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| EUROPEAN COMMISSION | EVROPSKA KOMISIJA |
| Brussels, 3.12.2020 | Bruselj, 3.12.2020 |
| COM(2020) 790 final | COM(2020) 790 final |
| COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS | SPOROČILO KOMISIJE EVROPSKEMU PARLAMENTU, SVETU, EVROPSKEMU EKONOMSKO-SOCIALNEMU ODBORU IN ODBORU REGIJ |
| On the European democracy action plan | o akcijskem načrtu za evropsko demokracijo |
| ‘The European Union is not only about parties and politics, rules or regulations, markets or currencies. It is ultimately — and above all else — about people and their aspirations. It is about people standing together. For their liberty, for their values, simply for a better future.’ | „V Evropski uniji ne gre le za stranke in politiko, za pravila ali predpise, za trge ali valute. Na koncu – in predvsem – gre za ljudi in njihova stremljenja. Za ljudi, ki so stopili skupaj. Za svojo svobodo, za svoje vrednote in preprosto za boljšo prihodnost.“ |
| Commission President von der Leyen, 27 November 2019 | Predsednica Komisije von der Leyen, 27. november 2019 |
| 1INTRODUCTION | 1UVOD |
| Democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are the foundations on which the European Union is based. Democracy is a core European value, and a precondition for EU membership. The EU’s citizens see democracy, human rights and the rule of law as its most important asset 1 . | Evropska unija temelji na demokraciji, pravni državi in temeljnih pravicah. Demokracija je temeljna vrednota in predpogoj za članstvo v EU. Za državljane EU so demokracija, človekove pravice in pravna država najpomembnejša prednost EU 1 . |
| Democracy allows citizens to shape laws and public policies at European, national, regional and local levels. It requires safeguards, checks and balances, and institutions that fulfil their roles and uphold the rules of pluralistic democratic debate. For participation to be meaningful, citizens must also be able to form their own judgements – they should be able to make electoral choices in a public space where a plurality of views can be expressed freely and where free media, academia and civil society can play their role in stimulating open debate, free from malign interference, either domestic or foreign. Democracy can only thrive in a climate where freedom of information and freedom of expression are both upheld, in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, allowing everyone to express their views, regardless how critical they are towards the governments and those in power. | Demokracija državljanom omogoča, da oblikujejo zakone in javne politike na evropski, nacionalni, regionalni in lokalni ravni. Za to pa so potrebna varovala, sistem zavor in ravnovesij ter institucije, ki opravljajo svojo vlogo in podpirajo pravila pluralistične demokratične razprave. Za kar se da tehtno udeležbo v demokratičnih procesih morajo državljani imeti možnost, da si ustvarijo lastno mnenje – da volilne odločitve sprejemajo v javnem prostoru, kjer se pluralizem pogledov lahko svobodno izraža in kjer lahko svobodni mediji, akademske skupnosti in civilna družba prispevajo k spodbujanju odprte razprave, ki je ne moti ne domače ne tuje zlonamerno vmešavanje. Demokracija lahko zares uspeva le v ozračju, ki v skladu z Listino o temeljnih pravicah podpira svobodo obveščanja in svobodo izražanja ter vsakomur omogoča, da izrazi svoje mnenje, ne glede na to, kako kritično je to mnenje do vlad in posameznikov na oblasti. |
| At the same time, the EU is not only concerned with protecting democracy within its borders, but as pressure is mounting on democracy, the rule of law and human rights globally, the EU is working actively to protect, inspire and support democracies around the world 5 . The challenges relating to the exercise of democracy are global and the world’s democracies have a common interest in working together to address them. At EU level, this requires a coherent approach between internal and external actions. The way we nurture and bolster our democratic foundations in the Union and Member States has impact on the strength of our external action. With this action plan, the Commission is proposing a response centred around individual rights and freedoms, transparency and accountability which could also serve as an example of how to approach these global challenges to democracy and a basis to build partnership with like-minded democracies. | Hkrati pa EU ne želi le zaščititi demokracijo znotraj svojih meja, pač pa si glede na to, da je tudi drugod opaziti vse večji pritisk na demokracijo, pravno državo in človekove pravice, prizadeva dejavno zaščititi, navdihovati in podpirati demokracije po svetu 5 . Problemi, povezani z uveljavljanjem demokracije, so svetovni pojav in demokracije po vsem svetu imajo skupni interes, da jih rešijo. Zato je treba na ravni EU zavzeti usklajen pristop med notranjimi in zunanjimi ukrepi. Način, kako spodbujamo in podpiramo svoje demokratične temelje v Uniji in državah članicah, vpliva na moč našega zunanjega delovanja. Komisija s tem akcijskim načrtom predlaga odziv, ki se osredotoča na pravice in svoboščine posameznikov, preglednost in odgovornost ter ki bi lahko bil primer reševanja teh globalnih izzivov za demokracijo in podlaga za razvoj partnerstev z enako mislečimi demokracijami. |
| The digital transformation of our democracies | Digitalna preobrazba naših demokracij |
| The digital revolution has transformed democratic politics. Political campaigns are now run not only on the doorstep, billboards, radio waves and TV screens, but also online. This gives political actors new opportunities to reach out to voters. It also brings new opportunities for civic engagement, making it easier for some groups — in particular young people — to access information and participate in public life and democratic debate. | Digitalna revolucija je preobrazila demokratično politiko. Politične kampanje zdaj potekajo ne le na pragovih domov, oglasnih panojih, po radiu in televiziji, pač pa tudi po spletu. Slednji političnim akterjem ponuja nove priložnosti za nagovarjanje volivcev. Hkrati prinaša nove priložnosti za državljansko udeležbo, saj nekaterim skupinam, zlasti mladim, omogoča lažji dostop do informacij ter sodelovanje v javnem življenju in demokratični razpravi. |
| However, the rapid growth of online campaigning and online platforms has also opened up new vulnerabilities and made it more difficult to maintain the integrity of elections, ensure a free and plural media, and protect the democratic process from disinformation and other manipulation. Digitalisation enabled new ways to finance political actors from uncontrolled sources, cyber-attacks can target critical electoral infrastructure, journalists face online harassment and hate speech, and false information and polarising messages spread rapidly through on social media, also by coordinated disinformation campaigns. The impact of some of these steps is amplified by the use of opaque algorithms controlled by widely used communication platforms. | Vendar je hitra rast spletnih kampanj in spletnih platform razkrila tudi nove ranljivosti in otežila zagotavljanje integritete volitev ter svobodnih in pluralističnih medijev in ščitenje demokratičnega procesa pred dezinformacijami in drugimi manipulacijami. Digitalizacija je omogočila nove načine za financiranje političnih akterjev iz nenadzorovanih virov, kibernetski napadi lahko merijo na kritično volilno infrastrukturo, novinarji se soočajo s spletnim nadlegovanjem in sovražnim govorom, neresnične informacije in razdvajajoča sporočila pa se po družbenih medijih hitro širijo, med drugim z usklajenimi kampanjami dezinformiranja. Nekateri od teh posegov dosežejo še večjo odmevnost z uporabo nepreglednih algoritmov, ki jih nadzorujejo splošno razširjene komunikacijske platforme. |
| Our European democratic cultures, in all their diversity, are being challenged by the digital transformation. Existing safeguards to ensure transparency and parity of resources and airtime during election campaigns are not designed for the digital environment. Online campaign tools have added potency by combining personal data and artificial intelligence with psychological profiling and complex micro-targeting techniques 6 . Some of these tools, such as the processing of personal data, are regulated by EU law. But others are currently framed mainly by corporate terms of service, and can also escape national or regional regulation by being deployed from outside the electoral jurisdiction. Concern about the transparency and accountability of online platforms adds to the challenge of enforcing rules. Online platforms can both have news media-related activities and act as gatekeepers for online news, while not being subject to the same national rules and professional standards. | Naše evropske demokratične kulture se v vsej svoji raznolikosti soočajo z izzivom digitalne preobrazbe. Obstoječi zaščitni ukrepi za zagotavljanje preglednosti ter enakomerne porazdeljenosti virov in programskega časa med volilnimi kampanjami niso zasnovani za digitalno okolje. Spletna orodja so povečala vpliv kampanj tako, da se osebni podatki in umetna inteligenca kombinirajo s psihološkim profiliranjem in zapletenimi tehnikami mikrociljanja 6 . Nekatera teh orodij, na primer obdelavo osebnih podatkov, ureja zakonodaja EU. Druga pa trenutno urejajo predvsem pogoji poslovanja podjetij in s tem, da se upravljajo zunaj volilne jurisdikcije, se lahko celo izognejo nacionalni in regionalni ureditvi. Izvrševanje pravil je dodatno oteženo zaradi vprašanj o preglednosti in odgovornosti v zvezi s spletnimi platformami. Spletne platforme lahko izvajajo dejavnosti, povezane z novičarskimi mediji, pri tem pa odbirajo spletne novice, ne da bi zanje veljali nacionalni predpisi in poklicni standardi. |
| Strengthening democratic resilience | Krepitev demokratične odpornosti |
| This action plan addresses the EU institutions, national governments and parliaments − who have primary responsibility for ensuring the sound functioning of democracy −, as well as other national authorities, political parties, media and civil society, and online platforms. In full respect of national competences, it sets out a reinforced EU policy framework and specific measures to: | Ta akcijski načrt nagovarja institucije EU, nacionalne vlade in parlamente, ki so prvi odgovorni za zagotavljanje dobrega delovanja demokracije, pa tudi druge nacionalne organe, politične stranke, medije in civilno družbo ter spletne platforme. Ob polnem spoštovanju nacionalnih pristojnosti določa okrepljeni politični okvir EU in posebne ukrepe za: |
| -Promote free and fair elections and strong democratic participation; | ‒spodbujanje svobodnih in poštenih volitev ter močne demokratične udeležbe, |
| -support free and independent media; and | ‒podporo svobodnim in neodvisnim medijem ter |
| -counter disinformation. | ‒boj proti dezinformacijam. |
| A healthy democracy relies on citizen engagement and an active civil society, not only at election time, but all the time. Engaged, informed and empowered citizens are the best guarantee for the resilience of our democracies. Across the action plan, there is a strong emphasis on empowering citizens and civil society to counter the threats 7 . | Zdrava demokracija potrebuje angažirane državljane in dejavno civilno družbo, ne le v volilnem obdobju, pač pa vedno. Angažirani, informirani in opolnomočeni državljani so najboljše jamstvo za odpornost naših demokracij. V celotnem akcijskem načrtu je velik poudarek na opolnomočanju državljanov in civilne družbe v boju proti grožnjam 7 . |
| 2PROTECTING ELECTION INTEGRITY AND PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION | 2ZAŠČITA INTEGRITETE VOLITEV IN SPODBUJANJE DEMOKRATIČNE UDELEŽBE |
| High voter turnouts in recent elections across the EU demonstrate that citizens remain confident in the power of the ballot box as tool to voice their opinion and hold their representatives to account. At the same time, social media are one of the channels for attempts to manipulate public opinion, discourage participation in elections and cast doubt on the integrity of election processes. Attempts at foreign interference have also been documented 8 . | Visoka volilna udeležba na nedavnih volitvah po EU dokazuje, da državljani še vedno zaupajo v moč volilne skrinjice kot orodja, ki jim omogoča, da izrazijo svoje mnenje in da zahtevajo odgovornost predstavnikov. Istočasno so družbeni mediji eden od kanalov, ki se uporabljajo za poskuse manipulacije z javnim mnenjem, odvračanje od udeležbe na volitvah in vzbujanje dvoma v integriteto volilnih postopkov. Dokumentirani so bili tudi poskusi tujega vmešavanja 8 . |
| Maintaining democracy requires more determined action to protect electoral processes, preserve open democratic debate and update safeguards in the light of new digital realities. Democracy is about the richness of participatory practices, civic engagement and respect for democratic standards and the rule of law, applied throughout the electoral cycle. | Vzdrževanje demokracije zahteva odločnejše ukrepe za zaščito volilnih postopkov, ohranitev odprte demokratične razprave in posodobitev zaščitnih ukrepov glede na nove digitalne razmere. Pri demokraciji gre za bogastvo participativnih praks, državljansko udeležbo ter spoštovanje demokratičnih standardov in pravne države, vse to pa se mora spoštovati v celotnem volilnem ciklu. |
| 2.1Transparency of political advertising and communication | 2.1Preglednost političnega oglaševanja in komuniciranja |
| Compliance with the traditional rules linked to political campaigning can be particularly challenging in the online context. The rules are often difficult to enforce or ineffective online, or the competent authorities may not have the powers or means to address online activity. The cross-border potential of online activity brings opportunities, but also adds to the challenge, as issues related to elections are largely governed by rules applicable only within a particular jurisdiction or may not have been formulated to take the borderless online space into account. | Spoštovanje tradicionalnih pravil o političnih kampanjah je lahko v okviru spletnega komuniciranja poseben izziv. Pravila je pogosto težko izvrševati oziroma so za splet neučinkovita ali pa pristojni organi nimajo pooblastil ali sredstev za obravnavanje dejavnosti na spletu. Čezmejni potencial spletnih dejavnosti prinaša priložnosti, a hkrati poglablja težave, saj vprašanja v zvezi z volitvami večinoma urejajo pravila, ki veljajo le znotraj določene jurisdikcije ali pa niso bila oblikovana, da bi upoštevala spletni prostor brez meja. |
| There is a clear need for more transparency in political advertising and communication, and the commercial activities surrounding it. Stronger enforcement and compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 9 rules is of utmost importance. | Nedvomno je potrebna večja preglednost političnega oglaševanja in komuniciranja ter komercialnih dejavnosti v zvezi z njima. Odločnejše izvrševanje in večja skladnost s splošno uredbo o varstvu podatkov 9 sta nadvse pomembna. |
| Citizens, civil society and responsible authorities must be able to see clearly the source and purpose of such advertising. In the online environment, it is often difficult to recognise paid-for political material and distinguish it from other political content, not least because it can often appear as ‘organic’ content shared or created by other users. This creates legal uncertainties for service providers and other operators, in particular online intermediaries, political consultancies and related firms, but also for political parties, campaign organisations, candidates and for the public more widely 10 , and affects accountability and oversight. | Državljani, civilna družba in pristojni organi morajo imeti možnost jasnega vpogleda v vir in namen takšnega oglaševanja. V spletnem okolju je pogosto težko prepoznati plačano politično gradivo in ga razlikovati od drugih političnih vsebin, med drugim zato, ker je pogosto videti kot „organska“ vsebina, ki so jo delili ali ustvarili drugi uporabniki. To ustvarja pravno negotovost za ponudnike storitev in druge akterje, zlasti spletne posrednike, podjetja za politično svetovanje in povezana podjetja, pa tudi za politične stranke, organizatorje kampanj, kandidate in širšo javnost 10 ter vpliva na prevzemanje odgovornosti in nadzor nad dogajanjem. |
| New techniques used by intermediaries/service providers to target advertising on the basis of users’ personal information enable political adverts to be amplified and tailored to an individual’s or a group’s specific profiles, often without their knowledge. Micro-targeting and behavioural profiling techniques can rely on data improperly obtained, and be misused to direct divisive and polarising narratives. This process makes it much harder to hold politicians to account for the messaging and opens new way for attempts to manipulate the electorate 11 . Other concerns are the concealment and/or misrepresentation of key information such as the origin, intent, sources and funding of political messages 12 . | Nove tehnike, ki jih posredniki/ponudniki storitev uporabljajo za ciljno oglaševanje na podlagi osebnih informacij uporabnikov, omogočajo, da imajo politični oglasi večjo odmevnost in da so prilagojeni posebnim profilom posameznikov ali skupin, pogosto brez njihove vednosti. Tehnike mikrociljanja in profiliranja vedenja lahko temeljijo na neprimerno pridobljenih podatkih in se lahko nepravilno uporabijo za usmerjanje narativa, ki razdvaja in polarizira javnost. Zaradi tega procesa je od politikov veliko težje zahtevati odgovornost za sporočila njihovih izjav, kar omogoča nove načine za poskuse manipuliranja z volivci 11 . Zaskrbljenost vzbuja tudi skrivanje in/ali napačno prikazovanje ključnih informacij, kot so izvor, namen, viri in financiranje političnih sporočil 12 . |
| To address these concerns, in 2021, the Commission will present a legislative proposal on the transparency of sponsored political content. The proposal will complement the rules on online advertising in of the forthcoming Digital Services Act (DSA), with the aim to have dedicated rules in place sufficiently ahead of the May 2024 European Parliament elections. It will target the sponsors of paid content and production/distribution channels, including online platforms, advertisers and political consultancies, clarifying their respective responsibilities and providing legal certainty. It will ensure that relevant fundamental rights and standards are upheld as effectively online as they are offline. The Commission will further assess whether a targeted approach is needed during election periods. | Da bi obravnavala te pojave, bo Komisija do leta 2021 predložila zakonodajni predlog o preglednosti sponzoriranih političnih vsebin. Predlog bo dopolnil pravila o spletnem oglaševanju v prihodnjem aktu o digitalnih storitvah, njegov cilj pa bo določiti posebna pravila dovolj zgodaj pred volitvami v Evropski parlament maja 2024. Osredotočen bo na sponzorje plačanih vsebin in produkcijske/distribucijske kanale, vključno s spletnimi platformami, oglaševalci in podjetji za politično svetovanje, ter bo pojasnil odgovornosti teh akterjev in zagotovil pravno varnost. Zagotovil bo, da se bodo ustrezne temeljne pravice in standardi enako učinkovito spoštovali tako na spletu kot izven njega. Komisija bo nadalje ocenila, ali je med volilnimi obdobji potreben ciljno usmerjen pristop. |
| The initiative will determine which actors and what type of sponsored content fall within the scope of enhanced transparency requirements. It will support accountability and enable monitoring and enforcement of relevant rules, audits and access to non-personal data, and facilitate due diligence. The Commission will also look at further restricting micro-targeting and psychological profiling in the political context. Certain specific obligations could be proportionately imposed on online intermediaries, advertising service providers and other actors, depending on their scale and impact (such as for labelling, record-keeping, disclosure requirements, transparency of price paid, and targeting and amplification criteria). Further provisions could provide for specific engagement with supervisory authorities, and to enable co-regulatory codes and professional standards. | Pobuda bo določila, kateri akterji in katere vrste sponzorirane vsebine sodijo v področje uporabe okrepljenih zahtev po preglednosti. Podpirala bo odgovornost in omogočala spremljanje in izvrševanje ustreznih pravil, revizij in dostopa do neosebnih podatkov ter spodbujala potrebno skrbnost. Komisija bo tudi proučila nadaljnje omejevanje mikrociljanja in psihološkega profiliranja v političnem kontekstu. Spletnim posrednikom, ponudnikom oglaševalskih storitev in drugim akterjem bi se lahko sorazmerno naložile določene posebne obveznosti glede na njihov obseg in učinek (na primer označevanje, vodenje evidenc, zahteve po razkritju, preglednost plačane cene ter merila za ciljno usmerjanje in povečevanje odmevnosti). Nadaljnje določbe bi se lahko nanašale na posebno sodelovanje z nadzornimi organi ter omogočile pravila koregulacije in poklicne standarde. |
| Building on the interdisciplinary exchanges between Member States in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections established in 2019 ahead of the elections to the European Parliament to allow for concrete and practical exchanges on a range of topics relevant to ensuring free and fair elections 13 , the proposed legislation will be complemented by support measures and guidance for Member States and other actors, such as national political parties and competent authorities, taking into account the limits of EU competence in this area. | Na podlagi interdisciplinarnih izmenjav med državami članicami v okviru evropske mreže za volilno sodelovanje, ki je bila ustanovljena leta 2019 pred volitvami v Evropski parlament, da bi omogočila konkretne in praktične izmenjave o vrsti tem, pomembnih za zagotovitev svobodnih in poštenih volitev 13 , bodo predlagano zakonodajo dopolnjevali podporni ukrepi in smernice za države članice in druge akterje, kot so nacionalne politične stranke in pristojni organi, pri čemer se bodo upoštevale omejitve pristojnosti EU na tem področju. |
| Actions: | ·Propose, in 2021, legislation to ensure greater transparency in the area of sponsored content in a political context (‘political advertising’) | ·Adopt support measures and guidance for political parties and Member States | Ukrep: | ·Leta 2021 bo predložena zakonodaja za zagotovitev večje preglednosti na področju sponzoriranih vsebin v političnem kontekstu (t. i. politično oglaševanje). | ·Sprejeti bodo podporni ukrepi in smernice za politične stranke in države članice. |
| 2.2Clearer rules on the financing of European political parties | 2.2Jasnejša pravila o financiranju evropskih političnih strank |
| The funding of European political parties is governed by EU law 14 . The 2019 European Parliament election report highlighted the need to strengthen some of the rules in order to prevent external interference, in particular by improving transparency as regards sources of financing for European political parties so as to tackle indirect funding by foreign interests channelled through national means or private donations 15 . In 2021, the Commission will propose a review of the legislation on the funding of European political parties with a view to addressing the financing of European political parties from outside the EU, revising the audit requirements, strengthening the links between European financing and national campaigns, and facilitating transparency and auditing. The goal is to have the new rules in place in sufficient time ahead of the May 2024 European Parliament elections. | Financiranje evropskih političnih strank ureja pravo EU 14 .. V Poročilu o volitvah v Evropski parlament leta 2019 je bila poudarjena potreba po okrepitvi nekaterih pravil, ki naj bi preprečevala zunanje vmešavanje, zlasti z izboljšanjem preglednosti v zvezi z viri financiranja za evropske politične stranke, da bi se obravnavalo posredno financiranje s strani zunanjih interesov, usmerjenih prek nacionalnih sredstev ali zasebnih donacij 15 . Komisija bo leta 2021 predlagala pregled zakonodaje o financiranju evropskih političnih strank, pri čemer namerava obravnavati financiranje evropskih političnih strank iz virov zunaj EU, pregledati zahteve glede revizije, okrepiti povezave med evropskim financiranjem in nacionalnimi kampanjami ter spodbuditi preglednost in revizije. Cilj je, da se nova pravila vzpostavijo dovolj zgodaj pred volitvami v Evropski parlament maja 2024. |
| The Commission will also consider developing web-based software tools to assist the work of civil society in the area of political financing and financial transparency, for example in detecting and exposing possible fraud and irregularities in political parties’ published accounts. | Komisija bo razmislila tudi o razvoju spletnih programskih orodij za pomoč prizadevanjem civilne družbe na področju političnega financiranja in finančne preglednosti, na primer za odkrivanje in razkrivanje morebitnih prevar ali nepravilnosti v objavljenih računovodskih izkazih političnih strank. |
| Actions: | ·Propose, in 2021, revision of Regulation No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations | Ukrep: | ·Leta 2021 bo predlagana revizija Uredbe št. 1141/2014 o statutu in financiranju evropskih političnih strank in evropskih političnih fundacij. |
| 2.3Strengthened cooperation in the EU to ensure free and fair elections | 2.3Tesnejše sodelovanje v EU za zagotovitev svobodnih in poštenih volitev |
| The organisation of national elections is a Member State competence informed by international standards, with some issues such as data protection governed by the broader framework of EU law. Dedicated EU law governs European Parliament elections and the voting rights of mobile EU citizens, while most aspects relevant to the electoral process still rest on national law. Experience in the run-up to the 2019 European Parliament elections showed how closer coordination and cooperation at national and EU level can make a key contribution in this respect. | Organizacija nacionalnih volitev je v pristojnosti držav članic, vendar mora upoštevati mednarodne standarde, v nekaterih primerih, kot je varstvo podatkov, pa jo ureja širši okvir prava EU. Posebna zakonodaja EU ureja volitve v Evropski parlament in volilne pravice mobilnih državljanov EU, vendar večina vidikov, ki so relevantni za volilni proces še vedno temelji na nacionalnem pravu. Izkušnje iz sklepnega obdobja pred volitvami v Evropski parlament leta 2019 so pokazale, kako pomembno je tesno usklajevanje in sodelovanje na nacionalni in EU ravni. |
| The Commission will also propose a new operational EU mechanism to support resilient electoral processes. It will be organised and coordinated through the European Cooperation Network on Elections to support deployment of joint expert teams and exchanges on issues such as the cybersecurity of elections and online forensics 16 , in close cooperation with the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group and the EU’s Rapid Alert System. The Commission will continue to facilitate strengthened cooperation among Member States competent authorities in addressing specific challenges (e.g. linked to election periods, elections observation, independent electoral oversight and effective remedies) and covering monitoring (including online), threat identification, capacity building, the operation of national elections networks and engagement with the private sector. Options for mutual support, including an online forum, joint training, pooled resources and expertise as well as online monitoring capabilities will be explored. Marking electoral processes or aspects of their administration as critical infrastructure could render these efforts more effective 17 . The Commission will organise a high level event bringing together various authorities to address the challenges related to electoral processes as well as empowering citizens to participate as voters and candidates in the democratic process. | Komisija bo predlagala tudi novi operativni mehanizem EU za podporo odpornim volilnim procesom. Organiziran in koordiniran bo prek evropske mreže za volilno sodelovanje, namenjen pa bo podpori napotitvam skupnih strokovnih skupin in izmenjavi mnenj o vprašanjih, kot sta kibernetska varnost volitev in spletna forenzika 16 , v tesnem povezovanju s skupino za sodelovanje na področju mrež in informacijskih sistemov ter sistemom hitrega obveščanja EU. Komisija bo še naprej spodbujala okrepljeno sodelovanje med pristojnimi organi držav članic pri obravnavanju posebnih izzivov (npr. glede volilnih obdobij, opazovanja volitev, neodvisnega pregleda nad volitvami in učinkovitih pravnih sredstev) ter pri spremljanju (tudi prek spleta), prepoznavanju groženj, krepitvi volilnih mrež in sodelovanju zasebnega sektorja. Proučile se bodo možnosti za medsebojno podporo, med drugim spletni forum, skupno usposabljanje, združevanje virov in strokovnega znanja ter spletne zmogljivosti za spremljanje. Če bi se volilni procesi ali vidiki njihovega upravljanja označili kot kritična infrastruktura, bi lahko bila ta prizadevanja učinkovitejša 17 . Komisija bo organizirala dogodek na visoki ravni, na katerem se bodo zbrali različni organi, da bi obravnavali izzive za volilne procese ter državljanke in državljane opolnomočili, da kot volivci in volivke ter kandidati in kandidatke sodelujejo v demokratičnem procesu. |
| Specific measures at EU level will be taken to protect election infrastructures against cyber-attacks 18 . In this context, the compendium on cyber security of election technology 19 will be updated and further practical exercises will be organised to explore risk and preparedness, drawing on joint work by the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group. The upcoming EU cybersecurity strategy will provide a cross-cutting framework, accompanied by legislative proposals to enhance the security of network and information systems and the protection of critical infrastructures. | Za zaščito volilnih infrastruktur pred kibernetskimi napadi 18 bodo sprejeti posebni ukrepi na ravni EU. V tem oziru se bo posodobil priročnik o kibernetski varnosti volilne tehnologije 19 , organizirani pa bodo tudi praktični projekti za proučitev tveganj in pripravljenosti, in sicer na podlagi sodelovanja evropske mreže za volilno sodelovanje in skupine za sodelovanje na področju mrež in informacijskih sistemov. Prihodnja strategija EU za kibernetsko varnost bo zagotovila medsektorski okvir, ki ga bodo spremljali zakonodajni predlogi za okrepitev varnosti mrež in informacijskih sistemov ter zaščite kritičnih infrastruktur. |
| The Commission will focus on strengthening cooperation between Member States and relevant regulatory authorities on parity of treatment and balanced media coverage during elections, given that traditional media and online platforms are not subject to the same obligations. Further guidance in this area could be facilitated at EU level benefiting also from the expertise of national media regulators in the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) 20 and of self-regulatory media bodies. This work will also draw on expertise in the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the EU’s Rapid Alert System. Upholding standards of journalistic and editorial integrity is particularly important in the electoral context. | Komisija se bo osredotočila na krepitev sodelovanja med državami članicami in ustreznimi regulativnimi organi v zvezi z enako obravnavo in uravnoteženo medijsko pokritostjo med volitvami, saj za tradicionalne medije in spletne platforme ne veljajo enake obveznosti. Na tem področju bi se na ravni EU lahko pripravile tudi nadaljnje smernice, ki bi črpale iz strokovnega znanja nacionalnih medijskih regulatorjev, ki sodelujejo v skupini evropskih regulatorjev za avdiovizualne medijske storitve (ERGA), 20 in organov za medijsko samoregulacijo. Ta prizadevanja bodo črpala tudi iz strokovnega znanja evropske mreže za volilno sodelovanje in sistema hitrega obveščanja EU. V volilnem okviru je posebej pomembno, da se spoštujejo standardi novinarske in uredniške integritete. |
| The Commission will also strengthen the knowledge base and explore ways of helping citizens and national electoral authorities to build resilience against threats to the electoral process. This could include studies, pilot projects, support for education for active citizenship, and helpdesks or similar shared resources. | Komisija bo tudi okrepila bazo znanja in raziskala načine za pomoč državljanom in nacionalnim volilnim organom pri krepitvi odpornosti proti grožnjam volilnemu procesu. To bi lahko vključevalo študije, pilotne projekte, podporo izobraževanju za aktivno državljanstvo in službam za pomoč ali podobne skupne vire. |
| IT is used in elections to tally votes and transmit results, or (albeit rarely in the EU) in the form of electronic voting machines or electronic voting. While Member States have traditionally been reluctant to introduce IT more generally in the voting process, the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for physical distancing has prompted renewed interest in electronic voting solutions 21 . The Commission will prepare a compendium of e-voting practices 22 , together with Member States and in close cooperation with the Council of Europe, which has already issued substantial guidance in this area, including on accessibility for persons with disabilities and older persons. | Informacijske tehnologije se pri volitvah uporabljajo za štetje glasov in posredovanje rezultatov ali (čeprav redko v EU) v obliki naprav za elektronsko glasovanje ali pri drugih načinih elektronskega glasovanja. Države članice sicer tradicionalno niso naklonjene splošnejši uvedbi informacijske tehnologije v postopek glasovanja, vendar je pandemija COVID-19 s potrebo po omejevanju fizičnih stikov oživila zanimanje za rešitve elektronskega glasovanja 21 . Komisija bo pripravila priročnik za prakse e-glasovanja 22 , in sicer skupaj z državami članicami in v tesnem sodelovanju s Svetom Evrope, ki je že izdal obsežne smernice na tem področju, med drugim o dostopnosti za invalide in starejše. |
| Cooperation and exchange on electoral matters, making best use of existing structures, will be strengthened with countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and beyond, as well as with international organisations such as the Council of Europe 23 , UNESCO and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 24 to facilitate the exchange of best practice and provide support on common challenges, such as tackling foreign interference and disinformation in the electoral context. Work is already under way with partner countries through democracy support and the EU Election Observation Missions, whose mandate has been extended to monitor online electoral campaigns, social media monitoring and give recommendations in this area. For these recommendations to be effectively followed up it will be necessary to consolidate their capacity to provide concrete technical support to governments and civil society in building policy frameworks, secure infrastructures, regulatory capacity and oversight, as well as to share experience in detecting, analysing and countering hybrid threats, including disinformation. | Okrepila se bosta sodelovanje in izmenjava v zvezi z volilnimi vprašanji in čim boljšo uporabo obstoječih struktur z državami v neposrednem sosedstvu EU in širše ter z mednarodnimi organizacijami, kot so Svet Evrope 23 , UNESCO ter Urad za demokratične institucije in človekove pravice Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje 24 , namen sodelovanja pa bo spodbujanje izmenjave dobrih praks in zagotavljanje podpore pri skupnih izzivih, na primer boju proti tujemu vmešavanju in dezinformacijam pri volitvah. Že zdaj poteka delo prek podpore demokraciji in misij EU za opazovanje volitev, katerih mandat je bil razširjen na spremljanje spletnih volilnih kampanj in družbenih medijev ter izdajanje priporočil na tem področju. Da bi se ta priporočila učinkovito spremljala, bo treba okrepiti zmogljivost teh misij za zagotavljanje konkretne tehnične podpore vladam in civilni družbi pri razvoju okvirov politike, varnih infrastruktur, regulativne zmogljivosti in nadzora, poleg tega pa bo koristna izmenjava izkušenj pri odkrivanju in analiziranju hibridnih groženj, vključno z dezinformacijami, ter boju proti njim. |
| Actions: | ·Set up a new joint operational mechanism and other support measures, building on the work of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, to promote resilient electoral processes and take further practical measures to protect election infrastructure against threats, including against cyber-attacks | ·The Commission will organise a high-level event bringing together various authorities related to elections to address the challenges outlined in this plan | ·Strengthen cooperation on parity of treatment and balanced media coverage during elections | ·Prepare a compendium of e-voting practices | ·Facilitate cooperation between EU networks and partner countries and international organisations to build capacity and exchange best practices in countering electoral threats and promote high international standards in the use of new technologies | ·Consolidate the capacity of EU election observation missions in third countries to observe and assess online election campaigns and to follow-up on their recommendations | Ukrep: | ·Vzpostavljeni bodo nov skupni operativni mehanizem in drugi podporni ukrepi, ki bodo temeljili na prizadevanjih evropske mreže za volilno sodelovanje, njihov namen pa bo spodbujati odporne volilne procese. Prav tako bodo sprejeti tudi nadaljnji praktični ukrepi za zaščito volilne infrastrukture pred grožnjami, tudi kibernetskimi napadi. | ·Komisija bo organizirala dogodek na visoki ravni, na katerem bodo različni organi, povezani z volitvami, obravnavali izzive, opisane v tem načrtu. | ·Okrepilo se bo sodelovanje na področju enakega obravnavanja in uravnoteženega medijskega poročanja med volitvami. | ·Pripravljen bo priročnik o praksah e-glasovanja. | ·Spodbujalo se bo sodelovanje med mrežami EU ter partnerskimi državami in mednarodnimi organizacijami za krepitev zmogljivosti in izmenjavo dobrih praks v boju proti volilnim grožnjam ter za spodbujanje visokih mednarodnih standardov pri uporabi novih tehnologij. | ·Konsolidirale se bodo zmogljivosti misij EU za opazovanje volitev v tretjih državah z namenom opazovati in ocenjevati spletne volilne kampanje in za nadaljnje ukrepanje na podlagi njihovih priporočil. |
| 2.4Promoting democratic engagement and active participation beyond elections | 2.4Spodbujanje demokratičnega angažmaja in aktivne udeležbe tudi po volitvah |
| Efforts to support a vibrant civil society and to promote and enhance democratic participation will be at the core of the Commission’s work in many areas, from EU citizenship, equality and non-discrimination, youth, education, culture and research policies to the use of EU funds both within the Union and in its neighbourhood. | Komisija bo prizadevanjem za podporo živahni civilni družbi ter za spodbujanje in krepitev demokratične udeležbe posvetila osrednjo pozornost pri delu na številnih področjih politike, od državljanstva EU, enakosti in nediskriminacije, mladih, izobraževanja, kulture in raziskav do uporabe sredstev EU tako v Uniji kot v njenem sosedstvu. |
| New steps in participatory and deliberative democracy have been taken in several Member States getting people involved in decision-making and empowering them on matters of public concern 25 . Improving transparency and involving citizens in policy- and decision-making enhances democratic legitimacy and trust. Initiatives in this area are closely linked and complementary to the work to promote EU citizenship rights including electoral rights and inclusive democratic participation, which will be detailed in the Commission’s 2020 EU citizenship report. | Več držav članic je sprejelo novosti v participativni in posvetovalni demokraciji, s čemer so bili ljudje vključeni v odločanje in opolnomočeni glede vprašanj javnega interesa 25 . Izboljšanje preglednosti in vključevanje državljanov v oblikovanje politik in odločanje krepita demokratično legitimnost in zaupanje. Pobude na tem področju so tesno povezane in dopolnjujejo prizadevanja za spodbujanje državljanskih pravic EU in vključujočo demokratično udeležbo, ki bodo podrobno opisana v poročilu Komisije o državljanstvu EU za leto 2020. |
| The Commission will continue to promote participatory and deliberative democracy, building on examples such as the Climate Pact, upcoming projects under the Horizon 2020 Green Deal and European Citizens’ Initiatives 26 , as well as citizen participation in the shaping of EU policies and existing laws 27 . The Commission’s annual Rule of Law report 28 also assesses the inclusiveness of the legislative process and civil society involvement. The Conference on the Future of Europe, a pan-European exercise in participatory and deliberative democracy, aims at enabling people from across the EU to make proposals to shape future EU policies. The Conference will be a catalyst for new forms of public participation at the European, national, regional and local levels. In addition, the new generation of Citizens’ Dialogues will also foster innovative forms of citizens’ participation and deliberation, including at transnational level. | Komisija bo še naprej spodbujala participativno in posvetovalno demokracijo, pri čemer se bo opirala na primere, kot so podnebni pakt, prihodnji projekti na podlagi zelenega dogovora v okviru programa Obzorje 2020 in evropske državljanske pobude 26 , spodbujala pa bo tudi sodelovanje državljanov pri oblikovanju politik EU in veljavne zakonodaje 27 . Letno poročilo Komisije o stanju pravne države 28 prav tako ocenjuje, kako vključujoč je zakonodajni postopek in kako je vključena civilna družba. Konferenca o prihodnosti Evrope, vseevropski projekt participativne in posvetovalne demokracije, si prizadeva za opolnomočenje ljudi po vsej EU, da bi predlagali svoje zamisli za oblikovanje prihodnjih politik EU. Konferenca bo spodbudila nove oblike sodelovanja javnosti na evropski, nacionalni, regionalni in lokalni ravni. Poleg tega bo inovativne oblike sodelovanja državljanov in posvetovanja z njimi spodbujala tudi nova generacija dialogov z državljani, tudi na transnacionalni ravni. |
| The Commission encourages Member States to make best use of relevant EU structural and investment funds to support and reinforce civil society capacities at both national and local level and involve civil society organisations in the partnership with the different levels of public administration, including by building a deliberative democracy infrastructure. This will allow for better civic participation and public engagement in the shaping of priorities, including for the Next Generation EU initiative in each Member State. The tools developed to support the Conference for the Future of Europe, such as its multilingual digital platform, will enable citizens and stakeholders to put forward proposals and organise debates beyond the duration of the Conference itself. | Komisija države članice spodbuja, naj čim bolje izkoristijo ustrezne strukturne in naložbene sklade EU, da bi podprle in okrepile zmogljivosti civilne družbe na nacionalni in lokalni ravni ter vključile organizacije civilne družbe v partnerstva z različnimi ravnmi javne uprave, med drugim z razvojem infrastrukture za posvetovalno demokracijo. To bo omogočilo boljšo državljansko udeležbo in angažma javnosti pri oblikovanju prednostnih nalog, tudi v okviru pobude NextGenerationEU v vsaki državi članici. Orodja, ki so bila razvita za podporo konferenci o prihodnosti Evrope, na primer njena večjezična digitalna platforma, bodo državljanom in deležnikom omogočila, da podajo predloge in organizirajo razprave tudi po sami konferenci. |
| Deliberative democracy will also be supported under the Horizon 2020 and its successor, Horizon Europe programme, through research, innovation and the transfer of knowledge on how it operates in practice, the challenges it faces and the impacts it can have 29 . In addition, the Commission will continue to support research to develop a better understanding of people’s dissatisfaction with democracy and how it can be addressed through democratic innovation, including civic engagement and deliberative democracy initiatives. The new Creative Europe Programme will offer new opportunities to actors in the cultural and creative sector for work related to democracy and civic participation. The Commission will also continue to promote and to defend the freedom of artists to create without censorship or intimidation. | Posvetovalna demokracija bo podprta tudi v okviru programa Obzorje 2020 in njegovega naslednika Obzorje Evropa, in sicer z raziskavami, inovacijami in prenosom znanja o tem, kako taka demokracija deluje v praksi, s kakšnimi izzivi se sooča in kakšen vpliv lahko ima 29 . Poleg tega bo Komisija še naprej podpirala raziskave za razvoj boljšega razumevanja, zakaj ljudje niso zadovoljni z demokracijo in kako se to lahko reši z demokratičnimi inovacijami, med drugim s pobudami za državljansko udeležbo in posvetovalno demokracijo. Novi program Ustvarjalna Evropa bo ponujal nove možnosti za akterje v kulturnem in ustvarjalnem sektorju za delo, povezano z demokracijo in državljansko udeležbo. Komisija bo še naprej spodbujala in zagovarjala svobodo umetnikov, da ustvarjajo brez cenzure ali ustrahovanja. |
| The Commission will also ensure the mainstreaming of equality in action at all levels to promote access to democratic participation, also in line with the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. This entails inclusiveness and equality in democratic participation, gender balance in politics and decision-making, 30 and proactive steps to counter anti-democratic attacks and hate speech seeking to dissuade women 31 , LGBTIQ persons and minority groups from being politically active. Particular attention will be paid to disadvantaged young people, people with a minority racial or ethnic background 32 , persons with disabilities 33 , persons with or groups with lower levels of digital literacy and digital engagement (e.g. low‑income households without easy internet access or older persons). | Komisija bo poskrbela tudi za vključevanje vidika enakosti v ukrepe na vseh ravneh, s čimer želi spodbuditi dostop do demokratične udeležbe, kar je hkrati skladno z načeli evropskega stebra socialnih pravic. To pomeni tudi vključevanje in enakost pri demokratični udeležbi, uravnoteženost zastopanosti spolov v politiki in odločanju 30 ter proaktivne ukrepe za boj proti nedemokratičnim napadom in sovražnemu govoru, s katerimi se skuša od političnega udejstvovanja odvrniti ženske 31 , LGBTIQ osebe in manjšine. Posebna pozornost bo namenjena prikrajšanim mladim, osebam z manjšinskim rasnim ali etničnim poreklom 32 , invalidom 33 , osebam ali skupinam z nižjo stopnjo digitalne pismenosti in digitalne angažiranosti (npr. gospodinjstva z nižjimi dohodki s slabšim dostopom do interneta ali starejši). |
| Promoting active citizenship among young people is an important feature of the EU youth strategy (2019‑2027) 34 . The EU youth dialogue will be reinforced by youth participation activities under Erasmus+ and the European Youth Portal. The new European Solidarity Corps programme will offer a wider range of opportunities for civic engagement by supporting communities in need in the EU and elsewhere. The Rights and Values programme will finance curricula promoting young people’s civic, political and democratic engagement in support of civil society organisations’ efforts to encourage and facilitate active participation. Externally, the Development, Education and Awareness Programme contributes to actively engaging the youth in addressing global challenges and raising awareness on universal values. | Spodbujanje aktivnega državljanstva med mladimi je pomemben vidik strategije EU za mlade za obdobje 2019–2027 34 . Mladinski dialog EU bodo okrepile dejavnosti za udeležbo mladih v okviru programa Erasmus+ in evropskega mladinskega portala. Novi program za evropske solidarnostne enote bo ponudil večji nabor priložnosti za državljansko udeležbo, saj bo podpiral skupnosti v stiski v EU in drugod. Program za pravice in vrednote bo v okviru podpore organizacij civilne družbe za spodbujanje aktivne udeležbe financiral učne načrte, ki bodo spodbujali državljansko, politično in demokratično udeležbo mladih. V zunanjem delovanju program za izobraževanje in ozaveščanje o razvoju prispeva k dejavnemu vključevanju mladih v reševanje svetovnih izzivov in ozaveščanje o univerzalnih vrednotah. |
| Further effort will be put into the fight against online hate speech, which can deter people from expressing their views and participating in online discussions. In 2021, the Commission will propose an initiative to extend the list of EU crimes under Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to cover hate crime and hate speech, including online hate speech. Work under the Code of conduct on tackling illegal hate speech 35 will also continue. These efforts will also contribute to increasing the safety of journalists (see section 3.1). Tackling illegal content online while promoting freedom of expression is one of the core objectives of the Digital Services Act. | Nadaljnja prizadevanja bodo usmerjena v boj proti sovražnemu govoru na spletu, ki ljudi lahko odvrne od tega, da bi izrazili svoje mnenje in sodelovali v spletnih razpravah. Komisija bo v letu 2021 predlagala pobudo za razširitev seznama kaznivih dejanj EU iz člena 83(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, da bo zajemal kaznivo dejanje iz sovraštva in sovražni govor, vključno s sovražnim govorom na spletu. Nadaljevalo se bo tudi delo na kodeksu ravnanja za boj proti nezakonitemu sovražnemu govoru na spletu 35 . Ta prizadevanja bodo prispevala tudi k večji varnosti novinarjev (glej oddelek 3.1). Boj proti nezakonitim spletnim vsebinam ob hkratnem spodbujanju svobode izražanja je eden od temeljnih ciljev akta o digitalnih storitvah. |
| Actions: | ·Encourage the use of EU structural funds to fund civil society and build capacity and institutional/administrative infrastructure for deliberative civic engagement and political participation | ·Use EU funds and opportunities under the EU youth strategy, citizenship education, the Creative Europe Programme and the equality agenda to foster access to democratic participation and trust in democracy | ·Fight against hate speech and promote respect in the public debate through the extension the list of EU crimes to hate crime and hate speech | Ukrep: | ·Spodbujala se bo uporaba strukturnih skladov EU za financiranje civilne družbe in krepitev zmogljivosti ter institucionalne/upravne infrastrukture za posvetovalno državljansko udeležbo in politično udejstvovanje. | ·Uporabljena bodo sredstva EU in priložnosti v okviru strategije EU za mlade, državljanske vzgoje, programa Ustvarjalna Evropa in agende za enakost, da se spodbudita dostop do demokratične udeležbe in zaupanje v demokracijo. | ·Boj proti sovražnemu govoru in spodbujanje spoštovanja v javni razpravi z razširitvijo seznama kaznivih dejanj EU, da bodo zajeta tudi kazniva dejanja iz sovraštva in sovražni govor. |
| 3STRENGTHENING media freedom and MEDIA pluralism | 3KREPITEV SVOBODE IN PLURALNOSTI MEDIJEV |
| Media freedom and media pluralism are essential to our democracies and are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Free and pluralistic media are key to hold power to account and to help citizens make informed decisions. By providing the public with reliable information, independent media play an important role in the fight against disinformation and the manipulation of democratic debate. | Svoboda in pluralnost medijev sta bistvena za naše demokracije in zapisana v Listini o temeljnih pravicah. Svobodni in pluralistični mediji so ključni za zagotavljanje odgovornosti vodilnih in pomoč državljanom pri sprejemanju informiranih odločitev. Neodvisni mediji s tem, da javnosti zagotavljajo zanesljive informacije, opravljajo pomembno nalogo v boju proti dezinformacijam in manipulaciji z demokratično razpravo. |
| Attacks, abuses of defamation laws and other forms of intimidation and pressure, including by organised crime, are damaging the environment in which journalists work 36 . The media sector also faces the challenges of the digital transformation and the role of platforms as gatekeepers for online news distribution. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these trends. It led to major advertising losses, hitting in particular small and local media 37 . | Napadi, zlorabe in zakoni o obrekovanju ter druge oblike ustrahovanja in pritiska, vključno z organiziranim kriminalom, škodujejo okolju, v katerem delujejo novinarji 36 . Medijski sektor se sooča tudi z izzivi digitalne preobrazbe in vlogo platform kot nadzornikov distribucije novic na spletu. Pandemija COVID-19 je te trende še okrepila. Povzročila je velike izgube pri oglaševanju, kar je zlasti prizadelo majhne in lokalne medije 37 . |
| There have been new violations of media freedom 38 , sometimes in the name of fighting online disinformation. In 2020, no less than 90 countries worldwide, including some in the EU and its Neighbourhood, have imposed restrictions on media freedoms on the grounds of COVID-19 39 . | Opažene so bile nove kršitev svobode medijev 38 , včasih v imenu boja proti dezinformacijam na spletu. V letu 2020 je kar 90 držav po svetu, med njimi tudi nekaj držav v EU in v sosedstvu, omejilo svobodo medijev zaradi COVID-19 39 . |
| There is a clear need to improve the online and physical safety of journalists, and to provide them and others actors involved in protecting the public interest with tools against abusive litigation. Better public disclosure of information on who owns or controls media outlets and the transparent and fair distribution of state advertising can also protect media pluralism. | Jasno je, da je treba izboljšati spletno in fizično varnost novinarjev, obenem pa je treba zagotoviti orodja za preprečevanje zlorab pravdnih postopkov zoper novinarje in druge akterje, ki si prizadevajo za zaščito javnega interesa. Pluralnost medijev lahko zaščitijo tudi boljše javno razkrivanje informacij o lastništvu in nadzoru medijev ter pregledna in pravična distribucija državnega oglaševanja. |
| Alongside this European Democracy Action Plan, the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan 40 will address the financial viability of the media sector, help the media industry recover and fully seize the opportunity of the digital transformation, and further support media pluralism. These plans form a comprehensive approach for the media sector and build on the work done by the European Parliament and the Council. 41 The European Human Rights and Democracy Action Plan also provides concrete guidance for external actions in support to free and pluralistic media around the world, especially in support to safety and protection of journalists. | Poleg tega akcijskega načrta za evropsko demokracijo bo tudi akcijski načrt za medijski in avdiovizualni sektor 40 obravnaval finančno vzdržnost medijskega sektorja, pripomogel k temu, da si medijski sektor opomore in povsem izkoristi priložnost digitalne preobrazbe, ter nadalje podpiral pluralnost medijev. Ta načrta predstavljata celovit pristop za medijski sektor in se opirata na delo, ki sta ga opravila Evropski parlament in Svet 41 . Tudi Akcijski načrt EU za človekove pravice in demokracijo zagotavlja konkretne smernice za zunanje delovanje za podporo svobodnim in pluralističnim medijem po vsem svetu, zlasti za podporo za varnost in zaščito novinarjev. |
| 3.1Safety of journalists | 3.1Varnost novinarjev |
| The 2020 Rule of Law report 42 showed that physical and online threats and attacks on journalists are on the rise in several Member States. Smear campaigns are frequent and overall intimidation and politically motivated interference have become commonplace. In recent years, Europe has witnessed brutal attacks on free media, with the assassinations of journalists, notably Daphne Caruana Galizia in Malta, Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in Slovakia. One common trait of these murders was that they were preceded by physical and legal threats to the victims. An ever-growing number of journalists are targets of threats, increasingly via online means. Journalists are targets of harassment, hate speech and smear campaigns, at times even initiated by political actors, in Europe and beyond 43 . Female journalists are particularly targeted. The 2020 Rule of Law Report noted that such pressure has a ‘chilling effect’ on journalists. This can lead to self-censorship and reduce the space for public debate on important issues. | Poročilo o pravni državi za leto 2020 42 je pokazalo, da je število fizičnih in spletnih groženj in napadov na novinarje v več državah članicah naraslo. Pogoste so kampanje blatenja, splošno ustrahovanje in politično motivirano vmešavanje pa sta postala običajen pojav. V zadnjih letih je bila Evropa priča brutalnim napadom na svobodne medije in celo umorom novinarjev; najbolj znani primeri so umor malteške novinarke Daphne Caruana Galizia ter slovaškega novinarja Jana Kuciaka in njegove zaročenke Martine Kušnírove. Skupna značilnost teh umorov je, da so žrtve pred njimi doživele fizične in pravne grožnje. Vse večje število novinarjev je tarča groženj, kar se vse pogosteje dogaja prek spleta. Novinarji so tarče nadlegovanja, sovražnega govora in blatenja, česar pobudniki so včasih celo politični akterji v Evropi in drugje 43 . Posebej so izpostavljene novinarke. Glede na poročilo o pravni državi za leto 2020 ima tak pritisk zastraševalni učinek na novinarje. Privede namreč lahko do samocenzure in omeji javno razpravo o pomembnih vprašanjih. |
| In April 2016, recognising the damage that threats to journalists do to the functioning of democratic society, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors 44 . The Council of Europe has also set up a dedicated Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists 45 to monitor alerts. Public authorities have a duty to protect freedom of expression and journalists’ safety by providing an enabling legal environment, taking criminal threats against journalists seriously and vigorously prosecuting attacks. However, the safety of journalists has continued to deteriorate, with the Platform registering an ever growing number of alerts 46 , and the Recommendation needs to be implemented better 47 . | Aprila 2016 je odbor ministrov Sveta Evrope ob priznavanju škode, ki jo grožnje novinarjem povzročajo v delovanju demokratične družbe, sprejel Priporočilo o zaščiti novinarstva ter varnosti novinarjev in drugih medijskih akterjev 44 . Svet Evrope je za spremljanje opozoril vzpostavil tudi namensko platformo za spodbujanje zaščite novinarstva in varnosti novinarjev 45 . Javni organi so dolžni zavarovati svobodo izražanja in varnost novinarjev tako, da zagotovijo omogočitveno pravno okolje, resno obravnavajo kazniva dejanja grožnje novinarjem ter resno in odločno preganjajo napade. Vendar se varnost novinarjev še naprej slabša, platforma pa beleži vse večje število opozoril 46 , zato je Priporočilo treba bolje izvajati 47 . |
| While the situation is alarming, a number of good practices have been developed in several Member States 48 . These include cross-border initiatives, e.g. the Press Freedom Police Codex is an initiative developed by media freedom organisations to promote dialogue between police forces and media actors 49 . The Commission is committed to facilitating the exchange and dissemination of best practices to foster a safer space for journalists across the EU. | Čeprav so razmere zaskrbljujoče, je več držav članic razvilo dobre prakse 48 . Med temi so čezmejne pobude, kakršna je pobuda o policijskem kodeksu o svobodi tiska, ki so jo razvile organizacije za svobodo medijev, da bi spodbudile dialog med policijskimi silami in medijskimi akterji 49 . Komisija je zavezana spodbujanju izmenjave in razširjanja dobrih praks, da bi omogočala varnejši prostor za novinarje po vsej EU. |
| The Commission will organise a structured dialogue involving Member States and their media regulatory authorities, representatives of journalists, self-regulatory bodies (media/press councils) and civil society, and bringing in the expertise of the Council of Europe, OSCE and UNESCO 50 . This dialogue will take place within the European News Media Forum that the Commission will set up to strengthen cooperation with stakeholders on media-related issues 51 . Involving Member States’ judiciary, prosecution and law enforcement authorities is essential for effectively addressing threats faced by journalists and reducing impunity for the perpetrators. | Komisija bo organizirala strukturiran dialog, v katerem bodo sodelovale države članice in njihovi regulativni organi za medije, predstavniki novinarjev, samoregulativni organi (medijski/tiskovni sveti) in civilna družba, upoštevalo pa se bo tudi strokovno znanje Sveta Evrope, OVSE in Unesca 50 . Ta dialog bo potekal v okviru evropskega foruma novičarskih medijev, ki ga bo Komisija vzpostavila za okrepitev sodelovanja z deležniki pri vprašanjih, povezanih z mediji 51 . Vključevanje sodstva, tožilstva in organov kazenskega pregona držav članic je bistveno za učinkovito obravnavanje groženj novinarjem in zmanjšanje nekaznovanosti storilcev. |
| The Commission will propose in 2021 a recommendation on the safety of journalists. It will aim to tackle further safety issues, including those highlighted in the 2020 Rule of Law report, ensure better implementation by Member States of the standards in the Council of Europe Recommendation, and draw particular attention to threats against women journalists. | Komisija bo leta 2021 predlagala priporočilo o varnosti novinarjev. Njegov cilj bo obravnavati nadaljnja varnostna vprašanja, vključno s tistimi, ki so bila izpostavljena v poročilu o pravni državi za leto 2020, zagotoviti, da države članice bolje izvajajo standarde iz priporočila Sveta Evrope, in posebej opozoriti na grožnje, s katerimi se soočajo novinarke. |
| Securing stable funding 52 is also critical for ensuring that journalists are supported. For example, the Media Freedom Rapid Response pilot project 53 focuses on developing coordinated rapid responses to violations of press and media freedom, including legal aid and practical support (e.g. shelters) for journalists in need in Member States and candidate countries. | Zagotavljanje stabilnega financiranja 52 je ključnega pomena tudi za zagotavljanje podpore novinarjem. Pilotni projekt za hitro odzivanje na kršitve svobode medijev 53 se na primer osredotoča na razvoj usklajenih hitrih odzivov na kršitve svobode tiska in medijev, vključno s pravno pomočjo in praktično podporo (npr. zatočišči) za novinarje v stiski v državah članicah in državah kandidatkah. |
| The EU actively promotes and supports journalists’ safety in its external actions and policies 54 . It will continue to monitor and strengthen the media environment outside the EU with a focus on fostering pluralism of independent media and safety of journalists and use public diplomacy to respond to threats and obstructions to journalists. The EU Protect Defenders Mechanism provides financial and legal support and relocation for hundreds of journalists every year 55 . This work will continue, as will legal support for journalists and media houses through thematic and bilateral programmes, especially in cases of judicial harassment and abusive use of cybersecurity laws. | EU v svojih zunanjih ukrepih in politikah 54 dejavno spodbuja in podpira varnost novinarjev. Še naprej bo spremljala in krepila medijsko okolje zunaj EU s poudarkom na spodbujanju pluralnosti neodvisnih medijev in varnosti novinarjev ter uporabljala javno diplomacijo za odzivanje na grožnje novinarjem in oviranje novinarskega dela. Mehanizem EU za zaščito zagovornikov človekovih pravic vsako leto zagotavlja finančno in pravno podporo ter premestitev stotin novinarjev 55 . To delo se bo nadaljevalo, prav tako pa tudi pravna podpora za novinarje in medijske hiše prek tematskih in dvostranskih programov, zlasti v primerih sodnega nadlegovanja in zlorabe zakonodaje o kibernetski varnosti. |
| Actions: | ·Recommendation on the safety of journalists in 2021, taking into account new online threats faced in particular by women journalists | ·Structured dialogue, under the European News Media Forum, with Member States, stakeholders and international organisations to prepare and implement the recommendation | ·Sustainable funding for projects with a focus on legal and practical assistance to journalists in the EU and elsewhere, including safety and cybersecurity training for journalists and diplomatic support | Ukrepi: | ·Sprejeto bo priporočilo o varnosti novinarjev v letu 2021 za obravnavo spletnih groženj, s katerimi se soočajo zlasti novinarke. | ·Organiziran bo strukturiran dialog v okviru evropskega foruma novičarskih medijev z državami članicami, deležniki in mednarodnimi organizacijami za pripravo in izvajanje priporočila. | ·Pripravljeno bo trajnostno financiranje projektov s poudarkom na pravni in praktični pomoči novinarjem v EU in drugod, vključno z usposabljanjem novinarjev o varnosti in kibernetski varnosti ter diplomatsko podporo. |
| 3.2Fighting abusive use of strategic lawsuits against public participation | 3.2Boj proti zlorabi strateških tožb za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti |
| Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are a particular form of harassment increasingly used against journalists and others involved in protecting the public interest. They are groundless or exaggerated lawsuits initiated by state organs, business corporations or powerful individuals against weaker parties who express criticism or communicate messages that are uncomfortable to the litigants, on a matter of public interest. Their purpose is to censor, intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defence until they abandon their criticism or opposition. While civil society actors can be vulnerable to such initiatives, the nature of journalists’ work makes them particularly exposed 56 . | Strateške tožbe za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti so posebna oblika nadlegovanja, ki se vse pogosteje uporablja proti novinarjem in drugim, ki si prizadevajo za zaščito javnega interesa. So neutemeljene ali pretirane tožbe, ki jih sprožijo državni organi, gospodarske družbe ali vplivni posamezniki proti šibkejšim strankam, ki izražajo kritike ali v zvezi z zadevo javnega interesa razširjajo sporočila, neprijetna za tožnike. Njihov namen je cenzurirati, ustrahovati in utišati kritične posameznike, tako da se obremenijo s stroški pravne obrambe, dokler svojih kritik ali nasprotovanj ne opustijo. Čeprav so lahko za tovrstno ravnanje dovzetni različni akterji civilne družbe, so novinarji zaradi narave svojega dela še posebej izpostavljeni 56 . |
| A recent study 57 shows that SLAPPs are increasingly used across many Member States, in an environment where hostile activity against journalists is growing 58 . While most result in acquittals, they still raise serious concerns, as they can interrupt the work of journalists and affect their credibility. Given the imbalance in power and resources, SLAPPs can have a devastating impact on the victims’ financial resources and produce ‘chilling effects’, dissuading or preventing them from pursuing their work in the public interest. SLAPPs are often used in combination with threats to physical safety – Daphne Caruana Galizia had 47 such lawsuits pending against her in Malta and abroad at the moment of her assassination. | Nedavna študija 57 kaže, da je v številnih državah članicah vse več strateških tožb za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti in da se novinarji soočajo z vse pogostejšimi sovražnimi dejanji 58 . Čeprav se večina postopkov konča z oprostitvijo, so še vedno zelo zaskrbljujoči, saj lahko ovirajo delo novinarjev in vplivajo na njihovo verodostojnost. Glede na neravnovesje moči in virov imajo lahko strateške tožbe za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti uničujoče posledice za finančna sredstva žrtev ter imajo zastraševalne učinke in žrtve odvračajo od opravljanja dela v javnem interesu ali jim takšno delo preprečujejo. Strateške tožbe za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti se pogosto uporabljajo v kombinaciji z grožnjami fizični varnosti – proti Daphne Caruana Galizia je bilo na Malti in v tujini v času njenega umora vloženih 47 takih tožb. |
| SLAPPs rely on national law, but they can be more complex and more costly to defend when deliberately brought in another jurisdiction or when they exploit differences in national procedural and private international law. SLAPPs often have a cross‑border nature. The fact that online media content is accessible across jurisdictions may open the way for forum shopping and hamper effective access to justice and judicial cooperation. | Strateške tožbe za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti se opirajo na nacionalno pravo, vendar je obramba proti njim lahko bolj zapletena in dražja, če se namerno vložijo v drugi jurisdikciji ali če izkoriščajo razlike v nacionalnem procesnem in zasebnem mednarodnem pravu. Pogosto so čezmejne narave. Dejstvo, da so spletne medijske vsebine dostopne v vseh jurisdikcijah, lahko spodbudi k izbiranju najugodnejšega pravnega reda ter ovira učinkovit dostop do pravnega varstva in pravosodnega sodelovanja. |
| In 2021 the Commission will present an initiative to protect journalists and civil society against SLAPPs. To prepare this work, the Commission is carrying out a mapping study and will be running a technical focus group to gather feedback on the type of legal aid or support that could be envisaged for SLAPP victims. Also, a new expert group will be established to gather legal practitioners, journalists, academics, members of civil society and professional organisations, with the aim to bring together expertise, exchange and disseminate best practices on legal support for journalists and other actors confronted with SLAPP cases. Dedicated judicial training should also help judges to know how to identify abusive litigation and use the available tools to address it 59 . Relevant cross-border aspects will also be examined in the context of the evaluation by 2022 of the Rome II and Brussels Ia Regulations 60 . | Komisija bo leta 2021 predstavila pobudo za zaščito novinarjev in civilne družbe pred strateškimi tožbami za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti. Za pripravo tega dela Komisija izvaja analitično študijo in bo organizirala tehnično fokusno skupino, da bi zbrala povratne informacije o vrsti pravne pomoči ali podpore, ki bi se lahko predvidela za žrtve strateških tožb za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti. Ustanovljena bo tudi nova strokovna skupina, v katero bodo vključeni delavci v pravni stroki, novinarji, akademiki, člani civilne družbe in poklicne organizacije, ki bodo združevali strokovno znanje ter si izmenjevali in razširjali najboljše prakse v zvezi s pravno podporo novinarjem in drugim akterjem, ki se soočajo s strateškimi tožbami za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti. Z namenskim izobraževanjem v pravosodju bi bilo treba sodnike usposobiti za prepoznavanje nepoštenih pravdnih postopkov in za uporabo razpoložljivih orodij proti njim 59 . Ustrezni čezmejni vidiki bodo do leta 2022 preučeni tudi v okviru ocenjevanja uredb Rim II in Bruselj Ia 60 . |
| Actions: | ·Set up expert group on SLAPPs in early 2021 | ·Present initiative to protect journalists and civil society against SLAPPs in late 2021 | Ukrepa: | ·V začetku leta 2021 bo ustanovljena strokovna skupina za strateške tožbe za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti. | ·Konec leta 2021 bo predstavljena pobuda za zaščito novinarjev in civilne družbe pred strateškimi tožbami za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti. |
| 3.3Closer cooperation to develop and implement professional standards | 3.3Tesnejše sodelovanje za razvoj in izvajanje strokovnih standardov |
| Transparency and compliance with professional norms and standards are essential for public trust in the media. Increasing commercial, and sometimes political, pressure puts a strain on media independence and journalists’ ability to follow codes of conduct and standards of excellence. | Preglednost in skladnost s poklicnimi normami in standardi sta bistvenega pomena za zaupanje javnosti v medije. Vse večji komercialni in včasih politični pritiski obremenjujejo neodvisnost medijev in zmožnost novinarjev, da upoštevajo kodekse ravnanja in standarde odličnosti. |
| Since 2019, the Commission has been co-funding a pilot project on media councils in the digital era 61 , which aims to raise the profile of media self-regulation bodies. As a next step, the Commission will promote stronger cooperation between national media councils, other media self‑regulatory bodies, independent media regulators and networks of journalists. The goal will be to identify more clearly the challenges faced and develop policy recommendations to foster journalistic standards in the EU. | Komisija od leta 2019 sofinancira pilotni projekt o medijskih svetih v digitalni dobi 61 , katerega cilj je povečati prepoznavnost medijskih samoregulativnih organov. Komisija bo kot naslednji korak spodbujala tesnejše sodelovanje med nacionalnimi medijskimi sveti, drugimi medijskimi samoregulativnimi organi, neodvisnimi medijskimi regulatorji in mrežami novinarjev. Cilj bo jasneje opredeliti izzive, s katerimi se soočajo, in oblikovati priporočila politike za spodbujanje novinarskih standardov v EU. |
| At the same time, the Commission will continue to support self-regulatory initiatives promoting professional standards 62 , including charters of editorial independence, and discussions on the challenges faced by journalists. In particular, dedicated support will be provided in the form of grants under the cross-sectoral strand of Creative Europe for collaborative news media partnerships, which will include the development of editorial standards, training of professionals and sharing of best practices. | Hkrati bo Komisija še naprej podpirala samoregulativne pobude za spodbujanje strokovnih standardov 62 , vključno z listinami o uredniški neodvisnosti, in razprave o izzivih, s katerimi se soočajo novinarji. Posebna podpora bo zagotovljena zlasti v obliki nepovratnih sredstev v okviru medsektorskega sklopa programa Ustvarjalna Evropa za skupna novičarska medijska partnerstva, ki bodo vključevala razvoj uredniških standardov, usposabljanje strokovnjakov in izmenjavo najboljših praks. |
| Actions: | ·Support EU cooperation between national media councils, other media self-regulatory bodies, independent media regulators and networks of journalists, and initiatives fostering journalistic partnerships and standards | Ukrep: | ·Zagotovljena bo podpora EU za sodelovanje med nacionalnimi medijskimi sveti, drugimi medijskimi samoregulativnimi organi, neodvisnimi medijskimi regulatorji in mrežami novinarjev ter pobude za spodbujanje novinarskih partnerstev in standardov. |
| 3.4Additional measures to support media pluralism | 3.4Dodatni ukrepi za podporo pluralnosti medijev |
| Transparency of media ownership is essential for assessing the plurality of media markets. The Council of Europe has also underlined the importance of transparency in enabling the public to evaluate the information and opinions disseminated by the media 63 . The public consultation for this action plan found widespread support for clear-cut obligations on all media outlets and companies to publish detailed information about their ownership 64 . | Preglednost lastništva medijev je bistvenega pomena pri ocenjevanju pluralnosti medijskih trgov. Svet Evrope je poudaril tudi pomen preglednosti pri omogočanju javnosti, da presoja informacije in mnenja, ki jih razširjajo mediji 63 . Javno posvetovanje o tem akcijskem načrtu je pokazalo široko podporo jasnim obveznostim, da vse medijske hiše in podjetja objavijo podrobne informacije o svojem lastništvu 64 . |
| The revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive 65 (AVMSD) is an important step towards ensuring high transparency standards in the European media sector, encouraging national legislation requiring transparency of ownership of media service providers 66 . The deadline for Member States to transpose the Directive was 19 September 2020 and transposition is currently being assessed. The 2020 Rule of Law report showed that, while some Member States have well-developed systems in place to ensure transparency of media ownership, others have no such system or face obstacles to effective public disclosure 67 . | Prenovljena direktiva o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah 65 je pomemben korak k zagotavljanju visokih standardov preglednosti v evropskem medijskem sektorju, saj spodbuja nacionalno zakonodajo, ki zahteva preglednost lastništva ponudnikov medijskih storitev 66 . Rok, do katerega bi morale države članice prenesti direktivo, je bil 19. september 2020, prenos pa se trenutno ocenjuje. Poročilo o pravni državi za leto 2020 je pokazalo, da imajo nekatere države članice dobro razvite sisteme za zagotavljanje preglednosti lastništva medijev, druge pa takega sistema nimajo ali se soočajo z ovirami za učinkovito javno razkritje 67 . |
| To improve the understanding and public availability of media ownership information, the Commission will co-finance the new Media Ownership Monitor, a pilot project setting up a publicly available database containing relevant information on media outlets, which the Commission intends to eventually expand to cover all Member States. Building on the results of that project and on the revised AVMSD, the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services could develop further guidance in this area. | Komisija bo za boljše razumevanje in javno dostopnost informacij o lastništvu medijev sofinancirala novo orodje za spremljanje lastništva medijev, pilotni projekt za vzpostavitev javno dostopne podatkovne zbirke z ustreznimi informacijami o medijskih hišah, ki ga namerava Komisija nazadnje razširiti na vse države članice. Skupina evropskih regulatorjev za avdiovizualne medijske storitve bi lahko na podlagi rezultatov tega projekta in revidirane direktive o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah pripravila nadaljnje smernice za to področje. |
| Given the serious impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission calls on Member States to support media in a way that respects and promotes media independence, freedom and pluralism 68 . The responsibility for ensuring that the news media sector can continue to offer products and services promoting pluralistic information, while competing in open and efficient markets, lies primarily with the Member States. Existing State aid rules clarify the conditions under which public support may be granted by Member States. In order to facilitate support from national authorities, the Council has invited the Commission to evaluate the application of State aid rules to the press sector. The Commission is assessing the need for appropriate action 69 . In addition, the State aid Temporary Framework of 19 March 2020 also applies to sector specific measures, such as aid to the press, music, and audiovisual sectors 70 . | Glede na resne posledice pandemije COVID-19 Komisija poziva države članice, naj podpirajo medije na način, ki spoštuje in spodbuja njihovo neodvisnost, svobodo in pluralnost 68 . Da lahko sektor novičarskih medijev še naprej ponuja izdelke in storitve, ki spodbujajo pluralistične informacije, hkrati pa konkurira na odprtih in učinkovitih trgih, so v prvi vrsti odgovorne države članice. Obstoječa pravila o državni pomoči pojasnjujejo pogoje, pod katerimi lahko države članice dodelijo javno podporo. Da bi se nacionalnim organom olajšalo dodeljevanje podpore, je Svet pozval Komisijo, naj oceni uporabo pravil o državni pomoči v medijskem sektorju. Komisija ocenjuje potrebo po ustreznih ukrepih 69 . Poleg tega se začasni okvir za državno pomoč z dne 19. marca 2020 uporablja tudi za sektorske ukrepe, kot so pomoč za medijski, glasbeni in avdiovizualni sektor 70 . |
| State financial support through public interest advertising can be crucial, especially for non‑profit, community media and other less commercial forms of journalism. Nevertheless, without appropriate safeguards to protect media independence, state advertising can be used to put indirect political pressure on the media 71 . Transparent rules and fair criteria for the allocation of advertising can mitigate the risks in this area. In particular, setting up publicly accessible contract registers that publish awarded contracts and their amendments (as supported by the Commission’s 2017 public procurement strategy 72 ) can help. | Državna finančna podpora prek oglaševanja v javnem interesu je lahko ključnega pomena, zlasti za neprofitne medije, skupnostne medije in druge manj komercialne oblike novinarstva. Kljub temu se lahko državno oglaševanje brez ustreznih zaščitnih ukrepov za zaščito neodvisnosti medijev uporabi za izvajanje posrednega političnega pritiska na medije 71 . Pregledna pravila in poštena merila za dodeljevanje oglaševalskih sredstev lahko ublažijo tveganja na tem področju. Zlasti lahko pomaga vzpostavitev javno dostopnih registrov javnih naročil, v katerih se objavljajo oddana naročila in njihove spremembe (kot je bilo podprto s strategijo Komisije za javna naročila iz leta 2017 72 ). |
| The Commission will also analyse existing national media diversity and concentration rules to see whether and how they ensure a plurality of voices in digital media markets, especially in the light of the growing role of online platforms. It will map options to address challenges in this area and further support media diversity in complementarity with competition tools, rules on freedom of establishment and the revised AVMSD. The latter allows Member States to take measures to ensure the appropriate prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest, to meet objectives such as media pluralism, freedom of speech and cultural diversity. 73 The Commission will encourage a common approach on this matter, as outlined in the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan. | Komisija bo analizirala tudi obstoječa nacionalna pravila o raznolikosti in koncentraciji medijev, da bi ugotovila, ali in kako zagotavljajo pluralnost glasov na digitalnih medijskih trgih, zlasti glede na vse večjo vlogo spletnih platform. Opredelila bo možnosti za reševanje izzivov na tem področju in zagotovila nadaljnjo podporo raznolikosti medijev v dopolnjevanju z orodji za konkurenco, pravili o svobodi ustanavljanja in revidirano direktivo o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah. Direktiva državam članicam omogoča, da sprejmejo ukrepe za zagotovitev ustrezne prepoznavnosti avdiovizualnih medijskih storitev splošnega pomena, da bi izpolnile cilje, kot so pluralnost medijev, svoboda govora in kulturna raznolikost. 73 Komisija bo v zvezi s tem spodbujala skupni pristop, kot je opisan v akcijskem načrtu za medijski in avdiovizualni sektor. |
| Actions: | ·Set up the Media Ownership Monitor and develop further possible guidance on the transparency of media ownership | ·Foster measures for the transparent and fair allocation of state advertising | ·Map options for further support for media diversity and foster a European approach on the prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest | Ukrepi: | ·Vzpostavljena bodo orodja za spremljanje lastništva medijev in razvoj nadaljnjih možnih smernic o preglednosti lastništva medijev. | ·Spodbujali se bodo ukrepi za pregledno in pravično dodeljevanje državnih oglaševalskih sredstev. | ·Opredeljene bodo možnosti za nadaljnjo podporo raznolikosti medijev in spodbujal se bo evropski pristop k prepoznavnosti avdiovizualnih medijskih storitev splošnega pomena. |
| 4COUNTERING DISINFORMATION | 4BOJ PROTI DEZINFORMACIJAM |
| It is important to distinguish between different phenomena that are commonly referred to as ‘disinformation’ to allow for the design of appropriate policy responses: | Da se omogoči oblikovanje ustreznih odzivov politike, je pomembno razlikovati med različnimi pojavi, ki so splošno znani pod izrazom „dezinformacija“: |
| -misinformation is false or misleading content shared without harmful intent though the effects can still be harmful, e.g. when people share false information with friends and family in good faith; | -napačne informacije so neresnične ali zavajajoče vsebine, ki se izmenjujejo brez škodljivega namena, čeprav so lahko učinki še vedno škodljivi, npr. če ljudje v dobri veri delijo napačne informacije s prijatelji in družino; |
| -disinformation is false or misleading content that is spread with an intention to deceive or secure economic or political gain and which may cause public harm; | -dezinformacije so neresnične ali zavajajoče vsebine, ki se širijo z namenom zavajanja ali zagotavljanja gospodarske ali politične koristi in lahko povzročijo javno škodo; |
| -information influence operation refers to coordinated efforts by either domestic or foreign actors to influence a target audience using a range of deceptive means, including suppressing independent information sources in combination with disinformation; and | -izraz operacija vplivanja na informacije se nanaša na usklajena prizadevanja domačih ali tujih akterjev za vplivanje na ciljno publiko z uporabo različnih zavajajočih sredstev, vključno z zatiranjem neodvisnih virov informacij v kombinaciji z dezinformacijami; ter |
| -foreign interference in the information space, often carried out as part of a broader hybrid operation, can be understood as coercive and deceptive efforts to disrupt the free formation and expression of individuals’ political will by a foreign state actor or its agents 74 . | -izraz tuje vmešavanje v informacijski prostor, ki se pogosto izvaja kot del širše hibridne operacije, se lahko razume kot prisilno in zavajajoče prizadevanje za prekinitev svobodnega oblikovanja in izražanja politične volje posameznikov s strani tujega državnega akterja ali njegovih agentov 74 . |
| For each type of these phenomena, and depending on the actor, channel and impact, different policy responses are required, in accordance with fundamental rights and democratic standards. For example, misinformation, where there is no intention to deceive, cause public harm or make an economic gain, can be tackled essentially by proactive communication, providing reliable information and raising awareness of the need to critically assess content and sources. To address the other phenomena, where there is a harmful intent, a more robust response is needed and our capabilities need to be continuously developed. Along these lines, and building on progress achieved 75 , this action plan sets out further action to counter disinformation, foreign interference and influence operations. | Za vsako vrsto teh pojavov ter glede na akterje, kanale in učinke so potrebni različni odzivi politike v skladu s temeljnimi pravicami in demokratičnimi standardi. Proti napačnim informacijam, s katerimi se ne namerava zavajati, povzročati škodo javnosti ali pridobiti gospodarske koristi, se je na primer mogoče boriti predvsem s proaktivnim sporočanjem, zagotavljanjem zanesljivih informacij in ozaveščanjem o potrebi po kritičnem presojanju vsebin in virov. Za obravnavanje drugih pojavov, pri katerih obstaja škodljiv namen, sta potrebna odločnejši odziv in nenehno razvijanje naših zmogljivosti. V skladu s tem in na podlagi doseženega napredka 75 ta akcijski načrt določa nadaljnje ukrepe za boj proti dezinformacijam, tujemu vmešavanju in operacijam vplivanja. |
| Reducing the incentives in the online environment that allow for the amplification of such content is an important response element as well. Information influence operations and foreign interference call for a stronger and well-coordinated response, using other instruments and approaches 76 . In this context, the Commission services and the EEAS will work with Member States, civil society and industry towards refined common definitions and methodologies in order to address different categories of disinformation and influence activities. The European Parliament has set up a special committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE) that can also contribute to this issue. The EU will also continue to invest in research in this area and strengthen its strategic communication and awareness raising activities. | Pri odzivu je pomembno tudi, da se v spletnem okolju zmanjšajo spodbude, ki omogočajo povečanje odmevnosti takih vsebin. Pri operacijah vplivanja na informacije in tujem vmešavanju je potreben odločnejši in dobro usklajen odziv z uporabo drugih instrumentov in pristopov 76 . V zvezi s tem si bodo službe Komisije in ESZD skupaj z državami članicami, civilno družbo in medijskim sektorjem prizadevale za izpopolnjene skupne opredelitve pojmov in metodologije, da bi obravnavale različne kategorije dezinformacij in dejavnosti vplivanja. Evropski parlament je ustanovil Posebni odbor o tujem vmešavanju v vse demokratične procese v Evropski uniji, tudi o dezinformacijah (INGE), ki lahko prav tako prispeva k temu vprašanju. EU bo še naprej vlagala v raziskave na tem področju ter krepila svoje dejavnosti strateškega komuniciranja in ozaveščanja. |
| In the joint 2018 Action Plan against Disinformation 77 , also building on the experience of the EEAS East Stratcom Task Force to address Russia’s disinformation campaign, the EU set out its approach to disinformation. This was followed by specific steps to address the disinformation wave during the COVID‑19 pandemic 78 as well as in relation to the development of a safe and effective vaccine. The EU’s work in this area will continue to be firmly rooted in European values and principles and fully safeguard freedom of expression. The actions presented below aim to prevent the manipulative amplification of harmful content by increasing transparency, curbing manipulative techniques and reducing economic incentives for spreading disinformation, as well as introduce deterrence by imposing costs on actors engaged in influence operations and foreign interference. They do not seek to and cannot interfere with people’s right to express opinions or to restrict access to legal content or limit procedural safeguards including access to judicial remedy. | EU je svoj pristop k dezinformacijam določila v skupnem akcijskem načrtu proti dezinformacijam iz leta 2018 77 , ki temelji tudi na izkušnjah projektne skupine EU East StratCom ESZD pri obravnavi ruske kampanje dezinformiranja. Temu so sledili specifični ukrepi za obravnavo vala dezinformacij med pandemijo COVID-19 78 ter v zvezi z razvojem varnega in učinkovitega cepiva. Delo EU na tem področju bo še naprej trdno zasidrano v evropskih vrednotah in načelih ter bo v celoti varovalo svobodo izražanja. Cilj ukrepov, predstavljenih v nadaljevanju, sta preprečevanje manipulativnega povečevanja odmevnosti škodljivih vsebin z izboljšanjem preglednosti, omejevanjem manipulativnih tehnik in zmanjšanjem ekonomskih spodbud za širjenje dezinformacij ter odvračanje z naložitvijo plačila stroškov akterjem, ki sodelujejo pri operacijah vplivanja in tujem vmešavanju. Z ukrepi se ne poskuša in ne more posegati v pravico ljudi do izražanja mnenj ali omejiti dostop do pravnih vsebin oziroma procesnih zaščitnih ukrepov, vključno z dostopom do pravnega sredstva. |
| A more transparent and accountable digital ecosystem allowing to assess the spread, reach and the degree of coordination behind disinformation campaigns is paramount. The EU will support the important work of journalists, civil society organisations and researchers to maintain a healthy and varied information space, notably with respect to fact-checking. | Bistvenega pomena je preglednejši in odgovornejši digitalni ekosistem, ki omogoča oceno širjenja, dosega in usklajevanja kampanj dezinformiranja. EU bo podpirala pomembno delo novinarjev, organizacij civilne družbe in raziskovalcev pri ohranjanju zdravega in raznolikega informacijskega prostora, zlasti v zvezi s preverjanjem dejstev. |
| 4.1Improving EU and Member State capacity to counter disinformation | 4.1Izboljšanje zmogljivosti EU in držav članic za boj proti dezinformacijam |
| Online and offline influence operations can be relatively cheap to carry out and have limited downsides for those acting with malign intent, which partly explains their proliferation. 79 Information can also be weaponised by foreign actors 80 . For example, foreign actors and certain third countries (in particular Russia 81 and China 82 ) have engaged in targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns around COVID‑19 in the EU, its neighbourhood and globally, seeking to undermine democratic debate, exacerbate social polarisation and improve their own image. When foreign actors use manipulative tactics to mislead EU citizens for their own gain, the threat to democracy demands a comprehensive, collective response. At the same time, the threat of disinformation by domestic actors is also growing 83 . | Operacije spletnega in nespletnega vplivanja se lahko izvajajo razmeroma poceni in imajo omejene negativne posledice za osebe, ki delujejo zlonamerno, kar delno pojasnjuje njihovo razširjenost 79 . Informacije lahko v rokah tujih akterjev postanejo tudi orožje 80 . Tuji akterji in nekatere tretje države, zlasti Rusija 81 in Kitajska 82 , so na primer izvajali ciljno usmerjene operacije vplivanja in kampanje dezinformiranja v zvezi s COVID-19 v EU, njenem sosedstvu in na svetovni ravni, s katerimi so želeli spodkopati demokratično razpravo, okrepiti družbeno polarizacijo in izboljšati lastno podobo. Kadar tuji akterji uporabljajo manipulativne taktike za zavajanje državljanov EU v svojo korist, je v boju proti grožnji za demokracije potreben celovit in skupen odziv. Hkrati narašča tudi grožnja dezinformacij s strani domačih akterjev 83 . |
| A prerequisite for effective responses to disinformation, both when it occurs in isolation and when it is part of a broader influence operation or foreign interference, is a thorough understanding of the challenges. Disinformation by spreading outright false content is only one technique used, others include distortion of information, misleading the audience and manipulative tactics such as fake profiles and false engagement to artificially amplify narratives on specific political issues and exploit existing divisions in society. | Predpogoj za učinkovito odzivanje na dezinformacije, kadar se pojavijo posamično in kadar so del širše operacije vplivanja ali tujega vmešavanja, je temeljito razumevanje izzivov. Dezinformacije z neposrednim širjenjem neresničnih vsebin so le ena od uporabljenih tehnik, druge vključujejo izkrivljanje informacij, zavajanje občinstva in manipulativne taktike, kot so lažni profili in lažno sodelovanje za umetno povečevanje odmevnosti narativov o posebnih političnih vprašanjih in izkoriščanje obstoječih delitev v družbi. |
| The new threat landscape calls for even closer cooperation within the EU, with relevant stakeholders in civil society, academia and private industry, and with international partners. Only by pooling existing knowledge on hybrid threats 84 across different sectors (e.g. disinformation, cyber operations and election interference) can the EU develop the comprehensive understanding of the threat landscape that it needs to respond effectively to disinformation and influence operations. The EU Security Union Strategy 85 puts particular focus on the systematic mainstreaming of hybrid considerations into policy making, to address the heightened risk of hybrid attacks by state and non-state actors, through a mix of cyber-attacks, damage to critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns, and radicalisation of the political narrative. | Zaradi novih groženj je potrebno še tesnejše sodelovanje znotraj EU z ustreznimi deležniki iz civilne družbe, akademskih krogov in zasebnega sektorja ter z mednarodnimi partnerji. EU lahko samo z združevanjem obstoječega znanja o hibridnih grožnjah 84 v različnih sektorjih (npr. dezinformacije, kibernetske operacije in vmešavanje v volitve) razvije celovito razumevanje okolja groženj, ki ga potrebuje za učinkovito odzivanje na dezinformacije in operacije vplivanja. Strategija EU za varnostno unijo 85 se osredotoča zlasti na sistematično vključevanje vidika hibridnih groženj v oblikovanje politik, da bi se obravnavalo povečano tveganje hibridnih napadov državnih in nedržavnih akterjev s kombinacijo kibernetskih napadov, škode na kritični infrastrukturi, kampanj dezinformiranja in radikalizacije političnega narativa. |
| The Commission and the High Representative will strengthen cooperation structures in this area within the EU, but also with international partners. The Rapid Alert System will continue to cooperate with international partners such as NATO, the G7, but possibilities to engage with other relevant organisation such as the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) 86 and Europol will also be explored, as appropriate. | Komisija in visoki predstavnik bosta okrepila strukture sodelovanja na tem področju znotraj EU, pa tudi z mednarodnimi partnerji. Sistem hitrega obveščanja bo še naprej sodeloval z mednarodnimi partnerji, kot sta NATO in G7, vendar bodo po potrebi proučene tudi možnosti za sodelovanje z drugimi ustreznimi organizacijami, kot so Agencija EU za kibernetsko varnost (ENISA), evropska opazovalnica digitalnih medijev (EDMO) 86 in Europol. |
| In addition to the Rapid Alert System, the European Cooperation Network on Elections, is also working to develop effective responses to disinformation, when part of a broader hybrid threat, by supporting cooperation between Member States and facilitating engagement with international entities like the Council of Europe and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as part of its comprehensive approach to free and fair elections in Europe. Regular cooperation and participation in joint meetings of the relevant structures working on disinformation will allow to put their vast knowledge to best use, developing a multi-disciplinary response to disinformation. | Poleg sistema hitrega obveščanja si tudi evropska mreža za volilno sodelovanje prizadeva za razvoj učinkovitih odzivov na dezinformacije, kadar so te del širše hibridne grožnje, in sicer s podpiranjem sodelovanja med državami članicami in olajševanjem sodelovanja z mednarodnimi subjekti, kot sta Svet Evrope in Urad OVSE za demokratične institucije in človekove pravice, v okviru celovitega pristopa k svobodnim in poštenim volitvam v Evropi. Redno sodelovanje in udeležba na skupnih sestankih ustreznih struktur, ki se ukvarjajo z dezinformacijami, bosta omogočila čim boljšo uporabo obsežnega znanja in razvoj večdisciplinarnega odziva na dezinformacije. |
| The EU institutions will ensure that their internal coordination on disinformation is strengthened, with a clear protocol for action to pull together knowledge and resources quickly in response to specific situations, for example ahead of European Parliament elections. This would build on the approach taken for COVID-19, where a system of reinforced coordination has been set up in response to the tougher challenges. Member States are invited to invest more in the relevant networks and ensure (also at national level) proper coordination between those who represent them in various fora, so as to ensure effective cooperation and coherent, comprehensive responses. | Institucije EU bodo zagotovile okrepitev notranjega usklajevanja v zvezi z dezinformacijami z jasnim protokolom ukrepanja za hitro združevanje znanja in virov v odziv na specifične situacije, na primer pred volitvami v Evropski parlament. Kot osnova se bo upošteval pristop, ki je bil uporabljen pri pandemiji COVID-19 in pri katerem je bil za odziv na resnejše izzive vzpostavljen sistem okrepljenega usklajevanja. Države članice so pozvane, naj več vlagajo v ustrezna omrežja in zagotovijo (tudi na nacionalni ravni) ustrezno usklajevanje med svojimi predstavniki v različnih forumih, da bi zagotovile učinkovito sodelovanje ter usklajene in celovite odzive. |
| The EU has steadily improved its abilities to expose information influence methods by foreign actors and has called out perpetrators. However, with the continuously changing threat landscape, the EU needs to use more systematically the full range of tools in its toolbox for countering foreign interference and influence operations, and further develop them including by imposing costs on the perpetrators 87 , in full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms. Possible ways of doing so range from publicly identifying commonly used techniques (so as to render them operationally unusable) to imposing sanctions following repeated offences. The response toolbox needs to be further developed. The Commission and the HR/VP will explore conceptual and legal aspects of devising appropriate instruments, seeking synergies with the EU’s Framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’) 88 . | EU nenehno izboljšuje svoje sposobnosti za razkrivanje metod vplivanja tujih akterjev na informacije in izpostavlja storilce. Vendar mora EU zaradi nenehno spreminjajočih se groženj bolj sistematično izkoriščati celoten nabor orodij za preprečevanje tujega vmešavanja in operacij vplivanja, ter ta orodja, vključno z naložitvijo plačila stroškov storilcem 87 , ob polnem spoštovanju temeljnih pravic in svoboščin nadalje razvijati. To bi lahko storila na različne načine, od javnega izpostavljanja pogosto uporabljenih tehnik (da bi tako postale operativno neuporabne) do nalaganja sankcij za ponovitve prestopkov. Nabor orodij za odzivanje je treba nadalje razviti. Komisija in visoki predstavnik/podpredsednik bosta preučila konceptualne in pravne vidike oblikovanja ustreznih instrumentov ter si prizadevali za sinergije z okvirom EU za skupen diplomatski odziv EU na zlonamerne kibernetske dejavnosti (t. i. zbirka orodij za kibernetsko diplomacijo) 88 . |
| The EU will continue to support work to build resilience in third countries, to equip societies and democratic governments with the means to respond to external disinformation threats and to raise awareness of European values and EU‑supported projects, in particular in the European Neighbourhood and Enlargement region. This includes efforts aimed at communicating more effectively the Union’s policies and values, strengthening the media environment, including support for greater media freedom and pluralism, and raising awareness and building resilience against disinformation and influence operations. | EU bo še naprej podpirala prizadevanja za krepitev odpornosti v tretjih državah, za zagotovitev sredstev družbam in demokratičnim vladam za odzivanje na zunanje grožnje dezinformacij ter za ozaveščanje o evropskih vrednotah in projektih, ki jih podpira EU, zlasti v evropskem sosedstvu in regiji širitve. To vključuje prizadevanja za učinkovitejše obveščanje o politikah in vrednotah Unije, krepitev medijskega okolja, vključno s podporo za večjo svobodo in pluralnost medijev, ter ozaveščanje in krepitev odpornosti proti dezinformacijam in operacijam vplivanja. |
| Actions: | ·Develop the EU’s toolbox for countering foreign interference and influence operations, including new instruments that allow imposing costs on perpetrators, as well as strengthening the EEAS strategic communication activities and taskforces | ·Put in place a new protocol to strengthen existing cooperation structures to fight disinformation, both in the EU and internationally | ·Develop a common framework and methodology for collecting systematic evidence on foreign interference and a structural dialogue with civil society, private industry actors and other relevant stakeholders to regularly review the threat situation | ·Increase support for capacity-building of national authorities, independent media and civil society in third countries to detect and respond to disinformation and foreign influence operations | Ukrepi: | ·Razvil se bo nabor orodij EU za boj proti tujemu vmešavanju in operacijam vplivanja, vključno z novimi instrumenti, ki omogočajo naložitev plačila stroškov storilcem, in krepile se bodo strateške komunikacijske dejavnosti in projektne skupine ESZD. | ·Vzpostavljen bo nov protokol za okrepitev obstoječih struktur sodelovanja za boj proti dezinformacijam, tako v EU kot na mednarodni ravni. | ·Razvila se bosta skupni okvir in metodologija za zbiranje sistematičnih dokazov o tujem vmešavanju ter strukturni dialog s civilno družbo, akterji iz zasebnega sektorja in drugimi zadevnimi deležniki za redno pregledovanje ogroženosti. | ·Povečala se bo podpora za krepitev zmogljivosti nacionalnih organov, neodvisnih medijev in civilne družbe v tretjih državah za odkrivanje dezinformacij in operacij tujega vplivanja ter odzivanje nanje. |
| 4.2More obligations and accountability for online platforms | 4.2Več obveznosti in odgovornosti za spletne platforme |
| Information exchanged on social media platforms has become increasingly important for news consumption and political debate. However, online platforms can be used by malicious operators for disseminating and amplifying false and misleading content and have been criticised for the lack of transparency in the use of algorithms to distribute content online and for targeting users on the basis of the vast amount of personal data generated from online activity. | Izmenjava informacij na platformah družbenih medijev postaja vse pomembnejša za spremljanje novic in politično razpravo. Vendar lahko zlonamerni akterji spletne platforme uporabljajo za razširjanje neresničnih in zavajajočih vsebin ter povečevanje njihove odmevnosti, zato so bile platforme deležne kritik zaradi pomanjkanja preglednosti pri uporabi algoritmov za razširjanje vsebin na spletu in glede ciljanega prilagajanja vsebin posameznim uporabnikom na podlagi velike količine osebnih podatkov, pridobljenih s spletno dejavnostjo. |
| Systems such as ranking and recommender algorithms, which facilitate citizens’ access to relevant information, can also be manipulated, in particular through coordinated and inauthentic actions, to facilitate the wide dissemination of disinformation on online platforms. A diligent inspection by the platform and meaningful transparency towards users and researchers, can help better understand and address such threats. | S sistemi, kot so razvrščevalni in priporočevalni algoritmi, ki državljanom olajšujejo dostop do relevantnih informacij, je možno tudi manipulirati, zlasti z usklajenimi in neavtentičnimi ravnanji, ki olajšajo obsežno razširjanje dezinformacij na spletnih platformah. Skrben pregled, ki ga opravi platforma, ter smiselna preglednost za uporabnike in raziskovalce lahko pripomoreta k boljšemu razumevanju in obravnavanju takih groženj. |
| These and other problems specific to disinformation were identified in a recent evaluation of the Code of practice on disinformation 89 (which platforms and other stakeholders joined on a voluntary basis). In the Commission’s view, a more robust approach based on clear commitments and subject to appropriate oversight mechanisms is necessary to fight disinformation more effectively. | Te in druge težave, povezane z dezinformacijami, so bile ugotovljene med nedavnim ocenjevanjem kodeksa ravnanja glede dezinformacij 89 (ki so se mu platforme in drugi deležniki pridružili prostovoljno). Komisija meni, da je za učinkovitejši boj proti dezinformacijam potreben odločnejši pristop, ki temelji na jasnih zavezah in je predmet ustreznih nadzornih mehanizmov. |
| The Digital Services Act (DSA) will propose a horizontal framework for regulatory oversight, accountability and transparency of the online space in response to the emerging risks. It will propose rules to ensure greater accountability on how platforms moderate content, on advertising and on algorithmic processes. Very large platforms will be obliged to assess the risks their systems pose − not only as regards illegal content and products but also systemic risks to the protection of public interests and fundamental rights, public health and security. In this context, very large platforms will also need to develop appropriate risk management tools and take measures to protect the integrity of their services against the use of manipulative techniques. The DSA will provide users with meaningful possibilities to challenge the platforms’ decisions to remove or label content. | V aktu o digitalnih storitvah bo kot odziv na nastajajoča tveganja predlagan horizontalni okvir za regulativni nadzor, odgovornost in preglednost spletnega prostora. Predlagana bodo pravila za zagotovitev večje odgovornosti platform glede moderiranja vsebin ter pravila za oglaševanje in algoritemske procese. Zelo velike platforme bodo morale oceniti tveganja, ki jih predstavljajo njihovi sistemi−, ne le glede nezakonitih vsebin in izdelkov, temveč tudi sistemska tveganja za zaščito javnih interesov in temeljnih pravic, javnega zdravja ter varnosti. V tem okviru bodo morale zelo velike platforme razviti tudi ustrezna orodja za obvladovanje tveganj in sprejeti ukrepe, ki bodo integriteto njihovih storitev zaščitile pred uporabo manipulativnih tehnik. Akt o digitalnih storitvah bo uporabnikom zagotovil pomembne možnosti za izpodbijanje odločitev platform glede odstranitve ali označevanja vsebin. |
| The DSA will also establish a co-regulatory backstop 90 for the measures which would be included in a revised and strengthened Code of practice on disinformation. Based on this co-regulatory approach, the Commission will steer efforts with targeted actions addressing issues specific to disinformation on three pillars: | Prav tako bo vzpostavil koregulativni varovalni mehanizem 90 za ukrepe, ki bodo vključeni v prenovljeni in okrepljeni kodeks ravnanja glede dezinformacij. Na podlagi tega koregulativnega pristopa bo Komisija usmerjala prizadevanja s ciljno usmerjenimi ukrepi, ki bodo obravnavali vprašanja, značilna za dezinformacije, v okviru treh stebrov: |
| ·the Commission will issue guidance, in parallel to the opening of the co-legislative discussions on the DSA, setting out how platforms and other relevant stakeholders should step up their measures to address the shortcomings identified in the assessment of the Code of practice on disinformation. Given the sensitivity of the issues, the Commission will follow a multi-stakeholder approach involving not only platforms but also other stakeholders, such as advertisers, media, civil society, fact-checkers and academia; | ·Komisija bo hkrati z začetkom sozakonodajnih razprav o aktu o digitalnih storitvah izdala smernice, v katerih bo opredelila, kako bi morale platforme in drugi zadevni deležniki okrepiti svoje ukrepe za odpravo pomanjkljivosti, ugotovljenih v oceni kodeksa ravnanja glede dezinformacij. Glede na občutljivost vprašanj bo Komisija uporabila večdeležniški pristop, ki bo vključeval ne le platforme, ampak tudi druge deležnike, kot so oglaševalci, mediji, civilna družba, preverjevalci dejstev in akademska skupnost; |
| ·subsequently, the Commission will call upon signatories and relevant stakeholders’ groups, including in cooperation with ERGA, to strengthen the Code of Practice according to the guidance; | ·Komisija bo nato pozvala podpisnike in ustrezne interesne skupine, tudi v sodelovanju s skupino ERGA, naj v skladu s smernicami sprejmejo strožji kodeks ravnanja; |
| ·the Commission will also set up a more robust framework for recurrent monitoring of the strengthened Code of Practice. This framework will build on the experience of the COVID-19 disinformation monitoring exercise 91 . | ·Komisija bo vzpostavila tudi trdnejši okvir za periodično spremljanje upoštevanja strožjega kodeksa ravnanja. Ta okvir bo temeljil na izkušnjah s spremljanjem dezinformacij v zvezi s COVID-19 91 . |
| In addition, stronger enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 92 in respect of online platforms and other players influencing the spread of disinformation is needed, in line with the September 2020 guidance from the European Data Protection Board 93 . | Poleg tega je potrebno strožje izvrševanje Splošne uredbe o varstvu podatkov 92 v zvezi s spletnimi platformami in drugimi akterji, ki vplivajo na širjenje dezinformacij, v skladu s smernicami Evropskega odbora za varstvo podatkov iz septembra 2020 93 . |
| Based on the guidance issued by the Commission, the strengthened Code of Practice will aim to address the following objectives: | Na podlagi smernic, ki jih je izdala Komisija, bo strožji kodeks ravnanja namenjen obravnavi naslednjih ciljev: |
| -monitor the impact of disinformation and the effectiveness of platforms’ policies, on the basis of a new methodological framework which includes principles for defining Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). In this context, timely information on platforms’ policies and access to relevant data, needs to be available to allow, amongst others, measuring progress against the KPIs; | -spremljanje vpliva dezinformacij in učinkovitosti politik platform na podlagi novega metodološkega okvira , ki vključuje načela za opredelitev ključnih kazalnikov uspešnosti. V zvezi s tem morajo biti na voljo pravočasne informacije o politikah platform in dostop do ustreznih podatkov, da se med drugim omogoči merjenje napredka glede na ključne kazalnike uspešnosti; |
| -support adequate visibility of reliable information of public interest 94 and maintain a plurality of views: by developing accountability standards (co-created benchmarks) for recommender and content ranking systems and providing users with access to indicators of the trustworthiness of sources; | -podpora ustrezni prepoznavnosti zanesljivih informacij javnega interesa 94 in ohranjanje pluralnosti mnenj: z razvojem standardov odgovornosti (soustvarjenih meril uspešnosti) za sisteme za razvrščanje priporočil in vsebin ter zagotavljanjem dostopa uporabnikom do kazalnikov zanesljivosti virov; |
| -reduce the monetisation of disinformation linked to sponsored content: in cooperation with advertisers, limiting the false or misleading issue-based advertisement on online platforms or on third-party websites as well as the placement of ads on websites that are purveyors of disinformation 95 ; | -zmanjšanje monetizacije dezinformacij, povezanih s sponzoriranimi vsebinami: v sodelovanju z oglaševalci omejevanje neresničnega ali zavajajočega tematskega oglaševanja na spletnih platformah ali na spletnih mestih tretjih oseb ter objavljanje oglasov na spletnih mestih, ki so glavni viri dezinformacij 95 ; |
| -step up fact-checking, by establishing transparent standards and procedures for open and non-discriminatory collaboration between fact-checkers and platforms and foster cooperation 96 ; | -okrepitev preverjanja dejstev z uvedbo preglednih standardov in postopkov za odprto in nediskriminatorno sodelovanje med preverjevalci dejstev in platformami ter spodbujanje sodelovanja 96 ; |
| -strengthen the integrity of services offered by online platforms by developing appropriate measures to limit the artificial amplification of disinformation campaigns; | -okrepitev celovitosti storitev, ki jih ponujajo spletne platforme, z razvojem ustreznih ukrepov za omejitev umetnega povečanja odmevnosti kampanj dezinformiranja; |
| -ensure an effective data disclosure for research on disinformation, by developing a framework in line with applicable regulatory requirements and based on the involvement of all relevant stakeholders (and independent from political influence). The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) can facilitate the development of such a framework. The Commission notes that the GDPR does not a priori and across the board prohibit the sharing of personal data by platforms with researchers 97 . | -zagotavljanje učinkovitega razkritja podatkov za raziskave o dezinformacijah z razvojem okvira, ki je v skladu z veljavnimi regulativnimi zahtevami in temelji na sodelovanju vseh ustreznih deležnikov (in neodvisno od političnega vpliva). Evropska opazovalnica digitalnih medijev (EDMO) lahko olajša razvoj takšnega okvira. Komisija ugotavlja, da splošna uredba o varstvu podatkov načeloma in na splošno ne prepoveduje izmenjave osebnih podatkov med platformami in raziskovalci 97 . |
| Actions: | ·Issue guidance for strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation (Spring 2021) | ·Convene the signatories of the Code of Practice and relevant stakeholders groups to strengthen the code according to the guidance | ·Set up a permanent framework for the monitoring of the code | Ukrepi: | ·Izdane bodo smernice za sprejetje strožjega kodeksa ravnanja glede dezinformacij (spomladi 2021). | ·Podpisniki kodeksa ravnanja in ustreznih deležnikov bodo pozvani k sprejetju strožjega kodeksa v skladu s smernicami. | ·Vzpostavljen bo stalni okvir za spremljanje upoštevanja kodeksa. |
| 4.3Empowering citizens to make informed decisions | 4.3Opolnomočenje državljanov za sprejemanje informiranih odločitev |
| Everyone has a role to play in combatting disinformation and misinformation. Media literacy, including critical thinking, is an effective capacity helping citizens of all ages to navigate the news environment, identify different types of media and how they work, have a critical understanding of social networks and make informed decisions 98 . Media literacy skills help citizens check information before sharing it, understand who is behind it, why it was distributed to them and whether it is credible. Digital literacy enables people to participate in the online environment wisely, safely and ethically. | Vsakdo ima pomembno vlogo v boju proti dezinformacijam in napačnim informacijam. Medijska pismenost je skupaj s kritičnim razmišljanjem tista sposobnost, ki državljanom vseh starosti dejansko omogoča, da se znajdejo v okolju novic, prepoznajo različne vrste medijev in njihovo delovanje, kritično razumejo družbena omrežja in sprejemajo informirane odločitve 98 . Medijska pismenost državljanom pomaga preveriti informacije, preden jih delijo, ter razumeti, kdo je informacije ustvaril, zakaj so jim bile poslane in ali so verodostojne. Digitalna pismenost ljudem omogoča pametno, varno in etično sodelovanje v spletnem okolju. |
| Countering disinformation and the use of hate speech through education and training as well as the promotion of open political debates is crucial for effective participation in society and democratic processes and is an important priority in the Digital Education Action Plan 99 . Over 40% of young people consider that critical thinking, media and democracy are ‘not taught sufficiently’ in school. In this context, promoting citizenship education is key in view of ensuring that young people are equipped with the social and civic competences to be open-minded, think critically and fully participate in our diverse societies. Along this line, ensuring academic freedom in higher education institutions is also at the core of all higher education policies developed at EU-level. | Boj proti dezinformacijam in uporabi sovražnega govora prek izobraževanja in usposabljanja ter spodbujanje odprtih političnih razprav sta ključnega pomena za učinkovito udeležbo v družbi in demokratičnih procesih ter pomembna prednostna naloga akcijskega načrta za digitalno izobraževanje 99 . Več kot 40 % mladih meni, da se v šolah „ne naučijo dovolj“ o kritičnem razmišljanju, medijih in demokraciji. V tem okviru je spodbujanje državljanske vzgoje ključnega pomena za zagotavljanje, da imajo mladi socialne in državljanske kompetence, da so odprti, kritično razmišljajo in polno sodelujejo v naših raznolikih družbah. V skladu s tem je zagotavljanje akademske svobode v visokošolskih ustanovah tudi v središču vseh visokošolskih politik, razvitih na ravni EU. |
| The Commission will increase its efforts to strengthen media literacy from various angles and further support national media literacy campaigns, in cooperation with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and the Media Literacy Expert Group. The revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive requires Member States to promote the development of media literacy skills. It also obliges video-sharing platforms to set up effective media literacy tools and raise user awareness. These are further developed under the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan, under which citizens are to be equipped with the necessary skills to understand fully the mechanisms that shape online interaction among users, including via a media literacy toolbox and guidelines to Member States. | Komisija bo okrepila svoja prizadevanja za krepitev medijske pismenosti z različnih vidikov in v sodelovanju z evropsko opazovalnico digitalnih medijev in skupino strokovnjakov za medijsko pismenost še naprej podpirala nacionalne kampanje na tem področju. V skladu z revidirano direktivo o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah morajo države članice spodbujati razvoj medijske pismenosti. Platformam za izmenjavo videov direktiva nalaga tudi vzpostavitev učinkovitih orodij za medijsko pismenost in ozaveščanje uporabnikov. Ta so podrobneje določena v okviru akcijskega načrta za medijski in avdiovizualni sektor, ki poudarja, da je treba državljane opremiti s potrebnimi znanji in spretnostmi, da lahko v celoti razumejo mehanizme za oblikovanje spletne interakcije med uporabniki, vključno z zbirko orodij za medijsko pismenost in smernicami za države članice. |
| The Commission will support media literacy projects under the new cross-sectoral strand of the Creative Europe programme. Media literacy projects will also be supported across various other programmes involving young people and schools (e.g. Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps). In 2021, the priority theme for the ‘etwinning’ action (which helps schools, teachers and students across the EU to collaborate via new technologies) will be ‘media literacy and disinformation’. EDMO and the multidisciplinary community coordinated by it, will provide support to national media literacy campaigns aiming at strengthening citizens’ ability to assess the quality and veracity of online information, including citizens with additional needs. Through the work of its national hubs, the EDMO will identify specific issues to be tackled. The Commission will also scale up its efforts within the next edition of the European media literacy week. It will also cooperate closely with international organisations such as UNESCO. | Komisija bo podprla projekte medijske pismenosti v okviru novega medsektorskega sklopa programa Ustvarjalna Evropa. Projekte medijske pismenosti bodo podpirali tudi različni drugi programi, ki bodo vključevali mlade in šole (npr. Erasmus+ in evropska solidarnostna enota). V letu 2021 bo prednostna tema ukrepa „e-twinning“ (ki šolam, učiteljem in učencem po vsej EU pomaga pri sodelovanju prek novih tehnologij) „medijska pismenost in dezinformacije“. Evropska opazovalnica digitalnih medijev in multidisciplinarna skupnost, ki jo ta usklajuje, bosta zagotovili podporo nacionalnim kampanjam za medijsko pismenost, katerih cilj je okrepiti sposobnost državljanov za ocenjevanje kakovosti in verodostojnosti spletnih informacij, tudi v primerih državljanov z dodatnimi potrebami. Prek dela svojih nacionalnih središč bo evropska opazovalnica digitalnih medijev opredelila specifična vprašanja, ki jih je treba obravnavati. Komisija bo prav tako okrepila svoja prizadevanja v okviru naslednjega evropskega tedna medijske pismenosti. Tesno bo sodelovala tudi z mednarodnimi organizacijami, kot je UNESCO. |
| In addition, the Commission will work on developing common guidelines for teachers and educational staff to foster digital literacy and tackle disinformation through education and training, as set out in the Digital Education Action Plan. In this context, it will engage with multiple stakeholders, including civil society, European technology companies and carriers, broadcasters, journalists, the Media Literacy Expert Group, EDMO, national authorities, parents, students and young people. The guidelines will go hand in hand with new initiatives to develop innovative ways to fight disinformation, such as an EUvsDisinfo hackathon. | Poleg tega si bo Komisija prizadevala za razvoj skupnih smernic za učitelje in pedagoško osebje za spodbujanje digitalne pismenosti in boj proti dezinformacijam z izobraževanjem in usposabljanjem, kot je določeno v akcijskem načrtu za digitalno izobraževanje. V zvezi s tem bo sodelovala z več deležniki, vključno s civilno družbo, evropskimi tehnološkimi podjetji in operaterji, radiodifuzijskimi hišami, novinarji, strokovno skupino za medijsko pismenost, evropsko opazovalnico digitalnih medijev, nacionalnimi organi, starši, študenti in mladimi. Smernice bodo spremljale nove pobude za razvoj inovativnih načinov za boj proti dezinformacijam, kot je hekaton EUvsDisinfo. |
| The Commission will support the involvement of journalists in media literacy activities, in particular through ‘back-to-school’ initiatives enabling them to discuss their work and the role of the media with school pupils. | Komisija bo podprla vključevanje novinarjev v dejavnosti medijske pismenosti, zlasti s pobudami „nazaj v šolo“, ki jim bodo omogočile, da z učenci razpravljajo o svojem delu in vlogi medijev. |
| Support for civil society (including funding) will be a key element of action to tackle disinformation. The Commission will support initiatives aimed at helping civil society actors to participate in public debate. It will also help to strengthen cooperation across civil society at European level. This could be supported by several programmes in the new financing period 100 , in particular the proposed Rights and Values programme for the period 2021-2027 101 . | Podpora civilni družbi (vključno s financiranjem) bo ključni element ukrepov za boj proti dezinformacijam. Komisija bo podprla pobude za pomoč akterjem civilne družbe pri sodelovanju v javnih razpravah. Prav tako bo pomagala pri tesnejšem sodelovanju v okviru civilne družbe na evropski ravni. Ti ukrepi bi se lahko podprli iz več programov v novem obdobju financiranja 100 , zlasti iz predlaganega programa za pravice in vrednote za obdobje 2021–2027 101 . |
| Actions: | ·Support new innovative projects to fight disinformation under various EU programmes, in particular by civil society organisations and higher education institutions, with journalists’ involvement | ·Increase support and funding for and diversifying initiatives, including by civil society organisations, to promote media literacy and help citizens identify disinformation, within the EU and beyond | Ukrepa: | ·Novi inovativni projekti za boj proti dezinformacijam bi se lahko podprli v okviru različnih programov EU, zlasti prek organizacij civilne družbe in visokošolskih ustanov, z udeležbo novinarjev. | ·Za spodbujanje medijske pismenosti in pomoč državljanom pri prepoznavanju dezinformacij v EU in zunaj nje bo namenjenih več podpore in financiranja, pa tudi pobude se bodo diverzificirale, med drugim prek organizacij civilne družbe. |
| 5CONCLUSION | 5ZAKLJUČEK |
| In July 2019, President von der Leyen called for a new push for European democracy, with a greater say for Europeans and for Europe altogether to strive for more in nurturing, protecting and strengthening our democracy. | Predsednica Ursula von der Leyen je julija 2019 pozvala k novim prizadevanjem za evropsko demokracijo, v kateri bi imeli Evropejci in Evropejke večji vpliv, Evropa pa bi si skupaj bolj prizadevala za spodbujanje, zaščito in krepitev naše demokracije. |
| This European democracy action plan, taken together with the new European rule of law mechanism, the new Strategy to strengthen the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 102 as well as the package of measures taken to promote and protect equality across the EU, will be a key driver for the new push for European democracy to face the challenges and reap the benefits of the digital age. The commitment to democracy is also embedded in the EU’s external action, and a central pillar of its work with accession and neighbourhood countries. | Ta akcijski načrt za evropsko demokracijo bo skupaj z novim evropskim mehanizmom pravne države, novo strategijo za okrepitev uporabe Listine o temeljnih pravicah 102 in svežnjem ukrepov, sprejetih za spodbujanje in zaščito enakosti po vsej EU, ključno gonilo novih prizadevanj za evropsko demokracijo, ki se bo tako soočila z izzivi in izkoristila prednosti digitalne dobe. Zavezanost demokraciji je vključena tudi v zunanje delovanje EU in je osrednji steber njenega dela z državami pristopnicami in sosednjimi državami. |
| The gradual delivery of the set of measures proposed in the action plan will ensure that Europe has a stronger democratic underpinning to take up the challenges of the unprecedented economic, climate and health crises we face, in full respect for our common principles and values. The Commission will review the implementation of the action plan in 2023, a year ahead of the elections to the European Parliament, and reflect on whether further steps are needed. | Postopno izvajanje svežnja ukrepov, predlaganega v akcijskem načrtu, bo zagotovilo, da bo imela Evropa močnejšo demokratično podlago za reševanje izzivov hude gospodarske, podnebne in zdravstvene krize, s katero se soočamo, ob polnem spoštovanju naših skupnih načel in vrednot. Komisija bo leta 2023, eno leto pred volitvami v Evropski parlament, pregledala izvajanje akcijskega načrta in proučila potrebo po uvedbi nadaljnjih ukrepov. |
| The Commission looks forward to the further engagement of the European Parliament and the Council as well as of the wide circle of national actors, public and private, beyond government authorities, who will be instrumental to ensure the resilience of our democracy. | Komisija z zanimanjem pričakuje nadaljnje sodelovanje Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta ter širokega kroga javnih in zasebnih nacionalnih akterjev, ne le vladnih organov, ki bodo imeli ključno vlogo pri zagotavljanju odpornosti naše demokracije. |
| (1) Special Eurobarometer 479 on the Future of Europe (October-November 2018). With 34% of respondents, this comes ahead of its economic, industrial and trading power (31%) and the standard of living of EU citizens (25%). | (1) Posebni Eurobarometer 479 o prihodnosti Evrope (oktober–november 2018). Za 34 % vprašanih je to pomembneje od gospodarske, industrijske in trgovinske moči (31 %) ter življenjskega standarda državljanov EU (25 %). |
| (2) See for example The Global State of Democracy 2019 Report (2019) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. | (2) Glej na primer: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2019), The Global State of Democracy 2019 Report [Mednarodni inštitut za demokracijo in pomoč pri volitvah (2019), Svetovni pregled stanja demokracije za leto 2019]. |
| (3) President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf . | (3) Politične usmeritve predsednice von der Leyen, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_sl.pdf. |
| (4) Venice Commission (2020), Interim report on the measures taken in the EU Member States as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and their impact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (adopted on 8 October 2020). | (4) Venice Commission (2020), Interim report on the measures taken in the EU Member States as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and their impact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights [Beneška komisija (2020), Vmesno poročilo o ukrepih, ki so jih države članice EU sprejele v odziv na krizo zaradi COVID-19, in njihov učinek na demokracijo, pravno državo in temeljne pravice] (sprejeto 8. oktobra 2020). |
| (5) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 (JOIN/2020/5 final, 25 March 2020), which reaffirms the EU’s commitment to promote and protect democracy worldwide. | (5) Skupno sporočilo Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu „Akcijski načrt EU za človekove pravice in demokracijo za obdobje 2020–2024“ (JOIN/2020/5 final z dne 25. marca 2020), ki potrjuje zavezo EU spodbujanju demokracije in njeni zaščiti po vsem svetu. |
| (6) European Commission, Joint Research Centre (2020), Technology and democracy: understanding the influence of online technologies on political behaviour and decision-making. | (6) European Commission, Joint Research Centre (2020), Technology and democracy: understanding the influence of online technologies on political behaviour and decision-making [Evropska komisija, Skupno raziskovalno središče (2020), Tehnologija in demokracija: kako razumeti vpliv spletnih tehnologij na politično vedenje in odločanje]. |
| (7) The Action Plan has been informed by a public consultation that demonstrated wide recognition of the risks of interference in EU democracy and the need for targeted action both online and offline. The report is available here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/report-public-consultation-european-democracy-action-plan-edap_en . | (7) V akcijskem načrtu je upoštevano javno posvetovanje, ki je pokazalo široko zavedanje o tveganjih poseganja v demokracijo EU in potrebo po ciljno usmerjenih ukrepih na spletu in izven njega. Poročilo je objavljeno na naslovu: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/report-public-consultation-european-democracy-action-plan-edap_en . |
| (8) For example, evidence collected around the time of the 2019 European Parliament elections revealed continuous disinformation activity by Russian sources aiming to interfere in the election process (Report on the implementation of the action plan against disinformation (JOIN(2019) 12 final, 14.6.2019)). The 2019 Report on the elections to the European Parliament (COM(2020) 252 final) later concluded that isolated cyberattacks, data protection and other elections-related complaints had been received, but that a covert, coordinated large-scale effort to interfere in the elections had not been identified. | (8) Dokazi, zbrani v času volitev v Evropski parlament leta 2019, so na primer razkrili stalne dejavnosti dezinformiranja s strani ruskih virov, katerih cilj je bil vpletanje v volilni postopek (Poročilo o izvajanju akcijskega načrta proti dezinformacijam (JOIN(2019) 12 final z dne 14. junija 2019)). V Poročilu o volitvah v Evropski parlament leta 2019 (COM(2020) 252 final) je bilo pozneje povzeto, da so bili prijavljeni posamični kibernetski napadi in podane druge pritožbe v zvezi z volitvami, vendar pa ni bil ugotovljen noben odkrit, usklajen in obsežen poskus vmešavanja v volitve. |
| (9) Regulation 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJL119, 4.5.2016. | (9) Uredba (EU) 2016/679 z dne 27. aprila 2016 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 95/46/ES (UL L 119, 4.5.2016). |
| (10) | (10) |
| Many respondents to the public consultation (including from business and civil society) said that the lack of transparency and clear definitions caused difficulties and uncertainties, in particular when it came to distinguishing paid-for political material from other political content. Respondents support stronger disclosure rules, including transparency on the origin of the content (96% of respondents), the creation of open and transparent archives and registries of political ads (91%) and requiring political parties to disclose their campaign finances (82%). 82% supported criteria for requiring the micro-targeting of political content to be publicly disclosed in a clear and transparent way for every advert. | V javnem posvetovanju so mnogi (tudi podjetja in civilna družba) dejali, da pomanjkanje preglednosti in jasnih opredelitev povzroča težave in negotovosti, zlasti pri razlikovanju med plačanim političnim gradivom in drugimi političnimi vsebinami. Vprašani podpirajo odločnejša pravila o razkritju, vključno s preglednostjo izvora vsebin (96 % vprašanih), vzpostavitev odprtih in preglednih arhivov in registrov političnih oglasov (91 %) ter zahteve, da politične stranke razkrijejo financiranje svojih kampanj (82 %). 82 % vprašanih je podprlo zamisel, da bi se vzpostavila merila, ki bi zahtevala, da se mikrociljanje politične vsebine za vsak oglas javno razkrije na jasen in pregleden način. |
| (11) Irrespective of its actual impact, the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, where millions of Facebook users' personal data was acquired without their consent and used predominantly for political advertising , is a revealing example of clear intent to engage in such manipulation by exploiting legal loopholes and taking advantage of weak safeguards for how social media protects its users’ personal data. It showed how data analytics, paired with micro-targeting techniques and psychological profiling, can be used to mislead, suppress turnout and manipulate voting behaviour. | (11) Ne glede na dejanski učinek je škandal Facebook-Cambridge Analytica, pri katerem so bili brez privolitve pridobljeni osebni podatki na milijone uporabnikov Facebooka, nato pa uporabljeni za politično oglaševanje, nazoren primer jasnega namena manipuliranja z izkoriščanjem pravnih vrzeli in šibkih varoval glede tega, kako družbeni mediji varujejo osebne podatke uporabnikov. Pokazal je, kako se lahko podatkovna analitika v kombinaciji s tehnikami mikrociljanja uporabi za zavajanje, omejevanje volilne udeležbe ter manipulacijo z volilnim vedenjem. |
| (12) 2019 EP election report (COM(2020) 252 final). | (12) Poročilo o volitvah v Evropski parlament leta 2019 (COM(2020) 252 final). |
| (13) https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en . | (13) https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en . |
| (14) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/673 of 3 May 2018 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (OJ L 114I , 4.5.2018, p. 1); Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/493 of 25 March 2019 amending Regulation 1141/2014 as regards a verification procedure related to infringements of rules on the protection of personal data in the context of elections to the European Parliament (OJ L 85I, 27.3.2019, p. 7). | (14) Uredba (EU, Euratom) 2018/673 z dne 3. maja 2018 o spremembi Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 1141/2014 o statutu in financiranju evropskih političnih strank in evropskih političnih fundacij (UL L 114I, 4.5.2018, str. 1); Uredba (EU, Euratom) 2019/493 z dne 25. marca 2019 o spremembi Uredbe št. 1141/2014, kar zadeva postopek preverjanja v zvezi s kršitvami pravil o varstvu osebnih podatkov v okviru volitev v Evropski parlament (UL L 85I, 27.3.2019, str. 7). |
| (15) | (15) |
| 84% of respondents to the public consultation supported more transparency on the financing of European political parties. | 84 % sodelujočih v javnem posvetovanju je podprlo večjo preglednost financiranja evropskih političnih strank. |
| (16) The acquisition and use of online data for justice purposes (e.g. in the monitoring and enforcement of relevant rules) require supervising authorities to have specialist capabilities and appropriate powers. | (16) Za pridobitev in uporabo spletnih podatkov za pravosodne namene (npr. pri spremljanju in izvrševanju ustreznih pravil) morajo imeti nadzorni organi specializirane zmogljivosti in ustrezna pooblastila. |
| (17) For example, Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1–14) includes electoral infrastructure as one of the potential elements of critical infrastructure to be taken into account when assessing if the effects of foreign direct investment is likely to affect security or public order. | (17) Uredba (EU) 2019/452 z dne 19. marca 2019 o vzpostavitvi okvira za pregled neposrednih tujih naložb v Uniji (UL L 79I, 21.3.2019, str. 1) navaja volilno infrastrukturo kot enega od možnih elementov ključne infrastrukture, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri ocenjevanju, ali učinki neposrednih tujih naložb lahko vplivajo na varnost ali javni red. |
| (18) Building on past recommendations on EU elections, on Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1–30), which is due for revision this year, and on related recommendations (C(2018) 5949 final and C(2018) 900 final). In the public consultation, respondents cited cyberattacks among the main threats to election integrity, in particular due to increasing reliance on the internet for sharing and accessing information on elections, political parties and campaigns. A well‑evidenced example of such attacks are ‘hack and leak’ operations, such as in the case of Russian intelligence agencies obtaining and disseminating documents from the Democratic National Committee during the 2016 US Presidential election campaign. | (18) Na podlagi preteklih priporočil o volitvah v EU, Direktive (EU) 2016/1148 z dne 6. julija 2016 o ukrepih za visoko skupno raven varnosti omrežij in informacijskih sistemov v Uniji (UL L 194, 19.7.2016, str. 1), ki naj bi bila revidirana letos, in povezanih priporočil (C(2018) 5949 final in C(2018) 900 final). Sodelujoči v javnem posvetovanju so kibernetske napade navedli kot eno glavnih groženj integriteti volitev, zlasti zato, ker se splet vse pogosteje uporablja za razširjanje informacij o volitvah, političnih strankah in kampanjah ter dostopanje do njih. Dobro dokumentirani primeri takih napadov so operacije vdorov in namernega razkrivanja informacij, kakršnemu smo bili priča, ko so ruske obveščevalne agencije med kampanjo za predsedniške volitve v ZDA leta 2016 pridobile in razširjale dokumente demokratskega nacionalnega odbora. |
| (19) http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=53645 . | (19) http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=53645 . |
| (20) ERGA report (2018); https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ERGA-2018-07-SG1-Report-on-internal-plurality-LQ.pdf . | (20) Poročilo skupine ERGA (2018). https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ERGA-2018-07-SG1-Report-on-internal-plurality-LQ.pdf . |
| (21) See Flash Eurobarometer 431 on Electoral rights (2015), which assessed public concerns regarding risks associated with voting electronically, online or by post. It found that, while people understood the usefulness of e-voting to help those with certain specific needs, they were concerned about voting confidentiality and reliability. The findings of Special Eurobarometer 477 (2018) on Democracy and elections, which looked at respondents’ concerns about voting electronically, online or by post, were similar. In 2016, the European Parliament gave the Commission a pilot grant for a Study on the benefits and drawbacks of remote voting, which includes a comprehensive survey of national experience with e‑voting and other remote voting tools. | (21) Glej Flash Eurobarometer 431: Electoral rights [Volilne pravice] iz leta 2015, ki je ocenil zaskrbljenost javnosti zaradi tveganj, povezanih z elektronskim glasovanjem oziroma glasovanjem prek spleta ali po pošti. Ugotovljeno je bilo, da ljudje sicer razumejo, da je e-glasovanje koristno za osebe z določenimi posebnimi potrebami, vendar jih skrbi zaupnost in zanesljivost takih praks. Do podobnih ugotovitev je privedla posebna raziskava Eurobarometer 477 iz leta 2018 z naslovom Democracy and elections [Demokracija in volitve], ki je proučila mnenje vprašanih o glasovanju v elektronski obliki, po spletu ali po pošti. Evropski parlament je leta 2016 Komisiji dodelil nepovratna sredstva za študijo z naslovom Study on the benefits and drawbacks of remote voting [Študija o koristih in slabostih glasovanja na daljavo] v okviru pilotnega projekta, ki vključuje tudi obsežno raziskavo nacionalnih izkušenj z e-glasovanjem in drugimi orodji za glasovanje na daljavo. |
| (22) This issue will also be addressed in the 2020 Citizenship Report. | (22) To vprašanje bo obravnavano tudi v poročilu o državljanstvu za leto2020. |
| (23) The Council Conclusions on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2020-2022 of 13 July 2020 identify democracy as one of the three priority pillars of cooperation. | (23) V Sklepih Sveta o prednostnih nalogah EU pri sodelovanju s Svetom Evrope v obdobju 2020–2022 z dne 13. julija 2020 je demokracija opredeljena kot eden od treh prednostnih stebrov sodelovanja. |
| (24) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); https://www.osce.org/odihr . | (24) Organizacija za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi – Urad za demokratične institucije in človekove pravice; https://www.osce.org/odihr . |
| (25) E.g. the recent Convention citoyenne sur le climat in France demonstrated the importance of including and empowering citizens when addressing a complex public problem such as the reduction of carbon emissions. In Ireland, citizen assemblies have fed into informed decisions over very divisive social issues such as abortion. Other institutionalised processes include citizens’ councils in parts of Austria (Vorarlberg) and Belgium (Parliament of the German-speaking Community of Belgium (2019), Was passiert beim Bürgerdialog?). See also OECD (2020), Innovative citizen participation and new democratic institutions: catching the deliberative wave (OECD Publishing, Paris). | (25) V Franciji se je na primer ob nedavni državljanski konvenciji o podnebju (Convention citoyenne sur le climat) izkazalo, kako pomembno je vključiti državljane in jih opolnomočiti, ko se obravnavajo zapleteni javni problemi, kakršno je zmanjšanje emisij ogljika. Na Irskem so se pri odločitvah o družbenih vprašanjih, ki razdvajajo javnost, na primer o splavu, upoštevala mnenja državljanskih zborov. Podobni institucionalizirani procesi so sveti državljanov v delih Avstrije (Vorarlberg) in Belgije (parlament nemško govoreče skupnosti v Belgiji (2019), Was passiert beim Bürgerdialog?). Glej tudi OECD (2020), Innovative citizen participation and new democratic institutions: catching the deliberative wave [Inovativna državljanska udeležba in nove demokratične institucije: izkoristek posvetovalnega vala] (Pariz: OECD Publishing). |
| (26) https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/_en . | (26) https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/_sl . |
| (27) https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say . | (27) https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say . |
| (28) https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en . | (28) https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_sl . |
| (29) The programme’s key strategic orientations include the creation of a ‘more resilient, inclusive and democratic European society’. Projects from the last calls for proposals of Horizon 2020 will focus inter alia on democratising territorial cohesion (experimenting with deliberative citizen engagement and participatory budgeting in EU regional and urban policies) and cities as arenas of political innovation in the strengthening of deliberative and participatory democracy. | (29) Med ključnimi strateškimi usmeritvami programa je ustvarjanje bolj odporne, vključujoče in demokratične evropske družbe. Projekti iz zadnjih razpisov za zbiranje predlogov programa Obzorje 2020 se bodo med drugim osredotočali na demokratizacijo teritorialne kohezije (eksperimentiranje s posvetovalnim angažmajem državljanov in participativno pripravo proračuna v regionalnih in mestnih politikah EU) ter na mesta kot prizorišča političnih inovacij pri krepitvi posvetovalne in participativne demokracije. |
| (30) The 2020-2025 gender equality strategy (COM(2020) 152) includes measures to enhance women’s participation in political decision-making. It underlines the importance of promoting the participation of women as voters and candidates in the 2024 EP elections. European political parties requesting EU funding are encouraged to be transparent about the gender balance of political party members. | (30) Strategija EU za enakost spolov za obdobje 2020–2025 (COM(2020) 152) navaja ukrepe za okrepitev udeležbe žensk v političnem odločanju. Poudarja pomen spodbujanja udeležbe žensk kot volivk in kandidatk na volitvah v Evropski parlament leta 2024. Evropske politične stranke, ki zaprosijo za sredstva EU, se spodbujajo k preglednosti glede uravnotežene zastopanosti spolov v njihovem članstvu. |
| (31) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604979/IPOL_STU(2018)604979_EN.pdf . | (31) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604979/IPOL_STU(2018)604979_EN.pdf . |
| (32) The EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020) 565) underlines that there are hurdles to democratic participation and representation for groups susceptible to marginalisation, such as people with a minority racial or ethnic background. | (32) Akcijski načrt EU za boj proti rasizmu za obdobje 2020–2025 (COM(2020) 565) poudarja, da obstajajo ovire za demokratično udeležbo in zastopanost skupin, ki so dovzetne za marginalizacijo, kot so pripadniki manjšinskih ras ali narodnosti. |
| (33) In line with obligations under UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to which the EU and all its Member States are Party, and in particular Article 29 on participation on political and public life. | (33) V skladu z obveznostmi na podlagi Konvencije ZN o pravicah invalidov, katere pogodbenice so EU in vse njene države članice, in zlasti s členom 29 o sodelovanju v političnem in javnem življenju. |
| (34) The EU youth dialogue reaches more than 50 000 young people in each of its 18-month cycles and is one of the biggest single participatory processes for citizens in the EU; https://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/youth-strategy/youthgoals_en . | (34) Mladinski dialog EU v vsakem od svojih 18-mesečnih ciklov doseže več kot 50 000 mladih in je eden največjih participativnih procesov za državljane v EU; https://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/youth-strategy/youthgoals_en . |
| (35) https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en . | (35) https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en . |
| (36) European University Institute, (2020) Media Pluralism Monitor Report. The Media Pluralism Monitor, co-funded by the EU, provides a comprehensive assessment of the media pluralism landscape across Europe: https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2020-results/ . | (36) European University Institute, (2020) Media Pluralism Monitor Report [Evropski univerzitetni inštitut (2020), Poročilo orodja za spremljanje pluralnosti medijev]. Orodje za spremljanje pluralnosti medijev, ki ga je soustanovila EU, zagotavlja celovito oceno pluralnosti medijev po vsej Evropi: https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2020-results/ . |
| (37) News publishing saw its advertising revenues drop between 30% and 80% and TV by 20%, during generalised lockdowns in Q2 2020; see COM(2020) 784. | (37) Dohodki od oglaševanja so v novičarskem založništvu upadli za 30 do 80 %, televizijske hiše pa so med splošnimi omejitvami v drugem četrtletju leta 2020 zabeležile 20-odstotni upad; glej COM(2020) 784. |
| (38) https://ipi.media/wpfd-2020-covid-19-accelerating-a-global-decline-in-media-freedom/ . | (38) https://ipi.media/wpfd-2020-covid-19-accelerating-a-global-decline-in-media-freedom/ . |
| (39) https://rsf.org/en/news/nearly-half-un-member-countries-have-obstructed-coronavirus-coverage . | (39) https://rsf.org/en/news/nearly-half-un-member-countries-have-obstructed-coronavirus-coverage . |
| (40) COM(2020) 784. | (40) COM(2020) 784. |
| (41) In particular, the recent report by the European Parliament on strengthening media freedom and the Council conclusions on safeguarding a free and pluralistic media system. | (41) Nedavno poročilo Evropskega parlamenta o krepitvi svobode medijev in sklepi Sveta o zaščiti svobodnega in pluralističnega medijskega sistema. |
| (42) COM(2020) 580 final. | (42) COM(2020) 580 final. |
| (43) See European University Institute, (2020) Media Pluralism Monitor Report. The Media Pluralism Monitor, co-funded by the EU, provides a comprehensive assessment of the media pluralism landscape across Europe: https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2020-results/ . | (43) Glej European University Institute, (2020) Media Pluralism Monitor Report [Evropski univerzitetni inštitut (2020), Poročilo orodja za spremljanje pluralnosti medijev]. Orodje za spremljanje pluralnosti medijev, ki ga je soustanovila EU, zagotavlja celovito oceno pluralnosti medijev po vsej Evropi: https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2020-results/ . |
| (44) CM/Rec(2016) 4. This was accompanied by guidelines on prevention, protection, prosecution and the promotion of information, education and awareness-raising with the aim of enhancing journalists’ safety. | (44) CM/Rec(2016) 4. Priporočilu so bile priložene smernice o preprečevanju, zaščiti, pregonu ter spodbujanju obveščanja, izobraževanja in ozaveščanja z namenom izboljšanja varnosti novinarjev. |
| (45) The platform facilitates the compilation, processing and dissemination of information on serious concerns about media freedom and journalists’ safety in Council of Europe member states, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It aims to improve the protection of journalists, action on threats and violence against media professionals and the Council of Europe’s early warning and response capacity. | (45) Platforma omogoča zbiranje, obdelavo in razširjanje informacij o resnih pomislekih glede svobode medijev in varnosti novinarjev v državah članicah Sveta Evrope, kakor sta zapisani v členu 10 Evropske konvencije o človekovih pravicah. Namenjena je izboljšanju zaščite novinarjev, ukrepanja ob grožnjah in nasilju nad medijskimi delavci ter zmogljivosti Sveta Evrope za zgodnje opozarjanje in odziv. |
| (46) In 2015-2019, it registered a total of 652 alerts, 78% of which remain unresolved. Between March and June 2020 alone, a total of 126 alerts were registered across Europe. See Council of Europe (2020), Annual report by the partner organisations to the Council of Europe Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists. | (46) V obdobju 2015–2019 je bilo zabeleženih skupno 652 opozoril, od tega pa jih je 78 % še vedno nerešenih. Samo od marca do junija 2020 je bilo po vsej Evropi zabeleženih 126 opozoril. Glej Council of Europe (2020), Annual report by the partner organisations to the Council of Europe Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists [Svet Evrope (2020), Letno poročilo partnerskih organizacij platformi Sveta Evrope za promocijo zaščite novinarstva in varnosti novinarjev]. |
| (47) https://rm.coe.int/safety-implementation-guide-en-16-june-2020/16809ebc7c . | (47) https://rm.coe.int/safety-implementation-guide-en-16-june-2020/16809ebc7c . |
| (48) Documented by the 2020 Rule of Law report. For example, in Belgium, the Flemish Association of Journalists set up a specific hotline for aggression against journalists. In Italy, a coordination centre dealing with acts against journalists has been set up. In the Netherlands, the PersVeilig protocol aimed at reducing threats, violence and aggression against journalists was concluded between the public prosecution service, the police, the Society of Editors-in-Chief and the Association of Journalists. Sweden has set up national contact points and allocated resources to support journalists and better investigate hate crimes. | (48) Dokumentirano v poročilu o pravni državi za leto 2020. V Belgiji na primer je flamsko združenje novinarjev vzpostavilo posebno telefonsko linijo za prijavljanje nasilja nad novinarji. V Italiji je bil ustanovljen center za koordinacijo, ki obravnava dejanja zoper novinarje. Na Nizozemskem so državno tožilstvo, policija, združenje urednikov in združenje novinarjev sklenili protokol „PersVeilig“ za zmanjšanje groženj, nasilja in napadov na novinarje. Švedska je vzpostavila nacionalne kontaktne točke in dodelila vire za podporo novinarjem in za boljše preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj iz sovraštva. |
| (49) Press Freedom Police Codex, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF). | (49) European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), Press Freedom Police Codex [Evropski center za svobodo tiska in medijev (ECPMF), Policijski kodeks o svobodi tiska]. |
| (50) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. | (50) Organizacija Združenih narodov za izobraževanje, kulturo in znanost. |
| (51) COM(2020)784. | (51) COM(2020) 784. |
| (52) These are key objectives under the proposed 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme, which for the first time earmarks funds to promote media pluralism. | (52) To so ključni cilji predlaganega programa Ustvarjalna Evropa za obdobje 2021–2027, ki prvič namenja sredstva za spodbujanje pluralnosti medijev. |
| (53) https://www.mfrr.eu/ | (53) https://www.mfrr.eu/ |
| (54) In line with the 2014 EU Human Rights Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline; see EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, (JOIN/2020/5 final, 25.3.2020). | (54) V skladu z dokumentom z naslovom EU Human Rights Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline [Smernice EU o človekovih pravicah – svoboda izražanja na spletu in drugje] iz leta 2014; glej Akcijski načrt EU za človekove pravice in demokracijo za obdobje 2020–2024 (JOIN(2020) 5 final z dne 25. marca 2020). |
| (55) 425 journalists were directly supported in 2019. | (55) Leta 2019 je bila neposredna podpora zagotovljena 425 novinarjem. |
| (56) SLAPPs are typically launched against individual journalists, activists, human rights defenders or civil society organisations that have a public watchdog function. See the policy paper signed by 100 NGOs, Ending gag lawsuits in Europe, protecting democracy and fundamental rights; https://www.ecpmf.eu/ending-gag-lawsuits-in-europe-protecting-democracy-and-fundamental-rights/ | (56) Strateške tožbe za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti se običajno sprožijo proti posameznim novinarjem, aktivistom, zagovornikom človekovih pravic ali organizacijam civilne družbe, ki opravljajo funkcijo javnega nadzora. Glej dokument o politiki, ki ga je podpisalo 100 nevladnih organizacij, Ending gag Lawuits in Europe, protecting democracy and fundamental rights [Odprava tožb za utišanje v Evropi, zaščita demokracije in temeljnih pravic]; https://www.ecpmf.eu/ending-gag-lawsuits-in-europe-protecting-democracy-and-fundamental-rights/ |
| (57) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ad-hoc-literature-review-analysis-key-elements-slapp_en.pdf | (57) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ad-hoc-literature-review-analysis-key-elements-slapp_en.pdf |
| (58) The Council of Europe’s Platform is monitoring alerts relating to SLAPPs; see Hands off press freedom: attacks on media in Europe must not become a new normal, annual report by the partner organisations to the Council of Europe Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists (2020). | (58) Platforma Sveta Evrope spremlja opozorila v zvezi z strateškimi tožbami za onemogočanje udeležbe javnosti; glej letno poročilo partnerskih organizacij platforme Sveta Evrope za promocijo zaščite novinarstva in varnosti novinarjev: Council of Europe Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists (2020) (2020), Hands off press freedom: attacks on media in Europe must not become a new normal [Roke stran od svobode tiska: napadi na medije v Evropi ne smejo postati „novo normalno“]. |
| (59) Commission Communication ‘Ensuring justice in the EU — a European judicial training strategy for 2021-2024’, COM(2020) 713 final. | (59) Sporočilo Komisije „Zagotavljanje pravnega varstva v EU – evropska strategija za usposabljanje na področju pravosodja za obdobje 2021–2024“ (COM(2020) 713 final). |
| (60) Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40–49) and Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32). | (60) Uredba (ES) št. 864/2007 z dne 11. julija 2007 o pravu, ki se uporablja za nepogodbene obveznosti (Rim II) (UL L 199, 31.7.2007, str. 40), in Uredba (EU) št. 1215/2012 z dne 12. decembra 2012 o pristojnosti in priznavanju ter izvrševanju sodnih odločb v civilnih in gospodarskih zadevah (UL L 351, 20.12.2012, str. 1). |
| (61) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/pilot-project-media-councils-digital-age-0 | (61) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/pilot-project-media-councils-digital-age-0 |
| (62) This includes the development of structural and procedural indicators for trustworthiness by the media sector, promoting compliance with professional norms and ethics. The Commission co-funds for example the implementation of the Journalism Trust Initiative https://jti-rsf.org/en | (62) To vključuje razvoj strukturnih in postopkovnih kazalnikov zanesljivosti v medijskem sektorju ter spodbujanje skladnosti s poklicnimi normami in etiko. Komisija na primer sofinancira izvajanje pobude o novinarskem zaupanju „Journalism Trust Initiative“ ( https://jti-rsf.org/en ). |
| (63) Recommendation CM/Rec(2018) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership. | (63) Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership [Svet Evrope, Priporočilo sveta ministrov CM/Rec(2018)11 o pluralnosti medijev in preglednosti lastništva medijev]. |
| (64) e.g. 88% of respondents were in favour of obligations on all media outlets and companies to publish detailed information about their ownership on their website. | (64) Na primer, 88 % sodelujočih v javnem posvetovanju je podprlo obveznost vseh medijskih hiš in družb, da na svojem spletišču objavijo podrobne informacije o svojem lastništvu. |
| (65) Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities (OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 69). | (65) Direktiva (EU) 2018/1808 z dne 14. novembra 2018 o spremembi Direktive 2010/13/EU o usklajevanju nekaterih zakonov in drugih predpisov držav članic o opravljanju avdiovizualnih medijskih storitev (Direktiva o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah) glede na spreminjajoče se tržne razmere (UL L 303, 28.11.2018, str. 69). |
| (66) Article 5(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/1808. | (66) Člen 5(2) Direktive (EU) 2018/1808. |
| (67) In order to provide better overview of the media transparency rules, an interactive database presenting the national legislative frameworks in this regard will be published as part of an independent study on the implementation of the AVMSD. | (67) Da bi zagotovili boljši pregled nad pravili o preglednosti medijev, bo kot del neodvisne študije o izvajanju direktive o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah objavljena interaktivna podatkovna zbirka, v kateri bodo predstavljeni nacionalni zakonodajni okviri na tem področju. |
| (68) See also COM/2020/575 final and JOIN(2020) 8 final. | (68) Glej tudi COM(2020) 575 final in JOIN(2020) 8 final. |
| (69) To facilitate support to the press, and enhance the transparency and predictability of State aid control in this sector, the Commission has made and will regularly update an online repository ( https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/sa_decisions_to_media.pdf ) containing relevant case practice. Regularly updated information on aid granted by Member States is also accessible in the transparency register. | (69) Da bi olajšala podporo medijem ter povečala preglednost in predvidljivost nadzora državne pomoči v tem sektorju, je Komisija pripravila in bo redno posodabljala spletno zbirko ( https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/sa_decisions_to_media.pdf ), ki vsebuje ustrezno prakso odločanja v teh zadevah. Prek registra za preglednost so dostopne tudi redno posodobljene informacije o pomoči, ki so jo odobrile države članice. |
| (70) Aid granted under the Temporary Framework may be cumulated with aid under de minimis Regulations (Commission Regulations (EU) No 1407/2013, No 1408/2013, No 717/2014, and No 360/2012.), which is exempt from the notification obligation, provided that the provisions and cumulation rules of those Regulations are respected. There have been cases in 2020 concerning Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg. | (70) Pomoč, dodeljena na podlagi začasnega okvira, se lahko kumulira s pomočjo na podlagi uredb de minimis (uredbe Komisije (EU) št. 1407/2013, št. 1408/2013, št. 717/2014 in št. 360/2012), ki je izvzeta iz obveznosti priglasitve, če se spoštujejo določbe in pravila o kumulaciji iz navedenih uredb. Leta 2020 so bile obravnavane zadeve v zvezi z Dansko, Italijo in Luksemburgom. |
| (71) The 2020 Rule of Law report showed that many Member States lack specific rules for the distribution of state advertising, with little transparency on distribution criteria, amounts allocated and beneficiaries. The Commission will continue to examine this issue in the context of its future annual reports. | (71) Iz Poročila o pravni državi za leto 2020 je videti, da številne države članice nimajo posebnih pravil za razdeljevanje državnega oglaševanja, saj ni dovolj preglednosti glede meril za razdeljevanje, dodeljenih zneskov in upravičencev. Komisija bo to vprašanje še naprej proučevala v okviru svojih prihodnjih letnih poročil. |
| (72) Commission Communication on Making public procurement work in and for Europe (COM(2017) 572 final). | (72) Sporočilo Komisije z naslovom Uspešno izvajanje javnega naročanja v Evropi in za njo (COM(2017) 572 final). |
| (73) Article 7a and Recital 25 of the revised AVMSD. Regarding these provisions, a specific subgroup of ERGA was set up in 2020 to facilitate a common understanding of its scope and potential appropriate measures, which would guarantee that audiovisual media services of general interest are given appropriate prominence as well as types of regulatory approaches Member States can take. | (73) Člen 7a in uvodna izjava 25 revidirane direktive o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah. V zvezi s temi določbami je bila leta 2020 ustanovljena posebna podskupina skupine ERGA, da bi se olajšalo enotno razumevanje njenega področja uporabe in morebitnih ustreznih ukrepov, kar bi zagotovilo, da bi bile avdiovizualne medijske storitve splošnega pomena ustrezno prepoznavne, ter omogočilo določitev vrst regulativnih pristopov, ki jih lahko sprejmejo države članice. |
| (74) See also Pamment, J., The EU’s role in fighting disinformation: Taking back the initiative, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, July 2020; available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 . | (74) Glej tudi Pamment, J., The EU’s role in fighting disinformation: Taking back the initiative, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper [Vloga EU v boju proti dezinformacijam: Prevzem pobude, Delovni dokument organizacije Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], julij 2020; na voljo na spletnem naslovu: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 . |
| (75) For an overview of EU action against disinformation see JOIN(2020) 8 final, p. 2. | (75) Za pregled ukrepov EU proti dezinformacijam glej JOIN(2020) 8 final, str. 2. |
| (76) Pamment, J., The EU’s role in fighting disinformation: Crafting a new disinformation framework, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, September 2020; available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 . | (76) Pamment, J., The EU’s role in fighting disinformation: Crafting a new disinformation framework, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper [Vloga EU v boju proti dezinformacijam: Oblikovanje novega okvira za boj proti dezinformacijam, Delovni dokument organizacije Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], september 2020; na voljo na spletnem naslovu: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 . |
| (77) JOIN(2018) 36 final. | (77) JOIN(2018) 36 final. |
| (78) Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative, Tackling COVID-19 disinformation − getting the facts right (JOIN(2020) 8 final). | (78) Skupno sporočilo Evropske komisije in visokega predstavnika z naslovom Boj proti dezinformacijam v zvezi s COVID-19 – kaj je res in kaj ne (JOIN(2020) 8 final). |
| (79) For example report by the NATO StratCom Center of Excellence, which shows that an entire industry has developed around the manipulation of social media, including the purchase of fake accounts, fake engagement and others, that can be found easily on the internet at a low price. | (79) Na primer poročilo Natovega centra odličnosti StratCom, iz katerega je razvidno, da se je za manipulacijo družbenih medijev razvila cela industrija, ki vključuje kupovanje lažnih računov, lažno sodelovanje in drugo, kar je mogoče na spletu zlahka najti po nizki ceni. |
| (80) See for example Information Manipulation – A challenge for our democracies, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. | (80) Glej na primer poročilo Information Manipulation – A challenge for our democracies [Manipuliranje z informacijami – Izziv za naše demokracije], ki ga je pripravilo francosko ministrstvo za evropske in zunanje zadeve ter ministrstvo za obrambo. |
| (81) www.EUvsDisinfo.eu has identified over 500 examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation on COVID-19 in its publicly available database which holds over 10.000 examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation. | (81) Projekt www.EUvsDisinfo.eu je v javno dostopni podatkovni zbirki, ki vsebuje več kot 10 000 primerov proruskih dezinformacij, identificiral več kot 500 primerov proruskih dezinformacij o COVID-19. |
| (82) The EEAS has described foreign states’ activities in its public analytical report e.g.: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-covid19-pandemic-updated-23-april-18-may/ | (82) ESZD je dejavnosti tujih držav opisala v svojem javnem analitičnem poročilu, npr.: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-covid19-pandemic-updated-23-april-18-may/ . |
| (83) Pamment, J., The EU’s role in fighting disinformation: Taking back the initiative, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, July 2020; available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 . | (83) Pamment, J., The EU’s role in fighting disinformation: Taking back the initiative, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper [Vloga EU v boju proti dezinformacijam: Prevzem pobude, Delovni dokument organizacije Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], julij 2020; na voljo na spletnem naslovu: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 . |
| (84) To date, the process of building all-source situational awareness on hybrid threats within the EU is led by INTCEN and its Hybrid Fusion Cell. | (84) Proces ozaveščanja o razmerah na podlagi vseh virov o hibridnih grožnjah v EU trenutno vodita INTCEN in njegova hibridna fuzijska celica. |
| (85) COM/2020/605 final. | (85) COM(2020) 605 final. |
| (86) EDMO was set up in October 2020. It is based on the work of an independent multidisciplinary community of researchers, fact-checkers and other relevant stakeholders, aiming to contribute to increased resilience and a better understanding of disinformation. In addition, cooperation between the RAS and the European Cooperation Network on Elections will be reinforced to allow to make better use of the vast knowledge of these two networks. | (86) Evropska opazovalnica digitalnih medijev je bila ustanovljena oktobra 2020. Temelji na delu neodvisne multidisciplinarne skupnosti raziskovalcev, preverjevalcev dejstev in drugih ustreznih deležnikov, njen cilj pa je prispevati k večji odpornosti in boljšemu razumevanju dezinformacij. Poleg tega se bo okrepilo sodelovanje med sistemom hitrega obveščanja in evropsko mrežo za volilno sodelovanje, da se omogoči boljša uporaba obsežnega znanja obeh mrež. |
| (87) 74% of respondents to the public consultation were in favour of imposing costs on states that conduct organised disinformation campaigns. Civil society organisations stressed the need to make the threat of targeted sanctions more credible and frequent, thereby raising the cost of foreign influence operations and deterring interference. | (87) 74 % sodelujočih v javnem posvetovanju je podprlo naložitev plačila stroškov državam, ki izvajajo kampanje dezinformiranja. Organizacije civilne družbe so poudarile, da je treba odločneje in pogosteje groziti s ciljno usmerjenimi sankcijami, s čimer bi se zvišali stroški operacij tujega vpliva in preprečilo vmešavanje. |
| (88) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/cyber-diplomacy-toolbox . | (88) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/cyber-diplomacy-toolbox . |
| (89) SWD(2020) 180 final. | (89) SWD(2020) 180 final. |
| (90) A large number of respondents support the option of pursuing the Code of practice on disinformation and combining it with some form of regulation. This approach is notably supported by regulators, civil society organisations and academia. | (90) Veliko število sodelujočih v javnem posvetovanju podpira možnost uporabe kodeksa ravnanja glede dezinformacij skupaj z določenimi predpisi. Ta pristop podpirajo zlasti regulativni organi, organizacije civilne družbe in akademska skupnost. |
| (91) JOIN(2020) 8 final. | (91) JOIN(2020) 8 final. |
| (92) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). | (92) Uredba (EU) 2016/679 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 27. aprila 2016 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 95/46/ES (UL L 119, 4.5.2016, str. 1). |
| (93) https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/public-consultations-art-704/2020/guidelines-082020-targeting-social-media-users_en . | (93) https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/public-consultations-art-704/2020/guidelines-082020-targeting-social-media-users_en . |
| (94) During the Covid-19 crisis online platforms have promoted accurate and reliable information about COVID-19 from the WHO, national health authorities and independent media outlets. They have implemented new tools such as information panels, cards, pop-ups, maps and prompts that lead users directly to reliable information sources in multiple languages. It is nevertheless important that citizens are always able to access a plurality of sources. | (94) Med krizo zaradi COVID-19 so spletne platforme spodbujale natančne in zanesljive informacije o COVID-19, katerih vir so bili SZO, nacionalni zdravstveni organi in neodvisne medijske hiše. Uvedle so nova orodja, kot so informacijske tabele, kartice, pojavna okna, zemljevidi in napotki, ki uporabnike usmerjajo neposredno k verodostojnim virom informacij v več jezikih. Kljub temu je pomembno, da imajo državljani vedno dostop do številnih virov. |
| (95) The Global Disinformation Index recently estimated that online ad spending on disinformation domains amounted to $235 million a year: https://disinformationindex.org/ | (95) Svetovni indeks dezinformacij je nedavno ocenil, da so izdatki za spletne oglase na domenah, ki objavljajo dezinformacije, znašali 235 milijonov USD na leto: https://disinformationindex.org/ |
| (96) Alongside media and other relevant actors, fact-checkers have a specific role in the development of trustworthiness indicators and the scrutiny of ad placement. | (96) Poleg medijev in drugih ustreznih akterjev imajo preverjevalci dejstev posebno vlogo pri razvoju kazalnikov zanesljivosti in nadzoru prikazovanja oglasov. |
| (97) See in this respect also Data protection rules as a pillar of citizens’ empowerment and EUs approach to digital transition - two years of application of the General Data Protection Regulation, SWD/2020/115 final, page 27. | (97) V zvezi s tem glej tudi dokument Varstvo podatkov kot steber krepitve vloge državljanov in pristopa EU k digitalnemu prehodu – dve leti uporabe splošne uredbe o varstvu podatkov, SWD(2020) 115 final, str. 27. |
| (98) Also, the new European digital identity proposal announced for 2021 will make it easier to carry out tasks and access services online across Europe and ensure that people have greater control and peace of mind over what data they share and how it is used. | (98) V istem duhu bo novi predlog o evropski digitalni identiteti, napovedan za leto 2021, olajšal spletne opravke in dostop do spletnih storitev po vsej Evropi ter zagotovil, da bodo ljudje imeli večji nadzor nad tem, katere podatke razkrivajo, in pregled nad tem, kako se ti podatki uporabljajo. |
| (99) COM(2020) 624 final. | (99) COM(2020) 624 final. |
| (100) Including under the proposals for Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps and the Media programme. | (100) Tudi v okviru predlogov za Erasmus+, evropsko solidarnostno enoto in program Media. |
| (101) COM (2018) 383 final of 7.6.2018. | (101) COM(2018) 383 final z dne 7. junija 2018. |
| (102) COM(2020) 711. | (102) COM(2020) 711. |
