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Document 52011SC1569
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Final report of the Advisory Group on the Energy Roadmap 2050Summary record of the PRIMES Peer review MeetingResults of the public consultation on the Energy Roadmap 2050Accompanying the documentCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONSEnergy Roadmap 2050
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Final report of the Advisory Group on the Energy Roadmap 2050Summary record of the PRIMES Peer review MeetingResults of the public consultation on the Energy Roadmap 2050Accompanying the documentCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONSEnergy Roadmap 2050
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Final report of the Advisory Group on the Energy Roadmap 2050Summary record of the PRIMES Peer review MeetingResults of the public consultation on the Energy Roadmap 2050Accompanying the documentCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONSEnergy Roadmap 2050
/* SEC/2011/1569 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Final report of the Advisory Group on the Energy Roadmap 2050Summary record of the PRIMES Peer review MeetingResults of the public consultation on the Energy Roadmap 2050Accompanying the documentCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONSEnergy Roadmap 2050 /* SEC/2011/1569 final */
FINAL REPORT The Advisory Group on the Energy Roadmap 2050 13 December 2011 Contents 1.
Introduction 2.
What is a Roadmap? 3.
What is the policy context for the
Roadmap? 4.
Are there tradeoffs between the
objectives? 5.
What happens if other countries do not
follow the EU lead? 6.
Should there be intermediate targets? 7.
Why Europe? 8.
How much harmonisation? 9.
What role for the carbon price? 10.
What role for scenario modelling and the
PRIMES model? 11.
Should the Roadmap be
technology-specific? 12.
How should network investment and finance
be facilitated? 13.
What role for EU regulation? 14.
What sort of policy framework should be
provided? 15.
Recommendations Annexes: a.
Terms of reference b.
The membership of the Group c.
Meetings and working arrangements 1.
Introduction: The Ad Hoc
Advisory Group (the Group) was set up with the aim of providing independent
advice to the Commissioner for Energy in the preparation of the 2050 Energy
Roadmap. The Group met on three occasions (in April, July and September 2011)
and this report summarises the main contributions from the Group members, and
lists a number of agreed recommendations to the Commissioner. The terms of
reference are attached in annex (a). The members of the Group are listed in
annex (b). Details of the meetings and working arrangements are set out in
annex (c). By the very nature
of the Group’s membership, views on major aspects of the Energy Roadmap
inevitably differed, sometimes strongly. For the Group’s work this has been an
advantage, helping to sharpen the modelling and scenario work the Commission
has been undertaking, forcing the different views to be tested out over the
period to 2050. Given the period of four decades, a host of uncertainties, new
technologies and changes in the nature of the European economy and society as a
whole are likely to play out in ways that it would be foolish for anyone to try
to predict. The actions by other major carbon emitters – such as the US, China
and India – are yet to be determined following the Copenhagen and Cancun
meetings in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The Group stressed that the design of
the policy framework depends upon the nature of this uncertainty, and again the
diversity of views has helped to provide insights into the robustness of
different policy options. It is important to
bear in mind what is beyond the scope of the Group. The Group is not
responsible for the contents of the Roadmap, nor is it required to provide a
detailed analysis or a critique of the modelling that the Commission has
conducted or intends to conduct. The Group was not informed about and did not
discuss the outcome of simulations carried out by the Commission in order to
assess the impact of alternative paths to 2050 carbon targets. These are tasks
for the Commission. Crucially, the Group has not produced its own Roadmap. In providing
advice, the Group has been mindful of its terms of reference which take the
current European energy and climate change policies as a given starting
point. The Roadmap is designed to provide a framework for future policies
to achieve the three aims of European energy policy – decarbonisation, security
of supply and competitiveness. 2.
What is a Roadmap? At the first
meeting of the Group, there was extensive debate about the role and limits of
the Roadmap. Some members of the Group considered the term “Roadmap” as
overused, with various organisations giving the term very different meanings.
The importance of considering a range of possible transition paths to
decarbonisation has the corollary that there is no one single “Roadmap”,
but rather many. This should be reflected in the various scenarios that the
Commission is investigating, and in the ways in which they are presented. The central role
of deep technical change was emphasised by members, though there was
disagreement about the extent that the deployable technological options over
the next four decades were largely already known and determined, or whether
there were likely to be major changes within the Roadmap period. Particular
emphasis was placed on the implications of adequate transmission and
distribution investment, smart meters, and super grids and the implications of
a more active role for the demand side. For the period to 2030, much more is
already known, and hence whilst the Roadmap is to 2050, in practice the
transition to 2030 can be given much more definition than the subsequent
decades. Members raised the
question of domain, and the extent to which the Roadmap should focus on energy
in the wider sense, rather than place too much emphasis on electricity. The
view was expressed that decarbonisation of electricity was more straightforward
than other energy sources and uses, and that the Roadmap should explicitly
recognise all these other energy dimensions, rather than focussing exclusively
on electricity. The role of transport – and in particular the electrification
of transport – was emphasised by the Group, with significant consequences for
the design and expansion of the electricity networks and almost complete
decarbonisation of electricity production. The rationale for separate Roadmaps
for transport and energy was therefore questioned, as was the provision of
separate finances for the two sectors in the EU’s budgetary arrangements.
Recognition of the wider role of the oil and gas sectors in the Roadmap and the
avoidance of too narrow an emphasis on the electricity sector was stressed. Some members were
concerned about the extent to which detailed modelling and underlying
assumptions would be understood by the wider public, who would have to bear the
costs of the decarbonisation transition, particularly if Europe’s leadership in
climate change was not matched by similar measures from other major economies.
The price implications for consumers would need to be communicated and part of
the role of the Roadmap should be to engage with the public on the full costs
and implications of the radical transformation that decarbonisation implies. In
this regard, attention was specifically drawn to the UK DECC 2050 Pathways
Calculator as an example of how citizens could engage in the debate. Recommendation
One: The Commission should set out in the Roadmap its role, limits and
uncertainties, and address the diversity of possible transition paths. Flexibility
in the face of possible technical and other change should be given a central
place in the Roadmap. Recommendation
Two: The Commission should integrate the transport and energy Roadmaps, with
explicit modelling of the consequences of the electrification of transport for the
electricity and gas sectors, and of the role of the oil sector. Recommendation
Three: The Commission should set out in the Roadmap how the outcomes will be
presented transparently to the wider public to ensure full public engagement
and understanding of the necessary tradeoffs. 3.
What is the policy context for the
Roadmap? There are three
main pillars to the existing policy framework on which the Roadmap must build: ·
The Internal Energy Market (IEM) ·
The climate change framework ·
The external framework, including the European
Energy Community Treaty and the Eastern Partnership These measures are
all in the context where the choice of the energy mix and most of the policy
instruments remain largely a national matter. The Lisbon Treaty, whilst
incorporating a chapter on energy and considerably extending the powers of the
Commission with respect to energy policy, specifically reserved the energy mix
to national governments. Taking each in
turn, there have been three phases to the development of EU directives to
complete the Internal Energy Market (IEM): the first round of Directives
(1996 and 1998); the second round (2003); and the third package (2007). The
current aim is to complete the IEM by 2014. The Group drew attention to the
fact that most of the current low carbon technologies (notably wind and solar)
were being supported outside the market, hence reducing the scope and
role of the IEM. It was noted too that coal and nuclear received support in a
number of EU member countries. The need to align the IEM and the
decarbonisation and security agendas was emphasised, and the Roadmap should
explain how this is to be achieved. The climate
change framework itself builds upon several phases to the development of EU
climate change policy. Early measures included support for the Kyoto Protocol,
and then the EUETS. Most recently the Climate Change Package set out the
2020-20-20 measures, with Directives covering the 2020 carbon target and the
20% renewables targets, and an ambition to achieve the 20% energy efficiency
target by 2020. The EU has adopted a commitment to reduce the production of
greenhouse gas emissions to 80-95% below the 1990 levels by 2050, and actively
pursued an international agreement at Copenhagen. The Roadmap is being prepared
on the assumption that other countries will play their part in
addressing what is a global and not just a European problem. The Group
nevertheless considered the possibility that international agreement may not be
forthcoming as rapidly or completely as the Commission would like. The overarching Low
Carbon Roadmap, already published, provides a further framework within
which the Energy Roadmap is set. On the external
dimension, the EU has an active neighbourhood energy policy. The main
components are the European Energy Community Treaty (ECT), the Eastern
Partnership and the relations with Russia. For the purposes of the
Roadmap, the important element is the ECT that incorporates the acquis
into treaty members’ obligations, and in particular the carbon and renewables
targets. The implication is that the Roadmap will influence energy policy
beyond the EU’s borders – in the Balkans, North Africa, Eastern Europe, South
East Europe and the Caspian states. One member, stressing the importance of
universal global access to electricity, regarded this as a core issue for the
Roadmap. 4.
Are there trade-offs between the
objectives? The IEM and the
climate change package confront Europe with an enormous challenge, the scale of
which is yet far from apparent to the general public (who will have to pay for
the investments) and indeed to many governments. The almost complete
decarbonisation of the energy sector in the next four decades requires the
replacement of most of the existing assets. Energy intensive industries will
either have to switch to low carbon energy supplies or exit the European economy.
The relative price of energy between the EU and other major economies
(including also compensation measures to combat carbon leakage) will be
critical in determining the outcome for the energy intensive sectors. Both the
completion of the IEM and the decarbonisation of the energy sector require the
development of an integrated set of energy networks ― and hence further
infrastructure beyond the requirements for decarbonisation. These enormous
investments must be achieved whilst ensuring security of supply and protecting
and enhancing the competitiveness of the European economy – in other words, all
three objectives (decarbonisation, security of supply and competitiveness) need
to be met simultaneously. There was also discussion of the relation
between the IEM and decarbonisation on the one hand, and technological
development on the other. It has been
claimed that these three objectives do not conflict: that decarbonisation
policies enhance security of supply by reducing reliance on (frequently imported)
fossil fuels, and that the investment in decarbonisation will create green
growth, offsetting losses to “brown” jobs and industries. The assumption of
high, rising and volatile fossil fuel prices forms part of this “win-win-win”
argument. The Group held differing views about the direction of fossil fuel
prices, (notably in respect of gas and the impact of shale gas) and in any
event it was argued that the Roadmap should not be dependent on any one fuel
price projection, and the scenarios should model a wide range of possible
outcomes. Not all the Group
was entirely convinced by this happy coincidence of objectives. Some members of
the Group considered that intermittent renewable technologies may, if developed
to a substantive or dominating share of the energy market and not complemented
by appropriate measures, create issues in respect of security of supply, and
for many members of the Group the problem of carbon leakage remains a
substantive one, if other countries do not follow the EU’s lead. Some members
considered that the Roadmap should make clear whether the carbon objective was
unconditional in respect of the action of other countries, and whether it was a
“trump” objective, or could be traded off against security and competitiveness
objectives. To the extent that the Roadmap was primarily identifying policy
frameworks and scenarios to achieve the 2050 emissions reduction target, the
Group recommended that the Roadmap should identify the consequences to the
other objectives of various decarbonisation paths, and set out the measures
that would need to be taken to ensure adequate security of supply and protect
competitiveness with different technological mixes. In particular, various
levels of renewables shares should be explicitly modelled alongside the
security and competitive implications comprising the whole life cycle. Recommendation
Four: the Roadmap should explicitly address and make transparent the potential trade-offs
between the three objectives under each scenario. The Roadmap should explicitly
provide for flexibility in policy measures in the event that other countries do
not play their part in addressing the global challenge of climate change, and
if competitiveness and security problems materialise. Recommendation
Five: the Roadmap should set out the consequences and mitigating measures under
each scenario for security of supply and competitiveness while taking the whole
lifecycle into account. Each scenario should set out the associated measures to
protect security and competitiveness. 5.
What happens if other countries do not
follow the EU lead? A number of
members of the Group were particularly concerned about the consequences of
other major economies not following the EU’s lead. It is already apparent that
the ambitions the EU had for the Copenhagen COP have not been fulfilled, and
recent developments in the US do not encourage the expectation of early action
on binding legal carbon caps. Whilst China has moved quickly to develop its
domestic supply and its export potential in renewables technologies, members of
the Group noted that China also plans to greatly expand its coal-fired
electricity generation. On current plans, such an increase in China’s coal burn
would negate much of the positive impacts of EU mitigation measures, and indeed
the “carbon leakage” problems may be exacerbated, and continue to undermine the
impact of the reduction of carbon production in Europe. Whilst carbon
production might fall, carbon consumption may not – and indeed strong rises in
carbon consumption in some EU countries since 1990 were noted. The Group
reiterated the importance of the Energy Roadmap focussing on global
climate change, and assessing the impact of European policy not just on EU
carbon production, but on global emissions. Thus some members considered that
carbon production and carbon consumption within the EU should
both be explicitly modelled for the Roadmap. Some members questioned both the
feasibility and the relevance of the EU’s 2050 carbon production target
in this context. Others pointed to a number of difficulties in measuring and
modelling carbon consumption. The problem of
carbon leakage is not limited to China, India and the US. Leakage to countries
on the EU’s borders was specifically mentioned, and in this context the importance
of the ECT was emphasised. In the absence of appropriate policies and measures,
energy intensive industries on Europe’s borders could evade the carbon
reduction costs, and export their products back into the EU. Additionally,
higher carbon electricity generation could be generated just outside Europe and
then fed back in as and when the European-wide electricity grids develop. The Group
concluded that the issue of carbon leakage could not be ignored and that the
Roadmap should explicitly address this issue. The options include setting
carbon targets in consumption terms, border taxes (ensuring a level playing
field between EU carbon constrained industries and imports from countries which
do not price carbon) and adjustments to the EUETS to take account of the
position of energy intensive industries. Recommendation
Six: Whilst recognising the practical difficulties and the possible
implications for the EUETS, the Roadmap should pay explicit attention to the
challenges from carbon leakage under different scenarios, including
consideration of the measurement of EU carbon consumption. The Roadmap should
not be exclusively focussed on carbon production. Recommendation
Seven: The Roadmap should explicitly address scenarios in which other countries
take longer to develop climate change policies. Recommendation
Eight: The ECT should be further developed in respect of agreeing carbon
policies with Europe’s neighbours. 6.
Should there be intermediate targets? In debating the role of the Roadmap in setting out a
variety of transition paths, the Commission is taking the overarching carbon
reduction target to 2050 as a given. The question therefore arises as to
whether the Roadmap should indicate an intermediate carbon reduction target
after the 2020 target, and before the 2050 target, and whether it should be
conditional, in carbon production or consumption terms, and extend to targets
for specific technologies (or groups of technologies), notably renewables and
energy efficiency. Unsurprisingly members did not form an agreed position on an
extended bundle of targets, and therefore debate focussed on the minimum basis
of an intermediate carbon target. Members of the Group were broadly sympathetic to the
development of a 2030 intermediate carbon or greenhouse gas target consistent
with the longer term targets, though there was considerable debate and
disagreement about whether this should be unilateral or be conditional on other
countries adopting similar targets. Members also discussed the basis of the
range of possible disaggregated targets, noting the issues not only of
conditionality, but also the sectors to which targets might be applied, and
importance of carbon consumption. There were very strong differences of opinion on the
issue of additional intermediate targets. Some members expressed support for a
rolling forward of the renewables and energy efficiency targets, highlighting
impacts on investors and infrastructure implications. Others argued against
such targets, highlighting the problem of “picking winners”, the need to take
account of technical change, the role of gas, and the problems of lobbying and
capture. Whatever form of intermediate targets is adopted, the
Group emphasised the need for annual monitoring and reporting on
progress towards the 2050 target. It was argued that a process of annual
reviews allows not only an assessment of how well the EU is doing, but would
also help the credibility of the targets by requiring the EU to set out how it
would deal with over- or underperformance as it materialised, or as conflicts
between the three overarching objectives emerge, and the consequences for
further policy actions. Recommendation
Nine: the Roadmap should set out intermediate 2030
greenhouse gas targets to provide further clarity to investors. The Commission
should assess the arguments for and against conditional or unconditional
targets as well as for and against renewable and energy efficiency and other
possible complimentary low carbon targets, taking account of the role of the
transport sector and buildings. Recommendation
Ten: There should be annual reviewing and reporting of progress in respect of
each of the three objectives. 7.
Why Europe? The Roadmap is explicitly an EU construct, and hence at
the core is the need to both respect the reserved areas for member states, and
to spell out the benefits of achieving the overall objectives through common
European approaches where appropriate, and where the gains from cooperation can
be clearly demonstrated. Members of the Group noted in particular the
consequences to neighbouring countries of Germany’s recent decisions. In respect of a number of European dimensions, members of
the Group drew particular attention to first, the extent to which
infrastructure was more cost effective if developed for the internal market as
a whole. Insufficient attention has been paid to modelling a European
electricity and gas transmission network linked to pan-European production
sites (super grids), rather than solely considering links between the member
states. Such modelling and the recognition of the impacts of technical change
for grids should be explicit in the Roadmap and its role in implementing the
IEM should be emphasised. Second, the gains to security from interconnection,
and hence the creation of considerable Europe-wide portfolio effects from new
infrastructure, should be explicitly modelled in the Roadmap. Third, the key
role transmission plays in facilitating the development of renewables and
support, given their intermittency and their locations (frequently not
coincidental with the major load centres), should be incorporated into the
scenarios and their implications. Finally, the gains from pooling R&D and
innovation efforts in respect of renewables, CCS, batteries and storage, and
other technologies should be estimated, and their implications for the S.E.T.
Plan spelt out. Recommendation
Eleven: the Commission should commission an independent study of the economic
gains from European energy network integration and the economic gains from a
common approach to climate change mitigation, and compare these with the costs and
benefits of heterogeneous national approaches to renewables and the technology
mix. 8.
How much harmonisation? Notwithstanding the gains from a Europe-wide approach
noted above, many measures to achieve the three objectives are national and
indeed even more localised. Measures to improve the energy efficiency of
buildings are an obvious example. Particular attention was directed towards
cities and urban design, and the potential gains from integrated city planning. Some members stressed that these national competences do
not however rule out the gains from common targets (for example for renewables
and energy efficiency), nor the benefits from coordination and the sharing of
R&D, innovation and best practice. If some countries make more rapid
progress towards decarbonisation, some members considered that they would face
a competitive disadvantage against slower EU members with implications for the
IEM. Others thought it might be a competitive advantage. The Group discussed the case for making the 2020 energy
efficiency targets mandatory. There was no consensus on this. Issues raised
included: the difficulty in defining benchmarks and baselines; and the short
time now available to achieve the targets. The role of air conditioning was
also raised. Some members questioned whether energy efficiency, though by
definition a “good thing”, would reduce demand, and if so by the amount assumed
in Commission estimates. Others considered that energy efficiency had such a
central role to play in meeting the overarching objectives, that
notwithstanding the practical issues raised, the EU 2020 efficiency targets
should be made mandatory, and rolled forward to 2030. In terms of the aspects of existing policies which are
delegated to national competence, the Group noted the plethora of renewables
support mechanisms across the EU, and the possible inefficiencies which might
result. Looking ahead, specialisation in different types of renewables has obvious
cost advantages. It was noted that solar energy was likely to be more
successful in the south of Europe and wind power might be best placed on the
north western locations. This specialisation might extend beyond the EU’s
borders, notably in respect of solar in North Africa, and in this context,
opportunities within the framework of the Energy Community Treaty and the EU’s
external relationships should be fully explored in the Roadmap. 9.
What role for the carbon price? The Group agreed that a carbon price was one necessary
and crucial element in the transition, though there were different views as to
how central it should be. Some members placed great emphasis on this
market-based mechanism, and in particular its role in avoiding picking
technological “winners”. Others viewed the role of the carbon price as one
component in a package of technology-driven measures. It was however widely
(but not unanimously) viewed as unhelpful and economically inefficient to have
different carbon prices and different carbon price mechanisms across the EU,
not only raising the costs of transition, but also potentially distorting the
internal market, especially the IEM. The EUETS was set up with the intention of creating a
credible EU-wide carbon price which would drive emissions reductions. The EUETS
was the first large scale emission trading scheme, and the assumption was that
other countries would, in due course, set up their own ETS regimes (especially
the US), and that gradually these would become fungible with the EUETS. This
has not happened, nor, in the opinion of the majority of the Group, is such an
international development likely in the near future, or even at all. For a variety of reasons, a number of member states have
deemed the carbon price in the EUETS too low, volatile and short term to be
sufficient, and have introduced their own explicit or implicit carbon taxes. These
national innovations in carbon pricing have included: carbon taxes for the
non-EUETS sectors; carbon taxes that overlap with the EUETS; and floor prices
of carbon. In addition, energy taxes have been adjusted at the national level
to take greater account of the carbon content of the different fuels. Members of the Group considered the possible flaws in
the EUETS design and some members of the Group expressed a considerable degree
of scepticism about the future role of the EUETS. Others regarded the EUETS as
central to EU climate change policy. Some members of the Group argued that the
Roadmap should make clear whether, if an intermediate target to 2030 is
recommended, the EUETS cap would be formally tied to it. Most of the Group considered that the development of
lots of different carbon prices was not only inefficient in carbon terms but
also distorted the IEM. It recommended that the Commission should, through the
Roadmap, set out the costs and benefits of this national diversity, as part of
the wider consideration of the costs of different pathways to achieve the 2050
carbon target. Mindful of the problem of carbon leakage and the possible
undermining of energy intensive industries within the EU, where other countries
do not adopt commensurate carbon prices and carbon reduction measures of their
own, the Group considered the case for a carbon border tax and other possible
border adjustments. Many practical and political obstacles were noted, but the
Group concluded that this was sufficiently likely to be an efficient way of
addressing leakage to conclude that the Roadmap should at least investigate the
costs and benefits of this option, and compare it with other options. An alternative under consideration is to give special
treatment under the EUETS to energy intensive industries facing international
competition. Notwithstanding the appeal to some lobbyists and its broader
political appeal, this approach has a number of obvious drawbacks, not only
weakening the EUETS, but also implying higher reductions (and less permits) for
the rest of industry. Recommendation Twelve: the Roadmap should stress the
central role of a common carbon price in the EU and clarify the relationship
between the EUETS and an intermediate 2030 target. Recommendation
Thirteen: the Roadmap should take explicit account
of national measures to introduce carbon taxes and carbon floor prices, and set
out the rationale, benefits and costs of a common European approach to carbon
pricing, and the costs and benefits of national diversity. The Roadmap should
explore options to bolster and reinforce the carbon price across the EU. Recommendation
Fourteen: the Roadmap should propose a regular assessment of the measures taken
to combat carbon leakage and consider the case for a carbon border tax and
other compensating measures. 10.
What role for scenario modelling and the
PRIMES model? The second meeting
of the Group was devoted largely to consideration of the Commission’s scenarios
and the supporting role of the PRIMES model. It should be stressed that it was
not the job of the Group to comment on and critique in detail the PRIMES model,
but rather to consider how it fed into the scenarios and the Roadmap. The PRIMES model
is one tool, and it plays a central role in the Commission’s work on the
Roadmap. Members of the Group raised a host of questions, and as a result a
number of key points emerged. Essentially what matters is the assumptions that
feed into the modelling of the scenarios, and the Group stressed the need for
the Commission to be very explicit about these assumptions, as well as testing
sensitivity to changes in these exogenous variables. Amongst the issues
that emerged were: the assumption of perfect foresight by companies, but not by
individuals; the use of different discount rates; the costs of different
technologies; and fossil fuel prices. There was considerable debate about the
role of fossil fuel price assumptions, including of the IEA’s recent
contributions. Major recent developments in international gas markets, notably
shale gas, were considered. The Group was
concerned about the transparency of the PRIMES work, and in particular the
property rights in the algorithms and detailed internal workings of the model.
Whilst assumptions were published, the model remains the private property of
the National Technical University of Athens. The consequence is that
independent parties cannot replicate the results. This is a commercial matter
for the Commission, but members of the Group pointed out that it does have
obvious consequences for the credibility of the Roadmap. The technical
nature of the modelling limits that ability of wider public engagement, and
some members of the Group were concerned that the Commission should make its
work more widely available to non-technical audiences. The Commission’s
seven scenarios (but not the results) were presented to the Group and in
particular: the Common Reference Scenario; the Current Policy Initiatives
Scenario; and the Five Decarbonisation scenarios. Particular attention by the
Group members was paid to the decarbonisation scenarios: energy efficiency;
diversified supply technologies; high renewables; delayed CCS; and low nuclear. Amongst the issues
discussed were: the extent to which the carbon price drives the scenarios; the
absence of a “high nuclear scenario”; and the impact of delayed CCS not only on
the electricity sector but also on industrial emissions. Amongst the points
made were: that the delayed CCS scenario could be taken as, in effect, a high
nuclear scenario; and that a scenario with CCS plus biomass was needed as one
of the ways of moving towards negative carbon emissions. Indeed negative carbon
emissions technologies might be required in all scenarios to meet the
overarching targets. A number of
members expressed more general scepticism about the methodology, and in
particular the wider tendency to structure the energy policy around these
scenarios rather than a wider framework of policy. There was also
concern about the extent to which the scenarios chosen might be interpreted as
the main or only ones the Commission was considering. Criticism was also made
of the possible interpretations of the titles given to the scenarios, and that
these might encourage the public debate to focus on particular technologies
rather than the broader policy framework. By separating out scenarios, common
themes may be lost. The Group was
concerned that under each scenario the implications for security of supply and
competitiveness might not be fully explored. Recommendation
Fifteen: the PRIMES model should be made publically available so that its
results can be replicated by interested parties and to the extent that the PRIMES
model is used to support the Roadmap, the assumptions and technology costs
should be made explicit. 11. Should the Roadmap be technology-specific? There were very
strong differences between members of the Group on the extent to which the
Commission should be technology-specific in the Roadmap, especially in respect
of renewables and energy efficiency. One view was that,
given the technological and market uncertainties, and given the uncertainty
about the conduct of other major emitters, the most efficient strategy is to
rely primarily on markets and market-based instruments to achieve the targets.
These market-based instruments might include the carbon price, and prices for
security of supply, with a border tax creating a level playing field between the
EU and other countries which did not adopt similar measures. A variant might be
to auction capacity in low carbon technologies, creating a market-based
capacity mechanism, preferably with an EU-wide dimension. The alternative
view was that the Commission could not avoid additional elements of
technological choice and some members strongly criticised existing elements. If
the EU was minded to develop renewables on a larger scale, it was argued that
this would require a host of ancillary investments and policy choices, notably
in respect of networks and infrastructure and market design. A large-scale
electricification of transport would similarly require major ancillary
investments. Some members suggested that this created a “chicken-and-egg”
problem, and hence the EU should commit to a preferred path, and coordinate
policies to facilitate the necessary investments. Notwithstanding
these differences in views, the Group nevertheless agreed that market
instruments will be needed in any event, and at this stage in developing the
pathways, the Commission should at minimum in the Roadmap point out the
implications for coordinated investments under each of its scenarios. 12.
How should network investment and finance
be facilitated? Networks are, in large measure, monopolies, and hence
there is little option but to plan their expansion and integration. Markets
cannot solve network design and development problems, though they can of course
provide the finance. The Group noted the Commission’s various communications on
infrastructure and the importance of developing European grids and gas
networks―to complete the IEM, encourage price convergence and gain the
economies of scale and portfolio benefits. These networks are doubly important
in the context of the carbon reduction targets and building the scope for
specialisation in different renewables and other technologies to different
geographical areas within the EU and outside. Such networks will not arise spontaneously, and the
Group urged the Commission to take a strong position in the Roadmap not only on
the need for Europe-wide networks, but also the associated investments,
planning and finance. Pan-European networks should play a central role in the
Roadmap. The Group noted the sheer scale of the required investments
to meet the decarbonisation target for 2050, both in networks and with the
replacement of most of the electricity generation capacity in Europe, and the
consequent urgency given the life cycle of investments. The Group was concerned that although the Roadmap would
require this investment to be forthcoming largely from the private capital
markets, the EU had little by way of core policy measures to actually make this
happen. Though the investments would in large measure be for the member states
to deliver, there is as yet little evidence that this scale of investment will
in fact be forthcoming. The role of the EIB was considered by some members to
be extremely important. Some members also considered that the IEM should be
redesigned to deliver the necessary investment incentives. A key issue raised is the cost of capital. The Roadmap
policy framework is designed to provide more certainty to investors for
networks, buildings and generation, but to achieve this it has to be credible.
It is far from obvious that such credibility has been achieved so far, and the
Group emphasised the centrality of the investment finance question to the
Roadmap. Recommendation
Sixteen: the Roadmap should place the development of adequate European energy
networks at its core. Recommendation
Seventeen: the Roadmap should place considerable
emphasis on the need to finance a major investment programme in both generation
and networks, and spell out measures to minimise the cost of capital to the
extent they are deemed necessary. There should be explicit reference to the
role of European financial institutions, notably the EIB. 13. What role for EU regulation? The Group
discussed the regulatory context, and the implications of national regulatory
approaches for the development of the fully integrated IEM and the Europe-wide
grids. Whilst the IEM is
due to be completed by 2014, the plethora of different market designs and the
scale of the price disparities suggest that this dimension of European energy
policy has a long way to go to meet the spirit as well as the letter of the
IEM. Ensuring the
European integration of generation and of networks requires significant
elements of EU-wide regulation, based upon common principles and rules. The
Group noted the positive developments in respect of ACER, and the Roadmap
should consider how and whether the renewables and other reserved and protected
markets might be brought within the wider EU regulatory framework and the IEM. Recommendation Eighteen:
the Roadmap should in each scenario set out the regulatory requirements and
ways to overcome existing barriers. 14.
What sort of policy framework should be
provided? The Roadmap is intended to provide a framework
rather than a specification of a particular technological pathway. However, some
members pointed out that for many lobbyists and special interests, there is a
strong pressure to favour particular technologies and particular reserved
agendas, since they benefit from the subsidies and support mechanisms that
would be required for a technologically-specific pathway. This is especially
relevant to the advocates of nuclear power and specific renewables, like
offshore wind. Labelling the decarbonisation scenarios by terms like “high RES” and
“low nuclear” may act to encourage such lobbyists to push for the adoption of
their preferred technology. The Group agreed
that there were certain common policy framework components, independent of the
particular pathway pursued. Amongst those discussed (but not necessarily
agreed) were: a carbon price; the development of market-based capacity
mechanisms; intermediate greenhouse gases 2030 targets; trading in renewables
and other low carbon technologies; a plan for EU-wide networks; and common
regulatory principles. Members variously
suggested that additional measures, notably to address carbon leakage (carbon
border taxes and other compensation measures), linkage between the EUETS and a
2030 target, floor prices for carbon, and an element of technological
specificity should all be considered in the Roadmap and the scenarios. Finally, the Group
noted that this policy framework is a package, and the Roadmap should
pay careful attention to their interactions, especially in respect of security
of supply and competitiveness, rather than address each policy component in
isolation. Recommendation
Nineteen: a distinction should be made between setting the policy framework and
detailed intervention in specific markets. The Roadmap should focus primarily on
the former, leaving the choice of detailed policy instruments largely to the
member states, whilst maintaining options for harmonisation where appropriate.
In particular, the carbon price should be determined, where possible and
practical, at the European level. Maximising the ability to trade between
member states to meet targets should encourage the harmonisation of specific
instruments. Harmonisation of market design should be further encouraged
through the competitive forces of the IEM and the completion of the physical
infrastructure of European energy networks.
15. Recommendations Recommendation
One: The Commission should set out in the Roadmap its role, limits and
uncertainties, and address the diversity of possible transition paths. Flexibility
in the face of possible technical and other change should be given a central
place in the Roadmap. Recommendation
Two: The Commission should integrate the transport and energy Roadmaps, with
explicit modelling of the consequences of the electrification of transport for the
electricity and gas sectors, and of the role of the oil sector. Recommendation
Three: The Commission should set out in the Roadmap how the outcomes will be
presented transparently to the wider public to ensure full public engagement
and understanding of the necessary tradeoffs. Recommendation
Four: the Roadmap should explicitly address and make transparent the potential trade-offs
between the three objectives under each scenario. The Roadmap should explicitly
provide for flexibility in policy measures in the event that other countries do
not play their part in addressing the global challenge of climate change, and
if competiveness and security problems materialise. Recommendation
Five: the Roadmap should set out the consequences and mitigating measures under
each scenario for security of supply and competitiveness while taking the whole
lifecycle into account. Each scenario should set out the associated measures to
protect security and competitiveness. Recommendation
Six: Whilst recognising the practical difficulties and the possible implications
for the EUETS, the Roadmap should pay explicit attention to the challenges from
carbon leakage under different scenarios, including consideration of the
measurement of EU carbon consumption. The Roadmap should not be exclusively
focussed on carbon production. Recommendation
Seven: The Roadmap should explicitly address scenarios in which other countries
take longer to develop climate change policies. Recommendation
Eight: The ECT should be further developed in respect of agreeing carbon
policies with Europe’s neighbours. Recommendation
Nine: the Roadmap should set out intermediate 2030
greenhouse gas targets to provide further clarity to investors. The Commission
should assess the arguments for and against conditional or unconditional
targets as well as for and against renewable and energy efficiency and other
possible complimentary low carbon targets, taking account of the role of the
transport sector and buildings. Recommendation
Ten: There should be annual reviewing and reporting of progress in respect of
each of the three objectives. Recommendation
Eleven: the Commission should commission an independent study of the economic
gains from European energy network integration and the economic gains from a
common approach to climate change mitigation, and compare these with the costs and
benefits of heterogeneous national approaches to renewables and the technology
mix. Recommendation Twelve: the Roadmap should stress the
central role of a common carbon price in the EU and clarify the relationship
between the EUETS and an intermediate 2030 target. Recommendation
Thirteen: the Roadmap should take explicit account
of national measures to introduce carbon taxes and carbon floor prices, and set
out the rationale, benefits and costs of a common European approach to carbon
pricing, and the costs and benefits of national diversity. The Roadmap should
explore options to bolster and reinforce the carbon price across the EU. Recommendation
Fourteen: the Roadmap should propose a regular assessment of the measures taken
to combat carbon leakage and consider the case for a carbon border tax and
other compensating measures. Recommendation
Fifteen: the PRIMES model should be made publically available so that its
results can be replicated by interested parties and to the extent that the
PRIMES model is used to support the Roadmap, the assumptions and technology
costs should be made explicit. Recommendation
Sixteen: the Roadmap should place the development of adequate European energy
networks at its core. Recommendation
Seventeen: the Roadmap should place considerable
emphasis on the need to finance a major investment programme in both generation
and networks, and spell out measures to minimise the cost of capital to the
extent they are deemed necessary. There should be explicit reference to the
role of European financial institutions, notably the EIB. Recommendation Eighteen:
the Roadmap should in each scenario set out the regulatory requirements and
ways to overcome existing barriers. Recommendation
Nineteen: a distinction should be made between setting the policy framework and
detailed intervention in specific markets. The Roadmap should focus primarily on
the former, leaving the choice of detailed policy instruments largely to the
member states, whilst maintaining options for harmonisation where appropriate.
In particular, the carbon price should be determined, where possible and
practical, at the European level. Maximising the ability to trade between
member states to meet targets should encourage the harmonisation of specific
instruments. Harmonisation of market design should be further encouraged
through the competitive forces of the IEM and the completion of the physical
infrastructure of European energy networks. Annexes a)
Terms of Reference of the Ad Hoc Advisory
Group on Energy Roadmap 2050 “The Directorate
General for Energy in cooperation with other Commission services is currently
preparing an Energy Roadmap to 2050 to be adopted towards the end of 2011. This
Energy Roadmap will follow the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap 2050 adopted by the
Commission on 8 March 2011[1] and
will specifically focus on decarbonisation possibilities and policy challenges
in the energy sector. The objective of the Energy Roadmap 2050 in relation to
the Low-Carbon Economy Roadmap would be to assess energy-specific
scenarios and the means of achieving decarbonisation,
while ensuring energy security and competitiveness for the European Union. This assessment will build on the established EU energy policy and
the EU 2020 Energy Strategy, embedding them in a longer term strategy. It is essential to bring a long-term perspective to bear
on today's policy and regulatory decisions in the energy sector. Firstly, the
transition to an efficient, low-carbon energy system which has already started
must be shown to be on track towards a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions. Secondly, investors, especially those considering long lived
investments, want policy and regulatory certainty well into the future. The purpose of Roadmap is not to choose one scenario or one
development path to 2050 as a preferred option but rather to examine a set of
possible transitions against which a strategy for the long term and proposals
for actions in the coming years can be worked out. The role of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group is to discuss
different scenarios and policy challenges and provide advice for the preparation
of the Energy Roadmap. Member of the Advisory Group will bring their
contributions in their areas of expertise. Issues to be discussed could include: energy market integration, financing
of infrastructures, drivers towards market compatible national renewables
support schemes and use of cooperation mechanisms, incentive to investments in the transition to a secure, competitive, low-carbon
energy system, international issues and energy policy approach. The Ad Hoc
Advisory Group will meet approximately three times between May and November
2011 in Brussels Commission premises. The final output of the group will be a
report consolidating the results of the meetings providing advice, from the
group as a whole, on the challenges to be tackled in the 2050 Energy Roadmap.”
b)
The membership of the Group Dieter Helm (chair) Claude Mandil (deputy chair) Jorge Vasconcelos David MacKay Fatih Birol Arne Mogren Frederic Hauge Brigitte Bach Coby van der Linde Eugeniusz Toczylowski Ignacio J. Pérez-Arriaga Wolfgang Kröger Giacomo Luciani Felix Matthes c)
Meetings and working arrangements The Group met on
three occasions in Brussels. The first meeting
comprised a presentation from Philip Low on the background to the Roadmap, and
proceeded to a round table discussion of the objectives of the Roadmap and the
issues to be considered. The second meeting
comprised a presentation from Professor P. Capros NTUA on the PRIMES model,
followed by a presentation on the Commission’s scenarios. Members of the Group
discussed these presentations and set out the issues for consideration in the
Group’s report. In advance of the
third meeting, the Chairman prepared an initial outline draft of the report. The Commissioner for
Energy introduced the third meeting. The Chairman presented his first outline
draft report and the draft recommendations. Members of the Group discussed the
recommendations. Following the third
meeting, the Chairman revised the draft report, and communicated with members
of the Group on detailed drafting points. At the end of September
2011 the Group agreed this final report. [1]http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/272&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en Results of
the public consultation on the
"Energy Roadmap 2050"
Executive Summary The Commission is preparing an Energy Roadmap to 2050 to be adopted by
the end of 2011. This Energy Roadmap will follow
the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap 2050 adopted by the Commission on 8 March 2011[1] and focus on decarbonisation in
the energy sector. The background to the need to develop a decarbonisation
strategy is the EU commitment to an 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of necessary reductions by
developed countries as a group. The Energy Roadmap will present policy
challenges for the decarbonisation of the energy sector while preserving the
competitiveness of industry and strengthening energy security. On 20 December 2010, the Directorate General for Energy launched a
public consultation on the Energy Roadmap. The public consultation[2] was based on an online
questionnaire with seven questions, some requiring comments and others in the
form of multiple choice.[3]
The public consultation was open between 20 December 2010 and 7 March 2011. Nearly
400 contributions were received. This report summarises the replies. Statistical information is
provided in annex 1. Question 1 How to ensure credibility: A large
number of contributors said that the assumptions and data used for modelling
should be as transparent as possible and a variety of modelling methodologies
should be used. Many private sector organisations emphasised the need for a
stable, clear and predictable legislative framework, to encourage the necessary
investments in the energy sector which generally have a very long lead time. Question
2 The EU's position in a global policy
context: More than half of all respondents chose
"global energy efficiency and demand developments" and "global
development of renewable energy" as the most important issues. Question
3 Societal challenges and opportunities: Overall responses were fairly evenly
distributed among the different choices. Public acceptance of new infrastructures
was seen as important by many. Question
4 Policy developments at EU level: Roughly half of the respondents believe that
energy efficiency is among the three most important issues needing more
development at the EU level. Question
5 Milestones in the transition: Across all industries and NGOs, intermediate targets, checkpoints
and regular updates towards 2050 were recommended. However, the decarbonisation
roadmap should be flexible enough to allow the route to be changed along the
way. Question
6 Key drivers for the future energy mix: About half of
all respondents believe that global fossil fuel prices in relation to costs of
domestic energy resources and long term security of supply will be the most
likely key drivers of the future European energy mix. Question
7 Additional thoughts and contributions: There was a
considerable divergence in opinions on the best way to decarbonise the energy
sector in terms of market intervention as well in the selection of a preferred
technology option to be pursued. 1 Introduction The European Commission
is currently preparing an Energy Roadmap to 2050 to be adopted towards the end
of 2011. This Energy Roadmap will follow the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap 2050
adopted by the Commission on 8 March 2011[4]
and will specifically focus on decarbonisation in the energy sector. The need for our decarbonisation strategy
is the EU commitment to an 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below
1990 levels by 2050, in the context of necessary reductions by developed countries
as a group[5].
The Energy Roadmap will present a number of
policy challenges to achieve our long term strategy of progressive
decarbonisation of our energy sector while preserving the competitiveness of
industry and strengthening our security of energy supply. On 20 December
2010, as part of the process of preparation of the Energy Roadmap to 2050, the Directorate
General for Energy launched a public consultation. The public consultation was based
on an online questionnaire of seven questions of which some were multiple
choice and others open questions. 1. How to ensure credibility of the work (open question), 2. The EU's position in a global policy context (multiple
choice), 3. Societal challenges and opportunities (multiple choice), 4. Policy developments at EU level (multiple choice), 5. Milestones in the transition (open question), 6. Key drivers for the future energy mix (multiple choice), 7. Additional thoughts and contributions (open question) The public
consultation was open between 20 December 2010 and 7 March 2011. Nearly 400
contributions were received, approximately half from organisations and half
from individual citizens. Approximately half dozen Member States sent a formal
reply to the public consultation. This report summarises all contributions
received. Additional statistical information on the replies is provided in the
annex. The individual contributions have been published on the public
consultation's webpage.[6] Given the participation from a broad spectrum
of organisations as well as citizens, this public consultation offers insights
into a large range of stakeholder opinions. 2.1 How to ensure credibility of the
work Question 1: How can the
credibility of work on the transition to a low-carbon energy system in 2050 be
ensured? (For example regular updating of projections using energy system
models, focus on developments in technologies, level of expertise needed in
each sector,…) A large number of contributors from different entities and sectors said
that the assumptions and data used for modelling should be made as transparent
as possible. They also recommended modelling a range
of different scenarios using different modelling methodologies. Using diverse
scenarios and considering results from different models would allow a better
understanding of the risks and uncertainties in the modelling, e.g. regarding
the pace of technological development, possible energy price developments,
results from the implementation of policies, international developments influencing
the energy sector, risk of technological lock-ins, etc. and could help identify
configurations that could threaten the three core objectives of our energy
policy, namely security of supply, competitiveness and sustainable development. Scenarios used should be scientifically sound and updated on a
regular basis to include latest developments and to check progress towards our
objectives in the EU and Member States. The possibility to have peer reviews of
the modelling exercise was also suggested. A few organisations from diverse sectors explicitly criticised the
PRIMES model regarding its transparency. Many private sector organisations emphasised the need for a stable, clear
and predictable legislative framework, to encourage the necessary investment in
the energy sector which have generally very long lead time. In establishing the legislative framework preference should be
given to market driven policies rather than top down political intervention. Some industry respondents recommended that initiatives related to
sustainable use of energy, and GHG (greenhouse gas) reductions should be
bundled together in a holistic approach rather than a piecemeal method
tackling specific sectorial issues at different times. The importance of striking
a balance among decarbonisation of the energy sector while maintaining competitiveness
and ensuring security of energy supply was underlined. A few organisations expressed concerns about a loss of international
competiveness because of high energy costs and argued
that GHG abatement policies in the EU should only be implemented under equally
strong commitments from other countries and regions in a robust international
framework for cooperation on climate change. The need for a legislation ensuring fair competition between different
energy sources on a level playing field was also emphasised. However, different views were expressed on what constitutes a level
playing field. Renewables organisations in particular argued that policies
should take all external costs into account while other organisations argued
for a "technology neutral" approach and phase out of subsidies for
specific energy sectors (see also replies to question 5 in chapter 2.5). 2.2 The EU's position in a global
policy context Question 2: Looking forward,
EU energy policy may be increasingly influenced by developments in global
energy supply and demand, international cooperation on climate and initiatives
taken outside the EU. Which developments should be considered in the
Energy Roadmap 2050? On which do you think a stronger
EU line is necessary? (Pick three most important ones) The chart above represents the relative preferences expressed by
organisations and citizens to question 2. A detailed percentage split of
opinions of different organisations, with a breakdown among industries, NGOs
and utilities is provided in annex 1. Overall, more than half of all respondents chose "global energy
efficiency and demand developments" and "global development of
renewable energy" as the topics most worthwhile of consideration in the
roadmap or requiring a stronger EU line. Among
NGOs, those two answers received the strongest majority. The third most chosen response for organisations was the further
development of an international framework for cooperation on climate, a
response which the vast majority of energy utilities judged to be among the
most significant factors. "Further development of international standards, trade and
investment frameworks" was supported by almost a third of the respondents from
organisations. Approximately one third of organisations indicated specific developments
not included in the multiple choice option such as: taxes and carbon markets,
impacts on developing countries, competitiveness, land use change from biomass,
caps on energy use and increased efficiency, renewables, as well as secure
availability of fossil fuels. Remarkably among citizens, "global nuclear renaissance" was
the most popular answer after "global development of renewable
energy", indicated by more than half of the respondents. 2.3 Societal challenges and
opportunities Question 3: What societal
challenges and opportunities do you think are likely in Europe over the next decades as a result of changes in the EU and global energy system? On which ones do you think a stronger EU line is needed? (Pick
three most important ones) The chart above represents the relative
preferences expressed by organisations and citizens to question 3. A detailed
percentage split of opinion different organisations, with a breakdown among
industries, NGOs and utilities is provided in annex 1. Overall, responses were fairly evenly distributed among the top six choices. Public acceptance on new infrastructures received the highest
share of votes from organisations. More than half of utilities viewed public
acceptance and increased reliance on electricity as major social challenges or
in need of a stronger EU line. Among NGOs "increased scope for
decentralised power generation and for local, integrated solutions" and
"creation of sustainable and publicly acceptable energy sources"
received most support. Among citizens, the most popular answers were on increased energy
efficiency and increased reliance on electricity. Throughout the questionnaire,
citizens often tended to highlight a social dimension, e.g. through advocating
a role for education and media in driving behavioural change (energy saving)
and increasing public understanding or acceptance of certain technologies. Some
also viewed vocational training to create the necessary skills for a low-carbon
economy as essential. Some organisations underlined that due to the profound structural
changes in the energy industry required for a transition to a low-carbon energy
system, the roadmap should explicitly consider social and employment effects. Under "other (please specify)", a variety of other
challenges and opportunities were highlighted by respondents, mostly relating
to particular technologies. 2.4 Policy developments at EU level Question 4: The EU's approach
to energy policy is founded on regulation and an internal energy market
providing competition, innovation, energy efficiency and development of
resources including renewables, environmental sustainability, energy security
and solidarity, and effective relations with external partners. Which are the
main areas which you think might need further policy development at EU level,
in a 2050 perspective? Please specify what you think is needed, references to supporting analyses welcome. (Boxes, pick three; also text box) The chart above represents the relative preferences expressed by
organisations and citizens to question 4. A detailed percentage split of
opinion different organisations, with a breakdown among industries, NGOs and
utilities is provided in annex 1. Roughly half of respondents consider that energy efficiency is among
the three most important aspects needing more development at the EU level. This figure is goes up to 70% for NGOs and but is considered a
priority by only about a quarter of the preference for utilities, after infrastructure,
financing and energy security. A similar difference in emphasis between NGOs
and utilities can be found for renewables. Development of infrastructure was seen as a priority by
approximately a third of respondents. Within
organisations a significant majority of utilities views the development of
infrastructure as a main area for further policy development. Asked to give their own views, a variety of other possible areas for
policy development were specified by respondents, mostly related to particular
technologies. A few respondents also mentioned policy harmonisation in general
and a level playing field. Other aspects of EU low-carbon policy development, such as
solidarity, effective relations with external partners and support for industrial
and regional transition management were not viewed as high priorities by
respondents. 2.5 Milestones in the transition Question 5: Which milestones would you see as most useful to specify at this
stage for the transition to a low-carbon energy system in Europe? References to
supporting analyses welcome. Across all industries and NGOs, intermediate targets, regular
checkpoints and updates towards 2050 were recommended. The regular monitoring of the proper implementation of existing
legislation e.g. targets for Member States was also considered important. However, with respect to future milestones and targets to be adopted,
it was indicated that a straight line to our decarbonisation target will not
reflect the way in which changes will happen in our society. A
decarbonisation roadmap should be flexible enough to change route along the way
through periodic reviews, taking into account the latest developments in
technology, international framework etc. The usefulness of specific roadmaps
for different sectors was acknowledged e.g. industry, transport, agriculture
etc. A 'level playing field' is also seen as important by a broad
spectrum of organisations including renewables,
nuclear, gas and CCS associations as well as commerce chambers and utilities. However,
'level playing field' appears to be interpreted in a variety of ways by
different stakeholders, some arguing for a free market approach and others
for some form of intervention to internalise externalities or introduce support
schemes for making certain technologies commercially viable (renewables, CCS,
energy storage, etc.) Utilities tend to view liberalised and integrated EU
energy markets and a binding global post-Kyoto agreement as essential. A few
organisations indicated that EU decarbonisation efforts should be
conditional on equally far-reaching measures in other economies. Renewables and energy efficiency industries, NGOs and environmental
interest groups tend to view binding targets for energy efficiency by 2020 and binding
targets for renewables or GHG emissions by 2030 as essential to support a predictable investment framework for low-carbon
technologies. In some sectors, such as power generation, due to the long
lifetime of fossil fuel and nuclear power plants, 2050 is only one investment
cycle away. Clarity on the future legislative framework is needed to avoid a
lock-in into high carbon investments and the stranded cost in the associated
assets. Some recommended that milestones should not be restricted to
decarbonisation objectives but should also identify to "technological proof
points" for large scale deployment of innovative low carbon technologies. This
could concern technologies such as CCS, smart grids, super grids, new
electricity storage technologies and e-mobility. However, different choices
were emphasised by different stakeholders. Broad support was expressed for increased electrification of our energy
system and in particular of the transport sector. As
the power sector will be a major contributor to the decarbonisation of our
economy, the roadmap should provide milestones in the decarbonisation of power
generation. Some respondents advocate a full decarbonisation of power
generation as a prerequisite for achieving the overall 80-95% decarbonisation
of our economy including an abandonment of unabated coal power generation. 2.6 Key drivers for the future energy
mix Question 6: What are the most
likely key drivers for the future energy mix in the EU? (Pick 3) The chart above represents the relative
preferences expressed by organisations and citizens to question 6. A percentage
split of opinions of different organisations, with a breakdown among
industries, NGOs and utilities is provided in annex 1. About half of all organisations and citizens believe that global
fossil fuel prices, compared to costs of domestic energy resources and long
term security of supply will be the mostly likely key drivers of the future European energy mix. Overall less than 20% of respondents selected "gradual
integration of the internal market" as their choice. Hardly any NGOs
selected "gradual integration of the internal market" as their
choice. However, some 40% of the utilities did so. Among NGOs, over 60% believed that EU climate policy is decisive. However,
only 33% of overall respondents believe that climate policy is a likely key
driver for our future energy mix. Throughout all types of organisations and among citizens, public
subsidies were not viewed as one of the most likely key drivers for the future energy mix, receiving less than 10% of the choices. As to other likely key drivers, several organisations emphasised specific
low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power. Financing instruments for
achieving the required investments into low-carbon technologies were also
mentioned as another key driver. 2.7 Additional thoughts and
contributions Question 7: Do you have
additional suggestions or more specific thoughts on the Energy Roadmap 2050 ? There was a considerable divergence in opinions on the best way to decarbonise
the energy sector. Some replies indicated that decarbonisation should be obtained with minimal
intervention and driven by market-based instruments.
Policy and instruments should concentrate on goals and not
on prescription on what industry should do or on a selection of technology
options. Utilisation of offsets in other regions of the
world through the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation
to complement emission trading was advocated. Overlap of different legislative
initiatives aiming setting a carbon price, e.g. a CO2 tax, in
addition to the emission trading system should be avoided. Other replies supported mechanisms such as sectoral emission
targets, specific technologies, additional targets for renewables and binding
targets for energy efficiency, while explicitly opposing instruments for
offsets in other regions. Some argued that more
emphasis should be given to storage technologies, including utilisation of large hydro reservoirs in Northern Europe and particularly in Norway. Energy efficiency should be pursued all along the full supply chain including power generation, cogeneration, district heating and
actions on the demand side. The importance of energy efficiency in buildings which
represent 40% of EU energy use was underlined. Energy efficiency measures in
the building sector should avoid "shallow renovation" with only limited
increase in efficiency as such "shallow renovation" seems attractive
in the short term but prejudge future measures locking in suboptimal
renovations. . There was a broad
consensus on supporting technology and innovation and on extension of the Strategic
Energy Technology Plan beyond 2020. Opinions on the potential contributions of nuclear, renewable energy
sources and fossil fuels to our decarbonisation objectives are divergent. A few respondents advocated that for furthering a sustainable
energy system without technical lock-ins a long-term perspective, beyond 2050 up
to 2100 should be considered. NGOs, environmental
groups and renewable industries, tend to see a 100% renewable electricity
supply as both feasible and desirable. Others see nuclear power as the best form of decarbonised energy together with limited amount of renewables. Nuclear industries cite
cost advantages and availability of nuclear as base load capacity as main
advantages over intermittent and expensive renewables. Fossil fuel industries
emphasise CCS as a sustainable and cost effective way to reduce GHG emissions. For gas industries, gas is a cheap means of emission reductions and
could play a key role in the decarbonisation of the power sector via fuel
switch from coal, providing a cost efficient, sustainable, and flexible power
generation to complement the increase renewable capacity in the next decades.
Beside its role in power generation gas has still a major role in the
residential sector and a huge potential exists for an increased penetration of
natural gas vehicles in the transport sector. The need to strike a balance
between reducing fossil fuel use and fostering substantial investments in new
major gas infrastructures from third countries was underlined. The coal
industry underlined the need to avoid lock-in into a dash for unabated gas
generation. Some viewed the
development of a new "pan European" energy infrastructure as necessary
for our transition to a low carbon system. A trade
off among investments in new infrastructures, super grid, smargrid and new
power generation capacity is needed. Annex 1 Question 2. Looking forward, EU energy policy may be increasingly influenced by developments in global energy supply and demand, international cooperation on climate and initiatives taken outside the EU. Which developments should be considered in the Energy Roadmap 2050? On which do you think a stronger EU line is necessary? (Pick three most important ones) || Organisations || Citizens || Total || Industry || NGO || Utility || further development of an international framework for cooperation on climate || 44% || 42% || 42% || 81% || 35% take-up by other countries of EU model for action on climate change || 14% || 17% || 20% || 10% || 13% further development of international standards, trade and investment frameworks || 29% || 39% || 12% || 24% || 21% global energy efficiency and demand developments || 58% || 51% || 73% || 33% || 50% global nuclear renaissance || 15% || 9% || 15% || 38% || 53% global development of renewable energy || 53% || 38% || 71% || 29% || 55% global development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) || 10% || 17% || 5% || 15% || 12% price developments in global fossil fuel markets || 20% || 23% || 20% || 10% || 18% development of energy resources in neighbouring countries and infrastructures linking them with the EU market || 14% || 14% || 15% || 19% || 17% other (please specify) || 31% || 33% || 22% || 33% || 9% || || || || || Question 3. What societal challenges and opportunities do you think are likely in Europe over the next decades as a result of changes in the EU and global energy system? On which ones do you think a stronger EU line is needed? (Pick three most important ones) || Organisations || Citizens || Total || Industry || NGO || Utility || economic and employment gains in some parts of the energy sector, in some parts of the EU, losses in others || 23% || 20% || 27% || 15% || 15% increased importance of access to high-performance energy infrastructures (eg smart meters and grids) || 35% || 32% || 37% || 38% || 36% increased reliance on electricity || 28% || 25% || 22% || 57% || 40% creation of sustainable and publicly acceptable energy sources || 33% || 29% || 44% || 19% || 38% public acceptance of new infrastructures needed for the EU market (eg large storage technologies, pan-European grid) || 42% || 49% || 27% || 57% || 35% increased scope for decentralised power generation and for local, integrated solutions for meeting energy, waste management and other needs of communities || 35% || 30% || 46% || 29% || 30% public acceptance of need for increased energy efficiency || 33% || 25% || 37% || 29% || 41% changed patterns of disruptions in energy supplies, both fossil and electricity || 9% || 7% || 15% || 5% || 10% increases in energy prices and energy poverty || 18% || 23% || 12% || 10% || 24% moving of energy-intensive industry to other parts of the world || 10% || 13% || 7% || 24% || 8% other (please specify) || 20% || 29% || 12% || 14% || 5% || || || || || Question 4. The EU's approach to energy policy is founded on regulation and an internal energy market providing competition, innovation, energy efficiency and development of resources including renewables, environmental sustainability, energy security and solidarity, and effective relations with external partners. Which are the main areas which you think might need further policy development at EU level, in a 2050 perspective? Please specify what you think is needed, references to supporting analyses welcome. (Pick three most important ones) || Organisations || Citizens || Total || Industry || NGO || Utility || competition || 12% || 16% || 5% || 10% || 13% carbon pricing || 27% || 32% || 24% || 24% || 25% internalization of other external costs || 16% || 14% || 22% || 5% || 18% RTD, innovation || 32% || 36% || 20% || 29% || 39% energy efficiency || 47% || 38% || 71% || 24% || 51% transport policy || 9% || 6% || 15% || 5% || 13% renewables || 38% || 29% || 59% || 19% || 26% financing || 24% || 22% || 20% || 43% || 10% energy security || 24% || 29% || 15% || 29% || 28% solidarity || 2% || 1% || 0% || 10% || 7% development of infrastructures || 32% || 28% || 20% || 71% || 31% effective relations with external partners || 4% || 7% || 0% || 0% || 7% support for management of transition to affected regions, industries || 4% || 7% || 5% || 0% || 6% other (please specify) || 23% || 28% || 22% || 24% || 10% || || || || || Question 6. What are the most likely key drivers for the future energy mix in the EU? (Pick three most important ones) || Organisations || Citizens || Total || Industry || NGO || Utility || global fossil fuel prices, compared to costs of domestic energy resources || 52% || 52% || 51% || 33% || 48% long term security of supply || 48% || 55% || 37% || 48% || 52% public subsidy || 8% || 9% || 10% || 10% || 9% expectations about short-term security of supply || 3% || 6% || 2% || 0% || 9% political decisions by Member States || 37% || 43% || 29% || 38% || 36% gradual integration of internal energy market || 15% || 10% || 7% || 38% || 17% international framework for cooperation on climate || 21% || 14% || 24% || 24% || 24% EU climate policy || 41% || 29% || 63% || 48% || 33% public acceptance of new energy technologies and the related infrastructures || 41% || 39% || 42% || 48% || 42% other (please specify) || 20% || 26% || 15% || 14% || 7% [1] http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/roadmap/index_en.htm [2]
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/consultations/20110307_roadmap_2050_en.htm [3] Questions 1, 5 and 7 were open questions and 2, 3, 4 and 6 were in
form of multiple choice. [4] http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/roadmap/index_en.htm [5] Conclusions of European Council, 4 February 2011. [6] http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/consultations/20110307_roadmap_2050_en.htm Brussels, 27 September 2011 Ener.a.1.dir(2011)1238714 Summary record of the meeting Subject: PRIMES
Peer review Meeting, Brussels, Monday 26 September 2011 The aim of the
meeting was to assess the suitability of the PRIMES model for complex energy system
analysis by independent reviewers having the necessary modelling knowledge and
experience. The meeting was held at DG ENER premises on Monday 26/09/2011. Following reviewers
were invited: 1.
Dr. Fatih BIROL, Chief Economist of the
International Energy Agency and Ms. Laura COZZI, Principal Analyst, Deputy Head,
Office of the Chief Economist, International Energy Agency as alternate,
(both absent, excused) 2.
Mr. Patrick CRIQUI, CNRS-Université Pierre Mendès-France, Grenoble, 3.
Dr. Andy KYDES, OnsiteAnalytics, retired from US
DoE, Energy Information Administration (absent, excused) 4.
Dr. Felix Christian Matthes, Öko-Institut,
Institute for Applied Ecology, 5.
Mr. Hector Pollitt, Cambridge Econometrics
Limited, 6.
Prof Dr. Christian von Hirschhausen, Technical
University of Berlin, Other
participants Prof. Pantelis
Capros, National Technical University of Athens European
Commission, DG Energy: 7.
Mr. Tudor CONSTANTINESCU, acting Director A
Energy Policy 8.
Ms. Mechthild WÖRSDÖRFER, Head of Unit A1 9.
Mr. Manfred DECKER 10. Ms. Livia VASAKOVA 11. Mr. Michal TRATKOWSKI 12. Mr. Tom HOWES 13. Mr. Marc RINGEL The meeting was
chaired by M. WÖRSDÖRFER who gave a short introduction on the context and purpose
of the meeting and introduced the agenda. Peer reviewers had the possibility to
send questions per email prior to the meeting. The Commission received
questions and comments from all 4 peer relievers present as well as from Prof.
Kydes. In order to
structure the discussion on the basis of the questions received from peer
reviewers, it was proposed to have three broad sessions followed by
conclusions. This structure was accepted by all participants leading to the
following sessions: 1. PRIMES modelling mechanisms 2. Modelling context 3. Modelling assumptions Prof. Capros
prepared an extensive presentation on all three points that was distributed to
all peer reviewers at the meeting, and sent afterwards. The presentation is
annexed to the summary record. The three
sessions were followed by concluding remarks by each of the peer reviewer who
were also asked about possible suggestions for improvement in the next
modelling cycle. 1. PRIMES
modelling mechanisms Following issues
were covered in session 1: (1) Are the PRIMES modelling mechanisms adequate in balancing
the need for reducing complexity and providing a relevant picture of the
European energy system? 1.1 Final energy demand and representation of
behaviour of agents 1.2 Perception of costs within the micro-economic
budgeting problems 1.3 Power and heat generation in the overall
supply system 1.4 Grid representation in modelling,
interconnections and intra-EU trade 1.5 Market clearing and price formation (including
consumer prices) 1.6 Energy investments and modelling dynamics 1.7 Expectations, foresight and risk management by
agents 1.8 ETS modelling 1.9 Bio-energy modelling module 1.10 CCS: modelling of capture, transport and
storage of energy and process emissions 1.11 Calibration (sources, procedures, experience
gained in a suite of exercises) Prof. Capros presented the first part of his slides (1-27) and
replied to numerous questions from peer reviewers. The questions dealt in
particular with the following points: -
Formation of electricity prices in the model
and recovery of costs All cost are fully recovered through prices including RES subsidies,
hence the model is implicitly providing capacity payments (without simulating
explicitly such a system) on top of the wholesale prices based on marginal
costs. Prices are not the same for all final energy consumers but costs are
allocated according to their price elasticity with industry having the lowest
price reflecting the current situation. Marginal electricity costs can become
very low but are never equal to zero, even in a hypothetical 100% renewables
system based on wind and solar, as there are always costs for balancing and
storage. Scenarios with high penetration of nuclear and CCS have a substantial
part of baseload generation allowing lower prices for industry. Scenarios with
very high renewables penetration have much less low cost baseload electricity and
show convergence of prices for all final energy consumers. Electricity imports are possible and might be significant for some
Member States; the importer is considered to be a "price taker" and
is not determining the price on the market of a given Member State. -
Perfect foresight and expectations of
investors PRIMES generally applies perfect foresight over a limited time
horizon, e.g. 10 years in demand, 20 or 30 or more years in power generation.
The reason for applying the assumption of perfect foresight and thus giving
investors certainty over several years for their investments is that the model
simulates technologies that work; usually the scenarios quantified by the model
do not simulate technology or other failures; the foresight model options can
be changed to quantify scenarios of different nature. -
Infrastructure modelling For
infrastructure modelling a two-step approach is being used. In a first step,
running the fully integrated version of the electricity PRIMES model,
electricity trade and the need for infrastructure is being determined. Then, in
the second stage, net energy imports (exports) as well as infrastructure is
being introduced into the country specific PRIMES model with full resolution of
all technologies and types of consumers and with interaction with the demand
models. The reason for this two stage approach relates to computing time,
which even with the most modern equipment is very long (8 hours for one run)
when using the fully integrated model. This is particularly important as many model runs may be required when
iterations are performed between demand and supply and for meeting carbon
and/or other targets. The electricity
trade model of PRIMES covers all countries in the European continent except
countries of the CIS and Turkey. The model performs unit commitment, endogenous
use of interconnectors (with given capacities and Net Transfer Capacities (NTC))
and also optimal power generation capacity expansion planning in a perfect
foresight manner until 2050. Simulations of different electricity demand levels
with the model allow identification of bottlenecks and of the amount of
investment in interconnectors necessary to remove such bottlenecks. A typical
load profile with 11 segments is considered. Investment in
new power plants is endogenous. The rate of use of power capacities and
interconnectors is endogenous. Regarding the use of interconnectors the model
performs a linear Direct Current optimal power flow under oriented NTC
constraints defined per each couple of countries. The model makes distinction
between AC lines and DC lines, the use of the latter being controlled by
operators. All interconnectors existing today or planned to be constructed in
the future are represented (one by one) in the model. -
Modelling of energy efficiency There are different possibilities how to deal with energy efficiency
in the model. Policy measures such as Eco-design or energy efficiency standards
influence the technology availability and possible choices of consumers.
Labelling and more information campaigns are represented by lowering
"perceived" costs of technologies. Introduction of energy services
companies (ESCOs) lead to a reduction of discount rates. Another possibility mainly
used for unidentified measures is to work with energy efficiency value that is
perceived as a cost influencing the mix and energy demand without entailing
direct payment, unless it is a tax or a price of permits (white certificates).
The model assumes rational behaviour of agents. 2. Modelling context Following issues were covered in session 2: (2) Is
the PRIMES energy system model embedded in an appropriate modelling context? 2.1 World
modelling for international fossil fuel prices 2.2 Gas prices for Europe 2.3. Macro-economic and sectoral value added developments 2.4. Feedbacks on GDP 2.5 Modelling of transport activity including modal shift 2.6 Links to modelling non CO2 GHG including possible
feedbacks The PRIMES model does not work in isolation but relies on several
other models for input (GEM-E3 for macroeconomic assumptions; PROMETHEUS for
world energy prices; transport models for transport activity projections); has
links to other GHG modelling (e.g. GAINS) and it is possible to provide
feed-backs on GDP. -
World energy prices PRIMES uses results from the PROMETHEUS or
POLES model as inputs for fossil fuel import prices -
Macroeconomic modelling and GDP feed back
effects PRIMES can be
linked to macroeconomic GEM-E3 model to provide feed-back effects of various
energy and climate policies on GDP levels and growth rates. PRIMES takes
macroeconomic and sectoral projections from GEM-E3 and produces energy system
projections; the results (investment, prices) can be used to recalibrate
parameters of the GEM-E3 model. So, GEM-E3 model produces a new projection of
economic activity. PRIMES may run again with the adjusted economic activity
projections. Several rounds of iterations can be introduced to "close the
loop" making results progressively convergent. The linked model system was
used to assess GDP impacts of 2020 targets for RES and GHG reductions with one
closed loop for cost-effectiveness reasons. 3. Modelling
assumptions (3) Are
the modelling assumptions used in the 2009-2011 modelling cycle plausible? 3.1 Assumptions
on capital costs for present and future power generation, cost developments
and learning rates 3.2 Decommissioning pathways and economics of lifetime
extension 3.3 Sustainable bio-energy potential and way of sectoral
allocation (linked to 1.9) 3.4. Demand side technologies for stationary uses 3.5 Transport systems and parameters used for electro-mobility
(battery costs, recharging systems, etc) 3.6 Electricity storage and grids 3.7 Discount rates 3.8 CO2 storage potential including for bio-energy 3.9 Translation of policy measures into modelling parameters
(e.g. information campaigns, energy service companies, energy saving
obligations, eco-design standards, product labelling, promotion of CHP
and micro-generation, smart meters) The last part of Prof Capros's presentation
related to the main assumptions of the current modelling exercise, with scenarios
for the Energy Roadmap 2050. Besides the architecture of the model
(geographical, sectors and technologies coverage and modelling mechanisms)
assumptions are another element that significantly determines modelling
results. Several aspects were discussed in this context: -
Discount rates To simulate
capital budgeting decisions of agents (consumers, producers) in a realistic way,
the model uses sector specific discount rates. Subjective discount rates are
used for decisions by households and for private cars, whereas weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) rates are used for business decisions. A vast literature
has provided statistical evidence about subjective discount rates, which can be
substantially high for low income classes; these rates reflect risk aversion,
cash flow shortages, access to bank lending, etc. If the model used social
discount rates to simulate private capital budgeting decisions, the results
would be unrealistic (historical developments could not be explained) and the
energy saving or abatement possibilities would be overestimated. Social
discount rates are used to calculate cumulative energy system overall costs by
scenario. -
Assumptions on policy measures Certain energy
savings measures can be simulated by changing discount rates for parts of the
sector, e.g. in areas where the representative agent employs energy service
companies. PRIMES has a rather wide spectrum for capturing the various types of
policy measures. While some of them can be directly introduced by changing
variables, such as taxes and capital subsidies others require changes in
modelling parameters (see energy efficiency point). Targets for CO2 emissions,
energy efficiency, renewables and others are handled through their dual
(shadow) variable. -
Capital costs for power generation
technologies Prof Capros presented a short comparison of
capital costs for main power generation technologies with those of the US DOE
estimates for 2010 (sent by Prof Kydes prior to the peer review meeting). While
the costs are broadly similar for most technologies there are significant
differences for wind and nuclear. This can be explained by a rather small database
of realised projects in the last years. It was noted that if off-shore wind
costs at present were to be revised upwards there might be steeper cost
reductions (technology learning) afterwards; circumstances for nuclear would be
different from this. There is also a need to monitor solar PV costs as recent
developments show significant price reductions. Given the importance of the
capital cost estimates, a sensitivity analysis using alternative trends might
be a useful exercise. -
Decommissioning and lifetime extension issues For existing plants, decommissioning
schedules are based on information in the power plant inventory; however
extension of lifetime and retrofitting are handled endogenously if permissible.
For new plants, decommissioning is scheduled at the end of pre-determined
lifetime; extension of lifetime is handled endogenously. Extension of lifetime
entails investment costs (much lower than overnight capital costs);
retrofitting costs add to the other extension of lifetime costs. 4. Conclusions and suggestions for
improvements All peer
reviewers agreed that the PRIMES model is a suitable tool for complex analyses
of the energy sector/system, especially regarding its use for appropriate
scenario analysis of energy policy at the EU level. There was also a general
agreement, that given the importance of the exercise transparency is a key
element and main assumptions and results should be made publicly available. . Some suggestions
for improvements were brought forward by individual peer reviewers. Prof Dr.
Christian von HIRSCHHAUSEN, highlighting the
integrated nature of the exercise including macro-economic and climate aspects,
suggested further improving infrastructure modelling and including sensitivity
analyses for main input parameters. In particular, efforts should be invested
into a more detailed electricity (and perhaps natural gas) network, including
perhaps constraints on transmission expansion. Dr. Patrick
CRIQUI recommended further improving macro-economic
feedbacks and identified some challenges for future modelling of energy systems
– system with strong penetration of renewables, storage, local management
through smart grids and other infrastructure. PRIMES appears fairly well
equipped to deal with making the technology process endogenous, which is
however an area for research. Dr. Felix
Christian MATTHES recommended standard sensitivity analyses
in order to show sensitivities of the model to some key input parameters. He
highlighted the usefulness of the agent based approach in PRIMES that allows
examining transfers (ETS, taxes, etc) among sectors rather than just focusing
on overall costs given the expected policy debate on such issues. Recognising
that infrastructure modelling is important with respect to long term bottlenecks,
it is also important to consider that current load profiles might be improved
in the future as costs are also strongly dependent on storage. Mr. Hector
POLLITT, highlighting uncertainty and the
usefulness of sensitivities, particularly with regards to discount rates,
perfect foresight and rational behaviour, and recommended to study more
carefully the macroeconomic feedback issues as well as the linkages of energy
policies to biomass and land use.. Professor
Pantelis CAPROS addressed some of the concerns,
especially regarding infrastructure, and mentioned what are the improvements of
the model planned for the near future: further improvement of the
representation of the building sectors and modelling of renovation policies for
existing buildings and improvements of biomass modelling depending on better
statistical data availability. Mechthild
Wörsdörfer Annexes: 1.
List of participants, 2.
Prof. Capros's presentation, Annex
1 - List of participants 1.
Mr. Patrick CRIQUI, CNRS-Université Pierre Mendès-France,
Grenoble, 2.
Dr. Felix Christian Matthes, Öko-Institut,
Institute for Applied Ecology, 3.
Mr. Hector Pollitt, Cambridge Econometrics
Limited, 4.
Prof Dr. Christian von Hirschhausen, Technical
University of Berlin, 5.
Professor Pantelis Capros, Technical University of Athens, DG ENER represented by: Mr. Tudor
CONSTANTINESCU Ms. Mechthild WÖRSDÖRFER Mr. Manfred
DECKER Ms. Livia
VASAKOVA Mr. Michal
TRATKOWSKI Mr. Tom HOWES Mr. Marc RINGEL