(1)

On 20 July 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 (1).

(2)

In its conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, the European Council stated that Russia’s access to sensitive items and technologies with battlefield relevance must be restricted to the maximum extent possible, including by targeting entities in third countries enabling the circumvention of sanctions. The European Council called on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) and the Commission to prepare further sanctions against Belarus, North Korea and Iran. Moreover, the European Council stated that the European Union would continue to work intensely with regional and international partners to prevent further regional escalation, notably in Lebanon and the Red Sea. The European Council called on all actors, notably Iran, to refrain from escalatory actions.

(3)

On 14 April 2024, in the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the Union, the Union condemned in the strongest terms the Iranian drone and missile attacks against Israel on 13 April 2024 as an unprecedented escalation and a threat to regional security.

(4)

In its conclusions of 17 April 2024, the European Council strongly and unequivocally condemned the Iranian attack on Israel and reiterated its full solidarity with the people of Israel and commitment to Israel’s security and to regional stability. The European Council called on Iran and its proxies to cease all attacks and urged all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action that might increase tensions in the region. Furthermore, the European Council conclusions stated that the Union would take further restrictive measures against Iran, notably in relation to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. Finally, the European Council reiterated that the Union remains fully committed to contributing to de-escalation and security in the region.

(5)

Russia is using Iranian-produced UAVs in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of that country, including against civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Iranian state-sponsored programme for the development and production of UAVs therefore contributes to violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of fundamental principles of international law.

(6)

The Union is extremely concerned about reports that Iran might transfer missiles to Russia for use in its war of aggression against Ukraine.

(7)

The proliferation of Iranian-produced UAVs and missiles and related technologies to non-state armed groups in the Middle East and beyond is a central issue of concern. Iran has transferred Iranian-produced UAVs and missiles to armed groups and entities, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as to parties to the conflict in Sudan.

(8)

The Iranian missile programme, which is based on state-owned as well as private companies and benefits from domestic research capabilities, is run by the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, both of which bodies are sanctioned by the Union. The Iranian missile programme includes the procurement, development, production and transfer of missiles.

(9)

Iran maintains a long-standing relationship with armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, including terrorist organisations such as the military wings of Hezbollah and Hamas, and has provided them with Iranian-produced missiles and means of production.

(10)

Iran’s continued provision of arms and related materiel to the Houthis is in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015).

(11)

Attacks on central maritime shipping routes by the Houthis in the Middle East and the Red Sea region are a central concern with regard to the interests of the Union and the Member States. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/632 (2) launched the European Union maritime security operation to safeguard freedom of navigation in relation to the Red Sea crisis (EUNAVFOR ASPIDES). It is in the interest of the Union and the Member States to adopt measures within the framework of the common foreign and security policy in order to prevent the Houthis from gaining further access to Iranian-produced weapons such as missiles and UAVs.

(12)

In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Iran’s supplying of UAVs and missiles to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, which undermines peace and security, as well as the sovereignty of states, it is appropriate to introduce further restrictive measures with regard to Iran. Those measures should be kept under review and should be able to be suspended or withdrawn, or be supplemented by other restrictive measures, in light of developments on the ground.

(13)

In particular, the title of Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 should be amended and travel restrictions and asset freeze measures should be imposed against persons responsible for, supporting or involved in Iran’s missile programme, or supplying, selling or otherwise involved in transferring Iran’s missiles or UAVs or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine, or to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, or in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015).

(14)

It is also appropriate to prohibit the export from the Union to Iran of further components that could be used in the development and production of UAVs.

(15)

Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures.

(16)

Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

the title is replaced by the following:

‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region’.

(2)

Article 2(1) is replaced by the following:

(3)

Article 3(1) is replaced by the following: