91998E2522

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2522/98

by Karla Peijs (PPE) to the Council

(27 July 1998)

Subject: Use of statistics in the Stability Pact

Regulations (EC) 1466/97(1) and 1467/97(2) and the resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact(3) include provisions pursuant to which countries with a government deficit of more than 3 % are required to make a non-interest-bearing deposit which may, if the worst comes to the worst, be converted into a fine.

1. Can the Council indicate the point at which and on the basis of which statistics these decisions (the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, the requirement to make a deposit or the imposition of a fine and the lifting of the excessive deficit procedure) will be taken under the Stability Pact?

2. Can the Council indicate what action will be taken should revised GDP figures result in a change in the amount of the deposit or fine? Can it confirm that the ultimate fine will be imposed on the basis of definitive figures? Can it confirm that, with regard to the ultimate establishment of GDP, reference will be made to Article 10(8) of Regulation (EEC) 1552/89 on the system of the Communities' own resources(4)?

3. Will the Council take measures before Economic and Monetary Union begins on 1 January 1999 in order to clarify how Regulation 1467/97 on the Stability Pact will apply to this issue, possibly by means of a Council Decision, in order to enhance confidence in the smooth functioning of the Stability Pact?

Reply

(3 November 1998)

1. As regards the point at which the Council decides to impose a penalty under Article 104c(11) of the EEC Treaty, Regulation No 1467/97 provides in particular that it shall do so:

- within ten months of the date on which the participating Member State reports forecasts relating to its excessive government deficit if the State in question has not acted on the successive Council decisions provided for in Article 104c(7) and (9). An expedited procedure may be used in the event of a deliberately planned deficit; or

- immediately on the expiry of the time limits laid down in the Council's decision to give notice where the actual data communicated by the Member State in question show that the deficit recorded has not been corrected.

As regards the lifting of any sanctions imposed, Regulation No 1467/97 provides in particular that all outstanding sanctions are to be abrogated if the Council decides that an excessive deficit has been corrected.

2. As regards the basis of the data applicable to the calculation of sanctions, it is constituted in accordance with Regulation No 3605/93, by the actual GDP figures at market prices as defined in Article 2 of Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom(5) in a manner consistent with the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA).

Obviously changes to those data might justify review of any sanctions imposed.

The provisions of Regulation No 1552/89 cited by the Honourable Member (Article 10(8)) concern the Communities' being provided with their own resources. It should be recalled, however, that the fines or deposits imposed pursuant to Article 104c(11) are not own resources strictly speaking but form part of the other resources referred to in Article 201 of the Treaty.

Although in this situation the aforementioned provisions and the other provisions applicable to own resources do not apply automatically to the case in point, there is no reason why those rules should not be taken as a basis in the event of review of the fines or deposits imposed.

3. As regards the third question, no proposal in the area referred to is before the Council at present. It should, however, be recalled that the Council provided some clarification concerning the Stability Pact in the statement by the Ecofin Council and the Ministers meeting within that Council adopted on 1 May 1998(6), particularly in part 5.

(1) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

(3) OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

(4) OJ L 155, 7.6.1989, p. 1.

(5) OJ L 49, 21.2.1989, p. 26.

(6) OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 25.