This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52013DC0847
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU
/* COM/2013/0847 final */
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU /* COM/2013/0847 final */
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU 1.
Introduction Directive
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (hereinafter
“data protection Directive”) sets the rules for transfers of personal data from
EU Member States to other countries outside the EU[1] to the extent such
transfers fall within the scope of this instrument[2]. Under the
Directive, the Commission may find that a third country ensures an adequate
level of protection by reason of its domestic law or of the international
commitments it has entered into in order to protect rights of individuals in
which case the specific limitations on data transfers to such a country would
not apply. These decisions are commonly referred to as "adequacy
decisions". On 26 July
2000, the Commission adopted Decision 520/2000/EC[3] (hereafter “Safe
Harbour decision”) recognising the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and
Frequently Asked Questions (respectively “the Principles” and “FAQs”), issued
by the Department of Commerce of the United States, as providing adequate
protection for the purposes of personal data transfers from the EU. The Safe Harbour decision was taken following an opinion of the Article 29 Working Party and an
opinion of the Article 31 Committee delivered by a qualified majority of Member
States. In accordance with Council Decision 1999/468 the Safe Harbour Decision
was subject to prior scrutiny by the European Parliament. As a result,
the current Safe Harbour decision allows free transfer[4] of personal
information from EU Member States[5]
to companies in the US which have signed up to the Principles in circumstances
where the transfer would
otherwise not meet the EU standards for adequate level of data protection given
the substantial differences in privacy regimes between the two sides of
Atlantic. The functioning
of the current Safe Harbour arrangement relies on commitments and
self-certification of adhering companies. Signing up to these arrangements is
voluntary, but the rules are binding for those who sign up. The fundamental
principles of such an arrangement are: a)
Transparency of adhering companies' privacy
policies, b)
Incorporation of the Safe Harbour principles in
companies' privacy policies, and c)
Enforcement, including by public authorities. This fundamental basis of the Safe Harbour has to be reviewed in the new context of: a)
the exponential increase in data flows which
used to be ancillary but are now central to the rapid growth of the digital
economy and the very significant developments in data collection, processing
and use, b)
the critical importance of data flows notably
for the transatlantic economy,[6] c)
the rapid growth of the number of companies in
the US adhering to the Safe Harbour scheme which has increased by eight-fold
since 2004 (from 400 in 2004 to 3,246 in 2013), d)
the information recently released on US surveillance programmes which raises new questions on the level of the protection the Safe Harbour arrangement is deemed to guarantee. Against this background, this Communication
takes stock of the functioning of the Safe Harbour scheme. It is based on evidence gathered by the Commission, the work of the EU-US Privacy Contact
Group in 2009, a Study prepared by an independent contractor in 2008[7]
and information received in the ad hoc EU-U.S Working Group (the “Working
Group”) established following the revelations on US surveillance programmes (see
a parallel Document). This Communication follows the two Commission
Assessment Reports in the start-up period of the Safe Harbour arrangement,
respectively in 2002[8]
and 2004[9].
2. Structure and
functioning of Safe Harbour 2.1. Structure of the Safe Harbour A US company
that wants to adhere to the Safe Harbour must: (a) identify in its publicly
available privacy policy that it adheres to the Principles and actually does
comply with the Principles, as well as (b) self-certify i.e., declare to the US
Department of Commerce that it is in compliance with the Principles. The
self-certification must be resubmitted on an annual basis. The Safe Harbour
Privacy Principles attached in Annex I to the Safe Harbour Decision include
requirements on both the substantive protection of personal data (data
integrity, security, choice, and onward transfer principles) and the procedural
rights of data subjects (notice, access, and enforcement principles). As to the enforcement of the Safe Harbour scheme in the US, two US institutions play a major role: the US Department of
Commerce and the US Federal Trade Commission. The Department
of Commerce reviews every Safe Harbour self-certification and every annual
recertification submission that it receives from companies to ensure that they
include all the elements required to be a member of the scheme[10]. It
updates a list of companies which have filed self-certification letters and
publishes the list and letters on its website. Furthermore, it monitors the
functioning of Safe Harbour and removes from the list companies not complying
with the Principles. The Federal
Trade Commission, within its powers in the field of consumer protection,
intervenes against unfair or deceptive practices pursuant to Section 5 of the
Free Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission's enforcement actions
include inquiries on false statements of adherence to Safe Harbour and non-compliance with these Principles by companies which are members of the scheme.
In the specific cases of enforcing the Safe Harbour Principles against air
carriers, the competent body is the US Department of Transportation[11]. The current Safe
Harbour Decision is part of EU law which has to be applied by Member State
Authorities. Under the Decision, the EU national data protection authorities
(DPAs) have the right to suspend data transfers to Safe Harbour certified
companies in specific cases[12].
The Commission is not aware of any cases of suspension by a national data
protection authority since the establishment of Safe Harbour in 2000.
Independently of the powers they enjoy under the Safe Harbour Decision, EU
national data protection authorities are competent to intervene, including in
the case of international transfers, in order to ensure compliance with the
general principles of data protection set forth in the 1995 Data Protection
Directive. As recalled in the current Safe Harbour Decision, it is the
competence of the Commission – acting in accordance with the examination
procedure set out in Regulation 182/2011 – to adapt the Decision, to suspend it
or limit its scope at any time, in the light of experience with its
implementation. This is notably foreseen if there is a systemic failure on the
US side, for example if a body responsible for ensuring compliance with the
Safe Harbour Privacy Principles in the United States is not effectively
fulfilling its role, or if the level of protection provided by the Safe Harbour
Principles is overtaken by the requirements of US legislation. As with any
other Commission decision, it can also be amended for other reasons or even
revoked. 2.2. The functioning of the Safe Harbour The 3246[13] certified companies include both small
and big companies[14].
While financial services and telecommunication industries are outside the
Federal Trade Commission enforcement powers and therefore excluded from the
Safe Harbour, many industry and services sectors are present among certified
companies, including well known Internet companies and industries ranging from
information and computer services to pharmaceuticals, travel and tourism
services, healthcare or credit card services[15].
These are mainly US companies that provide services in the EU internal market.
There are also subsidiaries of some EU firms such as Nokia or Bayer. 51% are
firms that process data of employees in Europe transferred to the US for human resource purposes[16].
There has been
a growing concern among some data protection authorities in the EU about
data transfers under the current Safe Harbour scheme. Some Member States' data
protection authorities have criticised the very general formulation of the
principles and the high reliance on self-certification and self-regulation.
Similar concerns have been raised by industry, referring to distortions
of competition due to a lack of enforcement. The current Safe Harbour arrangement is based on the voluntary adherence of companies, on
self-certification by these adhering companies and on enforcement of the
self-certification commitments by public authorities. In this context any lack
of transparency and any shortcomings in enforcement undermine the foundations
on which the Safe Harbour scheme is constructed. Any gap in
transparency or in enforcement on the US side results in responsibility being
shifted to European data protection authorities and to the companies which use
the scheme. On 29 April 2010 German data protection authorities issued a
decision requesting companies transferring data from Europe to the US to actively check that companies in the US importing data actually comply with Safe Harbour
Privacy Principles and recommending that “at least the exporting company must
determine whether the Safe Harbour certification by the importer is still
valid”[17]. On 24 July
2013, following the revelations on US surveillance programmes, German DPAs went
a step further expressing concerns that “there is a
substantial likelihood that the principles in the Commission’s decisions are
being violated”[18].
There are cases of some DPAs (e.g., Bremen DPA) that have requested a company
transferring personal data to US providers to inform the DPA on whether and how
the concerned providers prevent access by the National Security Agency. The
Irish DPA has reported that it received two complaints recently which reference
the Safe Harbour programme following coverage about the US Intelligence
Agencies programmes but declined to investigate them on the basis that the
transfer of personal data to a third country met the requirements of Irish data
protection law. Following a
similar complaint, the Luxembourg DPA has found that
Microsoft and Skype have complied with the Luxembourg Data
Protection Act when transferring data to US[19]. However, the Irish High Court has since granted an application for
judicial review under which it will review the inaction
of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in relation to the US surveillance programmes. One of the two complaints was filed by a
student group Europe v Facebook (EvF) which also filed similar complaint against Yahoo in Germany, which is being processed by the relevant data protection authorities. These
divergent responses of data protection authorities to the surveillance
revelations demonstrate the real risk of the fragmentation of the Safe Harbour scheme and
raise questions as to the extent to which it is enforced. 3. Transparency of
adhered companies' privacy policies Under the FAQ 6
that is annexed to the Safe Harbour Decision (Annex II) companies interested in
certifying under the Safe Harbour must provide to the Department of Commerce
and make public their privacy policy. It must include a commitment to adhere to
the Privacy Principles. The requirement to make publicly available the
privacy policies of self-certified companies as well as their statement to
adhere to the Privacy Principles is critical for the operation of the scheme. Insufficient
accessibility to privacy policies of such companies is to the detriment of
individuals whose personal data is being collected and processed, and may
constitute a violation of the principle of notice. In such cases,
individuals whose data is being transferred from the EU may be unaware of their
rights and the obligations to which a self-certified company is subjected. Moreover, the
commitment by companies to comply with the Privacy Principles triggers the
Federal Trade Commission's powers to enforce these principles against
companies in cases of non-compliance as an unfair or deceptive practice. Lack
of transparency by companies in the US renders Federal Trade Commission
oversight more difficult and undermines the effectiveness of enforcement. Over the years
a substantial number of self-certified companies had not made their privacy
policy public and/or had not made a public statement of adherence to the
Privacy Principles. The 2004 Safe Harbour report pointed to the necessity for
the Department of Commerce to adopt a more active stance in scrutinising
compliance with this requirement. Since 2004, the
Department of Commerce has developed new information tools aimed at
helping companies to comply with their transparency obligations. The relevant
information on the scheme is accessible on the Department of Commerce’s website
dedicated to the Safe Harbour[20]
that also allows companies to upload their privacy policies. The Department of
Commerce has reported that companies have made use of this feature and posted
their privacy policies on the Department of Commerce website when applying to
join the Safe Harbour[21].
In addition, the Department of Commerce published in 2009-2013 a series of
guidelines for companies wishing to join Safe Harbour, such as a “Guide to
Self-Certification” and “Helpful Hints on Self-Certifying Compliance”[22]. The degree of
compliance with the transparency obligations varies amongst companies. Whereas
certain companies limit themselves to notifying to the Department of Commerce a
description of their privacy policy as part of the self-certification process,
the majority make these policies public on their websites, in addition to
uploading them on the Department of Commerce website. However, these policies
are not always presented in a consumer-friendly and easily readable form.
Hyperlinks to privacy policies do not always function properly nor do they
always refer to the correct webpages. It follows from
the Decision and its annexes that the requirement that companies should
publicly disclose their privacy policies goes beyond mere notification
of self-certification to the Department of Commerce. The requirements for
certification as set out in the FAQs include a description of the privacy
policy and transparent information on where it is available for viewing by the
public[23].
Privacy policy statements must be clear and easily accessible by the public.
They must include a hyperlink to the Department of Commerce Safe Harbour
website which lists all the ‘current’ members of the scheme and a link to the
alternative dispute resolution provider. However, a number of companies under
the scheme in the period 2000-2013 failed to comply with these requirements.
During working contacts with the Commission in February 2013 the Department of
Commerce has acknowledged that up to 10% of certified companies may actually
not have posted a privacy policy containing the Safe Harbour affirmative
statement on their respective public websites. Recent
statistics demonstrate also a persisting problem of false claims of Safe Harbour adherence. About 10% of companies claiming membership in the Safe Harbour are not listed by the Department of Commerce as current members of the scheme[24].
Such false claims originate from both: companies which have never been
participants of the Safe Harbour and companies which have once joined the
scheme but then failed to resubmit their self-certification to the Department
of Commerce at the yearly intervals. In this case they continue to be listed on
the Safe Harbour website, but with certification status "not
current", meaning that the company has been a member of the scheme and
thus has an obligation to continue to provide protection to data already
processed. The Federal Trade Commission is competent to intervene in cases of
deceptive practices and non-compliance of the Safe Harbour principles (see
Section 5.1). Unclarity over the "false claims" impacts the
credibility of the scheme. The European
Commission alerted the Department of Commerce through regular contacts in 2012
and 2013 that, in order to comply with the transparency obligations, it is not
sufficient for companies to only provide the Department of Commerce with a
description of their privacy policy. Privacy policy statements must be made
publicly available. The Department of Commerce was also asked to intensify
its periodic controls of companies’ websites subsequent to the verification
procedure carried out in the context of the first self-certification process or
its annual renewal and to take action against those companies which do not
comply with the transparency requirements. As a first
answer to EU concerns, the Department of Commerce has since March 2013 made
it mandatory for a Safe Harbour company with a
public website to make its privacy policy for customer/user data readily
available on its public website. At the same time, the Department of Commerce began notifying all companies
whose privacy policy did not already include a link to Department of Commerce
Safe Harbour website that one should be added, making the official Safe Harbour
List and website directly accessible to consumers visiting a company’s website.
This will allow European data subjects to verify immediately, without
additional searches in the web, a company’s commitments submitted to the
Department of Commerce. Additionally, the Department of Commerce started
notifying companies that contact information for their independent dispute
resolution provider should be included in their posted privacy policy[25]. This process
needs to be speeded up to ensure that all certified
companies fully meet Safe Harbour requirements not later than by March 2014
(i.e. by companies’ yearly recertification deadline, counting from the
introduction of new requirements in March 2013). Nevertheless, concerns remain as to whether all self-certified
companies fully comply with the transparency requirements. Compliance with the
obligations undertaken at the point of the initial self-certification and the
annual renewal should be monitored and investigated more stringently by the
Department of Commerce. 4. Integration
of the Safe Harbour privacy principles in companies' privacy policies Self-certified companies must comply with
the Privacy Principles set out in Annex I to the Decision in order to obtain
and retain the benefit of the Safe Harbour. In the 2004
report, the Commission found that a significant number of companies had not
correctly incorporated the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles in their data
processing policies. For example, individuals were not always given clear and
transparent information about the purposes for which their data were processed
or were not given the possibility to opt out if their data were to be disclosed
to a third party or to be used for a purpose that was incompatible with the
purposes for which it was originally collected. The 2004 Commission's report
considered that the Department of Commerce” should be more proactive with
regard to access to the Safe Harbour and to awareness of the Principles”[26].
There has been
limited progress in that respect. Since 1 January 2009, any company seeking to
renew its certification status for Safe Harbour – which must be renewed
annually – has had its privacy policy evaluated by the Department of Commerce
prior to the renewal. The evaluation is however limited in scope. There is no
full evaluation of the actual practice in the self-certified companies
which would significantly increase the credibility of the self-certification
process. Further to the
Commission's requests for a more rigorous and systematic oversight of the
self-certified companies by the Department of Commerce, more attention is
currently applied to new submissions. The number of new submissions which
have not been accepted, but are resent to companies for improvements in privacy
policies has significantly increased between 2010 and 2013: doubled for
re-certifying companies and tripled for the Safe Harbour newcomers[27].
The Department of Commerce has assured the Commission that any certification or
recertification can be finalised only if the company’s privacy policy fulfils
all requirements, notably that it includes an affirmative commitment to adhere
to the relevant set of Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and that the privacy
policy is publicly available. A company is required to identify in its Safe
Harbour List record the location of the relevant policy. It is also required to
clearly identify on its website an Alternative Dispute Resolution provider and
include a link to the Safe Harbour self-certification on the website of the
Department of Commerce. However, it has been estimated that over 30% of Safe Harbour members do not provide dispute resolution information in the privacy policies
on their websites[28]. A majority of
the companies that the Department of Commerce has removed from the Safe Harbour
List were removed at the express request of the relevant companies (e.g.,
companies that had merged or were acquired, had changed their lines of business
or had gone out of business). A smaller number of records of lapsed companies
have been removed when the websites that were listed in the records appeared to
be inoperative and the companies’ certification status had been “Not current”
for several years[29].
Importantly, none of these removals seems to have taken place because the
Department of Commerce verification led to the identification of compliance
problems. The Safe Harbour List record serves as a
public notice and as a record of a company’s Safe Harbour commitments. The
commitment to adhere to the Safe Harbour Principles is not time-limited with
respect to data received during the period in which the company enjoys the
benefit of the Safe Harbour, and the company must continue to apply the
Principles to such data as long as it stores, uses or discloses them, even if
it leaves the Safe Harbour for any reason. The number of Safe Harbour applicants that did not pass administrative review by the Department of
Commerce and therefore were never added to the Safe Harbour List is the
following: In 2010, only 6% (33) of the 513 first-time certifiers
were never included in the Safe Harbour List because they did not comply
with Department of Commerce standards for self-certification. In 2013, 12%
(75) of the 605 first-time certifiers were never included in the Safe Harbour
List because they have not complied with Department of Commerce standards for
self-certification. As a minimum
requirement to increase the transparency of the oversight, the Department of
Commerce should list on its website all companies that have been removed from
the Safe Harbour and indicate reasons for which the certification has not been
renewed. The label “Not current” on the Department of Commerce list of Safe
Harbour member companies should be regarded not just as information but should
be accompanied by a clear warning – both verbal and graphical - that a
company is currently not fulfilling Safe Harbour requirements. Moreover, some
companies still fall short of fully incorporating all Safe Harbour Principles.
Apart from the issue of transparency addressed in Section 3 above, privacy
policies of self-certified companies are often unclear as regards the purposes
for which data is collected, and the right to choose whether or not data can be
disclosed to third parties; thereby raising issues of compliance with the
Privacy Principles of “Notice” and “Choice”. Notice and choice are crucial to
ensure control from data subjects over what happens to their personal
information. The critical first step in the compliance
process, the incorporation of the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles in companies'
privacy policies, is not sufficiently ensured. The Department of Commerce
should address it as a matter of priority by developing a methodology of
compliance in the operational practice of companies and their interaction with
clients. There must be an active follow up by the Department of Commerce on effective
incorporation of the Safe Harbour principles in companies' privacy policies,
rather than leaving enforcement action only to be triggered by complaints of
individuals. 5. Enforcement by public
authorities A number of
mechanisms are available to ensure effective enforcement of the Safe Harbour scheme and to offer recourse for individuals in cases
where the protection of their personal information is affected by
non-compliance with the Privacy Principles. According to
the “Enforcement” Principle, privacy policies of self-certified organizations
must include effective compliance mechanisms. Pursuant to the “Enforcement”
Privacy Principle as further clarified by FAQ 11, FAQ 5 and FAQ 6, this
requirement can be met by adhering to independent recourse mechanisms
that have publicly stated their competence to hear individual complaints for
failure to abide by the Principles. Alternatively, this can be achieved through
the organization’s commitment to cooperate with the EU Data Protection Panel[30]. Moreover self-certified companies are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce[31]. The 2004 Report
expressed concerns as regards the enforcement of the Safe Harbour scheme,
namely that the Federal Trade Commission should be more proactive in launching
investigations and raising awareness of individuals about their rights.
Another area of concern was the lack of clarity in relation to the Federal
Trade Commission's competence to enforce the Principles regarding human
resources data. The recourse
body responsible for human resources data – the EU Data Protection Panel – has
received one complaint concerning human resources data[32]. However, the
absence of complaints does not allow conclusions to be drawn as to the full
functioning of the scheme. Ex-officio checks of companies’ compliance should
be introduced to verify the actual implementation of data protection
commitments. EU Data Protection Authorities should also undertake actions in
order to raise awareness of the existence of the Panel. Problems have
been highlighted in relation to the way in which alternative recourse
mechanisms function as enforcement bodies. A number of these bodies lack
appropriate means to remedy cases of failure to comply with the Principles.
This shortcoming needs to be addressed. 5.1. Federal Trade Commission The Federal
Trade Commission can take enforcement measures in case of violations of the Safe Harbour commitments that companies make. When Safe Harbour was established, the
Federal Trade Commission committed to review on a priority basis all referrals
from EU Member State authorities[33].
Since no complaints were received for the first ten years of the arrangement,
the Federal Trade Commission decided to seek to identify any Safe Harbour violations in every privacy and data security investigation it conducts. Since
2009, the Federal Trade Commission has brought 10 enforcement actions against
companies based on Safe Harbour violations. These actions notably resulted in
settlement orders – subject to substantial penalties – prohibiting privacy
misrepresentations, including of compliance with the Safe Harbour, and imposing
on companies’ comprehensive privacy programmes and audits for 20 years. The
companies must accept independent assessments of their privacy programmes on
the request of the Federal Trade Commission. These assessments are reported
regularly to the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal Trade Commission's
orders also prohibit these companies from misrepresenting their privacy
practices and their participation in Safe Harbour or similar privacy schemes.
This was the case for example in the Federal Trade Commission investigations
against Google, Facebook and Myspace.[34] In 2012 Google agreed to pay a $22.5 million fine to
settle allegations that it violated a consent order. In all privacy investigations
the Federal Trade Commission ex officio examines whether there is Safe Harbour violation. The Federal Trade
Commission has reiterated recently its declarations and commitment to
reviewing, on a priority basis, any referrals received from privacy
self-regulatory companies and EU Member States that allege a company’s
non-compliance with Safe Harbour Principles.[35] The Federal Trade Commission has received only a few
referrals from European data protection authorities over the past three years. Transatlantic cooperation between data
protection authorities started to develop in recent months. For example the
Federal Trade Commission signed on 26 June 2013 with the Office of the Data
Protection Commissioner of Ireland a Memorandum of Understanding on mutual
assistance in the enforcement of laws protecting personal information in the
private sector. The memorandum establishes a framework for increased, more
streamlined, and more effective privacy enforcement cooperation[36]. In August 2013, the Federal Trade Commission announced a
further reinforcement of the checks on companies with control over large
databases of personal information. It has also created a portal where consumers
can file a privacy complaint regarding a US company[37]. The Federal Trade Commission should also
increase efforts to investigate false claims of Safe Harbour adherence. A
company claiming on its website that it complies with the Safe Harbour requirements, but is not listed by the Department of Commerce as a ‘current’ member of
the scheme, is misleading consumers and abusing their trust. False claims
weaken the credibility of the system as a whole and therefore should be
immediately removed from the companies’ websites. The companies should be bound
by an enforceable requirement not to mislead consumers. The Federal Trade
Commission should continue seeking to identify Safe Harbour false claims as the
one in the Karnani case, where the Federal Trade Commission shut down a California website for claiming a false Safe Harbour registration, and engaging in
fraudulent e-commerce practices targeted at European consumers[38]. On 29 October 2013 the Federal Trade
Commission announced that it had opened “numerous investigations into Safe Harbor compliance in recent months” and that more enforcement actions on this front
can be expected “in the coming months”. The Federal Trade Commission confirmed
also that it is "committed to looking for ways to improve its
efficacy" and would “continue to welcome any substantive leads, such as
the complaint received in the past month from a European-based consumer
advocate alleging a large number of Safe Harbor-related violations”.[39]
The agency committed also to “systematically monitor compliance with Safe Harbor orders, as we do with all our orders”[40]. On 12 November 2013, the Federal Trade
Commission informed the European Commission that “if a company’s privacy
policy promises Safe Harbor protections, that company’s failure to make or
maintain a registration, is not, by itself, likely to excuse that company from
FTC enforcement of those Safe Harbor commitments”[41]. In November 2013, the Department of
Commerce informed the European Commission that “to help ensure that companies
do not make ‘false claims’ of participation in Safe Harbor, the Department of
Commerce will begin a process of contacting Safe Harbor participants one month
prior to their recertification date to describe the steps they must follow
should they chose not to recertify”. The Department of Commerce “will warn
companies in this category to remove all references to Safe Harbor participation, including use of Commerce’s Safe Harbor certification mark, from the
companies’ privacy policies and websites, and notify them clearly that
failure to do so could subject the companies to FTC enforcement actions”[42]. To combat false claims of Safe Harbour adherence, privacy policies of self-certified companies’ websites should always
include a link to the Department of Commerce Safe Harbour website where all the
‘current’ members of the scheme are listed. This will allow European data
subjects to verify immediately, without additional searches whether a company
is currently a member of the Safe Harbour. The Department of Commerce has
started in March 2013 to request this from companies, but the process should be
intensified. The continuous monitoring and consequent
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission of actual compliance with the Safe
Harbour Principles – in addition to the measures taken by the Department of
Commerce as highlighted above – remains a key priority for ensuring proper and
effective functioning of the scheme. It is necessary in particular to increase ex-officio
checks and investigations of companies’ compliance to the Safe Harbour principles. Complaints to the Federal Trade Commission relating violations should
also be further facilitated. 5.2. EU Data
Protection Panel The EU Data
Protection Panel is a body created under the Safe Harbour Decision. It is
competent to investigate complaints lodged by individuals referring to personal
data collected in the context of the employment relationship as well as cases
relating to certified companies which have chosen this option for dispute
resolution under the Safe Harbour (53% of all companies). It is composed of
representatives of various EU data protection authorities. To date, the
Panel received four complaints (two in 2010 and two in 2013). It referred two
complaints in 2010 to national data protection authorities (UK and Switzerland). The third and the fourth complaints are currently under examination. The low
level of complaints can be explained by the fact that the powers of Panel are,
as mentioned above, primarily limited to certain type of data. The Panel's
limited caseload could be also partly explained by the lack of awareness about
the existence of the Panel. The Commission has, since 2004, made the
information about the Panel more visible on its website[43]. To make a better use of the Panel, companies in the US which have
chosen to cooperate with it and comply with its decisions, for some or all categories
of personal data covered in their respective self-certifications, should
clearly and prominently indicate it in their privacy policies commitments to
allow the Department of Commerce to scrutinise this aspect. A dedicated page
should be created on each EU data protection authority's website regarding Safe Harbour to raise Safe Harbour awareness with European companies and data subjects. 5.3. Improvement of enforcement The weaknesses
in transparency and weaknesses in enforcement that have been identified above,
lead to concerns among European companies as regards the negative impact of the
Safe Harbour scheme on European companies' competitiveness. Where a European
company competes with a US company operating under Safe Harbour, but in
practice not applying its principles, the European company is at a competitive
disadvantage in relation to that US company. Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction extends to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices "in or affecting commerce". Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act established exceptions to the Federal Trade
Commission's authority over unfair or deceptive acts or practices with respect
inter alia to telecommunications. Being outside Federal Trade Commission
enforcement, telecom companies are not allowed to adhere to the Safe Harbour. However, with the growing convergence of technologies
and services, many of their direct competitors in the US ICT sector are members
of Safe Harbour. The exclusion of telecom companies from the data exchanges
under the Safe Harbour scheme is a matter of concern to some European telecom
operators. According to the European Telecommunications Network Operators’
Association (ETNO) “this is in clear conflict to the most important plea of
telecommunication operators regarding the need for a level playing field”[44]. 6. Strengthening the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles 6.1. Alternative Dispute Resolutions The enforcement principle requires that there must be “readily
available and affordable recourse mechanisms by which each individual’s
complaints and disputes are investigated”. To that end the Safe Harbour scheme establishes a system of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) by an
independent third party[45]
to provide individuals with rapid solutions. The three top recourse mechanisms
bodies are the EU Data Protection Panel, BBB (Better Business Bureaus) and
TRUSTe. The use of ADR has increased since 2004 and the Department of
Commerce has strengthened the monitoring of American ADR providers to make sure
that the information they offer about the complaint procedure is clear,
accessible and understandable. However, the effectiveness of this system is yet
to be proven due to the limited number of cases dealt with so far[46].
Though the
Department of Commerce has been successful is reducing the fees charged by the
ADRs, two out of seven major ADR providers continue to charge fees from
individuals who file a complaint[47].
This represents the ADR providers used by about 20% of Safe Harbour companies. These companies have selected an ADR provider that charges a fee to
consumers for filing a complaint. Such practices do not comply with the
Enforcement Principle of Safe Harbour which gives individuals the right of
access to a “readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms”.
In the European Union, access to an independent dispute resolution service
provided by the EU Data Protection Panel is free for all data subjects. On 12 November
2013 the Department of Commerce confirmed that it "will continue to advocate
on behalf of EU citizens' privacy and work with ADR providers to determine
whether their fees can be lowered further". In relation to
sanctions, not all ADR providers possess the necessary tools to remedy
situations of failure to abide by the Privacy Principles. Moreover, the
publication of findings of non-compliance does not seem to be foreseen amongst
the range of sanctions and measures of all ADR service providers. ADR providers
are also required to refer cases to the Federal Trade Commission where a
company fails to comply with the outcome of the ADR process, or rejects the ADR
provider's decision, so that the Federal Trade Commission can review and
investigate and, if appropriate, take enforcement measures. However, to date,
there have been no cases of referral from ADR providers to the Federal Trade
Commission for non-compliance[48].
Alternative
dispute resolution service providers maintain on their Websites lists of
companies (Dispute Resolution Participants) which use their services. This
allows consumers to easily verify if – in case of dispute with a company – an
individual can submit a complaint to an identified dispute resolution provider.
Thus, for example the BBB dispute resolution provider lists all companies which
are under the BBB dispute resolution system. However, there are numerous
companies claiming to be under a specific dispute resolution system but not
listed by the ADR service providers as participants of their dispute resolution
scheme[49].
ADR mechanisms should be easily accessible, independent and
affordable for individuals. A data subject should be able to file a complaint
without any excessive constraints. All ADR bodies should publish on their
websites statistics about the complaints handled as well as specific
information about their outcome. Finally, the ADR bodies should be further
monitored to make sure that information they provide about the procedure and
how to lodge a complaint is clear and understandable, so that the dispute
resolution becomes an effective, trusted mechanism providing results. It should
also be reiterated that publication of findings of non-compliance should be
included within the range of mandatory sanctions of ADRs. 6.2. Onward transfer With the exponential growth of data flows
there is a need to ensure the continued protection of personal data at all
stages of data processing, notably when data is transferred by a company
adhering to the Safe Harbour to a third party processor. Therefore, the
need for the better enforcement of the Safe Harbour concerns not only Safe Harbour members but also subcontractors. The Safe Harbour scheme allows onward
transfers to third parties acting as “agents” if the company – member of the
Safe Harbour scheme – “ascertains that the third party subscribes to the
Principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding or enters
into a written agreement with such third party requiring that the third party
provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the
Privacy Principles”[50].
For example, a cloud service provider is required by the Department of Commerce
to enter into a contract even if it is “Safe Harbour-compliant” and it receives
personal data for processing[51].
However, this provision is not clear in Annex II to the Safe Harbour Decision. As the recourse to subcontractors has
increased considerably over the past years, in particular in the context of
cloud-computing, when entering such a contract, a Safe Harbour company should
notify the Department of Commerce and be obliged to make public the privacy
safeguards[52].
The three
above mentioned issues: the alternative dispute resolution mechanism,
reinforced oversight and onward transfers of data should be further
clarified. 7. Access
to data transferred in the framework of the Safe Harbour scheme In the course
of 2013, information on the scale and scope of US surveillance programmes has
raised concerns over the continuity of protection of personal data lawfully
transferred to the US under the Safe Harbour scheme. For instance, all companies
involved in the PRISM programme, and which grant access to US authorities to
data stored and processed in the US, appear to be Safe Harbour certified. This
has made the Safe Harbour scheme one of the conduits through which access is
given to US intelligence authorities to collecting personal data initially
processed in the EU. The Safe
Harbour Decision provides, in Annex 1, that adherence to the Privacy Principles may be limited, if justified by national security, public
interest, or law enforcement requirements or by statute, government regulation
or case-law. In order for limitations and restrictions
on the enjoyment of fundamental rights to be valid, they must be narrowly
construed; they must be set forth in a publicly accessible law and they must be
necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. In particular, the Safe
Harbour Decision specifies that such limitations are
allowed only “to the extent necessary” to meet national security, public
interest, or law enforcement requirements[53].
While the exceptional processing of data for the
purposes of national security, public interest or law enforcement is provided
under the Safe Harbour scheme, the large scale access by intelligence agencies
to data transferred to the US in the context of commercial transactions was not
foreseeable at the time of adopting the Safe Harbour. Moreover, for reasons of transparency and legal certainty, the European
Commission should be notified by the Department of Commerce of any statute or
government regulations that would affect adherence to the Safe Harbour Privacy
Principles[54].
The use of exceptions should be carefully monitored and the exceptions must not
be used in a way that undermines the protection afforded by the Principles[55].
In particular, large scale access by US authorities to data processed by Safe Harbour self-certified companies risks undermining the confidentiality of electronic
communications. 7.1. Proportionality and necessity As results from the findings of the ad hoc
EU-US Working Group on data protection, a number of legal bases under US law allow large-scale collection and processing of personal data that is stored or otherwise
processed companies based in the US. This may include data previously
transferred from the EU to the US under the Safe Harbour scheme, and it raises
the question of continued compliance with the Safe Harbour principles. The
large scale nature of these programmes may result in data transferred under Safe Harbour being accessed and further processed by US authorities beyond what is strictly
necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security as foreseen
under the exception provided in the Safe Harbour Decision. 7.2. Limitations and redress possibilities As results from
the findings of the ad hoc EU-US Working Group on data protection, safeguards
that are provided under US law are mostly available to US citizens or legal
residents. Moreover, there are no opportunities for either EU or US data
subjects to obtain access, rectification or erasure of data, or administrative
or judicial redress with regard to collection and further processing of their
personal data taking place under the US surveillance programmes. 7.3. Transparency Companies do not
systematically indicate in their privacy policies when they apply exceptions to
the Principles. The individuals and companies are thus not aware of what is
being done with their data. This is particularly relevant in relation with the
operation of the US surveillance programmes in question. As a result, Europeans
whose data are transferred to a company in the US under Safe Harbour may not be made aware by those companies that their data may be subject to access[56].
This raises the question of compliance with the Safe Harbour principles on
transparency. Transparency should be ensured to the greatest extent possible
without jeopardising national security. In addition to existing requirements on
companies to indicate in their privacy policies where the Principles may be
limited by statute, government regulation or case law, companies should also be
encouraged to indicate in their privacy policies when they apply exceptions to
the Principles to meet national security, public interest or law enforcement
requirements. 8. Conclusions and recommendations Since its
adoption in 2000, Safe Harbour has become a vehicle for EU-US flows of personal
data. The importance of efficient protection in case of transfers of personal
data has increased due to the exponential increase in data flows central to the
digital economy and the very significant developments in data collection,
processing and use. Web companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple,
Yahoo have hundreds of millions of clients in Europe and transfer personal data
for processing to the US on a scale inconceivable in the year 2000 when the Safe Harbour was created. Due to deficiencies in transparency and
enforcement of the arrangement, specific problems still persist and should be
addressed: a)
transparency of privacy policies of Safe Harbour members, b)
effective application of Privacy Principles by
companies in the US, and c)
effectiveness of the enforcement. Furthermore, the large scale access by
intelligence agencies to data transferred to the US by Safe Harbour certified
companies raises additional serious questions regarding the continuity of
data protection rights of Europeans when their data in transferred to the US. On the basis of the above, the Commission
has identified the following recommendations: Transparency 1. Self-certified companies should publicly disclose their privacy
policies. It is not sufficient for companies to
provide the Department of Commerce with a description of their privacy policy.
Privacy policies should be made publicly available on the companies' websites,
in clear and conspicuous language. 2. Privacy policies of self-certified companies’ websites should always
include a link to the Department of Commerce Safe Harbour website which lists
all the ‘current’ members of the scheme. This will allow European data subjects to verify
immediately, without additional searches whether a company is currently a
member of the Safe Harbour. This would help increase the credibility of the
scheme by reducing the possibilities for false claims of adherence to the Safe Harbour. The Department of Commerce has started in March 2013 to request this from
companies, but the process should be intensified. 3. Self-certified companies should publish privacy conditions of any
contracts they conclude with subcontractors, e.g. cloud computing services. Safe Harbour allows onward transfers from Safe Harbour
self-certified companies to third parties acting as “agents”, for example to
cloud service providers. According to our understanding, in such cases the
Department of Commerce requires from self-certified companies to enter into a
contract. However, when entering such a contract, a Safe Harbour company should
also notify the Department of Commerce and be obliged to make public the
privacy safeguards. 4. Clearly flag on the website of the Department of Commerce all
companies which are not current members of the scheme. The label “Not current” on the Department of Commerce list of Safe
Harbour members should be accompanied by a clear warning that a company is
currently not fulfilling Safe Harbour requirements. However, in the case of
"Not current" the company is obliged to continue to apply the Safe Harbour requirements for the data that has been received under Safe Harbour. Redress 5. The privacy policies on companies’ websites should include a link to
the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provider and/or EU panel. This will allow European data subjects to contact immediately the
ADR or EU panel in case of problems. Department of Commerce has started in
March 2013 to request this from companies, but the process should be
intensified. 6.
ADR should be
readily available and affordable. Some ADR bodies in the Safe Harbour scheme continue to charge fees from
individuals – which can be quite costly for an individual user – for the
handling of the complaint ($ 200-250). By contrast, in Europe access to the
Data Protection Panel foreseen for solving complaints under the Safe Harbour, is free. 7.
Department of
Commerce should monitor more systematically ADR providers regarding the
transparency and accessibility of information they provide concerning the procedure
they use and the follow-up they give to complaints. This makes the dispute resolution an effective,
trusted mechanism providing results. It should also be reiterated that
publication of findings of non-compliance should be included within the range
of mandatory sanctions of ADRs. Enforcement 8.
Following the
certification or recertification of companies under the Safe Harbour, a certain percentage of these companies should be subject to ex officio investigations
of effective compliance of their privacy policies (going beyond control of
compliance with formal requirements). 9.
Whenever there has
been a finding of non-compliance, following a complaint or an investigation,
the company should be subject to follow-up specific investigation after 1 year. 10.
In case of doubts
about a company's compliance or pending complaints, the Department of Commerce
should inform the competent EU data protection authority. 11.
False claims of Safe Harbour adherence should continue to be investigated. A company claiming on its website that it complies
with the Safe Harbour requirements, but is not listed by the Department of
Commerce as a ‘current’ member of the scheme, is misleading consumers and
abusing their trust. False claims weaken the credibility of the system as a
whole and therefore should be immediately removed from the companies’ websites.
Access by US
authorities 12. Privacy policies of self-certified
companies should include information on the extent to which US law allows public authorities to collect and process data transferred under the Safe Harbour. In particular companies should be encouraged to indicate in their privacy
policies when they apply exceptions to the Principles to meet national
security, public interest or law enforcement requirements. 13. It is important that the national security
exception foreseen by the Safe Harbour Decision is used only to an extent that
is strictly necessary or proportionate. [1] Articles 25 and 26 of the data
protection Directive set forth the legal framework for transfers of personal
data from the EU to third countries outside the EEA. [2] Additional rules have been laid down in
Article 13 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters to the extent such transfers concern personal
data transmitted or made available by one Member State to another Member State,
who subsequently intends to transfer those data to a third state or
international body for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal sanctions. [3] Commission decision 520/2000/EC of 26
July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy
Principles and related FAQs issued by the US Department of Commerce in OJ 215
of 28 August 2000, page 7. [4] The above does not exclude the
application to the data processing of other requirements that may exist under
national legislation implementing the EU data protection directive. [5] Data transfers from the three States
Parties to the EEA are similarly affected, following extension of Directive
95/46/EC to the EEA Agreement, Decision 38/1999 of 25 June 1999, OJ L 296/41,
23.11.2000. [6] According to some studies, if services
and cross-border data flows were to be disrupted as a consequence of discontinuity
of binding corporate rules, model contract clauses and the Safe Harbour, the
negative impact on EU GDP could reach -0,8% to -1,3% and EU services exports to
the US would drop by -6,7% due to loss of competitiveness. See: “The Economic
Importance of Getting Data Protection Right”, a study by the European Centre
for International Political Economy for the US Chamber of Commerce, March 2013. [7] Impact Assessment Study prepared for the
European Commission in 2008 by the Centre de Recherche Informatique et Droit
('CRID') of the University of Namur. [8] Commission Staff Working Paper “The
application of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to
Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate
protection of personal data provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and
related FAQs issued by the US Department of Commerce”, SEC (2002) 196,
13.12.2002. [9] Commission Staff Working Paper "The
implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of
personal data provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and related FAQs
issued by the US Department of Commerce", SEC (2004) 1323, 20.10.2004. [10] If a company’s certification or
recertification fails to meet Safe Harbour requirements, the Department of
Commerce notifies the company requesting steps to be taken (e.g.,
clarifications, changes in policy description) before the company’s
certification may be finalised. [11] Under Title 49 of the US Code Section 41712. [12] More specifically, suspension of transfers
can be required in two situations, where: (a) the government body in the US has determined that the company is violating the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles; or (b) there is a substantial likelihood that the Safe
Harbour Privacy Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for
believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not
take adequate and timely steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing
transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to data subjects; and the
competent authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under
the circumstances to provide the company with notice and an opportunity to
respond. [13] On 26 September 2013 the number of Safe Harbour organizations listed as “current” on the Safe Harbour List was 3246,
as “not current” 935. [14] Safe Harbour organizations with 250 or
less employees: 60% (1925 of 3246). Safe Harbour organizations with 251
or more employees: 40% (1295 of 3246). [15] For example MasterCard deals with
thousands of banks and the company is a clear example of a case where Safe Harbour cannot be replaced by other legal instruments for personal data transfers such
as binding corporate rules or contractual arrangements. [16] Safe Harbour organizations that cover
organization human resources data under their Safe Harbour certification (and
thereby have agreed to cooperate and comply with the EU data protection
authorities): 51% (1671 of 3246). [17] See Düsseldorfer Kreis decision
of 28/29 April 2010 . See: Beschluss der obersten Aufsichtsbehörden für den
Datenschutz im nicht-öffentlichen Bereich am 28./29. April 2010 in Hannover: http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlung/DuesseldorferKreis/290410_SafeHarbor.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
However, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) Peter Hustinx expressed
an opinion at the European Parliament LIEBE Committee Inquiry on 7 October 2013
that “substantial improvements have been made and most issues now been settled”
as far as Safe Harbour is concerned: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2013/13-10-07_Speech_LIBE_PH_EN.pdf
[18] See a resolution of a German Conference of data protection commissioners
underlying that intelligence services constitute a massive threat to data
traffic between Germany and countries outside Europe: http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage_Kurzmeldungen/PMDSK_SafeHarbor.html?nn=408870 [19] See the
press statement of Luxemboug DPA on 18 November 2013. [20] http://www.export.gov/SafeHarbour/
[21] https://SafeHarbour.export.gov/list.aspx
[22] The Guide is available on the
programme’s website at: http://export.gov/SafeHarbour/
Helpful Hints: http://export.gov/SafeHarbour/eu/eg_main_018495.asp [23] On 12 November 2013 the Department of
Commerce has confirmed that “Today, companies that have public websites and
cover consumer/client/visitor data must include a Safe Harbor-compliant privacy
policy on their respective websites” (document: “U.S.-EU Cooperation to Implement
the Safe Harbor Framework” of 12 Nov. 2013). [24] In September 2013 an Australian
consultancy Galexia compared Safe Harbour membership "false claims"
in 2008 and 2013. Its main finding is that, in parallel to the increase of
membership in the Safe Harbour between 2008 and 2013 (from 1,109 to 3,246), the
number of false claims has increased from 206 to 427.
http://www.galexia.com/public/about/news/about_news-id225.html [25] Between
March and September 2013 the Department of Commerce has: • Notified the 101 companies who had
already uploaded their Safe Harbour compliant privacy policy to Safe Harbour website that they must also post their privacy policy to their company
websites; • Notified the 154 companies that had not
already done so, that they should include a link to Safe Harbour website in
their privacy policy; • Notified
more than 600 companies that they should include contact information for their
independent dispute resolution provider in their privacy policy. [26] See page 8 of the 2004 Report SEC (2004) 1323. [27] According to statistics provided in
September 2013 by the Department in Commerce, the DoC notified in 2010 18% (93)
of the 512 first-time certifiers and 16% (231) of the 1,417 recertifiers to
make improvements to their privacy policies and/or Safe Harbour applications.
However, as a follow up to Commission requests for severe, diligent and
systematic scrutiny of all submissions, through mid-Sep. 2013, DoC notified 56%
(340) of the 602 first-time certifiers and 27% (493) of the 1,809 recertifiers
asking them to make improvements to their privacy policies. [28] Chris Connolly (Galexia) appearance before
the European Parliament LIBE Committee inquiry on 7 Oct. 2013. [29] As of December 2011, the US Department of
Commerce had removed 323 companies from the Safe Harbour List: 94 companies
were removed because they were no longer in business; 88 companies due to
acquisition or merger, 95 at the requests of the parent company; 41 companies
because repeated failure to ask for recertification and 5 companies for
miscellaneous reasons. [30] The EU Data Protection Panel is a body
competent for investigating and resolving complaints lodged by individuals for
alleged infringement of the Safe Harbour Principles by an US company member of the Safe Harbour. Companies that certify to the Safe Harbour Principles must
choose to comply with independent recourse mechanism or to cooperate with the
EU Data Protection Panel in order to remedy problems arising out of failure to
comply with Safe Harbour Principles. Cooperation with the EU Data Protection
Panel is nonetheless mandatory when the US company processes human resources
personal data transferred from the EU in the context of an employment
relationship. If the company commits itself to cooperate with the EU panel, it
must also commit itself to comply with any advice given by the EU panel where
it takes the view that the company needs to take specific action to comply with
the Safe Harbour Principles, including remedial or compensatory measures. [31] The Department of Transportation exercises
similar jurisdictions over air carriers under Title 49 United States Code Section 41712. [32] The complaint originated from a Swiss
citizen and therefore has been referred by the EU Data Protection Panel to the
Swiss data protection authority (US has a separate Safe Harbour scheme for Switzerland). [33] See Annex V to the Commission Decision
2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000. [34] Over the period 2009-2012 Federal Trade
Commission has completed ten enforcement actions of Safe Harbour commitments:
FTC v. Javian Karnani, and Balls of Kryptonite, LLC (2009), World Innovators,
Inc. (2009), Expat Edge Partners, LLC (2009), Onyx Graphics, Inc. (2009),
Directors Desk LLC (2009), Progressive Gaitways LLC (2009), Collectify LLC
(2009), Google Inc. (2011), Facebook, Inc. (2011), Myspace LLC (2012). See:
“Federal Trade Commission of Safe Harbour Commitments”:
http://export.gov/build/groups/public/@eg_main/@SafeHarbour/documents/webcontent/eg_main_052211.pdf
See also: “Case Highlights”: http://business.ftc.gov/us-eu-Safe-Harbour-framework.
Most of these cases involved problems with companies that joined Safe Harbour but then continued to represent themselves as members without renewing the
annual certification. [35] This commitment has been reiterated at a
meeting of Federal Trade Commission Commissioner Julie Brill with EU Data
protection Authorities (Article 29 Working Party) in Brussels on 17 April 2013.
[36] http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?Docid=1317&Catid=66&StartDate=1+January+2013&m=n [37] Consumers can file their complaints via
the Federal Trade Commission Complaint Assistant (https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/)
and international consumers may file complaints via econsumer.gov
(http://www.econsumer.gov). [38] http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923081/090806karnanicmpt.pdf [39] http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/131029europeaninstituteremarks.pdf
and http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/131029tacdremarks.pdf
[40] Letter of the Federal Trade Commission
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez to Vice-President Viviane Reding. [41] Letter of the Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman
Edith Ramirez to Vice-President Viviane Reding. [42] “U.S.-EU Cooperation to Implement the Safe Harbor Framework”, 12 November 2013. [43] Pursuant to the
2004 report, an Information Notice in the form of Q&A of the EU Data
Protection Panel has been published on the Commission's website (DG Justice)
with the purpose of raising awareness of individuals and help them to
file a complaint when they believe that their personal data has been processed
in violation of the Safe Harbour: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/adequacy/information_Safe_harbour_en.pdf
The
standard complaint form is available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/adequacy/
complaint_form_en.pdf [44] “ETNO considerations” received by
Commission services on 4 October 2013 discuss also 1) definition of personal
data in Safe Harbour, 2) lack of monitoring of the Safe Harbour, 3) and the
fact that “US companies can transfer data with much less restrictions than
their European counterparts” which “constitutes a clear discrimination of
European companies and is affecting the competitiveness of European
companies”. Under the Safe Harbour rules, to disclose information to a third
party, organizations must apply the Notice and Choice Principles. Where an
organization wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as
an agent, it may do so if it first either ascertains that the third party
subscribes to the Principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy
finding or enters into a written agreement with such third party requiring that
the third party provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is
required by the relevant Principles. [45] The EU Directive 2013/11/EU on consumer
ADR underlines the importance of independent, impartial, transparent,
effective, fast and fair alternative dispute resolution procedures. [46] For example, one major service provider
("TRUSTe") reported that it received 881 requests in 2010, but that
only three of them were considered admissible, and grounded, and led to the
company concerned being required to change its privacy policy and website. In
2011, the number of complaints was 879, and in one case the company was
required to change its privacy policy. According to the DoC, vast majority of
the complaints to ADR are requests from consumers, for example users who have
forgotten their password and were unable to obtain it from the internet
service. Following Commission requests, the Department of Commerce developed
new statistics reporting criteria to be used by all ADR. They distinguish
between mere requests and complaints and they provide with further
clarification of types of complaints received. These new criteria need however
to be further discussed to make sure that new statistics in 2014 concern all
ADR providers, are comparable and provide critical information to assess the
effectiveness of the recourse mechanism. [47] International Centre for Dispute
Resolution / American Arbitration Association (ICDR/AAA), charges $ 200 and
JAMS $ 250 “filing fee”. The Department of Commerce informed the Commission that
it had worked with the AAA, the most costly dispute resolution provider for
individuals, to develop a Safe Harbour-specific program which reduced the cost
to consumers from several thousands of dollars to a flat rate of $ 200. [48] See FAQ 11. [49] Examples: Amazon has informed the DoC that
it uses the BBB as its dispute resolution provider. However the BBB does not
list Amazon among its dispute resolution participants. Vice versa, Arsalon
Technologies (www.arsalon.net), a cloud hosting service provider, appears on
the BBB Safe Harbour dispute resolution list but the company is not a current
member of the Safe Harbour (situation as of 1 October 2013). BBB, TRUSTe and
other ADR service providers should remove or correct the certification claims.
They should be bound by an enforceable requirement to only certify companies
who are members of the Safe Harbour. [50] See Commission Decision 2000/520/EC page 7
(onward transfer). [51] See: “Clarifications Regarding the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework and Cloud Computing”: http://export.gov/static/Safe%20Harbor%20and%20Cloud%20Computing%20Clarification_April%2012%202013_Latest_eg_main_060351.pdf
[52] These remarks concern cloud providers
which are not in the Safe Harbour. According to Galexia consultancy firm, “the
level of Safe Harbour membership (and compliance) amongst cloud service
providers is quite high. Cloud service providers typically have multiple layers
of privacy protection, often combining direct contracts with clients and
over-arching privacy policies. With one or two important exceptions, cloud
service providers in the Safe Harbour are compliant with the key provisions
relating to dispute resolution and enforcement. There are no major cloud
service providers in the list of false membership claims at this time.”
(appearance of Chris Connolly from Galexia before the LIBE Committee inquiry on
“Electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens”). [53] See Annex 1 of the Safe Harbour Decision:
“Adherence to these Principles may be limited: (a) to the extent necessary to
meet national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements; (b)
by statute, government regulation, or case law that create conflicting
obligations or explicit authorizations, provided that, in exercising any such
authorization, an organization can demonstrate that its non-compliance with the
Principles is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding legitimate
interests furthered by such authorization; or (c) if the effect of the
Directive of Member State law is to allow exceptions or derogations, provided
such exceptions or derogations are applied in comparable contexts. Consistent
with the goal of enhancing privacy protection, organizations should strive to
implement these Principles fully and transparently, including indicating in
their privacy policies where exceptions to the Principles permitted by (b)
above will apply on a regular basis. For the same reason, where the option is
allowable under the Principles and/or U.S. law, organizations are expected to
opt for the higher protection where possible.” [54] Opinion 4/2000 on the level of protection
provided by the “Safe Harbour Principles”, adopted by Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party on 16 May 2000. [55] Opinion 4/2000 on the level of protection
provided by the “Safe Harbour Principles”, adopted by Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party on 16 May 2000. [56] Relatively transparent information in this
respect is provided by some European companies in Safe Harbour. For example
Nokia, which has operations in the US and is a Safe Harbour member provides a
following notice in its privacy policy: “We may be obligated by mandatory law to
disclose your personal data to certain authorities or other third parties, for
example, to law enforcement agencies in the countries where we or third parties
acting on our behalf operate.”