EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 21.11.2023
SWD(2023) 360 final
JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Report on EU Enhanced Engagement with three Everything But Arms beneficiary countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar
Accompanying the document
Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council
on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2020-2022
{JOIN(2023) 34 final} - {SWD(2023) 359 final} - {SWD(2023) 361 final} - {SWD(2023) 362 final} - {SWD(2023) 363 final} - {SWD(2023) 364 final} - {SWD(2023) 365 final} - {SWD(2023) 366 final} - {SWD(2023) 367 final} - {SWD(2023) 368 final}
Enhanced Engagement
1.Introduction
This is the second joint Staff Working Document (SWD) dedicated to enhanced engagement with three GSP beneficiary countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar. Enhanced Engagement started in 2017 with these three beneficiary countries under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) arrangement in the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and has not been extended to other EBA beneficiaries so far .
Enhanced engagement is conducted by the European Commission Services and the European External Action Service (EEAS), aiming to facilitate and incentivise beneficiary countries to make progress on critical areas with regard to the 15 core human rights and labour rights international conventions listed in the GSP Regulation. Article 19 of the GSP Regulation provides that preferences may be withdrawn from any GSP beneficiaries in case of serious and systematic violation of the principles of the core human and labour right conventions. On this basis, EBA preferences for Cambodia were partially and temporarily withdrawn on 12 February 2020 (
) due to serious and systematic violations of certain human rights in Cambodia.
The enhanced engagement with these three EBA beneficiaries focuses on the most serious issues linked to the implementation of key principles laid down in United Nations (UN) and International Labour Organization (ILO) reports and recommendations. It also reflects the deep concerns regarding the implementation status of these EBA beneficiaries as expressed by the European Parliament and the Council, international organisations, and civil society, including trade unions.
In concrete terms, the process notably involves dialogue with representatives of the country concerned, including at political level, monitoring missions, including official dialogues, discussions with stakeholders, on-the-spot visits and exchange of letters on progress made and efforts that are still needed.
Enhanced engagement with these three EBA beneficiaries is particularly important given their considerable share of total EU imports from countries under the EBA arrangement, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: EU imports by GSP beneficiaries and from EBA enhanced engagement countries (
)
|
|
Preferential EU27 imports (€ million)
|
growth 2019-2022 (%)
|
share of imports from EBA countries 2020-2022 (%)
|
|
|
2019
|
2020
|
2021
|
2022
|
|
|
|
GSP
|
62,326
|
52,618
|
55,908
|
80,635
|
29.4
|
|
|
GSP - general
|
28,665
|
23,666
|
24,216
|
31,955
|
11.5
|
|
|
GSP - plus
|
8,496
|
7,623
|
9,386
|
13,274
|
56.2
|
|
|
GSP - EBA
|
25,164
|
21,329
|
22,307
|
35,407
|
40.7
|
|
|
Enhanced Engagement
|
|
Bangladesh
|
15,366
|
13,050
|
14,887
|
22,672
|
47.5
|
64.0
|
|
Cambodia
|
4,174
|
3,118
|
2,517
|
4,220
|
1.1
|
7.6
|
|
Myanmar
|
2,471
|
2,442
|
2,044
|
4,005
|
62.1
|
6.1
|
The three EBA beneficiary countries under enhanced engagement present highly different political, economic and development situations, hence the engagement process has followed a different track and focus. The respective engagements also take into account all the EU instruments available – beyond the EBA – to address the identified problems.
The EU provides countries under enhanced engagement with every opportunity to cooperate and continue dialogue on any of the issues addressed in this context. Each case is assessed on its own merit, with a view to induce and encourage the necessary reforms.
In the case of Bangladesh, the enhanced engagement process allowed for constructive bilateral exchanges on labour rights.
In the case of Myanmar, the February 2021 military coup has deeply influenced the modalities of the enhanced engagement process, due to its broader impact on bilateral relations between the EU and the country. The Council Conclusions of 22 February 2021 clearly define the EU position condemning the military coup in the strongest terms, and stressing that the EU stands with the population, especially those people who are in the most vulnerable circumstances.
In the case of Cambodia, since the launch of the procedure for a temporary withdrawal in February 2019 (
), the interaction with the country took place in the specific procedural framework outlined in the GSP Regulation . The withdrawal procedure was concluded in 2020 with a partial withdrawal of preferences for selected garment and footwear, travel goods and selected sugar products. Since then, the interaction with Cambodia continued in the context of the political dialogues with the EEAS. Under the GSP rules, the partial withdrawal will be in place until the reasons that led to it no longer apply.
2.
Bangladesh
2.1.Context
There has been sustained cooperation with the Bangladeshi authorities over the reporting period.
As regards labour rights, in 2022 Bangladesh ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on minimum age. The enhanced engagement process has also led to the finalisation of Bangladesh’s National Action Plan on the Labour Sector (NAP) in 2021. Bangladesh is regularly reporting every six months on the progress of the implementation (the latest report was published on 18 April 2023). Concerns remain in particular with respect to freedom of association including anti-union discrimination and obstacles to trade union establishment and operation, occupational safety and health, labour inspection, and child labour and forced labour.
At the same time, limited progress was recorded for human rights, where concerns persist for alleged torture, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances, as well as for deficiencies regarding freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the civil society space and the application of the death penalty.
2.2.Economic situation and impact of EBA tariff preferences
Bangladesh remains by far the most important beneficiary of the EBA arrangement in terms of exports to the EU. EBA preferences have contributed significantly to the country’s remarkable economic growth and associated social progress over the past decades.
The economic performance in terms of GDP growth continued to be positive in the period 2020 to 2022 despite the COVID-19 pandemic (contrary to many other GSP beneficiaries) (). Bangladesh met the (Least Developed Country) LDC graduation criteria in 2018 and 2021 and is now scheduled to graduate from LDC status in 2026, having been granted an exceptional 5-year transition period by the UN due to challenges stemming from the pandemic. Graduation from LDC status will also imply exit from the EBA arrangement three years later according to the current GSP Regulation.
After a decrease by 16.0% in 2020 largely linked to the pandemic, Bangladesh’s exports to the EU recovered to €15.6 billion in 2021 (+16.5% compared to 2020), and even more strongly to €23.9 billion in 2022 (+53.5% compared to 2021) . Exports to the EU also grew faster than Bangladeshi total exports to the world. The EU’s share of Bangladesh’s exports reached 51.8% in 2022, making the EU the most important export market by far .
Bangladesh’s exports to the EU (as well as globally) are overwhelmingly apparel (knitted and not knitted), accounting for more than 90% of total exports to the EU in 2022. This reflects Bangladesh’s overall export structure, which has been strongly based on its ready-made garments (RMG) exports, where Bangladesh has become the second-most important exporter globally, after China. Virtually all Bangladeshi exports to the EU take place under the EBA preferences, and utilisation rates have consistently been 95% or higher.
2.3.Key Concerns
In the reporting period the key concerns on labour rights related to:
·Bringing labour laws in full compliance with international standards: remove legal obstacles to the right to establish trade unions, elect representatives of trade unions and organise freely trade unions’ activities, minimum membership requirements to form a trade union, limitations to the establishment of trade unions in some sectors and certain workers, and the absence of trade unions in Export Processing Zones (EPZs), and addressing gaps in implementing occupational safety and health in factories and workplaces;
·Anti-union discrimination, including violence, harassment, dismissal, and arrest of workers with insufficient investigations and prosecutions of cases;
·Shortcomings in the labour inspectorate in terms of capacity and ability;
·Persistence of child and forced labour.
With respect to the key concerns on human rights, these concern freedom of expression, both online and offline, freedom of assembly and civil society space; investigate cases of alleged torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances; the authorities should also fully implement the recommendations of the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), including with respect to the abolition of the death penalty, as well as the conclusions of UN treaty monitoring bodies.
2.4.Process of Engagement
Over the reporting period, the EU regularly informed Bangladesh of its concerns and conducted two monitoring missions in October 2019, and once the COVID-19 pandemic conditions allowed again, in March 2022.
In October 2019, the authorities of Bangladesh agreed to develop the National Action Plan on the Labour Sector of Bangladesh (NAP) with timelines for reforms to improve labour rights, notably to ensure the compliance of the Bangladesh Labour Act and the Export Processing Zone Labour Act with the ILO fundamental Conventions. The final NAP was made public by Bangladesh in September 2021. It is a comprehensive document also addressing EU concerns related to child labour, labour inspection and closure of factories that cannot be remediated to comply with health and safety requirements.
At the 4th EU-Bangladesh Diplomatic Consultations on 26 October 2021, the EU stressed the need to focus on the NAP’s implementation, in particular the respect of deadlines for specific actions, the shortening of the EPZ Labour Act amendment’s timeline, and the closure of non-remediated factories without delay. In the area of human rights, the EU underlined its concern on the increasing pressure on freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the need to respect the freedom of assembly. The EU also called for a moratorium on the death penalty and raised concern as to the manner in which the Digital Security Act was being implemented.
The EBA joint monitoring mission to Dhaka from 13 to 17 March 2022 allowed the EU representatives to reiterate clear messages on the need for Bangladesh to deliver on the compliance with international labour and human rights obligations. As regards the NAP, the EU acknowledged the steps taken by the Government such as the ratification of ILO Convention No. 138 on minimum age and of the 2014 Protocol on the forced labour Convention No. 29. The EU also stressed the urgency to ensure full and timely implementation, and to shorten the timeline for amending the Export-Processing-Zones Labour Act. The EU also emphasised the need for compliance with the human rights obligations as raised several times during the enhanced engagement process notably concerning freedom of expression, including in the digital space, the combat of extrajudicial killings and torture and violence against women and marginalised groups.
At the 9th meeting of the EU-Bangladesh Subgroup on Trade and Economic Cooperation held on 19 May 2022 in Brussels, the EU raised concerns on a number of delays, including on the revision of Bangladesh labour laws, and once again underlined the importance of addressing the issues already raised during the mission to Dhaka. The EU also asked to take the necessary action to eliminate child labour by 2025, to effectively combat harassment and violence against workers, fill all existing posts of labour inspectors and create the new posts needed and ensure safe and healthy workplaces. In the area of human rights, the EU reiterated the need for the Government to deliver on the relevant requests raised since the outset of the enhanced engagement.
The 10th EU-Bangladesh Joint Commission in Brussels on 20 May 2022 was another opportunity for the EU to recall EBA’s requirements on the respect of human rights, including labour rights, as reflected in the relevant international conventions listed in the GSP Regulation. The Joint Commission discussed the situation of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, including the importance of holding free and fair elections. The EU raised concerns on human rights and emphasised the need to ensure accountability for human rights violations. The EU also pointed to issues of freedom of expression offline and online, notably in the framework of the Digital Security Act, noting the importance for legislation and its implementation in this area to remain in line with international human rights obligations. The EU called on promoting and protecting human rights of all, regardless of ethnicity, age, gender identity, sexual orientation, religious or political affiliation, disability or socio-economic background, noting that progress in these areas is also crucial for stability, economic growth and development. The EU also noted that it was ready to provide increased cooperation in view of Bangladesh’s next UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review in 2023.
In April 2022, the European Parliament’s International Committee on Trade (INTA) held an exchange of views on the implementation of the NAP. While expressing satisfaction with its publication in 2021, the Committee recalled its deep concerns on the labour rights situation expressed in previous meetings of the Committee. The Committee confirmed that it would continue to follow very closely the implementation of the NAP .
The first formal EU-Bangladesh Political Dialogue was held on 24 November 2022 in Dhaka. The EU stressed the need for comprehensive implementation of the National Action Plan on the Labour Sector of Bangladesh as per the stipulated timelines. Both sides highlighted the shared values of democracy, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, inclusiveness, and respect for human rights.
|
Box 1: Cooperation priorities and projects – Bangladesh
The Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for Bangladesh has an indicative allocation for 2021-2024 of €306 million. Additional funds (loans) can be leveraged under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+). The MIP builds on existing cooperation in the fields of education, TVET (Technical and Vocal Education and Training) and Skills, social protection and governance and expands to cover green energy transition and environmental protection. The MIP 2021-2027 priority areas are the following: 1) Human Capital Development, 2) Green Inclusive Development, and 3) Inclusive Governance. Two Team Europe Initiatives will contribute to 1) a green energy transition and 2) to accelerating the decent work agenda. Under this MIP, two Annual Action Plans were already adopted by the Commission: one in 2021 comprising two actions: EU support to the National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) and Promoting Justice for All; and one in 2022 supporting the partnership for Green Energy Transition. Further initiatives in the field of Education, TVET, decent work, energy transition, governance and gender are planned for the near future.
|
2.5.State of Play
Thanks to progress achieved in ratifying ILO Conventions in recent years, Bangladesh has ratified all the 27 GSP+ international Conventions referred to in the GSP Regulation.
Through various amendments to its legislation and finetuning its approach to implementation, in the reporting period Bangladesh achieved some gradual improvements with respect to labour rights. Amendments to the Labour Act in 2018 and to the EPZ Labour Act in 2019 partially addressed the comments made by the ILO Committee of Experts and the EU. However, most of the changes to the Labour Act/EPZ Labour Act requested by the ILO Committee of Experts for a number of years have either not been addressed yet or have only been addressed partially The trade union registration process has been gradually improving, although further efforts are needed in this area to address all the remaining problems.
In response to a complaint to the ILO, in June 2021, the Government submitted a roadmap to the ILO, focussing on four priority areas for action: 1) labour law reform, 2) trade union registration, 3) labour inspection and enforcement, and 4) anti-union discrimination/unfair labour practices and violence against workers.
In September 2021, the Ministry of Labour published the abovementioned National Action Plan on the Labour Sector of Bangladesh (NAP 2021-2026), following intense and productive technical discussions with the EU. The NAP and the ILO roadmap are mutually supportive. The NAP also identifies the national institutions responsible for each action, and includes commitments going beyond the roadmap, such as the elimination of child labour by 2025.
The Bangladesh Labour Rules and the EPZ Labour Rules, sub-rules to the Labour Act/EPZ Labour Act, have been revised and adopted in 2022. However, the Rules still fall short of compliance with international labour standards .
The Government has committed to establish and fill 942 additional posts for labour inspectors by the end of 2023, and undertaken trainings for labour inspectors, though almost 200 posts of labour inspectors, making up for about one third of the existing posts, remain unfilled. The Government has completed a business plan in 2021 to remediate factories under the national initiative for fire, electrical and structural safety; it needs to follow up on its commitments to remediate factories ensuring the safety of workers, including by sending closure notices to factories where necessary as per the NAP. The Government should step up its efforts to investigate and prosecute alleged cases of violence and harassment against workers and their representatives.
In 2022, Bangladesh ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age, committing to the international community that no child below 14 years of age would be allowed entry into work or employment, in both formal and informal sectors. The ratification of Convention No. 138 is an important step forward, although the challenge lying ahead is the implementation. In 2021, Bangladesh published the National Plan of Action to Eliminate Child Labour (2020-2025). In 2022, the Government adopted a revised list of hazardous work, extending from 38 to 43 the number of types of work prohibited for persons under 18 years of age, while important sectors such as agriculture or domestic work have not been taken up. Action in the area of education as the most decisive instrument to eliminate child labour, as referred to in the NAP, is however not mentioned at all in the 3rd NAP report. The compulsory school leaving age needs to be aligned with the minimum age to take up work.
Limited progress has been recorded in the reporting period with respect to human rights concerns expressed by the EU. With regard to cases of alleged torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances, on multiple occasions in 2021 and 2022, the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights expressed deep concern about the Government’s failure to complete investigations and bring the perpetrators to justice. As part of the enhanced engagement discussions on human rights, the EU repeatedly expressed concern about some of the Digital Security Act’s provisions and encouraged Bangladesh to fully implement the recommendations that the Human Rights Council made during the last Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. Bangladesh’s authorities expressed the intention to amend the Digital Security Act and to align its provisions with international human rights standards, and in September 2023 the Act was repealed by the Cyber Security Act. Preliminary analysis shows that the Cyber Security Act is not fully aligned with international human rights standards; its application will be monitored.
On 14 September 2023, the European Parliament adopted a joint motion for a resolution on the human rights situation in Bangladesh, and in particular the case of the human rights organisation Odhikar, which coincided with the sentencing of two of the organisation’s leaders. The following day, the Spokesperson the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the Commission issued a statement on the case and on the role of civil society.
2.6.Looking ahead
With respect to the key concerns on labour rights, the authorities in Bangladesh should increase the pace of implementing the commitments on labour rights included in the NAP and ILO Road map, and continue to report regularly on progress achieved in line with the timelines provided.
With respect to the key concerns on human rights, the authorities in Bangladesh should improve freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and civil society space; investigate cases of alleged torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances; fully implement the recommendations of the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) including with respect to the abolition of the death penalty, as well as the conclusions of UN treaty monitoring bodies.
The full compliance with the GSP relevant international conventions should also be seen in the light of the expected future graduation of Bangladesh from LDC status , which would imply moving from the EBA arrangement to standard GSP. In this context, is important that Bangladesh can demonstrate that it meets its obligations under the GSP regulation, in particular as mentioned above, the labour rights reforms under the National Action Plan and the respect of international human rights standards. The EU will continue to closely monitor the implementation of Bangladesh’s GSP commitments, and will foster the ongoing engagement, notably through an EU High-Level mission to Dhaka in November 2023.
3.
Myanmar
3.1.Context
On 8 November 2020, Myanmar held its first general election under the control of a civilian government, the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD). Despite shortcomings, which included the disenfranchisement of some ethnic minority groups, especially the Rohingya in Rakhine State, the election was seen as an important milestone in the country’s democratic transition following sixty years of direct or indirect military rule. International observers (including the EU’s Expert Mission) concluded that, despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, the elections were transparent and largely reflected the will of the Myanmar people. Yet, on 1 February 2021, the day of the opening of the new session of Parliament, the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar armed forces) seized power after arresting State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, imposing an unconstitutional state of emergency.
The general human rights situation in Myanmar and its significant deterioration since the military coup are of very serious concern to the EU.
The process of EBA enhanced engagement that started in 2017 in relation to human rights and labour rights has been overshadowed by the military coup, the democratic backsliding in the country, and the significant worsening of the human rights and labour rights situation. Formal interaction with the military regime has been put on hold.
As of December 2022, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 2,565 people have been killed through military crackdowns following pro-democracy movements since the coup and 13,068 people were in detention. The UN estimates that around 25 million people (of a population of 54 million) lived in poverty during 2022, with the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance rising from 1 million at the start of 2021 to 17.6 million over the year 2022.
Politically, a broad-based pro-democracy movement has emerged in the opposition as a result of the coup. It encompasses the National Unity Government (formed by democratically elected lawmakers in the 2020 elections who were ousted by the coup), the National Unity Consultative Council the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (the elected Members of Parliament in the November 2020 election), various Ethnic Resistance Organisations, as well as an array of civil society groups. However, the Political Party Registration Law of January 2023, prohibiting anyone previously convicted of a crime or serving a prison term from joining a political party, prevents key members of the political opposition from taking part in political life and running in elections.
The Rohingya crisis continues, and in 2022 more than 750,000 Rohingya from the Rakhine State in Myanmar were forcibly displaced to Bangladesh, despite international efforts and calls on Myanmar to create the conditions for their return. The EU continues to advocate for the safe, sustainable, dignified, and voluntary return of the Rohingya refugees to their places of origin. The EU supports the work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) established by the UN Human Rights Council to ensure full accountability for the crimes committed against the Rohingya as well as for the crimes committed by the military junta since the military coup.
In view of the continuing escalation of violence, grave human rights violations and threats to the peace, security and stability in Myanmar, as of July 2023 the Council of the European Union has adopted seven rounds of restrictive measures (sanctions) against individuals and entities supporting the military regime and its human rights violations. Restrictive measures currently apply to a total of 99 individuals and 19 entities. Those designated are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban, which prevents them from entering or transiting through EU territory. In addition, EU persons and entities are prohibited to make funds available to those listed.
The restrictive measures come in addition to the withholding of EU financial assistance directly going to the Government and the freezing of all EU assistance that may be seen as legitimising the junta. Therefore, the development assistance has been re-oriented to directly support the people of Myanmar since the 2021 coup. At the same time, the EU continues providing humanitarian assistance and attempting to avoid harm for the most vulnerable persons, including women working in the garment sector.
On 25 July 2022, the military regime executed four pro-democracy and opposition activists, the first prisoners to be executed in the country in more than three decades. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy stressed that these politically motivated executions represented yet another step towards the complete dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar. As of December 2022, 139 persons had been sentenced to death in Myanmar since 1 February 2021.
In June 2022, the International Labour Conference’s 110th session in Geneva concluded that, the situation in Myanmar had continuously and gravely deteriorated since the military coup. The country’s democratic transition had been halted with disastrous humanitarian, social, security, economic, and human and labour rights consequences. At the Conference, the EU and its Member States condemned again in the strongest terms the continuing widespread human and labour rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Myanmar military and security forces across the country, including the unlawful persecution of civil society organisations and its activists, violence against peaceful protestors and arbitrary arrests and detentions, intimidation and harassment, unjustified dismissals, threats and acts of grave violence and torture, including killings, against trade unionists and human rights defenders, and acts of sexual and gender-based violence.
On 21 December 2022, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on Myanmar expressing deep concern at the ongoing state of emergency and its grave impact on the people of Myanmar. The resolution also urged concrete and immediate actions to end violence and called on the military junta to release all political prisoners, including ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and implement the ASEAN five-point consensus to tackle the political crisis in Myanmar.
On 4 April 2023, at the initiative of the EU, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, strongly condemning the human rights violations perpetrated by the Myanmar military. The resolution included new language on the transfer of surveillance technologies and less-lethal technologies, on politically motivated arrests and executions, and on the recent Organisation Registration Law. As in previous years, the resolution expressed strong support for ongoing accountability efforts, including by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, to ensure that perpetrators of past and current human rights violations in the country are held to account. The Resolution also extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar for a further period of one year.
3.2.Economic situation and impact of EBA tariff preferences
Myanmar’s economy grew strongly from 2012 to 2019, averaging 6.9% per year. Growth continued but slowed in 2020 to 3.1%, but sharply contracted in 2021 (-18%) following the military coup and the ongoing political crisis, and only limited growth of 3.0% was recorded in 2022. GDP per capita also increased until 2020, reaching €1,411, but dropped to €1,085 in 2021 and again to €1,042 in 2022. The poverty rate decreased from 42.2% in 2010 to 24.8% in 2017, but UNDP estimates that it reached almost 50% again in early 2022.
Myanmar met the LDC graduation criteria for the first time in 2018 and again in 2021. However, because of concerns that the state of emergency in force since February 2021 would negatively affect the country’s development trajectory, a decision by the UN on graduation was deferred to 2024. Thus, the earliest graduation from LDC status could occur in 2027, while, under the current GSP Regulation, the exit from the EBA would take place only three years thereafter.
Over the reporting period, preference utilisation rates of EBA preferences have consistently been high, at about 95%. Myanmar’s exports to the EU rapidly expanded following the reinstatement of EBA preferences in 2013, increasing at an average annual growth of 57% to almost €2.8 billion in 2019 (of which €2.5 billion were under the EBA preferences). Importantly, exports to the EU thereafter fell by 8% to €2.6 billion in 2020 (of which €2.4 billion were under the EBA) and by another 13% to €2.2 billion in 2021 (of which €2.0 billion were under the EBA), but then almost doubled in 2022 to €4.3 billion (of which €4.0 billion under the EBA). The EU’s main imported products were garments (€3.1 billion), rice, and footwear (€380 million each). Myanmar’s imports from the EU (mostly pharmaceuticals, machinery and aircraft) are significantly lower at €361 million in 2022.
Over the last few years, the EU has become an increasingly important market for Myanmar: exports to the EU as a share of total exports grew to more than 21% in 2020 to 2022. In 2022, the EU was the country’s third most important export destination, just after Thailand and China.
Myanmar is one of the main beneficiaries of EBA tariff preferences. It ranks number three after Bangladesh and Cambodia in terms of the value of exports to the EU under the EBA arrangement.
Supported by Myanmar’s rapidly growing exports to the EU, especially of garments, employment in the sector also quickly expanded: in 2015, the garment sector provided employment for 380,000 persons, with women accounting for 91%. By 2019, just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, employment in the sector had grown to almost 700,000 people, 90% of whom women. However, the situation in the sector deteriorated due to the pandemic and the military coup. The Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association estimated that employment in the sector in September 2021 had declined to about 480,000 workers, with some of them on furlough or reduced hours. Out of those remaining in jobs, around 60% were estimated as working in factories depending on exports to the EU – this is a higher share than the share of Myanmar’s garments exports destined to the EU in 2020, indicating that exports to the EU were associated with a higher employment retention during the dual crisis.
3.3.Key concerns
Of particular concern prior to the coup was the violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya community in Rakhine State in 2017. Discrimination of ethnic minorities has persisted, and the EU and the rest of the international community became seriously concerned about grave human rights violations and abuses amounting to crimes against humanity , in particular in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States. In response, an Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar was established through a joint EU-OIC tabled resolution in the UN Human Rights Council in September 2018 and confirmed by the UN General Assembly in December 2018.
Broader EU concerns, exacerbated by the military coup, relate to a wide range of human rights and labour rights issues across Myanmar, including the use of violence and grave human rights violations, particularly against ethnic and religious minorities, political opponents and worker representatives; impunity of human rights violators; lack of cooperation with UN bodies and procedures; prevention of humanitarian access, the situation of internally displaced persons and conditions regarding the return of refugees; hate speech and discrimination; restrictions to freedom of expression; continued prevalence of child labour and forced labour; and severe restrictions to freedom of association.
3.4.Process of Engagement
During the reporting period and as a follow-up to the third biennial GSP Report for the period 2018-2019, on 14 April 2020 the Commission communicated in writing to the authorities of Myanmar to set out the priorities for monitoring under EBA enhanced engagement. A more detailed follow-up ‘list of salient issues’ was sent in June 2020. Myanmar authorities responded by mid-September 2020 but did not provide evidence of progress on any of the salient issues.
The process of engagement with Myanmar slowed down in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU-Myanmar 6th Human Rights Dialogue that took place on 14 October 2020 brought no progress. The EU reiterated the calls for further actions on, among others, humanitarian access to the states of Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, creating the conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees, and ensuring accountability for crimes committed.
With the military coup of 1 February 2021, formal interaction with the military regime has been put on hold, rendering any contact or communication in the framework of the EBA enhanced engagement impossible.
Since then, the EU position was established in Council conclusions adopted on 22 February 2021, stating that ‘the EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance and will seek to avoid measures which could adversely affect the people of Myanmar/Burma, especially those people who are in the most vulnerable circumstances’ ().
Furthermore, the EU has maintained its policy of using the tools at its disposal to continue putting pressure on the military regime, including by adopting a series of packages of targeted – as opposed to comprehensive – restrictive measures ().
Enhanced engagement continues through contacts with business, trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Myanmar. Moreover, regular engagement by the EEAS is maintained with the National Unity Government, with a view to closely monitor the situation on a wide range of human rights and labour rights issues in relation to the EBA. The Commission services and the EEAS are actively engaged with a range of stakeholders in Myanmar’s society, so that the channels of information and communication are kept open, and the labour rights situation of workers, in particular in the garment industry, is monitored.
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Box 1: Cooperation priorities and projects – Myanmar
The EU’s development interests in Myanmar lie in the return to democracy and the respect of the human rights, and helping the country meet the Sustainable Development Goals. Following the military coup and in line with the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of February 2021, EU’s development cooperation in Myanmar was adjusted to avoid any legitimisation of the de facto authorities. A total of €268 million from the MIP 2014-2020 was put on hold, and after a review, only €97 million were devoted to supporting the people of Myanmar, working through NGOs and international organisations, notably the UN. In 2021 and 2022, the EU allocated €125 million for two Special Measures focusing on: Building resilience and peacebuilding at local level, education and sustainable livelihoods, to reinforce socio-economic resilience of the population. Some additional funding from the Regional MIP envelope (€8 million) addresses the issue of providing durable solutions for displaced Myanmar populations along the Thailand-Myanmar border. The EU is also providing support to Human Rights Defenders and Human Rights groups to document human rights abuses, as well as to journalists in need of protection. Since 2017, the EU has also contributed over €350 million in humanitarian and development funding to address the impact of the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the whole region.
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3.5.State of Play
Since the beginning of 2020, no progress regarding the human rights and labour rights situation in Myanmar has been recorded. To the contrary, there is clear evidence of a significant deterioration of human and labour rights compared to the EU’s specific concerns formulated at the beginning of the enhanced engagement in 2017. Additional, new severe concerns have arisen since the military coup. The restrictions on the work of civil society organisations, including social partners, and tripartite institutions, and the fact that military authorities do not engage with the international community, even severely restricting their engagement with organisations such as the ILO further clouds the outlook.
While the human rights situation in Myanmar deteriorated already during 2020, a year marked by elections and COVID-19, this cannot compare to the aftereffects of the military coup. Together with pandemic restrictions that were used to restrict freedom of movement, a perfect storm for human rights abuses has emerged. The Myanmar armed forces have a history of human rights violations, but the 2021 coup has brought their blatant disregard for human life and physical integrity, previously reserved for ethnic minority regions, into all areas of the country.
Crimes perpetrated under the current military regime include physical and mental torture, sexual and gender-based violence, the persecution of civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists and journalists, arbitrary detentions and unfair trials, attacks on the civilian population, including ethnic and religious minorities, and the destruction of private property. Responsibility for atrocities is routinely denied by the regime.
Restrictions on humanitarian assistance imposed by the regime since the coup have created a nationwide humanitarian crisis. The latest escalation by the junta was the execution of four pro-democracy and opposition leaders in July 2022, which marked the return to the death penalty in Myanmar after more than 30 years.
With respect to labour rights, these were restricted further following the military coup. The ILO Governing Body expressed on several occasions its profound concern with the removal of the civilian Government and the events that followed, including arbitrary arrests, detention, intimidation, threats and acts of violence against trade union members and others. ILO also called for the release of trade union leaders and members who had been detained. In response to the gravity of the situation, in March 2022, the ILO Governing Body decided to establish a Commission of Inquiry for Myanmar under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution in relation to non-compliance with Conventions No. 87 (on freedom of association and protection of the right to organise) and No. 29 (on the prohibition of forced labour), which was appointed in June 2022. The report of the Commission of Inquiry was made public on 4 October 2023 and will be on the agenda of the ILO Governing Body session scheduled for 30 October-9 November 2023. Commissions of Inquiry represent the highest level of ILO supervisory mechanisms to address very serious violations of ILO principles.
Myanmar should address the conclusions of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry in relation to non-compliance with ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 29 Moreover, it should address the conclusions and recommendations of the ILO supervisory bodies, as well as the International Labour Conference (2021) and the Governing Body issued over the last few years, in particular in relation to forced labour and freedom of association.
3.6.Looking Ahead
The EU’s response to the military coup has been robust and coordinated with like-minded partners. As indicated above, the EU has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions against the military and their interests, withheld or reoriented development assistance and provided humanitarian support. The EU has also led resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly condemning the violations of human rights and will keep calling for the end of all acts of violence. The EU continues to consider additional targeted restrictive measures in order to promote progress in all areas of concern.
As already mentioned in the previous GSP Report, on 11 November 2019, The Gambia brought a case against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. On 22 July 2022, the ICJ found that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, to entertain the Application filed by The Gambia, and that the said Application was admissible. The case is ongoing.
The participation of Myanmar in the EBA arrangement continues to contribute to the eradication of poverty in the beneficiary country. This is particularly important at a time of a dire humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The crisis triggered by the military coup led in fact to an unprecedented increase in humanitarian needs. The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has sharply increased from 1 million in 2021 to 17.6 million people in 2022, and there are currently over 1.4 million internally displaced people reported in the country, while humanitarian access is increasingly constrained. Trade preferences under the EBA arrangement provide essential livelihoods to a significant number of workers and their families. So far, despite a deteriorating situation as regards human and labour rights, including with respect to many of the 15 core conventions listed in the GSP Regulation, the position of a wide range of stakeholders in Myanmar (including the National Unity Government and civil society organisations) is that a possible withdrawal of preferences under the arrangement would be detrimental to the livelihoods of the local population.
The Resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2021 and 2023() on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, called on all business enterprises, including transnational corporations and domestic enterprises operating in Myanmar or that have parts of their supply chain in Myanmar, to implement the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the recommendations made by the independent international fact-finding mission on the economic interests of the Myanmar armed forces. They also requested the home States of those enterprises to take enhanced measures so that those businesses conduct enhanced human rights due diligence so that their activities do not contribute to or cause any human rights violations or abuses, in accordance with the Guiding Principles.
The EU re-assesses on a regular basis its policy on the EBA engagement with Myanmar. To this end the EU is following closely the political and humanitarian developments on the ground as well as international assessments, including the outcomes of the ILO Commission of Inquiry. The EU stands ready to adapt – if necessary – its policy accordingly, including through a possible future application of Article 19 of the GSP Regulation (i.e. temporary withdrawal of preferences).
4.
Cambodia
4.1.Context
At the initiation of the withdrawal procedure in 2019 (
), the EU’s concerns related to four main areas : a) political rights and the shrinking of the democratic space; b) freedom of expression and freedom of association; c) labour rights; and d) concerns over land issues arising from economic land concessions (ELCs) in the sugar sector.
Between 2019 and 2020, in the course of the withdrawal procedure, Cambodia had made progress on some of the issues of concern, notably the ones related to labour right and the ELCs. Despite this progress, the final decision of February 2020 to partially withdraw Cambodia’s EBA preferences was based on clear evidence of serious and systematic human rights violations, substantiated in the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/550. The violations underpinning the withdrawal concern the following areas:
-limitation of the right to political participation,
-restriction of the right to freedom of expression,
-restriction of the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly.
The outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020 pre-empted any possibility to engage on the ground with the Cambodian authorities. In the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal, discussions could take place only virtually. In person dialogue resumed in 2022 once the COVID-19 limitations were lifted.
In the reporting period the European Parliament adopted two resolutions drawing attention to the continuous crackdown of political opposition in Cambodia including through the mass trials against opposition members and civil society.
4.2.Economic situation and impact of EBA tariff preferences
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Cambodian economy had a strong growth rate averaging over 7% over the last decade. Major relevant factors were the growth of export industries, notably garments, footwear, and travel goods and the development of significant exports of rice and other agricultural products. Growth recovered to 3% in 2021 and 5.2% in 2022 after the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (-3.1% GDP) that decimated tourism and affected the export-oriented manufacturing sectors.
Thanks to the sustained and inclusive economic growth over the last decade, poverty rates almost halved between 2009 and 2019 allowing almost 2 million Cambodians to escape poverty . Cambodia met for the first time in 2021 the LDC graduation criteria and, provided that it meets for the second time the criteria in 2024, the country will graduate from LDC status as early as 2027. Graduation from LDC status will also imply exit from the EBA arrangement three years later according to the current GSP Regulation.
In 2021, imports from Cambodia to the EU amounted to €3.5 billion, which represented a significant decrease from pre-COVID-19 and pre-EBA partial withdrawal (€4.6 billion in 2019 and €3.6 billion in 2020); but imports in 2022 strongly increased, reaching a record €5.5 billion. Total trade in goods between the two partners equalled €6.3 billion in 2022, meaning that Cambodia has a large trade surplus. In 2022, the EU was the second largest market for Cambodian exports (20% of total of exports) after the US (44% of total of exports). Garments and footwear represented more than 80% of total EU imports from Cambodia (almost €4.5 billion). Other products imported by the EU were bicycles (€421 million, 7.6%) and rice (€207 million, 3.7%).
About 76% of these exports entered the EU market under EBA tariff preferences in 2022. This ratio has been significantly reduced compared to 2018 (95%) Overall, in 2022 Cambodia was the second largest user of EBA preferences, after Bangladesh.
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Box 3: The economic effect of the partial withdrawal of EBA tariff preferences for Cambodia
The partial withdrawal of Cambodia’s EBA preferences started to apply in August 2020, reinstating EU import tariffs based on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs to a selection of tariff lines within garments, footwear, travel goods and sugar that represented approximately 20% of total imports by the EU from Cambodia in 2018. The effects of the withdrawal for the last months of 2020 overlapped with the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns in the EU market, and it is therefore difficult to disentangle both effects. In 2020, imports by the EU-27 decreased sharply for both products affected by the EBA partial withdrawal (decrease by 20%, from €944 million in 2019 to €752 million) and products that were not affected by the withdrawal (decrease by 22%, from €3.7 billion to €2.9 billion). The impact of the loss of preferences was clearer in 2021: While EU imports of unaffected products slightly recovered, increasing by 3.3% to €3 billion, imports of products for which the preferences were withdrawn decreased by a further 33.6%, to €499 million. In 2022, imports of both categories of products rapidly increased again: unaffected products by 57%, to €4.7 billion, and affected ones by 68%, to €839 million. This seems to indicate that exporters have adjusted to the partial withdrawal of preferences. In any case, over the period 2019 to 2022, EU imports of products affected by the withdrawal decreased by 11.1% whereas imports of unaffected products increased by 27.5%. This also meant that the share of affected products in the EU’s total imports from Cambodia dropped from 20% (until 2020) to about 15% (in 2022).
Figure 1: EU imports from Cambodia, products covered by the temporary partial withdrawal (PW) of preference vs. products for which preferences were not withdrawn, 2012-2022 (€ million and %)
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat COMEXT dataset DS-045409 - EU trade since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8 [accessed 06.10.2023].
Despite the decreasing exports to the EU, Cambodian total exports keep a positive trend thanks to the good performance on other export markets, notably the United States. The decrease in exports to the EU in 2020 was largely compensated by an increase in exports to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to China. Similarily, the increase in Cambodia’s total exports in 2021 were again caused by increasing exports to the United States and China, as well as to other markets.
Accordingly, the EU’s share in Cambodia’s total exports fell by 12 percentage points from 30% in 2018 to 18% in 2021, but recovered to 20% in 2022. For products affected by the preference withdrawal, this decrease was even stronger: from 31% in 2018 to 13% in 2021, with a slight recovery to 14% in 2022.
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Figure 2: Cambodia – main export destinations (total exports less gold), 2016-2022 (USD billion and %)
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Figure 3: Cambodia’s exports to the EU and world, 2016-2022 (USD million and index (2019=100; right axis))
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Source: Calculations based on ITC TradeMap [accessed 06.10.2023].
There is not enough data to deduct any substantial impact of the EBA partial withdrawal on production of garments, footwear and travel goods in Cambodia, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms. While the sector was affected in 2020 by COVID-19 due to the shortages in input materials and reduction of orders, the 2021 trade data suggests that the sector bounced back relatively quickly.
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4.3.Key Concerns
Political participation. The local elections of 5 June 2022 showed a limited opening of civil and political space: 17 parties registered candidates to participate in the process, the elections were conducted in a peaceful manner and parties were allowed to campaign and participate. However, the main opposition leaders remained politically incapacitated and unable to mobilise supporters and voters. Despite that, the opposition Candlelight Party received more than 20% of votes.
The courts continued to prosecute opposition politicians and activists, including through criminal charges in both mass and individual trials and increased charges under Article 495 of the Cambodian Criminal Code on incitement to commit a felony or to disturb social security.
Freedom of expression. Under Articles 31 and 41 of Cambodia’s Constitution, freedom of expression continues to be guaranteed. However, the adoption by the National Assembly of the Law on Preventive Measures against the spread of COVID-19 undulied narrowed further the space for freedom of assembly and expression.
Additionally, the approval by the Cambodian Government of a sub-decree regarding National Internet Gateway in February 2021, increased the risk for online censorship and surveillance. The National Internet Gateway Legislation has however not yet been implemented.
Freedom of association and of peaceful assembly. In 2021, restriction of freedom of association and peaceful assembly continued, and a number of activists and human rights defenders continued to be persecuted with criminal charges. During 2022 there was a certain reopening of the space for the political parties and civil society to participate in the electoral process, with the local elections taking place in June. Parties were able to register candidates and campaign and civil society published recommendation, conducted electoral observation and voter awareness activities. However, in 2023 new restrictions were imposed on the right of political parties and individuals to participate in the parliamentary elections held on 23 July 2023.
Non-discrimination, land and housing rights. The EU recognises the actions taken by the Cambodian authorities to resolve these issues, and efforts taken to grant land titles to individual holders. However, progress on the registration process for communal land and indigenous communities continues to be slow.
Labour rights, notably freedom of association and collective bargaining. In 2021 and 2022 the ILO urged Cambodia to take immediate measures to address and prevent anti-union harassment and discrimination problems related to the application of the fundamental ILO Conventions No. 87 on freedom of association and No. 98 on collective bargaining. Concerns over the Law on Trade Union remain, even after certain reforms have been in force since January 2020. The Law continues to be not in line with the two conventions, including because of restrictions and their effects on the right to join and establish workers’ organisations. During the pandemic, further harassments towards independent trade union leaders have been reported, including unlawful termination of contracts. More recently, a protracted labour conflict has turned into criminal accusations towards the trade union leaders and activists, with some being placed in jail. The space for labour activism has been further closed, in a context of difficult economic recovery for the industry in the country. In 2023, the ILO also criticised violations in law and practice of fundamental Convention No. 105 on the abolition of forced labour with respect to prison sentences affecting opposition members, human rights defenders and participants in peaceful strikes.
4.4.Process of Engagement
The withdrawal procedure was concluded during the reporting period, in February 2020, with the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/55 ( (the withdrawal regulation) partially withdrawing preferences, which entered into force on 25 April 2022 and started to apply as from 12 August 2020 .
As detailed in the withdrawal regulation, the Commission had identified serious and systematic violation of the principles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and notably the right to Political Participation (Article 25 ICCPR), the freedom of Expression (Article 19 ICCPR) and the Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly (Articles 21 and 22 ICCPR). However, in the same withdrawal regulation, the Commission also noted progress, since the initiation of the temporary withdrawal procedure in 2019, on some of the concerns related to the economic land concessions and labour rights.
In practical terms, the withdrawal regulation implies that the zero-duty tariff preferences granted to Cambodia under the EBA are replaced by the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) standard tariffs for imports from Cambodia of selected products listed in the withdrawal regulation in relation to the garment and footwear, travel goods and sugar sectors. At the time of withdrawal, this amounted to around one-fifth or €1 billion of Cambodia's yearly exports to the EU.
After the adoption of the withdrawal regulation, the first immediate occasion to engage further with Cambodia was expected to be the 11th Cambodia- EU Joint Committee originally planned to take place in March 2020. However, the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic and related travel and entry restrictions seriously hindered any possibility to engage on the ground with the Cambodian authorities.
Discussions resumed when the withdrawal regulation had already become final, first in hybrid format in November 2020, in the context of the Sub-Group on Trade and Investment and Sub-Group on Human Rights and Governance (on that occasion the Joint Committee Plenary session was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic) and then in presence during the 11th Cambodia-EU Joint Committee that took place in Phnom Penh on 10 March 2022. It was also regularly raised in bilateral dialogue at the highest political level in 2022.
In particular, the re-establishment of the dialogue in the context of the Joint Committee allowed to take stock of recent developments and re-ascertain expectations of both sides as to the process. The bilateral dialogue at the highest political level was maintained and further reinforced in the context of the 2022 Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship.
Since then, in the framework of Cambodia’s Chairmanship of ASEAN, there have been opportunities for a more continued high-level engagement. In August 2022, HR/VP Josep Borrell travelled to Phnom Penh to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum and had a courtesy call with the Cambodian Prime Minister and a bilateral meeting with the Foreign Minister, where issues of concern were raised. The President of the Council met the Prime Minister, on occasion of his trip to Tokyo and again in Phnom Penh, in November 2022, when he travelled to the country to participate in the Open Session of the East Asia Summit.
In December 2022, a bilateral meeting between Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis and Minister of Commerce Pan Sorasak took place in Brussels in the margins of the EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit. The bilateral relation and issues of concern related to the temporary partial withdrawal of EBA preferences were discussed on that occasion.
The EU also continued to underline the key concerns in the context of the UN monitoring bodies including in the context of the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia.
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Box 4: Cooperation priorities and projects – Cambodia
After the partial withdrawal of EBA preferences, and also due to the difficult circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has remained engaged with Cambodia on the necessary reforms to achieve the SDGs and to support Cambodia to fulfil the conditions necessary for a possible reinstatement of full EBA preferences. Team Europe mobilised €443 million in grants and loans to work with Cambodia in fighting the global pandemic and mitigate its socio-economic effects. In addition, under its strategy for Cambodia 2021-2027 (MIP), the EU contributes to Cambodia’s Green Growth and Decent Jobs, to accelerate its integration in ASEAN and global value chains and increase the country’s resilience to external shocks. A significant part of the MIP focuses on trade facilitation and automated customs procedures, to strengthen Cambodia’s competitiveness and its compliance with multilateral rules under World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Customs Organization (WCO). More specifically, the garment sector, impacted by the partial withdrawal of EBA preferences, receives attention to improve decent labour conditions for the workers and to green its productivity. Additional support is also being laid out to strengthen labour rights and working conditions through the empowerment of Cambodian civil society. Globally recognised principles and values, including the ones related to human rights and labour rights remain at the core of any initiative launched by the EU in partnership with Cambodia.
In 2021 a project was approved to support NGOs in civil society monitoring of the elections, raising awareness of voters and voter education.
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4.5.State of Play
Political participation
On 1 March 2021, Sam Rainsy, former co-leader of Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), and eight other senior CNRP members, were convicted in absentia to between 20- and 25-years imprisonment on charges of attempted attack on the institutions of Cambodia. On 17 March and 14 June 2022, a Cambodian court imposed new convictions to the leaders of CNRP and some members and activists of the dissolved party in new mass trials. On 3 March 2023 the Municipal Court in Phnom Penh convicted the former CNRP leader, Kem Sokha, to 27 years of prison of jail time, temporarily allowed to serve in house arrest and suspended his political rights to vote and to stand for election indefinitely.
During 2022, a limited reopening of the political space took place to conduct local elections. Some parties were allowed to register, political campaigns took place unobstructed, and the number of incidents registered was low. One opposition party (formerly presided by the leader in exile, Sam Rainsy) gained 20% of the votes. In May 2023 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal to the National Electoral Commission decision refusing the registration of two parties for the parliamentary elections held in July 2023, which is an alarming restriction on the right of political parties to participate in elections.
Overall, those elections were conducted in a restricted political and civic space, where the opposition, civil society and the media were unable to function without hindrance. The elections also excluded important sectors of the opposition, due to criminal convictions of political leaders and the disqualification of the Candlelight Party, which was not allowed to register to take part in the vote. Amendments to the electoral law, adopted a few weeks before the election, also raise concern as they restrict the right to freedom of speech and the right of all citizens to stand for election.
On 7 August 2023, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced he was stepping down in favour of his son, Hun Manet, who was appointed Prime Minister on the same day by royal decree. Hun Manet formed a new Government which was approved by the National Assembly and took up its duties on 22 August 2023.
The Law of Political Parties and the Law of Associations and NGOs (LANGO) have not been amended. Main political leaders remain incapacitated and unable to compete in election. The leadership in exile has multiple convictions for criminal charges substantiated in absentia in three mass trials, in which due process was not observed and the accused were not allowed to come back to the country to defend themselves.
Freedom of expression
There continue to be restrictions to the freedom of expression, and in February 2023, the Cambodian Government revoked, without following the procedure established in the Law of the Press, the license of the independent media outlet, Voice of Democracy. This decision seriously undermines media freedom and pluralism, which are essential for any open and free society.
Freedom of association and of peaceful assembly
In 2022 there was a certain reopening of the space for the civil society to operate. With the celebration of the local elections in 2022, civil society was allowed to publish reports, conduct monitoring activities, and issue recommendations. However, restrictive legislation remains in place and, as noted above, LANGO has not been amended. NGOs are still subjected to cumbersome registration and reporting procedures. During 2023 the situation seems to have become more restrictive, and NGOs have reported increased surveillance and requests to disclose information on funding and activities.
Non-discrimination, land and housing rights
Progress on registration process for communal land and indigenous communities continues to be slow. Conversion of protected zones into economic concessions remains one of the areas for possible review, since the Government has approved a new Economic Land Concession (ELC), despite the moratorium in 2012 and has started revoking licences of unproductive or unused ELCs. Government has also started allocating social land concession to the landless poor, together with social houses. More information is still required to know the scope of this measure and number of beneficiaries.
Labour rights, notably freedom of association and collective bargaining
In June 2021, the ILO’s Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) expressed deep concern at the continuing acts of violence against workers, the arrests of trade unionists in connection with their activities as well as the lack of effective and timely investigations in relation to these incidents. The Conference Committee also noted that, while some positive steps have been achieved in bringing the law in line with the Convention, serious compliance issues remain unaddressed .
Some positive development was recorded by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in its report of February 2022: over the last few years, the Cambodian Government has trained several hundred police officers on the rights to strike and on peaceful demonstrations, in cooperation with the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the ILO. However, the CEACR Committee requested further information, in particular whether disciplinary consequences of using excessive force were part of such training.
An ILO Direct Contacts Mission to Cambodia took place in late March 2022 to discuss again options to overcome the serious deficiencies in implementing ILO Convention No. 87, but its recommendations to the Government still remain to be implemented.
During 2022 there was an alarming increase in cases of human trafficking centred in Cambodia, where criminal gangs operate online scams. Authorities have taken some action to curtail the problem and cooperate with other countries to repatriate rescued victims. However, there is no transparent information on the magnitude of the problem, which continues in 2023.
In June 2023, the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) of the International Labour Conference discussed the situation in Cambodia as one of the four most worrying situations (the so called double-footnoted cases) among the 187 ILO members, with a particular focus on violations of the ILO Convention No. 105 on the abolition of forced labour (). Particularly criticised was the fact that imprisoned opposition members, human rights defenders and journalists are exposed to the risk of forced labour as part of their prison sentences (). In its conclusions, the Committee deeply deplored the continued use of the provisions of the national legislation, including the Penal Code, to prosecute and convict persons who express their political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system, or to punish those who participate in strikes, leading to penalties of imprisonment involving compulsory prison labour. In this context, the EU issued a statement underlying that reports related to the arrests and prosecution of trade union members and leaders for participation in strikes are particularly worrisome (). The EU also strongly encouraged the Cambodian authorities to implement all the other recommendations arising from the ILO’s Direct Contact Mission of spring 2022, to stop labour rights violations, and to embark on a constructive path of reform.
4.6.Looking ahead
Under the GSP rules, the partial withdrawal of Cambodia’s EBA preferences will continue until the Commission finds that reasons that led to it no longer apply.
Addressing the existing human rights and labour rights concerns is an essential requirement for the full reinstatement of the EBA preferences. The EU is committed to continue working with the Cambodian authorities to achieve the tangible progress needed to this effect. Cambodia must show real, credible improvement on the issues of concern for the EU to reinstate full EBA preferences, notably as regards civil and political rights.