Appeal brought on 11 December 2024 by Silgan Holdings Inc., Silgan Holdings Austria GmbH, Silgan International Holdings BV, Silgan Metal Packaging Distribution GmbH und Silgan White Cap Manufacturing GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 October 2024 in Case T-589/22, Silgan Holdings and Others v Commission

(Case C-845/24 P)

(C/2025/539)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: Silgan Holdings Inc., Silgan Holdings Austria GmbH, Silgan International Holdings BV, Silgan Metal Packaging Distribution GmbH, Silgan White Cap Manufacturing GmbH (represented by: D. Seeliger, Y.-K. Gürer, E. Venot, R. Grafunder, H. Wollmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of their appeal, the appellants rely on five grounds.

First, as regards paragraphs 33 et seq., and in particular paragraphs 39 and 40, of the judgment under appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court incorrectly interpreted and applied the principle of subsidiarity as enshrined in Article 5 of the TEU. According to the appellants, where a national competition authority already deals with a case and where in addition that case is well advanced, the European Commission, for its part, is able to initiate proceedings and take charge of the investigation only to the extent that that investigation may be justified having regard to the principle of subsidiarity enshrined by primary law. Accordingly, the General Court should have either interpreted Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2) more strictly and in a manner consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, or, in the alternative, declared that article not applicable on account of infringing the principle of subsidiarity. Ultimately, the General Court should have held, therefore, that the initiation of proceedings by the Commission infringed the principle of subsidiarity.

Secondly, as regards paragraphs 49 et seq., and in particular paragraph 66, of the judgment under appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court incorrectly interpreted and applied the prohibition of the misuse of powers. The General Court should have examined whether the initiation of proceedings by the Commission was actually necessary for the purpose of ensuring an effective implementation of EU law on restrictive practices. Ultimately, the General Court should have responded in the negative and consequently held that by initiating the proceedings the Commission acted in a manner amounting to an abuse of power and that it breached, in addition, the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of the right to a judge assigned by law.

Thirdly, as regards paragraphs 69 et seq., and in particular paragraph 78, of the judgment under appeal, the appellants complain that the General Court incorrectly interpreted and applied the principle of proportionality. According to them, the General Court should have examined whether the initiation of proceedings by the Commission was actually necessary for the purpose of ensuring an effective implementation of EU law on restrictive practices and the General Court should have responded in the negative. Furthermore, the General Court should have held that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the transfer of the investigation to the Commission was made too late in order to comply with the requirement of proportionality. In the alternative, the appellants claim that the alleged advantages of the transfer of the investigation to the Commission are disproportionate in comparison to the damage suffered by Silgan.

Fourthly, the appellants claim that the General Court incorrectly interpreted and applied in paragraphs 105 and 106 of the judgment under appeal the principle by which the administration is bound by its own decisions. In their view, the General Court arrived at the incorrect conclusion in paragraph 105 that it was not proved that the Commission departed from the communication on the network. (3) The General Court should have held instead that the conditions for a reallocation of cases a posteriori in accordance with that communication – including taking into account paragraphs 18, 19 and 54 – were not satisfied and that in addition the initiation of proceedings by the Commission was made too late in order to meet the requirements of that communication.

Fifthly, and lastly, the appellants claim that the General Court incorrectly interpreted and applied the requirement to state reasons referred to in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU. In paragraphs 61 et seq., and in particular paragraph 65, of the judgment under appeal, the General Court wrongly took the view that the Commission complied with its obligation to state reasons in the decision at issue. The only reference in the decision at issue that the proceedings were initiated at the request of the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office, Germany), is not sufficient. The decisive question for assessing whether the initiation of proceedings by the Commission was lawful is not whether in the present case the Bundeskartellamt requested the Commission to take over the investigation but rather for what reasons the Commission responded to that request.

(1)  Summary in OJ 2023 C 57, p. 5.

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).

(3)  Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43).