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Dokument 02019R0159-20220701

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Konsolidovaný text: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/159/2022-07-01

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02019R0159 — EN — 01.07.2022 — 007.005

This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document

►B	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 031 1.2.2019, p. 27)

Amended by:

		Official Journal
		No	page	date
M1	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1590 of 26 September 2019	L 248	28	27.9.2019
M2	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/35 of 15 January 2020	L 12	13	16.1.2020
►M3	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/894 of 29 June 2020	L 206	27	30.6.2020
M4	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/2037 of 10 December 2020	L 416	32	11.12.2020
►M5	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021	L 225I	1	25.6.2021
M6	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1091 of 2 July 2021	L 236	47	5.7.2021
M7	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/434 of 15 March 2022	L 88	181	16.3.2022
►M8	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/664 of 21 April 2022	L 121	12	22.4.2022
►M9	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/978 of 23 June 2022	L 167	58	24.6.2022
►M10	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/104 of 12 January 2023	L 12	7	13.1.2023

Corrected by:

►C1	Corrigendum, OJ L 272, 20.10.2022, p. 54 (2022/978)

▼B

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/159

of 31 January 2019

imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products

Article 1

Subject to Articles 6 and 7, a tariff quota is hereby opened in relation to imports into the Union of each of the 26 products categories concerned (defined by reference to the CN codes specified in relation to it in Annex I) and each of the periods specified in Annex IV.1 and IV.2.

▼M3

For each of the product categories concerned, and with the exception of product categories 8 and 25a, a part of each tariff-rate quota is allocated to the countries specified in Annex IV.

The remaining part of each tariff-rate quota, as well as the tariff-rate quota for product categories 8 and 25, shall be allocated on a first-come-first-served basis, based on a tariff-rate quota established equally for each quarter of the period of imposition.

▼B

The drawings on each quarterly quota shall be stopped on the twentieth working day of the Commission following the end of the quarterly period. At the end of each quarter, the unused balances of the tariff-rate quota shall automatically be transferred to the next quarter. No unused balance at the end of the last quarter of each year of application of the definitive tariff-rate quota shall be transferred.

▼M9

Where the relevant tariff-rate quota under paragraph 2 is exhausted for one specific country, imports from that country for some product categories can be made under the remaining part of the tariff-rate quota for the same product category. This provision shall only apply during the last quarter of each year of application of the definitive tariff-rate quota. For product categories 5, 9, and 21 no further access to the remaining part of the tariff-rate quota will be allowed. For product categories 12, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 27 only access to a specific volume within the tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter, will be allowed. In product categories 1 and 4B no exporting country shall be allowed to use, on its own, more than 30 % of the residual tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter of each year of application of measures. For product categories 2, 3A, 3B, 4A, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25B, 26 and 28 the access will be allowed over the total tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter in the respective product categories.

▼B

Where the relevant tariff-rate quota is exhausted or where imports of the product categories do not benefit from the relevant tariff-rate quota, an additional duty at the rate of 25 %, applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, shall be applied on the product categories set out in Annex IV.1.

Article 2

The origin of any product to which this Regulation applies shall be determined in accordance with the provisions in force in the Union relating to non-preferential origin.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by one percentage point.

Article 3

The tariff-rate quotas set out in Article 1 shall be managed by the Commission and the Member States in accordance with the management system for tariff-rate quotas provided for in Articles 49 to 54 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447.

Article 4

The Member States and the Commission shall cooperate closely to ensure compliance with this Regulation.

Article 5

Subject to paragraph 2, imports of the 26 product categories specified in Annex IV originating in one of the countries specified in Annex III shall not be subject to the measures contained in Article 1.

For each of the 26 product categories specified in Annex IV, Annex III.2 specifies the originating countries which shall be subject to the measures set out in Article 1.

Article 6

Products originating in Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein shall not be subject to the measures set out in Article 1.

►M8 Mozambique shall also not be subject to the measures set out in Article 1. ◄

Article 7

Prior surveillance measures in force by means of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/670 ( 1 ) shall be suspended for the products mentioned in Annex IV during the time of the imposition of safeguard measures set out in Article 1.

Article 8

During the period set out in Annexes IV.1 and IV.2 the Commission may review the measures in case of change of circumstances.

Article 9

Any amounts paid in respect of additional duties imposed pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1013 in relation to the products specified in Annex IV of this Regulation shall be definitively collected at the level set in Article 1(3) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1013.

Article 10

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

▼M5

It shall apply until 30 June 2024

▼B

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

ANNEX I

Product concerned

Product Number	Product category	CN Codes
1	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips	7208 10 00 , 7208 25 00 , 7208 26 00 , 7208 27 00 , 7208 36 00 , 7208 37 00 , 7208 38 00 , 7208 39 00 , 7208 40 00 , 7208 52 10 , 7208 52 99 , 7208 53 10 , 7208 53 90 , 7208 54 00 , 7211 13 00 , 7211 14 00 , 7211 19 00 , 7212 60 00 , 7225 19 10 , 7225 30 10 , 7225 30 30 , 7225 30 90 , 7225 40 15 , 7225 40 90 , 7226 19 10 , 7226 91 20 , 7226 91 91 , 7226 91 99
2	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Cold Rolled Sheets	7209 15 00 , 7209 16 90 , 7209 17 90 , 7209 18 91 , 7209 25 00 , 7209 26 90 , 7209 27 90 , 7209 28 90 , 7209 90 20 , 7209 90 80 , 7211 23 20 , 7211 23 30 , 7211 23 80 , 7211 29 00 , 7211 90 20 , 7211 90 80 , 7225 50 20 , 7225 50 80 , 7226 20 00 , 7226 92 00
3	Electrical Sheets (other than GOES)	7209 16 10 , 7209 17 10 , 7209 18 10 , 7209 26 10 , 7209 27 10 , 7209 28 10 , 7225 19 90 , 7226 19 80
4	Metallic Coated Sheets	7210 20 00 , 7210 30 00 , 7210 41 00 , 7210 49 00 , 7210 61 00 , 7210 69 00 , 7210 90 80 , 7212 20 00 , 7212 30 00 , 7212 50 20 , 7212 50 30 , 7212 50 40 , 7212 50 61 , 7212 50 69 , 7212 50 90 , 7225 91 00 , 7225 92 00 , 7225 99 00 , 7226 99 10 , 7226 99 30 , 7226 99 70
5	Organic Coated Sheets	7210 70 80 , 7212 40 80
6	Tin Mill products	7209 18 99 , 7210 11 00 , 7210 12 20 , 7210 12 80 , 7210 50 00 , 7210 70 10 , 7210 90 40 , 7212 10 10 , 7212 10 90 , 7212 40 20
7	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Quarto Plates	7208 51 20 , 7208 51 91 , 7208 51 98 , 7208 52 91 , 7208 90 20 , 7208 90 80 , 7210 90 30 , 7225 40 12 , 7225 40 40 , 7225 40 60
8	Stainless Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips	7219 11 00 , 7219 12 10 , 7219 12 90 , 7219 13 10 , 7219 13 90 , 7219 14 10 , 7219 14 90 , 7219 22 10 , 7219 22 90 , 7219 23 00 , 7219 24 00 , 7220 11 00 , 7220 12 00
9	Stainless Cold Rolled Sheets and Strips	7219 31 00 , 7219 32 10 , 7219 32 90 , 7219 33 10 , 7219 33 90 , 7219 34 10 , 7219 34 90 , 7219 35 10 , 7219 35 90 , 7219 90 20 , 7219 90 80 , 7220 20 21 , 7220 20 29 , 7220 20 41 , 7220 20 49 , 7220 20 81 , 7220 20 89 , 7220 90 20 , 7220 90 80
10	Stainless Hot Rolled Quarto Plates	7219 21 10 , 7219 21 90
11	Grain-Oriented Electrical Sheet	7225 11 00 , 7226 11 00
12	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Merchant Bars and Light Sections	7214 30 00 , 7214 91 10 , 7214 91 90 , 7214 99 31 , 7214 99 39 , 7214 99 50 , 7214 99 71 , 7214 99 79 , 7214 99 95 , 7215 90 00 , 7216 10 00 , 7216 21 00 , 7216 22 00 , 7216 40 10 , 7216 40 90 , 7216 50 10 , 7216 50 91 , 7216 50 99 , 7216 99 00 , 7228 10 20 , 7228 20 10 , 7228 20 91 , 7228 30 20 , 7228 30 41 , 7228 30 49 , 7228 30 61 , 7228 30 69 , 7228 30 70 , 7228 30 89 , 7228 60 20 , 7228 60 80 , 7228 70 10 , 7228 70 90 , 7228 80 00
13	Rebars	7214 20 00 , 7214 99 10
14	Stainless Bars and Light Sections	7222 11 11 , 7222 11 19 , 7222 11 81 , 7222 11 89 , 7222 19 10 , 7222 19 90 , 7222 20 11 , 7222 20 19 , 7222 20 21 , 7222 20 29 , 7222 20 31 , 7222 20 39 , 7222 20 81 , 7222 20 89 , 7222 30 51 , 7222 30 91 , 7222 30 97 , 7222 40 10 , 7222 40 50 , 7222 40 90
15	Stainless Wire Rod	7221 00 10 , 7221 00 90
16	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Wire Rod	7213 10 00 , 7213 20 00 , 7213 91 10 , 7213 91 20 , 7213 91 41 , 7213 91 49 , 7213 91 70 , 7213 91 90 , 7213 99 10 , 7213 99 90 , 7227 10 00 , 7227 20 00 , 7227 90 10 , 7227 90 50 , 7227 90 95
17	Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non Alloy Steel	7216 31 10 , 7216 31 90 , 7216 32 11 , 7216 32 19 , 7216 32 91 , 7216 32 99 , 7216 33 10 , 7216 33 90
18	Sheet Piling	7301 10 00
19	Railway Material	7302 10 22 , 7302 10 28 , 7302 10 40 , 7302 10 50 , 7302 40 00
20	Gas pipes	7306 30 41 , 7306 30 49 , 7306 30 72 , 7306 30 77
21	Hollow sections	7306 61 10 , 7306 61 92 , 7306 61 99
22	Seamless Stainless Tubes and Pipes	7304 11 00 , 7304 22 00 , 7304 24 00 , 7304 41 00 , 7304 49 10 , 7304 49 93 , 7304 49 95 , 7304 49 99
23	Bearing Tubes and Pipes	7304 51 12 , 7304 51 18 , 7304 59 32 , 7304 59 38
24	Other Seamless Tubes	7304 19 10 , 7304 19 30 , 7304 19 90 , 7304 23 00 , 7304 29 10 , 7304 29 30 , 7304 29 90 , 7304 31 20 , 7304 31 80 , 7304 39 10 , 7304 39 52 , 7304 39 58 , 7304 39 92 , 7304 39 93 , 7304 39 98 , 7304 51 81 , 7304 51 89 , 7304 59 10 , 7304 59 92 , 7304 59 93 , 7304 59 99 , 7304 90 00
25	Large welded tubes	7305 11 00 , 7305 12 00 , 7305 19 00 , 7305 20 00 , 7305 31 00 , 7305 39 00 , 7305 90 00
26	Other Welded Pipes	7306 11 10 , 7306 11 90 , 7306 19 10 , 7306 19 90 , 7306 21 00 , 7306 29 00 , 7306 30 11 , 7306 30 19 , 7306 30 80 , 7306 40 20 , 7306 40 80 , 7306 50 20 , 7306 50 80 , 7306 69 10 , 7306 69 90 , 7306 90 00
27	Non-alloy and other alloy cold finished bars	7215 10 00 , 7215 50 11 , 7215 50 19 , 7215 50 80 , 7228 10 90 , 7228 20 99 , 7228 50 20 , 7228 50 40 , 7228 50 61 , 7228 50 69 , 7228 50 80
28	Non Alloy Wire	7217 10 10 , 7217 10 31 , 7217 10 39 , 7217 10 50 , 7217 10 90 , 7217 20 10 , 7217 20 30 , 7217 20 50 , 7217 20 90 , 7217 30 41 , 7217 30 49 , 7217 30 50 , 7217 30 90 , 7217 90 20 , 7217 90 50 , 7217 90 90

ANNEX II

II.1 — Growth in imports for the 26 product categories (in tonnes)

Product Number	Product category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	MRP	Growth MRP compared to 2013
1	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips	4 867 242	5 263 815	7 854 395	8 610 847	7 048 217	7 209 718	48 %
2	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Cold Rolled Sheets	1 837 875	1 906 067	2 761 337	2 007 299	2 463 937	2 463 941	34 %
3	Electrical Sheets (other than GOES)	266 355	284 376	279 777	312 647	377 744	433 526	63 %
4	Metallic Coated Sheets	1 855 325	2 203 135	2 688 830	3 924 906	5 019 132	4 637 052	150 %
5	Organic Coated Sheets	681 646	725 004	622 482	730 619	919 000	937 693	38 %
6	Tin Mill products	549 941	660 743	634 722	754 638	616 810	735 928	34 %
7	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Quarto Plates	1 439 430	1 968 634	2 573 220	2 834 744	2 549 694	2 374 170	65 %
8	Stainless Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips	157 197	213 885	247 090	326 631	407 886	408 468	160 %
9	Stainless Cold Rolled Sheets and Strips	645 004	954 179	697 199	753 058	869 091	972 415	51 %
10	Stainless Hot Rolled Quarto Plates	26 799	34 700	31 586	25 995	27 704	28 677	7 %
12	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Merchant Bars and Light Sections	942 999	1 265 397	1 233 328	1 429 511	1 419 973	1 792 392	90 %
13	Rebars	528 702	972 572	1 430 000	1 292 936	1 191 379	1 755 338	232 %
14	Stainless Bars and Light Sections	114 638	149 670	144 875	149 499	161 973	184 811	61 %
15	Stainless Wire Rod	52 068	71 209	57 542	58 659	63 022	69 786	34 %
16	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Wire Rod	1 107 169	1 267 308	1 694 707	2 001 322	2 093 877	2 354 164	113 %
17	Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non Alloy Steel	222 797	274 863	267 851	387 353	262 759	373 732	68 %
18	Sheet Piling	15 871	16 497	14 051	36 683	84 549	83 502	426 %
19	Railway Material	14 587	25 532	23 202	12 494	18 232	23 013	58 %
20	Gas pipes	275 378	349 078	314 471	354 261	401 410	445 569	62 %
21	Hollow sections	485 038	578 426	602 190	757 274	862 889	956 360	97 %
22	Seamless Stainless Tubes and Pipes	42 417	55 590	54 948	51 614	49 593	49 781	17 %
24	Other Seamless Tubes	440 696	509 052	448 761	448 333	410 822	480 600	9 %
25	Large welded tubes	295 502	418 808	218 549	171 512	1 053 049	720 886	144 %
26	Other Welded Pipes	462 137	484 915	494 914	526 634	551 764	558 457	21 %
27	Non-alloy and other alloy cold finished bars	446 086	514 066	479 271	454 924	454 921	501 232	12 %
28	Non Alloy Wire	555 798	700 560	683 041	726 158	714 480	762 600	37 %

II.2 — Growth in imports for the 2 product categories (in tonnes)

Product Number	Product category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	MRP	Growth MRP compared to 2013
11	Grain-Oriented Electrical Sheet	114 388	112 258	101 737	109 518	99 917	106 570	– 7 %
23	Bearing Tubes and Pipes	7 475	8 998	8 337	7 035	6 137	6 265	– 16 %

ANNEX III

III.1 — List of developing countries, members of the WTO

Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

▼M9

III.2 — List of product categories originating in developing countries to which the definitive measures apply

List of product categories originating in developing countries to which the definitive measures apply

Country / Product group

25A

25B

Brazil

China

Egypt

India

Indonesia

Kazakhstan

Moldova

North Macedonia

South Africa

Tunisia

Turkey

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

Vietnam

All other developing countries

ANNEX IV

IV.1 – Volumes of tariff–rate quotas

Product Number	Product category	CN Codes	Allocation by country (Where Applicable)	Year 5				Year 6				Additional duty rate	Order numbers
				From 1.7.2022 to 30.9.2022	From 1.10.2022 to 31.12.2022	From 1.1.2023 to 31.3.2023	From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023	From 1.7.2023 to 30.9.2023	From 1.10.2023 to 31.12.2023	From 1.1.2024 to 31.3.2024	From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024
				Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)				Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)
1	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips	7208 10 00 , 7208 25 00 , 7208 26 00 , 7208 27 00 , 7208 36 00 , 7208 37 00 , 7208 38 00 , 7208 39 00 , 7208 40 00 , 7208 52 10 , 7208 52 99 , 7208 53 10 , 7208 53 90 , 7208 54 00 , 7211 13 00 , 7211 14 00 , 7211 19 00 , 7212 60 00 , 7225 19 10 , 7225 30 10 , 7225 30 30 , 7225 30 90 , 7225 40 15 , 7225 40 90 , 7226 19 10 , 7226 91 20 , 7226 91 91 , 7226 91 99	Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8966
			Turkey	452 373,88	452 373,88	442 539,66	447 456,77	469 183,40	469 183,40	464 083,58	464 083,58	25 %	09.8967
			India	287 227,31	287 227,31	280 983,24	284 105,28	297 900,24	297 900,24	294 662,20	294 662,20	25 %	09.8968
			Korea, Republic of	179 365,46	179 365,46	175 466,21	177 415,83	186 030,40	186 030,40	184 008,33	184 008,33	25 %	09.8969
			United Kingdom	150 045,49	150 045,49	146 783,63	148 414,56	155 620,95	155 620,95	153 929,42	153 929,42	25 %	09.8976
			Serbia	159 231,56	159 231,56	155 770,01	157 500,79	165 148,37	165 148,37	163 353,27	163 353,27	25 %	09.8970
			Other countries	900 290,25	900 290,25	880 718,72	890 504,48	933 743,65	933 743,65	923 594,27	923 594,27	25 %	(1)
2	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Cold Rolled Sheets	7209 15 00 , 7209 16 90 , 7209 17 90 , 7209 18 91 , 7209 25 00 , 7209 26 90 , 7209 27 90 , 7209 28 90 , 7209 90 20 , 7209 90 80 , 7211 23 20 , 7211 23 30 , 7211 23 80 , 7211 29 00 , 7211 90 20 , 7211 90 80 , 7225 50 20 , 7225 50 80 , 7226 20 00 , 7226 92 00	India	156 974,80	156 974,80	153 562,31	155 268,55	162 807,74	162 807,74	161 038,10	161 038,10	25 %	09.8801
			Korea, Republic of	91 042,24	91 042,24	89 063,06	90 052,65	94 425,23	94 425,23	93 398,87	93 398,87	25 %	09.8802
			United Kingdom	84 142,99	84 142,99	82 313,80	83 228,39	87 269,62	87 269,62	86 321,03	86 321,03	25 %	09.8977
			Ukraine	69 898,31	69 898,31	68 378,78	69 138,54	72 495,62	72 495,62	71 707,62	71 707,62	25 %	09.8803
			Serbia	39 631,71	39 631,71	38 770,15	39 200,93	41 104,37	41 104,37	40 657,58	40 657,58	25 %	09.8805
			Other countries	321 824,43	321 824,43	314 828,25	318 326,34	333 782,94	333 782,94	330 154,85	330 154,85	25 %	(2)
3.A	Electrical Sheets (other than GOES)	7209 16 10 , 7209 17 10 , 7209 18 10 , 7209 26 10 , 7209 27 10 , 7209 28 10	Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8808
			United Kingdom	532,59	532,59	521,01	526,80	552,38	552,38	546,38	546,38	25 %	09.8978
			Iran, Islamic Republic of	159,72	159,72	156,25	157,98	165,65	165,65	163,85	163,85	25 %	09.8809
			Korea, Republic of	244,60	244,60	239,29	241,94	253,69	253,69	250,93	250,93	25 %	09.8806
			Other countries	817,65	817,65	799,87	808,76	848,03	848,03	838,81	838,81	25 %	(3)
3.B		7225 19 90 , 7226 19 80	Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8811
			Korea, Republic of	33 860,21	33 860,21	33 124,12	33 492,16	35 118,40	35 118,40	34 736,68	34 736,68	25 %	09.8812
			China	29 777,29	29 777,29	29 129,96	29 453,62	30 883,77	30 883,77	30 548,08	30 548,08	25 %	09.8813
			Taiwan	23 288,87	23 288,87	22 782,59	23 035,73	24 154,25	24 154,25	23 891,70	23 891,70	25 %	09.8814
			Other countries	8 303,99	8 303,99	8 123,47	8 213,73	8 612,56	8 612,56	8 518,94	8 518,94	25 %	(4)
4.A	Metallic Coated Sheets	TARIC Codes: 7210410020 , 7210410030 , 7210490020 , 7210490030 , 7210610020 , 7210610030 , 7210690020 , 7210690030 , 7212300020 , 7212300030 , 7212 50 20 , 7212506120 , 7212506130 , 7212506920 , 7212506930 , 7225920020 , 7225920030 , 7225990011 , 7225990022 , 7225990023 , 7225990041 , 7225990045 , 7225990091 , 7225990092 , 7225990093 , 7226993010 , 7226993030 , 7226997011 , 7226997013 , 7226997091 , 7226997093 , 7226997094	Korea (Republic of)	36 115,37	36 115,37	35 330,25	35 722,81	37 457,36	37 457,36	37 050,22	37 050,22	25 %	09.8816
			India	51 623,89	51 623,89	50 501,64	51 062,77	53 542,16	53 542,16	52 960,18	52 960,18	25 %	09.8817
			United Kingdom	34 028,35	34 028,35	33 288,60	33 658,47	35 292,79	35 292,79	34 909,17	34 909,17	25 %	09.8979
			Other countries	454 338,51	454 338,51	444 461,58	449 400,05	471 221,03	471 221,03	466 099,06	466 099,06	25 %	(5)
4.B		CN Codes: 7210 20 00 , 7210 30 00 , 7210 90 80 , 7212 20 00 , 7212 50 30 , 7212 50 40 , 7212 50 90 , 7225 91 00 , 7226 99 10 TARIC codes: 7210410080 , 7210490080 , 7210610080 , 7210690080 , 7212300080 , 7212506180 , 7212506980 , 7225920080 , 7225990025 , 7225990095 , 7226993090 , 7226997019 , 7226997096	China	123 409,30	123 409,30	120 726,49	122 067,90	127 995,00	127 995,00	126 603,75	126 603,75	25 %	09.8821
			Korea (Republic of)	160 163,83	160 163,83	156 682,01	158 422,92	166 115,27	166 115,27	164 309,67	164 309,67	25 %	09.8822
			India	73 708,96	73 708,96	72 106,59	72 907,78	76 447,88	76 447,88	75 616,92	75 616,92	25 %	09.8823
			United Kingdom	34 028,35	34 028,35	33 288,60	33 658,47	35 292,79	35 292,79	34 909,17	34 909,17	25 %	09.8980
			Other countries	100 848,08	100 848,08	98 655,73	99 751,91	104 595,44	104 595,44	103 458,53	103 458,53	25 %	(6)
5	Organic Coated Sheets	7210 70 80 , 7212 40 80	India	75 642,86	75 642,86	73 998,45	74 820,66	78 453,64	78 453,64	77 600,88	77 600,88	25 %	09.8826
			Korea, Republic of	68 363,40	68 363,40	66 877,24	67 620,32	70 903,68	70 903,68	70 132,99	70 132,99	25 %	09.8827
			United Kingdom	33 563,94	33 563,94	32 834,29	33 199,12	34 811,13	34 811,13	34 432,75	34 432,75	25 %	09.8981
			Taiwan	21 910,16	21 910,16	21 433,85	21 672,00	22 724,31	22 724,31	22 477,30	22 477,30	25 %	09.8828
			Turkey	15 126,78	15 126,78	14 797,94	14 962,36	15 688,87	15 688,87	15 518,34	15 518,34	25 %	09.8829
			Other countries	41 252,54	41 252,54	40 355,75	40 804,14	42 785,42	42 785,42	42 320,36	42 320,36	25 %	(7)
6	Tin Mill products	7209 18 99 , 7210 11 00 , 7210 12 20 , 7210 12 80 , 7210 50 00 , 7210 70 10 , 7210 90 40 , 7212 10 10 , 7212 10 90 , 7212 40 20	China	106 758,00	106 758,00	104 437,17	105 597,58	110 724,96	110 724,96	109 521,43	109 521,43	25 %	09.8831
			United Kingdom	38 940,37	38 940,37	38 093,84	38 517,11	40 387,34	40 387,34	39 948,34	39 948,34	25 %	09.8982
			Serbia	21 429,38	21 429,38	20 963,53	21 196,46	22 225,67	22 225,67	21 984,08	21 984,08	25 %	09.8832
			Korea, Republic of	15 501,05	15 501,05	15 164,07	15 332,56	16 077,04	16 077,04	15 902,29	15 902,29	25 %	09.8833
			Taiwan	12 887,99	12 887,99	12 607,82	12 747,90	13 366,89	13 366,89	13 221,60	13 221,60	25 %	09.8834
			Other countries	35 715,05	35 715,05	34 938,63	35 326,84	37 042,16	37 042,16	36 639,53	36 639,53	25 %	(8)
7	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Quarto Plates	7208 51 20 , 7208 51 91 , 7208 51 98 , 7208 52 91 , 7208 90 20 , 7208 90 80 , 7210 90 30 , 7225 40 12 , 7225 40 40 , 7225 40 60 , 7225 99 00	Ukraine	270 017,57	270 017,57	264 147,62	267 082,59	280 051,01	280 051,01	277 006,97	277 006,97	25 %	09.8836
7	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Quarto Plates		Other countries	554 571,27	554 571,27	542 515,37	548 543,32	575 178,29	575 178,29	568 926,35	568 926,35	25 %	(9)
8	Stainless Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips	7219 11 00 , 7219 12 10 , 7219 12 90 , 7219 13 10 , 7219 13 90 , 7219 14 10 , 7219 14 90 , 7219 22 10 , 7219 22 90 , 7219 23 00 , 7219 24 00 , 7220 11 00 , 7220 12 00	Other countries	105 581,29	105 581,29	103 286,04	104 433,67	109 504,53	109 504,53	108 314,26	108 314,26	25 %	(10)
▼C1
9	Stainless Cold Rolled Sheets and Strips	7219 31 00 , 7219 32 10 , 7219 32 90 , 7219 33 10 , 7219 33 90 , 7219 34 10 , 7219 34 90 , 7219 35 10 , 7219 35 90 , 7219 90 20 , 7219 90 80 , 7220 20 21 , 7220 20 29 , 7220 20 41 , 7220 20 49 , 7220 20 81 , 7220 20 89 , 7220 90 20 , 7220 90 80	Korea, Republic of	47 773,95	47 773,95	46 735,39	47 254,67	49 549,16	49 549,16	49 010,58	49 010,58	25 %	09.8846
			Taiwan	44 302,39	44 302,39	43 339,29	43 820,84	45 948,59	45 948,59	45 449,15	45 449,15	25 %	09.8847
			India	29 610,23	29 610,23	28 966,53	29 288,38	30 710,50	30 710,50	30 376,69	30 376,69	25 %	09.8848
			South Africa	25 765,68	25 765,68	25 205,56	25 485,62	26 723,10	26 723,10	26 432,63	26 432,63	25 %	09.8853
			United States	24 090,93	24 090,93	23 567,21	23 829,07	24 986,11	24 986,11	24 714,52	24 714,52	25 %	09.8849
			Turkey	20 046,66	20 046,66	19 610,86	19 828,76	20 791,56	20 791,56	20 565,57	20 565,57	25 %	09.8850
			Other countries	63 645,29	63 645,29	62 261,69	62 953,49	66 010,25	66 010,25	65 292,75	65 292,75	25 %	(11)
			▼M9
10	Stainless Hot Rolled Quarto Plates	7219 21 10 , 7219 21 90	China	4 731,30	4 731,30	4 628,44	4 679,87	4 907,10	4 907,10	4 853,77	4 853,77	25 %	09.8856
			India	2 007,05	2 007,05	1 963,42	1 985,24	2 081,63	2 081,63	2 059,01	2 059,01	25 %	09.8857
			South Africa	1 374,32	1 374,32	1 344,44	1 359,38	1 425,39	1 425,39	1 409,89	1 409,89	25 %	09.8859
			United Kingdom	827,96	827,96	809,96	818,96	858,73	858,73	849,39	849,39	25 %	09.8984
			Taiwan	764,41	764,41	747,79	756,10	792,81	792,81	784,19	784,19	25 %	09.8858
			Other countries	1 002,95	1 002,95	981,14	992,04	1 040,21	1 040,21	1 028,91	1 028,91	25 %	(12)
12	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Merchant Bars and Light Sections	7214 30 00 , 7214 91 10 , 7214 91 90 , 7214 99 31 , 7214 99 39 , 7214 99 50 , 7214 99 71 , 7214 99 79 , 7214 99 95 , 7215 90 00 , 7216 10 00 , 7216 21 00 , 7216 22 00 , 7216 40 10 , 7216 40 90 , 7216 50 10 , 7216 50 91 , 7216 50 99 , 7216 99 00 , 7228 10 20 , 7228 20 10 , 7228 20 91 , 7228 30 20 , 7228 30 41 , 7228 30 49 , 7228 30 61 , 7228 30 69 , 7228 30 70 , 7228 30 89 , 7228 60 20 , 7228 60 80 , 7228 70 10 , 7228 70 90 , 7228 80 00	China	135 003,41	135 003,41	132 068,55	133 535,98	140 019,93	140 019,93	138 497,97	138 497,97	25 %	09.8861
			United Kingdom	112 785,82	112 785,82	110 333,95	111 559,89	116 976,77	116 976,77	115 705,28	115 705,28	25 %	09.8985
			Turkey	101 999,52	101 999,52	99 782,14	100 890,83	105 789,67	105 789,67	104 639,78	104 639,78	25 %	09.8862
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8863
			Switzerland	65 555,05	65 555,05	64 129,94	64 842,50	67 990,98	67 990,98	67 251,94	67 251,94	25 %	09.8864
			Belarus	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8865
			Other countries	58 414,15	58 414,15	57 144,27	57 779,21	60 584,73	60 584,73	59 926,20	59 926,20	25 %	(13)
13	Rebars	7214 20 00 , 7214 99 10	Turkey	90 856,92	90 856,92	88 881,77	89 869,35	94 233,03	94 233,03	93 208,76	93 208,76	25 %	09.8866
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8867
			Ukraine	42 298,50	42 298,50	41 378,96	41 838,73	43 870,24	43 870,24	43 393,39	43 393,39	25 %	09.8868
			Bosnia and Herzegovina	32 685,87	32 685,87	31 975,31	32 330,59	33 900,43	33 900,43	33 531,95	33 531,95	25 %	09.8869
			Moldova, Republic of	27 318,01	27 318,01	26 724,14	27 021,07	28 333,10	28 333,10	28 025,13	28 025,13	25 %	09.8870
			Other countries	132 668,90	132 668,90	129 784,79	131 226,85	137 598,67	137 598,67	136 103,03	136 103,03	25 %	(14)
14	Stainless Bars and Light Sections	7222 11 11 , 7222 11 19 , 7222 11 81 , 7222 11 89 , 7222 19 10 , 7222 19 90 , 7222 20 11 , 7222 20 19 , 7222 20 21 , 7222 20 29 , 7222 20 31 , 7222 20 39 , 7222 20 81 , 7222 20 89 , 7222 30 51 , 7222 30 91 , 7222 30 97 , 7222 40 10 , 7222 40 50 , 7222 40 90	India	30 542,92	30 542,92	29 878,94	30 210,93	31 677,84	31 677,84	31 333,52	31 333,52	25 %	09.8871
			United Kingdom	4 463,47	4 463,47	4 366,44	4 414,96	4 629,33	4 629,33	4 579,01	4 579,01	25 %	09.8986
			Switzerland	4 393,46	4 393,46	4 297,95	4 345,71	4 556,72	4 556,72	4 507,19	4 507,19	25 %	09.8872
			Ukraine	3 393,31	3 393,31	3 319,54	3 356,42	3 519,40	3 519,40	3 481,14	3 481,14	25 %	09.8873
			Other countries	4 956,51	4 956,51	4 848,76	4 902,63	5 140,68	5 140,68	5 084,81	5 084,81	25 %	(15)
15	Stainless Wire Rod	7221 00 10 , 7221 00 90	India	7 103,74	7 103,74	6 949,31	7 026,53	7 367,70	7 367,70	7 287,62	7 287,62	25 %	09.8876
			Taiwan	4 580,21	4 580,21	4 480,64	4 530,43	4 750,40	4 750,40	4 698,77	4 698,77	25 %	09.8877
			United Kingdom	3 679,69	3 679,69	3 599,69	3 639,69	3 816,42	3 816,42	3 774,93	3 774,93	25 %	09.8987
			Korea, Republic of	2 286,74	2 286,74	2 237,03	2 261,88	2 371,71	2 371,71	2 345,93	2 345,93	25 %	09.8878
			China	1 548,74	1 548,74	1 515,07	1 531,90	1 606,28	1 606,28	1 588,83	1 588,83	25 %	09.8879
			Japan	1 536,99	1 536,99	1 503,57	1 520,28	1 594,10	1 594,10	1 576,77	1 576,77	25 %	09.8880
			Other countries	773,87	773,87	757,04	765,46	802,62	802,62	793,90	793,90	25 %	(16)
16	Non Alloy and Other Alloy Wire Rod	7213 10 00 , 7213 20 00 , 7213 91 10 , 7213 91 20 , 7213 91 41 , 7213 91 49 , 7213 91 70 , 7213 91 90 , 7213 99 10 , 7213 99 90 , 7227 10 00 , 7227 20 00 , 7227 90 10 , 7227 90 50 , 7227 90 95	United Kingdom	176 384,36	176 384,36	172 549,92	174 467,14	182 938,53	182 938,53	180 950,07	180 950,07	25 %	09.8988
			Ukraine	118 599,40	118 599,40	116 021,16	117 310,28	123 006,38	123 006,38	121 669,35	121 669,35	25 %	09.8881
			Switzerland	130 373,45	130 373,45	127 539,25	128 956,35	135 217,93	135 217,93	133 748,17	133 748,17	25 %	09.8882
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8883
			Turkey	113 300,38	113 300,38	110 837,33	112 068,85	117 510,45	117 510,45	116 233,16	116 233,16	25 %	09.8884
			Belarus	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8885
			Moldova, Republic of	66 581,74	66 581,74	65 134,31	65 858,02	69 055,81	69 055,81	68 305,20	68 305,20	25 %	09.8886
			Other countries	116 864,97	116 864,97	114 324,43	115 594,70	121 207,50	121 207,50	119 890,02	119 890,02	25 %	(17)
17	Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non Alloy Steel	7216 31 10 , 7216 31 90 , 7216 32 11 , 7216 32 19 , 7216 32 91 , 7216 32 99 , 7216 33 10 , 7216 33 90	Ukraine	30 113,25	30 113,25	29 458,61	29 785,93	31 232,21	31 232,21	30 892,73	30 892,73	25 %	09.8891
17	Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non Alloy Steel		Other countries	64 947,85	64 947,85	63 535,94	64 241,90	67 361,21	67 361,21	66 629,03	66 629,03	25 %	(18)
18	Sheet Piling	7301 10 00	China	6 736,44	6 736,44	6 590,00	6 663,22	6 986,76	6 986,76	6 910,82	6 910,82	25 %	09.8901
			United Arab Emirates	3 333,90	3 333,90	3 261,43	3 297,67	3 457,79	3 457,79	3 420,20	3 420,20	25 %	09.8902
			United Kingdom	864,55	864,55	845,76	855,16	896,68	896,68	886,93	886,93	25 %	09.8990
			Other countries	274,44	274,44	268,47	271,45	284,63	284,63	281,54	281,54	25 %	(19)
19	Railway Material	7302 10 22 , 7302 10 28 , 7302 10 40 , 7302 10 50 , 7302 40 00	United Kingdom	4 916,90	4 916,90	4 810,01	4 863,46	5 099,61	5 099,61	5 044,18	5 044,18	25 %	09.8991
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8906
			Turkey	1 498,14	1 498,14	1 465,57	1 481,86	1 553,81	1 553,81	1 536,92	1 536,92	25 %	09.8908
			China	1 449,19	1 449,19	1 417,68	1 433,44	1 503,04	1 503,04	1 486,70	1 486,70	25 %	09.8907
			Other countries	759,42	759,42	742,91	751,17	787,64	787,64	779,08	779,08	25 %	(20)
20	Gas pipes	7306 30 41 , 7306 30 49 , 7306 30 72 , 7306 30 77	Turkey	47 578,14	47 578,14	46 543,83	47 060,99	49 346,07	49 346,07	48 809,70	48 809,70	25 %	09.8911
			India	18 309,56	18 309,56	17 911,53	18 110,55	18 989,92	18 989,92	18 783,51	18 783,51	25 %	09.8912
			North Macedonia	6 762,54	6 762,54	6 615,53	6 689,04	7 013,83	7 013,83	6 937,59	6 937,59	25 %	09.8913
			United Kingdom	6 432,95	6 432,95	6 293,10	6 363,03	6 671,99	6 671,99	6 599,47	6 599,47	25 %	09.8992
			Other countries	10 690,62	10 690,62	10 458,21	10 574,41	11 087,86	11 087,86	10 967,34	10 967,34	25 %	(21)
21	Hollow sections	7306 61 10 , 7306 61 92 , 7306 61 99	Turkey	94 689,32	94 689,32	92 630,86	93 660,09	98 207,83	98 207,83	97 140,35	97 140,35	25 %	09.8916
			United Kingdom	50 502,05	50 502,05	49 404,18	49 953,11	52 378,63	52 378,63	51 809,29	51 809,29	25 %	09.8993
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8917
			North Macedonia	27 955,71	27 955,71	27 347,98	27 651,85	28 994,51	28 994,51	28 679,35	28 679,35	25 %	09.8918
			Ukraine	20 676,33	20 676,33	20 226,85	20 451,59	21 444,63	21 444,63	21 211,54	21 211,54	25 %	09.8919
			Switzerland	15 453,34	15 453,34	15 117,40	15 285,37	16 027,57	16 027,57	15 853,35	15 853,35	25 %	09.8920
			Belarus	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8921
			Other countries	19 871,64	19 871,64	19 439,65	19 655,65	20 610,04	20 610,04	20 386,02	20 386,02	25 %	(22)
22	Seamless Stainless Tubes and Pipes	7304 11 00 , 7304 22 00 , 7304 24 00 , 7304 41 00 , 7304 49 83 , 7304 49 85 , 7304 49 89	India	5 659,79	5 659,79	5 536,75	5 598,27	5 870,10	5 870,10	5 806,30	5 806,30	25 %	09.8926
			Ukraine	3 543,95	3 543,95	3 466,91	3 505,43	3 675,64	3 675,64	3 635,69	3 635,69	25 %	09.8927
			United Kingdom	1 798,90	1 798,90	1 759,80	1 779,35	1 865,75	1 865,75	1 845,47	1 845,47	25 %	09.8994
			Korea, Republic of	1 114,07	1 114,07	1 089,85	1 101,96	1 155,47	1 155,47	1 142,91	1 142,91	25 %	09.8928
			Japan	1 036,03	1 036,03	1 013,51	1 024,77	1 074,53	1 074,53	1 062,85	1 062,85	25 %	09.8929
			China	888,89	888,89	869,57	879,23	921,92	921,92	911,90	911,90	25 %	09.8931
			Other countries	2 586,28	2 586,28	2 530,05	2 558,16	2 682,38	2 682,38	2 653,22	2 653,22	25 %	(23)
24	Other Seamless Tubes	7304 19 10 , 7304 19 30 , 7304 19 90 , 7304 23 00 , 7304 29 10 , 7304 29 30 , 7304 29 90 , 7304 31 20 , 7304 31 80 , 7304 39 50 , 7304 39 82 , 7304 39 83 , 7304 39 88 , 7304 51 81 , 7304 51 89 , 7304 59 82 , 7304 59 83 , 7304 59 89 , 7304 90 00	China	36 946,09	36 946,09	36 142,92	36 544,50	38 318,95	38 318,95	37 902,44	37 902,44	25 %	09.8936
			Ukraine	30 880,76	30 880,76	30 209,44	30 545,10	32 028,25	32 028,25	31 680,11	31 680,11	25 %	09.8937
			Belarus	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8938
			United Kingdom	11 268,07	11 268,07	11 023,11	11 145,59	11 686,77	11 686,77	11 559,74	11 559,74	25 %	09.8995
			United States	8 110,65	8 110,65	7 934,33	8 022,49	8 412,03	8 412,03	8 320,60	8 320,60	25 %	09.8940
			Other countries	43 742,37	43 742,37	42 791,45	43 266,91	45 367,77	45 367,77	44 874,64	44 874,64	25 %	(24)
25.A	Large welded tubes	7305 11 00 , 7305 12 00	Other countries	115 747,59	115 747,59	113 231,34	114 489,47	120 048,60	120 048,60	118 743,72	118 743,72	25 %	(25)
25.B	Large welded tubes	7305 19 00 , 7305 20 00 , 7305 31 00 , 7305 39 00 , 7305 90 00	Turkey	14 371,47	14 371,47	14 059,05	14 215,26	14 905,49	14 905,49	14 743,48	14 743,48	25 %	09.8971
			China	8 134,62	8 134,62	7 957,78	8 046,20	8 436,89	8 436,89	8 345,18	8 345,18	25 %	09.8972
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8973
			United Kingdom	5 903,81	5 903,81	5 775,46	5 839,64	6 123,18	6 123,18	6 056,63	6 056,63	25 %	09.8996
			Korea, Republic of	2 781,17	2 781,17	2 720,71	2 750,94	2 884,52	2 884,52	2 853,16	2 853,16	25 %	09.8974
			Other countries	6 251,05	6 251,05	6 115,16	6 183,11	6 483,33	6 483,33	6 412,86	6 412,86	25 %	(26)
26	Other Welded Pipes	7306 11 00 , 7306 19 00 7306 21 00 , 7306 29 00 , 7306 30 12 , 7306 30 18 , 7306 30 80 , 7306 40 20 , 7306 40 80 , 7306 50 21 , 7306 50 29 , 7306 50 80 , 7306 69 10 , 7306 69 90 , 7306 90 00	Switzerland	46 275,35	46 275,35	45 269,36	45 772,35	47 994,87	47 994,87	47 473,18	47 473,18	25 %	09.8946
			Turkey	36 650,08	36 650,08	35 853,34	36 251,71	38 011,94	38 011,94	37 598,77	37 598,77	25 %	09.8947
			United Kingdom	11 192,00	11 192,00	10 948,70	11 070,35	11 607,88	11 607,88	11 481,71	11 481,71	25 %	09.8997
			Taiwan	8 671,66	8 671,66	8 483,14	8 577,40	8 993,88	8 993,88	8 896,12	8 896,12	25 %	09.8950
			China	7 769,95	7 769,95	7 601,04	7 685,50	8 058,67	8 058,67	7 971,08	7 971,08	25 %	09.8949
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8952
			Other countries	19 298,91	19 298,91	18 879,37	19 089,14	20 016,03	20 016,03	19 798,47	19 798,47	25 %	(27)
27	Non-alloy and other alloy cold finished bars	7215 10 00 , 7215 50 11 , 7215 50 19 , 7215 50 80 , 7228 10 90 , 7228 20 99 , 7228 50 20 , 7228 50 40 , 7228 50 61 , 7228 50 69 , 7228 50 80	Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8956
			Switzerland	40 584,14	40 584,14	39 701,88	40 143,01	42 092,18	42 092,18	41 634,66	41 634,66	25 %	09.8957
			United Kingdom	24 483,32	24 483,32	23 951,08	24 217,20	25 393,08	25 393,08	25 117,07	25 117,07	25 %	09.8998
			China	25 900,31	25 900,31	25 337,26	25 618,79	26 862,73	26 862,73	26 570,74	26 570,74	25 %	09.8958
			Ukraine	29 232,30	29 232,30	28 596,82	28 914,56	30 318,53	30 318,53	29 988,98	29 988,98	25 %	09.8959
			Other countries	30 366,43	30 366,43	29 706,29	30 036,36	31 494,80	31 494,80	31 152,46	31 152,46	25 %	(28)
28	Non Alloy Wire	7217 10 10 , 7217 10 31 , 7217 10 39 , 7217 10 50 , 7217 10 90 , 7217 20 10 , 7217 20 30 , 7217 20 50 , 7217 20 90 , 7217 30 41 , 7217 30 49 , 7217 30 50 , 7217 30 90 , 7217 90 20 , 7217 90 50 , 7217 90 90	Belarus	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8961
			China	75 996,55	75 996,55	74 344,45	75 170,50	78 820,47	78 820,47	77 963,72	77 963,72	25 %	09.8962
			Russian Federation	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	25 %	09.8963
			Turkey	49 453,52	49 453,52	48 378,45	48 915,98	51 291,14	51 291,14	50 733,63	50 733,63	25 %	09.8964
			Ukraine	37 294,60	37 294,60	36 483,85	36 889,22	38 680,41	38 680,41	38 259,97	38 259,97	25 %	09.8965
			Other countries	47 545,89	47 545,89	46 512,29	47 029,09	49 312,63	49 312,63	48 776,62	48 776,62	25 %	(29)
(1) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8601 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8602 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey: 09.8572, for India: 09.8573, for Korea (Republic of): 09.8574, for Serbia: 09.8575 and for United Kingdom: 09.8599 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (2) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8603 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8604 From 1.4 to 30.6: For India, Korea (Republic of), Ukraine, Brazil, Serbia* and United Kingdom: 09.8567 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (3) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8605 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8606 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Korea (Republic of), Iran (Islamic republic of) and United Kingdom: 09.8568 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (4) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8607 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8608 09.8816From 1.4 to 30.6: For Korea (Republic of), China and Taiwan: 09.8569 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (5) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8609 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8610 From 1.4 to 30.6: For India, Korea (Republic of) and United Kingdom: 09.8570 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (6) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8611 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8612 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China: 09.8581, for Korea (Republic of): 09.8582, for India: 09.8583, for United Kingdom: 09.8584 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (7) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8613 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8614 (8) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8615 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8616 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China, Korea (Republic of), Taiwan, Serbia* and United Kingdom: 09.8576 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (9) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8617 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8618 (10) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8619 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8620 (11) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8621 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8622 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Korea (Republic of), Taiwan, India, South Africa, United States of America, Turkey and Malaysia: 09.8578 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (12) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8623 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8624 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China, India, South Africa, Taiwan and United Kingdom: 09.8591 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (13) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8625 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8626 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China, Turkey, Switzerland* and United Kingdom: 09.8592 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (14) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8627 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8628 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina* and Moldova: 09.8593In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (15) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8629 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8630 From 1.4 to 30.6: For India, Switzerland, Ukraine* and United Kingdom: 09.8594 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (16) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8631 09.8907 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8632 From 1.4 to 30.6: For India, Taiwan, Korea (Republic of), China, Japan* and United Kingdom: 09.8595 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (17) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8633 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8634 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Ukraine, Switzerland, Turkey, Moldaova and United Kingdom: 09.8558 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (18) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8635 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8636 (19) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8637 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8638 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom: 09.8580 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (20) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8639 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8640 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China, Turkey and United Kingdom: 09.8585 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (21) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8641 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8642 (22) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8643 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8644 (23) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8645 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8646 From 1.4 to 30.6: For India, Ukraine, Korea (Republic of), Japan, China* and United Kingdom: 09.8597 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (24) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8647 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8648 From 1.4 to 30.6: For China, Ukraine, United States of America* and United Kingdom: 09.8586 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (25) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8657 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8658 (26) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8659 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8660 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey, China, Korea (Republic of)* and United Kingdom: 09.8587 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (27) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8651 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8652 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Switzerland, Turkey, Taiwan, China and United Kingdom: 09.8588 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (28) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8653 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8654 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Switzerland, China , Ukraine* and United Kingdom: 09.8539 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5 (29) From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8655 From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8656 From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey, Ukraine and China : 09.8598 In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

IV.2 – Volumes of global and residual tariff–rate quotas per trimester

Product Number	Allocation by country (Where Applicable)	Year 2				Year 3
		From 1.7.2022 to 30.9.2022	From 1.10.2022 to 31.12.2022	From 1.1.2023 to 31.3.2023	From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023	From 1.7.2023 to 30.9.2023	From 1.10.2023 to 31.12.2023	From 1.1.2024 to 31.3.2024	From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024
		Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)	Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)
1	Other countries	900 290,25	900 290,25	880 718,72	890 504,48	933 743,65	933 743,65	923 594,27	923 594,27
2	Other countries	321 824,43	321 824,43	314 828,25	318 326,34	333 782,94	333 782,94	330 154,85	330 154,85
3A	Other countries	817,65	817,65	799,87	808,76	848,03	848,03	838,81	838,81
3B	Other countries	8 303,99	8 303,99	8 123,47	8 213,73	8 612,56	8 612,56	8 518,94	8 518,94
4A	Other countries	454 338,51	454 338,51	444 461,58	449 400,05	471 221,03	471 221,03	466 099,06	466 099,06
4B	Other countries	100 848,08	100 848,08	98 655,73	99 751,91	104 595,44	104 595,44	103 458,53	103 458,53
5	Other countries	41 252,54	41 252,54	40 355,75	40 804,14	42 785,42	42 785,42	42 320,36	42 320,36
6	Other countries	35 715,05	35 715,05	34 938,63	35 326,84	37 042,16	37 042,16	36 639,53	36 639,53
7	Other countries	554 571,27	554 571,27	542 515,37	548 543,32	575 178,29	575 178,29	568 926,35	568 926,35
8	Other countries	105 581,29	105 581,29	103 286,04	104 433,67	109 504,53	109 504,53	108 314,26	108 314,26
▼C1
9	Other countries	63 645,29	63 645,29	62 261,69	62 953,49	66 010,25	66 010,25	65 292,75	65 292,75
▼M9
10	Other countries	1 002,95	1 002,95	981,14	992,04	1 040,21	1 040,21	1 028,91	1 028,91
12	Other countries	58 414,15	58 414,15	57 144,27	57 779,21	60 584,73	60 584,73	59 926,20	59 926,20
13	Other countries	132 668,90	132 668,90	129 784,79	131 226,85	137 598,67	137 598,67	136 103,03	136 103,03
14	Other countries	4 956,51	4 956,51	4 848,76	4 902,63	5 140,68	5 140,68	5 084,81	5 084,81
15	Other countries	773,87	773,87	757,04	765,46	802,62	802,62	793,90	793,90
16	Other countries	116 864,97	116 864,97	114 324,43	115 594,70	121 207,50	121 207,50	119 890,02	119 890,02
17	Other countries	64 947,85	64 947,85	63 535,94	64 241,90	67 361,21	67 361,21	66 629,03	66 629,03
18	Other countries	274,44	274,44	268,47	271,45	284,63	284,63	281,54	281,54
19	Other countries	759,42	759,42	742,91	751,17	787,64	787,64	779,08	779,08
20	Other countries	10 690,62	10 690,62	10 458,21	10 574,41	11 087,86	11 087,86	10 967,34	10 967,34
21	Other countries	19 871,64	19 871,64	19 439,65	19 655,65	20 610,04	20 610,04	20 386,02	20 386,02
22	Other countries	2 586,28	2 586,28	2 530,05	2 558,16	2 682,38	2 682,38	2 653,22	2 653,22
24	Other countries	43 742,37	43 742,37	42 791,45	43 266,91	45 367,77	45 367,77	44 874,64	44 874,64
25A	Other countries	115 747,59	115 747,59	113 231,34	114 489,47	120 048,60	120 048,60	118 743,72	118 743,72
25B	Other countries	6 251,05	6 251,05	6 115,16	6 183,11	6 483,33	6 483,33	6 412,86	6 412,86
26	Other countries	19 298,91	19 298,91	18 879,37	19 089,14	20 016,03	20 016,03	19 798,47	19 798,47
27	Other countries	30 366,43	30 366,43	29 706,29	30 036,36	31 494,80	31 494,80	31 152,46	31 152,46
28	Other countries	47 545,89	47 545,89	46 512,29	47 029,09	49 312,63	49 312,63	48 776,62	48 776,62

IV.3 – Maximum volume of residual quota accessible in last quarters to countries with a country specific quota

Product category	New alocated quota in tonnes
Product category	From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023	From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024
1	Special regime	Special regime
2	318 326,34	330 154,85
3.A	808,76	838,81
3.B	8 213,73	8 518,94
4.A	449 400,05	466 099,06
4.B	Special regime	Special regime
5	No access to the residual quota in Q4	No access to the residual quota in Q4
6	35 326,84	36 639,53
7	Not applicable	Not applicable
8	Not applicable	Not applicable
9	No access to the residual quota in Q4	No access to the residual quota in Q4
10	992,04	1 028,91
12	22 671,97	23 514,42
13	53 215,94	55 193,36
14	3 652,73	3 788,46
15	765,46	793,90
16	18 138,68	18 812,69
17	Not applicable	Not applicable
18	271,45	281,54
19	751,17	779,08
20	960,89	996,60
21	No access to the residual quota in Q4	No access to the residual quota in Q4
22	2 558,16	2 653,22
24	43 266,91	44 874,64
25.A	Not applicable	Not applicable
25.B	6 183,11	6 412,86
26	19 089,14	19 798,47
27	4 699,24	4 873,85
28	47 029,09	48 776,62

▼M10

ANNEX V

Attractiveness of Union market

(1) In its original determination, the Commission explained that the Union steel market was attractive for imports in terms of size and prices ( 2 ). In this respect, according to OECD data ( 3 ), in the years prior to the initiation of the investigation that led to the imposition of a safeguard measure, the Union market was the largest importing territory in terms of volumes, accounting from 13,8 % to 18,4 % of the global share of imports throughout this period.

(2) In addition to the volumes, the Union market was also very attractive in terms of prices. In fact, an analysis of the relevant data ( 4 ) showed that the main steel exporting countries to the Union achieved, for a large proportion of their exports (from 46 % to 78 % of the CN codes concerned), a higher price in the Union market as compared to the export prices achieved in other third markets for the same CN codes. For these countries, the Union market also represented an important share of their exports, being the main or among their main export destinations, in some cases reaching more than 25 % share and even reaching 32 % in a given year ( 5 ).

(3) The attractiveness of the Union market was also confirmed by the fact that while the main steel exporting countries ( 6 ) were reducing exports to third countries, they were increasing their exports to the Union at a fast pace. In particular, exports to other third countries from these origins decreased by more than 11 million tonnes (-8 %) in 2018 ( 7 ) when compared to 2017 ( 8 ). On the other hand, in the same period, imports into the Union from these origins increased by more than 3 million tonnes (+14 %) ( 9 ). These opposite trends showed that while imports to other third countries decreased generally, in a context of increasing overcapacity and increased restriction to access markets worldwide (see Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 below), and in the absence of any major positive developments in their domestic consumption, exporting producers seized the opportunity to dispose of ever larger volumes into the Union market.

(4) Therefore, the above set of data shows that, unequivocally, the Union market was attractive for exporting producers in terms of both volumes and prices.

1. ANALYSIS

1.1. Increased imports as a result of unforeseen developments

(5) The subsections below thus provide with additional information and a more detailed explanation linking each of the unforeseen developments identified with the increase in imports that took place, thereby supplementing the original findings.

1.1.1. Increase of imports to the Union due to global overcapacity in the steel sector

(6) In the original determination, the Commission established that overcapacity existed in the steel sector and that despite efforts aiming to reduce it; it had nevertheless increased over the period of investigation ( 10 ).

(7) Several sources have consistently confirmed the direct link between excess capacity in the steel sector and its effects on exports. For instance, the OECD noted, ‘Excessive levels of steelmaking capacity have important implications for the steel industry, often associated with over-supply, low prices, and weak profitability’ ( 11 ). It also noted that ‘At the global level, the effects of excess capacity are transmitted through trade; excess capacity can lead to export surges, leading to price declines and market share losses for import-competing domestic producers’ ( 12 ).

(8) Similarly, other studies point into the same direction. A 2014 ‘Economic Policy Institute’ paper ( 13 ), which noted, “Excess capacity means that steel production facilities have the capacity to produce much more steel than the market demands. High fixed costs, capital intensity, and the large scale of steelmaking encourages to export the surplus at below-market rates. […] ‘Excess capacity leads to overproduction and surges of exports’ and that ‘[t]he high capital intensity of the industry leads producers to maximize production to cover fixed costs, and this in turn leads them to dump excess production on foreign markets—particularly the attractive U.S. market—when domestic demand lags. This has led to repeated surges in unfairly traded steel over the years.’

(9) In the same vein the European Commission, in a 2016 Communication, also stated, ‘The excess production of steel has recently led to a dramatic increase of exports, the destabilisation of global steel markets and depression of steel prices world-wide.’ ( 14 ).

(10) Therefore, there is a generally accepted economic rationale explaining the action of exporting producers of offloading their excess capacity into third country markets (usually at lower prices) to at least contribute to covering part of their costs.

(11) The Commission then assessed in further detail the direct link between the confirmed existing (and increasing) overcapacity in the steel sector, and the increase of imports into the Union.

(12) In a situation of overcapacity, and having an incentive to offload their excess capacity, exporting producers would target those markets which allow them to sell, in principle, higher volumes at, ideally, better prices (as compared to other third markets). In this respect, the Commission explained in recitals (1) to (4) that the Union was an attractive market for exporting producers both in terms of size and price levels. The import data available also showed that imports into the Union had increased rapidly and in great volumes in the period where overcapacity was also increasing ( 15 ) and that they did it at much faster pace than Union consumption ( 16 ), and it also showed that imports to the Union continued to increase while the trend of exports to other third countries was the opposite. In addition, data in the Provisional Regulation showed that exporting producers were consistently undercutting Union producers (in some cases significantly), showing their determination to remain benefiting from the attractive conditions of the Union market ( 17 ). The magnitude and pace of imports into the Union at consistently lower prices than those of the Union industry, in a context of a much slower consumption growth, could have hardly been reasonably explained in the first place if it were not for a context of increasing overcapacity, which was at the core of exporting producers’ behaviour.

(13) Accordingly, the Commission concluded that imports into the Union increased as a result of overcapacity in the steel sector in the original period of investigation.

1.1.2. Increase of trade defence measures and trade restrictive measures in third countries

(14) In recitals (33) and (34) of the Provisional Regulation, the Commission explained that there had been a significant increase in the use of trade defence instruments in the steel sector in particular in the years prior to the initiation of the EU safeguard investigation. The Provisional Regulation stated that ‘whereas during 2011-2013 on average around 77 steel-related investigations had been initiated per year, during 2015-2016 this average increased to 117’. Furthermore, third countries continued throughout 2017 to impose trade restrictive measures ( 18 ).

(15) In overall terms, the Commission observed from the data ( 19 ) it analysed that more than 300 trade defence measures on steel products ( 20 ) had been imposed in the period 2013-2017.

(16) A breakdown of these figures revealed that these measures had been imposed by a large number of countries (at least 24 jurisdictions), and among them, all the main steel importing countries ( 21 ). These countries had imposed 157 measures in the period 2013-2017, i.e. more than 52 % of the total.

(17) At the same time, the top exporting countries to the Union were, in this period, subject to a large amount of measures in numerous jurisdictions. Taking as an example the top seven exporters to the Union ( 22 ), the Commission observed that they were subject to around 200 measures, this is, around 66 % of the total measures in place in at least 24 different third countries.

(18) Therefore, the Commission confirmed that the magnitude of the TDI measures, in terms of number of individual measures and countries affected (both imposing and subject to the measures) was very significant. The Commission further noted that data on the original file suggested that these figures could be even rather conservative ( 23 ). In addition, the duties imposed pursuant to those measures appeared to be sufficiently high to impact the level of imports entering those markets as compared to the period before these measures were in place. This was reflected in an overall decrease in exports from countries subject to TDI measures into third markets (see recital (19)), despite the fact that the overall market conditions had not changed significantly ( 24 ) and thus would not, in principle, justify a reduction of volumes exported of such magnitude if it was not for the effects of the level of the measures.

(19) In this respect, the Commission confirmed based on the data analysed that a common effect of the imposition of trade defence measures was the reduction (in many cases significant) of imports into the countries subject to measures in the period subsequent to their imposition. In this regard, the Commission observed that, based on an analysis of its own TDI investigations on steel products ( 25 ), imports decreased on average by up to 82 % when compared to the level of imports in the investigation period that lead to the imposition of measures. In those cases, the volumes of imports affected were significant ( 26 ). The Commission also confirmed that TDI measures on steel had a similar effect when imposed by third countries. In a sample of 26 cases assessed ( 27 ), the Commission confirmed that the reduction of imports was on average 73 %, and that the volumes affected were also relevant ( 28 ). Therefore, the imposition of TDI measures by third countries reduced the volume of exports to those countries, which were, at least partially, directed to the Union market.

(20) Furthermore, another set of data showing the clear connection between the increasing number of trade defence measures in third countries and the increase in imports into the Union market is the opposing trends of exports of the main steel exporting countries to the Union explained in recital (3) ( 29 ). In view of the large amount of trade defence measures imposed by third countries and the effects they have on the volumes of imports into the countries imposing a measure (as detailed in recitals (18) and (19)), this trend confirms that their ability to export to third countries was significantly curtailed. Therefore, they sought to dispose of these additional volumes (also affected by overcapacity) into the attractive Union market, which as a result experienced a consistent increase in imports over the same period, at a pace substantially higher than the evolution of consumption.

(21) The graph below ( 30 ) illustrates these trends.

(22) The Commission also observed that the overall steel consumption did not see any major reduction in that period that would explain such a decrease in exports to third countries. Hence, the reduction of exports to other third countries could only be reasonably explained by the limiting effect of the wide array of TDI measures or other trade restrictive measures imposed by a large number of jurisdictions.

(23) Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the increase in TDI and other trade restrictive measures across third countries had resulted in increased imports into the Union during the period considered.

1.1.3. US Section 232 measure

(24) In recitals (58) to (61) of the Definitive Regulation the Commission explained the link between the US Section 232 measures and the increase of imports into the Union. In addition, in recitals (101) to (110) of the Definitive Regulation, the Commission also assessed the evolution of imports into both the Union and US markets ( 31 ).

(25) Because the data assessed to determine an increase in imports stopped at the end of June 2018 (end of Most Recent Period or ‘MRP’), it covered import trends into the Union and into the US for a relatively short period after the US Section 232 came into effect. Nevertheless, as explained in recital (58) of the Definitive Regulation, the investigation leading to the US measure had already been initiated in April 2017 and the report setting the basis for the later adoption of the measure was published in January 2018, and hence the first signs of trade diversion were already identified.

(26) The data showed that while during the first half of 2018 imports into the US decreased by almost 1 million tonnes (-7 %) when compared to the same period in 2017, imports into the Union followed an almost identical opposite trend, with an increase in imports of 1,2 million tonnes (+7 %).

(27) This trend is explained because the main steel exporting countries to the Union also exported relevant volumes to the US market. While export volumes to the US were decreasing (as a result of the effects of the 25 % duty under the US Section 232), the volume of exports of some of these countries to the Union increased in parallel. Furthermore, and as explained in recital (3) above, exports from these countries into other third markets generally decreased.

(28) Therefore, the impossibility to export in the same amounts to the US after the US Section 232 measure entered into force put exporting countries in a situation where they were forced to seek other outlets for their steel. In this case, because the Union market was very attractive in terms of size and prices compared to other third markets, it was a natural target for exporting countries and this resulted in increased imports, notably from origins who lost export volumes to the US. These trends are shown in the graphs below ( 32 ).

(29) In view of these facts, the Commission confirmed that the increase in imports into the Union that took place in the period of investigation was the result (together with the other unforeseen developments established) of the US Section 232 measure.

Cumulative assessment

(30) The Commission also concluded that the increase in imports occurred as a result of the combination of all the identified unforeseen developments (global overcapacity, increase of trade defence measures and trade restrictive measures in third countries and the US Section 232 measure). The existence of several unforeseen developments at the same time reinforces the finding of a logical connection between the increase in imports into the Union, which was an attractive and major market for steel exports, and the identified unforeseen developments.

1.2. Threat of serious injury

(31) The original determination established that if the Union did not impose a safeguard measure, there was a threat of serious injury for the domestic producers as imports were expected to continue increasing, notably due (but not limited) to trade diversion originating in the US Section 232 measure, and thus to add import pressure in terms of price and volumes ( 33 ). This section of the Regulation will develop in further detail why a threat of serious injury existed and was well founded in light of the evidence available at the time of the imposition of the definitive measure. To do so, this section of the Regulation will provide additional explanations and clarifications on the following aspects leading to the finding of a threat of serious injury: i) situation of the Union industry and reasons explaining its partial recovery in 2017; ii) role of EU TDI measures in the situation of the Union industry; iii) impact of US Section 232 measure – including recent import evolution into the Union; iv) most recent evolution of steel and raw material prices; v) state of play of TDI measures in third countries and overcapacity; vi) market outlooks and forecasts.

Continuous attractiveness of the Union market

(32) In recitals (1) to (4) above, the Commission explained how the Union market was attractive in terms of size and prices and how these features contributed to an increasing amount of imports into the Union market in the period of investigation.

(33) The Commission’s considered that these features remained the same at the end of the investigation that led to the imposition of the definitive safeguard, confirming that in 2018, the Union market continued to be an attractive market in terms of size ( 34 ) and prices. The main steel exporting countries to the Union achieved a higher price in the Union market as compared to the export prices achieved in other third markets for 48 % to 81 % of the CN codes concerned ( 35 ). Thus confirming the continuous attractiveness in terms of prices. Regarding size, the Union continued to be a relevant export market, representing for some exporting countries almost 40 % and for some of them around 25 % of their total exports, depending on the exporting country ( 36 ).

(34) Furthermore, the Commission concluded that there were no elements among the data assessed, including submissions from interested parties, indicating that the Union market would become any less attractive in the near future. In fact, as shown in this Annex (see as an example subsections 1.2.3 and 1.2.5 below) there was an increasing lack of alternative outlets where exporting producers could reach the same or similar volumes of exports as they did in the past, and as a result the import pressure on the attractive Union market would increase even further.

1.2.1. Situation of the Union industry and factors explaining its partial recovery in 2017

(35) Section VI.1 of the Provisional Regulation and Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of the Definitive Regulation explained the situation of the Union industry at the end of the period analysed, and the evolution of the injury indicators since 2013, concluding that Union industry was in a fragile and vulnerable position.

(36) The finding of vulnerability despite a partial improvement in 2017, was explained by a number of factors that allowed the Union industry to reach, only in 2017, overall healthier levels of profitability than in previous years despite continuous increasing imports ( 37 ).

(37) First, the profitability of the Union industry throughout the period analysed showed a generally poor performance, incurring losses (2013) or achieving very low level of profits (2014-2016). While in 2017 the industry achieved for the first time in a period of five years a healthier level of profitability, this did not reach a magnitude that would make up for the previous performance over a four-year period. Even on that year, for a large number of product categories, profitability remained low. Three product categories remained loss making and 13 product categories close to break-even. Only seven product categories could recover to a level of profit above 6 % in 2017 ( 38 ). In this respect, a key different factor in 2017 related to the evolution and level of its unit sales prices and the difference with the cost of production compared with that of previous years. Regarding the price, in 2017 it increased by around 18 % with respect to the previous year (106 EUR/tonne increase). At the same time, even if the cost of production also increased in that year (by 82 EUR/tonne compared with the previous year) ( 39 ), the Union industry was able to achieve the biggest (positive) margin between the two in the period analysed (36 EUR/tonne), which resulted in higher profitability ( 40 ). However, this exceptional ( 41 ) situation was, according to the most recent developments analysed in the investigation not expected to be of a long-lasting nature and there were clear trends showing that it was already reversing (see Section 1.2.4).

(38) Second, while the Union industry was able to increase its volume of sales in overall terms by 7 % in 2017 when compared to 2013 ( 42 ), contributing to improving partially its performance in that year, it was clearly unable to fully benefit from a much higher increase in consumption in the same period (+14 %) ( 43 ) in the Union market although it continued to have sufficient capacity available in 2017 (76 % in 2017 of capacity utilisation compared to 75 % in 2016) ( 44 ) to increase its domestic sales further. It is noteworthy that the Union industry barely improved its capacity utilisation in 2017 compared with the previous year. Such suppressed performance could be explained by the significant increasing import pressure (in terms of volumes and prices) that the Union industry suffered in the period assessed. In fact, imports benefitted to a much larger extent than Union producers from the increase in consumption. While Union producers lost market share consistently year-on-year (from 87,2 % to 81,9 %) ( 45 ) imports experienced a drastic increase (+71 %) ( 46 ), representing an increase in their market share from 12,7 % in 2013 to 18,8 % in 2017 ( 47 ). The market share of imports in the MRP was 18,8 %, which was even higher than in 2017 (18,1 %). These trends could be explained by the consistent undercutting of imports ( 48 ), which thus prevented the Union industry from realising either the full (or at least a greater) potential of market developments.

(39) Third, while market conditions overall improved (with increased consumption, domestic sales and price levels), the Union industry was still unable to translate this into more employment, which had suffered the loss of nearly 10 000 workers in the Union in the period 2013-2017 ( 49 ). In 2017 employment level even decreased very slightly compared to 2016. Lastly, stocks grew by 19 % over the investigation period and remained high in 2017 ( 50 ).

(40) Therefore, the Union industry improved partially its performance in 2017 as a result of a combination of factors, notably the increase in consumption and of domestic sales and the higher difference between steel and raw material price ( 51 ) but this improvement was nevertheless limited by the degree of import pressure suffered in that year, which did not allow the Union industry to benefit to a greater extent from such existing factors. The continuous loss of market share and the persistent undercutting across product categories, or the jobs that it was not able to recuperate, were clear signs that its situation was not that of an industry that had fully recovered from the effects of previous negative performances in previous years, and that import pressure was playing a key role in impeding such recovery.

(41) Since some of these factors that developed positively in 2017 were reversing in 2018 (see below latest developments and expected performance for steel and raw material prices, as well as expected trends in consumption) in a situation where import pressure was expected to increase in terms of volumes and prices, the impact on the financial situation of the Union industry would be negative.

(42) In other words, while the Union industry was able partially recover due to the cumulated positive developments of a series of key factors in the market and to slower increase of imports in 2017 compared with previous years ( 52 ), the negative turn that most of these factors were showing at the end of 2018 would necessarily result in a worsening of the Union industry’s situation against the ongoing further increase of import pressure, which this time, due to its magnitude and the expected prevailing market context, the Union industry would not be able to sustain. As a result, the situation of the Union industry at the end of the investigation period was that of vulnerability to a further surge in imports.

1.2.2. Role of Union TDI measures in the situation of the Union industry in 2017

(43) In this Section the Commission provides the necessary additional explanations and supporting data regarding the role played by TDI measures on the partial recovery of the Union industry in 2017.

(44) In the first place, to carry out this exercise, the Commission selected those measures imposed in the years 2015 and 2016 because the Commission considered that those would be the measures whose effects on the Union industry’s performance in 2017 could be partially attributed to ( 53 ). Therefore, under these parameters, prior to 2017 the Commission had imposed six TDI measures on imports from product categories which were subsequently subject to the safeguard measure ( 54 ).

(45) These measures were the following ( 55 ): Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/501 ( 56 ), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181 ( 57 ), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1778 ( 58 ), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/113 ( 59 ), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1777 ( 60 ) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 ( 61 ).

(46) The Commission observed that the profitability of Union producers in these product categories systematically improved in the year following the imposition of measures. In particular, the Commission found that, in 2017, profitability generally improved ( 62 ), although for a large number of category products profitability remained low, in particular for the product categories subject to recent TDI measures, and that import prices of third countries (other than those subject to the TDI measures in question) generally increased temporarily in 2017 following the imposition of the TDI measures ( 63 ).

(47) Furthermore, the volumes affected by the recent trade defence measures represented around 40 % of total imports within the product categories subject to recent TDI measures in the period considered ( 64 ) and in the years following the imposition of those TDI measures their volumes in the Union market went down by more than 90 % ( 65 ). Therefore, the substantial reduction of unfair traded imports that ensued the imposition of measures generally allowed Union producers and other exporting countries to increase their sales prices in 2017.

(48) Moreover all product categories subject to recent trade defence measures experienced a significant improvement in profitability ( 66 ), several of which exceeded 6 % in 2017 ( 67 ). For the rest of categories, the picture was more diverse, with few categories exceeding or reaching close to 6 % profitability ( 68 ), other categories improving but still showing weak or low profitability levels ( 69 ), and others loss-making or around 1 % profitability ( 70 ), irrespective of the recent trends. Thus showing that the picture in terms of evolution of profitability was not homogeneous among categories and that in overall terms, most categories ( 71 ) were, in 2017, either loss making or with unhealthy levels of profitability, even if their situation had improved in some cases as compared to the previous year. Thus confirming the fragility of the overall situation of the Union industry despite the situation being better than the preceding year.

(49) However, as explained below, the trend of increasing pricing in 2017 was temporary and started reversing in 2018 when the Union was faced with a surge in imports mainly from third countries not subject to trade defence measures and the trade diversion caused by the US Section 232 measure. This is shown by the volume of imports in the MRP that reached a record figure of 31 314 tonnes despite the imposition of recent trade defence measures in some product categories. This showed that while recent TDI measures contributed to the partial and temporary improvement of the Union industry, they also benefitted those exporting countries not subject to measures, which had also started to increase significantly their presence in the Union market ( 72 ).

(50) Hence, the Commission confirmed that the imposition of TDI measures contributed to the overall performance of Union producers, insofar as these categories were concerned ( 73 ).

(51) In addition, the reasoning in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 clearly showed that some factors explaining the partial recovery of the Union (e.g. consumption) did not affect or benefit Union producers and exporting countries equally or similarly, as the latter were able to increase greatly (+71 % in volumes) their presence in the Union market at the expense of Union producers which lost market share, and only saw a relatively modest increase in overall sales volumes (+7 %) when compared to the continuous growth of imports.

1.2.3. Impact of US Section 232 measure

(52) In the Definitive Regulation ( 74 ) the Commission reached the conclusion that the US Section 232 would be liable of significant trade diversion into the Union market.

(53) In this respect, the Commission has conducted a more detailed analysis of the import patterns into the Union and the USA, both in overall terms and then further analysing the behaviour of certain exporting countries. This analysis showed that when comparing the imports into the US and into the Union in the first half of 2018 with the first half of 2017, imports into the US decreased by almost 1 million tonnes (-7 %) when compared to the same period in 2017, imports into the Union followed an almost identical opposite trend, with an increase in imports of 1,2 million tonnes (+7 %) (See recital (26) above). When assessing the developments in the second half of 2018 and the same period in 2017, these opposing trends become more acute. In fact, imports into the US decreased by 2,4 million tonnes (-19 %) while imports into the Union increased by more than 2 million tonnes (+15 %) ( 75 ).

(54) This resulted in an overall yearly reduction of imports into the US of 3,3 million tonnes (-13 %) and an increase of imports into the Union of 3,2 million tonnes (+11 %), out of which 72 % of the total volumes reduced into the US and 63 % of the imports increase in the Union took place in the second half of 2018 ( 76 ).

(55) Therefore, the pace and magnitude at which these trends of imports accelerated in the second half of 2018 showed that the impact of the US Section 232 measure was taking progressively more effect as it had been in place already for a few months, and that exporting countries were rapidly adjusting to the new market situation ( 77 ).

(56) Zooming in into the behaviour of exporting countries to both the US and EU market, the Commission confirmed this trend. For instance, countries like Türkiye, Russia, South Korea and Taiwan ( 78 ), which accounted for significant volumes of exports to the US and to the Union, saw the following trends in 2018 when compared to 2017: Türkiye decreased its exports to the US by around 850 000 tonnes (-45 %) and it increased its exports to the Union by 2,6 million tonnes (+56 %). Similarly, Russia’s exports to the US went down by more than 250 000 tonnes (-36 %) and increased by 870 000 tonnes (+23 %) in the Union, South Korea’s exports to the US decreased by more than 880 000 tonnes (-27 %) while increasing in the Union by around 250 000 tonnes (+8 %), and lastly Taiwan’s exports to the US went down by around 160 000 tonnes (-14 %) while increased by more than 500 000 tonnes (+40 %) in the Union ( 79 ).

(57) Therefore, these figures showed that exporting producers were generally able to ship, at least part of the volumes lost in the US, to the Union market, and in some cases to increase their presence in the Union market well above the volumes lost in the US. Given the size of the US market ( 80 ), the fact that the US Section 232 measure was still in its first months of application and hence had not yet reached its full intended effects ( 81 ), it was reasonable to expect that the exports to the US would continue to decrease in significant volumes and that exporting producers would be able to adapt to these circumstances and increase their presence in the Union market even further.

(58) Therefore, the Commission confirmed that the US Section 232 measure was liable to cause an even greater trade diversion of exports into the Union market in the near future.

1.2.4. Most recent evolution of steel and raw material prices

(59) In the Definitive Regulation the Commission noted that ‘steel prices in the Union started to follow a declining trend since the third quarter of 2018’ ( 82 ).

(60) In this respect the Commission observed in section 1.2.1 above, that one of the factors that explained a partial improvement in the Union industry’s performance in 2017 was that the difference between steel price and raw material cost was higher than in any of the previous years of the period analysed. However, a further detailed analysis of the most recent developments prior to the imposition of a definitive measure showed that the trend was reversing and that the positive difference between the two was squeezing progressively, and therefore that would have a negative impact on the economic performance of the Union industry.

(61) As shown in the graph 4 below ( 83 ), steel prices in the Union saw a steady decline in the second half of 2018. This trend could be expected to continue in light of the uncertain market prospects (see Section 1.2.6) and as a result of the continuous and increasing import pressure in terms of volumes and prices, which against a worsening or uncertain market conditions, would likely have a downwards effect on prices, thus not allowing Union industry to adapt its prices to the increased costs. In the graph 5 ( 84 ) it is observed how the price of some of the main steelmaking raw materials were increasing constantly over the same period.

(62) Therefore, such combined trends, for which there were no signs of reversal in the near future, would put the Union industry in an even more strained financial situation.

(63) In addition, the Commission considered that in a likely scenario of further import pressure and in a market that was not to experience any significant growth, the trends of undercutting domestic prices identified in the original investigation would exacerbate further. Thus creating additional difficulties to Union producers who would face the decision either to compete for market share, at the expense of more sustainable prices, or to preserve a higher level of prices at the expense of continuing to lose market share. In both scenarios, its financial performance would be negatively impacted.

(64) Furthermore, the Commission noted that this evolution in prices coincided with the period when a provisional safeguard measure was already in place (since mid-July 2018). Therefore showing that exporting countries were having an even more aggressive import behaviour under the measure, and showing their continued interest to enter the Union market in large volumes despite a provisional safeguard measure being in place.

1.2.5. State of play of TDI measures in third countries and overcapacity

(65) In Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 the Commission explained the evolution and more recent situation of overcapacity and TDI measures in third countries. In view of that information, the Commission considered that it was highly unlikely that there would be a reversal of the existing situation in the near future. For instance, TDI measures are usually imposed for a period of five years, and they can be prolonged further. In particular, because many of the measures had been imposed within the few years prior to the adoption of the EU steel safeguard measure ( 85 ), they were set to continue in place a least for the immediate future. Regarding overcapacity, the reports referred to by the Commission did not indicate that there were signs that overcapacity was going to go down to any significant extent, if anything, they suggested that the situation of global overcapacity in the sector could even deteriorate further ( 86 ). In fact, the Global Forum of Steel Excess capacity was also very clear in concluding that overcapacity continued to be an ongoing problem in late 2018. It noted, ‘Excess steelmaking capacity – a global challenge that continues to plague the sector – creates significant difficulties for steel producers in advanced, emerging and developing economies alike’ ( 87 ).

(66) The proven effects that these factors had caused in the Union market in the form of substantial increase in imports were detailed in Section 1.1 above, as well as in the Definitive Regulation. As they were set to continue in place in the near future, their effects were thus expected to be of the same nature and therefore, together with the U.S Section 232 measure would generate a further increase of imports into the Union, with ensuing negative effects on the Union industry, if no safeguard measure was imposed.

(67) Therefore, the Commission concluded that these elements would continue to play an important role in the Union steel market in the near future and were thus pertinent for the analysis of a threat of serious injury.

1.2.6. Market outlooks and forecasts

(68) Throughout the period analysed, consumption of steel in the Union market increased year-on-year ( 88 ). This trend allowed the Union industry to, generally, also increase its volume of sales, which in turn allowed it to alleviate to some extent the effects of the import pressure it was subject to and showed by the persistent undercutting and steady loss of market share. As explained in Section 1.2.1, in 2017 this increase in sales in a context of a recovery in prices (both in overall terms and when compared to evolution of costs) allowed to the Union industry to partially recover from a consistent negative financial performance in previous years. In Section 1.2.4, the Commission observed a downward trend in steel prices in the Union parallel to an increase in raw material prices.

(69) The Commission then assessed the economic outlooks and forecasts for the period that would follow the conclusion of the investigation in order to assess the existence of a threat of serious injury, analysing a variety of specialized market sources.

(70) In this regard, sources consistently pointed to a scenario of uncertainty and cooling down of worldwide steel demand in the near future. Worldsteel Association noted, ‘deceleration in steel demand will continue into 2019 (…). No deal Brexit and trade war pose risks’ ( 89 ). It also recalled, ‘While the strength of steel demand recovery seen in 2017 was carried over to 2018, risks have increased. Rising trade tensions and volatile currency movements are increasing uncertainty’ ( 90 ).

(71) The OECD noted, ‘recovery (of steel market conditions) looks fragile because of persistent structural imbalances’ ( 91 ). Other market sources like S&P Global Platts echoed this uncertainty sentiment in its Global Market Outlook of December 2018.

(72) Moreover, the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity concluded in September 2018 ‘While steel market conditions have shown some cyclical recovery in 2017, the underlying trend in global steel demand remains weak and excess capacity remains significant’ ( 92 ).

(73) In the same vein, Eurofer (an EU Steel Association), noted ‘(…) ongoing trade frictions with the US, and cooling global demand, suggest that external risks could continue to climb, which in turn would increase uncertainty and lead to weakening prospects for EU steel users’ ( 93 ).

(74) Therefore, the data analysed from a variety of sources consistently showed that the expectation was that at best, a modest increase in steel consumption would take place although this was not even certain as prospects were deteriorating amid growing uncertainty. As a result, the stagnating global steel demand would make it even more likely that steel exporters would sell into the attractive Union market.

Conclusion on threat of serious injury

(75) The data analysed in this Section confirmed that imports were very likely going to increase in relevant volumes and that import pressure was thus going to continue, both on volumes and prices, as a result of the persistent overcapacity and the increasing number of TDI measures in third countries, whose effects on exports would continue. In addition, the effects of the US Section 232 would very likely be felt more strongly as months passed by, thus adding further pressure to the Union market through an increased risk of trade diversion, the first signs of which had already materialised.

(76) Against this background, the Commission also confirmed the opposing trends of steel and raw material prices in the second half of 2018, and the uncertain market outlook for the near future.

(77) Therefore, in view of the elements analysed in this Annex, together with the findings in the original determination the Commission confirmed that there was a threat of serious injury and that such serious injury would have materialised if the Commission had not imposed a definitive safeguard measure.

1.3. Obligations whose effect resulted in the increase in imports

(78) Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 stipulates, in relevant part: ‘[i]f, as a result … of the effect of the obligations incurred by a [Member] under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that [Member] in such increased quantities …’.

(79) The product in question comprises several tariff lines ( 94 ).

(80) On all of these tariff lines, the European Union has, as a result of tariff concessions made in past rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, the tariff commitments of ( 95 ):

—

0 % ad valorem

(81) These concessions were inscribed, at the time of the safeguard determination, in Part I, Section II of the European Union’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments, certified as Schedule EU CLXXIII – European Union on 1 December 2016 ( 96 ), as amended. The column for ‘other duties and charges’ in that Schedule and regarding the above tariff lines was empty.

(82) As a result of these concessions inscribed in the European Union’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments, annexed to the GATT and incorporated pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994, the European Union had, at the time of the safeguard determination, obligations incurred under the GATT 1994 notably as follows: Article XI:1, prohibiting non-tariff restrictions on the importation of the above-listed products, and, importantly, Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b), first and second sentences, of the GATT 1994. Under Article II:1(b), first sentence, the EU is not allowed, absent an applicable exception, to impose ordinary customs duties on the product in question in excess of those set forth and provided in the relevant part of the EU’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments, i.e. the zero rate pointed out above for each of the tariff lines covered. At the time of the original safeguard determination as well as of the imposition of the definitive safeguard measure, the EU’s applied import tariffs on the product covered by the safeguard was 0 %. In other words, for ordinary customs duties, these applied tariffs were already the maximum permitted under Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994. As for other duties or charges, no flexibility existed under Article II:1(b), second sentence, for introducing additional other duties or charges than ordinary customs duties.

(83) The product subject to the safeguard was being imported in increased quantities (as established in the definitive safeguard) as a result of the above obligations undertaken under the GATT 1994 (Article XI:1, Article II:1(a) and II:1(b), first and second sentences, of the GATT 1994), because those obligations, combined with the tariff concessions which the European Union made in the successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, enhanced and secured the conditions of market access for imports of the product subject to the safeguard on the market of the European Union. The above-mentioned tariff commitments of the European Union thus resulted in the increase in imports and gave no leeway for the EU to increase ordinary customs duties in lieu of introducing a safeguard measure. This simultaneously explains how the obligations in question resulted in the increase in imports that threatened to cause serious injury.

(84) The GATT obligations specified simultaneously prevented the EU from increasing the applied import duties on the product at issue. These were thus, the European Union’s ‘obligations of the GATT 1994 [which] constrain[ed] its ability to prevent or remedy injury from an increase in imports’. Concomitantly, the European Union ‘suspend[ed] those obligations as a result’ of its safeguard measure.

( 1 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/670 of 28 April 2016 introducing prior Union surveillance of imports of certain iron and steel products originating in certain third countries (OJ L 115, 29.4.2016, p. 37).

( 2 ) See recital (35) of the Provisional Regulation, and Section 4 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 3 ) See OECD, ‘Recent Developments in Steel Trade and Trade Policy Measures’, DSTI/SC(2018)3, p. 9, table 3.

( 4 ) Source: DG TRADE calculations on Global Trade Atlas data (https://ihsmarkit.com/index.html)– raw data available upon subscription – period analysed: 2014-2017. For details see Note to the file dated 30 November 2022, table 1.

( 5 ) Ibid

( 6 ) These countries were: China, India, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Türkiye and Ukraine, and represented around 75 % of total imports into the Union in 2018.

( 7 ) Data for full year 2018 extrapolated based on the data available for the period January-November 2018.

( 8 ) Source: Global Trade Atlas (https://ihsmarkit.com/index.html) – available upon subscription.

( 9 ) See recital (32) of the Provisional Regulation.

( 10 ) See recitals (31) and (32) of the Provisional Regulation, and recitals (51) to (54) of the Definitive Regulation.

( 11 ) See OECD ‘Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry: The Current Situation and Ways Forward’, 2015, p. 3.

( 12 ) See OECD ‘Evaluating the Financial Health of the Steel Industry’, DSTI/SU/SC(2015)12/FINAL, 9 June 2017, p. 25.

( 13 ) Available at: https://www.epi.org/publication/surging-steel-imports

( 14 ) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank – ‘Steel: Preserving sustainable jobs and growth in Europe’; COM (2016) 155 final, 16.3.2016.

( 15 ) See OECD ‘Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry: The Current Situation and Ways Forward’, 2015, table at p. 2.

( 16 ) Throughout the investigation period imports increased by 71 % while consumption increased by 14 %.

( 17 ) Specifically, undercutting was established for 17 product categories, with ranges between 1,2 % and 23 %.

( 18 ) See recital (33) of the Provisional Regulation.

( 19 ) Source: WTO, Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) - Extraction made on 28/11/2018, 10:58.

( 20 ) Covering those steel products under the safeguard measure and excluding the measures imposed by the European Union, and those imposed against imports from EU exporting producers. For an overview of the TDI measures imposed by the European Union on product categories subject also to the safeguard measure see Annex 1.B. of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1382 of 2 September 2019, amending certain Regulations imposing anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures on certain steel products subject to safeguard measures (OJ L 227, 3.9.2019, p. 1).

( 21 ) For reference of the main steel importing countries in the period of investigation, see OECD, ‘Recent developments in steel trade and trade policy measures - A closer look at non-tariff trade measures’, DSTI/SC(2018)3, of 26 January 2018, page 9, table 3. Available at the following link. (https://one.oecd.org/document/DSTI/SC(20183/en/pdf)

( 22 ) These countries were (listed alphabetically): China (10 %), India (9 %), Korea (10 %), Russia (14 %), Taiwan (5 %), Türkiye (22 %) and Ukraine (7 %). They represented, on average, around 75 % of imports of the product concerned into the Union in the period 2013-2017.

( 23 ) See recital (76) of EUROFER’s submission of 16 April 2018 in the original investigation, linked to more granular information on each of the measures considered, provided in Annex A07 D.1. Source of the data: SBB Platts.

( 24 ) See CRU data: consumption for years 2017 and 2018 was rather stable (only around 2 % increase).

( 25 ) A similar trend was observed when assessing the impact of TDI measures on products other than steel.

( 26 ) Around 15 million tonnes of combined imports affected by these measures, out of which, only slightly more than 2 million tonnes continued entering the market after the measures. For details, see Note to the File, table 2.

( 27 ) See Note to the File dated 30 November 2022, Table 3.

( 28 ) To impose a TDI measure, the volumes concerned by each investigation need to be above de minimis. In addition, steel is usually traded in rather large volumes as seen in the examples from EU TDI practice and from the sampled cases of TDI measures in other third countries.

( 29 ) These countries accounted consistently for around 75 % of total imports into the Union in the period of investigation.

( 30 ) Source: For imports into the Union: Eurostat; for TDI measures: WTO, Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP).

( 31 ) For the purpose of explaining the link of the US Section 232 and the increased imports, the Commission refers, within those recitals, only to the data until June 2018 included. The reason is that the increase in imports assessed in the Definitive Regulation covers up to that month.

( 32 ) Source: GTA, cumulated exports from Türkiye, Korea, Russia and Taiwan to the United States (graph 2); and cumulated exports from the same countries to the USA and the Union (graph 3).

( 33 ) See recitals (90) and (110) of the Definitive Regulation.

( 34 ) See OECD Steel Committee – Recent developments in steel trade and trade policy measures, 17-18 September, 2018, p. 8, Table 2 (showing that in 2018 Union was consolidating further its position as main steel importing country worldwide).

( 35 ) Source: DG TRADE calculations on Global Trade Atlas data (https://ihsmarkit.com/index.html)– raw data available upon subscription. For details, see Note to the file dated 30 November 2022, Table 1.

( 36 ) Ibid

( 37 ) Imposition of TDI measures on some product categories also contributed to this improvement, but their specific role is analysed in Section 1.2.2.

( 38 ) Recital (53) of the Provisional Regulation.

( 39 ) See Table 15 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 40 ) These trends were assessed for the product concerned, and not for individual product categories.

( 41 ) Based on a comparison of all the years in the period analysed.

( 42 ) See Table 4 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 43 ) Ibid

( 44 ) See Table 5 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 45 ) See Table 4 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 46 ) See Table 2 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 47 ) Ibid

( 48 ) See Annex III of the Provisional Regulation.

( 49 ) See Table 7 of Definitive Regulation.

( 50 ) See Table 5 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 51 ) See Section 1.2.2. for the explanation of the role of recent TDI measures in the Union industry’s performance in 2017.

( 52 ) Total imports increased by around 1 million tons and their market share went up from 17,9 to 18,1 % from 2016 to 2017, which is less than previous year-on-year increases both in absolute and relative terms.

( 53 ) In this regard the Commission considered that, for instance, a TDI measure imposed in 2013 would be too far in time to be connected to the Union’s improved performance in 2017, and therefore, the selected measures offer a more accurate and appropriate basis for the analysis.

( 54 ) In some cases the scope of a TDI measure on a certain product, in terms of CN codes covered, may not Match entirely the product definition of the corresponding product category under the safeguard measure, thus this assessment is an approximation.

( 55 ) These references to these regulations pertain to the regulations imposing a provisional measure, because for practical purposes, as long as a duty (provisional or definitive) was in place, it was assumed to have a similar impact on the volumes traded. In all these cases, the investigation resulted in the imposition of a definitive measure.

( 56 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/501 of 24 March 2015 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 79, 25.3.2015, p. 23).

( 57 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181 of 10 February 2016 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation (OJ L 37, 12.2.2016, p. 1).

( 58 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1778 of 6 October 2016 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 272, 7.10.2016, p. 33).

( 59 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/113 of 28 January 2016 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of high fatigue performance steel concrete reinforcement bars originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 23, 29.1.2016, p. 16).

( 60 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1777 of 6 October 2016 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain heavy plate of non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 272, 7.10.2016, p. 5).

( 61 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17).

( 62 ) Source: DG TRADE analysis of the injury indicators published in the relevant measures and analysis of the questionnaire replies provided by the Union industry per product category in the framework of the original safeguard investigation. For details, see Note to the File dated 30 November 2022, Table 4.

( 63 ) Source: Eurostat

( 64 ) The sum of imports subject to TDI measures by these investigations (although they concern different periods of investigation and different years, e.g. 2013 to 2015) was slightly above 5 million tonnes.

( 65 ) Source: DG TRADE analysis of its own TDI cases for the volume of imports in the relevant investigation period, and Eurostat for import figures following the investigation period of each of these investigations for this implementation.

( 66 ) Categories 1, 2, 7, 9, 12 and 13.

( 67 ) Categories 1, 2 and 9.

( 68 ) See categories 4, 8 and 14.

( 69 ) See categories 5, 6, 15, 16 and 26

( 70 ) See categories 3, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 28.

( 71 ) At least fifteen categories out of a total of twenty three subject to a provisional measure (for which a breakdown was provided in Annex III of the Provisional Regulation.

( 72 ) For instance, Türkiye increased its presence in the Union market in category 1, where China was made subject to TDI measures in October 2016, from 1 062 247 tonnes in 2016 to 2 million tonnes in 2017 (and nearly 3 million tonnes in 2018. In the same vein, India increased from 443 551 tonnes to 1 121 334 tonnes in 2017, or Egypt, from 47 400 tonnes in 2016 to 409 432 tonnes in 2017.

( 73 ) Section 1.2.1. explained the reasons behind the overall improvement of the Union industry regarding the product concerned.

( 74 ) See recitals (57) to (62), and Table 12 of the Definitive Regulation.

( 75 ) To put this volume into context, a basic calculation taking the average steel price in the Union in 2017 shows that the EU industry could lose out on around 1,4 billion EUR worth of domestic sales as a result of these additional imports. Thus showing that the potential impact of these additional sales was relevant.

( 76 ) Whereas the increase in imports into the Union from 2016 to 2017 was much smaller, around 1 million tonnes.

( 77 ) See also OECD Steel Committee – Recent developments in steel trade and trade policy measures, 17-18 September, 2018, p. 8, Table 2.

( 78 ) At the time of the adoption of the definitive safeguard measure, only the following four TDI measures affecting imports into the Union were in place (three against Russia and one against Taiwan): Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 of 5 October 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminating the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia (OJ L 258, 6.10.2017, p. 24). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328 of 29 July 2016 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cold rolled flat steel products originating in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation (OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 1). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1469 of 1 October 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or steel, originating in Russia and Ukraine, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 246, 2.10.2018, p. 20). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1429 of 26 August 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 224, 27.8.2015, p. 10).

( 79 ) Source: for US imports (GTA); for EU imports (Eurostat).

( 80 ) The US steel market was among the top import destinations by size - See OECD, ‘Recent Developments in Steel Trade and Trade Policy Measures’, DSTI/SC(2018)3, p. 9, table 3.

( 81 ) See recital (35) of the Provisional Regulation: ‘The U.S. have calculated that the imposition of a single across product tariff under the Section 232 measures with almost no country exclusion should decrease imports by approximately 13 million tonnes – corresponding to 7 % of Union consumption.’

( 82 ) See recital (89) of the Definitive Regulation.

( 83 ) Source: Eurostat for import prices, and S&P Global Commodity Insights for prices of HDG and HRC.

( 84 ) Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights.

( 85 ) Around 140 of the investigations that led to the adoption of measures were initiated in the year 2015 or later, hence their duration was set to be in place, in principle, until at least 2021 (this is, at least 2 years after the conclusion of the EU safeguard investigation). Source: WTO, Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP).

( 86 ) See OECD, ‘Recent Developments in Steelmaking Capacity’, DSTI/SC(2018)2/FINAL: ‘the updated information on announced investment projects suggests that nearly 52 million tonnes of gross capacity additions are currently underway and could come on stream during the three-year period of 2018-20. An additional 39 million tonnes of capacity additions are currently in the planning stages for possible start-up during the same time period’.

( 87 ) Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, Ministerial Report, 20 September 2018, paragraph 2.

( 88 ) Definitive Regulation, table 4.

( 89 ) See Worldsteel Association – Global Steel Market Outlook – OECD Steel Committee Meeting, 17 September 2018.

( 90 ) See Worldsteel Association - Worldsteel Short Range Outlook October 2018, Press Release.

( 91 ) See OECD Steel Market Developments, 85th Session of the Steel Committee, September 2018. See also pages 7 and 8 of OECD Global Economic Outlook, 17 September 2018, showing a downwards revision of growth expectations (also in the Union), and that ‘global trade had slowed amid growing trade policy uncertainties’.

( 92 ) Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, Ministerial Report, 20 September 2018, paragraph 2.

( 93 ) See EUROFER – Economic and Steel Market Outlook 2018-2019, 25 October 2018.

( 94 ) See Annex I to the Definitive Regulation.

( 95 ) For further details see Note to the file dated 30 November 2022, Table 5.

( 96 ) WTO doc. WT/Let/1220

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