1.

Does Article 24 of the [EIO Directive], (2) read in conjunction with Article 3 [of the EIO Directive], permit an EIO to be issued for the hearing by videoconference of an accused person who is in custody in the executing State during the hearing of oral argument, for the purpose of gathering evidence as part of his or her examination and with the additional aim of ensuring that he or she participates in the trial, having regard to the provisions of Article 24 and recitals 25 and 26, in particular where the conditions for issuing an EAW are not met and the national law of the issuing State recognises the right of the accused person to participate in the trial and to be examined, including by videoconference, in order to make statements of probative value?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, can the rule laid down in Article 10 of the [EIO Directive], which empowers the executing State to refuse the execution of an EIO if the investigative measure would not be authorised in a similar domestic case, be interpreted as empowering the executing State to refuse the execution of an EIO for the hearing of an accused person who is in custody abroad by videoconference in the trial, in the light of Article 24 [of the EIO Directive], which governs the specific rules for the hearing by videoconference without including the ground for refusal at issue?

3.

Must Article 11(1)(f) of the [EIO Directive], read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that the execution of an EIO for the hearing of an accused person who is in custody abroad by videoconference at the hearing of oral argument cannot be refused if the procedural safeguards applicable to that videoconference under the law of the issuing State are appropriate in the particular case to ensure the accused person’s effective exercise of his or her rights of defence and the fundamental right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter?

4.

Can the concept of ‘fundamental principles of [the law of] the executing State’, which may constitute a special ground for refusal within the meaning of Article 24(2)(b) of the [EIO Directive], constitute a limit to the execution of any request for hearing an accused person by videoconference in the trial, on the basis of a general national directive binding on all executing authorities, without any assessment of the particular circumstances of the specific case and the requirements contained in the national law of the issuing State to guarantee the rights of defence of the accused person, applicable in the specific case, or, on the contrary, is it incorrect to regard the refusal of execution as an exception which must be interpreted strictly, in relation to specific procedural aspects provided for in the national law of the issuing State or to particular relevant elements of the specific case?

5.

Does Article 22(1) of the [EIO Directive], read in conjunction with Article 3 of the [EIO Directive], permit the issuing of an EIO for the temporary transfer of an accused person who is in custody abroad in order to allow him or her to be heard at a hearing of oral argument, where that hearing has investigatory value under the national law of the issuing State?