred by third parties to the account of the listed person, entity or body, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the competent authorities about such transactions without delay.

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Article 4a

By way of derogation from Article 2(1), where a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that person, entity or body had been listed, the competent authorities of the Member States, as indicated on the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that:

(i) 

the competent authority concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a person, entity or body listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ ; and

(ii) 

the Member State concerned has, at least 2 weeks prior to the grant of the authorisation, notified the other Member States and the Commission of that determination and its intention to grant the authorisation.

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Article 4b

By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are necessary for official purposes of diplomatic missions or consular posts or international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

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Article 5

1.  

Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

(a) 

immediately supply the competent authorities indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, in the country where they are resident or located, with any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, and directly or indirectly supply such information to the Commission; and

(b) 

cooperate with the competent authorities indicated in the websites listed in Annex II in any verification of this information.

2.  
Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

▼B

Article 6

The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen as a result of negligence.

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Article 7

1.  

The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of:

(a) 

authorisations granted under this Regulation;

(b) 

information received under Article 1z;

(c) 

violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

2.  
The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.
3.  
Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used for the purposes for which it was provided or received, including ensuring the effectiveness of the measures set out in this Regulation.

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Article 8

The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annexes II and Vc on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

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Article 8a

1.  
Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2(1), it shall amend ►M15  Annex I ◄ accordingly.
2.  
The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3.  
Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly.
4.  
The lists in ►M15  Annex I ◄ shall be reviewed in regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

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Article 8b

1.  
It shall be prohibited for any aircraft operated by Belarusian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier in code-sharing or blocked-space arrangements, to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the Union.
2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of an emergency landing or an emergency overflight.

Article 8c

1.  
By way of derogation from Article 8b, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise an aircraft to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the Union if those competent authorities have determined that such landing, take-off or overflight is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this Regulation.
2.  
The Member State or Member States concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

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Article 8ca

1.  
The Network Manager for air traffic management network functions of the single European sky shall support the Commission and the Member States in ensuring the implementation of, and compliance with, Articles 2(2) and 8b of this Regulation. The Network Manager shall, in particular, reject all flight plans filed by aircraft operators indicating an intent to carry out activities over the territory of the Union or of Belarus that constitute a violation of this Regulation, such that the pilot is not permitted to fly.
2.  
The Network Manager shall regularly supply to the Commission and the Member States, based on the analysis of flight plans, reports on the implementation of Article 8b.

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Article 8d

1.  

No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a) 

designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

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(b) 

entities referred to in Articles 1j, 1k, 1l and 1zb or listed in Annexes V, IX and XV;

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(c) 

any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;

(d) 

any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

2.  
In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3.  
This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

Article 8e

1.  

The Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall process personal data that are necessary to carry out their tasks under this Regulation. Those tasks include:

(a) 

as regards the Council, preparing and making amendments to Annex I;

(b) 

as regards the High Representative, preparing amendments to Annex I;

(c) 

as regards the Commission:

(i) 

adding the contents of Annex I to the electronic, consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial sanctions and to the interactive sanctions map, both publicly available;

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(ii) 

processing information on the impact of the measures provided for in this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds, information on deposits and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.

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2.  
The Council, the Commission and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, to criminal convictions of such persons or to security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of Annex I.
3.  
For the purposes of this Regulation, the Council, the Commission and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of point (8) of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 7 ), in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

▼B

Article 9

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1.  
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties, including as appropriate criminal penalties, applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall also provide for appropriate measures of confiscation of the proceeds of such infringements.

▼B

2.  
Member States shall notify these rules to the Commission without delay after entry into force of the Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

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Article 9a

1.  
Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in Articles 3, 4(2) and 5 and identify them in the websites listed in Annex II.
2.  
Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities and the contact details thereof by 31 July 2008 and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment without delay.

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Article 9b

Where there is, in this Regulation, a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

▼B

Article 10

This Regulation shall apply:

— 
within the territory of the Community, including its airspace,
— 
on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State,
— 
to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Community who is a national of a Member State,
— 
to any legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State,
— 
to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Community.

Article 11

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

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ANNEX I

List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)

A.   Natural persons referred to in Article 2(1)



 

Names (Transliteration of Belarusian spelling)

(Transliteration of Russian spelling)

Names

(Belarusian spelling)

(Russian spelling)

Identifying information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

1.

Uladzimir Uladzimiravich NAVUMAU

Vladimir Vladimirovich NAUMOV

Уладзімір Уладзіміравіч НАВУМАЎ

Владимир Владимирович НАУМОВ

Position(s): former Minister of Internal Affairs; former Head of the President’s Security Service

DOB: 7.2.1956

POB: Smolensk, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Gender: male

Failed to take action to investigate the case of the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Minister of Internal Affairs and also former Head of the President's Security Service. As a Minister of Internal Affairs he was responsible for the repression of peaceful demonstrations until his retirement on 6 April 2009 for health reasons. Received a residence in the Drozdy nomenklatura district in Minsk from the Presidential Administration. In October 2014, was awarded the Order ‘For Merit’ III degree by President Lukashenka.

24.9.2004

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2.

Dzmitry Valerievich PAULICHENKA

Dmitri Valerievich PAVLICHENKO (Dmitriy Valeriyevich PAVLICHENKO)

Дзмiтрый Валер'евiч ПАЎЛIЧЭНКА

Дмитрий Валериевич ПАВЛИЧЕНКО

Position(s): Former Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR)

Commander of an OMON unit

DOB: 1966

POB: Vitebsk/Viciebsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Address: Belarusian Association of Veterans of Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ‘Honour’, 111 Mayakovskogo St., 220028 Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Key person in the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA).

Businessman, Head of ‘Honour’, the MoIA's Association of Veterans of Special Forces of the MoIA.

He was identified as commanding an OMON unit during the brutal crackdown on protesters that took place in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

24.9.2004

3.

Viktar Uladzimiravich SHEIMAN (Viktar Uladzimiravich SHEYMAN)

Viktor Vladimirovich SHEIMAN (Viktor Vladimirovich SHEYMAN)

Вiктар Уладзiмiравiч ШЭЙМАН

Виктор Владимирович ШЕЙМАН

Position(s): Former Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate

DOB: 26.5.1958

POB: Soltanishki, Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Address: Belarus President Property Management Directorate, 38 Karl Marx St., 220016 Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Former Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate. Responsible for the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Secretary of the Security Council. Sheiman remains a Special Assistant/Aid to the President.

He remains an influential and active member of the Lukashenka regime.

24.9.2004

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4.

Iury Leanidavich SIVAKAU (Yuri Leanidavich SIVAKAU, SIVAKOU)

Iury (Yuri) Leonidovich SIVAKOV

Юрый Леанідавіч СІВАКАЎ, СІВАКОЎ

Юрий Леонидович СИВАКОВ

Position(s): former Minister of Internal Affairs; former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration

DOB: 5.8.1946

POB: Onor, Sakhalin Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Address: Belarusian Association of Veterans of Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ‘Honour’, 111 Mayakovskogo St., Minsk 220028, Belarus

Gender: male

Orchestrated the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Minister of Tourism and Sports, former Minister of Internal Affairs and former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.

24.9.2004

5.

Yuri Khadzimuratavich KARAEU

Yuri Khadzimuratovich KARAEV

Юрый Хаджымуратавіч КАРАЕЎ

Юрий Хаджимуратович КАРАЕВ

Position(s): Former Minister of Internal Affairs; Lieutenant General of Militia (police force); Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast

DOB: 21.6.1966

POB: Ordzhonikidze, former USSR (now Vladikavkaz, Russian Federation)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

Remains active in the Lukashenka regime as an aide to the President of Belarus – Inspector for the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast.

2.10.2020

6.

Genadz Arkadzievich KAZAKEVICH

Gennadi Arkadievich KAZAKEVICH

Генадзь Аркадзьевіч КАЗАКЕВІЧ

Геннадий Аркадьевич КАЗАКЕВИЧ

Position(s): Former First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs;

Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs – Chief of the Criminal Militia, Colonel of Militia (police force)

DOB: 14.2.1975

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. He retains his post of Chief of the Criminal Militia.

2.10.2020

7.

Aliaksandr Piatrovich BARSUKOU

Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich BARSUKOV

Аляксандр Пятровіч БАРСУКОЎ

Александр Петрович БАРСУКОВ

Position(s): Former Deputy Minister Internal Affairs; Lieutenant-General of Militia (police force);

Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for the Minsk Region/Oblast

DOB: 29.4.1965

POB: Vetkovski (Vetka) District, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Aide to the President of Belarus – Inspector for the Minsk Region/Oblast.

2.10.2020

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8.

Siarhei Mikalaevich KHAMENKA

Sergei Nikolaevich KHOMENKO

Сяргей Мiкалаевiч ХАМЕНКА

Сергей Николаевич ХОМЕНКО

Position(s): Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

Minister of Justice

DOB: 21.9.1966

POB: Yasinovataya, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Minister of Justice.

2.10.2020

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9.

Yuri Genadzevich NAZARANKA

Yuri Gennadievich NAZARENKO

Юрый Генадзевіч НАЗАРАНКА

Юрий Геннадьевич НАЗАРЕНКО

Position(s): Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Former Commander of the Internal Troops;

First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Head of the Public Security Police, Major General of Militia (police force)

DOB: 17.4.1976

POB: Slonim, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and Commander of the MoIA Internal Troops, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces, in particular the Internal Troops under his command, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as first Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of the Public Security Police.

2.10.2020

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10.

Khazalbek Baktibekavich ATABEKAU

Khazalbek Bakhtibekovich ATABEKOV

Хазалбек Бактiбекавiч АТАБЕКАЎ

Хазалбек Бахтибекович АТАБЕКОВ

Position(s): Former Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops

DOB: 18.3.1967

Gender: male

In his former position as Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces, in particular the Internal Troops under his command, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators, as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He was passed to the military reserve in March 2022 by the decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. He has the right to wear military uniform and insignia.

2.10.2020

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11.

Aliaksandr Valerievich BYKAU

Alexander (Alexandr) Valerievich BYKOV

Аляксандр Валер’евiч БЫКАЎ

Александр Валерьевич БЫКОВ

Position(s): First Deputy Commander of the Interior Troops, former Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR), Lieutenant Colonel

Gender: male

In his former position as Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by SOBR forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as First Deputy Commander of the Interior Troops.

2.10.2020

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12.

Aliaksandr Sviataslavavich SHEPELEU

Alexander (Alexandr) Svyatoslavovich SHEPELEV

Аляксандр Святаслававіч ШЭПЕЛЕЎ

Александр Святославович ШЕПЕЛЕВ

Position(s): Head of the Department for Safety and Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 14.10.1975

POB: village of Rublevsk, Kruglyanskiy district, Mogilev/Mahiliou Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his senior position as Head of the Department for Safety and Security in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is involved in the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

2.10.2020

13.

Dzmitry Uladzimiravich BALABA

Dmitry Vladimirovich BALABA

Дзмітрый Уладзіміравіч БАЛАБА

Дмитрий Владимирович БАЛАБА

Position(s): Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) for the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 1.6.1972

POB: village of Gorodilovo, Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Minsk in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

2.10.2020

14.

Ivan Uladzimiravich KUBRAKOU

Ivan Vladimirovich KUBRAKOV

Іван Уладзіміравіч КУБРАКОЎ

Иван Владимирович КУБРАКОВ

Position(s): Former Head of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee;

Minister of Internal Affairs, Major General of Militia (police force)

DOB: 5.5.1975

POB: village of Malinovka, Mogilev/Mahiliou Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Head of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Minister of Internal Affairs.

2.10.2020

15.

Maxim Aliaksandravich GAMOLA (HAMOLA)

Maxim Alexandrovich GAMOLA

Максім Аляксандравіч ГАМОЛА

Максим Александрович ГАМОЛА

Position(s): Former Head of the Police Department in Moskovski District, Minsk;

Deputy head of the Minsk City Police Department, Head of Criminal Police

Gender: male

In his former position as Head of the Police Department in Moskovski District, Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Head of the Minsk City Police Department and Head of Criminal Police.

2.10.2020

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16.

Aliaksandr Mikhailavich ALIASHKEVICH

Alexander Mikhailovich ALESHKEVICH

Аляксандр Мiхайлавiч АЛЯШКЕВIЧ

Александр Михайлович АЛЕШКЕВИЧ

Position(s): Former First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovsky District, Minsk, Head of Criminal Police

Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Leninsky District, Minsk

Gender: male

In his former position as First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovsky District, Minsk, and Head of Criminal Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Leninsky District, Minsk.

2.10.2020

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17.

Andrei Vasilievich GALENKA

Andrey Vasilievich GALENKA

Андрэй Васiльевiч ГАЛЕНКА

Андрей Васильевич ГАЛЕНКА

Position(s): First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk, Head of Public Safety Police

Gender: male

In his former position as Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk and Head of Public Safety Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime and is serving as the First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk, Head of Public Safety Police.

2.10.2020

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18.

Aliaksandr Paulavich VASILIEU

Alexander Pavlovich VASILIEV

Аляксандр Паўлавiч ВАСIЛЬЕЎ

Александр Павлович ВАСИЛЬЕВ

Position(s): Former Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee

Head of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 24.3.1975

POB: Mahiliou/Mogilev, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2.10.2020

19.

Aleh Mikalaevich SHULIAKOUSKI

Oleg Nikolaevich SHULIAKOVSKI

Алег Мiкалаевiч ШУЛЯКОЎСКI

Олег Николаевич ШУЛЯКОВСКИЙ

Position(s): Former First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Criminal Police

Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee

DOB: 26.7.1977

Gender: male

In his former position as First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee and Head of Criminal Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee.

2.10.2020

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20.

Anatol Anatolievich VASILIEU

Anatoli Anatolievich VASILIEV

Анатоль Анатольевiч ВАСIЛЬЕЎ

Анатолий Анатольевич ВАСИЛЬЕВ

Position(s): First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police

Former Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police, Former Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 26.1.1972

POB: Gomel/Homyel, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee and Head of Public Safety Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police.

2.10.2020

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21.

Aliaksandr Viachaslavavich ASTREIKA

Alexander Viacheslavovich ASTREIKO

Аляксандр Вячаслававiч АСТРЭЙКА

Александр Вячеславович АСТРЕЙКО

Position(s): Former Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Major-General of Militia (police force)

Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk Region/Oblast Executive Committee

DOB: 22.12.1971

POB: Kapyl, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee and Major-General of Militia, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk Region/Oblast Executive Committee.

2.10.2020

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22.

Leanid ZHURAUSKI

Leonid ZHURAVSKI

Леанiд ЖУРАЎСКI

Леонид ЖУРАВСКИЙ

Position(s): Former Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Vitebsk/Viciebsk

DOB: 20.9.1975

Gender: male

In his former command position over OMON forces in Vitebsk/Viciebsk, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Vitebsk/Viciebsk in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

2.10.2020

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23.

Mikhail DAMARNACKI

Mikhail DOMARNATSKY

Міхаіл ДАМАРНАЦКІ

Михаил ДОМАРНАЦКИЙ

Position(s): Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Gomel/Homyel

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Gomel/Homyel, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Gomel/Homyel in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

2.10.2020

24.

Maxim MIKHOVICH

Maxim MIKHOVICH

Максім МІХОВІЧ

Максим МИХОВИЧ

Position(s): Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Brest, Lieutenant Colonel

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Brest, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Brest in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

2.10.2020

25.

Aleh Uladzimiravich MATKIN

Oleg Vladimirovitch MATKIN

Алег Уладзіміравіч МАТКІН

Олег Владимирович МАТКИН

Position(s): Head of the Penal Correction Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the Penal Correction Department that has authority over the detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters.

2.10.2020

26.

Ivan Yurievich SAKALOUSKI

Ivan Yurievich SOKOLOVSKI

Іван Юр’евіч САКАЛОЎСКІ

Иван Юрьевич СОКОЛОВСКИЙ

Position(s): Director of the Akrestina detention centre, Minsk

Gender: male

In his capacity as Director of the Akrestina detention centre in Minsk, he is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in that detention centre in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

2.10.2020

27.

Valeri Paulavich VAKULCHYK

Valery Pavlovich VAKULCHIK

Валерый Паўлавіч

ВАКУЛЬЧЫК

Валерий Павлович ВАКУЛЬЧИК

Position(s): Former Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB);

Former State Secretary of the Security Council;

Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus – Inspector for the Brest Region/Oblast

DOB: 19.6.1964

POB: Radostovo, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Aide to the President of Belarus – Inspector for the Brest Region/Oblast.

2.10.2020

28.

Siarhei Yaugenavich TSERABAU

Sergey Evgenievich TEREBOV

Сяргей Яўгенавіч ЦЕРАБАЎ

Сергей Евгеньевич ТЕРЕБОВ

Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

DOB: 1972

POB: Borisov/Barisaw, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

2.10.2020

29.

Dzmitry Vasilievich RAVUTSKI

Dmitry Vasilievich REUTSKY

Дзмітрый Васільевіч РАВУЦКІ

Дмитрий Васильевич РЕУЦКИЙ

Position(s): Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

2.10.2020

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30.

Uladzimir Viktaravich KALACH

Vladimir Viktorovich KALACH

Уладзiмiр Вiктаравiч КАЛАЧ

Владимир Викторович КАЛАЧ

Position(s): Former Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for Minsk Region/Oblast

Gender: male

Rank: Major-General

In his former leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for Minsk Region/Oblast.

2.10.2020

31.

Alieg Anatolevich CHARNYSHOU

Oleg Anatolievich CHERNYSHEV

Алег Анатольевiч ЧАРНЫШОЎ

Олег Анатольевич ЧЕРНЫШЁВ

Position(s): Former Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences

Gender: male

Rank: Major-General

In his former leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences.

2.10.2020

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32.

Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich KANYUK

Alexander (Alexandr) Vladimirovich KONYUK

Аляксандр Уладзіміравіч КАНЮК

Александр Владимирович КОНЮК

Position(s): Former Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus;

Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus to Armenia

DOB: 11.7.1960

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Prosecutor General, he was responsible for the widespread use of criminal proceedings to disqualify opposition candidates ahead of the 2020 presidential election and to prevent persons from joining the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the ambassador of Belarus to Armenia.

2.10.2020

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33.

Lidzia Mihailauna YARMOSHINA

Lidia Mikhailovna YERMOSHINA

Лiдзiя Мiхайлаўна ЯРМОШЫНА

Лидия Михайловна ЕРМОШИНА

Position(s): Former Chairwoman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 29.1.1953

POB: Slutsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

In her former position as Chairwoman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency, and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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34.

Vadzim Dzmitryevich IPATAU

Vadim Dmitrievich IPATOV

Вадзім Дзмітрыевіч ІПАТАЎ

Вадим Дмитриевич ИПАТОВ

Position(s): Deputy Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 30.10.1964

POB: Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

As Deputy Chairman of the CEC, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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35.

Alena Mikalaeuna DMUHAILA

Elena Nikolaevna DMUHAILO

Алена Мiкалаеўна ДМУХАЙЛА

Елена Николаевна ДМУХАЙЛО

Position(s): Former Secretary of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 1.7.1971

Gender: female

In her former position as Secretary of the CEC, she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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36.

Andrei Anatolievich GURZHY

Andrey Anatolievich GURZHIY

Андрэй Анатольевіч ГУРЖЫ

Андрей Анатольевич ГУРЖИЙ

Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 10.10.1975

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

37.

Volga Leanidauna DARASHENKA

Olga Leonidovna DOROSHENKO

Вольга Леанідаўна ДАРАШЭНКА

Ольга Леонидовна ДОРОШЕНКО

Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 1976

Gender: female

As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

38.

Siarhei Aliakseevich KALINOUSKI

Sergey Alexeyevich KALINOVSKIY

Сяргей Аляксеевіч КАЛІНОЎСКІ

Сергей Алексеевич КАЛИНОВСКИЙ

Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 3.1.1969

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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39.

Sviatlana Piatrouna KATSUBA

Svetlana Petrovna KATSUBO

Святлана Пятроўна КАЦУБА

Светлана Петровна КАЦУБО

Position(s): Chair of Social Humanities and Legal Disciplines at Gomel/Homyel State Technical University, former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 6.8.1959

POB: Podilsk, Odessa Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: female

In her former position as a member of the CEC college, she was responsible for its misconduct in the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Chair of Social Humanities and Legal Disciplines at Gomel/Homyel State Technical University.

2.10.2020

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40.

Aliaksandr Mikhailavich LASYAKIN

Alexander (Alexandr) Mikhailovich LOSYAKIN

Аляксандр Міхайлавіч ЛАСЯКІН

Александр Михайлович ЛОСЯКИН

Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 21.7.1957

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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41.

Igar Anatolievich PLYSHEUSKI

Ihor Anatolievich PLYSHEVSKIY

Iгар Анатольевiч ПЛЫШЭЎСКI

Игорь Анатольевич ПЛЫШЕВСКИЙ

Position(s): Managing Director of OOO Bergia Group, former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 19.2.1979

POB: Lyuban, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as a member of the CEC college, he was responsible for its misconduct in the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Managing Director of OOO Bergia Group.

2.10.2020

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42.

Marina Yureuna RAKHMANAVA

Marina Yurievna RAKHMANOVA

Марына Юр’еўна РАХМАНАВА

Марина Юрьевна РАХМАНОВА

Position(s): Former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 26.9.1970

Gender: female

In her former position as a member of the CEC college, she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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43.

Aleh Leanidavich SLIZHEUSKI

Oleg Leonidovich SLIZHEVSKI

Алег Леанiдавiч СЛIЖЭЎСКI

Олег Леонидович СЛИЖЕВСКИЙ

Position(s): Head of the Legal Support Department of the Permanent Committee of the Union State of Belarus and Russia, former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 16.8.1972

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as a member of the CEC college, he was responsible for its misconduct in the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as head of the Legal Support Department of the Permanent Committee of the Union State of Belarus and Russia.

2.10.2020

44.

Irina Aliaksandrauna TSELIKAVETS

Irina Alexandrovna TSELIKOVEC

Iрына Аляксандраўна ЦЭЛIКАВЕЦ

Ирина Александровна ЦЕЛИКОВЕЦ

Position(s): Former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 2.11.1976

POB: Zhlobin, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

In her former position as a member of the CEC college, she was responsible for its misconduct in the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

2.10.2020

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45.

Aliaksandr Ryhoravich LUKASHENKA

Alexander (Alexandr) Grigorievich LUKASHENKO

Аляксандр Рыгоравіч ЛУКАШЭНКА

Александр Григорьевич ЛУКАШЕНКО

Position(s): President of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 30.8.1954

POB: Kopys settlement, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

As President of Belarus with authority over State bodies, he is responsible for the violent repression by the State apparatus carried out before and after the 2020 presidential election, in particular the dismissal of key opposition candidates, arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

6.11.2020

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46.

Viktar Aliaksandravich LUKASHENKA

Viktor Aleksandrovich LUKASHENKO

Вiктар Аляксандравiч ЛУКАШЭНКА

Виктор Александрович ЛУКАШЕНКО

Position(s): Former National Security Advisor to the President, Member of the Security Council

President of the National Olympic Committee of Belarus

DOB: 28.11.1975

POB: Mahiliou/Mogilev, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Personal ID: 3281175A014PB8

In his former position as National Security Advisor to the President and a Member of the Security Council, as well as his informal supervisory position over Belarus security forces, he has been responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the President of the National Olympic Committee. In this position, to which he was appointed on 26 February 2021, he bears responsibility for the mistreatment by the NOC officials of athlete Krystsina Tsimanouskaya during the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo.

6.11.2020

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47.

Ihar Piatrovich SERGYAENKA

Igor Petrovich SERGEENKO

Ігар Пятровіч СЕРГЯЕНКА

Игорь Петрович СЕРГЕЕНКО

Position(s): Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration

DOB: 14.1.1963

POB: Stolitsa village in Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for ensuring the implementation of presidential powers in the field of domestic and foreign policy. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime, including in the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

6.11.2020

48.

Ivan Stanislavavich TERTEL

Ivan Stanislavovich TERTEL

Іван Станіслававіч ТЭРТЭЛЬ

Иван Станиславович ТЕРТЕЛЬ

Position(s): Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), former Chairman of the State Control Committee

DOB: 8.9.1966

POB: village Privalka/Privalki in Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB) and in his former position as the Chairman of the State Control Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

6.11.2020

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49.

Raman Ivanavich MELNIK

Roman Ivanovich MELNIK

Раман Iванавiч МЕЛЬНIК

Роман Иванович МЕЛЬНИК

Position(s): Former Head of the Main Directorate of Law and Order Protection and Prevention at the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Head of the Administration of the Leninsky District of Minsk

DOB: 29.5.1964

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as the Head of the Main Directorate of Law and Order Protection and Prevention at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Administration of the Leninsky District of Minsk.

6.11.2020

50.

Ivan Danilavich NASKEVICH

Ivan Danilovich NOSKEVICH

Iван Данiлавiч НАСКЕВIЧ

Иван Данилович НОСКЕВИЧ

Position(s): Former Chairman of the Investigative Committee

Member of the reserve of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 25.3.1970

POB: village of Cierabličy in Brest Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as the Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by that Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a member of the reserve of the Investigative Committee.

6.11.2020

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51.

Aliaksey Aliaksandravich VOLKAU

Alexei Alexandrovich VOLKOV

Аляксей Аляксандравіч ВОЛКАЎ

Алексей Александрович ВОЛКОВ

Position(s): Former First Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee; currently Chairman of the State Committee for Forensic Expertise

DOB: 7.9.1973

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as the First Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

6.11.2020

52.

Siarhei Yakaulevich AZEMSHA

Sergei Yakovlevich AZEMSHA

Сяргей Якаўлевіч АЗЕМША

Сергей Яковлевич АЗЕМША

Position(s): Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 17.7.1974

POB: Rechitsa, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

6.11.2020

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53.

Andrei Fiodaravich SMAL

Andrei Fyodorovich SMAL

Андрэй Фёдаравiч СМАЛЬ

Андрей Федорович СМАЛЬ

Position(s): Former Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 1.8.1973

POB: Brest, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

6.11.2020

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54.

Andrei Yurevich PAULIUCHENKA

Andrei Yurevich PAVLYUCHENKO

Андрэй Юр’евіч ПАЎЛЮЧЕНКА

Андрей Юрьевич ПАВЛЮЧЕНКО

Position(s): Head of Operational-Analytical Center

DOB: 1.8.1971

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Head of Operational-Analytical Center, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for the repression of civil society, in particular interrupting connection to telecommunication networks as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

6.11.2020

55.

Ihar Ivanavich BUZOUSKI

Igor Ivanovich BUZOVSKI

Ігар Іванавіч БУЗОЎСКІ

Игорь Иванович БУЗОВСКИЙ

Position(s): Deputy Minister of Information

DOB: 10.7.1972

POB: village of Koshelevo, Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

6.11.2020

56.

Natallia Mikalaeuna EISMANT

Natalia Nikolayevna EISMONT

Наталля Мікалаеўна ЭЙСМАНТ

Наталья Николаевна ЭЙСМОНТ

Position(s): Press Secretary of the President of Belarus

DOB: 16.2.1984

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Maiden name: Kirsanova (Russian spelling: Кирсанова) or Selyun (Russian spelling: Селюн)

Gender: female

In her position as Press Secretary of the President of Belarus, she is closely associated with the President and responsible for coordinating media activities of the President, including drafting statements and organising public appearances. She is therefores supporting the Lukashenka regime, including in the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. In particular, with her public statements defending the President and criticising opposition activists as well as the peaceful protesters, made in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, she contributed to seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

6.11.2020

57.

Siarhei Yaugenavich ZUBKOU

Sergei Yevgenevich ZUBKOV

Сяргей Яўгенавіч ЗУБКОЎ

Сергей Евгеньевич ЗУБКОВ

Position(s): ALFA Unit Commander

DOB: 21.8.1975

Gender: male

In his commanding position over ALFA Unit forces, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign carried out by those forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

6.11.2020

58.

Andrei Aliakseevich RAUKOU

Andrei Alexeyevich RAVKOV

Андрэй Аляксеевіч РАЎКОЎ

Андрей Алексеевич РАВКОВ

Position(s): Former State Secretary of the Security Council

Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus to Azerbaijan

DOB: 25.6.1967

POB: village of Revyaki, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as State Secretary of the Security Council, he has been closely associated with the President and responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign carried out by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the ambassador of Belarus to Azerbaijan.

6.11.2020

59.

Pyotr Piatrovich MIKLASHEVICH

Petr Petrovich MIKLASHEVICH

Пётр Пятровіч МІКЛАШЭВІЧ

Петр Петрович МИКЛАШЕВИЧ

Position(s): Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 18.10.1954

POB: Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

As the chairman of the Constitutional Court, he is responsible for the Constitutional Court’s decision adopted on 25 August 2020, by which the results of the fraudulent elections were legitimised. He has therefore supported and facilitated actions of repression and intimidation campaign by the State apparatus against peaceful protestors and journalists and is therefore responsible for seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

6.11.2020

60.

Anatol Aliaksandravich SIVAK

Anatoli Alexandrovich SIVAK

Анатоль Аляксандравіч СІВАК

Анатолий Александрович СИВАК

Position(s): Deputy Prime Minister; former Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 19.7.1962

POB: Zavoit, Narovlya District, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership capacity as Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign run by the local apparatus in Minsk under his oversight in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists. He made numerous public statements criticising peaceful protests taking place in Belarus.

In his current leadership position as Deputy Prime Minister he continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

61.

Ivan Mikhailavich EISMANT

Ivan Mikhailovich EISMONT

Іван Міхайлавіч ЭЙСМАНТ

Иван Михайлович ЭЙСМОНТ

Position(s): Chairman of the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company, Head of Belteleradio Company

DOB: 20.1.1977

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his current position as Head of the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company, he is responsible for the dissemination of state propaganda in public media and continues to support the Lukashenka regime. This includes using media channels to support the President’s continuation of his term in office, despite the fraudulent presidential elections that took place on 9 August 2020, and the subsequent and repeated violent crackdown on peaceful and legitimate protests.

Eismont made public statements criticising the peaceful protesters and refused to provide media coverage of the protests. He also fired striking employees of Belteleradio Company under his management, thereby making him responsible for human rights violations.

17.12.2020

62.

Uladzimir Stsiapanavich KARANIK

Vladimir Stepanovich KARANIK

Уладзімір Сцяпанавіч КАРАНІК

Владимир Степанович КАРАНИК

Position(s): Governor of the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast; former Minister of Healthcare

DOB: 30.11.1973

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership capacity as the Minister of Healthcare, he was responsible for the use of healthcare services to repress peaceful protesters, including using ambulances to transport protesters in need of medical assistance to isolation wards rather than to hospitals. He made numerous public statements criticising the peaceful protests taking place in Belarus, on one occasion accusing a protester of being intoxicated.

In his current leadership position as the Governor of the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast he continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

63.

Natallia Ivanauna KACHANAVA

Natalia Ivanovna KOCHANOVA

Наталля Іванаўна КАЧАНАВА

Наталья Ивановна КОЧАНОВА

Position(s): Chair of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus

DOB: 25.9.1960

POB: Polotsk, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

In her current leadership position as Chair of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus, she is responsible for supporting the decisions of the President in the field of domestic policy. She is also responsible for organising the fraudulent elections that took place on 9 August 2020. She made public statements defending the brutal crackdown of the security apparatus on peaceful demonstrators.

17.12.2020

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64.

Pavel Mikalaevich LIOHKI

Pavel Nikolaevich LIOHKI

Павел Мiкалаевiч ЛЁГКI

Павел Николаевич ЛЁГКИЙ

Position(s): minister counsellor at the Belarusian embassy in Moscow, Russia, Former First Deputy Minister of Information

DOB: 30.5.1972

POB: Baranavichy, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as First Deputy Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, and in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a minister counsellor at the Belarusian embassy in Moscow, Russia.

17.12.2020

65.

Ihar Uladzimiravich LUTSKY

Igor Vladimirovich LUTSKY

Iгар Уладзiмiравiч ЛУЦКI

Игорь Владимирович ЛУЦКИЙ

Position(s): Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Information

DOB: 31.10.1972

POB: Stolin, Brest Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Minister of Information, he was responsible for the repression of civil society, and in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.

17.12.2020

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66.

Andrei Ivanavich SHVED

Andrei Ivanovich SHVED

Андрэй Іванавіч ШВЕД

Андрей Иванович ШВЕД

Position(s): Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 21.4.1973

POB: Glushkovichi, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Prosecutor General, he is responsible for the ongoing repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and in particular the launching of numerous criminal proceedings against peaceful demonstrators, opposition leaders and journalists in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections. He also made public statements threatening participants in ‘unauthorised rallies’ with punishment.

17.12.2020

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67.

Genadz Andreevich BOGDAN

Gennady Andreievich BOGDAN

Генадзь Андрэевiч БОГДАН

Геннадий Андреевич БОГДАН

Position(s): Former Deputy Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate

DOB: 8.1.1977

Gender: male

In his former position of Deputy Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate, he oversees the functioning of numerous enterprises. The body under his leadership provides financial, material and technical, social, household and medical support to the State apparatus and republican authorities. He is closely associated with the President and continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

68.

Ihar Paulavich BURMISTRAU

Igor Pavlovich BURMISTROV

Iгар Паўлавiч БУРМIСТРАЎ

Игорь Павлович БУРМИСТРОВ

Position(s): Former Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 30.9.1968

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Internal Troops under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He was passed to the military reserve. He has the right to wear military uniform and insignia.

17.12.2020

69.

Arciom Kanstantinavich DUNKA

Artem Konstantinovich DUNKO

Арцём Канстанцiнавiч ДУНЬКА

Артем Константинович ДУНЬКО

Position(s): Deputy Head of the Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast Office of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee, former Senior Inspector for Special Matters of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee

DOB: 8.6.1990

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Senior Inspector for Special Matters of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched into opposition leaders and activists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Deputy Head of the Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast Office of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee.

17.12.2020

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70.

Aleh Heorhievich KARAZIEI

Oleg Georgievich KARAZEI

Алег Георгiевiч КАРАЗЕЙ

Олег Георгиевич КАРАЗЕЙ

Position(s): Former Head of the Prevention Department of the Main Department of Law Enforcement and Prevention of the Public Security Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Associate professor at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 1.1.1979

POB: Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Head of the Prevention Department of the Main Department of Law Enforcement and Prevention of the Public Security Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as associate professor at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

17.12.2020

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71.

Dzmitry Aliaksandravich KURYAN

Dmitry Alexandrovich KURYAN

Дзмiтрый Аляксандравiч КУРЬЯН

Дмитрий Александрович КУРЬЯН

Position(s): Deputy Head of the public militia of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Colonel, former Deputy Head of the Main Department and Head of the Department of Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 3.10.1974

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Deputy Head of the Main Department and Head of the Department of Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Deputy Head of the public militia of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and retains the rank of Police Colonel.

17.12.2020

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72.

Aliaksandr Henrykavich TURCHIN

Alexander (Alexandr) Henrihovich TURCHIN

Аляксандр Генрыхавіч ТУРЧЫН

Александр Генрихович ТУРЧИН

Position(s): Chairman of Minsk Regional Executive Committee

DOB: 2.7.1975

POB: Novogrudok, Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as the Chairman of Minsk Regional Executive Committee, he is responsible for overseeing local administration, including a number of committees. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

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73.

Dzmitry Mikalaevich SHUMILIN

Dmitry Nikolayevich SHUMILIN

Дзмiтрый Мiкалаевiч ШУМIЛIН

Дмитрий Николаевич ШУМИЛИН

Position(s): Deputy Head of the Directorate for the Protection of Law and Order and Prevention, former Deputy Head of the department for mass events of the GUVD (Main Department of Internal Affairs) of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 26.7.1977

Gender: male

In his former position as Deputy Head of the department for mass events of the GUVD of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He was documented as personally taking part in the unlawful detention of peaceful protesters.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Head of the Directorate for the Protection of Law and Order and Prevention of the GUVD (Main Department of Internal Affairs) of the Minsk City Executive Committee.

17.12.2020

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74.

Vital Ivanavich STASIUKEVICH

Vitalyi Ivanovich STASIUKEVICH

Віталь Іванавіч СТАСЮКЕВІЧ

Виталий Иванович СТАСЮКЕВИЧ

Position(s): Deputy Chief of the Public Security Police in Grodno/Hrodna

DOB: 5.3.1976

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Chief of the Public Security Police in Grodno/Hrodna, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised the unlawful detention of peaceful protesters.

17.12.2020

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75.

Siarhei Leanidavich KALINNIK

Sergei Leonidovich KALINNIK

Сяргей Леанiдавiч КАЛИННИК

Сергей Леонидович КАЛИННИК

Position(s): Deputy Head of Criminal Police in the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee, former Police Colonel, Chief of the Sovetsky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 23.7.1979

Gender: male

In his former position as Chief of the Sovetsky District Police Department of Minsk, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised and took part in torturing unlawfully detained protesters.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Deputy Head of Criminal Police in the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive. Committee.

17.12.2020

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76.

Vadzim Siarhaevich PRYGARA

Vadim Sergeyevich PRIGARA

Вадзім Сяргеевіч ПРЫГАРА

Вадим Сергеевич ПРИГАРА

Position(s): Police Lieutenant Colonel, Head of the District Police Department in Molodechno

DOB: 31.10.1980

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the District Police Department in Molodechno, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised beatings of unlawfully detained protesters. He also made numerous derogatory statements about the protesters to the media.

17.12.2020

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77.

Viktar Ivanavich STANISLAUCHYK

Viktor Ivanovich STANISLAVCHIK

Вiктар Iванавiч СТАНIСЛАЎЧЫК

Виктор Иванович СТАНИСЛАВЧИК

Position(s): Former Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Sovetsky District of Minsk, Head of the Public Security Police

First Deputy Head of the Centre of Advanced Studies and Specialists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 27.1.1971

Gender: male

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Sovetsky District of Minsk and Head of the Public Security Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised the detention of peaceful protesters and beatings of those unlawfully detained.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the First Deputy Head of the Centre of Advanced Studies and Specialists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

17.12.2020

▼M53

78.

Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich PIETRASH

Alexander (Alexandr) Alexandrovich PETRASH

Аляксандр Аляксандравiч ПЕТРАШ

Александр Александрович ПЕТРАШ

Position(s): Chairman of the Tsentralny District Court in Minsk, former Chairman of the Moskovski district court in Minsk

DOB: 16.5.1988

Gender: male

In his former position as chairman of the Moskovski district court in Minsk, he was responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence and reliance on statements from false witnesses were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

He was instrumental in fining and detaining protesters, journalists and opposition leaders in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

He is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as chairman of the Tsentralny District Court in Minsk.

17.12.2020

▼M35

79.

Andrei Aliaksandravich LAHUNOVICH

Andrei Alexandrovich LAHUNOVICH

Андрэй Аляксандравіч ЛАГУНОВІЧ

Андрей Александрович ЛАГУНОВИЧ

Position(s): Judge of the Sovetsky district court in Gomel/Homyel

Gender: male

In his position as judge of the Sovetsky district court in Gomel/Homyel, he is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

He is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

80.

Alena Vasileuna LITVINA

Elena Vasilevna LITVINA

Алена Васільеўна ЛІТВІНА

Елена Васильевна ЛИТВИНА

Position(s): Judge of the Leninsky district court in Mogilev/Mahiliou

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Leninsky district court in Mogilev/Mahiliou, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

81.

Victoria Valeryeuna SHABUNYA

Victoria Valerevna SHABUNYA

Вікторыя Валер’еўна ШАБУНЯ

Виктория Валерьевна ШАБУНЯ

Position(s): Judge of the Central district court in Minsk

DOB: 27.2.1974

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Central district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Sergei Dylevsky – Coordination Council member and leader of a strike committee. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

82.

Alena Aliaksandravna ZHYVITSA

Elena Alexandrovna ZHYVITSA

Алена Аляксандравна ЖЫВІЦА

Елена Александровна ЖИВИЦА

Position(s): Judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk

DOB: 9.4.1990

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

83.

Natallia Anatolievna DZIADKOVA

Natalia Anatolievna DEDKOVA

Наталля Анатольеўна ДЗЯДКОВА

Наталья Анатольевна ДЕДКОВА

Position(s): Judge of the Partizanski district court in Minsk

DOB: 2.12.1979

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Partizanski district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Coordination Council leader Mariya Kalesnikava. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

84.

Maryna Arkadzeuna FIODARAVA

Marina Arkadievna FEDOROVA

Марына Аркадзьеўна ФЁДАРАВА

Марина Аркадьевна ФЕДОРОВА

Position(s): Judge of the Sovetsky district court in Minsk

DOB: 11.9.1965

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Sovetsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

▼M53

85.

Yulia Chaslavauna HUSTYR

Yulia Cheslavovna HUSTYR

Юлiя Чаславаўна ГУСТЫР

Юлия Чеславовна ГУСТЫР

Position(s): lawyer at the legal aid office of the Kastrychnitski district in Minsk, former Judge of the Central district court in Minsk

DOB: 14.1.1984

Gender: female

In her former position as judge of the Central district court in Minsk, she was responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as lawyer at the legal aid office of the Kastrychnitski district in Minsk.

17.12.2020

▼M35

86.

Alena Tsimafeeuna NYAKRASAVA

Elena Timofeyevna NEKRASOVA

Алена Цімафееўна НЯКРАСАВА

Елена Тимофеевна НЕКРАСОВА

Position(s): Judge of the Zavodsky district court in Minsk

DOB: 26.11.1974

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Zavodsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

▼M56

87.

Aliaksandr Vasilevich SHAKUTSIN

Aleksandr Vasilevich SHAKUTIN

Аляксандр Васiльевiч ШАКУЦIН

Александр Васильевич ШАКУТИН

Position(s): Businessman, chairman of the board of directors of Amkodor holding, shareholder of SV Maschinen GmbH, UAB EM System, Anulatrans SIA, Amkodor-Tsentr, OOO PMI Inzhiniring

DOB: 12.1.1959

POB: Bolshoe Babino, Orsha Rayon, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

He is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, with business interests in construction, machine building, agriculture and other sectors.

He is reported to be one of the persons who has benefitted most from privatisation during Lukashenka’s tenure as President. He is also a former member of the presidium of the pro-Lukashenka public association ‘Belaya Rus’ and a former member of the Council for the Development of Entrepreneurship in the Republic of Belarus.

In July 2020, he made public comments condemning the opposition protests in Belarus, thus supporting the Lukashenka regime’s policy of repression towards peaceful protesters, democratic opposition and civil society.

He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

He maintains business interests in Belarus.

17.12.2020

▼M35

88.

Mikalai Mikalaevich VARABEI/VERABEI

Nikolay Nikolaevich VOROBEY

Мiкалай Мiкалаевiч ВАРАБЕЙ/ВЕРАБЕЙ

Николай Николаевич ВОРОБЕЙ

Position(s): Businessman, co-owner of Bremino Group

DOB: 4.5.1963

POB: Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

He is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, and has had business interests in petroleum, coal transit, banking and other sectors.

He is the co-owner of Bremino Group – a company that has enjoyed tax breaks and other forms of support from the Belarusian administration. His company BelKazTrans was granted an exclusive right to transfer coal through Belarus. In December 2020 he transferred some of his assets to his close business associates. According to media reports he still controls companies Interservice and Oil Bitumen Plant. He maintains business activities and close relations with authorities in Belarus and gave two luxury cars to Lukashenka. He also has business interests in Ukraine and Russia.

He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

▼M38

89.

Natallia Mikhailauna BUHUK

Natalia Mikhailovna BUGUK

Наталля Мiхайлаўна БУГУК

Наталья Михайловна БУГУК

Position: judge of the Minsk City Court, former judge at the Fruzensky district court in Minsk

DOB: 19.12.1989

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her former position as judge at the Fruzensky district court in Minsk, Natallia Buhuk was responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova. Violations of rights of defence and of right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a judge of the Minsk City Court.

21.6.2021

90.

Alina Siarhieeuna KASIANCHYK

Alina Sergeevna KASYANCHYK

Алiна Сяргееўна КАСЬЯНЧЫК

Алина Сергеевна КАСЬЯНЧИК

Position: prosecutor at the Minsk City Prosecutor’s Office, former Assistant Prosecutor at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk

DOB: 12.3.1998

POB:

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her former position as assistant prosecutor at the Fruzensky District Court in Minsk, Alina Kasianchyk has represented the Lukashenka regime in politically motivated cases against journalists, activists and protesters. In particular, she has prosecuted journalists Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova for recording peaceful protests, based on the groundless charges of ‘conspiracy’ and ‘violating public order’. She has also prosecuted members of Belarusian civil society e.g. for taking part in peaceful protests, and paying tribute to murdered protester Aliaksandr Taraikousky. She has continuously asked the judge for long-term prison sentences.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a prosecutor at the Minsk City Prosecutor’s Office.

21.6.2021

91.

Ihar Viktaravich KURYLOVICH

Igor Viktorovich KURILOVICH

Iгар Вiĸтаравiч КУРЫЛОВIЧ,

Игорь Викторович КУРИЛОВИЧ

Senior Investigator of the Frunzensky District Department of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 26.09.1990

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Senior Investigator at the Fruzensky District Court in Minsk, Ihar Kurylovich was involved in preparing a politically motivated criminal case against journalists Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova. The journalists, who recorded peaceful protests, were accused of violations of public order and sentenced to two years of prison.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

92.

Siarhei Viktaravich SHATSILA

Sergei Viktorovich SHATILO

Сяргей Віĸтаравіч ШАЦІЛА

Сергей Виĸторович ШАТИЛО

Judge at Sovetsky District Court in Minsk

DOB: 13.08.1989

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as judge of the Sovetsky District Court in Minsk, Siarhei Shatsila is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against protesters, in particular the sentencing of Natallia Hersche, Dzmitry Halko and Dzmitry Karatkevich, considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarusian human rights organisation.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

93.

Anastasia Vasileuna ACHALAVA

Anastasia Vasilievna ACHALOVA

Анастасія Васільеўна АЧАЛАВА

Анастасия Васильевна АЧАЛОВА

Judge at the Leninsky District Court in Minsk

DOB: 15.10.1992

POB: Minsk, Belarus

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as judge of the Leninsky District Court in Minsk, Anastasia Achalava is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Coordination Council member Dzmitry Kruk, as well as against medical personnel and senior citizens. Reliance on statements of anonymous witnesses was reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

94.

Mariya Viachaslavauna YAROKHINA

Maria Viacheslavovna YEROKHINA

Марыя Вячаславаўна ЯРОХІНА

Мария Вячеславовна ЕРОХИНА

Judge at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk

DOB: 04.07.1987

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as judge of the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk, Mariya Yerokhina is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, trade union activists, sportsmen and protesters, in particular the sentencing of journalist Uladzimir Hrydzin.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

95.

Yuliya Aliaksandrauna BLIZNIUK

Yuliya Aleksandrovna BLIZNIUK

Юлія Аляĸсандраўна БЛІЗНЮК

Юлия Алеĸсандровна БЛИЗНЮК

Deputy Chairwoman/judge at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk

DOB: 23.09.1971

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as Deputy Chairwoman and judge at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk, Yuliya Blizniuk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters, in particular sentencing activists Artsiom Khvashcheuski, Artsiom Sauchuk, Maksim Pauliushchyk. These persons are considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarusian human rights organization.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

96.

Anastasia Dzmitreuna KULIK

Anastasia Dmitrievna KULIK

Анастасія Дзмітрыеўна КУЛІК

Анастасия Дмитриевна КУЛИК

Judge of the Pervomaisky District Court of Minsk

DOB: 28.07.1989

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as judge of the Pervomaisky District Court of Minsk, Anastasia Kulik is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Aliaksandr Zakharevich, who is considered as a political prisoner by Viasna, a Belarusian human rights organization.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

97.

Maksim Leanidavich TRUSEVICH

Maksim Leonidovich TRUSEVICH

Маĸсім Леанідавіч ТРУСЕВІЧ

Маĸсим Леонидович ТРУСЕВИЧ

Judge of the Pervomaisky District Court of Minsk

DOB: 12.08.1989

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as judge at the Pervomaisky District Court in Minsk, Maksim Trusevich is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

98.

Tatsiana Yaraslavauna MATYL

Tatiana Yaroslavovna MOTYL

Тацяна Яраславаўна МАТЫЛЬ

Татьяна Ярославовна МОТЫЛЬ

Judge of the Moskovsky District Court of Minsk

DOB: 20.01.1968

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as judge at the Moskovsky District Court in Minsk, Tatsiana Matyl is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of opposition politician Mikalai Statkevich and journalist Alexander Borozenko. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

99.

Aliaksandr Anatolevich RUDZENKA

Aleksandr Anatolevich RUDENKO

Аляĸсандр Анатольевіч РУДЗЕНКА

Алеĸсандр Анатольевич РУДЕНКО

Deputy Chairman of the of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Minsk

DOB: 01.12.1981

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Deputy Chairman and judge of the Oktyabrsky District Court in Minsk, Aliaksandr Rudzenka is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters, in particular fining an elderly and disabled protester, as well as the sentencing of Lyudmila Kazak – the lawyer of Mariya Kalesnikava, Belarussian opposition leader. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

100.

Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich VOUK

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich VOLK

Аляĸсандр Аляĸсандравіч ВОЎК

Алеĸсандр Алеĸсандрович ВОЛК

Judge of the Sovetsky District Court of Minsk

DOB: 01.08.1979

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as judge of the Sovetsky District Court of Minsk, Aliaksandr Vouk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of sisters Anastasia and Victoria Mirontsev, considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

101.

Volha Siarheeuna NIABORSKAIA

Olga Sergeevna NEBORSKAIA

Вольга Сяргееўна НЯБОРСКАЯ

Ольга Сергеевна НЕБОРСКАЯ

Judge of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Minsk

DOB: 14.02.1991

POB:

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk, Volha Niaborskaya is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters and journalists, in particular the sentencing of Sofia Malashevich and Tikhon Kliukach, considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

102.

Marina Sviataslavauna ZAPASNIK

Marina Sviatoslavovna ZAPASNIK

Марына Святаславаўна ЗАПАСНІК

Марина Святославовна ЗАПАСНИК

Deputy Chairman of the Court of the Leninsky District of Minsk

DOB: 28.03.1982

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as Deputy Chairman and judge of the Court of the Leninsky District of Minsk, Marina Zapasnik is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of activists Vladislav Zenevich, Olga Pavlova, Olga Klaskovskaya, Viktar Barushka, Sergey Ratkevich, Aleksey Charvinskiy, Andrey Khrenkov, student Viktor Aktistov, and minor Maksim Babich. All are recognized as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

103.

Maksim Yurevich FILATAU

Maksim Yurevich FILATOV

Максім Юр'евіч Філатаў

Максим Юрьевич ФИЛАТОВ

Judge of the Lida City Court

DOB:

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the judge of Lida City Court, Maksim Filatau is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of activist Vitold Ashurok, who is recognized as political prisoner by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

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104.

Andrei Vaclavavich HRUSHKO

Andrei Vatslavovich GRUSHKO

Андрэй Вацлававiч ГРУШКО

Андрей Вацлавович ГРУШКО

Position: Deputy Chairman of the Leninsky District Court of Brest, former Judge of the Leninsky District Court of Brest

DOB: 24.1.1979

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as judge of the Leninsky District Court of Brest, Andrei Hrushko is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular by sentencing activists, recognized as political prisoners, and minors.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He currently serves as the Deputy Chairman of the Leninsky District Court of Brest.

21.6.2021

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105.

Dzmitry Iurevich HARA

Dmitry Iurevich GORA

Дзмітрый Юр'евіч ГАРА

Дмитрий Юрьевич ГОРА

Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Belarus (appointed on 11 March 2021)

Former Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus (until 11 March 2021)

DOB: 04.05.1970

In his position of Deputy Prosecutor General until March 2021, Dzmitry Hara bears responsibility for politically motivated criminal cases against peaceful protestors, members of the opposition, journalists, civil society and regular citizens. Mr Hara was also involved in initiating of politically motivated criminal proceedings against Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

POB: Tbilisi, former Georgian SSR (now Georgia)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

As the Head of the Intergovernmental Commission created by the Office of the General Prosecutor to investigate citizens' complaints about abuse of powers by law enforcement officers, Dzmitry Hara is responsible for inaction of this institution, since no case of such an investigation is known, despite applications for the initiation of criminal cases complaining about the use of violence, ill-treatment and torture.

As of March 2021, he is the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Belarus. In this position he is responsible for prosecuting human rights defenders and participants in peaceful protests.

 

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition

 

106.

Aliaksei Kanstantsinavich STUK

Alexey Konstantinovich STUK

Аляĸсей Канстанцінавіч СТУК

Алеĸсей Константинович СТУК

Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 1959

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position of Deputy Prosecutor General, Aliaksei Stuk bears responsibility for politically motivated criminal cases against opposition, journalists, civil society and regular citizens. He is responsible for tightening the Prosecutor's Office's control of citizens' activities in localities and work places and is responsible for applying excessive legal responsibilities on participants in peaceful protests. He publicly stated that the Office of Prosecutor General would work to identify "illegal" citizen associations and suppress their activities.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

107.

Genadz Iosifavich DYSKO

Gennadi Iosifovich DYSKO

Генадзь Іосіфавіч ДЫСКО

Геннадий Иосифович ДЫСКО

Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus, State Counselor of Justice of the 3rd class DOB: 22.03.1964

POB: Oshmyany, Hrodna region, (former USSR) now Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position of Deputy Prosecutor General, Genadz Dysko bears responsibility for politically motivated criminal cases against opposition, journalists, civil society and regular citizens. He was also involved in initiating of politically motivated criminal proceedings against Siarhei Tsikhanousky - opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

108.

Sviatlana, Anatoleuna LYUBETSKAYA

Svetlana Anatolevna LYUBETSKAYA

Святлана Анатольеўна ЛЮБЕЦКАЯ

Светлана Анатольевна ЛЮБЕЦКАЯ

Member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Chairperson of the Standing Commission on Law

DOB: 03.06.1971

POB: former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as Chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Law, Sviatlana Lyubetskaya is responsible for the adoption of the new Code of Administrative Infringements (entered into force on 1 March 2021) that authorises arbitrary arrests and imposed increased liability for participation in mass events, including for display of political symbols. Through these legislative activities, she is responsible for serious violations of human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. These legislative activities also seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

21.6.2021

109.

Aliaksei Uladzimiravich IAHORAU

Alexei Vladimirovich YEGOROV

Аляксей Уладзіміравіч ЯГОРАЎ

Алексей Владимирович ЕГОРОВ

Member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Deputy Chairperson of the Standing Commission on Law

DOB: 16.12.1969

In his position as Deputy Chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Law, Aliaksei Iahorau is responsible for the adoption of the new Code of Administrative Infringements (entered into force on 1 March 2021) that authorises arbitrary arrests and imposed increased liability for participation in mass events, including for display of political symbols. Through these legislative activities, he is responsible for serious violations of human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. These legislative activities also seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

POB: Novosokolniki, Pskov region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

 

 

110.

Aliaksandr Paulavich AMELIANIUK

Aleksandr Pavlovich OMELYANYUK

Аляксандр Паўлавіч АМЕЛЬЯНЮК

Александр Павлович ОМЕЛЬЯНЮК

Member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Deputy Chairperson of the Standing Commission on Law

DOB: 06.03.1964

In his position as Deputy Chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Law, Aliaksandr Amelianiuk is responsible for the adoption of the new Code of Administrative Infringements (entered into force on 1 March 2021) that authorises arbitrary arrests and imposed increased liability for participation in mass events, including display of political symbols. Through these legislative activities, he is responsible for serious violations of human rights, including the right to peaceful assembly, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. These legislative activities also seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

POB: Kobrin, Brest Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

 

 

111.

Andrei Mikalaevich MUKAVOZCHYK

Andrei Nikolaevich MUKOVOZCHYK

Андрэй Міĸалаевіч МУКАВОЗЧЫК

Андрей Ниĸолаевич МУКОВОЗЧИК

Political observer of "Belarus Today" ("Sovietskaia Belarus - Belarus Segodnya")

DOB: 13.06.1963

POB: Novosibirsk, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Andrei Mukavozchyk is one of the main propagandists of the Lukashenka regime publishing in "Belarus Today", the official newspaper of the Presidential Administration. In his articles, democratic opposition and civil society are systematically highlighted in a negative and derogatory way, using falsified information. He is one of the main sources of state propaganda, which supports and justifies the repression of the democratic opposition and of civil society.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Passport number: MP 3413113 and MP 2387911

In May 2020, Mukavozchyk became a recipient of the "Golden Pen" award from a pro-governmental organization Belarusian Union of Journalists. In December 2020, he received the prize "Golden Letter", handed over by representatives of the Belarussian Ministry of Information. In January 2021, Lukashenka signed a decree awarding Mukavozchyk a medal "For labour merits".

He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

 

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112.

Siarhei Aliaksandravich GUSACHENKA

Sergey Alexandrovich GUSACHENKO

Сяргей Аляксандравiч ГУСАЧЭНКА

Сергей Александрович ГУСАЧЕНКО

Position(s): Deputy Chair of the National State Television and Radio Company (Belteleradio Company)

DOB: 5.11.1983

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Tel. (office): +375 (17) 369-90-15

In his position as the Deputy Chair of Belteleradio Company (the National State Television and Radio Company), author and host of weekly propaganda television show Glavnyy efir, Siarhei Gusachenka has been willingly providing the Belarusian public with false information about the outcome of elections, protests, repressions perpetrated by the state authorities and activities of the Lukashenka regime that facilitate illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union. He is directly responsible for the way in which the state television presents information about the situation in the country, thus lending support to the authorities including Lukashenka.

He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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113.

Genadz Branislavavich DAVYDZKA

Gennadi Bronislavovich DAVYDKO

Генадзь Браніслававіч ДАВЫДЗЬКА

Геннадий Брониславович ДАВЫДЬКO

Member of the Chamber of Representatives, Chair of the Committee on Human Rights and Media

Chair of the Belarusian political organisation Belaya Rus

DOB: 29.09.1955

As the Chairman of Belaya Rus, a major pro-Lukashenka organization, Genadz Davydzka is one of the main propagandists of the regime. In his support for Lukashenka, he frequently used inflammatory language, and encouraged the violence of the state apparatus against peaceful protesters.

He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

POB: Popovka village, Senno/Sjanno, Vitebsk Region, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Passport MP2156098

 

 

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114.

Volha Mikalaeuna CHAMADANAVA

Olga Nikolaevna CHEMODANOVA

Вольга Мiĸалаеўна ЧАМАДАНАВА

Ольга Ниĸолаевна ЧЕМОДАНОВА

Position(s): Former Press Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus

Head of the Main Directorate for Ideology and Youth of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 13.10.1977

POB: Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Rank: Colonel

Passport: MC1405076

In her former position as the main media person of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, Volha Chamadanava played a key role in distorting and deflecting the facts regarding violence against protesters, as well as in spreading false information about them. She threatened peaceful protesters and continuously justified violence against them.

Since she has been a part of the security apparatus and has spoken on its behalf, she is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Head of the Main Directorate for Ideology and Youth of the Minsk City Executive Committee.

21.6.2021

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115.

Siarhei Ivanavich SKRYBA

Sergei Ivanovich SKRIBA

Сяргей Іванавіч СКРЫБА

Сергей Иванович СКРИБА

Vice Chancellor of the Belarusian State Economic University for Educational Work

DOB: 21.11.1964 / 1965

POB: Kletsk, Minsk Region, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

e-mail: skriba_s@bseu.by

In his position as Vice Chancellor of the Belarusian State Economic University (BSEU) for educational work, Siarhei Skryba is responsible for sanctions taken against students for their participation in peaceful protests, including their expulsion from university.

Some of these sanctions were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

116.

Siarhei Piatrovich, RUBNIKOVICH

Sergei Petrovich RUBNIKOVICH

Сяргей Пятровіч РУБНІКОВІЧ Сергей Петрович РУБНИКОВИЧ

Rector of the Belarusian State Medical University DOB: 1974

POB: Sharkauschyna, Vitebsk/ Viciebsk Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Rector of the Belarusian State Medical University, whose appointment was approved by Alexander Lukashenka, Siarhei Rubnikovich is responsible for the decision of University administration to expel students for taking part in peaceful protests. The expulsion orders were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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117.

Aliaksandr Henadzevich BAKHANOVICH

Aleksandr Gennadevich BAKHANOVICH

Аляĸсандр Генадзевiч БАХАНОВIЧ

Алеĸсандр Геннадьевич БАХАНОВИЧ

Position(s): First Deputy Minister of Education, former Rector of the Brest State Technical University

DOB: 1972

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as the Rector of the Brest State Technical University, whose appointment was approved by Alexander Lukashenka, Aliaksandr Bakhanovich was responsible for the decision of the university administration to expel students for taking part in peaceful protests. The expulsion orders were made following Lukashenka’s call on 27 October 2020 to expel from universities students taking part in protests and strikes. In January 2023, Aliaksandr Bakhanovich was appointed First Deputy Minister of Education of the Republic of Belarus.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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118.

Mikhail Ryhoravich BARAZNA

Mikhail Grigorevich BOROZNA

Міхаіл Рыгоравіч БАРАЗНА

Михаил Григорьевич БОРОЗНА

Rector of the Belarusian State Academy of Arts (BSAA)

DOB: 20.11.1962

POB: Rakusheva, Mahileu/ Mogiliev Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Rector of the Belarusian State Academy of Arts (BSAA), Mikhail Barazna is responsible for the decision of University administration to expel students for taking part in peaceful protests.

The expulsion orders were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

Mikhail Barazna is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

119.

Maksim Uladzimiravich RYZHANKOU

Maksim Vladimirovich RYZHENKOV

Максім Уладзіміравіч РЫЖАНКОЎ

Максим Владимирович РЫЖЕНКОВ

First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration

DOB: 19.06.1972

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Maksim Ryzhankou is closely associated with the President and responsible for ensuring the implementation of presidential powers in the field of domestic and foreign policy. For over 20 years of his career in the civil service of Belarus he has held a number of posts, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various embassies. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

120.

Dzmitry Aliaksandravich LUKASHENKA

Dmitry Aleksandrovich LUKASHENKO

Дзмітрый Аляксандравіч ЛУКАШЭНКА

Дмитрий Александрович ЛУКАШЕНКО

Businessman, chairman of President’s Sport Club

DOB: 23.03.1980

POB: Mogilev/ Mahiliou, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Dzmitry Lukashenka is Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s son and a businessman. He has been the chairman of the State-Public Association ‘Presidential Sport’s Club’ since 2005 and in 2020 he has been re-elected to this post. Through this entity, he conducts business and controls a number of enterprises. He was present on Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s secret inauguration in September 2020. He is therefore benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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121.

Liliya Valereuna LUKASHENKA (SIAMASHKA)

Liliya Valerevna LUKASHENKO (SEMASHKO)

Лiлiя Валер'еўна ЛУКАШЭНКА (СЯМАШКА)

Лилия Валерьевна ЛУКАШЕНКО (СЕМАШКО)

Position(s): Businesswoman, director of an art gallery

DOB: 29.10.1979

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 4291079A047PB1

Liliya Lukashenka is the wife of Viktar Lukashenka and daughter-in-law of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. She has been closely connected with a number of high-profile companies which have benefitted from the Lukashenka regime, including Dana Holdings / Dana Astra and Belkhudozhpromysly concern. She was present, alongside her husband Viktar Lukashenka, on Aliaksandr Lukashenka's secret inauguration in September 2020.

She is currently the director of the art gallery Art Chaos. Her business activities are promoted by regime-affiliated media.

She is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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122.

Valeri Valerevich IVANKOVICH

Valery Valerevich IVANKOVICH

Валерый Валер'евіч ІВАНКОВІЧ

Валерий Валерьевич ИВАНКОВИЧ

General Director of OJSC "MAZ".

DOB: 1971

POB: Novopolotsk, Belarusian SSR (Now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the General Director of OJSC ‘MAZ’, Valeri Ivankavich bears responsibility for the detention of MAZ workers within MAZ premises by security forces, and for firing MAZ employees who were participating in peaceful protests against the regime. He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

He was appointed by Lukashenka as a member of the commission tasked to draft amendments to the Belarus constitution. He therefore supports the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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123.

Aliaksandr Yauhenavich SHATROU

Alexander (Alexandr) Evgenevich SHATROV

Аляксандр Яўгенавiч ШАТРОЎ

Александр Евгеньевич ШАТРОВ

Position(s): Businessman, shareholder and former head of Synesis LLC

DOB: 9.11.1978

POB: former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Gender: male

Nationality: Russian, Belarusian

Personal ID: 3091178A002VF5

In his position as the former head and former majority shareholder of Synesis LLC, Alexander Shatrov was responsible for that company’s decision to provide Belarusian authorities with a surveillance platform, Kipod, which can search through and analyse video footage and employ facial recognition software. He is therefore contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition by the state apparatus. Synesis claims to have stopped providing the Belarusian authorities with the Kipod platform, but according to ByPOL reports Kipod is still used by the state securities agencies.

Synesis is one of the residents of the Hi-Tech Park, created by a decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and as such enjoys numerous benefits, including exemptions from income tax, VAT, offshore duty, customs duties and others.

Synesis LLC and its subsidiary Panoptes have benefitted from their participation in the Republican Safety Monitoring System. Other companies which have been owned or co-owned by Shatrov, such as BelBet and Synesis Sport, also benefit from government contracts.

He made public statements in which he criticised those protesting against the Lukashenka regime and put into perspective the lack of democracy in Belarus. He therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

He remains a shareholder of Synesis LLC.

21.6.2021

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124.

Siarhei Siamionavich TSIATSERYN

Sergei Semionovich TETERIN

Сяргей Сямёнавiч ЦЯЦЕРЫН

Сергей Семёнович ТЕТЕРИН

Position(s): Businessman, owner of BelGlobalStart, co-owner of VIBEL, former Chairman of the Belarusian Tennis Federation

DOB: 7.1.1961

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Siarhei Tsiatseryn is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, with business interests in the distribution of alcohol drinks (through his company BelGlobalStart), food products and furniture. He belongs to Lukashenka's inner circle.

In 2019, BelGlobalStart was granted an opportunity to start the construction of a multi-functional business centre in front of the presidential palace in Minsk. He co-owns the company VIBEL, which sells commercials on a number of Belarusian national TV channels. He was the chairman of the Belarusian Tennis Federation and Lukashenka's former aide for sports matters.

21.6.2021

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125.

Mikhail Safarbekovich GUTSERIEV

Микаил (Михаил) Сафарбекович ГУЦЕРИЕВ

Position(s): Businessman, shareholder and chairman of the board of executives of Slavkali, chairman of the board of directors and shareholder of: JSC Mospromstroi, Industrial Financial Group Safmar JSC, LLC Proekt Grad.

Member of the board of directors and shareholder of JSC NKNeftisa

►C11  DOB: 9.3.1958 ◄

POB: Akmolinsk, former USSR (now Kazakhstan)

Gender: male

Nationality: Russian

Mikhail Gutseriev is a prominent Russian businessman, with business interests in Belarus in the sectors of energy, potash, hospitality and others. He is a long-time acquaintance of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and thanks to that association has accumulated significant wealth and influence among the political elite in Belarus. Safmar, a company which has been controlled by Gutseriev, was the only Russian oil firm that carried on supplying oil to Belarusian refineries during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in early 2020.

Gutseriev also supported Lukashenka in disputes with Russia over oil deliveries. Gutseriev has been the chairman of the board of directors of, and a shareholder in, the Slavkali company, which is building the Nezhinsky potassium chloride mining and processing plant based on the Starobinsky potash salt deposit near Lyuban. It is the largest investment in Belarus, worth USD 2 billion. Lukashenka promised to rename the town of Lyuban ‘Gutserievsk’ in his honour.

His other businesses in Belarus have included fuelling stations and oil depots, a hotel, a business centre and an airport terminal in Minsk. Lukashenka came to Gutseriev’s defence after a criminal investigation was initiated against him in Russia. Lukashenka also thanked Gutseriev for his financial contributions to charity and investments worth billions of dollars in Belarus. Gutseriev is reported to have gifted Lukashenka luxurious presents.

Gutseriev also declared himself to be the owner of a residency which de facto belongs to Lukashenka, thus covering him up when journalists started to investigate Lukashenka’s assets. Gutseriev attended Lukashenka’s secret inauguration on 23 September 2020. In October 2020 Lukashenka and Gutseriev both appeared at the opening of an orthodox church, which the latter sponsored.

According to media reports, when the striking employees of Belarusian state-owned media were fired in August 2020, Russian media workers were flown to Belarus on board aircraft belonging to Gutseriev in order to replace the fired workers, and lodged in the Minsk Renaissance Hotel belonging to Gutseriev. Gutseriev assisted with the acquisition of CT scanners for Belarus during the COVID-19 crisis. Mikhail Gutseriev is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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126.

Aliaksey Ivanavich ALEKSIN

Alexei Ivanovich OLEKSIN

Аляксей Іванавіч АЛЕКСІН

Алексей Иванович ОЛЕКСИН

Businessman, Co-owner of Bremino Group,

DOB:

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Aliaksei Aleksin is one of the leading businessmen in Belarus, with business interests in the sectors of oil and energy, real estate, development, logistics, tobacco, retail, finance and others. He enjoys a close relationship with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his son and former National Security Advisor Viktar Lukashenka. He is active in the biker movement in Belarus, a hobby he shares with Viktar Lukashenka. His company owns property in ‘Alexandria 2’ (Mogilev region), commonly called ‘presidential residence’, where Aliaksandr Lukashenka is a frequent visitor.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is the co-owner of ‘Bremino Group’ – the initiator and co-administrator of the Bremino-Orsha special economic zone project, created by a presidential decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The company has received state support for developing the Bremino-Orsha zone, as well as a number of financial and tax advantages and other benefits. Aleksin and other owners of Bremino Group received support from Viktar Lukashenka.

 

 

 

 

 

Companies ‘Inter Tobacco’ and ‘Energo-Oil’, which belong to Aleksin and members of his close family, were given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, based on a decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and received state support for the creation of Tabakierka kiosks. He was allegedly involved in the establishment of the first government-approved private military company in Belarus ‘GardServis’, with reported links to the Belarussian security apparatus. He is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

 

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127.

Aliaksandr Mikalaevich ZAITSAU

Alexander (Alexandr) Nikolaevich ZAITSEV

Аляксандр Мiкалаевiч ЗАЙЦАЎ

Александр Николаевич ЗАЙЦЕВ

Position(s): Businessman, co-owner of Bremino Group and Sohra Group

DOB: 22.11.1976

POB: Ruzhany, Brest Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Aliaksandr Zaitsau is the former assistant of Viktar Lukashenka, son of and former Adviser on National Security to Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Through access to the Lukashenka family, Zaitsau obtains lucrative contracts for his businesses. He has had close ties with the Sohra Group that is granted the right to export state-owned enterprises' production (tractors and trucks) to the Gulf and African countries. He is also the co-owner and chairman of the Council of participants of Bremino Group. The company has received state support for developing the Bremino-Orsha zone, as well as a number of financial and tax advantages and other benefits. Zaitsau and other owners of Bremino Group received support from Viktar Lukashenka.

He therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

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128.

Ivan Branislavavich MYSLITSKI

Ivan Bronislavovich MYSLITSKIY

Іван Браніслававіч МЫСЛІЦКІ

Иван Брониславович МЫСЛИЦКИЙ

First Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department Of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 23.10.1976

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as First Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Ivan Myslitski is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

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129.

Aleh Mikalaevich, BELIAKOU

Oleg Nikolaevich BELIAKOV

Алег Мiĸалаевiч БЕЛЯКОЎ

Олег Ниĸолаевич БЕЛЯКОВ

Position: Head of the Department of ideological work and personnel support at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, former Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB:

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Aleh Beliakou was responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Department of ideological work and personnel support at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus.

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130.

Uladzislau Aliakseevich MANDRYK

Vladislav Alekseevich MANDRIK

Уладзіслаў Аляксеевіч МАНДРЫК

Владислав Алексеевич МАНДРИК

Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 04.07.1971

POB:

National ID: 3040771A125PB2; Passport: MP3810311.

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Uladzislau Mandryk is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorization of prisoners, corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

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131.

Andrei Mikalaevich DAILIDA

Andrei Nikolaevich DAILIDA

Андрэй Мiкалаевiч ДАЙЛIДА

Андрей Ниĸолаевич ДАЙЛИДА

Position: Head of the Rear Support Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, former Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 1.7.1974

POB:

Passport: KH2133825

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Andrei Dailida was responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorization of prisoners, corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture. For his work as Deputy head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he received, in December 2020, the Presidential Order for service to the Motherland and has therefore benefitted from the Lukashenka regime.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Rear Support Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus.

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132.

Aleh Mikalaevich LASHCHYNOUSKI

Oleg Nikolaevich LASHCHINOVSKII

Алег Мікалаевіч ЛАШЧЫНОЎСКІ

Олег Николаевич ЛАЩИНОВСКИЙ

Former Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 12.05.1963

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department that has authority over detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aleh Lashchynouski is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

In his former position, he bears responsibility for conditions in Belarusian prisons and the repressive measures taken there, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

133.

Zhana Uladzimirauna BATURYTSKAIA

Zhanna Vladimirovna BATURITSKAYA

Жана Уладзіміраўна БАТУРЫЦКАЯ

Жанна Владимировна БАТУРИЦКАЯ

Head of the Directorate of Sentence Enforcement of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 20.04.1972

POB:

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her position as Head of the Directorate of Sentence Enforcement of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Zhana Baturitskaia is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

In her position, she bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kind of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings, brutal torture.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

134.

Dzmitry Mikalaevich STREBKOU

Dmitry Nikolaevich STREBKOV

Дзмітрый Мікалаевіч СТРЭБКОЎ

Дмитрий Николаевич СТРЕБКОВ

Head of the Prison No. 8 in Zhodino

DOB: 19.03.1977

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Head of the Prison No. 8 in Zhodino, Dzmitry Strebkou is responsible for the appalling conditions in the detention centre and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in this detention facility, including in its temporary detention centre, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

135.

Yauhen Andreevich SHAPETSKA

Evgeniy Andreevich SHAPETKO

Яўген Андрэевіч ШАПЕЦЬКА

Евгений Андреевич ШАПЕТЬКО

Head of Akrestina isolation centre for offenders

DOB: 30.03.1989

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Akrestina Isolation Centre for Offenders, Yauhen Shapetska is responsible for appalling conditions in the isolation centre and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

136.

Ihar Ryhoravich KENIUKH

Igor Grigorevich KENIUKH

Ігар Рыгоравіч КЕНЮХ

Игорь Григорьевич КЕНЮХ

Head of Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre

DOB: 21.01.1980

POB: Gomel Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre, Ihar Keniukh is responsible for appalling conditions and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including beatings and torture, inflicted on citizens detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He exerted pressure on medical staff to remove doctors who sympathize with protesters. According to the testimony of multiple women included in the report of the Centre for Promotion of Women’s Rights, "Her Rights," the most inhumane treatment took place in the detention centre at Akrestina in Minsk, where the OMON policemen were especially cruel and used torture.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

137.

Hleb Uladzimiravich DRYL

Gleb Vladimirovich DRIL

Глеб Уладзіміравіч ДРЫЛЬ

Глеб Владимирович ДРИЛЬ

Deputy Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre

DOB: 12.05.1980

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Deputy Head of the Temporary Detention Centre, Hleb Dryl is responsible for the appalling conditions and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including beatings and torture, inflicted on citizens detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

According to witness testimonies, some of the women detained on 9-12 August 2020 were heavily beaten in the detention centres. According to the testimony of multiple women, included in the report of the Centre for Promotion of Women’s Rights ‘Her Rights’, the most inhumane treatment took place in the detention centre at Akrestina in Minsk, where the OMON policemen were especially cruel and used torture.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

138.

Uladzimir Iosifavich LAPYR

Vladimir Yosifovich LAPYR

Уладзімір Іосіфавіч ЛАПЫР

Владимир Иосифович ЛАПЫРЬ

Deputy Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre

DOB: 21.08.1977

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Deputy Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre, Uladzimir Lapyr is responsible for appalling conditions and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including beatings and torture, inflicted on citizens detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. According to the testimony of multiple women included in the report of the Centre for Promotion of Women’s Rights, "Her Rights," the most inhumane treatment took place in the detention centre at Akrestina in Minsk, where the OMON policemen were especially cruel and used torture.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

139.

Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich VASILIUK

Alexander (Alexandr) Vladimirovich VASILIUK

Аляксандр Уладзіміравіч ВАСІЛЮК

Александр Владимирович ВАСИЛЮК

Head of the Investigation team of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 08.05.1975

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Head of the Investigation team of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Aliaksandr Vasiliuk is responsible for politically-motivated prosecutions and detention, in particular of the opposition Coordination Council members, including Belarusian opposition leader Mariya Kalesnikava who is considered a political prisoner by human rights organisations. He is also responsible for the detention of several opposition media representatives.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

140.

Yauhen Anatolevich ARKHIREEU

Evgeniy Anatolevich ARKHIREEV

Яўген Анатольевіч АРХІРЭЕЎ

Евгений Анатольевич АРХИРЕЕВ

Head of the Main Investigation Department, Central Office of Investigative Committee

DOB: 1.07.1977

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Yauhen Arkhireeu is responsible for initiating and investigating politically-motivated criminal proceedings, in particular of the opposition Coordination Council members and other protesters. Such investigations are aimed at intimidating protesters, as well as criminalizing the participation in peaceful protests.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

141.

Aliaksei Iharavich KAURYZHKIN

Alexey Igorovich KOVRYZHKIN

Аляĸсей Ігаравіч КАЎРЫЖКІН

Алеĸсей Игоревич КОВРИЖКИН

Head of Investigation Team, Main Investigation Department, Investigative Committee

DOB: 03.11.1981

POB: Bobruisk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Investigation Team of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Aliaksei Kauryzhkin is responsible for politically motivated prosecutions and detention, in particular of members of Viktar Babarika's presidential campaign team and of Coordination Council members, including lawyer Maksim Znak who is considered a political prisoner by human rights organisations.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

142.

Aliaksandr Dzmitryevich AHAFONAU

Alexander (Alexandr) Dmitrievich AGAFONOV

Аляксандр Дзмітрыевіч АГАФОНАЎ

Александр Дмитриевич АГАФОНОВ

First Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department, Investigative Committee

DOB: 13.03.1982

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the First Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Aliaksandr Ahafonau is responsible for politically-motivated prosecutions and arrests of the presidential candidate Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya. and other political activists, including Mikalai Statkevich and Dzmitry Kazlou. Siarhei Tsikhanousky, Dzmitry Kazlou, and Mikalai Statkevich are recognised as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

143.

Kanstantsin Fiodaravich BYCHAK

Konstantin Fedorovich BYCHEK

Канстанцін Фёдаравіч БЫЧАК

Константин Фёдорович БЫЧЕК

Head of Division of the KGB Investigation Department

DOB: 20.09.1985

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Head of Division of the KGB Investigation Department, Kanstantin Bychak has supervised politically motivated investigation of presidential candidate Viktar Babarika. Babarika’s candidacy was rejected by the Central Election Commission. This decision was based on a report from the KGB and official TV statements of Bychak declaring Babarika guilty of money laundering while investigations were still ongoing.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

On October 26, 2020, Bychak threatened peaceful protestors on the governmental TV by stating that their actions would be classified as acts of terrorism.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of the democratic opposition and civil society.

 

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144.

Andrei Siarheevich BAKACH

Andrei Sergeevich BAKACH

Андрэй Сяргеевiч БАКАЧ

Андрей Сергеевич БАКАЧ

Position(s): Former Head of the Pervomaysky District Police Department of Minsk

First Deputy Head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Grodno/Hrodna Regional Executive Committee

DOB: 19.11.1983

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Pervomaysky District Administration in Minsk, Andrei Bakach was responsible for the actions of police forces belonging to that police precinct and for the actions occurring in the police station. During his time as Head, peaceful protesters in Minsk were subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment inside the police station under his control.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the First Deputy Head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Grodno/Hrodna Regional Executive Committee.

21.6.2021

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145.

Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich, PALULEKH

Aleksandr Vladimirovich POLULEKH

Аляксандр Уладзіміравіч ПАЛУЛЕХ

Александр Владимирович ПОЛУЛЕХ

Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 25.06.1979

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Frunzensky District Administration of Minsk, Aliaksandr Palulekh is responsible for the repression led by the police forces in this district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections, in particular with ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful protesters who were detained inside the police station under his control.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

146.

Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich ZAKHVITSEVICH

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ZAKHVITSEVICH

Аляксандр Аляксандравіч ЗАХВІЦЭВІЧ

Александр Александрович ЗАХВИЦЕВИЧ

Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 01.01.1977

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk Aliaksandr Zakhvitsevich supervises public security police and is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in the Frunzenskiy District in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in this district. Officers under Zakhvitsevich's supervision used torture against detainees.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

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147.

Siarhei Uladzimiravich USHAKOU

Sergei Vladimirovich USHAKOV

Сяргей Уладзiмiравiч УШАКОЎ

Сергей Владимирович УШАКОВ

Position(s): Head, and former Deputy Head, of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 22.8.1980

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as the Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk supervising criminal police, Siarhei Ushakou was responsible for the actions of his subordinates, especially inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in the Frunzensky District in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters. Officers under Ushakou’s direct supervision used torture against detainees.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He is currently the head of the Fruzensky District Police Department of Minsk.

21.6.2021

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148.

Siarhei Piatrovich ARTSIOMENKA

Sergei Petrovich ARTEMENKO / ARTIOMENKO

Сяргей Пятровіч АРЦЁМЕНКА

Сергей Петрович АРТЁМЕНКО

Deputy Head of the Pervomaisky Police District in Minsk

DOB: 26.03.1973

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Deputy Head of the Pervomaisky Police District in Minsk, supervising public security police, Siarhei Artemenko is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted, by his subordinates on citizens detained at the Pervomaiskiy District Police Department of Minsk that occurred in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters. One example is the mistreatment of Maksim Haroshin, a floral shop owner, who was arrested after he gave flowers to the participants of the Women's March on 13 October 2020. Artemenko exerted pressure on citizens not to participate in peaceful demonstrations.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

149.

Aliaksandr Mikhailavich RYDZETSKI

Aleksandr Mikhailovich RIDETSKIY

Аляксандр Міхайлавіч РЫДЗЕЦКІ

Александр Михайлович РИДЕЦКИЙ

Former Head of the Oktyabrskiy District Police Department of Minsk, Head of the Directorate of internal security of the State Forensic Examination Committee

DOB: 14.08.1978

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as the Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department of Minsk, Aliandsandr Rydzetski was responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted by his subordinates on citizens detained in that district in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

150.

Dzmitry Iauhenevich BURDZIUK

Dmitry Evgenevich BURDIUK

Дзмітрый Яўгеньевіч БУРДЗЮК

Дмитрий

Евгеньевич БУРДЮК

Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department, Former Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 31.01.1980

POB: Brest region, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk, Dzmitry Burdziuk was responsible for overseeing the severe beatings and torture of peaceful protesters and bystanders in that district in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

In December 2020 he was appointed Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal identification: 3310180C009PB7

Passport number: MP3567896

 

 

151.

Vital Vitalevich KAPILEVICH

Vitaliy Vitalevich KAPILEVICH

Віталь Вітальевіч КАПІЛЕВІЧ

Виталий Витальевич КАПИЛЕВИЧ

Head of the Leninsky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 26.11.1988

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Leninsky District Police Department of Minsk, Vital Kapilevich is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained at the Leninsky District Police Department. The detainees were denied medical help; paramedics who arrived at the Department were intimidated to prevent the provision of medical assistance to the detainees.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society.

21.6.2021

152.

Kiryl Stanislavavich KISLOU

Kirill Stanislavovich KISLOV

Кірыл Станіслававіч КІСЛОЎ

Кирилл Станиславович КИСЛОВ

Head of the Zavodsky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 02.01.1979

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Head of the Zavodsky District Police Department of Minsk, Kiryl Kislou is responsible for inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained at the premises of this police station. He is also responsible for mass repressions against peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights activists, workers, representatives of the academic community and bystanders, inflicted by his subordinates.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society.

21.6.2021

153.

Siarhei Aliaksandravich VAREIKA

Sergey Aleksandrovich VAREIKO

Сяргей Аляĸсандравіч ВАРЭЙКА

Сергей Алеĸсандрович ВАРЕЙКО

Head of Moskovski District Police Department of Minsk, former Deputy Head of the Zavodsky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 01.02.1980

POB:

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Zavodsky District Police Siarhei Vareika is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained on the premises of the Zavodsky District Police Department in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. He is also responsible for the actions of his subordinates, who took part in mass repressions against peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights activists, workers, representatives of the academic community and bystanders.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

On 21 December 2020 he was appointed Head of Moskovsky District Police Department of Minsk.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society.

 

154.

Siarhei Feliksavich DUBAVIK

Sergey Feliksovich DUBOVIK

Сяргей Феліĸсавіч ДУБАВІК

Сергей Фелиĸсович ДУБОВИК

Deputy Head of the Leninsky District Police Department

DOB: 01.02.1974

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Deputy Head of the Leninsky District Police Department, Siarhei Dubavik is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained on the premises of the Leninsky District Police Department in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. The detainees were denied medical help; paramedics who arrived at the Department were intimidated to prevent the provision of medical assistance to the detainees.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

He is also responsible for the actions of his subordinates, who took part in mass repressions against peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights activists, workers, representatives of the academic community and bystanders.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

155.

Aliaksandr Mechyslavavich ANDRYEUSKI

Alexander (Alexandr) Mechislavovich ANDRIEVSKII

Аляĸсандр Мечыслававіч АНДРЫЕЎСКІ

Алеĸсандр Мечиславович АНДРИЕВСКИЙ

Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 29.04.1982

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department in Minsk, Aliaksandr Andryeuski is responsible for inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained on the premises of the Fruzensky District Police Department in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. Detaineees were standing on their knees with heads down for hours, violently beaten, hit with a taser.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

156.

Vital Mikhailavich MAKRYTSKI

Vitalii Mikhailavich MAKRITSKII

Віталь Міхайлавіч МАКРЫЦКІ

Виталий

Михайлович МАКРИЦКИЙ

Deputy Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department of Minsk (Until December 17 2020). From December 17 2020 - the Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 17.02.1975

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as Deputy Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department of Minsk, Vital Makrytski was responsible for overseeing the severe beatings and torture of peaceful protesters and bystanders detained on the premises of this police department, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

In December 2020 he was promoted to the position of the Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

157.

Yauhen Aliakseevich URUBLEUSKI

Evgenii Alekseevich VRUBLEVSKII

Яўген Аляĸсеевіч УРУБЛЕЎСКІ

ЕвгенийАлеĸсеевич ВРУБЛЕВСКИЙ

Senior Police Sergeant of the Akrestina Offenders' Isolation Centre

DOB: 28.01 1966

POB:

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as a senior police sergeant of the Akrestina Offenders Isolation Centre. Yauhen Urubleuski is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in the Offenders’ Detention Centre. According to witnesses and media reports, he personally took part in brutal beatings of civilians detained in August 2020.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.

21.6.2021

158.

Mikalai Mikalaevich KARPIANKAU

Nikolai Nikolaevich KARPENKOV

Міĸалай Міĸалаевіч КАРПЯНКОЎ

Ниĸолай Ниĸолаевич КАРПЕНКОВ

Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Former Head of the Main Department for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 06.09.1968

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as the Head of the Main Department for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mikalai Karpiankau is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and for their arbitrary arrest and detention. Numerous testimonies, photo and video evidence indicate that the group under his command beat and arrested peaceful protestors, threatened them with firearms.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

On 6 September 2020, Karpiankou was filmed as he was smashing a glass door with a baton to the café where peaceful protestors were hiding and brutally detaining them. A recording has been published where he claimed his department would use firearms against the protestors.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

159.

Mikhail Viachaslavavich HRYB

Mikhail Viacheslavovich GRIB

Міхаіл Вячаслававіч ГРЫБ

Михаил Вячеславович ГРИБ

Head of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 29.07.1980

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Mikhail Hryb was Head of the Department of Internal Affairs in the Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee from March 2019 to October 2020, afterwards being appointed Head of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk city Executive Committee and assigned the title of major general of militia (police forces).

21.6.2021

 

 

 

 

In this capacity, he is responsible for the actions of police forces, respectively in the Vitebsk region until October 2020 and in Minsk since after October 2020, including violent repression of peaceful protesters and breaches of right to peaceful assembly and free speech, committed by police forces in Vitebsk and Minsk, in the aftermath of the 2020 Belarussian presidential elections.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

 

160.

Viktar Genadzevich KHRENIN

Viktor Gennadievich KHRENIN

Віктар Генадзевіч ХРЭНІН

Виктор Геннадиевич ХРЕНИН

Minister of Defense

DOB: 01.08.1971

POB: Navahrudak/ Novogrudek, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

Rank: Lieutanant General

BY passport number: KH2594621

In his position as Minister of Defense of Belarus since 20 January 2020, Viktar Khrenin is responsible for the decision taken by the Command of the Air Forces and Air Defence Forces, on Lukashenka's instructions, to dispatch military aircraft to escort the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

Personal identification: 3010871K003PB1

He has made several public statements, declaring readiness to use the army against peaceful protesters in August 2020 and likening protesters' use of the historical white-red-white flag to Nazi collaborators.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

 

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161.

Ihar Uladzimiravich HOLUB

Igor Vladimirovich GOLUB

Iгар Уладзiмiравiч ГОЛУБ

Игорь Владимирович ГОЛУБ

Position(s): Director of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, former Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence of the Armed Forces

DOB: 19.11.1967

POB: Chernigov, Chernigov kaya oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

Rank: Major General

BY passport number: KH2187962

Personal identification: 3191167E003PB1

In his former position as Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, Ihar Holub was responsible for the decision taken by the Command of the Air Forces and Air Defence Forces, on Lukashenka’s instructions, to dispatch military aircraft to escort the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021.

This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

Following the incident, Ihar Holub gave press statements together with Belarusian Ministry of Transport Aviation Department Director Artem Sikorsky justifying the actions of the Belarusian aviation authorities.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Director of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Belarus.

21.6.2021

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162.

Andrei Mikalaevich GURTSEVICH

Andrei Nikolaevich GURTSEVICH

Андрэй Мікалаевіч ГУРЦЕВИЧ

Андрей Николаевич ГУРЦЕВИЧ

Chief of the Main Staff, First Deputy Commander of the Air Force

DOB: 27.07.1971

POB: Baranovich, Brest Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

Rank: Major General

In his position as Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces, Andrei Gurtsevich is responsible for the decision taken by the Command of the Air Forces and Air Defence Forces, on Lukashenka's instructions, to dispatch military aircraft to escort the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

BY passport number: MP3849920

Personal identification: 3270771C016PB2

This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. Following the incident, he gave press statements justifying the actions of the Belarusian authorities.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

 

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163.

Leanid Mikalaevich CHURO

Leonid Nikolaevich CHURO

Леанiд Мiкалаевiч ЧУРО

Леонид Николаевич ЧУРО

Position(s): Chairman of the Republican Chess Federation – Public Association ‘Belarusian Chess Federation’, former Director General of BELAERONAVIGATSIA State-Owned Enterprise

DOB: 8.7.1956

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

BY passport number: P4289481

Personal identification: 3080756A068PB5

In his former position as Director General of the BELAERONAVIGATSIA State-Owned Enterprise, Leanid Churo was responsible for Belarusian air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the chairman of the Republican Chess Federation – Public Association ‘Belarusian Chess Federation’.

21.6.2021

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164.

Aliaksei Mikalaevich AURAMENKA

Alexey Nikolaevich AVRAMENKO

Аляксей Мікалаевіч АЎРАМЕНКА

Алексей Николаевич АВРАМЕНКО

Minister of Transport and Communications

DOB: 11.05.1977

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

BY passport number: MP3102183

Personal identification: 3110577A020PB2

In his position as Minister of Transport and Communications of Belarus, Aliaksei Auramenka is responsible for the state management in the sphere of civil aviation and supervision of air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. He is therefore responsible for repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

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165.

Artsiom Igaravich SIKORSKI

Artem Igorevich SIKORSKIY

Арцём Iгаравiч СIКОРСКI

Артем Игоревич СИКОРСКИЙ

Position(s): Director General of the BELAERONAVIGATSIA State-Owned Enterprise, former Director of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport and Communications

DOB: 1983

POB: Soligorsk, Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

BY passport number: MP3785448

Personal identification: 3240483A023PB7

In his former capacity as the Director of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Belarus, Artsiom Sikorski was responsible for state management in the sphere of civil aviation and supervision of air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk on 23 May 2021 without a proper justification. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining the opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition of Belarus.

Following the incident, he gave press statements together with Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, Ihar Holub, justifying the actions of the Belarusian aviation authorities.

He is therefore responsible for repression of civil society and democratic opposition and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Director General of the BELAERONAVIGATSIA State-Owned Enterprise.

21.6.2021

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166.

Aleh Siarheevich HAIDUKEVICH

Oleg Sergeevich GAIDUKEVICH

Алег Сяргеевіч ГАЙДУКЕВІЧ

Олег Сергеевич ГАЙДУКЕВИЧ

Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee on International Affairs in the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, member of the delegation of the National Assembly for contacts with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

DOB: 26.03.1977

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Aleh Haidukevich is the Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee on International Affairs in the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, member of the delegation of the National Assembly for contacts with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He made public statements, applauding diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was done without proper justification and was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

21.6.2021

 

 

 

Gender: Male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal identification: 3260377A081PB9

Passport number: MP2663333

Additionally, Aleh Haidukevich made public statements suggesting that Belarusian opposition leaders may be detained abroad and transported to Belarus ‘in a car trunk’, thus supporting the ongoing crackdown of security forces on Belarusian democratic opposition and journalists.

He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

 

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167.

Ihar Anatolevich KRUCHKOU

Igor Anatolevich KRIUCHKOV

Ігар Анатольевіч КРУЧКОЎ

Игорь Анатольевич КРЮЧКОВ

Head of Separate Service for Active Measures (ASAM) of the Special Forces of the State Border Committee

DOB: 13.4.1976

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3130476M077PB6

In his position as Head of Separate Service for Active Measures (ASAM) of the Special Forces of the State Border Committee, Ihar Kruchkou is responsible for actions of forces under his command, who are involved in the physical transportation of migrants inside Belarus to the border between Belarus and Union Member States. ASAM charges the transported migrants for the border crossing. Those actions are implemented as part of operation ‘Gate’.

He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

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168.

Anatol Piatrovich LAPO

Anatoliy Petrovich LAPPO

Анатоль Пятровiч ЛАПО/ЛАППО

Анатолии Петрович ЛАППО

Position(s): Former Lieutenant General and Chairman of the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus (appointed on 29 December 2016), Chief State Border Delegate

DOB: 24.5.1963

POB: Kulakovka, Mogilev Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Passport number: MP4098888

Personal ID: 3240563K033PB5

In his former position as Chairman of the State Border Committee, Anatol Lapo was responsible for actions of border control bodies under his command, whose border guards were documented as directing, guiding or forcing migrants to illegally cross the border between Belarus and Union Member States, and whose deliberate failure to carry out their duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross that border.

He is therefore responsible for organising activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

He was passed to the military reserve in May 2023.

2.12.2021

169.

Kanstantsin Henadzevich MOLASTAU

Konstantin Gennadevich MOLOSTOV

Канстанцiн Генадзьевiч МОЛАСТАЎ

Константин Геннадьевич МОЛОСТОВ

Position(s): Colonel, Chairman of the State Border Committee, former Head of the Grodno Border Group (appointed on 1 October 2014), Military Unit 2141, State Border Delegate

DOB: 30.5.1970

POB: Krasnoarmeysk, Saratov Region, Russian Federation

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Passport number: KH2479999

Personal ID: 3300570K025PB3

In his former position as Head of the Grodno Border Group, Kanstantsin Molastau was responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Grodno Border Group to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States.

He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

He was appointed by Lukashenka as the Chairman of the State Border Committee.

2.12.2021

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170.

Pavel Mikalaevich KHARCHANKA

Pavel Nikolaevich KHARCHENKO

Павел Мікалаевіч ХАРЧАНКА

Павел Николаевич ХАРЧЕНКО

Head of the Polotsk Border Detachment

DOB: 29.3.1981

POB: Chita, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Head of the Polotsk Border Detachment, Pavel Kharchanka is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Polotsk Border Detachment to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States.

He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

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171.

Ihar Mikalaevich GUTNIK

Igor Nikolaevich GUTNIK

Iгар Мiкалаевiч ГУТНIК

Игорь Николаевич ГУТНИК

Position(s): Colonel, Deputy Chairman of the State Border Committee, former Head of the Brest Border Group

DOB: 17.12.1974

POB: Village of Zabolotye, Smolevichi District, Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Address: 90 Heroes of Defense of the Brest Fortress St., 224018, Brest, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Passport number: BM1962867

In his former position as Head of the Brest Border Group, Ihar Gutnik, who in 2018 became a deputy of the Brest Regional Council as one of the candidates loyal to Lukashenka, was responsible for the actions of the border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Brest Border Group to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States.

He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

He was appointed by Lukashenka as Deputy Chairman of the State Border Committee.

2.12.2021

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172.

Aliaksandr Barysavich DAVIDZIUK

Aleksandr Borisovich DAVIDIUK

Аляксандр Барысавіч ДАВІДЗЮК

Александр Борисович ДАВИДЮК

Colonel, Head of the Lida Border Detachment, Military Unit 1234 (appointed on 27 September 2016), State Border Delegate

Member of Lida District Council of Deputies of the 28th convocation (took office on 2 February 2018)

DOB: 4.5.1973

POB: Novograd-Volynsky, Zhytomyr region, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Passport number: KH2613034

Personal ID : 3040573E050PB7

In his position as Head of the Lida Border Detachment, Aliaksandr Davidziuk is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Lida Border Detachment to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States. He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

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173.

Maksim Viktaravich BUTRANETS

Maxim Viktorovich BUTRANETS

Максiм Вiктаравiч БУТРАНЕЦ

Максим Викторович БУТРАНЕЦ

Position(s): Head of the Brest Border Group, former Head of the Smorgon Border Group, Military Unit 2044 (appointed in March 2018), State Border Delegate

DOB: 12.12.1978

POB: Sverdlovsk, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as Head of the Smorgon Border Group, Maksim Butranets was responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Smorgon Border Group to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States. Maksim Butranets also stated that the number of migrants at the Belarusian-Lithuanian border remained at the usual level, despite the substantial increase observed on the Lithuanian side. He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

He was appointed as the Head of the Brest Border Group.

2.12.2021

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174.

Anatol Anatolyevich GLAZ

Anatoliy Anatolyevich GLAZ

Анатоль Анатольевіч ГЛАЗ

Анатолий Анатольевич ГЛАЗ

Head of the Department of Information and Digital Diplomacy (spokesperson) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus

DOB: 31.7.1982

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Anatol Glaz has been Head of the Department of Information and Digital Diplomacy and Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus since 11 June 2018. In this capacity, he made a number of public statements, supporting the policy of the Lukashenka regime in its latest attempts to facilitate the illegal crossings of the external borders of Union Member States. He also publicly defended the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision had the aim of the arrest and detention of opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

2.12.2021

175.

Siarhei Aliaksandravich EPIKHAU

Sergei Aleksandrovich EPIKHOV

Сяргей Аляксандравіч ЕПІХАЎ

Сергей Александрович ЕПИХОВ

Judge at the Minsk Regional Court

DOB: 16.5.1966

Address: 38 Timoshenko St., apt. 198, Minsk, Belarus;

59 L.Tolstoy St., apt. 80, Vileika, Belarus;

14 Kedyshko St., apt. 11, Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID : 3160566B046PB4

In his position as judge at the Minsk Regional Court, Siarhei Epikhau is responsible for politically motivated rulings against opposition leaders and activists, in particular the sentencing of Maria Kolesnikova and Maksim Znak, who are considered as political prisoners by human rights organisations. Violations of rights of defence and of the right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

176.

Ihar Viachaslavavich LIUBAVITSKI

Igor Viacheslavovich LIUBOVITSKI

Ігар Вячаслававіч ЛЮБАВІЦКІ

Игорь Вячеславович ЛЮБОВИЦКИЙ

Judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 21.7.1983

Address: Vogel 1K St., apt. 17, Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3210783C002PB2

In his position as judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, Ihar Liubavitski is responsible for politically motivated rulings against opposition leaders, activists and journalists, in particular the sentencing of opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika, who is considered a political prisoner by human rights organisations.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

177.

Siarhei Siarheevich GIRGEL

Sergei Sergeevich GIRGEL

Сяргей Сяргеевіч ГIРГЕЛЬ

Сергей Сергеевич ГИРГЕЛЬ

Senior Prosecutor of the Department of Public Prosecution of the General Prosecutor’s Office

DOB: 16.6.1978

Address: 16 Lidskaya St., apt. 165, Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3160678H018PB5

In his position as the Senior Prosecutor of the Department of Public Prosecution of the General Prosecutor’s Office, Siarhei Girgel has represented the Lukashenka regime in politically motivated cases against opposition leaders and civil society members. In particular he has prosecuted the opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika, who is recognised as a political prisoner by human rights organisations. Siarhei Girgel has continuously asked the judge for long-term prison sentences.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

178.

Valiantsina Genadzeuna KULIK

Valentina Gennadevna KULIK

Валянціна Генадзьеўна КУЛІК

Валентина Геннадьевна КУЛИК

Judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 15.1.1960

Address: 54 Angarskaya St., apt. 48, Minsk, Belarus

►C5  Gender: female ◄

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 4150160A119PB2

In her position as judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, Valiantsina Kulik is responsible for politically motivated decisions against activists and opposition leaders. In particular she denied Viktar Babarika’s complaint to initiate a civil case based on his complaints against the Central Electoral Commission’s decision to refuse registration as a presidential candidate.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

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179.

Andrei Andreevich PRAKAPUK

Andrey Andreevich PROKOPUK

Андрэй Андрэевiч ПРАКАПУК

Андрей Андреевич ПРОКОПУК

Position: Director of the Republican Unitary Enterprise ‘Brest Center for Standardization, Metrology and Certification’, former Deputy Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee of the Republic of Belarus

Colonel of the Financial Police

DOB: 22.7.1973

POB: Kobrin, Brest region, Belarus

Address: 22 Mira St., apt. 88, Priluki, Minsk Region, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3220773C061PB1

In his former position as the Deputy Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Andrei Prakapuk was responsible for politically motivated campaigns of that department against journalists and independent Belarusian media outlets. He personally approved a decision to search the premises of independent media outlet TUT.by and initiated a court case into TUT.by and the journalists employed by TUT.by, as well as blocking access to the TUT.by website.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition as well as for seriously undermining the rule of law.

He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Director of the Republican Unitary Enterprise ‘Brest Center for Standardization, Metrology and Certification’.

2.12.2021

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180.

Ihar Anatolevich MARSHALAU

Igor Anatolevich MARSHALOV

Ігар Анатольевіч МАРШАЛАЎ

Игорь Анатольевич МАРШАЛОВ

Deputy Chairman of the State Control Committee, Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee

Major General of Financial Police

DOB: 12.1.1972

POB: Shkolv, Mogilev Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Address: 15 Shchukina St., Minsk, Belarus;

43A Franciska St., apt. 41, Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID : 3120172H018PB4

Ihar Marshalau is the Deputy Chairman of the State Control Committee of Belarus and Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee. In that position, he is responsible for initiating the politically motivated tax evasion case against the media outlet TUT.by, allegedly based on Article 243 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus, which threatens the freedom of media in Belarus. He is also responsible for the searches conducted in May 2021 at the office of TUT.by in Minsk, at regional offices and at the homes of several TUT.by staff.

He is also responsible for the detention of members of the Belarus Press Club in December 2020, a search and confiscation of items at the office of Rights of People with Disabilities including the violent interrogation of Aleh Hrableuski and Syarhei Drazdouski in January 2021, the detention of and tax evasion charges on member of the Coordination Council Liliya Ulasava, as well as the searches and detentions affecting employees of PandaDoc software company, who was running the initiative ‘Protect Belarus’, in September 2021.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition as well as for seriously undermining the rule of law.

2.12.2021

181.

Hanna Mikhailauna SAKALOUSKAYA

Anna Mikhaylovna SOKOLOVSKAYA

Ганна Міхайлаўна САКАЛОЎСКАЯ

Анна Михайловна СОКОЛОВСКАЯ

Judge of the Judicial Collegium for Civil Cases at the Supreme Court

DOB: 18.9.1955

Address: 22 Surhanava St., apt. 1, Minsk, Belarus

►C5  Gender: female ◄

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 4180955A015P80

In her position as judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, Hanna Sakalouskaya is responsible for the politically motivated decision to liquidate the Belarus PEN Center – a Belarusian civil society organisation. She is also responsible for a politically motivated decision leading up to the liquidation of the Belarus Helsinki Committee (BHC), as on 2 September 2021 she dismissed the complaint from BHC concerning the warning directed towards BHC by the Belarusian Ministry of Justice.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

182.

Marat Siarheevich MARKAU

Marat Sergeevich MARKOV

Марат Сяргеевіч МАРКАЎ

Марат Сергеевич МАРКОВ

Chairman of the Management Board of State-controlled TV channel ONT, host of the ‘Markov: Nothing Personal’ programme

DOB: 1.5.1969

POB: Luninets, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Marat Markau is the Chairman of the Management Board of State-controlled TV channel ONT and the host of the ‘Markov: Nothing Personal’ programme. In this position he has been willingly providing the Belarusian public with false information about the outcome of elections, protests and the repression perpetrated by the State authorities, and the circumstances of the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. He is directly responsible for the way in which the ONT channel presents information about the situation in the country, thus lending support to the authorities, including Lukashenka. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

Markov conducted the first forced interview with Raman Pratasevich, after Pratasevich was detained and according to numerous reports tortured by the Belarusian authorities. Markov also threatened and intimidated ONT workers who were striking in the wake of fraudulent 2020 presidential elections and authorities’ crackdown. He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

183.

Dzmitry Siarheevich KARSIUK

Dmitriy Sergeevich KARSIUK

Дзмітрый Сяргеевіч КАРСЮК

Дмитрий Сергеевич КАРСЮК

Judge at the Central District of the City of Minsk Court

DOB: 7.7.1995

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as judge at the Central District of the City of Minsk Court, Dzmitriy Karsiuk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Yahor Viarshynin, Pavel Lukoyanov, Artsiom Sakovich and Mikalai Shemetau, who are recognised as political prisoners by Belarusian Human rights organisation Viasna. He has sentenced people to penal colony, prison and house arrest for taking part in peaceful protests, posts on social media, use of the white-red-white flag of Belarus and other exercises of civil freedoms.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

2.12.2021

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184.

Ihar Vasilievich KARPENKA

Igor Vasilievich KARPENKO

Iгар Васiльевiч КАРПЕНКА

Игорь Васильевич КАРПЕНКО

Position(s): Chairperson of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda

DOB: 28.4.1964

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as Chairperson of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda since 13 December 2021, Ihar Karpenka is responsible for the organisation and holding of the constitutional referendum of 27 February 2022, which does not meet the international standards of rule of law, democracy and human rights and does not meet the criteria set by the Venice Commission. In particular, the drafting process was not transparent and did not involve civil society or the democratic opposition in exile.

He is therefore responsible for seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

3.6.2022

185.

Dzmitry Aliakseevich ALEKSIN

Dmitry Alexeevich OLEKSIN

Дзмiтрый Аляксеевiч АЛЕКСIН

Дмитрий Алексеевич ОЛЕКСИН

Position(s): Son of Aliaksei Aleksin, shareholder of Belneftgaz, Energo-Oil and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest)

DOB: 25.4.1987

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Dzmitry Aleksin is the son of Aliaksei Aleksin, a prominent Belarusian businessman. In 2021 he became the co-owner of companies owned by or associated with his father, including Energo-Oil, Belneftgaz and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest). Those companies were given preferential treatment based on presidential decrees signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka: Inter Tobacco was given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, while Belneftgaz was appointed national transit monitoring operator.

He is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

186.

Vital Aliakseevich ALEKSIN

Vitaliy Alexeevich OLEKSIN

Вiталь Аляксеевiч АЛЯКСIН

Виталий Алексеевич ОЛЕКСИН

Position(s): Son of Aliaksei Aleksin, shareholder of Belneftgaz, Energo-Oil and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest)

DOB: 29.8.1997

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Vital Aleksin is the son of Aliaksei Aleksin, a prominent Belarusian businessman. In 2021 he became the co-owner of companies owned by or associated with his father, including Energo-Oil, Belneftgaz and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest). Those companies were given preferential treatment based on presidential decrees signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka: Inter Tobacco was given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, while Belneftgaz was appointed national transit monitoring operator.

He is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

187.

Bogoljub KARIĆ

Богољуб КАРИЋ

Боголюб КАРИЧ

Position(s): Serbian businessman and politician, associated with the company Dana Holdings

DOB: 17.1.1954

POB: Peja/Pec, Kosovo

Gender: male

Nationality: Serbian

Passport number: 012830978 (valid until 27.12.2026)

Bogoljub Karić is a Serbian businessman and politician. Together with his family members, he developed a network of real estate companies in Belarus and has cultivated a network of contacts with the family of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. In particular, he has been closely associated with Dana Holdings and its former subsidiary Dana Astra, and he reportedly represented those entities during meetings with Lukashenka. The Minsk World project, which was developed by a company associated with Karić, was described by Lukashenka as ‘an example of cooperation of the Slavonic world’. Thanks to those close relationships with Lukashenka and his entourage, companies associated with Karić received preferential treatment from the Lukashenka regime, including tax breaks and plots of land for real estate development.

He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

188.

Andrii SICH

Andrey SYCH

Андрiй СИЧ

Андрей СЫЧ

Position(s): Co-host of programme ‘Platform’ on state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’

Member of organisation ‘Rusj molodaja’

DOB: 20.9.1990

POB: Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Andrii Sich is a co-host of the programme ‘Platform’ on state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’. In that position, he has supported regime narratives that aim to discredit independent media, undermine democracy and justify repression. He has supported the Lukashenka regime’s narrative about Western states’ intentions to organise a coup d’état in Belarus and called for harsh punishments for those allegedly involved, supported disinformation campaigns about mistreatment of migrants arriving in the Union from Belarus, and promoted the image of independent media as agents of foreign influence whose activity should be restricted.

He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

189.

Dzianis Aliaksandravich MIKUSHEU

Denis Alexandrovich MIKUSHEV

Дзянiс Аляксандравiч МIКУШЭЎ

Денис Александрович МИКУШЕВ

Position(s): Head of the Department for Supervision of Compliance with the Law of Court Decisions in Criminal Cases of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Gomel Region/Oblast; senior legal adviser

DOB: 21.3.1980

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Dzianis Mikusheu is the Head of the Department for Supervision of Compliance with the Law of Court Decisions in Criminal Cases of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Gomel Region/Oblast and senior legal adviser. In that position, he is responsible for initiating the prosecutions of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Artsiom Sakau, Dzmitry Papou, lhar Losik, Uladzimir Tsyhanovich and Mikalai Statkevich. He contributed to the arbitrary detention of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, as presented in the report by the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

3.6.2022

190.

Mikalai Ivanavich DOLIA

Nikolai Ivanovich DOLYA

Мiĸалай Iванавiч ДОЛЯ

Ниĸолай Иванович ДОЛЯ

Position(s): Judge at the Gomel Regional Court

DOB: 3.7.1979

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3070379H041PBI

Mikalai Dolia is a judge at the Gomel Regional Court. ln that position, he is responsible for sentencing Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Artsiom Sakau, Dzmitry Papou, lhar Losik, Uladzimir Tsyhanovich and Mikalai Statkevich to disproportionally lengthy prison terms. He contributed to the arbitrary detention of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, as presented in the report by the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

3.6.2022

191.

Andrei Yauhenavich PARSHYN

Andrei Yevgenevich PARSHIN

Андрэй Яўгенавiч ПАРШЫН

Андрей Евгеньевич ПАРШИН

Position(s): Head of the Main Department for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption in Belarus (GUBOPiK)

DOB: 19.2.1974

Address: 4A Skryganova St., Apt. 211, Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Andrei Parshyn is the Head of the Main Department for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption (GUBOPiK) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 2021. GUBOPiK is one of the main bodies responsible for political persecution in Belarus, including arbitrary and unlawful arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of activists and members of civil society.

GUBOPiK has published on its Telegram profile videos of forced confessions by Belarusian activists and ordinary citizens, exposing them to the Belarusian general public and using them as a tool for political pressure. GUBOPiK also detained Mark Bernstein, one of the top Russian-language Wikipedia editors, for publishing information on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, considered as anti-Russian ‘fake news’.

Andrei Parshyn is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.6.2022

192.

Ihar Piatrovich TUR

Igor Petrovich TUR

Iгар Пятровiч ТУР

Игорь Петрович ТУР

Position(s): Employee of state-owned television channel ‘ONT’, author and anchor of several programmes (‘Propaganda’, ‘To be completed’)

DOB: 26.3.1989

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Ihar Tur is an employee of the state-owned television channel ‘ONT’ and one of the main propagandists of the Lukashenka regime. He is the host of the ‘Propaganda’ programme, in which he calls for violence, discredits opposition activists and promotes videos with forced confessions from political prisoners. He is the author of a number of false reports on protests by the Belarusian opposition, and of disinformation regarding events in the Union and regarding attacks on civil society. He is also responsible for spreading disinformation and violence-inciting messages online. He was awarded a medal by Aliaksandr Lukashenka for his work in the media.

He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

193.

Lyudmila Leanidauna HLADKAYA

Lyudmila Leonidovna GLADKAYA

Людмiла Леанiдаўна ГЛАДКАЯ

Людмила Леонидовна ГЛАДКАЯ

Position(s): Special correspondent of ‘SB Belarus Segodnya’ newspaper, presenter on state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’

DOB: 30.6.1983

Address: 8A Vodolazhsky St., apt. 45, Minsk, Belarus

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Lyudmila Hladkaya is one of the most prominent propagandists of the Lukashenka regime. She is an employee of the newspaper ‘SB Belarus Segodnya’ and an associate of other pro-regime media, including state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’. She frequently uses hate speech and derogatory language while speaking of democratic opposition. She has also conducted numerous ‘interviews’ with unjustly detained Belarusian citizens, often students, showing them in humiliating situations and mocking them. She has promoted repression by the Belarusian security apparatus and taken part in disinformation and information manipulation campaigns. She is publicly voicing support for Aliaksandr Lukashenka and expressing pride in serving his regime. For her work, she has been publicly praised by and received awards from Lukashenka.

She is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

194.

Ryhor Yuryevich AZARONAK

Grigoriy Yurevich AZARYONOK

Рыгор Юр’евiч АЗАРОНАК

Григорий Юрьевич АЗАРЁНОК

Position(s): Employee of state-owned television channel ‘CTV’, author and host of several programmes (‘Secret Springs of Politics’, ‘Order of Judas’, ‘Panopticon’)

Rank: Lieutenant in reserve

DOB: 18.10.1995

POB: Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Ryhor Azaronak is one of the chief propagandists of the Lukashenka regime. He is a political columnist, author and the host of weekly propaganda shows on the state-owned television channel ‘CTV’. In his broadcasts he endorsed violence against dissenters of the Lukashenka regime, and systematically used derogatory language about activists, journalists and other opponents of the Lukashenka regime. He received an award with the medal ‘For Courage’ from Aliaksandr Lukashenka.

He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

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195.

Ivan Ivanavich GALAVATYI

Ivan Ivanovich GOLOVATY

Iван Iванавiч ГАЛАВАТЫ

Иван Иванович ГОЛОВАТЫЙ

Position(s): Director-General of the Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belaruskali’, Chairman of the supervisory board of JSC Belarussian Potash Company.

Member of the Standing Committee of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus for Foreign Affairs and National Security

DOB: 15.6.1976

POB: Pogost Settlement, Soligorsk District, Minsk Province, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Ivan Galavatyi is the director general of the state-owned enterprise Belaruskali, which is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenka regime. He is a member of the Council of the Republic and the National Assembly. He also holds multiple other high positions in Belarus and he has received multiple state awards, including from Lukashenka’s hands, during his career. He has been closely associated with Lukashenka and members of his family. He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

As director general of Belaruskali, Ivan Galavatyi is directly involved in the Lukashenka regime’s relocation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories in collaboration with Russia. Therefore, Ivan Galavatyi supports the Lukashenka regime.

The employees of OJSC ‘Belaruskali’ who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus, were deprived of premiums and laid off. Alexander Lukashenka himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine. Therefore, as the head of Belaruskali, Ivan Galavatyi is responsible for the repression of civil society.

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196.

Aliaksandr Uladzimirovich KARNIENKA

Alexander Vladimirovich KORNIENKO

Аляксандр Уладзiмiравiч КАРНIЕНКА

Александр Владимирович КОРНИЕНКО

Position(s): Former head of the Penal Colony IK-17 Shklov, Lieutenant Colonel of the Internal Service

Current position: District Inspector, Department of Internal Affairs of the Slutsk District Executive Committee

DOB: 9.1.1979

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position as former head of Penal Colony IK-17 in Shklov, Aliaksandr Karnienka is responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on the political prisoners and other citizens detained in that penal colony in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and the ensuing peaceful protests. He was the head of the penal colony at the time of the death of the political prisoner Vitold Ashurak in that penal colony on 21 May 2021, in unexplained circumstances.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

197.

Andrei Siarheevich PALCHIK

Andrei Sergeevich PALCHIK

Андрэй Сяргеевiч ПАЛЬЧЫК

Андрей Сергеевич ПАЛЬЧИК

Position(s): Former head of correctional colony No 1 in Novopolotsk

DOB: 3.3.1981

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his former position as head of correctional colony No 1 in Novopolotsk, Andrei Palchik has been responsible for and participated in the systematic practice of torture, ill-treatment and abusive punishments, including prolonged and repeated use of solitary confinement, against the political prisoners and other citizens detained in that penal colony, notably in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and the ensuing peaceful protests. As head of that penal colony, Andrei Palchik is not only responsible for ordering and supervising these abuses, but has a documented track record of personal involvement in acts of torture and violence against prisoners. During Andrei Palchik’s administration from 2017 until March 2023, correctional colony No 1 in Novopolotsk has become ill-famed for its extremely harsh detention conditions and the ill-treatment applied to the prisoners, many of them leading political activists and civil society representatives, detained for their opposition to President Lukashenka’s regime. After his transfer from Penal Colony No 1, Palchik continues to hold an active high-ranking position at another detention facility and therefore he continues to serve the repressive system.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of the civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

198.

Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich KAROL

Aleksandr Vladimirovich KAROL

Аляксандр Уладзiмiравiч КАРОЛЬ

Александр Владимирович КОРОЛЬ

Position(s): Senior Prosecutor of the Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office

DOB: 28.6.1992

POB: Bobruisk, Mogilev region, Republic of Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3280692M019PB8

In his position as Senior Prosecutor at the Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office of Belarus, Aliaksandr Karol is responsible for numerous politically-motivated criminal cases against Belarusian human rights defenders. In particular, he is involved in the politically motivated prosecution of representatives from the Belarusian human rights organization Viasna, including Viasna chairperson Ales Bialiatski, deputy chairperson Valiantsin Stefanovic, lawyer Uladzimir Labkovich, coordinator of Viasna’s network of volunteers Marfa Rabkova, head of Viasna’s office in Gomel, Leanid Sudalenka, and volunteer Andrei Chapiuk, as well as volunteer Tatsiana Lasitsa who was released from Gomel penal colony on 24 September 2022.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

199.

Mikhail Mikhailavich MURASHKIN

Mikhail Mikhailovich MURASHKIN

Мiхаiл Мiхайлавiч МУРАШКIН

Михаил Михайлович МУРАШКИН

Position(s): Former Deputy Head of the Municipal Department of Internal Affairs in Zhodino – Head of the Public Security Police; First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Borisov – Head of the Public Security Police as of 29.10.2021

DOB: 8.9.1989

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his capacity as former head of the Public Security Police in Zhodino, Mikhail Murashkin ordered the police troops and riot police, OMON, to brutally crack down on peaceful protests in the wake of the presidential elections in 2020, beating protesters and using violence against them. He is also involved in the unlawful repeated detention of independent journalists covering the protests in the lead-up to the presidential elections.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus. He continues to hold a similarly high-ranking position within the Department of Internal Affairs.

3.8.2023

200.

Mikalai Vasilievich MAKSIMAVICH

Nikolai Vasilievich MAKSIMOVICH

Мiкалай Васiльевiч МАКСIМАВIЧ

Николай Васильевич МАКСИМОВИЧ

Position(s): Deputy Chief of the Public Security Militia, Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee

DOB: 25.2.1977

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Address: Minsk, st. Yankee Brylya 21, apt. 224;

Minsk, st. Kolesnikova 32, apt. 3

Personal ID: 3250277M077PB2

In his capacity as Deputy Chief of the Public Security Militia, Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee, Mikalai Maksimavich is responsible for the brutal crackdown on peaceful protests in the run-up to the presidential elections in August 2020 and afterwards. He has personally given orders to the riot police, OMON, to violently suppress the demonstrations, detain the protesters and the independent journalists covering these events, and submit them to harsh conditions of detention.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

201.

Piotr Aleksandrovich ARLOU

Petr Aleksandrovich ORLOV

Пётр Александровiч АРЛОЎ

Петр Александрович ОРЛОВ

Position(s): Judge at the Minsk City Court

DOB: 6.4.1967

POB: Minsk, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 3040667A088PB0

Address: Minsk, st. Sharangovicha 78, apt. 60

In the position of judge at the Minsk City Court, Piotr Arlou has represented the Lukashenka regime in numerous politically motivated trials and is responsible for the lengthy verdicts in absentia against several members of the democratic opposition; Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (15 years), Pavel Latushka (18 years), and Volha Kavalkova, Maryia Maroz and Siarhei Dyleuski (12 years each).

Piotr Arlou is also responsible for the politically motivated conduct of trial and verdicts against blogger Eduard Palchys (13 years of imprisonment) and journalist Katsiaryna Andreyeva (two years). These verdicts are part a systematic denial of, and punishment for, the exercise of freedom of expression by the Belarusian authorities. Piotr Arlou’s verdicts are examples of the systemic repression of dissent.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights, the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and activities that seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

3.8.2023

202.

Ruslan Khikmetavich MASHADZEOU

Ruslan Khikmetovich MASHADIYEV

Руслан Хiкметовiч МАШАДЗЕЎ

Руслан Хикметович МАШАДИЕВ

Position(s): Former Deputy Head of Penal Colony No°1; Current Head of Penal Colony No°1

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position of Head and the former Deputy Head of Penal Colony No°1, Ruslan Mashadzeou is responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on the political prisoners and other citizens detained in that penal colony in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and in the ensuing peaceful protests. He was the head of the penal colony at the time of the death of the political prisoner Vitold Ashurak in that penal colony on 21 May 2021, in unexplained circumstances.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

203.

Siarhei Uladzimiravich KARCHEUSKY

Sergey Vladimirovitch KARCHEVSKIY

Сяргей Уладзiмiравiч КАРЧЭЎСКI

Сергей Владимирович КАРЧЕВСКИЙ

Position(s): Major and head of the regime department of Penal Colony No 17 Shklow

DOB: 15.6.1983

Address: 6 Fatina str, apt. 100, Mogilev, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal: 3150683MO74PB5

As head of the regime department of Penal Colony No 17 in Shklow, Siarhei Kharcheusky is directly responsible for the inhumane conditions of detention in the colony, for the violent practices and ill-treatment inflicted on prisoners, notably on political prisoners. He was personally involved in carrying out beatings and other acts of extreme violence against prisoners and he is directly involved in, and responsible for, the death of the political prisoner Vitold Ashurak in that penal colony on 21 May 2021.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

204.

Siarhei Vasilyevich MASLIUKOU

Sergey Vasilyevich MASLIUKOV

Сяргей Васiльевiч МАСЛЮКОЎ

Сергей Васильевич МАСЛЮКОВ

Position(s): Head colonel of the internal service of Educational Colony No.°2 in Bobruysk

POB: Shklov, Belarus

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Suspected address: Bobruysk

In his position of Head colonel of the internal service of Educational Colony No.°2 in Bobruysk, Siarhei Masliukou is responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment of minors. He is responsible for subjecting children to hunger, torture, forced work, and various forms of physical and psychological violence. He is also responsible for depriving underage convicts of access to medical care.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

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205.

Sviatlana Aliaksandrauna BANDARENKA

Svetlana Aleksandrovna BONDARENKO

Святлана Аляксандраўна БАНДАРЭНКА

Светлана Александровна БОНДАРЕНКО

Position(s): Judge of the Supreme Court of Belarus, former Judge at the court of the Moskovsky district of Minsk

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

In her former position as judge of the Moskovsky district of Minsk, Sviatlana Bandarenka was responsible for numerous politically-motivated rulings. She sentenced several Belarusian citizens for participating in protests and publishing anti-government comments on Telegram. She also sentenced the journalist Ekaterina Borisevich and the emergency hospital doctor Artyom Sorokin for disclosing medical secrets about Roman Bondarenko, who was beaten to death by the security forces.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

She was appointed by Lukashenka as judge of the Supreme Court of Belarus.

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206.

Sviatlana Paulauna PAKHODAVA

Svetlana Pavlovna POKHODOVA

Святлана Паўлаўна ПАХОДАВА

Светлана Павловна ПОХОДОВА

Position(s): Head of Penal Colony No.°4 for women in Gomel

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Suspected location: Gomel

In her position of Head of Penal Colony No.°4 for women in Gomel, Sviatlana Pakhodava is responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on the political prisoners and other citizens detained in that female penal colony. She was already the head of the penal colony at the time of the prosecution of Maria Kalesnikava, a political prisoner who was handed an 11-year custodial sentence for her participation in the protests against the authoritarian rule of Aliaksandr Lukashenko in the penal colony. She was deprived of all prisoner rights, including the right to consult a lawyer.

She is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

207.

Tatsiana Valerieuna PIROZHNIKAVA

Tatiana Valeryevna PIROZHNIKOVA

Таццяна Валер’еўна ПIРОЖНIКАВА

Татьяна Валерьевна ПИРОЖНИКОВА

Position(s): Judge at the court of the Moscovsky district of Minsk

DOB: 8.1.1987

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Personal ID: 4010887M019PB2

In her position as Judge of Moskovsky district of Minsk, Tatsiana Pirozhnikava sentenced several Belarusian citizens on political grounds, including for their participation in protests and for publishing anti-government comments on Telegram. She is documented as occasionally issuing heavier sentences than those requested by the prosecutor.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition In Belarus.

3.8.2023

208.

Tatsiana Aliaksandrauna GRAKUN

Tatyana Alexandrovna GRAKUN

Таццяна Аляксандраўна ГРАКУН

Татьяна Александровна ГРАКУН

Position(s): Senior Prosecutor of the Minsk Region Prosecutor’s Office for Supervision of Compliance with the Law of Court Decisions in Criminal Cases, Junior Counselor of Justice

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Tatsiana Grakun is a Belarusian prosecutor who serves in the Minsk Region Prosecutor’s Office. In this position, she has represented the Lukashenka regime in politically-motivated cases against journalists. In particular, she has prosecuted Maryna Zolatava, TUT.BY editor-in-chief, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison, and Liudmila Chekina, TUT.BY general director, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in March 2023, based on groundless charges of ‘harming to the national security of the Republic of Belarus’.

Tatsiana Grakun is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

209.

Valyantsina Mikalaeuna ZIANKEVICH

Valentina Nikolaevna ZENKEVICH

Валянцiна Мiкалаеўна ЗЯНКЕВIЧ

Валентина Николаевна ЗЕНЬКЕВИЧ

Position(s): Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Minsk City Court, Judge

DOB: 8.1.1969

Gender: female

Nationality: Belarusian

Valyantsina Ziankevich is a Belarusian judge who serves in a Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Minsk City Court. She has issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. She has convicted at least seven Belarusian citizens on political grounds, including Maryna Zolatava, TUT.BY editor-in-chief, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison, and Liudmila Chekina, TUT.BY general director, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in March 2023. She has a documented history of issuing politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities since 2022.

She is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

210.

Yauhen Valerievich BUBICH

Yevgeniy Valerievich BUBICH

Яўген Валер’евiч БУБIЧ

Евгений Валерьевич БУБИЧ

Position(s): Head of Penal Colony No.°2; Lieutenant colonel of the internal service

DOB: 3.6.1979

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

Address: Bobruysk, st. Kovzana 60, apartment 42;

Bobruysk, st. Kovzana 5/485;

Bobruysk, st. Internationalnaya 66B, apartment 31

In his position as head of Penal Colony No.°2 in Bobruysk, Yauhen Bubich is responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, forced work, physical and psychological violence, inflicted on prisoners.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

211.

Yuri Ivanavich VASILEVICH

Yuriy Ivanovich VASILEVICH

Юры Iванавiч ВАСIЛЕВIЧ

Юрий Иванович ВАСИЛЕВИЧ

Position(s): Head of Penal Colony No.°14 in Novosady

Gender: male

Nationality: Belarusian

In his position of Head of Penal Colony No.°14, Yuri Vasilevich is responsible for the mistreatment of the convicts detained under his jurisdiction, and for inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on the political prisoners and other citizens detained in that penal colony.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

212.

Raman Ivanavich BIZIUK

Roman Ivanovich BIZYUK

Раман Iванавiч БIЗЮК

Роман Иванович БИЗЮК

Position(s): Prosecutor

DOB: 25.3.1986

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Personal ID: 3250386H012PB7

Address: Minsk, 30 Masherova Ave., apt. 25

In the position of prosecutor at the Minsk Municipal Court, Raman Biziuk has represented the Lukashenka regime in numerous politically-motivated cases, in particular against Marfa Rabkova and Andrei Chapiuk, who receiving exceptionally lengthy verdicts of 15 and six years in prison, respectively, and their eight co-defendants who received prison verdicts of between five and 17 years.

Marfa Rabkova was imprisoned on politically-motivated charges of ‘training people to participate in mass riots or financing such activities’ for coordinating the volunteer service at the internationally recognized human rights group Viasna and organising the monitoring of the election in August 2020. She also documented cases of torture and other ill-treatment against detained protesters. Marfa Rabkova was one of the first members of Viasna to be targeted by the authorities with politically-motivated criminal charges after the protests in August 2020.

Andrei Chapiuk was charged for participation in a criminal organisation and the incitement of hatred, among other things, for his engagement in Viasna as a volunteer.

Their trial was held behind closed doors by request of prosecutor Raman Biziuk and approval by judge Siarhei Khrypach due to the alleged existence of ‘materials of extremist nature’ in the case.

Raman Biziuk is also responsible for the politically-motivated prosecution against the co-defendants in the same trial, namely Akihiro Haeuski-Hanada, Alyaksandr Frantaskevich, Alykaksei Galauko, Alyaksandr Kazlyanka, Pavel Shpteny, Mikita Dranets, Andrei Marach and Daniil Chul. He is also responsible for the politically-motivated charges against Andrei Linnik and Anton Bialenski as well as against Dzmitry Kanapelka, Vitalii Kavalenka, Tsimur Pipiya, Dzianis Boltuts, Vital Shyshlou and Emil Huseinau.

Raman Biziuk is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights, the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and activities that seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus.

3.8.2023

213.

Siarhei Fiodaravich KHRYPACH

Sergey Fedorovich KHRIPACH

Сяргей Фёдаравiч ХРЫПАЧ

Сергей Федорович ХРИПАЧ

Position(s): Judge at the Minsk Municipal Court

DOB: 16.4.1966

POB: Minsk, Belarus

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Personal ID: 3160466A077PB2

Address: Minsk, st. Odintsova 105, apt. 206

In the position of judge at the Minsk Municipal Court, Siarhei Khrypach has represented the Lukashenka regime in numerous politically-motivated cases, in particular against Marfa Rabkova, Andrei Chapiuk who received exceptionally lengthy sentences of 15 and six years in prison, respectively, and their eight co-defendants who received custodial sentences of between five to 17 years.

Marfa Rabkova was imprisoned on politically-motivated charges of ‘training people to participate in mass riots or financing such activities’, for coordinating the volunteer service at the internationally recognized human rights group Viasna and for organising the monitoring of the election in August 2020. She also documented cases of torture and other ill-treatment against detained protesters. Marfa Rabkova was one of the first members of Viasna to be targeted by the authorities with politically-motivated criminal charges after the protests in August 2020.

Andrei Chapiuk was charged for participation in a criminal organisation and the incitement of hatred among other things, for his engagement in Viasna as a volunteer.

Their trial was held behind closed doors by request of prosecutor Raman Biziuk and by approval of judge Siarhei Khrypach due to the alleged existence of ‘materials of extremist nature’ in the case.

Siarhei Khrypach is also responsible for the politically-motivated conduct of the trial and verdicts for the co-defendants in the same trial, namely Akihiro Haeuski-Hanada, Alyaksandr Frantaskevich, Alykaksei Galauko, Alyaksandr Kazlyanka, Pavel Shpteny, Mikita Dranets, Andrei Marach and Daniil Chul.

Siarhei Khrypach is also responsible for the politically-motivated verdict against Yegor Dudnikov in May 2021.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights, the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and activities that seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus.

3.8.2023

214.

Vadzim Frantzavich GIGIN

Vadim Franzevich GIGIN

Vadzim HIHIN

Вадзiм Францавiч ГIГIН

Вадим Францевич ГИГИН

Position(s): Director of the National Library of Belarus; former Head of the Belarus governmental society ‘Knowledge’, and Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Belarus State University, candidate of Historical Science

DOB: 21.10.1977

POB: Minsk, former Belarussian SSR (now Belarus)

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Vadzim Gigin is one of the most vocal and influential members of the Belarusian state propaganda system. He systematically supports the Lukashenka regime and often presents his views on the state TV channels ONT and Belarus 1. Vadzim Gigin has supported and justified the repression of democratic opposition and civil society and of independent media, in particular after the presidential elections in August 2020. Vadzim Gigin spreads his propaganda narratives on a ‘nazi regime in Ukraine’, discrediting the West and justification of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Until June 2023, Vadzim Gigin was the head of the Belarusian society ‘Knowledge’, which is known as a state-sponsored non-governmental organisation promoting Lukashenka and his regime. Gigin’s contribution to the regime has been acknowledged by Lukashenka in September 2021 when Gigin received the medal ‘For Labor Merits’. Furthermore, he was appointed in February 2023 as member of the Commission to consider appeals of Belarusian citizens abroad concerning offences committed by them, headed by Prosecutor General of Belarus Andrei Shved.

Therefore, Vadzim Gigin is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.8.2023

215.

Ksenia Piatrouna LEBEDZEVA

Ksenia Petrovna LEBEDEVA

Ксенiя Пятроўна ЛЕБЕДЗЕВА

Ксения Петровна ЛЕБЕДЕВА

Position(s): Propagandist and employee of the state channel ‘Belarus 1’ and in Belarus News Agency

DOB: 12.12.1987

POB: Mogilev, former Belarussian SSR (now Belarus)

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Ksenia Lebedzeva is one of the leading propagandists of the Lukashenka regime and is closely associated with regime media. She is Belarusian TV presenter at the state-owned ‘Belarus 1’ channel. Since July 2021, she has hosted the information and analytical programme ‘This is different’ at the state-owned ‘Belarus 1’ TV channel. In her column and reports for Belarus 1 TV channel, she promotes Russian propaganda regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and Belarus state propaganda directed against opposition and neighbouring countries. Ksenia Lebedzeva is promoting the idea that Ukraine, together with NATO, has been launching information and psychological special operations against Belarus since 2020 and the Lukashenka narrative that opposition representatives are financed by Western countries.

On 16.1. 2021, Ksenia Lebedzeva was awarded with gratitude by President Lukashenka for ‘a significant contribution to the implementation of state information policy, high professionalism, objective and comprehensive coverage of the events of the socio-political and socio-cultural life of the country’.

Therefore, Ksenia Lebedeva is benefiting from and supporting and the Lukashenka regime.

3.8.2023

216.

Zinaida Vasilieuna BALABALAVA

Zinaida Vasilievna BALABALAVA

Зiнаiда Васiльеўна БАЛАБАЛАВА

Зинаида Васильевна БАЛАБОЛАВА

Position(s): Judge at Navapolatsk City Court

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Navapolatsk City Court, Zinaida Balabalava is responsible for numerous politically-motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of union leader Volha Bytsikava and of activists Hanna Tukava and Andrei Halavyryn. She has subjected people to fines and arrests for publishing ‘no war’ signs or independent trial reporting.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

217.

Halina KNIZHONAK

Galina KNIZHONAK

Галiна КНIЖОНАК

Галина КНИЖОНАК

Position(s): Judge of Mazyr District Court

Gender: female

In her position as judge of Mazyr district court, Halina Knizhonak is responsible for numerous politically-motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Hleb Koipish, Uladzislau Hancharou, Aliaksandr Tsimashenka and Daniil Skipalski. She has sentenced people to terms of imprisonment for taking part in peaceful protests against the Lukashenka regime.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

218.

Hanna Barisauna LIAVUSIK

Anna Borisovna LEUSIK

Ганна Барысаўна ЛЯВУСIК

Анна Борисовна ЛЕУСИК

Position(s): Judge of Leninsky district court of Hrodna/Grodno

DOB: 7.10.1973

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Address: Grodno, st. Soviet Border Guards 120, apt. 47

Personal ID: 4071073K000PB2

In her position as judge of the Leninski district court of Hrodna, Hanna Liavusik is responsible for numerous politically-motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Alexander Tyelega. She has sentenced people to fines and prison terms for speaking up against violence and repression.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

219.

Henadz Ivanavich KUDLASEVICH

Gennadiy Ivanovich KUDLASEVICH

Генадзь Iванавiч КУДЛАСЕВIЧ

Геннадий Иванович КУДЛАСЕВИЧ

Position(s): Judge of Ivanovsky District Court

DOB: 5.5.1973

POB: Tereblychi, Stolin District, former Belarussian SSR (now Belarus)

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

In his position as judge of Ivanovsky District Court, Henadz Kudlasevich is responsible for numerous politically-motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Yuryi Holik. He has sentenced people to terms of imprisonment, house detention and fines for protesting against the government or for independent reporting.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

220.

Ina Leanidauna PAULOUSKAYA

Inna Leonidovna PAVLOVSKAYA

Iна Леанiдаўна ПАЎЛОЎСКАЯ

Инна Леонидовна ПАВЛОВСКАЯ

Position(s): Judge at Baranovichi District Court

DOB: 29.7.1975

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Address: Baranovichi, st. Mikolskaya 32

Personal ID: 4290775C016PB9

In her position as judge of Baranovichi District Court, Ina Paulouskaya is responsible for numerous politically-motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Vitaly Korsak and Anatoly Pugach. She has sentenced people to prison terms and fines for criticizing President Lukashenka and protesting against the outcome of the presidential elections of 2020.

She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

221.

Aliaksandr Mikalaevich TARAKANAU

Alexander Nikolaevich TARAKANOV

Аляксандр Мiкалаевiч ТАРАКАНАЎ

Александр Николаевич ТАРАКАНОВ

Position(s): Shklov District Court, Mogilev Region, Judge

DOB: 19.5.1965

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Aliaksandr Tarakanau is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Shklov District Court in Mogilev Region. He was appointed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka indefinitely in 2017. He mainly handed down sentences that increased the penalties against political opponents of the Belarusian authorities, especially in the context of changing sentences imposed to absolute imprisonment or a stricter regime for the serving of such sentences. Such a decision was made in the case of the philosopher and journalist Uladzimir Matskievich who is associated with the independent television channel Belsat.Aliaksandr Tarakanau is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

222.

Dzmitriy Vitalievich BUBENCHIK

Dmitriy Vitalievich BUBENCHIK

Дзмiтрый Вiтальевiч БУБЕНЧЫК

Дмитрий Витальевич БУБЕНЧИК

Position(s): Grodno Regional Court, Judge

DOB: 15.7.1985

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Dzmitriy Bubenchik is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Grodno District Court. He was appointed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. He issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. On 8 February 2023, he sentenced Andrzej Poczobut, an independent journalist and a Polish minority activist critical of the government of the Republic of Belarus, to eight years imprisonment.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

223.

Aleg Uladzimiravich KHOROSHKA

Oleg Vladimirovich KHOROSHKO

Алег Уладзiмiравiч ХОРОШКА

Олег Владимирович ХОРОШКО

Position(s): Gomel Regional Court, Judge

DOB: 22.5.1977

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Aleg Khoroshka is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Gomel District Court. He was appointed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. He issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities, which include a journalist of the independent TV station Belsat, Katsiaryna Andreyeva who received a sentence of eight years and three months in a penal colony.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

224.

Anastasia Uladzimirouna BENEDZISIUK

Anastasia Vladimirovna BENEDISYUK

Анастасiя Уладзiмipаўна БЕНЕДЗIСЮК

Анастасия Владимировна БЕНЕДИСЮК

Position(s): Head of the Reporters Department of the TV News Agency in National State TV channel Belarus 1 TV

DOB: 31.10.1992

POB: Oshmyan, Belarus

Nationality: Belarussian

Gender: female

Anastasia Benedzisiuk is one of the leading propagandists of the Lukashenka regime and the Head of the Reporters Department at the TV News Agency, preparing reportages for the Belarus 1 TV channel.

She hosts the information program ‘Plan B’ at the state-owned ‘Belarus 1’ TV channel. In her programme and reports for the Belarus 1 TV channel, she spreads Russian propaganda narratives about a ‘nazi regime in Ukraine’, the Ukrainian armed forces, as well as President Lukashenka’s propaganda against the Belarusian opposition and Kalinousky regiment. She also spreads propaganda against Western sanctions.

In 2023, Anastasia Benedzisiuk was given an official award with gratitude from Lukashenka for her ‘significant contribution to the implementation of state information policy, high professionalism, objective and comprehensive coverage of the events of the socio-political and socio-cultural life of the country’.

She is therefore benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.8.2023

225.

Yauhen PUSTAVY

Yevgeniy PUSTOVOY

Яўген ПУСТАВЫ

Евгений ПУСТОВОЙ

Function: Belarusian propagandist and broadcaster

DOB: 29.2.1984

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Yauhen Pustavy is a Belarussian propagandist working for Stolichnoye Televideniye, one of the three national television channels in Belarus, and for Minskaya Prauda, a state newspaper. He is responsible for disseminating propaganda in support of Lukashenka’s policies and which justifies Russia’ war of aggression against Ukraine. He was awarded by Lukashenka for his merits in the development of the State information policy. Moreover, he is member of theic State Commission aimed at verifying political refugees who wish to return to Belarus. This commission was created by Lukashenka with the political aim of portraying the refugees returning to Belarus as persons regretting their actions against the Lukashenka regime.

He is therefore benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.8.2023

226.

Alena Stanislavauna HARMASH

Alena Stanislavovna GORMASH

Алена Станiславаўна ГОРМАШ

Елена Станиславовна ГОРМАШ

Function: Court of Bobruisk District and Bobruisk, Judge

DOB: 10.9.1967

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Alena Harmash is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Court of the Bobruisk District and Bobruisk. She has issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. She convicted six opposition supporters and activists on political grounds. She has a documented history of having issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities since 2020.

She is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

227.

Andrei Ramanavich TARASEVICH

Andrei Romanovich TARASEVICH

Андрэй Раманавiч ТАРАСЕВIЧ

Андрей Романович ТАРАСЕВИЧ

Function: Glubokoye District Court, Judge

DOB: 10.11.1974

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Andrei Tarasevich is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Glubokoye District Court. He has issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. He convicted at least 13 Belarusian citizens on political grounds. He has a documented history of having issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities from 2017 to 2023.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

228.

Hanna Mikhailauna ASIPENKA

Anna Mikhailovna OSIPENKO

Ганна Мiхайлаўна АСIПЕНКА

Анна Михайловна ОСИПЕНКО

Function: Judge of Court of Bobruisk District and Bobruisk

DOB: 7.12.1982

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Hanna Asipenka is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Court of Bobruisk District and Bobruisk. She has issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. Between 2020 and 2023, she took an active part in the sentencing of political opponents of the regime. During that period, she handed down at least 13 sentences, including in the cases of two independent media journalists.

She is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

229.

Iryna Uladzimirauna PADKAVYRAVA

Irina Vladimirovna PODKOVYROVA

Iрына Уладзiмiраўна ПАДКАВЫРАВА

Ирина Владимировна ПОДКОВЫРОВА

Function: Prosecutor

DOB: 22.9.1972

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Iryna Padkavyrava is a Belarussian prosecutor. She has been associated with the prosecuting authorities since at least 2009, when she served as a senior prosecutor in the Gomel region. In 2022, she acted as a prosecutor in the trial of an independent journalist affiliated with TVP and Belsat TV. At the time, she requested a four-year prison sentence for the journalist. She also took part in the consideration of appeals against sentences handed down for posting entries on Belarusian social media which were unfavourable to the government and its officials. As a prosecutor, she supported the penalties, considering them adequate and fair.

She is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

230.

Ludmila Stsiapanauna VASHCHANKA

Ludmila Stiepanovna VASHCHENKO

Людмiла Сцяпанаўна ВАШЧАНКА

Людмила Степановна ВАЩЕНКО

Function: Judge of Glubokoye District Court

DOB: 22.9.1972

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Ludmila Vashchanka is a Belarussian judge who serves in Glubokoye District Court. She has issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. She has a documented history of having issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities from 2007 to 2023. During this period, she convicted at least nine Belarusian citizens, including opposition supporters and activists, on political grounds.

She is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

231.

Uladzimir Aliaksandravich DAVYDAU

Vladimir Alexandrovich DAVYDOV

Уладзiмiр Аляксандравiч ДАВЫДАЎ

Владимир Александрович ДАВЫДОВ

Function: Judge of Supreme Court of Belarus

DOB: 11.4.1967

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Uladzimir Davydau is a Belarussian judge who serves in the Supreme Court of Belarus. He was appointed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka indefinitely in 2014. Judge Davydau has mainly ruled on appeals regarding prison sentences for political activists and journalists. He has left those sentenced unchanged. Such a decision was made in the case of the Belsat journalist, Pavel Vinahradau.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

232.

Viachaslau Uladzimiravich YELISEENKA

Vyacheslav Vladimirovich ELISEENKO

Вячаслаў Уладзiмiравiч ЕЛIСЕЕНКА

Вячеслав Владимирович ЕЛИСЕЕНКО

Function: Judge of Dokshitsy District Court

DOB: 10.4.1979

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: male

Viachaslau Yeliseenka is a Belarussian judge who serves in a Dokshitsy District Court. He has issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities. He has convicted 10 Belarusian citizens on political grounds. He has a documented history of having issued politically-motivated rulings against the opponents of the Belarusian authorities since 2018.

He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

233.

Anton Uladzimiravich KALYAGA

Anton Vladimirovich KOLYAGO

Антон Уладзiмiравiч КАЛЯГА

Антон Владимирович КОЛЯГО

Function: Chief investigator – investigator for particularly important cases of the Main Directorate for the Investigation of Crimes in the Sphere of Organized Crime and Corruption of the Central Apparatus of the Investigative Committee, Major of Justice

DOB: 2.10.1989

POB: Minsk, Republic of Belarus

Nationality: Belarus

Gender: male

Anton Kalyaga is an investigator of the Main Directorate for Investigating Crimes in the Sphere of Organized Crime and Corruption of the Central Office of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Belarus. He conducts the criminal case against Viasna members. The judicial proceedings against Ales Bialiatski, Valianstin Stefanovich and Uladzimir Labkovich include numerous irregularities and the investigation period has been artificially extended by the authorities in an attempt to fabricate evidence, exceeding the time limit established by Belarusian law and international standards governing the right to a fair trial. The investigation and trial of the Viasna case did not comply with the rule of law.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

3.8.2023

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B.   Legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)

▼M45



 

Names

(Transliteration of Belarusian spelling)

(Transliteration of Russian spelling)

Names

(Belarusian spelling)

(Russian spelling)

Identifying information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

1.

Beltechexport

Белтехэкспорт

Address: Nezavisimosti Ave. 86-B, Minsk, Belarus

Website: https://bte.by/

E-mail address: mail@bte.by

Beltechexport is a private entity which exports weapons and military equipment produced by Belarusian state-owned companies to countries in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East. Beltechexport is closely associated with the Ministry of Defence of Belarus.

Beltechexport is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime, by bringing benefits to the presidential administration.

17.12.2020

2.

Dana Holdings

ТАА ‘Дана Холдынгз’

ООО ‘Дана Холдингз’

Address: Peter Mstislavets St. 9, pom. 3 (office 4), 220076 Minsk, Belarus

Registration number: 690611860

Websites: https://bir.by/; https://en.dana-holdings.com; https://dana-holdings.com/

E-mail address: info@bir.by

Tel.: +375 (29) 636-23-91

Dana Holdings is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company and its subsidiaries received development rights for plots of land and developed several large residential complexes and business centres.

Individuals reportedly representing Dana Holdings maintain close relations with President Lukashenka. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, had a high-ranking position in Dana Astra.

Dana Holdings is still active economically in Belarus.

Dana Holdings is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

3.

Dana Astra

ЗТАА ‘Дана Астра’

ИООО ‘Дана Астра’

Address: Peter Mstislavets St. 9, pom. 9-13, 220076 Minsk, Belarus

Registration number: 191295361

Websites: https://bir.by/; https://en.dana-holdings.com; https://dana-holdings.com/

E-mail address: PR@bir.by

Tel.: +375 (17) 269-32-60; +375 17 269-32-51

Dana Astra, previously a subsidiary of Dana Holdings, is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company received development rights for plots of land and is developing the multifunctional centre ‘Minsk World’, which is advertised by the company as the biggest investment of its kind in Europe.

Individuals reportedly representing Dana Astra maintain close relations with President Lukashenka. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, had a high-ranking position in the company.

Dana Astra is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

4.

GHU – Main Economic Department of the Presidential Administration

Главное хозяйственное управление

Address: Miasnikova St. 37, Minsk, Belarus

Website: http://ghu.by

E-mail address: ghu@ghu.by

Main Economic Department (GHU) of the Presidential Administration is the largest operator on the non-residential real estate market in the Republic of Belarus and a supervisor of numerous companies.

Victor Sheiman, who as the former head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate exercised direct control over GHU, was asked by President Aliaksandr Lukashenka to supervise the safety of the 2020 presidential elections.

GHU is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

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5.

SYNESIS LLC

ООО ‘Синезис’

Address: 220005, Minsk, Platonova 20B Belarus; Mantulinskaya 24, Moscow 123100, Russia.

Registration number (УНН/ИНН): 190950894 (Belarus); 7704734000/

770301001 (Russia).

Website: https://synesis.partners; https://synesis-group.com/

Tel. +375 (17) 240-36-50

Email address: yuriy.serbenkov@synesis.by

Synesis LLC has provided the Belarusian authorities with a Kipod surveillance platform, which can search through and analyse video footage and employ facial recognition software, making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition by the state apparatus in Belarus. The Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs have been listed as users of a system created by Synesis.

Synesis claims to have stopped providing the Belarusian authorities with the Kipod platform, but according to ByPOL reports Kipod is still used by the state securities agencies.

Synesis is one of the residents of the Hi-Tech Park, created by a decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and as such enjoys numerous benefits, including exemptions from income tax, VAT, offshore duty, customs duties and others.

The company is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

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6.

AGAT electromechanical Plant OJSC

Агат-электромеханический завод

Address: Nezavisimosti Ave. 115, 220114 Minsk, Belarus

Website: https://agat-emz.by/

E-mail address: marketing@agat-emz.by

Tel.:

+375 (17) 272-01-32;

+375 (17) 570-41-45

AGAT electromechanical Plant OJSC is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and a subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus.

AGAT electromechanical Plant OJSC is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

The company manufactures ‘Rubezh’ – a barrier system designed for riot control that has been deployed against peaceful demonstrations that took place in the wake of the presidential elections held on 9 August 2020, thus making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

7.

140 Repair Plant

140 ремонтный завод

Website: 140zavod.org

140 Repair Plant is part of the Belarussian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and a subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus. 140 Repair Plant is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

The company manufactures transport vehicles and armoured vehicles, which have been deployed against peaceful demonstrations that took place in the wake of the presidential elections held on 9 August 2020, thus making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

8.

MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT)

МЗКТ - Минский завод колёсных тягачей

Website: www.mzkt.by

MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT) is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and a subordinate to the Council of Ministers and the President of Belarus. MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT) is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

Employees of MZKT who protested during the visit of Aliaksandr Lukashenka to the factory and went on strike in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were fired, which makes the company responsible for violation of human rights.

17.12.2020

9.

Sohra Group / Sohra LLC

ООО Сохра

Address: Revolucyonnaya 17/19, office no. 22, 220030 Minsk, Belarus

Registration number: 192363182

Website: http://sohra.by/

E-mail address: info@sohra.by

Sohra company was owned by Aliaksandr Zaitsau, one of the most influential businessmen in Belarus, a person with close connections to the Belarusian political establishment and a close aide to Lukashenka's eldest son Viktor. Sohra promotes Belarusian industrial products in countries in Africa and the Middle East. It co-founded the defence company BSVT-New Technologies, engaged in weapons production and missile modernisation. Sohra, using its privileged position, serves as a proxy between the Belarusian political establishment and state-owned companies and foreign partners in Africa and the Middle East. It also engaged in gold mining in African countries on the basis of concessions obtained by the Lukashenka regime.

Sohra Group is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

10.

Bremino Group LLC

ООО ‘Бремино групп’

Address: Niamiha 40, 220004 Minsk, Belarus; Bolbasovo village, Zavodskaya 1k, Orsha Region/Oblast, Belarus

Registration number: 691598938

Website: http://www.bremino.by

E-mail address: office@bremino.by; marketing@bremino.by

Bremino Group is the initiator and co-administrator of the Bremino-Orsha special economic zone project, created by a presidential decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The company has received state support for developing the Bremino-Orsha zone, as well as a number of financial and tax advantages and other benefits. The owners of Bremino Group - Aliaksandr Zaitsau, Mikalai Varabei and Aliaksei Aleksin - belong to the inner circle of Lukashenka-related businessmen and maintain close relations with Lukashenka and his family.

Bremino Group is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

Bremino Group is the owner of Transport and Logistics Center (TLC) on the Belarusian-Polish border - Bremino-Bruzgi, which was used by the Lukashenka regime as a shelter for migrants who have been transported to the Belarusian-Union border with the aim of illegally crossing it. Bremino-Bruzgi TLC was also a site of Lukashenka's propaganda visit to the migrants.

Bremino Group is therefore contributing to the activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

21.6.2021

11.

Globalcustom Management LLC

ООО ‘Глобалкастом-менеджмент’

Address: Nemiga 40/301, Minsk, Belarus

Registration number: 193299162

Website: https://globalcustom.by/

E-mail address: info@globalcustom.by

Globalcustom Management is associated with the Belarus President Property Management Directorate, formerly headed by Victor Sheiman, who has been designated by the Union since 2004. The company is involved in the smuggling of goods to Russia, which would not be possible without the consent of the Lukashenka regime, which controls the border guards and customs. The privileged position in the flower export sector to Russia, from which the company benefits, is also conditioned on the support of the regime. Globalcustom Management was the first owner of the GardService, the only private company to whom Lukashenka granted the use of weapons. Globalcustom Management is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

12.

Belarusski Avtomobilnyi Zavod (BelAZ) / OJSC ‘BELAZ’

Open Joint Stock Company ‘BELAZ’ - Management Company of Holding ‘BELAZ-HOLDING’

ААТ ‘БЕЛАЗ’

ОАО ‘БЕЛАЗ’

Address: 40 let Octyabrya St. 4, 222161, Zhodino, Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

Website: https://belaz.by

OJSC BelAZ is one of the leading state-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world. It is a source of significant revenue for the Lukashenka regime. Lukashenka stated that the government will always support the company, and described it as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and ‘part of the national legacy’. OJSC BelAZ has offered its premises and equipment to stage a political rally in support of the Lukashenka regime. Therefore OJSC BelAZ benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

The employees of OJSC BelAZ who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 elections in Belarus were threatened with layoffs and intimidated by the company management. A group of employees was locked indoors by OJSC BelAZ to prevent them from joining the other protesters. The company management presented a strike to the media as a staff meeting. Therefore OJSC BelAZ is responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

13.

Minskii Avtomobilnyi Zavod (MAZ) / OJSC ‘MAZ’

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Minsk Automobile Works’ - Management Company of ‘BELAVTOMAZ’ Holding

ААТ ‘Мiнскi аўтамабiльны завод’

ОАО ‘Минский автомобильный завод’

Address: Socialisticheskaya 2, 220021 Minsk, Belarus

Website: http://maz.by/

Date of registration: 16.7.1944

Tel.: +375 (17) 217-22-22; +8000 217-22-22

OJSC Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) is one of the biggest state-owned automotive manufacturers in Belarus. Lukashenka described it as ‘one of the most important industrial enterprises of the country’. It is a source of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. OJSC MAZ has offered its premises and equipment to stage a political rally in support of the regime. Therefore, OJSC MAZ benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

Employees of OJSC MAZ who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of fraudulent August 2020 elections in Belarus were intimidated and later laid off by the company's management. A group of employees was locked indoors by OJSC MAZ to prevent them from joining the other protesters. Therefore, OJSC MAZ is responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

14.

Logex

ТАА ‘Лагекс’

ООО ‘Логекс’

Address: 24 Kommunisticheskaya St., office 2, Minsk, Belarus

Registration number: 192695465

Website: http://logex.by/

E-mail address: info@logex.by

Logex is associated with Aliaksandr Shakutsin, a businessman close to the Lukashenka regime, who has been designated by the Union.

The company is involved in the export of flowers to the Russian Federation at dumped prices, which would not be possible without the consent of the regime, which controls the border guards and customs. The privileged position in the flower export sector to Russia, from which the company benefits, is conditioned on the support of the regime. The main Belarusian suppliers of cut flowers are the companies that are closely connected with the leadership of the republic.

Logex is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

15.

JSC ‘NNK’ (Novaia naftavaia kampania) / New Oil Company

ЗАТ ‘ННК’ (Новая нафтавая кампанiя)

ЗАО ‘ННК’ (Новая нефтяная компания)

Address: Rakovska St. 14W room 7, 5th floor, Minsk, Belarus

Registration number: 193402282

Novaya Neftnaya Kompaniya (NNK), New Oil company, is an entity founded in March 2020. It is the only private company entitled to export oil products from Belarus - an indication of close links to the authorities and the highest level of state privileges. NNK is owned by Interservice, a company belonging to Mikalai Varabei who is one of the leading businessmen benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime. NNK is also reported to be connected to Aliaksei Aleksin, another prominent Belarusian businessman who benefits from the Lukashenka regime. According to media reports, Aleskin was the founder of NNK alongside Varabei. NNK was also used by the Belarusian authorities to adapt the Belarusian economy to restrictive measures introduced by the Union.

NNK is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

21.6.2021

16.

Belaeronavigatsia

State-owned enterprise

Белаэранавiгацыя

Дзяржаўнае прадпрыемства

Белаэронавигация

Государственное предприятие

Address: 19 Korotkevich St., 220039 Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 1996

Website: http://www.ban.by/

E-mail address: office@ban.by

Tel.: +375 (17) 215-40-51

Fax: +375 (17) 213-41-63

The state-owned enterprise Belaeronavigatsia is responsible for Belarusian air traffic control. It therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was taken with the aim of arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

The state-owned enterprise Belaeronavigatsia is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

21.6.2021

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17.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belavia Belarusian Airlines’

ААТ ‘Авiякампанiя Белавiя’

ОАО ‘Авиакомпания Белавиа’

Address: 14A Nemiga St., 220004 Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 4.1.1996

Registration number: 600390798

OJSC Belavia Belarusian Airlines is the state-owned national flag carrier airline. Belavia also owns and operates Belarusian governmental airplanes used by President Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Aliaksandr Lukashenka promised that his administration would provide all possible support to Belavia after the Union decided to introduce a prohibition on the overflight of Union airspace and on access to Union airports by all Belarusian air carriers. To that end, he agreed with the Russian President Vladimir Putin on planning the opening of new airline routes for Belavia. In 2021, Belavia’s CEO confirmed receiving government support in the restoration of flights to the Russian Federation. The flag carrier airline has also been exempted from paying added value tax by the Belarusian government in respect of aircraft and components imported into the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Furthermore, in 2014, Belavia received loans for the acquisition of new aircraft from a state-owned bank.

Belavia’s management also told its employees not to protest against election irregularities and mass detentions in Belarus, in view of the fact that Belavia is a state-owned enterprise.

Belavia is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

2.12.2021

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18.

Republican unitary enterprise ‘TSENTRKURORT’

Рэспублiканскае унiтарнае прадпрыемства ‘ЦЭНТРКУРОРТ’

Республиканское унитарное предприятие ‘ЦЕНТРКУРОРТ’

Address: 39 Myasnikova St., 220030 Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 12.8.2003

Registration number: 100726604

State-owned tourism company Tsentrkurort is part of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate. Tsentrkurort is reported to be one of the companies coordinating the flow of migrants that intend to cross the border between Belarus and the Union. Tsentrkurort helped at least 51 Iraqi citizens acquire visas for their visit to Belarus, and signed a contract for transportation services with Belarusian company Stroitur, which offers bus rentals with drivers. Buses booked by Tsentrkurort transported migrants, including children, from Minsk airport to hotels.

Tsentrkurort is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

19.

Oskartour LLC

ООО Оскартур

Address: 25 Karl Marx St., room 1n, Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 18.10.2016

Registration number: 192721937

Oskartour is a tour operator, which facilitated the obtainment of visas for migrants coming from Iraq and organised their subsequent travel to Belarus by flights from Bagdad to Minsk. Those Iraqi migrants were later transported to the Belarusian-Union border with the aim of illegally crossing it. Thanks to Oskartour and its contacts with Iraqi airlines, Belarusian authorities and the state-owned Tsentrkurort company, regular flights from Baghdad to Minsk were launched by the Iraqi air carrier, in order to bring more persons to Belarus to illegally cross the external borders of the Union. Oskartour took part in this illegal border-crossing scheme carried out by Belarusian security services and state-owned companies.

It is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

20.

Republican subsidiary unitary enterprise ‘Hotel Minsk’

Гатэль ‘Мiнск’

Республиканское дочернее унитарное предприятие “Отель ‘Минск’

Address: 11 Nezavisimosti Ave., Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 26.12.2016/3.4.2017

Registration number: 192750964

Website: http://hotelminsk.by/

E-mail address: hotelminsk@udp.gov.by; marketing@hotelminsk.by

Tel.: +375 (17) 209-90-61

Fax: +375 (17) 200-00-72

Hotel Minsk is a subsidiary company of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate – a government agency that directly reports to the President. Hotel Minsk took part in the illegal border-crossing scheme carried out by Belarusian security services and state-owned companies. Migrants were accommodated in the hotel before being transported to the border between Belarus and the Union in order to illegally cross it. Iraqi migrants had listed Hotel Minsk as a temporary residence in their Belarusian visa applications, which were lodged immediately before their arrival in Belarus.

Hotel Minsk is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

21.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Hotel Planeta’

ААТ ‘Гасцiнiца Планета’

OAO ‘Гостиница Планета’

Address: 31 Pobediteley Ave., Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 1.2.1994/6.3.2000

Registration number: 100135173

Website: https://hotelplaneta.by/

E-mail address: planeta@udp.gov.by

Tel.: +375 (17) 226-78-53

Fax: +375 (17) 226-78-55

OJSC Hotel Planeta is a subsidiary company of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate – a government agency that directly reports to the President. Hotel Planeta took part in the illegal border-crossing scheme carried out by Belarusian security services and state-owned companies. Migrants were accommodated in the hotel before being transported to the border between Belarus and the Union in order to illegally cross it. They paid USD 1 000 to a travel agent in Baghdad for the flight, a tourist visa and a stay in the hotel.

Hotel Planeta is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

22.

ASAM (Asobnaia sluzhba aktyunykh merapryemstvau)

OSAM (Otdiel'naya sluzhba aktivnykh mieropriyatiy)

Асобная служба актыўных мерапрыемстваў (АСАМ)

Отдельная служба активных мероприятий (ОСАМ)

Address: State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 24 Volodarsky St., 220050 Minsk, Belarus

ASAM (Separate Service for Active Measures) is a Belarusian special border guard unit controlled by Viktar Lukashenka and headed by Ihar Kruchkou. ASAM forces under special operation ‘Gate’ organise illegal border crossings through Belarus to Union Member States and are directly involved in the physical transportation of migrants to the other side of the border. ASAM additionally charges the transported migrants for the border crossing.

ASAM is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

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▼M45

24.

VIP Grub

 

Address: Büyükdere Cad., No:201, Istanbul, Turkey

VIP Grub is a passport and visa service based in Istanbul, Turkey, which organises trips to Belarus with the explicit intention of facilitating migration to the Union. VIP Grub actively advertises migration to the Union. VIP Grub therefore contributes to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

2.12.2021

25.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Grodno Azot’

Including Branch ‘Khimvolokno Plant’ JSC ‘Grodno Azot’

ААТ ‘Гродна Азот’

ОАО ‘Гродно Азот’

Фiлiял ‘Завод Хiмвалакно’ ААТ ‘Гродна Азот’

Филиал ‘Завод Химволокно’ ОАО ‘Гродно Азот’

Address: 100 Kosmonavtov Ave., Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

Date of registration: 1965

Registration number: 500036524

Website: https://azot.by/en/

Address: 4 Slavinskogo St., 230026 Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

Date of registration: 12.5.2000

Registration number: 590046884

Website: www.grodno-khim.by

E-mail address: office@grodno-khim.by; market@grodno-khim.by; ppm@grodno-khim.by; tnp@grodno-khim.by

Tel./Fax: +375 (152) 39-19-00; +375 (152) 39-19-44

OJSC Grodno Azot is a large state-owned producer of nitrogen compounds, based in Grodno/Hrodna. Lukashenka described it as ‘a very important enterprise, a strategic one’. Grodno Azot also owns Khimvolokno Plant, which is a large manufacturer of polyamide and polyester and composite materials. Grodno Azot and its Khimvolokno Plant are a source of substantial revenue for the Lukashenka regime. Grodno Azot is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

Lukashenka visited the company and met with its representatives, discussing the plant's modernisation and various forms of State support. Lukashenka also promised that a loan would be used for the construction of a new nitrogen plant in Grodno/Hrodna. Grodno Azot is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

The workers of Grodno Azot, including its employees at the Khimvolokno Plant, who participated in peaceful protests against the regime and went on strike, were dismissed, intimidated and threatened both by the Grodno Azot management and regime representatives. Grodno Azot is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

2.12.2021

26.

State Production Association ‘Belorusneft’

Дзяржаўнае вытворчае аб'яднанне ‘Беларуснафта’

Государственное производственное объединение ‘Белоруснефть’

Address: 9 Rogachevskaya St., 246003 Gomel/Homyel, Belarus

Date of registration: 25.2.1966

Registration number: 400051902

Belorusneft is a state-owned company, operating in the petrochemical sector. The company's management dismissed workers who went on strike, took part in anti-regime protests or publicly supported those protests. Belorusneft is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

2.12.2021

27.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belshina’

AAT ‘Белшина’

ОАО ‘Белшина’

Address: 4 Minskoe Shosse St., 213824 Bobruisk, Belarus

Date of registration: 10.1.1994

Registration number: 700016217

Website: http://www.belshinajsc.by/

OJSC Belshina is one of the leading state-owned companies in Belarus and a large manufacturer of vehicle tyres. As such, it is a substantial source of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. The Belarusian State is directly profiting from the earnings made by Belshina. Therefore, Belshina supports the Lukashenka regime.

Employees of Belshina who protested and went on strike in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were dismissed. Belshina is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

2.12.2021

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28.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belaruskali’

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Беларуськалiй’

Открытое акционерное общество ‘Беларуськалий’

Address: 5 Korzha St., Soligorsk, 223710 Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

Date of registration: 23.12.1996

Registration number: 600122610

OJSC Belaruskali is a state-owned enterprise and one of the biggest potash producers in the world. Despite the decline of its global share in the global potash market from 20 % to 9 % in 2022, Belaruskali remains one of the most significant exporters of potash and a substantial source of revenue for the Belarussian state budget. Alexander Lukashenka described Belaruskali as ‘a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports’. It is also a major source of foreign currency for the Lukashenka regime.

Belaruskali is directly involved in the Lukashenka regime’s relocation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories in collaboration with Russia. Since Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Dubrava facility, which is owned by OJSC Belaruskali, has held more than 2 050 Ukrainian children. Therefore, OJSC ‘Belaruskali’ supports the Lukashenka regime.

The employees of OJSC ‘Belaruskali’ who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and laid off by the company’s management. Alexander Lukashenka himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine. Therefore, ‘Belaruskali’ is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supports the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

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29.

Joint Stock Company ‘Belarusian Potash Company’

ААТ ‘Беларуская калiйная кампанiя’

ОАО ‘Белорусская калийная компания’

Address: 35 Masherova Ave., 220002 Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 13.9.2013

Registration number: 192050251

Tel. +375 (17) 309-30-10; +375 (17) 309-30-30

Email address: info@belpc.by

JSC Belarusian Potash Company is the exporting arm of Belarusian state potash producer Belaruskali. Belaruskali is one of the largest sources of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. Supplies from the Belarusian Potash Company account for 20 % of global potash exports.

The state guaranteed the Belarusian Potash Company monopoly rights to export potassium fertilizers. Thanks to preferential treatment from the Belarusian authorities, the company earns a substantial revenue. Therefore, the Belarusian Potash Company benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022.

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30.

‘Inter Tobacco’ LLC

Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю ‘Iнтэр Табак’

Общество с ограниченной ответственностью ‘Интер Тобако’

Address: 131 Novodvorskiy village, Novodvorskiy village council, Minsk District, 223016 Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus (Minsk Free Economic Zone)

Date of registration: 10.10.2002

Registration number: 808000714

Inter Tobacco LLC is part of the tobacco manufacturing industry in Belarus. It has a significant share of the profitable domestic cigarette market in Belarus. The company was given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, based on a decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Additionally, Lukashenka issued a Presidential decree to re-draw the boundaries of Belarus’s capital, Minsk, to carve out land for Inter Tobacco’s factory, probably for reasons related to tax evasion. Inter Tobacco belongs to Alexei Oleksin and members of his close family (it is owned by Oleksin’s company Energo-Oil).

Therefore, Inter Tobacco is benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

31.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Naftan’

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Нафтан’

Открытое акционерное общество ‘Нафтан’

Address: Novopolotsk 1, 211440 Vitebsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

Date of registration: 1992

Registration number: 300042199

As a state-owned enterprise, OJSC Naftan is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, Naftan benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

Employees of Naftan who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and dismissed by the company’s management. Therefore, Naftan is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supports the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

32.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman’

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Гродзенская тытунёвая фабрыка Нёман’

Oткрытое акционерное общество ‘Гродненская табачная фабрика Неман’

Address: 18 Ordzhonikidze St., 230771 Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

Date of registration: 30.12.1996

Registration number: 500047627

OJSC Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman is a Belarusian state-owned enterprise and one of the major sources of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. The company has a 70-80 % share of the tobacco market in Belarus. Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

Manufactured in Belarus, Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman brands are among the most common cigarettes smuggled into the Union as part of the lucrative contraband tobacco trade. Train cars belonging to Belarusian state-owned companies Belaruskali and Grodno Azot are used in the contraband scheme. Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman therefore contributes to facilitating the illegal transfer of restricted goods into the territory of the Union.

3.6.2022

33.

Beltamozhservice

Рэспублiканскае унiтарнае прадпрыемства ‘Белмытсэрвiс’

Республиканское унитарное предприятие ‘Белтаможсервис’

Address: 17th km, Minsk- Dzerzhinsk highway, administrative building, office 75, Shchomyslitsky s/s, 223049 Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

Date of registration: 9.6.1999

Registration number: 101561144

Beltamozhservice is a state-owned company and one of the largest logistics companies in Belarus. It is closely associated with the Belarusian authorities and is involved in the smuggling and re-export of goods from Belarus to Russia. The company benefits from links with the Belarusian authorities and provides significant revenue to the Lukashenka regime. Beltamozhservice is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

34.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘Managing Company of Holding ‘Belkommunmash’’

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Кiруючая кампанiя холдынгу ‘Белкамунмаш’’

Открытое акционерное общество ‘Управляющая компания холдинга ‘Белкоммунмаш’’

Address: 64B-2 Perekhodnaya St., 220070 Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 13.8.1991

Registration number: 100205408

Belkommunmash is a Belarusian manufacturer of public transport vehicles. Aliaksandr Lukashenka is promoting Belkommunmash’s business, guaranteeing the company’s compliance with its contractual obligations to its partners and using his influence to support its business activity. Belkommunmash is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

Belkommunmash dismissed workers in retaliation for their protest against falsified presidential election results in 2020, and is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

35.

Belteleradio Company / National State Television and Radio Company of the Republic of Belarus

Нацыянальная дзяржаўная тэлерадыёкампанiя Рэспублiкi Беларусь / Белтэлерадыёкампанiя

Национальная государственная телерадиокомпания Республики Беларусь / Белтелерадиокомпания

Address: 9 Makayonka St., Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 14.9.1994

Registration number: 100717729

Website: tvr.by

Belteleradio Company is the state television and radio broadcasting company, and controls seven television channels and five radio stations in Belarus. In the aftermath of fraudulent presidential elections in August 2020, Belteleradio Company dismissed protesting workers of the media outlets it controls and replaced them with Russian media employees. It is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

The television and radio stations supervised by Belteleradio Company are actively spreading propaganda and thus supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.6.2022

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36.

Open Joint Stock Company ‘MINSK ELECTROTECHNICAL PLANT NAMED AFTER V. I. KOZLOV’

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘МIНСКI ЭЛЕКТРАТЭХНIЧНЫ ЗАВОД IМЯ В.I.КАЗЛОВА’

Открытое акционерное общество ‘МИНСКИЙ ЭЛЕКТРОТЕХНИЧЕСКИЙ ЗАВОД ИМЕНИ В.И.КОЗЛОВА’/ОАО ‘МЭТЗ ИМ. В.И.КОЗЛОВА’

Address: Room 502, 4, Uralskaya st., Minsk 220037, Republic of Belarus

Type of entity: State-owned company

Place of registration: 4, Uralskaya st.,

Minsk 220037,

Republic of Belarus

Date of registration: 1.3.1994

Registration number: 100211261(УНП)

Principal place of business: Belarus

Company website: www.metz.by

Company email: urist@metz.by

Company phone: 8017 230 11 22

OJSC ‘Minsk Electrotechnical Plant named after V.I. Kozlov’ is a state-owned enterprise, one of the biggest producers of electricity equipment in Europe and one of industrial giants of Belarus. As such, it is a major source of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. The employees of OJSC ‘Minsk Electrotechnical Plant named after V.I. Kozlov’ who took part in peaceful protests and strikes in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 elections in Belarus were threatened with layoffs and intimidated by company management. Workers were later fired due to their participation in the strikes.

Therefore OJSC ‘Minsk Electrotechnical Plant named after V.I. Kozlov’ is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime. Furthermore, OJSC ‘Minsk Electrotechnical Plant named after V.I. Kozlov’ is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

37.

Open joint stock company ‘Byelorussian Steel Works – management company of ‘Byelorusssian Metallurgical Company’ holding’ a.k.a. OJSC ‘BSW (BMZ) – management company of ‘BMC’ holding’

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Беларускi металургiчны завод – кiруючая кампанiя холдынгу ‘Беларуская металургiчная кампанiя’’ a.k.a. ААТ ‘БМЗ – кiруючая кампанiя холдынгу ‘БМК’’

Открытое акционерное общество ‘Белорусский металлургический завод- управляющая компания холдинга ‘Белорусская металлургическая компания’’ a.k.a. ОАО ‘БМЗ- управляющая компания холдинга ‘БМК’’

Address: 37, Promyshlennaya Street, Zhlobin,Gomel region, Belarus, 247210

Type of entity: Open joint stock company

Place of registration: Zhlobin, Gomel region, Belarus

Date of registration: 24.4.1991 as ‘БЕЛОРУССКИЙ МЕТАЛЛУРГИЧЕСКИЙ ЗАВОД’,

11.9.1996 as ‘Государственное предприятие – Белорусский металлургический завод’,

1.12.1997 as ‘Белорусский металлургический завод’,

3.11.1999 as ‘Республиканское унитарное предприятие ‘Белорусский металлургический завод’’,

1.1.2012 as ‘Открытое акционерное общество ‘Белорусский металлургический завод’’

Registration number: 400074854

Principal place of business: Zhlobin, Gomel region, Belarus

OJSC BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding is a unique state enterprise in the metallurgical industry in Belarus and among the largest companies in the country. As such, it is a substantial source of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. The Belarusian State is directly profiting from the earnings made by OJSC BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding. Furthermore, the company receives large government grants and political support from the Lukashenka regime. The general director of OJSC BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding was personally appointed by President Lukashenka.

Employees of OJSC BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding who protested and went on strike in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were dismissed. Since then, the enterprise continues to take measures against employees who attempt to organize strikes through threats and dismissals. Therefore, OJSC BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime. Furthermore, it is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus.

3.8.2023

38.

Belneftekhim – Belarusian State Concern for Oil and Chemistry

Белнафтахiм – Беларускi дзяржаўны канцэрн па нафце i хiмii

Белнефтехим, Белорусский государственный концерн по нефти и химии

Address: 73, Dzerzhinskogo Street, Minsk, 220116

Type of entity: State concern

Place of registration: 73 Dzerzhinskogo Street, Minsk, 220116

Date of registration: 21.7.1997

Registration number: 101272253

Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus

The Belarusian State Concern for Oil and Chemistry (Belneftekhim) is one of the largest industrial complexes of the Republic of Belarus and consists of multiple other state-owned companies established in 1997. Aliaksandr Lukashenka considers Belneftekhim to be one of the most important and strategic concerns in Belarus. In particular, Belneftekhim represents a fundamental asset for the Belarusian economy and foreign policy, in particular in relation to the cooperation between Russia and Belarus in developing a common oil market. Regular consultations are held between the concern and President Lukashenka. Belneftekhim benefits from the support provided by the Lukashenka regime, especially in relation to the effects of Western sanctions. Therefore, Belneftekhim is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

3.8.2023

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ANNEX II

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Websites for information on the competent authorities referred to in Articles 3, 4(2), and 5, and address for notifications to the European Commission

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BELGIUM

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

BULGARIA

https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions

CZECHIA

www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

DENMARK

http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/

GERMANY

https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html

ESTONIA

https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid

IRELAND

https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/

GREECE

http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

SPAIN

https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

FRANCE

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

CROATIA

https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955

ITALY

https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

CYPRUS

https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/

LATVIA

http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539

LITHUANIA

http://www.urm.lt/sanctions

LUXEMBOURG

https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html

HUNGARY

https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato

MALTA

https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx

NETHERLANDS

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

AUSTRIA

https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/

POLAND

https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe

https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions

PORTUGAL

https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas

ROMANIA

http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

SLOVAKIA

https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

https://um.fi/pakotteet

SWEDEN

https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA)

Rue de Spa 2

B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

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ANNEX III

List of equipment which might be used for internal repression as referred to in Article 1a and Article 1b

1. Fire-arms, ammunition and related accessories therefor, as follows:

1.1. 

Firearms not controlled by ML 1 and ML 2 of the Common Military List of the European Union ( 8 ) (‘Common Military List’);

1.2. 

Ammunition specially designed for the firearms listed in item 1.1 and specially designed components therefor;

1.3. 

Weapon-sights not controlled by the Common Military List.

2. Bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List.

3. Vehicles as follows:

3.1. 

Vehicles equipped with a water cannon, specially designed or modified for the purpose of riot control;

3.2. 

Vehicles specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel borders;

3.3. 

Vehicles specially designed or modified to remove barricades, including construction equipment with ballistic protection;

3.4. 

Vehicles specially designed for the transport or transfer of prisoners and/or detainees;

3.5. 

Vehicles specially designed to deploy mobile barriers;

3.6. 

Components for the vehicles specified in items 3.1 to 3.5 specially designed for the purposes of riot control.

Note 1   This item does not control vehicles specially designed for the purposes of fire-fighting.

Note 2   For the purposes of item 3.5 the term ‘vehicles’ includes trailers.

4. Explosive substances and related equipment as follows:

4.1. 

Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosions by electrical or non-electrical means, including firing sets, detonators, igniters, boosters and detonating cord, and specially designed components therefor; except those specially designed for a specific commercial use consisting of the actuation or operation by explosive means of other equipment or devices the function of which is not the creation of explosions (e.g., car air-bag inflaters, electric-surge arresters of fire sprinkler actuators);

4.2. 

Linear cutting explosive charges not controlled by the Common Military List;

4.3. 

Other explosives not controlled by the Common Military List and related substances as follows:

a. 

amatol;

b. 

nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen);

c. 

nitroglycol;

d. 

pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);

e. 

picryl chloride;

f. 

2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT).

5. Protective equipment not controlled by ML 13 of the Common Military List as follows:

5.1. 

Body armour providing ballistic and/or stabbing protection;

5.2. 

Helmets providing ballistic and/or fragmentation protection, anti-riot helmets, antiriot shields and ballistic shields.

Note: This item does not control:

— 
equipment specially designed for sports activities,
— 
equipment specially designed for safety of work requirements,

6. Simulators, other than those controlled by ML 14 of the Common Military List, for training in the use of firearms, and specially designed software therefor.

7. Night vision, thermal imaging equipment and image intensifier tubes, other than those controlled by the Common Military List.

8. Razor barbed wire.

9. Military knives, combat knives and bayonets with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm.

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9a. Riot control agents, as defined by article 1A004.a.4 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1749 of 7 October 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.

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10. Production equipment specially designed for the items specified in this list.

11. Specific technology for the development, production or use of the items specified in this list.

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ANNEX IV

EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1c AND 1d

General note

Notwithstanding the contents of this Annex, it shall not apply to:

(a) 

equipment, technology or software which are specified in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 ( 9 ) or the Common Military List; or

(b) 

software which is designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier and which is generally available to the public by being sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of:

(i) 

over the counter transactions;

(ii) 

mail order transactions;

(iii) 

electronic transactions; or

(iv) 

telephone order transactions; or

(c) 

software which is in the public domain.

The categories A, B, C, D and E refer to the categories referred to in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009.

The equipment, technology and software referred to in Articles 1c and 1d is:

A. 

List of equipment:

— 
Deep Packet Inspection equipment,
— 
Network Interception equipment including Interception Management Equipment (IMS) and Data Retention Link Intelligence equipment,
— 
Radio Frequency monitoring equipment,
— 
Network and Satellite jamming equipment,
— 
Remote Infection equipment,
— 
Speaker recognition/processing equipment,
— 
IMSI ( 10 ), MSISDN ( 11 ), IMEI ( 12 ), TMSI ( 13 ) interception and monitoring equipment,

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— 
Systems, equipment, and components therefor, specially designed or modified for the generation, command and control, or delivery of intrusion software as defined in Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 14 ),

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— 
Equipment designed or modified to perform cryptanalysis,
— 
Tactical SMS ( 15 ) /GSM ( 16 ) /GPS ( 17 ) /GPRS ( 18 ) /UMTS ( 19 ) /CDMA ( 20 ) /PSTN ( 21 ) interception and monitoring equipment,
— 
DHCP ( 22 ) /SMTP ( 23 ), GTP ( 24 ) information interception and monitoring equipment,
— 
Pattern Recognition and Pattern Profiling equipment,
— 
Remote Forensics equipment,
— 
Semantic Processing Engine equipment,
— 
WEP and WPA code breaking equipment,
— 
Interception equipment for VoIP proprietary and standard protocol.
B. 

Not used.

C. 

Not used.

D. 

"Software" for the "development", "production" or "use" of the equipment specified in point A and "software" having the characteristics of, or performing or simulating, the functions of the equipment specified in point A.

E. 

"Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of the equipment specified in point A.

Equipment, technology and software falling within those categories is within the scope of this Annex only to the extent that it falls within the general description "internet, telephone and satellite communications interception and monitoring systems".

For the purpose of this Annex, "monitoring" means acquisition, extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis and archiving call content or network data.

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ANNEX V

LIST OF NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1e(7), 1f(7) AND 1fa(1)

Belarus Ministry of Defence

140 Repair Plant JSC

558 Aircraft Repair Plant JSC

2566 Radioelectronic Armament Repair Plant JSC

AGAT - Control Systems - Managing Company of Geoinformation Control Systems Holding, JSC

AGAT - Electromechanical Plant OJSC

AGAT - SYSTEM

ATE - Engineering LLC

BelOMO Holding

Belspetsvneshtechnika SFTUE

Beltechexport CJSC

BSVT-New Technologies

Department of Internal Affairs of the Gomel Region Executive Committee

Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus

KGB Alpha

Kidma Tech OJSC

Minotor-Service

Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant

Oboronnye Initsiativy LLC

OJS KB Radar Managing Company

Peleng JSC

State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus

State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus

Transaviaexport Airlines JSC

Volatavto OJSC

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ANNEX Va

LIST OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1f(1) AND 1fa(1)

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Part A

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General Notes, Acronyms and Abbreviations, and Definitions in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 apply to this Annex, with the exception of ‘Part I - General Notes, Acronyms and Abbreviations, and Definitions, General Notes to Annex I, point 2’.

Definitions of terms used in the Common Military List (CML) of the European Union ( 25 ) apply to this Annex.

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Without prejudice to Article 1m of this Regulation, non-controlled items containing one or more components listed in this Annex are not subject to the controls under Articles 1f and 1fa of this Regulation.

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Category I - Electronics

X.A.I.001 

Electronic devices and components.

a. 

‘Microprocessor microcircuits’, ‘microcomputer microcircuits’, and microcontroller microcircuits having any of the following:

1. 

A performance speed of 5 GigaFLOPS or more and an arithmetic logic unit with an access width of 32 bit or more;

2. 

A clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz; or

3. 

More than one data or instruction bus or serial communication port that provides a direct external interconnection between parallel ‘microprocessor microcircuits’ with a transfer rate of 2,5 Mbyte/s;

b. 

Storage integrated circuits, as follows:

1. 

Electrically erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs) with a storage capacity:

a. 

Exceeding 16 Mbits per package for flash memory types; or

b. 

Exceeding either of the following limits for all other EEPROM types:

1. 

Exceeding 1 Mbit per package; or

2. 

Exceeding 256 kbit per package and a maximum access time of less than 80 ns;

2. 

Static random access memories (SRAMs) with a storage capacity:

a. 

Exceeding 1 Mbit per package; or

b. 

Exceeding 256 kbit per package and a maximum access time of less than 25 ns;

c. 

Analog-to-digital converters having any of the following:

1. 

A resolution of 8 bit or more, but less than 12 bit, with an output rate greater than 200 Mega Samples Per Second (MSPS);

2. 

A resolution of 12 bit with an output rate greater than 105 Mega Samples per Second (MSPS);

3. 

A resolution of more than 12 bit but equal to or less than 14 bit with an output rate greater than 10 Mega Samples per Second (MSPS); or

4. 

A resolution of more than 14 bit with an output rate greater than 2,5 Mega Samples Per Second (MSPS);

d. 

Field programmable logic devices having a maximum number of single-ended digital input/outputs between 200 and 700;

e. 

Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) processors having a rated execution time for a 1 024 point complex FFT of less than 1 ms;

f. 

Custom integrated circuits for which the function is unknown, or the control status of the equipment in which the integrated circuits will be used is unknown to the manufacturer, having any of the following:

1. 

More than 144 terminals; or

2. 

A typical ‘basic propagation delay time’ of less than 0,4 ns;

g. 

Traveling-wave ‘vacuum electronic devices’, pulsed or continuous wave, as follows:

1. 

Coupled cavity devices, or derivatives thereof;

2. 

Devices based on helix, folded waveguide, or serpentine waveguide circuits, or derivatives thereof, having any of the following:

a. 

An ‘instantaneous bandwidth’ of half an octave or more and average power (expressed in kW) times frequency (expressed in GHz) of more than 0,2; or

b. 

An ‘instantaneous bandwidth’ of less than half an octave; and average power (expressed in kW) times frequency (expressed in GHz) of more than 0,4;

h. 

Flexible waveguides designed for use at frequencies exceeding 40 GHz;

i. 

Surface acoustic wave and surface skimming (shallow bulk) acoustic wave devices, having either of the following:

1. 

A carrier frequency exceeding 1 GHz; or

2. 

A carrier frequency of 1 GHz or less; and

a. 

A ‘frequency side-lobe rejection’ exceeding 55 dB;

b. 

A product of the maximum delay time and bandwidth (time in microseconds and bandwidth in MHz) of more than 100; or

c. 

A dispersive delay of more than 10 microseconds;

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.I.001.i ‘Frequency side-lobe rejection’ is the maximum rejection value specified in data sheet.

j. 

‘Cells’ as follows:

1. 

‘Primary cells’ having an ‘energy density’ of 550 Wh/kg or less at 293 K (20°C);

2. 

‘Secondary cells’ having an ‘energy density’ of 350 Wh/kg or less at 293 K (20°C);

Note: X.A.I.001.j does not control batteries, including single cell batteries.

Technical Notes: 

1. 

For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j, energy density (Wh/kg) is calculated from the nominal voltage multiplied by the nominal capacity in ampere-hours (Ah) divided by the mass in kilograms. If the nominal capacity is not stated, energy density is calculated from the nominal voltage squared then multiplied by the discharge duration in hours divided by the discharge load in Ohms and the mass in kilograms.

2. 

For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j, a ‘cell’ is defined as an electrochemical device, which has positive and negative electrodes, and electrolyte, and is a source of electrical energy. It is the basic building block of a battery.

3. 

For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j.1, a ‘primary cell’ is a ‘cell’ that is not designed to be charged by any other source.

4. 

For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j.2, a ‘secondary cell’ is a ‘cell’ that is designed to be charged by an external electrical source.

k. 

‘Superconductive’ electromagnets or solenoids specially designed to be fully charged or discharged in less than one minute, having all of the following:

Note: X.A.I.001.k does not control ‘superconductive’ electromagnets or solenoids designed for Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) medical equipment.

1. 

Maximum energy delivered during the discharge divided by the duration of the discharge of more than 500 kJ per minute;

2. 

Inner diameter of the current carrying windings of more than 250 mm; and

3. 

Rated for a magnetic induction of more than 8T or ‘overall current density’ in the winding of more than 300 A/mm2;

l. 

Circuits or systems for electromagnetic energy storage, containing components manufactured from ‘superconductive’ materials specially designed for operation at temperatures below the ‘critical temperature’ of at least one of their ‘superconductive’ constituents, having all of the following:

1. 

Resonant operating frequencies exceeding 1 MHz;

2. 

A stored energy density of 1 MJ/m3 or more; and

3. 

A discharge time of less than 1 ms;

m. 

Hydrogen/hydrogen-isotope thyratrons of ceramic-metal construction and rate for a peak current of 500 A or more;

n. 

Not used;

o. 

Solar cells, cell-interconnect-coverglass (CIC) assemblies, solar panels, and solar arrays, which are ‘space qualified’ and not controlled by 3A001.e.4 ( 26 ).

X.A.I.002 

General purpose "electronic assemblies", modules and equipment.

a. 

Electronic test equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

b. 

Digital instrumentation magnetic tape data recorders having any of the following characteristics;

1. 

A maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 60 Mbit/s and employing helical scan techniques;

2. 

A maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 120 Mbit/s and employing fixed head techniques; or

3. 

‘Space qualified’;

c. 

Equipment, with a maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 60 Mbit/s, designed to convert digital video magnetic tape recorders for use as digital instrumentation data recorders;

d. 

Non-modular analog oscilloscopes having a bandwidth of 1 GHz or greater;

e. 

Modular analog oscilloscope systems having either of the following characteristics:

1. 

A mainframe with a bandwidth of 1 GHz or greater; or

2. 

Plug-in modules with an individual bandwidth of 4 GHz or greater;

f. 

Analog sampling oscilloscopes for the analysis of recurring phenomena with an effective bandwidth greater than 4 GHz;

g. 

Digital oscilloscopes and transient recorders, using analog-to-digital conversion techniques, capable of storing transients by sequentially sampling single-shot inputs at successive intervals of less than 1 ns (greater than 1 Giga Samples per Second (GSPS)), digitizing to 8 bits or greater resolution and storing 256 or more samples.

Note: X.A.I.002 controls the following specially designed components for analog oscilloscopes:

1. 

Plug-in units;

2. 

External amplifiers;

3. 

Pre-amplifiers;

4. 

Sampling devices;

5. 

Cathode ray tubes.

X.A.I.003 

Specific processing equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, as follows:

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a. 

Frequency changers and their specially designed components, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

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b. 

Mass spectrometers, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

c. 

All flash x-ray machines, or components of pulsed power systems designed thereof, including Marx generators, high power pulse shaping networks, high voltage capacitors, and triggers;

d. 

Pulse amplifiers, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

e. 

Electronic equipment for time delay generation or time interval measurement, as follows:

1. 

Digital time delay generators with a resolution of 50 nanoseconds or less over time intervals of 1 microsecond or greater; or

2. 

Multi-channel (three or more) or modular time interval meter and chronometry equipment with resolution of 50 nanoseconds or less over time intervals of 1 microsecond or greater;

f. 

Chromatography and spectrometry analytical instruments.

X.B.I.001 

Equipment for the manufacture of electronic components or materials, as follows, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.

a. 

Equipment specially designed for the manufacture of electron tubes, optical elements and specially designed components therefor controlled by 3A001 ( 27 ) or X.A.I.001;

b. 

Equipment specially designed for the manufacture of semiconductor devices, integrated circuits and ‘electronic assemblies’, as follows, and systems incorporating or having the characteristics of such equipment:

Note: X.B.I.001.b. also controls equipment used or modified for use in the manufacture of other devices, such as imaging devices, electro-optical devices, acoustic-wave devices.

1. 

Equipment for the processing of materials for the manufacture of devices and components as specified in the heading of X.B.I.001.b, as follows:

Note: X.B.I.001 does not control quartz furnace tubes, furnace liners, paddles, boats (except specially designed caged boats), bubblers, cassettes or crucibles specially designed for the processing equipment controlled by X.B.I.001.b.1.

a. 

Equipment for producing polycrystalline silicon and materials controlled by 3C001 ( 28 );

b. 

Equipment specially designed for purifying or processing III/V and II/VI semiconductor materials controlled by 3C001, 3C002, 3C003, 3C004, or 3C005 ( 29 ) except crystal pullers, for which see X.B.I.001.b.1.c below;

c. 

Crystal pullers and furnaces, as follows:

Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.c does not control diffusion and oxidation furnaces.

1. 

Annealing or recrystallizing equipment other than constant temperature furnaces employing high rates of energy transfer capable of processing wafers at a rate exceeding 0,005 m2 per minute;

2. 

‘Stored program controlled’ crystal pullers having any of the following characteristics:

a. 

Rechargeable without replacing the crucible container;

b. 

Capable of operation at pressures above 2,5 x 105 Pa; or

c. 

Capable of pulling crystals of a diameter exceeding 100 mm;

d. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment for epitaxial growth having any of the following characteristics:

1. 

Capable of producing silicon layer with a thickness uniform to less than ± 2,5 % across a distance of 200 mm or more;

2. 

Capable of producing a layer of any material other than silicon with a thickness uniformity across the wafer of equal to or better than ± 3,5 %; or

3. 

Rotation of individual wafers during processing;

e. 

Molecular beam epitaxial growth equipment;

f. 

Magnetically enhanced ‘sputtering’ equipment with specially designed integral load locks capable of transferring wafers in an isolated vacuum environment;

g. 

Equipment specially designed for ion implantation, ion-enhanced or photo-enhanced diffusion, having any of the following characteristics:

1. 

Patterning capability;

2. 

Beam energy (accelerating voltage) exceeding 200 keV;

3. 

Optimised to operate at a beam energy (accelerating voltage) of less than 10 keV; or

4. 

Capable of high energy oxygen implant into a heated ‘substrate’;

h. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment for the selective removal (etching) by means of anisotropic dry methods (e.g., plasma), as follows:

1. 

‘Batch types’ having either of the following:

a. 

End-point detection, other than optical emission spectroscopy types; or

b. 

Reactor operational (etching) pressure of 26,66 Pa or less;

2. 

‘Single wafer types’ having any of the following:

a. 

End-point detection, other than optical emission spectroscopy types;

b. 

Reactor operational (etching) pressure of 26,66 Pa or less; or

c. 

Cassette-to-cassette and load locks wafer handling;

Notes:

 
1. 

‘Batch types’ refers to machines not specially designed for production processing of single wafers. Such machines can process two or more wafers simultaneously with common process parameters, e.g., RF power, temperature, etch gas species, flow rates.

2. 

‘Single wafer types’ refers to machines specially designed for production processing of single wafers. These machines may use automatic wafer handling techniques to load a single wafer into the equipment for processing. The definition includes equipment that can load and process several wafers but where the etching parameters, e.g., RF power or end point, can be independently determined for each individual wafer.

i. 

‘Chemical vapor deposition’ (CVD) equipment, e.g., plasma-enhanced CVD (PECVD) or photo-enhanced CVD, for semiconductor device manufacturing, having either of the following capabilities, for deposition of oxides, nitrides, metals or polysilicon:

▼M47

1. 

"Chemical vapor deposition" equipment operating below 105 Pa; or

▼M46

2. 

PECVD equipment operating either below 60 Pa or having automatic cassette-to-cassette and load lock wafer handling;

Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.i does not control low pressure ‘chemical vapor deposition’ (LPCVD) systems or reactive ‘sputtering’ equipment.

j. 

Electron beam systems specially designed or modified for mask making or semiconductor device processing having any of the following characteristics:

1. 

Electrostatic beam deflection;

2. 

Shaped, non-Gaussian beam profile;

3. 

Digital-to-analog conversion rate exceeding 3 MHz;

4. 

Digital-to-analog conversion accuracy exceeding 12 bit; or

5. 

Target-to-beam position feedback control precision of 1 micrometer or finer;

Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.j does not control electron beam deposition systems or general purpose scanning electron microscopes.

k. 

Surface finishing equipment for the processing of semiconductor wafers as follows:

1. 

Specially designed equipment for backside processing of wafers thinner than 100 micrometer and the subsequent separation thereof; or

2. 

Specially designed equipment for achieving a surface roughness of the active surface of a processed wafer with a two-sigma value of 2 micrometer or less, total indicator reading (TIR);

Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.k does not control single-side lapping and polishing equipment for wafer surface finishing.

l. 

Interconnection equipment which includes common single or multiple vacuum chambers specially designed to permit the integration of any equipment controlled by X.B.I.001 into a complete system;

m. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment using ‘lasers’ for the repair or trimming of ‘monolithic integrated circuits’ with either of the following characteristics:

1. 

Positioning accuracy less than ± 1 micrometer; or

2. 

Spot size (kerf width) less than 3 micrometer.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.B.I.001.b.1, 'sputtering' is an overlay coating process wherein positively charged ions are accelerated by an electric field towards the surface of a target (coating material). The kinetic energy of the impacting ions is sufficient to cause target surface atoms to be released and deposited on the substrate. (Note: Triode, magnetron or radio frequency sputtering to increase adhesion of coating and rate of deposition are ordinary modifications of the process.).

2. 

Masks, mask substrates, mask-making equipment and image transfer equipment for the manufacture of devices and components as specified in the heading of X.B.I.001, as follows:

Note: The term masks refers to those used in electron beam lithography, X-ray lithography, and ultraviolet lithography, as well as the usual ultraviolet and visible photo-lithography.

a. 

Finished masks, reticles and designs therefor, except:

1. 

Finished masks or reticles for the production of integrated circuits not controlled by 3A001 ( 30 ); or

2. 

Masks or reticles, having both of the following characteristics:

a. 

Their design is based on geometries of 2,5 micrometer or more; and

b. 

The design does not include special features to alter the intended use by means of production equipment or ‘software’;

b. 

Mask substrates as follows:

1. 

Hard surface (e.g., chromium, silicon, molybdenum) coated ‘substrates’ (e.g., glass, quartz, sapphire) for the preparation of masks having dimensions exceeding 125 mm x 125 mm; or

2. 

Substrates specially designed for X-ray masks;

c. 

Equipment, other than general purpose computers, specially designed for computer aided design (CAD) of semiconductor devices or integrated circuits;

d. 

Equipment or machines, as follows, for mask or reticle fabrication:

1. 

Photo-optical step and repeat cameras capable of producing arrays larger than 100 mm x 100 mm, or capable of producing a single exposure larger than 6 mm x 6 mm in the image (i.e., focal) plane, or capable of producing line widths of less than 2,5 micrometer in the photoresist on the ‘substrate’;

2. 

Mask or reticle fabrication equipment using ion or ‘laser’ beam lithography capable of producing line widths of less than 2,5 micrometer; or

3. 

Equipment or holders for altering masks or reticles or adding pellicles to remove defects;

Note: X.B.I.001.b.2.d.1 and b.2.d.2 do not control mask fabrication equipment using photo-optical methods which was either commercially available before the 1st January 1980, or has a performance no better than such equipment.

e. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment for the inspection of masks, reticles or pellicles with:

1. 

A resolution of 0,25 micrometer or finer; and

2. 

A precision of 0,75 micrometer or finer over a distance in one or two coordinates of 63,5 mm or more;

Note: X.B.I.001.b.2.e does not control general purpose scanning electron microscopes except when specially designed and instrumented for automatic pattern inspection.

f. 

Align and expose equipment for wafer production using photo-optical or X-ray methods, e.g., lithography equipment, including both projection image transfer equipment and step and repeat (direct step on wafer) or step and scan (scanner) equipment, capable of performing any of the following functions:

Note: X.B.I.001.b.2.f does not control photo-optical contact and proximity mask align and expose equipment or contact image transfer equipment.

1. 

Production of a pattern size of less than 2,5 micrometer;

2. 

Alignment with a precision finer than ± 0,25 micrometer (3 sigma);

3. 

Machine-to-machine overlay no better than ± 0,3 micrometer; or

4. 

A light source wavelength shorter than 400 nm;

g. 

Electron beam, ion beam or X-ray equipment for projection image transfer capable of producing patterns less than 2,5 micrometer;

Note: For focused, deflected-beam systems (direct write systems), see X.B.I.001.b.1.j.

h. 

Equipment using ‘lasers’ for direct write on wafers capable of producing patterns less than 2,5 micrometer.

3. 

Equipment for the assembly of integrated circuits, as follows:

a. 

‘Stored program controlled’ die bonders having all of the following characteristics:

1. 

Specially designed for ‘hybrid integrated circuits’;

2. 

X-Y stage positioning travel exceeding 37,5 x 37,5 mm; and

3. 

Placement accuracy in the X-Y plane of finer than ± 10 micrometer;

b. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment for producing multiple bonds in a single operation (e.g., beam lead bonders, chip carrier bonders, tape bonders);

c. 

Semi-automatic or automatic hot cap sealers, in which the cap is heated locally to a higher temperature than the body of the package, specially designed for ceramic microcircuit packages controlled by 3A001 ( 31 ) and that have a throughput equal to or more than one package per minute.

Note: X.B.I.001.b.3 does not control general purpose resistance type spot welders.

4. 

Filters for clean rooms capable of providing an air environment of 10 or less particles of 0,3 micrometer or smaller per 0,02832 m3 and filter materials therefor.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.B.I.001, ‘stored program controlled’ is a control using instructions stored in an electronic storage that a processor can execute in order to direct the performance of predetermined functions. Equipment may be ‘stored program controlled’ whether the electronic storage is internal or external to the equipment.

X.B.I.002 

Equipment for the inspection or testing of electronic components and materials, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.

a. 

Equipment specially designed for the inspection or testing of electron tubes, optical elements and specially designed components therefor controlled by 3A001 ( 32 ) or X.A.I.001;

b. 

Equipment specially designed for the inspection or testing of semiconductor devices, integrated circuits and ‘electronic assemblies’, as follows, and systems incorporating or having the characteristics of such equipment:

Note: X.B.I.002.b also controls equipment used or modified for use in the inspection or testing of other devices, such as imaging devices, electro-optical devices, acoustic-wave devices.

1. 

‘Stored program controlled’ inspection equipment for the automatic detection of defects, errors or contaminants of 0,6 micrometer or less in or on processed wafers, substrates, other than printed circuit boards or chips, using optical image acquisition techniques for pattern comparison;

Note: X.B.I.002.b.1 does not control general purpose scanning electron microscopes, except when specially designed and instrumented for automatic pattern inspection.

2. 

Specially designed ‘stored program controlled’ measuring and analysis equipment, as follows:

a. 

Specially designed for the measurement of oxygen or carbon content in semiconductor materials;

b. 

Equipment for line width measurement with a resolution of 1 micrometer or finer;

c. 

Specially designed flatness measurement instruments capable of measuring deviations from flatness of 10 micrometer or less with a resolution of 1 micrometer or finer.

3. 

‘Stored program controlled’ wafer probing equipment having any of the following characteristics:

a. 

Positioning accuracy finer than 3,5 micrometer;

b. 

Capable of testing devices having more than 68 terminals; or

c. 

Capable of testing at a frequency exceeding 1 GHz;

4. 

Test equipment as follows:

a. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment specially designed for testing discrete semiconductor devices and unencapsulated dice, capable of testing at frequencies exceeding 18 GHz;

Technical Note: Discrete semiconductor devices include photocells and solar cells.

b. 

‘Stored program controlled’ equipment specially designed for testing integrated circuits and ‘electronic assemblies’ thereof, capable of functional testing:

1. 

At a ‘pattern rate’ exceeding 20 MHz; or

2. 

At a ‘pattern rate’ exceeding 10 MHz but not exceeding 20 MHz and capable of testing packages of more than 68 terminals.

Notes: X.B.I.002.b.4.b does not control test equipment specially designed for testing:

1. 

Memories;

2. 

‘Assemblies’ or a class of ‘electronic assemblies’ for home and entertainment applications; and

3. 

Electronic components, ‘electronic assemblies’ and integrated circuits not controlled by 3A001 ( 33 ) or X.A.I.001 provided such test equipment does not incorporate computing facilities with ‘user accessible programmability’.

Technical Note: For purposes of X.B.I.002.b.4.b, ‘pattern rate’ is defined as the maximum frequency of digital operation of a tester. It is therefore equivalent to the highest data rate that a tester can provide in non-multiplexed mode. It is also referred to as test speed, maximum digital frequency or maximum digital speed.

c. 

Equipment specially designed for determining the performance of focal-plane arrays at wavelengths of more than 1 200  nm, using ‘stored program controlled’ measurements or computer aided evaluation and having any of the following characteristics:

1. 

Using scanning light spot diameters of less than 0,12 mm;

2. 

Designed for measuring photosensitive performance parameters and for evaluating frequency response, modulation transfer function, uniformity of responsivity or noise; or

3. 

Designed for evaluating arrays capable of creating images with more than 32 x 32 line elements;

5. 

Electron beam test systems designed for operation at 3 keV or below, or ‘laser’ beam systems, for non-contactive probing of powered-up semiconductor devices having any of the following:

a. 

Stroboscopic capability with either beam blanking or detector strobing;

b. 

An electron spectrometer for voltage measurements with a resolution of less than 0,5 V; or

c. 

Electrical tests fixtures for performance analysis of integrated circuits;

Note: X.B.I.002.b.5 does not control scanning electron microscopes, except when specially designed and instrumented for non-contactive probing of a powered-up semiconductor device.

6. 

‘Stored program controlled’ multifunctional focused ion beam systems specially designed for manufacturing, repairing, physical layout analysis and testing of masks or semiconductor devices and having either of the following characteristics:

a. 

Target-to-beam position feedback control precision of 1 micrometer or finer; or

b. 

Digital-to-analog conversion accuracy exceeding 12 bit;

7. 

Particle measuring systems employing ‘lasers’ designed for measuring particle size and concentration in air having both of the following characteristics:

a. 

Capable of measuring particle sizes of 0,2 micrometer or less at a flow rate of 0,02832 m3 per minute or more; and

b. 

Capable of characterizing Class 10 clean air or better.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.B.I.002, ‘stored program controlled’ is a control using instructions stored in an electronic storage that a processor can execute in order to direct the performance of predetermined functions. Equipment may be ‘stored program controlled’ whether the electronic storage is internal or external to the equipment.

X.C.I.001 

Positive resists designed for semiconductor lithography specially adjusted (optimised) for use at wavelengths between 370 and 193 nm.

X.D.I.001 

‘Software’ specially designed for the ‘development’, ‘production’, or ‘use’ of electronic devices or components controlled by X.A.I.001, general purpose electronic equipment controlled by X.A.I.002, or manufacturing and test equipment controlled by X.B.I.001 and X.B.I.002; or ‘software’ specially designed for the ‘use’ of equipment controlled by 3B001.g and 3B001.h ( 34 ).

X.E.I.001 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of electronic devices or components controlled by X.A.I.001, general purpose electronic equipment controlled by X.A.I.002, or manufacturing and test equipment controlled by X.B.I.001 or X.B.I.002, or materials controlled by X.C.I.001.

Category II – Computers

Note: Category II does not control goods for the personal use of the natural persons.

X.A.II.001 

Computers, ‘electronic assemblies’ and related equipment, not controlled by 4A001 or 4A003 ( 35 ), and specially designed components therefor.

Note: The control status of the ‘digital computers’ and related equipment described in X.A.II.001 is determined by the control status of other equipment or systems provided:

a. 

The ‘digital computers’ or related equipment are essential for the operation of the other equipment or systems;

b. 

The ‘digital computers’ or related equipment are not a ‘principal element’ of the other equipment or systems; and

N.B.1: The control status of ‘signal processing’ or ‘image enhancement’ equipment specially designed for other equipment with functions limited to those required for the other equipment is determined by the control status of the other equipment even if it exceeds the ‘principal element’ criterion.

N.B.2: For the control status of ‘digital computers’ or related equipment for telecommunications equipment, see Category 5, Part 1 (Telecommunications) ( 36 ).

c. 

The ‘technology’ for the ‘digital computers’ and related equipment is determined by 4E ( 37 ).

a. 

Electronic computers and related equipment, and ‘electronic assemblies’ and specially designed components therefor, rated for operation at an ambient temperature above 343 K (70°C);

b. 

‘Digital computers’, including equipment of ‘signal processing’ or image enhancement”, having an ‘Adjusted Peak Performance’ (‘APP’) equal to or greater than 0,0128 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT);

c. 

‘Electronic assemblies’ that are specially designed or modified to enhance performance by aggregation of processors, as follows:

1. 

Designed to be capable of aggregation in configurations of 16 or more processors;

2. 

Not used;

Note 1: X.A.II.001.c applies only to ‘electronic assemblies’ and programmable interconnections with a ‘APP’ not exceeding the limits in X.A.II.001.b, when shipped as unintegrated ‘electronic assemblies’. It does not apply to ‘electronic assemblies’ inherently limited by nature of their design for use as related equipment controlled by X.A.II.001.k.

Note 2: X.A.II.001.c does not control any ‘electronic assembly’ specially designed for a product or family of products whose maximum configuration does not exceed the limits of X.A.II.001.b.

d. 

Not used;

e. 

Not used;

f. 

Equipment for ‘signal processing’ or ‘image enhancement’ having an ‘Adjusted Peak Performance’ (‘APP’) equal to or greater than 0,0128 Weighted TeraFLOPS WT;

g. 

Not used;

h. 

Not used;

i. 

Equipment containing ‘terminal interface equipment’ exceeding the limits in X.A.III.101;

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.II.001.i, ‘terminal interface equipment’ means equipment at which information enters or leaves the telecommunication system, e.g. telephone, data device, computer, etc.

j. 

Equipment specially designed to provide external interconnection of ‘digital computers’ or associated equipment that allows communications at data rates exceeding 80 Mbyte/s.

Note: X.A.II.001.j does not control internal interconnection equipment (e.g., backplanes, buses) passive interconnection equipment, ‘network access controllers’ or ‘communication channel controllers’.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.II.001.j, ‘communication channel controllers’ is the physical interface which controls the flow of synchronous or asynchronous digital information. It is an assembly that can be integrated into computer or telecommunications equipment to provide communications access.

k. 

‘Hybrid computers’ and ‘electronic assemblies’ and specially designed components therefor containing analog-to-digital converters having all of the following characteristics:

1. 

32 channels or more; and

2. 

A resolution of 14 bit (plus sign bit) or more with a conversion rate of 200 000  Hz or more.

X.D.II.001 

‘Program’ proof and validation ‘software’, ‘software’ allowing the automatic generation of ‘source codes’, and operating system ‘software’ that are specially designed for ‘real-time processing’ equipment.

a. 

‘Program’ proof and validation ‘software’ using mathematical and analytical techniques and designed or modified for ‘programs’ having more than 500 000 ‘source code’ instructions;

b. 

‘Software’ allowing the automatic generation of ‘source codes’ from data acquired on line from external sensors described in the Regulation (EU) 2021/821; or

c. 

Operating system ‘software’ specially designed for ‘real-time processing’ equipment that guarantees a ‘global interrupt latency time’ of less than 20 microseconds.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.D.II.001, 'global interrupt latency time' is the time taken by the computer system to recognise an interrupt due to the event, service the interrupt and perform a context switch to an alternate memory-resident task waiting on the interrupt.

X.D.II.002 

‘Software’ other than that controlled in 4D001 ( 38 ) specially designed or modified for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by 4A101 ( 39 ), X.A.II.001.

X.E.II.001 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.II.001, or ‘software’ controlled by X.D.II.001 or X.D.II.002.

X.E.II.001 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of equipment designed for ‘multi-data-stream processing’.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.E.II.001, ‘multi-data-stream processing’ is a microprogram or equipment architecture technique that permits simultaneous processing of two or more data sequences under the control of one or more instruction sequences by means such as:

1. 

Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) architectures such as vector or array processors;

2. 

Multiple Single Instruction Multiple Data (MSIMD) architectures;

3. 

Multiple Instruction Multiple Data (MIMD) architectures, including those that are tightly coupled, closely coupled or loosely coupled; or

4. 

Structured arrays of processing elements, including systolic arrays.

Category III. Part 1 – Telecommunications

Note: Category III.Part 1 does not control goods for the personal use of the natural persons.

X.A.III.101 

Telecommunication equipment.

a. 

Any type of telecommunications equipment, not controlled by 5A001.a ( 40 ), specially designed to operate outside the temperature range from 219 K (-54°C) to 397 K (124°C).

b. 

Telecommunication transmission equipment and systems, and specially designed components and accessories therefor, having any of the following characteristics, functions or features:

Note: Telecommunication transmission equipment:

a. 

Categorised as follows, or combinations thereof:

1. 

Radio equipment (e.g., transmitters, receivers and transceivers);

2. 

Line terminating equipment;

3. 

Intermediate amplifier equipment;

4. 

Repeater equipment;

5. 

Regenerator equipment;

6. 

Translation encoders (transcoders);

7. 

Multiplex equipment (statistical mutiplex included);

8. 

Modulators/demodulators (modems);

9. 

Transmultiplex equipment (see CCITT Rec. G701);

10. 

‘Stored program controlled’ digital cross-connection equipment;

11. 

‘Gateways’ and bridges;

12. 

‘Media access units’; and

b. 

Designed for use in single or multi-channel communication via any of the following:

1. 

Wire (line);

2. 

Coaxial cable;

3. 

Optical fibre cable;

4. 

Electromagnetic radiation; or

5. 

Underwater acoustic wave propagation.

1. 

Employing digital techniques, including digital processing of analog signals, and designed to operate at a ‘digital transfer rate’ at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mbit/s or a ‘total digital transfer rate’ exceeding 90 Mbit/s;

Note: X.A.III.101.b.1 does not control equipment specially designed to be integrated and operated in any satellite system for civil use.

2. 

Modems using the ‘bandwidth of one voice channel’ with a ‘data signalling rate’ exceeding 9 600 bits per second;

3. 

Being ‘stored program controlled’ digital cross connect equipment with ‘digital transfer rate’ exceeding 8,5 Mbit/s per port.

4. 

Being equipment containing any of the following:

a. 

"Network access controllers" and their related common medium having a ‘digital transfer rate’ exceeding 33 Mbit/s; or

b. 

‘Communication channel controllers’ with a digital output having a ‘data signalling rate’ exceeding 64 000 bit/s per channel;

Note: If any uncontrolled equipment contains a ‘network access controller’, it cannot have any type of telecommunications interface, except those described in, but not controlled by X.A.III.101.b.4.

5. 

Employing a ‘laser’ and having any of the following characteristics:

a. 

A transmission wavelength exceeding 1 000  nm; or

b. 

Employing analog techniques and having a bandwidth exceeding 45 MHz;

c. 

Employing coherent optical transmission or coherent optical detection techniques (also called optical heterodyne or homodyne techniques);

d. 

Employing wavelength division multiplexing techniques; or

e. 

Performing ‘optical amplification’;

6. 

Radio equipment operating at input or output frequencies exceeding:

a. 

31 GHz for satellite-earth station applications; or

b. 

26,5 GHz for other applications;

Note: X.A.III.101.b.6 does not control equipment for civil use when conforming with an International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocated band between 26,5 GHz and 31 GHz.

7. 

Being radio equipment employing any of the following:

a. 

Quadrature-amplitude-modulation (QAM) techniques above level 4 if the ‘total digital transfer rate’ exceeds 8,5 Mbit/s;

b. 

QAM techniques above level 16 if the ‘total digital transfer rate’ is equal to or less than 8,5 Mbit/s;

c. 

Other digital modulation techniques and having a ‘spectral efficiency’ exceeding 3 bit/s/Hz; or

d. 

Operating in the 1,5 MHz to 87,5 MHz band and incorporating adaptive techniques providing more than 15 dB suppression of an interfering signal.

Notes: 

1. 

X.A.III.101.b.7 does not control equipment specially designed to be integrated and operated in any satellite system for civil use.

2. 

X.A.III.101.b.7 does not control radio relay equipment for operation in an International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocated band:

a. 

Having any of the following:

1. 

Not exceeding 960 MHz; or

2. 

With a ‘total digital transfer rate’ not exceeding 8,5 Mbit/s; and

b. 

Having a ‘spectral efficiency’ not exceeding 4 bit/s/Hz.

c. 

‘Stored program controlled’ switching equipment and related signalling systems, having any of the following characteristics, functions or features, and specially designed components and accessories therefor:

Note: Statistical multiplexers with digital input and digital output which provide switching are treated as 'stored program controlled' switches.

1. 

‘Data (message) switching’ equipment or systems designed for ‘packet-mode operation’, electronic assemblies and components therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

2. 

Not used;

3. 

Routing or switching of ‘datagram’ packets;

Note: X.A.III.101.c.3 does not control networks restricted to using only ‘network access controllers’ or to ‘network access controllers’ themselves.

4. 

Not used;

5. 

Multi-level priority and pre-emption for circuit switching;

Note: X.A.III.101.c.5 does not control single-level call preemption.

6. 

Designed for automatic hand-off of cellular radio calls to other cellular switches or automatic connection to a centralised subscriber data base common to more than one switch;

7. 

Containing ‘stored program controlled’ digital cross connect equipment with ‘digital transfer rate’ exceeding 8,5 Mbit/s per port.

8. 

‘Common channel signalling’ operating in either non-associated or quasi-associated mode of operation;

9. 

‘Dynamic adaptive routing’;

10. 

Being packet switches, circuit switches and routers with ports or lines exceeding any of the following:

a. 

A ‘data signalling rate’ of 64 000 bit/s per channel for a ‘communications channel controller’; or

Note: X.A.III.101.c.10.a does not control multiplex composite links composed only of communication channels not individually controlled by X.A.III.101.b.1.

b. 

A ‘digital transfer rate’ of 33 Mbit/s for a ‘network access controller’ and related common media;

Note: X.A.III.101.c.10 does not control packet switches or routers with ports or lines not exceeding the limits in X.A.III.101.c.10.

11. 

‘Optical switching’;

12. 

Employing ‘Asynchronous Transfer Mode’ (‘ATM’) techniques.

d. 

Optical fibres and optical fibre cables of more than 50 m in length designed for single mode operation;

e. 

Centralised network control having all of the following characteristics:

1. 

Receives data from the nodes; and

2. 

Process these data in order to provide control of traffic not requiring operator decisions, and thereby performing ‘dynamic adaptive routing’;

Note 1: X.A.III.101.e does not include cases of routing decisions taken on predefined information.

Note 2: X.A.III.101.e does not preclude control of traffic as a function of predictable statistical traffic conditions.

f. 

Phased array antennas, operating above 10,5 GHz, containing active elements and distributed components, and designed to permit electronic control of beam shaping and pointing, except for landing systems with instruments meeting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards (microwave landing systems (MLS)).

g. 

Mobile communications equipment other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, electronic assemblies and components therefor; or

h. 

Radio relay communications equipment designed for use at frequencies equal to or exceeding 19,7 GHz and components therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.III.101:

1) 

‘Asynchronous transfer mode’ (‘ATM’) is a transfer mode in which the information is organised into cells; it is asynchronous in the sense that the recurrence of cells depends on the required or instantaneous bit rate.

2) 

‘Bandwidth of one voice channel’ is data communication equipment designed to operate in one voice channel of 3 100  Hz, as defined in CCITT Recommendation G.151.

3) 

‘Communications channel controller’ is the physical interface that controls the flow of synchronous or asynchronous digital information. It is an assembly that can be integrated into computer or telecommunications equipment to provide communications access.

4) 

‘Datagram’ is a self-contained, independent entity of data carrying sufficient information to be routed from the source to the destination data terminal equipment without reliance on earlier exchanges between this source and destination data terminal equipment and the transporting network.

5) 

‘Fast select’ is a facility applicable to virtual calls that allows data terminal equipment to expand the possibility to transmit data in call set-up and clearing ‘packets’ beyond the basic capabilities of a virtual call.

6) 

‘Gateway’ is the function, realised by any combination of equipment and ‘software’, to carry out the conversion of conventions for representing, processing or communicating information used on one system into the corresponding, but different conventions used in another system.

7) 

‘Integrated Services Digital Network’ (ISDN) is a unified end-to-end digital network, in which data originating from all types of communication (e.g., voice, text, data, still and moving pictures) are transmitted from one port (terminal) in the exchange (switch) over one access line to and from the subscriber.

8) 

‘Packet’ is a group of binary digits including data and call control signals that is switched as a composite whole. The data, call control signals, and possible error control information are arranged in a specified format.

9) 

‘Common channel signalling’ means the transmission of control information (signalling) via a separate channel than that used for the messages. The signalling channel usually controls multiple message channels.

10) 

‘Data signalling rate’ means the rate, as defined in ITU Recommendation 53-36, taking into account that, for non-binary modulation, baud and bit per second are not equal. Bits for coding, checking and synchronization functions are to be included.

11) 

‘Dynamic adaptive routing’ means Automatic rerouting of traffic based on sensing and analysis of current actual network conditions

12) 

‘Media access unit’ means equipment that contains one or more communication interfaces (‘network access controller’, ‘communications channel controller’, modem or computer bus) to connect terminal equipment to a network.

13) 

‘Spectral efficiency’ is the ‘digital transfer rate’ [bits/s] / 6 dB spectrum bandwidth in Hz.

14) 

‘Stored program controlled’ is a control using instructions stored in an electronic storage that a processor can execute in order to direct the performance of predetermined functions. Note: Equipment may be ‘stored program controlled’ whether the electronic storage is internal or external to the equipment.

X.B.III.101 

Telecommunications test equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

X.C.III.101 

Preforms of glass or of any other material optimised for the manufacture of optical fibres controlled by X.A.III.101.

X.D.III.101 

‘Software’ specially designed or modified for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.III.101 and X.B.III.101, and dynamic adaptive routing software as described as follows:

a. 

‘Software’, other than in machine-executable form, specially designed for ‘dynamic adaptive routing’.

b. 

Not used;

X.E.III.101 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.III.101 or X.B.III.101, or ‘software’ controlled by X.D.III.101, and other ‘technologies’ as follows:

a. 

Specific ‘technologies’ as follows:

1. 

‘Technology’ for the processing and application of coatings to optical fibre specially designed to make it suitable for underwater use;

2. 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’ of equipment employing ‘Synchronous Digital Hierarchy’ (‘SDH’) or ‘Synchronous Optical Network’ (‘SONET’) techniques.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.E.III.101:

1) 

‘Synchronous digital hierarchy’ (SDH) is a digital hierarchy providing a means to manage, multiplex, and access various forms of digital traffic using a synchronous transmission format on different types of media. The format is based on the Synchronous Transport Module (STM) that is defined by CCITT Recommendation G.703, G.707, G.708, G.709 and others yet to be published. The first level rate of ‘SDH’ is 155,52 Mbits/s.

2) 

‘Synchronous optical network’ (SONET) is a network providing a means to manage, multiplex and access various forms of digital traffic using a synchronous transmission format on fibre optics. The format is the North America version of ‘SDH’ and also uses the Synchronous Transport Module (STM). However, it uses the Synchronous Transport Signal (STS) as the basic transport module with a first level rate of 51,81 Mbits/s. The SONET standards are being integrated into those of ‘SDH’.

Category III. Part 2 – Information Security

Note: Category III. Part 2 does not control goods for the personal use of the natural persons.

X.A.III.201 

Equipment as follows:

a. 

Not used;

b. 

Not used;

c. 

Goods classified as mass market encryption in accordance with Cryptography Note – Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2 ( 41 ).

X.D.III.201 

‘Information Security’‘software’ as follows:

Note: This entry does not control ‘software’ designed or modified to protect against malicious computer damage, e.g., viruses, where the use of ‘cryptography’ is limited to authentication, digital signature and/or the decryption of data or files.

a. 

Not used;

b. 

Not used;

c. 

‘Software’ classified as mass market encryption software in accordance with Cryptography Note – Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2 ( 42 ).

X.E.III.201 

‘Information Security’‘technology’ according to the General Technology Note, as follows:

a. 

Not used;

b. 

‘Technology’, other than specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, for the ‘use’ of mass market goods controlled by X.A.III.201.c or mass market ‘software’ controlled by X.D.III.201.c.

Category IV – Sensors and Lasers

X.A.IV.001 

Marine or terrestrial acoustic equipment, capable of detecting or locating underwater objects or features or positioning surface vessels or underwater vehicles; and specially designed components, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

X.A.IV.002 

Optical Sensors as follows:

a. 

Image intensifier tubes and specially designed components therefor, as follows:

1. 

Image intensifier tubes having all the following:

a. 

A peak response in wavelength range exceeding 400 nm, but not exceeding 1 050  nm;

b. 

A microchannel plate for electron image amplification with a hole pitch (center-to-center spacing) of less than 25 micrometers; and

c. 

Having any of the following:

1. 

An S-20, S-25 or multialkali photocathode; or

2. 

A GaAs or GaInAs photocathode;

2. 

Specially designed microchannel plates having both of the following characteristics:

a. 

15 000 or more hollow tubes per plate; and

b. 

Hole pitch (center-to-center spacing) of less than 25 micrometers.

b. 

Direct view imaging equipment operating in the visible or infrared spectrum, incorporating image intensifier tubes having the characteristics listed in X.A.IV.002.a.1.

X.A.IV.003 

Cameras as follows:

a. 

Cameras that meet the criteria of Note 3 to 6A003.b.4. ( 43 )

b. 

Not used;

X.A.IV.004 

Optics as follows:

a. 

Optical filters:

1. 

For wavelengths longer than 250 nm, comprised of multi-layer optical coatings and having either of the following:

a. 

Bandwidths equal to or less than 1 nm Full Width Half Intensity (FWHI) and peak transmission of 90 % or more; or

b. 

Bandwidths equal to or less than 0,1 nm FWHI and peak transmission of 50 % or more;

Note: X.A.IV.004 does not control optical filters with fixed air gaps or Lyot-type filters.

2. 

For wavelengths longer than 250 nm, and having all of the following:

a. 

Tunable over a spectral range of 500 nm or more;

b. 

Instantaneous optical bandpass of 1,25 nm or less;

c. 

Wavelength resettable within 0,1 ms to an accuracy of 1 nm or better within the tunable spectral range; and

d. 

A single peak transmission of 91 % or more;

3. 

Optical opacity switches (filters) with a field of view of 30° or wider and a response time equal to or less than 1 ns;

b. 

‘Fluoride fibre’ cable, or optical fibres therefor, having an attenuation of less than 4 dB/km in the wavelength range exceeding 1 000  nm but not exceeding 3 000  nm.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.IV.004.b ‘Fluoride fibres’ are fibres manufactured from bulk fluoride compounds.

X.A.IV.005 

‘Lasers’ as follows:

a. 

Carbon dioxide (CO2) ‘lasers’ having any of the following:

1. 

A CW output power exceeding 10 kW;

2. 

A pulsed output with a ‘pulse duration’ exceeding 10 μs; and

a. 

An average output power exceeding 10 kW; or

b. 

A pulsed ‘peak power’ exceeding 100 kW; or

3. 

A pulsed output with a ‘pulse duration’ equal to or less than 10 μs; and

a. 

A pulse energy exceeding 5 J per pulse and ‘peak power’ exceeding 2,5 kW; or

b. 

An average output power exceeding 2,5 kW;

b. 

Semiconductor lasers, as follows:

1. 

Individual, single-transverse mode semiconductor ‘lasers’ having:

a. 

An average output power exceeding 100 mW; or

b. 

A wavelength exceeding 1 050  nm;

2. 

Individual, multiple-transverse mode semiconductor ‘lasers’, or arrays of individual semiconductor ‘lasers’, having a wavelength exceeding 1 050  nm;

c. 

Ruby ‘lasers’ having an output energy exceeding 20 J per pulse;

d. 

Non-‘tunable’‘pulsed lasers’ having an output wavelength exceeding 975 nm but not exceeding 1 150  nm and having any of the following:

1. 

A ‘pulse duration’ equal to or exceeding 1 ns but not exceeding 1 μs, and having any of the following:

a. 

A single transverse mode output and having any of the following:

1. 

A ‘wall-plug efficiency’ exceeding 12 % and an ‘average output power’ exceeding 10 W and capable of operating at a pulse repetition frequency greater than 1 kHz; or

2. 

An ‘average output power’ exceeding 20 W; or

b. 

A multiple transverse mode output and having any of the following:

1. 

A ‘wall-plug efficiency’ exceeding 18 % and an ‘average output power’ exceeding 30W;

2. 

A ‘peak power’ exceeding 200 MW; or

3. 

An ‘average output power’ exceeding 50 W; or

2. 

A ‘pulse duration’ exceeding 1 μs and having any of the following:

a. 

A single transverse mode output and having any of the following:

1. 

A ‘wall-plug efficiency’ exceeding 12 % and an ‘average output power’ exceeding 10 W and capable of operating at a pulse repetition frequency greater than 1 kHz; or

2. 

An ‘average output power’ exceeding 20 W; or

b. 

A multiple transverse mode output and having any of the following:

1. 

A ‘wall-plug efficiency’ exceeding 18 % and an ‘average output power’ exceeding 30 W; or

2. 

An ‘average output power’ exceeding 500 W;

e. 

Non-‘tunable’ continuous wave ‘(CW) lasers’, having an output wavelength exceeding 975 nm but not exceeding 1 150  nm and having any of the following:

1. 

A single transverse mode output and having any of the following:

a. 

A ‘wall-plug efficiency’ exceeding 12 % and an ‘average output power’ exceeding 10 W and capable of operating at a pulse repetition frequency greater than 1 kHz; or

b. 

An ‘average output power’ exceeding 50 W; or

2. 

A multiple transverse mode output and having any of the following:

a. 

A ‘wall-plug efficiency’ exceeding 18 % and an ‘average output power’ exceeding 30 W; or

b. 

An ‘average output power’ exceeding 500 W;

Note: X.A.IV.005.e.2.b does not control multiple transverse mode, industrial ‘lasers’ with output power less than or equal to 2 kW with a total mass greater than 1 200 kg. For the purpose of this note, total mass includes all components required to operate the ‘laser’, e.g., ‘laser’, power supply, heat exchanger, but excludes external optics for beam conditioning and/or delivery.

f. 

Non-‘tunable’‘lasers’, having a wavelength exceeding 1 400  nm, but not exceeding 1 555  nm and having any of the following:

1. 

An output energy exceeding 100 mJ per pulse and a pulsed ‘peak power’ exceeding 1 W; or

2. 

An average or CW output power exceeding 1 W;

g. 

Free electron ‘lasers’.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.IV.005 ‘Wall-plug efficiency’ is defined as the ratio of "laser" output power (or "average output power") to total electrical input power required to operate the "laser", including the power supply/conditioning and thermal conditioning/heat exchanger.

X.A.IV.006 

‘Magnetometers’, ‘Superconductive’ electromagnetic sensors, and specially designed components therefor, as follows:

a. 

‘Magnetometers’, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, having a ‘sensitivity’ lower (better) than 1,0 nT (rms) per square root Hz.

Technical Note: For the purposes of X.A.IV.006.a, ‘sensitivity’ (noise level) is the root mean square of the device-limited noise floor which is the lowest signal that can be measured.

b. 

‘Superconductive’ electromagnetic sensors, components manufactured from ‘superconductive’ materials:

1. 

Designed for operation at temperatures below the ‘critical temperature’ of at least one of their ‘superconductive’ constituents (including Josephson effect devices or ‘superconductive’ quantum interference devices (SQUIDS));

2. 

Designed for sensing electromagnetic field variations at frequencies of 1 KHz or less; and

3. 

Having any of the following characteristics:

a. 

Incorporating thin-film SQUIDS with a minimum feature size of less than 2 μm and with associated input and output coupling circuits;

b. 

Designed to operate with a magnetic field slew rate exceeding 1 x 106 magnetic flux quanta per second;

c. 

Designed to function without magnetic shielding in the earth’s ambient magnetic field; or

d. 

Having a temperature coefficient less (smaller) than 0,1 magnetic flux quantum/K.

X.A.IV.007 

Gravity meters (gravimeters) for ground use, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, as follows:

a. 

Having a static accuracy of less (better) than 100 μGal; or

b. 

Being of the quartz element (Worden) type.

X.A.IV.008 

Radar systems, equipment and major components, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, and specially designed components therefor, as follows:

a. 

Airborne radar equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, and specially designed components therefor.

b. 

‘Space-qualified’‘laser’ radar or Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) equipment specially designed for surveying or for meteorological observation.

c. 

Millimeter wave enhanced vision radar imaging systems specially designed for rotary wing aircraft and having all of the following:

1. 

Operates at a frequency of 94 GHz;

2. 

An average output power of less than 20 mW;

3. 

Radar beam width of 1 degree; and

4. 

Operating range equal to or greater than 1 500  m.

X.A.IV.009 

Specific processing equipment, as follows:

a. 

Seismic detection equipment not controlled by X.A.IV.009.c.

b. 

Radiation hardened TV cameras, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

c. 

Seismic intrusion detection systems that detect, classify and determine the bearing on the source of a detected signal.

X.B.IV.001 

Equipment, including tools, dies, fixtures or gauges, and other specially designed components and accessories therefor, specially designed or modified for any of the following:

a. 

For the manufacture or inspection of:

1. 

Free electron ‘laser’ magnet wigglers;

2. 

Free electron ‘laser’ photo injectors;

b. 

For the adjustment, to required tolerances, of the longitudinal magnetic field of free electron ‘lasers’.

X.C.IV.001 

Optical sensing fibres that are modified structurally to have a ‘beat length’ of less than 500 mm (high birefringence) or optical sensor materials not described in 6C002.b ( 44 ) and having a zinc content of equal to or more than 6 % by ‘mole fraction.’

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.C.IV.001:

1) 

‘Mole fraction’ is defined as the ratio of moles of ZnTe to the sum of the moles of CdTe and ZnTe present in the crystal.

2) 

‘Beat length’ is the distance over which two orthogonally polarised signals, initially in phase, must pass in order to achieve a 2 Pi radian(s) phase difference.

X.C.IV.002 

Optical materials, as follows:

a. 

Low optical absorption materials, as follows:

1. 

Bulk fluoride compounds containing ingredients with a purity of 99,999 % or better; or

Note: X.C.IV.002.a.1 controls fluorides of zirconium or aluminum and variants.

2. 

Bulk fluoride glass made from compounds controlled by 6C004.e.1 ( 45 );

b. 

‘Optical fibre preforms’ made from bulk fluoride compounds containing ingredients with a purity of 99,999 % or better, ‘specially designed’ for the manufacture of ‘fluoride fibres’ controlled by X.A.IV.004.b.

Technical Note: For the purpose of X.C.IV.002:

1) 

‘Fluoride fibres’ are fibres manufactured from bulk fluoride compounds.

2) 

‘Optical fibre preforms’ are bars, ingots, or rods of glass, plastic or other materials that have been specially processed for use in fabricating optical fibres. The characteristics of the preform determine the basic parameters of the resultant drawn optical fibres.

X.D.IV.001 

‘Software’, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, specially designed for the ‘development’, ‘production’, or ‘use’ of goods controlled by 6A002, 6A003 ( 46 ), X.A.IV.001, X.A.IV.006, X.A.IV.007, or X.A.IV.008.

X.D.IV.002 

‘Software’ specially designed for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of equipment controlled by X.A.IV.002, X.A.IV.004, or X.A.IV.005.

X.D.IV.003 

Other ‘software’, as follows:

a. 

Air Traffic Control (ATC) ‘software’ application ‘programs’ hosted on general purpose computers located at ATC centers, and capable of automatically handing over primary radar target data (if not correlated with secondary surveillance radar (SSR) data) from the host ATC center to another ATC center.

b. 

‘Software’ specially designed for seismic intrusion detection systems in X.A.IV.009.c.

c. 

‘Source Code’ specially designed for seismic intrusion detection systems in X.A.IV.009.c.

X.E.IV.001 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.IV.001, X.A.IV.006, X.A.IV.007, X.A.IV.008 or X.A.IV.009.c.

X.E.IV.002 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of equipment, materials or ‘software’ controlled by X.A.IV.002, X.A.IV.004, or X.A.IV.005, X.B.IV.001, X.C.IV.001, X.C.IV.002, or X.D.IV.003.

X.E.IV.003 

Other ‘technology’ as follows:

a. 

Optical fabrication technologies for serially producing optical components at a rate exceeding 10 m2 of surface area per year on any single spindle and having all of the following:

1. 

Area exceeding 1 m2; and

2. 

Surface figure exceeding λ/10 (rms) at the designed wavelength;

b. 

‘Technology’ for optical filters with a bandwidth equal to or less than 10 nm, a field of view (FOV) exceeding 40° and a resolution exceeding 0,75 line pairs per milliradian;

c. 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of cameras controlled by X.A.IV.003;

d. 

‘Technology’ required for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of non-triaxial fluxgate ‘magnetometers’ or non-triaxial fluxgate ‘magnetometer’ systems, having any of the following:

1. 

‘Sensitivity’ lower (better) than 0,05 nT (rms) per square root Hz at frequencies of less than 1 Hz; or

2. 

‘Sensitivity’ lower (better) than 1 x 10-3 nT (rms) per square root Hz at frequencies of 1 Hz or more.

e. 

‘Technology’ required for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of infrared up-conversion devices having all of the following:

1. 

A response in the wavelength range exceeding 700 nm but not exceeding 1 500  nm; and

2. 

A combination of an infrared photodetector, light emitting diode (OLED), and nanocrystal to convert infrared light into visible light.

Technical Note: For the purposes of X.E.IV.003, ‘sensitivity’ (or noise level) is the root mean square of the device-limited noise floor which is the lowest signal that can be measured.

Category V – Navigation and Avionics

X.A.V.001 

Airborne communication equipment, all "aircraft" inertial navigation systems, and other avionic equipment, including components, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

Note 1: X.A.V.001. does not control headsets or microphones.

Note 2: X.A.V.001. does not control goods for the personal use of the natural persons.

X.B.V.001 

Other equipment specially designed for the test, inspection, or ‘production’ of navigation and avionics equipment.

X.D.V.001 

‘Software’, other than specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, for the ‘development’, ‘production’, or ‘use’ of navigation, airborne communication and other avionics.

X.E.V.001 

‘Technology’, other than specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of navigation, airborne communication, and other avionics equipment.

Category VI – Marine

X.A.VI.001 

Vessels, marine systems or equipment, and specially designed components therefor, components and accessories as follows:

a. 

Underwater vision systems, as follows:

1. 

Television systems (comprising camera, lights, monitoring and signal transmission equipment) having a limiting resolution when measured in air of more than 500 lines and specially designed or modified for remote operation with a submersible vehicle; or

2. 

Underwater television cameras having a limiting resolution when measured in air of more than 700 lines;

Technical Note: Limiting resolution in television is a measure of horizontal resolution usually expressed in terms of the maximum number of lines per picture height discriminated on a test chart, using IEEE Standard 208/1960 or any equivalent standard.

b. 

Photographic still cameras specially designed or modified for underwater use, having a film format of 35 mm or larger, and having autofocusing or remote focusing ‘specially designed’ for underwater use;

c. 

Stroboscopic light systems, specially designed or modified for underwater use, capable of a light output energy of more than 300 J per flash;

d. 

Other underwater camera equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

e. 

Not used;

f. 

Vessels (surface or underwater), including inflatable boats, and specially designed components therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

Note: X.A.VI.001.f does not control vessels on temporary sojourn, used for private transport or for the transport of passengers or goods from or through the customs territory of the Union.

Marine engines (both inboard and outboard) and submarine engines and specially designed components therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

h. 

Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (scuba gear) and accessories therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

i. 

Life jackets, inflation cartridges, dive compasses and dive computers;

Note: X.A.VI.001.i does not control goods for the personal use of the natural persons.

j. 

Underwater lights and propulsion equipment;

Note: X.A.VI.001.j does not control goods for the personal use of the natural persons.

k. 

Air compressors and filtration system specially designed for filling air cylinders;

X.D.VI.001 

‘Software’ specially designed or modified for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.VI.001.

X.D.VI.002 

‘Software’ specially designed for the operation of unmanned submersible vehicles used in the oil and gas industry.

X.E.VI.001 

‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.VI.001.

Category VII – Aerospace and Propulsion

X.A.VII.001 

▼M47

Diesel engines, and tractors and specially designed components therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821:

▼M46

a. 

Diesel engines, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, for trucks, tractors, and automotive applications, having an overall power output of 298kW or more.

b. 

Off highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9 t or more; and major components and accessories, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

c. 

Road tractors for semi-trailers, with single or tandem rear axles rated for 9 t per axel or more and specially designed major components.

Note: X.A.VII.001.b and X.A.VII.001.c do not control vehicles on temporary sojourn, used for private transport or for the transport of passengers or goods from or through the customs territory of the Union.

X.A.VII.002 

Gas turbine engines and components, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

a. 

Not used.

b. 

Not used.

c. 

▼M47

Aero gas turbine engines and components specially designed therefor.

▼M46

Note: X.A.VII.002.c does not control aero gas turbine engines that are destined for use in civil ‘aircraft’ and that have been in use in bona fide civil ‘aircraft’ for more than eight years. If they have been in use in bona fide civil ‘aircraft’ for more than eight years, see ANNEX XI.

d. 

Not used.

e. 

Pressurised aircraft breathing equipment components specially designed therefor, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

X.B.VII.001 

Vibration test equipment and specially designed components, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

Note: X.B.VII.001. controls only equipment for the ‘development’ or ‘production’. It does not control condition monitoring systems.

X.B.VII.002 

Specially designed ‘equipment’, tooling or fixtures for manufacturing or measuring gas turbine blades, vanes or tip shroud castings, as follows:

a. 

Automated equipment using non-mechanical methods for measuring airfoil wall thickness;

b. 

Tooling, fixtures or measuring equipment for the ‘laser’, water jet or ECM/EDM hole drilling processes controlled by 9E003.c ( 47 );

c. 

Ceramic core leaching equipment;

d. 

Ceramic core manufacturing equipment or tools;

e. 

Ceramic shell wax pattern preparation equipment;

f. 

Ceramic shell burn out or firing equipment.

X.D.VII.001 

‘Software’, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of equipment controlled by X.A.VII.001 or X.B.VII.001.

X.D.VII.002 

‘Software’, for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ of equipment controlled by X.A.VII.002 or X.B.VII.002.

X.E.VII.001 

‘Technology’, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, for the ‘development’ or ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.VII.001 or X.B.VII.001.

X.E.VII.002 

‘Technology’, for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by X.A.VII.002 or X.B.VII.002.

X.E.VII.003 

Other ‘technology’, not described by 9E003 ( 48 ), as follows:

a. 

Rotor blade tip clearance control systems employing active compensating casing ‘technology’ limited to a design and development data base; or

b. 

Gas bearing for turbine engine rotor assemblies.

▼M55

Part B

1.   Semiconductor devices



CN Code

Description

8541 10

Diodes, other than photosensitive or light-emitting diodes (LED)

8541 21

Transistors, other than photosensitive transistors with a dissipation rate of less than 1 W

8541 29

Other transistors, other than photosensitive transistors

8541 30

Thyristors, diacs and triacs (excl. photosensitive semiconductor devices)

8541 49

Photosensitive semiconductor devices (excl. Photovoltaic generators and cells)

8541 51

Other semiconductor devices: Semiconductor-based transducers

8541 59

Other semiconductor devices

8541 60

Mounted piezo-electric crystals

2.   Electronic integrated circuits, manufacturing and testing equipment



CN Code

Description

8486 10

Machines and apparatus for the manufacture of boules or wafers

8486 20

Machines and apparatus for the manufacture of semiconductor devices or of electronic integrated circuits

8486 40

Machines and apparatus specified in note 11(C) to this chapter

8534 00

Printed circuits

8542 31

Processors and controllers, whether or not combined with memories, converters, logic circuits, amplifiers, clock and timing circuits, or other circuits

8542 32

Memories

8542 33

Amplifiers

8542 39

Other Electronic Integrated Circuits

8543 20

Signal generators

9030 20

Oscilloscopes and oscillographs

9030 32

Multimeters with recording device

9030 39

Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking voltage, current, resistance or electrical power, with recording device

9030 82

Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices

3.   Photographic cameras and optical components



CN Code

Description

8525 89

Other television cameras, digital cameras and video camera recorders

9013 10

Telescopic sights for fitting to arms; periscopes; telescopes designed to form parts of machines, appliances, instruments or apparatus of this chapter or Section XVI

9013 80

Other optical devices, appliances and instruments

4.   Other electrical/magnetic components



CN Code

Description

8532 21

Other fixed capacitors of tantalum

8532 24

Ceramic dielectric multilayer capacitors

8536 69

Plugs and sockets

8536 90

Other apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits, or for making connections to or in electrical circuits (for example, switches, relays, fuses, surge suppressors, plugs, sockets, lamp holders and other connectors, junction boxes), for a voltage not exceeding 1 000 V; connectors for optical fibres, optical fibre bundles or cables

8548 00

Electrical parts of machinery or apparatus, not specified or included elsewhere in Chapter 85

5.   Electronic devices, modules and assemblies



CN Code

Description

8471 50

Processing units other than those of subheading 8471 41 or 8471 49 , whether or not containing in the same housing one or two of the following types of unit: storage units, input units, output units

8471 80

Units for automatic data-processing machines (excl. processing units, input or output units and storage units)

8517 62

Machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus

8517 69

Other apparatus for the transmission or reception of voice, images or other data, including apparatus for communication in a wired or wireless network

8526 91

Radio navigational aid apparatus

9014 20

Instruments and appliances for aeronautical or space navigation (other than compasses)

9014 80

Other navigational instruments and appliances

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ANNEX Vb

LIST OF PARTNER COUNTRIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1e(4), 1f(4) AND 1fc(4)

[…]




ANNEX Vc

A.   Model for supply, transfer or export notification, application and authorisation forms

(referred to in Article 1fb of this Regulation)

The export authorisation is valid in all Member States of the European Union until its expiry date.

image

image

image

image

image

B.   Model for brokering services/technical assistance notification, application and authorisation forms

(referred to in Article 1fb of this Regulation)

image

image

image

▼M46




ANNEX VI

LIST OF GOODS USED FOR THE PRODUCTION OR MANUFACTURING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1g



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Filters

ex 4823 90

Papers for cigarettes

4813

Flavours for tobacco

ex 3302 90

Machinery for preparing or making up of tobacco

8478

Other knives and cutting blades, for machines or for mechanical appliances

ex 8208 90 00

(1)   

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:385:FULL&from=EN




ANNEX VII

LIST OF MINERAL PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1h



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Oils and other products of the distillation of high temperature coal tar; similar products in which the weight of the aromatic constituents exceeds that of the non-aromatic constituents

2707

Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals (excl. crude); preparations containing >= 70% by weight of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from bituminous minerals, these oils being the basic constituents of the preparations, n.e.s.; waste oils containing mainly petroleum or bituminous minerals

2710

Petroleum gas and other gaseous hydrocarbons

2711

Petroleum jelly, paraffin wax, micro- crystalline petroleum wax, slack wax, ozokerite, lignite wax, peat wax, other mineral waxes, and similar products obtained by synthesis or by other processes, whether or not coloured

2712

Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen and other residues of petroleum oil or of oil obtained from bituminous minerals, n.e.s.

2713

Bituminous mastics, cut-backs and other bituminous mixtures based on natural asphalt, on natural bitumen, on petroleum bitumen, on mineral tar or on mineral tar pitch

2715

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ANNEX VIII

LIST OF POTASSIUM CHLORIDE (‘POTASH’) PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1i



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Potassium chloride

3104 20

Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing the three fertilising elements nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium

3105 20 10

3105 20 90

Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing the two fertilising elements phosphorus and potassium

3105 60 00

Other fertilisers containing potassium chloride

ex 3105 90 20

ex 3105 90 80

(1)   

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▼M44




ANNEX IX

LIST OF MAJOR CREDIT INSTITUTIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1j AND 1k

Belarusbank

Belinvestbank (Belarusian Bank for Development and Reconstruction)

Belagroprombank

Bank Dabrabyt

Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus

▼M46




ANNEX X

LIST OF WOOD PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1o



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal

44

(1)   

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:385:FULL&from=EN




ANNEX XI

LIST OF CEMENT PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1p



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not coloured

2523

Articles of cement, concrete or artificial stone, whether or not reinforced

6810

(1)   

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ANNEX XII

LIST OF IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1q



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Iron and steel

72

Articles of iron and steel

73

(1)   

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:385:FULL&from=EN




ANNEX XIII

LIST OF RUBBER PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1r



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

New pneumatic tyres, of rubber

4011

(1)   

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:385:FULL&from=EN




ANNEX XIV

LIST OF MACHINERY REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1s



Name of the good

Combined Nomenclature (CN) code (1)

Nuclear reactors; fuel elements (cartridges), non-irradiated, for nuclear reactors; machinery and apparatus for isotopic separation:

8401

Steam or other vapour generating boilers (other than central heating hot water boilers capable also of producing low pressure steam); superheated water boilers:

8402

Auxiliary plant for use with boilers of heading 8402 or 8403 (for example, economisers, superheaters, soot removers, gas recoverers); condensers for steam or other vapour power units

8404

Producer gas or water gas generators, with or without their purifiers; acetylene gas generators and similar water process gas generators, with or without their purifiers

8405

Steam turbines and other vapour turbines:

8406

Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines

8407

Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semidiesel engines):

8408

Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the engines of heading 8407 or 8408

8409

Hydraulic turbines, water wheels, and regulators therefor

8410

Other engines and motors

8412

Pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with a measuring device; liquid elevators:

8413

Air-conditioning machines, comprising a motor-driven fan and elements for changing the temperature and humidity, including those machines in which the humidity cannot be separately regulated

8415

Furnace burners for liquid fuel, for pulverised solid fuel or for gas; mechanical stokers, including their mechanical grates, mechanical ash dischargers and similar appliances

8416

Heat pumps other than air-conditioning machines of heading 8415

Ex  84 18

Calendering or other rolling machines, other than for metals or glass, and cylinders therefor

8420

Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers; filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus, for liquids or gases

8421

Machinery for cleaning or drying bottles or other containers; machinery for filling, closing, sealing or labelling bottles, cans, boxes, bags or other containers; machinery for capsuling bottles, jars, tubes and similar containers; other packing or wrapping machinery (including heat-shrink wrapping machinery); machinery for aerating beverages

Ex  84 22

Weighing machinery (excluding balances of a sensitivity of 5 cg or better), including weight-operated counting or checking machines; weighing machine weights of all kinds

8423

Mechanical appliances (whether or not hand-operated) for projecting, dispersing or spraying liquids or powders; fire extinguishers, whether or not charged; spray guns and similar appliances; steam or sandblasting machines and similar jet projecting machines

8424

Pulley tackle and hoists other than skip hoists; winches and capstans; jacks

8425

Ships' derricks; cranes, including cable cranes; mobile lifting frames, straddle carriers and works trucks fitted with a crane

8426

Fork-lift trucks; other works trucks fitted with lifting or handling equipment

8427

Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery (for example, lifts, escalators, conveyors, teleferics

8428

Self-propelled bulldozers, angledozers, graders, levellers, scrapers, mechanical shovels, excavators, shovel loaders, tamping machines and roadrollers

8429

Other moving, grading, levelling, scraping, excavating, tamping, compacting, extracting or boring machinery, for earth, minerals or ores; piledrivers and pile extractors; snowploughs and snowblowers

8430

Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the machinery of headings 8425 to 8430

8431

Machinery for making pulp of fibrous cellulosic material or for making or finishing paper or paperboard

8439

Bookbinding machinery, including book-sewing machines

8440

Other machinery for making up paper pulp, paper or paperboard, including cutting machines of all kinds

8441

Machinery, apparatus and equipment (other than the machine tools of headings 8456 to 8465 ) for preparing or making plates, cylinders or other printing components; plates, cylinders and other printing components; plates, cylinders and lithographic stones, prepared for printing purposes (for example, planed, grained or polished)

8442

Printing machinery used for printing by means of plates, cylinders and other printing components of heading 8442 ; other printers, copying machines and facsimile machines, whether or not combined; parts and accessories thereof

8443

Machines for extruding, drawing, texturing or cutting man-made textile materials:

8444 00

Machines for preparing textile fibres; spinning, doubling or twisting machines and other machinery for producing textile yarns; textile reeling or winding (including weft-winding) machines and machines for preparing textile yarns for use on the machines of heading 8446 or 8447

8445

Knitting machines, stitch-bonding machines and machines for making gimped yarn, tulle, lace, embroidery, trimmings, braid or net and machines for tufting

8447

Auxiliary machinery for use with machines of heading 8444 , 8445 , 8446 or 8447 (for example, dobbies, jacquards, automatic stop motions, shuttle changing mechanisms); parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with the machines of this heading or of heading 8444 , 8445 , 8446 or 8447 (for example, spindles and spindle flyers, card clothing, combs, extruding nipples, shuttles, healds and heald-frames, hosiery needles)

8448

Machinery for the manufacture or finishing of felt or nonwovens in the piece or in shapes, including machinery for making felt hats; blocks for making hats

8449 00 00

Machinery for preparing, tanning or working hides, skins or leather or for making or repairing footwear or other articles of hides, skins or leather, other than sewing machines

8453

Converters, ladles, ingot moulds and casting machines, of a kind used in metallurgy or in metal foundries

8454

Metal-rolling mills and rolls therefor

8455

Machining centres, unit construction machines (single station) and multi- station transfer machines, for working metal

8457

Lathes (including turning centres) for removing metal

8458

Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with the machines of headings 8456 to 8465 , including work or tool holders, self- opening dieheads, dividing heads and other special attachments for machine tools; tool holders for any type of tool for working in the hand

8466

Tools for working in the hand, pneumatic, hydraulic or with self- contained electric or non-electric motor

8467

Machinery and apparatus for soldering, brazing or welding, whether or not capable of cutting, other than those of heading 8515 ; gas-operated surface tempering machines and appliances

8468

Automatic data-processing machines and units thereof; magnetic or optical readers, machines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form and machines for processing such data, not elsewhere specified or included

8471

Machinery for sorting, screening, separating, washing, crushing, grinding, mixing or kneading earth, stone, ores or other mineral substances, in solid (including powder or paste) form; machinery for agglomerating, shaping or moulding solid mineral fuels, ceramic paste, unhardened cements, plastering materials or other mineral products in powder or paste form; machines for forming foundry moulds of sand

8474

Machines for assembling electric or electronic lamps, tubes or valves or flashbulbs, in glass envelopes; machines for manufacturing or hot working glass or glassware

8475

Machinery for working rubber or plastics or for the manufacture of products from these materials, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter

8477

Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter

8479

Moulding boxes for metal foundry; mould bases; moulding patterns; moulds for metal (other than ingot moulds), metal carbides, glass, mineral materials, rubber or plastics

8480

Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances for pipes, boiler shells, tanks, vats or the like, including pressure-reducing valves and thermostatically controlled valves

8481

Ball or roller bearings

8482

Transmission shafts (including cam shafts and crank shafts) and cranks; bearing housings and plain shaft bearings; gears and gearing; ball or roller screws; gear boxes and other speed changers, including torque converters; flywheels and pulleys, including pulley blocks; clutches and shaft couplings (including universal joints)

8483

Gaskets and similar joints of metal sheeting combined with other material or of two or more layers of metal; sets or assortments of gaskets and similar joints, dissimilar in composition, put up in pouches, envelopes or similar packings; mechanical seals

8484

Electric motors and generators (excluding generating sets)

8501

Electric generating sets and rotary converters

8502

Parts suitable for use solely or principally with electric motors and generators, electric generating sets or rotary converters not specified elsewhere

8503

Electrical transformers, static converters (for example, rectifiers) and inductors; parts thereof

8504

Electromagnets (other than for medical use); permanent magnets and articles intended to become permanent magnets after magnetisation; electromagnetic or permanent magnet chucks, clamps and similar holding devices; electromagnetic couplings, clutches and brakes; electromagnetic lifting heads; parts thereof

8505

Electric accumulators, incl. separators therefor, whether or not square or rectangular; parts thereof (excl. spent and those of unhardened rubber or textiles)

8507

Electrical ignition or starting equipment of a kind used for spark-ignition or compression-ignition internal combustion engines (for example, ignition magnetos, magneto-dynamos, ignition coils, sparking plugs and glow plugs, starter motors); generators (for example, dynamos, alternators) and cut-outs of a kind used in conjunction with such engines; parts thereof

8511

Industrial or laboratory electric furnaces and ovens (including those functioning by induction or dielectric loss); other industrial or laboratory equipment for the heat treatment of materials by induction or dielectric loss; parts thereof

8514

Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the apparatus of headings 8525 to 8528

8529

Boards, panels, consoles, desks, cabinets and other bases, equipped with two or more apparatus of headings 8535 or 8536 , for electric control or the distribution of electricity, including those incorporating instruments or apparatus of Chapter 90, and numerical control cabinets (excl. switching apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy or videophones)

8537

Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the apparatus of headings 8535 , 8536 or 8537 not specified elsewhere

8538

Electric filament or discharge lamps, including sealed beam lamp units and ultraviolet or infra-red lamps; arc lamps; parts thereof

8539

Insulated (incl. enamelled or anodised) wire, cable (incl. coaxial cable) and other insulated electric conductors, whether or not fitted with connectors; optical fibre cables, made up of individually sheathed fibres, whether or not assembled with electric conductors or fitted with connectors

8544

Carbon electrodes, carbon brushes, lamp carbons, battery carbons and other articles of graphite or other carbon, with or without metal, of a kind used for electrical purposes

8545

Insulating fittings for electrical machines, appliances or equipment, being fittings wholly of insulating material apart from any minor components of metal (for example, threaded sockets) incorporated during moulding solely for purposes of assembly, other than insulators of heading 8546 ; electrical conduit tubing and joints therefor, of base metal lined with insulating material

8547

Waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric accumulators; spent primary cells, spent primary batteries and spent electric accumulators; electrical parts of machinery or apparatus, not specified elsewhere in Chapter 85

8548

Confidential products under Chapter 85; goods under Chapter 85 transported by post or by parcel post (extra)/reconstituted code for statistical distribution

 

(1)   

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▼M51




ANNEX XV

LIST OF LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES OR BODIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1zb



Name of the legal person, entity or body

Date of application

Belagroprombank

20 March 2022

Bank Dabrabyt

20 March 2022

Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus

20 March 2022

Belinvestbank (Belarusian Bank for Development and Reconstruction)

14 June 2022

▼M55




ANNEX XVI

List of firearms and other arms referred to in Article 1ba



CN Code

Description

9303

Other firearms and similar devices which operate by the firing of an explosive charge

ex  93 04

Other arms (for example, spring, air or gas guns and pistols), excluding those of heading 9307




ANNEX XVII

List of goods and technologies referred to in Article 1sa



CN Code

Description

88

Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof

ex 2710 19 83

Hydraulic oils for the usage in vehicles of Chapter 88

ex 2710 19 99

Other lubricating oils and other oils for use in aviation

4011 30 00

New pneumatic tyres of rubber, of a kind used on aircraft

ex 6813 20 00

Brake discs and pads for use on aircraft

6813 81 00

Brake linings and pads

8411 11

Turbojets of a thrust <= 25 kn

8411 12

Turbojets of a thrust > 25 kn

8411 21

Turbopropellers of a power <= 1 100 kw

8411 22

Turbopropellers of a power > 1 100 kw

8411 91

Parts of turbojets or turbopropellers, n.e.s.

8517 71 00

Aerials and aerial reflectors of all kinds; parts suitable for use therewith

ex 8517 79 00

Other parts related to aerials

9024 10 00

Machines and appliances for testing the hardness, strength, compressibility, elasticity or other mechanical properties of materials: Machines and appliances for testing metals

9026 00 00

Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking the flow, level, pressure or other variables of liquids or gases (for example, flow meters, level gauges, manometers, heat meters), excluding instruments and apparatus of heading 9014 , 9015 , 9028 or 9032



( 1 ) Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p.1).

( 2 ) Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 1).

( 3 ) Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).

( 4 )  OJ C 86, 18.3.2011, p. 1.

( 5 ) Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations’ Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, p. 1).

( 6 )  OJ L 285, 17.10.2012, p. 1.

( 7 ) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

( 8 )  OJ C 86, 18.3.2011, p. 1.

( 9 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1).

( 10 ) 'IMSI' stands for International Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is a unique identification code for each mobile telephony device, integrated in the SIM card, which allows for identification of such SIM via GSM and UMTS networks.

( 11 ) 'MSISDN' stands for Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number. It is a number uniquely identifying a subscription in a GSM or a UMTS mobile network. Simply put, it is the telephone number to the SIM card in a mobile phone and therefore it identifies a mobile subscriber as well as IMSI, but to route calls through him.

( 12 ) 'IMEI' stands for International Mobile Equipment Identity. It is a number, usually unique to identify GSM, WCDMA and IDEN mobile phones as well as some satellite phones. It is usually found printed inside the battery compartment of the phone. interception (wiretapping) can be specified by its IMEI number as well as IMSI and MSISDN.

( 13 ) 'TMSI' stands for Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is the identity that is most commonly sent between the mobile and the network.

( 14 ) Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1).

( 15 ) 'SMS' stands for Short Message System.

( 16 ) 'GSM' stands for Global System for Mobile Communications.

( 17 ) 'GPS' stands for Global Positioning System.

( 18 ) 'GPRS' stands for General Package Radio Service.

( 19 ) 'UMTS' stands for Universal Mobile Telecommunication System.

( 20 ) 'CDMA' stands for Code Division Multiple Access.

( 21 ) 'PSTN' stands for Public Switch Telephone Networks.

( 22 ) 'DHCP' stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.

( 23 ) 'SMTP' stands for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.

( 24 ) 'GTP' stands for GPRS Tunnelling Protocol.

( 25 ) Common Military List of the European Union (OJ C 85, 13.3.2020, p.1).

( 26 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 27 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 28 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 29 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 30 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821

( 31 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 32 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 33 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 34 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU)2021/821.

( 35 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 36 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 37 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 38 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821

( 39 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821

( 40 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821

( 41 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 42 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 43 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 44 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821

( 45 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 46 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 47 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

( 48 ) Ref. Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

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