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Document 52016SC0166

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery services Disclaimer: This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission.

SWD/2016/0166 final - 2016/0149 (COD)

Brussels, 25.5.2016

SWD(2016) 166 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery services

{COM(2016) 285 final}
{SWD(2016) 167 final}


Annex 1: Procedural information

Lead DG

The lead DG is the Directorate General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs.

Agenda planning and Work Programme References

The Agenda Planning Reference is 2015/GROW/027.

The cross-border parcel initiative forms part of the Digital Single Market Strategy, adopted in May 2015 and, as one of the ten priorities for the Juncker Commission, part of the Commission's 2015 and 2016 Work Programmes.

Organization and Timing of the Impact Assessment and Inter-service Steering Group

The Directorates General participating in the Inter-service Steering Group chaired by the Secretariat General included:

The Secretariat General

The Legal Service

DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology

DG Competition

DG Economic and Financial Affairs

DG Employment and Social Affairs

THE Joint Research Centre

DG Justice and Consumers

DG Mobility and Transport

DG Taxation and Customs Union

Meetings of the Inter-service Steering Group were held on:

8 April 2015. The background to the project, the roadmap and the consultation were discussed.

22 July 2015. The problem definition, problem tree and approach to the IA were discussed.

25 September 2015. A draft of the impact assessment was discussed.

15 October 2015. The draft impact assessment was discussed.

8 January 2016. An updated impact assessment was discussed.

4 March 2016. The RSB opinion and draft regulation were discussed.

Consultation of the RSB

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board of the European Commission assessed a draft version of this Impact Assessment on 2 December and issued its opinion of negative on 4 December. The changes made in response to their recommendations are set out below.

RSB recommendation

Changes

The purpose of the initiative should be clarified

Section 3.2, figure 3 and figure 4 have been updated to clarify the purpose of the initiative and the policy options have been streamlined.

The baseline scenario should be further developed

The baseline scenario is more comprehensively explained in sections 1.3, 4.1 and 6.1.

More information about the evidence base and added value of the initiative is needed

Evidence has been added from studies by the University of St Louis, University of Antwerp, the Joint Research Council; a report from the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP).

The assessment of the impacts should be clarified using evidence

The studies about have been used alongside evidence from the public consultation to clarify the expected impacts. Tables 2 and 3 have been revised with a comprehensive explanation given in Annex 8.

The report should present the links between different sections and explain price setting mechanisms and the role of regulators.

Cross references to different sections have been included and more information about the regulatory framework added in section 1.2.2 and details about how prices are set in sections 1.1.1.

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board issued a second opinion of positive on 2 March 2016. The changes made in response to their recommendations are set out below.

RSB recommendation

Changes

The proposals can be better justified by explaining better the extent to which the objectives would be attained.

The impact of the policy options on the objectives has been explained more clearly (sections 5 and 6). The baseline scenario (i.e. what would happen in the absence of the proposals) is more comprehensive.

The content of the options should be better explained.

The options have been described in more detail in section 4.

The report should better assess the expected impacts of the proposed options.

Section 5 (analysis of impacts) is more comprehensive, as it section (6) comparison of the options, and the ratings have been explained.

Key assumptions for cost calculations should be better presented. The market structure should be presented.

The administrative burden calculation, including uncertainties and limitations has been explained further (section 5.9). More detail on the a market structure is included in 1.2.1

Evidence and Studies

Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and internet marketing and selling techniques in the retail of goods (2011)

This study was commissioned by the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers, acting on behalf of the European Commission's Directorate General for Health and Consumers. The study was conducted by Civic Consulting with support of TNS Opinion and Euromonitor International. Research was conducted between December 2012 and February 2011 in the EU27 and included an online customer surveys, a price collection survey, interviews and surveys of business associations, consumer protection authorities, consumer organisations and European Consumer Centres. The study examined why e-commerce had developed more extensively in some Member States than others and whether e-commerce was delivering its full potential in consumer welfare and the obstacles and remedies for this.

Lower online prices and greater online choice can increase EU consumer welfare. The study estimated that the total welfare gains for EU consumers would amount to 204.5bn EUR per year (equivalent to 1.7% of EU GDP) if there was a single EU consumer market in the e-commerce of goods and a 15% share of internet retailing instead of 3.5% (the level at the time of the study). Two thirds of welfare gains were due to more choice, which is greater across borders. In contrast to more recent surveys, this study found that it was not common to use mobile phones for online shopping.

Worries about delivery, returns or replacing a faulty product were the mains concerns for both cross-border and domestic purchase: the top five concerns were related to this for cross-border purchases and the top four for domestic products. Long delivery times were the main concern for cross-border purchases (40% of cross-border online shoppers) and also the main problem that customers actually encountered (28% of those shopping online in their own country and encountering problems and 26% of those shopping online cross-border encountering problems). The quality of delivery services also affected how willing consumers were to shop online. Although price comparison websites were valued, they often lacked adequate information about delivery costs and timings. Security of payment and personal data were the measures most likely to increase consumer confidence when buying online. Recommendations to address this 'missing potential' of e-commerce included reducing costs and time for cross-border deliveries and increasing convenience and quality; encouraging retailers of offer goods to consumers in other Member States, for example through an information platform and sharing best practice; promoting faster and improved complaint handling and customer service; and creating effective redress mechanisms for cross-border e-commerce.

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/study_ecommerce_goods_en.pdf

Study on intra-community cross-border parcel delivery (FTI Consulting – December 2011)

This 2011 study was commissioned by the European Commission, Directorate General for the Internal Market and Services to gain a deeper understanding of the EU cross-border parcel delivery market in terms of structure, regulatory environment and conduct of its participants. The project included significant data collection work, including from national regulatory authorities, delivery operators, e-retailers, the Postal User Group and relevant representative bodies. Desk research and other sources of public data (such as Eurobarometer surveys) were also used).

The study found that only 9% of EU consumers and 18% of e-retailers used cross-border e-commerce. E-commerce was estimated to account for 5% of retail turnover, 1% of which was generated cross-border. Participation of small retailers in cross border e-commerce was lower than this, with the potential to grow significantly. The study concluded there were three sets of barriers to e-commerce that are directly related to delivery and which affected smaller retailers in particular: prices, quality of service and information. The study also noted that in some member states competition for small infrequent senders of parcels was increasing, smaller customers tended not to take advantage of such deals and use national postal operators instead, due to lack of knowledge of and confidence in the alternatives. There was a two tier market in which larger firms were generally able to enjoy competitive markets, unlike individual consumers and smaller firms, particularly in low density countries or areas where the universal service provision is essential. The lack of confidence was exacerbated by the lack of information about the quality of service for cross border delivery.

Regulation of cross-border parcels was also found to be lacking, with consequences for pricing, particularly affecting smaller senders. Three factors were thought to contribute to the lack of regulation: differences between the parcels included in the universal service obligation (USO); potential lack of data on volumes, quality, costs and termination rates; and scare cooperation between NRAs regarding the regulation of cross border parcels. The study recommended that terminal rates should be disclosed to NRAs (but not made public).

The Study estimated that parcels paid for at 'individual' prices made up around 20% of the market. On average cross-border prices were twice as high as domestic benchmark prices, and three to five times higher for packets.

Recommendations included removing information barriers through rapid implementation (by Member States) of the Consumer Rights Directive and campaigns to promote awareness of consumer rights and cross-border delivery options; removal of quality of services barriers though publication of quality of service standards and introducing cross-border quality measurements for parcels; and removing price barriers though clarifying the scope of the USO, NRAs enforcing Articles 12 and 13 of the Postal Services Directive (including through appropriate cost allocation procedures) and sharing information to gain an understanding of cross border markets.

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/2011-parcel-delivery-study_en.pdf

AT Kearney: Europe's CEP Market, Growth on New Terms

This study was produced by the consultants A. T. Kearney and was based on over 500 interviews with industry executives and research into company performance in 16 European countries, including Russia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey as well as EU Member States. Express products were defined as products including the fastest possible service with guaranteed delivery times and standard products as offering day certain and deferred delivery times. Packages weighing up to 2,500kg were included.

The study found that volumes grew faster than revenues between 2009 and 2011 for both the international and domestic markets. International traffic did however grow faster than domestic (volume growth of 10% between 2009 and 2010 and 8% between 2010 and 2011). International services accounted for 30% of revenues and 9% of volumes in 2011. From 2008 customers had moved away from more expensive express services towards cheaper standard services as a way of reducing costs during the economic downturn. Most markets therefore had stronger growth in standard parcel markets than express and "express" operators were noted to be moving more into the growing segments of B2C and standard parcels.

Subsequent research (Europe's CEP Market: Steady Growth Begins to Shift) by A. T. Kearney found that growth in volumes continued to outpace revenues up to 2013, growing by 5% between 2012 and 2013 compared to 4%. Growth in international shipments outpaced domestic ones (8% increase compared to 5% increase). Growth in standard (rather than express) parcels was still strong in many countries. Domestic volume growth was expected to slow slightly by 2016 as shippers and service providers seek to minimise the number of returns.

http://www.atkearney.tw/documents/10192/649916/Europe%27s+CEP+Market+-+Growth+on+New+Terms+%283%29.pdf/6613e0d5-1620-4694-b52c-26f8ef1b4ead  

http://www.atkearney.tw/documents/10192/5544202/Europes+CEP+Market%E2%80%B9Steady+Growth+Begins+to+Shift.pdf/b63e4b9e-8979-4d54-a7bb-0ee9cf6008df  

E-commerce and delivery - Study on the state of play of EU parcel markets with particular emphasis on e-commerce - Copenhagen Economics (July 2013)

Commissioned by the then DG Internal Market, for this study Copenhagen Economics conducted qualitative and quantitative research covering over 3,000 e-shoppers, 70 e-retailers, 61 delivery operators and 26 NRA to complement existing literature and statistics on the EU parcel market.

The study noted significant differences in the levels of e-commerce between Member States, citing Eurostat data that showed 82% of internet users in the UK bought something online in 2012 compared to 11% of internet users in Romania. On average 90% of e-shoppers engaged in domestic e-commerce compared to 30% for cross border and 85% of e-commerce shipments are domestic. A survey among 3,000 e-shoppers conducted for the survey found that delivery problems were a key reason for not buying online and were responsible for 68% of abandoned shopping carts. The main cause of abandonment was delivery charges that shoppers felt to be two high, the second was delivery times that were considered to be too long. 38% of shoppers were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the delivery of their most recent online purchase, with 26% dissatisfied with returns, 21% unsatisfied with delivery prices and 16% unsatisfied with the speed or quality of delivery service.

This study estimated that the market share of universal service providers (USPs) was around 35% for the delivery of B2C packets and parcels, rising to 54% in the more mature e-commerce markets. For specifically e-commerce deliveries, international integrators handle slightly more than USPs with 42% compared to 40%, and increasing to a 50% market share for the integrators for cross-border shipments.

The four most important elements of delivery were identified as low prices; delivery to the home address; electronic delivery notifications and track and trace; and convenient return options, with surprisingly few differences between countries. E-retailers preferences were also similar although they had more diverse preferences for delivery points.

In terms of information provision, the study observed that a lack of adequate information and high search costs often caused e-retailers to remain with the same delivery provider and one in five e-retailers responding to their survey was only aware of one delivery operators although on average there were three to four alternatives. Solutions proposed included a European trustmark for delivery, an extension of the Consumer Rights Directive to include requirements for delivery information on e-retailers websites, and information campaigns.

The quality of service (returns options, notification, track and trace etc) was found to be better for domestic e-commerce than for cross-border, although some services were only available in parts of a country and in some cases there were delivery options on offer by delivery operators that were not offered by e-retailers. The main reasons for the lack of services were found to be low volumes and interoperability problems.

Prices observed for cross-border delivery were often three to five times higher than for domestic delivery. E-retailers sending bulk shipments were able to save at least 18% per parcel compared to smaller e-retailers who paid the 'single piece' price. Low volumes and a lack of interoperability (which reduces competition) were two of the main reasons for higher cross border prices, as well as higher costs (arising from transport) and weaker competition. Solutions suggested included volume consolidation; greater interoperability (especially for tracking and labeling); and strengthening monitoring and regulation of the market .

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/20130715_ce_e-commerce-and-delivery-final-report_en.pdf

Main developments in the postal sector (2010–2013) – WIK Consult/Jim Campbell (August 2013)

This study examined regulatory and market developments in both the letter and parcel markets across the EU and the EEA between 2010 and 2013 and their impact for future postal policy. Research was based on a survey of NRAs and competition authorities, and USPs; interviews with government officials, NRAs, USPs and other postal operators, and other associations with an interest in the postal sectors; a review of legislation, literature and market statistics; and economic modelling. The study noted that the role of postal services is changing as letters decline as a result of e-substitution yet at the same time e-commerce is driving growth in parcel delivery.

In terms of cross-border services, the study noted the distortions arising from the Universal Postal Union (UPU) system of terminal dues, in particular due to the lack of non-discriminatory access for designated operators, and the REIMS agreements. Most Member States, in response to a WIK survey, did not state that the tariff principles in Article 13 were respected for cross border items.

The 2013 WIK study also noted that there is "no consensus about the size of the European parcel and express market due to different market definitions" and that many regulatory authorities "do not systematically collect data on domestic and cross border parcel and express services". A "consistent methodology and … clear responsibilities for data collection" were recommended. The lack of data on employment in operators other than universal service providers was also noted, especially given the reductions in letter mail operations and growth in parcel volumes.

Differences between Member States' parcel and express markets were noted, in particular the difference in market size: the UK, France and Germany accounted for 70% of the EU market in 2012. Growth in the B2C market due to online shopping was also highlighted, as was some convergence between the two markets with operators traditionally focused on the B2B markets taking advantage of e-shoppers' desire for faster and more reliable parcel delivery services, and businesses switching to cheaper services to cut costs. National postal operators were estimated to have a wide range of domestic market shares.

The study recommended that NRAs and Governments should regularly compile market studies and introduce a more systematic observation of the parcel and express markets to ensure that the market can continue to operate without regulatory intervention. In terms of the cross-border market, they should become fully open and competitive, both within the EU and more widely, for example through a new notice on the application of competition rules to the postal sector 1 ; strengthening Article 13; a (new) process for reviewing multilateral terminal dues arrangements; and improved, standardised data collection, particularly covering employment in the sector.

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/20130821_wik_md2013-final-report_en.pdf

European Regulators Group for Postal Services Opinion on Cross Border Parcel Delivery 2013

The European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) was established on 10 August 2010 and brings together the NRAs for the postal sector from the 28 Member States. The Commission, the EFTA Surveillance Authority, EEA countries and EU candidate countries participate as permanent observers. The group serves as a body for reflection, discussion and the provision of advice to the European Commission on postal services. It also aims to facilitate consultation, coordination and cooperation between EU countries and the Commission. 2

The 2013 ERGP Opinion on cross-border parcel delivery 3 (requested by the European Commission) noted that " cross-border prices for European parcels delivery may be higher than what would be justified by cost differences related to domestic prices "and "collecting information on the market to better understand its functioning and any possible competition problems could be useful." The ERGP did however conclude that there was no indication of a competition problem that could be best dealt with by ex-ante regulation and they believed there was no need for a full formal market analysis.

All ERGP reports can be found here:

  http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/ergp/index_en.htm

Special Eurobarometer 398 Internal Market Report

Fieldwork for this survey was conducted in April and May 2013 and covered the then 27 Member States plus Croatia. 27, 563 respondents were interviewed in their mother tongue for the survey.

The survey found that although almost half of those surveyed had shopped online in the last 12 months, just 11% had bought form another EU country and (6% ) from outside the EU, compared to 40% within their own country. Cheaper delivery prices were found to be the main improvement that would encourage more online shopping from other Member States. 41% always check for accreditation with a trustmark label or logo.

The proportion of online shoppers was highest in Sweden (79%), Denmark (76%) and the Netherlands (75%). Frequent online shopping was most common in the UK (31% several times a month). The proportion shopping online was lowest in Portugal (18%), Bulgaria (21%) and Croatia (21%). Online shopping was found to be less common in rural areas than towns (40% compared to 48% for small or mid-size towns and 49% for large towns), though the reason was not given.

The most common problems that shoppers experienced were found to be with delivery, whether for domestic or online purchases. For cross-border purchases 12% had experiences a delay in the delivery; 10% had had problems with the product arriving when the recipient was not at home; 8% mentioned delivery costs that were too high and 5% the lack of tracked services. 16% had tried to purchase from a website that did not deliver to the country of residence and 4% had to buy an additional guarantee or pay additional fees. Problems with payment methods 99%) and being redirected to other websites (6%) were also reported.

The main reasons for buying online were a preference to buy in shops and not needing to buy online. Delivery costs being too high was cited by 3% of respondents who had not bought online in their own country and 7% who had not bought form another Member State. Returns and reimbursement were mentioned by 5% domestic non-shoppers compared to 7% who did not shop from other Member States.

The most popular improvements which would encourage shoppers to buy abroad were cheaper delivery prices (19%), track and trace (11%) an easier returns process (11%); knowing the time and date of delivery (10%) and more convenient delivery options (5%). Nevertheless, 42% respondents said they would never purchase online from abroad. Lack of information about delivery and returns were found to contribute to a lack of trust in online retailers (each mentioned by 14% respondents who had changes their mind about a purchase because they did not trust the e-retailer).

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_398_en.pdf

Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Report on an integrated parcel delivery market for the growth of E-commerce in the EU, 14 January 2014 (2013/2043 INI)

This Report by the European Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection noted that cross-border delivery was considered to be an obstacle by 57% of retailers and that one in two consumers worried about cross-border transactions. It stressed that any action should take into consideration the sustainability of the delivery process and seek to minimise its environmental footprint. It also "deplored" the lack of transparent on pricing conditions and performance of services , called for the information on offer to be improved and noted a need to increase consumer confidence in and choice of cross-border services.

The report pointed out that delivery to remote areas or outermost reasons was one of the main reasons for consumer dissatisfaction and called for the geographic coverage and accessibility to the universal service to be improved in rural and remote areas. It stressed the importance of a stable and coherent social dimension with the high quality employment with ongoing training contributing to the quality of service. The importance of SMEs being able to grow and expand, but the fact that they often pay higher prices for delivery due to lower volumes was also highlighted.

The commission were asked to draw up guidelines on price comparison websites; delivery service indicators (jointly with industry; measures to improve interoperability and the creation [by the Commission] of platforms for co-operation and information sharing between delivery operators; and the creation of a pan European trustmark for e-commerce.

The report also states that any legislative measures should be carefully assessed and should seek to avoid hindering the dynamic aspect of the market, but that close market monitoring of all ty pes of delivery service provider is needed to identify where action may be needed. In addition it was recommended that Member States and the Commission should ensure that the existing regulatory framework was properly implemented and enforced.

Opinions provided by other European Parliament Committees highlighted the use of outsourcing in the delivery sector and that this should not be used as a way of evading remuneration requirements or employment legislation; the fragmentation between delivery providers; the positive impacts of labels and certificates for delivery services that could be used at a European level.

Flash Eurobarometer 396: Retailers' Attitudes Towards Cross Border Trade and Consumer Protection

Fieldwork for this study was carried out in March and April 2014 in the EU28 plus Norway and Iceland. The study was requested by the European Commission. It found that more than a quarter (28%) of retailers sell cross border to consumers. The main obstacles for retailers who sell online were a higher risk of fraud and non-payments in cross border sales (43%) and differences in national tax regulations (42%), whereas those who do not sell online mentioned as main obstacles the nature of business (50%) and a potentially higher risk of fraud and non-payment (45%).

Just above half of European retailers (54 %) were aware of any Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) entities, be it in their own sector or in any other sector. This comprises slightly less than a third (30 %) who are willing or mandated by law to use ADR in connection with consumer complaints, 16 % who are aware of such procedures but say that they do not exist in their sector and 8% who are aware but not willing to use them 4 .

The survey showed that there were big variations in retailers’ preference of sales via e-commerce/mobile commerce between Member States. For example, retailers in Spain (57%) and France (54%) were the most likely to sell using e-commerce/mobile commerce whereas retailers in Romania (22%) and Slovenia (24%) were the least likely to use this channel. On average (for the EU28), 37% of retailers selling online found the higher costs of cross border delivery to be an important obstacle to the development of cross border sales, rising to over 50% in four Member States. The cost of resolving complaints and disputes cross border was considered to be a barrier by 38% of retailers selling online on average for the EU28, rising to over 50% for six Member States. Higher costs due to geographic distance were considered important by 40% of retailers on average, and by over 50% in seven Member States. By way of comparison, the costs arising from language differences were considered an obstacle by 27% of retailers on average (EU28) not reaching over 50% in any of the Member States.

http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/FLASH/surveyKy/2032

European Regulators Group for Postal Services ERGP Report 2014 on the Quality of Services and End-User Satisfaction

This ERGP report uses data collected from 32 ERGP Members. The Quality of Service and End User satisfaction were measures with respect to transit time; collection and delivery; access points; consumer satisfaction and surveys measuring consumers' needs. Both letter and parcel services were covered by the study, though the summary here focusses on the result for parcels where available. The differences between the two also shows the different ways in which the two product groups are regulated.

13 Member states measured transit time for (domestic) parcels, whereas all measures the transit time of priority mail. Six Member States set a D+1 quality of service target for parcels, compared to almost every Member State for D+1 letter post, though a further 11 countries have a slower regulatory target for (parcel) transit time. 5   Difference methodologies are used to calculate the transit time for parcels. A previous ERGP report found that national regulatory authorities are more likely to be able to take action if letter targets rather than parcel ones are missed. 6  

The study found that most national regulatory authorities are responsible for complaints relating to all postal service issues and not only universal service issues. It is however less common for other postal service providers to be required to publish information about procedures to complain, redress schemes, and means of dispute resolution than it is for NRAs to require that the universal service provider publishes such information. The data NRAs collect about complaints also tends to be about universal service products, rather than those falling outside the scope of the universal services, whether provided by other postal operators or the universal service provider.

Mandatory compensation schemes are more common for universal service providers than for other postal operators, as are existing compensation schemes, in particular for the arrival of an item late or damaged.

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ergp/docs/documentation/2014/ergp-14-24-report-on-qos-and-end-user-satisfaction-version-of-27-november-final_en.pdf

Design and development of initiatives to support the growth of e-commerce via better functioning parcel delivery systems in Europe (WIK Consult, August 2014)

This study was commissioned to assess the types of initiatives that could be used to support e-commerce through improved parcel delivery services. Given the diversity of e-commerce and delivery markets, four Member States (Germany, Greece, Ireland and Poland) were chosen as case studies. Desk research on the e-commerce delivery context was used to provide the foundations for interviews with stakeholders (including delivery operators, the e-commerce community and consumers) and workshops in the four case study countries to look at their particular requirements for e-commerce delivery and to gain feedback on the six possible initiatives that were tested.

The research concluded that an information platform on delivery services, with comprehensive and up to date information, would be welcomed by e-retailers as there was no such solution that covered the whole EU and all operators. A platform would support decision making by SME retailers by raising awareness of the different options available and the study suggested that the Commission should consider developing a common agreed terminology for all delivery services. Public authorities could also consider providing funding and/or promotional activities for such a platform.

An e-commerce scoreboard on price and delivery performance that could be compiled and published by the Commission and/or European e-commerce associations was also proposed, potentially combined with other data on the e-commerce market.

This study found that that many Member States had one or more trustmarks. While the inclusion of delivery elements would be welcomed, the report suggested that these could be combined with existing trustmarks or an umbrella certification process be introduced at EU level, instead of creating new, additional trustmarks. Where no trustmarks are present the reasons for this should also be examined.

Problems with the quality of service in rural areas were noted including fewer operators and slower delivery. It was suggested that these could be helped by sharing best practice about rural transport economics and effectiveness and studying the sharing of infrastructure for parcel delivery in low demand areas.

To improve interoperability, the report recommended monitoring the progress made by the postal industry and if improvements did not meet expectations, alternative policies could be considered. Non-discriminatory access to national postal operators' networks should also be enforced. Developments in measuring cross-border transit time for parcels should be monitored, given the need for reliability, yet balanced against the potential costs of investment.

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/20140828-wik-markt-support-e-commerce_final-report_en.pdf

Effigy Consulting European Courier Express and Parcel 2013 Market Overview Summary¸(November 2014)

This study drew on primary and secondary research in 28 European Countries / EU28 (except Greece), Norway, Switzerland, Russia and Ukraine. The study defined parcels as "individual boxes or packages that can be carried by one man (up to 30kg) , and as well as only covering parcels, for the purposes of the study the CEP market was defined as having tracking throughout the delivery chain; using a regular transport network and the same corporate group of carriers for the brand.

The study found that volumes in the European CEP market were growing faster than revenues The three largest markets in terms of both value and volume were Germany, France and the UK.

http://www.effigy-consulting.com/

European Regulators Group for Postal Services Opinion on a better understanding of European e-commerce parcel delivery 2014

The 2014 ERGP Opinion on a better understanding of European cross-border e-commerce parcel delivery 7 raised issues relating to quality; the difference between offers for bulk and individual customers; differences in monitoring and data collection regarding parcels; different national legal provisions; and issues affecting e-commerce more widely (e.g payments and transparency of information). The lack of evidence for introducing new ex-ante regulation in the cross-border parcel sector was restated.

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ergp/docs/documentation/2014/ergp-14-26-opinion-parcels-delivery-fin_en.pdf

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of the Postal Services Directive, 2015

The Report on the Application of the Postal Services Directive is a requirement of the Postal Services Directive. As well as explaining how the Postal Services Directive has been implemented in Member States, the Report also set out data on the evolution of the European letter and parcel market, drawing on the Commission's statistics. Other sources of information used for the Report include reports but the European Regulators Group for Postal Services and the studies listed in this section, in particular WIK-Consult's Main Developments in the Postal Sector 2010-2013.

The Report concluded that the role of postal services was changing in many Member States, but the ability to send letters and parcels to arrive at a specified time at a definite price to all parts of the European Union remained a fundamental contributor to social, economic and territorial cohesion and the development of the single market. While e-substitution caused letter volumes to decline, on average falling by 4.85% between 2012 and 2013 (though by much more in some Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands), e-commerce also offered new parcel delivery opportunities. Affordable and reliable parcel delivery services were therefore more important than ever to help realise the potential of the Digital Single Market - yet there were concerns about the price and quality of cross-border delivery services.

Furthermore, assessments of the size, value and employment impact of the parcel market are less comprehensive than for letters, making changes in the market harder to monitor and instances of market failure harder to ascertain. Despite the growth in e-commerce, NRAs for postal services still focus primarily on the letter market. The staff working document also noted that concerns had been raised about the working conditions in the parcel delivery sector.

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/legislation/index_en.htm

European Regulators Group for Postal services 2015 Report to the European Commission on Legal Regimes Applicable to European domestic or cross-border parcel delivery

In 2015 the ERGP cross border sub group examined the legal regimes applicable to European domestic or cross-border parcel delivery and any specific provisions that may be in conflict with each other. The Report concluded that the boundaries of the market were not clear and included a wide variety of services. Different countries and NRAs do not always have definitions of the different products/services or sections of the market, where there are definitions these may differ between countries. This has an impact on data collection as the statistics on the CEP market might not always be comparable, and compounded by different approaches by NRAs to the collection and publication of data. Furthermore the boundaries of where different legislation applies (for example postal services and transport services) are also not always clear.

http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14689/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native

UPS: Pulse of the Online Shopper

UPS research into online shopping, conducted by Comscore, compares the online shopping habits in Europe, North America, Asia and Australia. The surveys were 'blind', i.e. respondents were not aware that the research was being conducted on behalf of UPS. In addition to delivery features, the use of smartphones, the impact of social media and other consumer preferences (for example loyalty programmes) were assessed.

The 2013 Europe study noted that online shoppers were becoming increasingly demanding and retailers were "raising the bar" on customer service. Fieldwork was conducted in the first half of 2013 in Belgian, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, among individuals who regularly shopped online (at least twice in a typical three month period). Those shopping online more frequently made up a higher percentage of respondents. Delivery features were found to have a strong influence the choice of e-retailer. Free shipping was the main reason for recommending an e-retailer, followed by timely arrival and easy returns: more than half of online shippers had returned an online purchase. On the other hand, the key reasons for abandoning a shopping cart were shipping costs making the product more than expected, wanting to gain an idea of shipping costs and long delivery times. Over half through tracking was an essential service.

For the 2015 Europe study fieldwork was conducted in 2014 with participants from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK using the same frequency requirements as the 2013 study. The study found that online shoppers and increasingly switching between devices and channels, with choices driven by convenience, and that information and control are crucial.

The survey found that in terms of delivery options, two in three shoppers prefer to have packages delivered home, fewer than in the previous year's study. 43% said that having a product delivered late decreases their likelihood of shopping with that retailer again. In terms of delivery features, consumers were least satisfied with the possibility of choosing a delivery date or rerouting packages while in transit.

Regarding returns, around half of the shoppers (53%) were satisfied with clear and easy to understand returns polices, and the ease of making online returns. 34% want a returns label in the box when it arrives and 58% say free return shipping is key to a good experience.

Delivery prices are important. 33% of consumers choose a slower transit time to qualify for free shipping, 67% say they will wait another one to three days to qualify for free (domestic) shipping), 47% will wait four days or more for free shipping within Europe, and 46% of loyalty programme participants value free shipping most as a benefit of membership.

Delivery times are also important. 60% of online shoppers choose delivery in two days or less and 58% of shoppers have abandoned a shopping cart due to slow delivery times or no delivery date being given.

The main items purchases were clothing (by 54%); books, music and movies (52%) and shoes (37%).

2013 Study: https://www.ups.com/media/en/gb/UPS_Pulse_of_the_Online_Shopper.pdf

2015 Study: https://www.ups.com/media/en/gb/OnlineComScoreWhitepaper.pdf  

E-commerce Europe Studies

e-logistics: A need for integrated European solutions (2015) noted that although the work national postal operators were doing to improve the quality of services was welcome, ideally they would be consulting e-retailers and providing clearer communication on timings, and also addressing prices as both consumers and retailers find delivery prices an obstacle to buying and selling online. Other barriers for e-retailers that were noted included lack of transparency and competition in pricing; lack of information on differences in services and standards; slow delivery times; lack of track and trace services; customs and VAT rules; reverse logistics and lack of standardised labelling.

E-commerce Europe is therefore developing an e-logistics platform to improve transparency and help e-retailers by providing them with an independent source of "delivery intelligence", including listing the different delivery suppliers available for cross-border shipments. The intention is that the platform will also include data on quality of service to help overcome perceptions and problems of poor reliability of cross-border services and provide a service what will enable merchants to combine volumes and thereby hopefully obtain higher discounts. The report also encouraged the use of open standards, particularly in labelling to allow merchants to move between different delivery operators more easily; a better marketing dialogue between e-retailers and delivery operators to help the latter to understand the needs of the former and to develop new services to meet those needs; improved customer services (for the delivery element) and trustmarks indicating this; and free access to address databases.

http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/stream/ecommerce-europe-position-paper-e-logistics-final-150507.pdf

Policy and market solutions to stimulate cross-border e-commerce in Europe set out barriers and possible solutions to cross-border e-commerce. Delivery/logistics issues were one of the main barriers mentioned, alongside legal frameworks and different tax regimes, including VAT. 44% of companies selling abroad that were surveyed said they found logistics and distribution a difficult barrier to tackle and 15% not selling abroad said excessive transport costs were preventing them from doing so. Specific barriers noted were the same as those included in the logistics paper (see above: transparency and competition in pricing; lack of information on differences In services and standards; slow delivery times; lack of track and trace services; customs and VAT riles; reverse logistics and lack of standardised labelling).

http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/stream/ecommerce-europe-priority-paper-07052015-may-2015-final.pdf

The E-commerce Europe survey "Barriers to Growth" received answers from 352 companies in various member states and selling predominantly online and both online and offline, including to other businesses. Some were very small/ micro businesses (less than 10 employees) and over half of the companies surveyed already sold abroad, especially those with larger numbers of employees (77% with 20 or more FTE, 69% between 10 and 20, 53% between 0 and 1 FTE, 63% between 1 and 5%).

The main reason given for not selling cross border was that it was not a strategic priority for the company, followed by a lack of resources. Transport costs were the third most popular reason given. Companies with more that 50% of their activity linked to e-commerce reported transport costs as being particularly problematic. Logistics and distribution were seen as a difficult barrier by 44% respondents, with only 35% not finding them difficult. Examples of barriers included limited information and lack of choice about delivery services; slow delivery times; lack of track and trace; lack of competition and transparency in pricing; difficulties with returns, especially for smaller companies; and lack of standardised labelling. Different regulations and tax rates, especially concerning VAT and customs and online payments were among the non-delivery related barriers that were also highlighted.

As well as the creation of an online e-logistics web platform, the report also advocated a more connected and integrated delivery system; distance based invoicing; open standards, particularly for labelling and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) files; and a common dialogue to help solve the gap between the supply of and demand for delivery products.

http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/stream/survey-barriers-to-growth-ecommerce-europe-2015.pdf

 Flash Eurobarometer 413: Companies Engaged in Online Activities (2015)

Fieldwork was conducted in January and February 2015. The survey covered 26 Member States and around 8,700 respondents were interviewed. Companies were selected who already sold online to other EU countries; who sold online domestically but has sold to other EU countries in the past; who were trying to sell to other EU countries; and companies that did not sell online. The responding companies were drawn from a range of sectors including accommodation, information and communication and manufacturing as well as retail. Amongst the companies that did not sell online to other EU countries, 21% are considering selling abroad at the moment. On average 85.4% of a company's online sales come from their domestic market.

The survey found that the cost of delivery and returns are two of the top three problems businesses face when selling cross-border. High delivery prices were the main problem for businesses selling online in another EU country (or have tried to) and those considering selling online. High delivery costs are a problem for 51% of businesses already selling online in another EU country, 62% of businesses trying to or considering selling abroad and 57% of companies who do not sell online.

The expense of resolving complaints and disputes cross-border is a problem for 41% businesses already selling cross-border and, 58% of businesses considering it. The cost of guarantees and returns is a problem for 42% of business already selling cross-border and 58% of businesses considering it.

Other problems included uncertainty about the rules that need to be followed (37% already selling/63% trying or considering selling), the cost or complexity of foreign taxation (38%/54%), and a lack of language skills (39%/ 48%).

Apex-Insight, European Parcels Market Insight Report, 2015

This report drew on desk research, published information and interviews with senior contacts in the market. It is focussed on Germany, the UK, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands a, Belgium and Poland, representing 79% of total parcels revenues (according to the Apex model). Other European countries (but not Russia or Turkey) were also included within the scope of the study, which defined the parcel market as comprising domestic; intra- European and international parcels; all service levels; and a weight of usually up to 31.5kg (depending on the definitions used by individual operators).

The study estimated the size of the European parcel market to be over 50 billion EUR in 2014, with growth in recent years being driven by home shopping. Growth was fastest in Poland and the UK. Trends in delivery features were also highlighted, such as the growth in collection points and parcel lockers. A gradual trend toward consolidation as independent companies are bought out by larger ones was noted, as was acquisition as a way of enhancing the consumer offering.

http://www.apex-insight.com/product/european-parcels-market-insight-report-2015-2/

European Commission, Identifying the main cross-border obstacles to the Digital Single Market and where they matter most, September 2015

This study was commissioned by the European Commission and included fieldwork carried out in February and March 2015. 23,599 respondents in the EU28 plus Norway and Iceland were surveyed.

The survey found that, on average and across all 12 markets surveyed, approximately just 19% of online respondents report having bought tangible goods or offline services from other EU countries compared to 68% of respondents who report having bought such products online from domestic sellers. For consumers, the three main concerns about purchasing products online cross-border inside the EU are related to delivery and returns: high delivery costs (27%), high return shipping costs (24%), and long delivery times (23%). For domestic purchases consumers are more concerned about personal and payment data and receiving the wrong or a damaged product. In addition, the survey showed that amongst those who experienced problems, the most common problem with tangible goods and offline services purchased online outside one's own country was long delivery time (14% inside the EU and 24% outside the EU).

Reasons that were repeatedly noted for not completing online purchases 8 included high delivery costs (22% of surveyed consumers who could not complete online purchases -in BE and PL only, during a 2-3 week period in which respondents engaged in online purchasing), long proposed delivery times (17%), inconvenient delivery arrangements (16%), return shipping costs and concerns about fair treatment (10%), as well as other problems.

Clothes, shoes and accessories (21% of online buyers) were found to be the most commonly purchased products(latest online purchase), followed by electronics and computer hardware (13%), books (11%), cosmetics and healthcare products (8%), electrical household appliances (7%) and music and films (tangible media) (5%).

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/obstacles_dsm/index_en.htm

Annual Reports of Postal Operators

The Annual Reports of Delivery operators have been used, primarily to inform the Annex providing an overview of the parcel market, and are referenced where used. In addition to providing information about the individual operators, Annual Reports may also include information about the wider market in which companies operate, for example estimates of overall market share, size, growth projections and competition. They will in general also include information about the number of employees a company has – though this is not always stated on a comparable basis.

Postal Statistics Database

Postal Statistics for the European Union are now collected by the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, following the decision by Eurostat to stop the dedicated collection of statistics for the postal sector.

The statistics for 2014 show a wide variation in the number of standard parcels per capita across the EU. The statistics do however only cover standard parcels sent using universal service providers as many NRAs do not collect statistics on the wider parcel sector.

Prices obtained did however indicate that the prices charged by universal service providers for cross border deliveries are often three to five times the domestic price.

The statistics showed that in 2013 around 1.2 million people were employed by universal service providers, and the number of employees is falling, on average at a rate of 4.2% across the EU28 between 2012 and 2013. NRAs do not collect data on employment by other providers of postal services so we cannot quantify with certainty the impact that the growth in e-commerce is having on employment in the wider parcel delivery sector. Earlier estimates have however indicated that around 272,000 people were directly employed by the European express industry in 2010 and this number was projected to grow to 300,000 by 2020. 9

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/statistics/index_en.htm

Econometric Study on Parcel Prices 2015

This study was commissioned by the European Commission in summer 2015 from the University of Saint-Louis, Brussels. It covered a number of research questions including the zoning strategies that are applied, the differences between operators for comparable products/services, a comparison of domestic and cross-border prices and an analysis of the prices differences between products and the discounts offered.

The study concluded that:

Cross border letter prices are on average about 3.5 times higher that their domestic equivalent and cross border parcel prices are on average about 5 times higher that their domestic equivalent

Zoning strategies do not affect cross-border price differentials

Parcels lead to higher cross-border price differentials than letters

Premium products to lower differentials than standard products

Weight increases the price differentials

Cross-border price differentials increase in flows between periphery countries and decrease in flows between the six largest Western European countries, as far as parcels are concerned.

There is indirect evidence suggesting that vertical integration seems to decrease price differentials.

Letter differentials and parcel differentials are explained by different factors, highlighting the differences in the market structure and maturity of competition between the two distinct product segments (scale, density of population, liberalization etc.).

Labor costs in the destination country, although being a large component of the cost structure of the cross border parcel delivery service does not seem to statistically influence cross border differentials, contrary to the domestic leg of the cost structure.

For further details see Annex 5, Market Overview.

http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14647

Cross Border Parcel Logistics (2015)

This study was commissioned by the European Commission in summer 2015 from the University of Antwerp. It covered a number of research questions including elaborating on the cost drivers that influence the cross border delivery. The study simulated costs in given delivery scenarios and highlighted the importance of trade imbalances in cross border parcel delivery.

For further details see Annex 5, Market Overview.

http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14647]

BEREC/ERGP, Price transparency and regulatory oversight of cross-border parcels delivery, taking into account possible regulatory insights from the electronic communications sector, Joint BEREC-ERGP opinion 2015

Following a meeting with Vice-President Andrus Ansip on 15 June 2015, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) agreed to examine whether there were regulatory insights in the electronic communications sector that could be transferred to the postal sector. The report noted differences between the postal and electronic communications sectors, for example their different cost structures. It also found that the remit of many (postal) NRAs does not extend to all substitutable products and services in the postal sector and examined measures that could improve the transparency of retail prices.

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/ergp/index_en.htm

Duch-Brown, N. and Cardona, M. (2016), Delivery costs and cross-border e-commerce in the EU Digital Single Market, JRC/IPTS Digital Economy Working Paper.

This study examined the potential benefits of reducing concerns related to delivery prices. It found that removing delivery concerns relating to price is highly likely to increase cross border e-commerce by 4.3 percentage points. This alone should impact positively increase household consumption by 2 307 million Euros (0.03%) and the Real National Income by 2 372 million Euros (0.02%). Those effects are mainly driven by the estimated decline in the overall consumer prices by a factor of 0.03% and from the subsequent increase in the overall exports that is able to balance the negative effect in the output of the retail sector. For firms removing delivery cost concerns would increase the number of firms selling online across borders by 6.2 percentage points and the volume of online trade by 5 percentage points. Medium sized firms would be especially benefited by the removal of delivery cost concerns, as this would influence their decision to engage in selling cross border at a rate of 20pp.

https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC101030.pdf


Annex 2 - Stakeholder Consultation

Overview

This Annex sets out chronologically the ways in which stakeholders have been consulted during the development of the cross-border parcel delivery proposal. As well as an overview of the responses to the 2012 Green Paper and workshops that have been used to seek the views of stakeholders, it includes a summary of the 2015 open public consultation on parcel delivery.

2012 Green Paper: "An integrated parcel delivery market for the growth of e-commerce in the EU"

The 2012 Commission Communication on E-commerce 10 identified the delivery of goods purchased online as one of the top five priorities for boosting e-commerce by 2015. The 2012 Green Paper on Parcel Delivery therefore sought views on the information needs of consumers and e-retailers; the need for an improved quality of service and the way in which this could be obtained; means of reducing costs and increasing efficiency; delivery prices; competition; regulatory oversight; interoperability and governance.

The two main conclusions of the Green Paper were that e-commerce driven delivery was a key factor in the overall development of e-commerce and that the increasing expectations of consumers and e-retailers regarding parcel delivery services were not being met, especially for cross-border delivery.

89 contributions to the consultation were received, including from e-retailers, delivery operators, public authorities (including postal ministries and regulators), trade unions, consumer representatives and individuals. In their responses, most stakeholders and Member States' authorities expressed a preference for industry driven action and non-legislative measures, rather than new regulation. Most replies also characterised the existing regulatory framework as broadly sufficient and fit for purpose (including the Postal Services Directive, Consumer Rights Directive and Online and Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures), although numerous replies highlighted challenges such as high prices, low quality of service and lack of information. When asked to identify regulatory gaps, responses included lack of information and traceability, high prices and consumer protection when delivery went wrong. Other issues raised included interoperability and lack of common standards, network access, geographic coverage and more generally the lack of easy cross border sales and returns. Information that respondents suggested could be provided often concerned delivery features (e.g. delivery times and tracking) and around half though trust labels could be useful. A new universal service obligation was not thought necessary by around two thirds of respondents and most responses suggested that a price cap would not be the appropriate tool to address the needs of e-retailers and consumers.

The Green Paper, contributions to the consultation and the summary of responses are available here:

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=6356

Online and Postal Services Workshops 2012/13

Three workshops were held during the course of 2012/13 to present the external studies that had been commissioned to inform postal services policy. On 17 September the studies "Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013) and EU Parcel Markets with a particular emphasis on e-commerce were discussed. 11

Postal User Form 2014

The Postal User Forum 12 held on 21 March 2014 focused exclusively on parcel delivery and discussed the actions set out in the 2013 Roadmap. The 75 attendees included MEPs, e-retailers, delivery operators, regulators, trade unions and third party service providers. Delivery operators highlighted the cost of investment to develop new services. Participants reported that consumer expectations of delivery services were increasing and consumer trust was built mainly on quality of service, fair pricing and clear liability. E-retailers reported that delivery services across the EU were fragmented and they experienced problems with liability and responsibility during delivery. The social dimension and differences in employment conditions between parcel operators were also noted.

Workshop with Regulators on Regulatory Oversight of Parcel Delivery

This workshop, held on 23 April 2015, brought together several regulators from several Member States. The differences in the regulatory oversight of the parcel markets was discussed, along with the need for additional oversight, what it could cover and the different regulatory tools that could be suitable.

Most NRAs had limited oversight of the parcel market outside the scope of the universal service, whether because of the legal mandate of the NRA or prioritisation of resources. Some regulators did however also note that work was underway to understand their parcel markets better, including other operators, though there was no consensus that such work needed to be formalised. Furthermore, the European Regulators' Group for Postal Service (ERGP) was doing further work on different regulatory regimes which would also need to be taken into consideration.

2015 Public Consultation on Cross-Border Parcel Delivery

About the Consultation

The open public consultation on cross-border parcel delivery ran from 6 May 2015 to 5 August 2015. 361 responses were received. Most responses were received through the online tool (including answers to the questionnaire and uploaded documents), although some responses were also received by email.

The consumer and e-retailer questionnaire was published in six languages (EN, DE, FR, IT, ES, and PL). The questionnaire for delivery operators was subdivided into versions for delivery intermediaries and other logistics providers; predominantly domestic carrier; operator with international coverage; international integrators; and national postal operators. Respondents were able to reply in any official language of the EU. The consultation was publicised on the European Commission's 'your voice in Europe' website, through the online Linked in Parcel Delivery Group and social media channels of DGs GROW, CNECT and JUST, the SME network and at stakeholder meetings.

Reponses where confidentiality was not requested (i.e. where respondents were happy for their response to be published, whether with their name or anonymously) have been published with the exception of delivery operators as most requested confidentiality.

The number of responses below reflects the Commission's classification of responses, not necessarily the consultation form that was used. Blank responses, or where no information beyond a name was provided, have not been included in the totals below.

Consumer

211

Retailer

64

Delivery Operator

35

Of which:

 

NPO

21

Other  delivery operators

14

Representative bodies/organisations, Member States and Regulators

51

TOTAL

361

The consultation sought the views of interested parties; the responses are not statistically representative. Where fractions or percentages have been reported below, these are derived from the number of responses to a particular question, rather than to that section of the consultation or the consultation as a whole.

About the Respondents

Retailers

The location of the headquarters of retailers who responded were mainly in Germany, the UK and Spain, with over one fifth of the retailer responses from each of these locations. Most were SMEs (51 responses, of which 43 were micro businesses) 13 . Around half sold their goods online only and half sold both online and in a physical store. Micro businesses replying were more likely to sell online only. Aside from the 'other' category, the most common products sold were shoes and accessories followed by clothing. Most (45 responding retailers) sold to both domestic and international customers. Of those who did not sell online cross-border, delivery was more common than other reasons for not selling online to other countries 14 .

Nearly half the retailers responding stated that the share of packets and parcels returned to them was less than 1%. Several retailers indicated that there was no significant difference between the rate of returns between domestic and international customers although others stated they received more returns from domestic sales than from international ones. There were few responses to the question about weight categories, and where answers were given they were affected by the type of product sold for example retailers selling electronics had heavier shipments on average than those selling cosmetics.

Consumers

211 responses from consumers in 18 EU and EEA/EFTA countries were received through the online tool. Most of the consumers' replies came from Spain, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. Seven consumer associations also responded. Over half of the consumers who replied were content to have their contributions published, albeit anonymously. Over three quarters of the responses came from consumers aged between 18 and 44, and around two thirds were male. Nearly half shopped online every month, and nearly one third shopped online once a week or more. Travel, accommodation and event tickets was the most common category of online purchase, followed by consumer electronics and clothing. Roughly equal numbers bought from the country in which they lived and from other EU/EEA/EFTA countries.

Delivery Operators

21 national postal operators (NPOs) replied to the consultation. Other operators who responded included express operators/integrators, and operators with predominantly domestic and international coverage. Representative bodies for delivery operators also replied. Most operators requested that their responses remained confidential or anonymous given the commercial nature of some of the questions.

The most common type of cross-border delivery service for national postal operators involved 15 the networks of the national postal operators of the countries involved to arrange cross-border delivery operations and there was agreement with the description representing the "standard delivery model" 16 . Other operators stated they use a mix of their own networks (where applicable), other private (non NPO) delivery operators and NPOs.

For the NPOs and other operators the proportion of express parcels (in contrast to standard parcels) varied greatly. Standard parcels were more common than express for NPOs and deliveries handled by NPOs weighed less than those delivered by other operators, as a proportion of packet and parcel shipments. The domestic market was responsible for the majority of NPOs' volumes. NPOs and other operators used a mix of road and air transport.

For NPOs, remuneration costs/ termination rates were reported to be the main determinant of prices. For other operators, competition and transport costs were listed as most important factors when setting prices by larger companies.

Representative Organisations, Member States and Regulators

Representative bodies for consumers, businesses and retailers, delivery operators and trade unions replied to the consultation. In some cases these were domestic representative organisations, in others pan European. National Regulatory Authorities for postal services and government ministries also replied. Most agreed that their responses could be published. In this analysis the views of representative bodies are, where possible, are grouped with individual responses from those they represent, i.e. consumers, retailers and delivery operators.

About Delivery Services

Retailers' experiences

Retailers use a range of delivery services to ship cross-border. Over half always or often use the NPO, but express carriers and other private operators are also used. Track and trace capability and price appeared to be the most important considerations for e-retailers (and their customers) 17 : nearly one third always offer a track and trace services and one third often use the cheapest service.

Retailers were most satisfied 18 with the information from delivery operators about delivery options and prices, speed of delivery and (low) number of items lost. These features all had over 40% responses satisfied or very satisfied. Retailers were least satisfied with the possibility of changing the delivery location after dispatch, delivery prices and complaints handling. These features all had over one third of responses very unsatisfied or not satisfied. Smaller companies were particularly likely to be unsatisfied with the price of delivery services.



Q13 (retailers) - How satisfied are you with the following delivery features when selling to other European countries? Please rank each answer that applies to you on a scale from 1 to 5. 19

When asked about the cost of delivery, over half the responses from e-retailers stated that for domestic online sales, the cost of delivery represented 15% or less of their e-commerce turnover. For cross-border sales, nearly half the responses stated that the cost was 6-25% of turnover, rising to over half for 6-25% or more. Micro-companies in particular estimated that cross-border sales represented a greater share of their e-commerce turnover than domestic sales did.

Responses about free delivery were mixed, with just over half the responding retailers offering some form of free delivery (whether for domestic and international or only domestic purchases) and just under half offering no free delivery option. For those offering free delivery, this was most common for purchases above a certain value or as a temporary promotion. Retailers noted that the cost of 'free delivery' was often passed onto consumers through higher product prices. About a third stated that they could not offer free delivery because of the high cost of cross-border delivery or the weight of the products they sold.

Excluding free delivery options, retailers were asked whether they charged their customers more, less, or the same as the price they paid delivery operators. Of those who responded to this question, nearly half stated that they charged consumers more than they pay delivery operators, with the remainder evenly split between charging the same amount as they pay and charging less.

More than half of those responding to the question 20 stated that they did not receive any price discounts from delivery operators for the packets or parcels they sent to other European countries. Reponses differed according to company size with micro businesses less likely to receive discounts (over two thirds responding stated they did not receive discounts) whereas almost all larger companies did receive discounts (though the number of larger companies that replied to the consultation was small). Very few respondents provided information about the discounts they received from delivery operators. Where they did responses indicated the use of annual contracts with the national postal operator and that discounts depended on the weight and volume of shipments.

Consumers' Experiences

The two obstacles most commonly mentioned by the consumers who replied to the question 21 as "always" being a delivery problem when buying online were "Unable to redirect a delivery which is in progress to another delivery location" (more than one third of respondents) and "No possibility of delivery at predefined date and time slot" (more than one quarter of respondents). Problems that were "often" encountered included "no free delivery option" (over half of respondents), 'high delivery prices' (just under half); cost of delivery (over one third); and "high costs of return" (just under one third'; as well as other delivery features such as lack of choice of date and time of delivery (over one third respondents) and no delivery location options (one third respondents). "Unable to track the location of a good…" and "unable to find clear information about delivery options and prices" were identified as sometimes being obstacles by around half of the respondents. "Items being lost in transit" was most commonly stated to "never" be a problem. Expensive customs declarations in the Canary Islands were also cited as a problem, as were geographic restrictions on sales and surcharges to remote and peripheral areas, amongst other features.



Q6 (consumers) – When buying online how often do you face the following delivery problems? 22

In terms of delivery locations, delivery to a home address (for over half of the consumer responses) and delivery to a work address (over one third of consumer responses) were deemed to be 'very important' 23 . Delivery locations ranked as 'important' by over one quarter of respondents included relay points/shops with collection facilities, post offices and neighbours.

Over three quarters of consumers who responded stated they had in the last 12 months considered an online purchase, but then abandoned it only because of concerns about delivery. The most commonly highlighted reason, reported by over two thirds of consumers responding to this question was high delivery prices, followed by too slow delivery, reported by one third of responding consumers and no free return option, reported by nearly a quarter of responding consumers.

Delivery Operators' Experiences

The main obstacle faced when delivering abroad that NPOs and other operators reported was customs rules and procedures. 24 Security procedures were also a significant problem for NPOs. Difficulties with finding an operator in the destination country, negotiating favourable conditions, interoperability of networks and transport requirements were also reported. Other operators also noted that obstacles differ between destination countries, as well as the effects of the VAT exemption for public postal services and inter-operator pricing arrangements can limit competition and create distortions.

Outside the EU, most answers from other operators about obstacles to delivery focussed on tax and duty/customs and security procedures. 25 A lack of ability to clear and release goods for the entire EU in one specific country was also raised, and fragmentation of road transport policies across Europe were also noted. NPOs and other delivery operators also raised insufficient remuneration given delivery costs, transport options and costs and the lack of interoperability as problems. Several NPOs responses noted that the remuneration received from operators outside the EU/EEA did not cover costs, especially if additional services such as a registered service were used. E-commerce flows from Asia in particular posed a financial challenge for European operators, and e-retailers also noted the difficulty in competing with these cheaper delivery costs.

Representative Organisations, Member States and Regulators' Experiences

Several Member States stated that the cross-border parcel delivery market is not functioning properly and indicated a range of reasons (including disproportionate costs; taxation issues; discrimination; regulatory differences; lack of interoperability, transparency, consumer protection, quality measurement, confidentiality and security… ). Other Member States indicated there was no issue with affordability and regulatory oversight, because the market for (cross-border) parcel delivery is liberalized, competitive and dynamic.

Trade associations were divided about the need for additional measures to improve the cross-border parcel delivery market. Some agreed that price structures are not transparent, while others were concerned that regulation leads to (unnecessary) bureaucracy and can stifle innovation.

Trade unions unanimously signalled shortages in terms of social protection in the (labour-intensive) parcel delivery market and criticised sub-contracting and "false self-employment.

Areas for Improvement

For Retailers

The areas for improvement that retailers said would make them more likely sell online or increase sales to other countries were most commonly related to prices, namely "if prices for cross-border delivery were cheaper than they currently are" and "if prices for cross-border delivery were comparable to domestic prices". 26 Some retailers also highlighted "improved speed of cross-border delivery". Other improvements suggested included interoperability (between delivery operators, standardisation of labels, product comparison and transparency and competition (which could be facilitated by the EU regulatory framework).

 
Q
22 (retailers) - Which, if any, of the following improvements to the delivery process would make you more likely to sell online or increase your online sales to buyers located in another European country? Please select the three most important to you. 27

More than half the retailers who answered the relevant question 28 stated that a reduction in prices of between 10% and 60% would allow them to substantially increase sales to other countries.

Half the retailers responding (16) found it easy or fairly easy to obtain high quality delivery services to other EU/EEA countries, although this might depend on the countries in question. Half found it difficult or very difficult to obtain such delivery services. Responses also suggested that obtaining quality delivery services could be particularly problematic for small companies who might lack volumes large enough to obtain discounts and for those delivering packages rather than parcels as it was suggested there is less competition for smaller items. Some retailers also pointed out that tracking services tend to be expensive and that retailers often do not see any link between price and distance.

Other barriers to cross-border delivery raised, especially in documents that were uploaded, included a lack of standardised labelling; complicated customs and VAT administration; reverse logistics posing a problem for small volumes; lack of track-and-trace; long delivery times; lack of transparency and competition in pricing; lack of information; no choice in last-mile providers; and lack of inter-operability. It was noted that these issues arose more in Member States than others, and that smaller retailers would usually find them more problematic than larger and more established ones.

Several respondents argued in favour of enforcement of the existing legal framework on cross-border parcel delivery, especially concerning price transparency and regulatory oversight. Regulatory action was viewed by some only as a last resort, while industry initiatives should be encouraged. Retailers also highlighted the importance of promoting open standards and a European wide delivery system that is reliable and affordable. In addition, it was suggested that VAT privileges of national postal operators could be abolished, as well as addressing differences in parcel delivery prices.

Retailers also stated that they face unfair competition from Asian e-commerce merchants, in particular from China, who are able to benefit from reduced postal delivery tariffs compared to European e-retailers. Delivery operators noted they these tariffs do not cover the costs of their delivery.

For Consumers

Consumers were asked to rank improvements to the delivery process that would make them more likely to buy online. 29 The two main improvements, that nearly two thirds of responding consumers stated were "very likely" to make them buy more online were lower prices for cross-border delivery and free delivery.

Delivery outside working hours or during the weekend was ranked as "very likely" to make the consumers buy more online by over half the respondents. Faster delivery, affordable returns and convenient return process were deemed to be very likely to encourage online purchases by over 40% of respondents.



Q10 (consumers)- Which, if any, of the following improvements to the delivery process would make you more likely to buy online? Please rank on a scale from 1-5 30

 

Consumers were also asked to indicate the single most important improvement in delivery that would make them buy more online. High prices for cross-border delivery were most commonly cited, with almost a third of the 161 consumers who replied to this open question mentioning it as the most important area requiring improvement. Other specific improvements that consumers considered would make them buy more online included free delivery, faster cross-border delivery, better information about delivery options and prices, more flexibility to choose delivery location and date, unrestricted geographical delivery to the country of online shopper from seller based in a different EU country, free returns, more convenient return procedures, more options to receive delivery at predefined date and time slot, and lower customs fees and other costs (related to buying in the Canary Islands).

In general, consumer associations agreed there was an issue with both affordability and regulatory oversight of the cross-border parcel delivery market. Their key concerns related to high prices for cross-border delivery, lack of price transparency and information on delivery services, ineffective competition in the cross-border e-commerce market, access to appropriate safeguards for consumers, lack of return procedures, and unsatisfactory delivery times. Comments about regulatory oversight included that price transparency and competition should be improved (under the supervision of regulations), but others suggested that regulation should only be used as a last resort and price caps should not be introduced.

For Delivery Operators

Views on whether regulatory oversight was appropriate, should be increased, or should be reduced, were mixed. System interoperability was considered to be the most important feature that could improve the quality of delivery services by NPOs. 31 Other operators also raised the need for common standards and system interoperability, as well as more regulatory cooperation.

There were mixed views on the need for more regulatory oversight, and it was suggested that there should be greater emphasis on enforcing the existing regulatory framework under the Postal Services Directive (PSD). Delivery operators (other than NPOs) suggested that regulatory oversight is needed in order to guarantee that NPOs do not take advantage of their dominant market position, for example by allowing access to the rates and conditions resulting from agreements between NPOs, and called for more emphasis to be put on the cost orientation of prices and controlling cost and activities related to the universal service obligation (USO) to prevent compensation for the universal service obligation benefitting other activities carried out by the NPO/ universal service provider. Express operators stated that markets are highly competitive and more regulation would increase costs without benefits, though it was acknowledged that fragmentation in the postal regulatory landscape creates complexity for delivery operators.

Some operators stated that the parcel market is competitive and that additional regulation would have a negative impact on the level of investment and innovation needed to remain competitive and distort the market. Uncertainty over regulation could also hinder investment decisions and regulation is unlikely to be able to keep pace with developments in a rapidly changing market. Responses stated there was no current evidence of market failure and a risk of inefficiencies and regulatory failure if additional regulation was introduced. Negative impacts on profitability could have a negative impact on the sustainability of the universal service obligation.

Other comments included the negotiating power of large e-retailers and it was suggested that if there were additional regulation it should cover the prices e-retailers charge customers for delivery as postal operators cannot set the price the final customer pays for delivery. Other operators suggested that transparency, liberalisation, market entry and cost orientation (i.e. avoiding cross-border subsidisation) are needed, as well as better cooperation and coordination between NRAs.

 

For Representative Organisations, Member States and Regulators

Some Member States agreed that there is a need to collect more data about the market. Authorities currently may have difficulties in performing regulatory oversight, in particular due to a lack of clarity about definitions in the Postal Services Directive and insufficient monitoring powers. Member States that did not agree that there is an issue with affordability and regulatory oversight would prefer self-regulation in the event that market intervention is considered. The regulation of prices and cost structures was generally rejected.

Trade unions called for better working conditions in particular higher wages and more training; better environmental protection; and price structures that reflected the real cost of delivering a services. Media associations indicated that reducing cross-border delivery prices may lead to an increase of domestic prices which will not benefit the publishing sector that mainly operates nationally. In cases where cross-border delivery is very expensive, they suggested that special tariffs for books and greater transparency could be solutions.

Postal Directive Committee

The Postal Directive Committee brings together representatives from Member States' national administration and independent national regulatory authorities.

On the 11 June 2015 the cross-border parcel delivery element of the Digital Single Market strategy was presented and discussed with attendees from member state governments and National Regulatory Authorities. The discussion focussed on the different approaches taken by National Regulatory Authorities towards the parcel delivery market. Specific attention was paid to the mandate of postal regulators outside the universal service, in particular the legal basis and other constraints affecting data collection.

Previous Postal Directive Committee meetings have also been used to discuss the cross-border parcel delivery market. The 2012 Green Paper and the next steps to that consultation were presented at the 24 April 2013. On 12 December 2013 the meeting was used to discuss the Roadmap on cross-border parcel delivery and industry related activities and initiatives, and the following meeting on 10 June 2014 was used to provide an update on subsequent activities. In December 2014 WIK Consult presented the findings of their study on the "Design and development of initiatives to support the growth of e-commerce via better functioning parcel delivery systems in Europe". 32

European Social Dialogue Committee of the Postal Sector

The Social Dialogue Committee for the Postal Sector was set up to advise the European Commission on initiatives relative to social policy and on the developments in European policy which could have a social impact on the postal and allied services sector; to encourage and promote social dialogue within the postal and allied services sector in order to contribute to the development of jobs and to the improvement of working conditions of those working in this sector; and to discuss appropriate structures to allow negotiations between the partners in the sector. The Commission's work to improve cross-border parcel delivery was presented at the May 2015 meeting.

Workshop on the Implementation of the Roadmap for Parcel Delivery

This workshop was held by the Commission on 29 June 2015 to mark 18 months since the publication of the 2013 Parcel roadmap and assess the progress that had been made, by bringing together around 50 e-retailers, consumer organisations and a range of delivery operators, as well as trade unions and administrations and postal regulators from Member States.

E-retailers explained that while they felt that the delivery services on offer had improved, there was more to be done. The high price of cross-border deliveries and returns were highlighted as particular concerns, along with interoperability and the ease of using (and switching between) different delivery operators, for example common labels. Although national postal operators are improving their interoperability for cross-border services, some other delivery operators took the view that different systems drove innovation and should not be standardised. E-commerce Europe also set out plans for the creation of an information platform on delivery services, and EMOTA provided an update on a new European trustmark for e-commerce which builds on existing national schemes and will include delivery features.

Consultation of Delivery Operators

The Commission regularly meets delivery operators, including national postal operators, express operators and other letter and parcel delivery operators to discuss postal services. To monitor the development of the industry initiative a number of meetings were held with PostEurop, their member operators and the International Post Corporation. Dedicated meetings were also held with delivery operators during the development of this impact assessment, including with PostEurop and the Express Industry Association, to supplement written contributions to the consultation and other industry contact.

Workshop with European Regulators Group for Postal Services with Body of Regulators for Electronic Communication

On 29 September 2015 the European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) and the Body of Regulators for Electronic Communication (BEREC) held a join workshop to on cross-border parcel delivery. BEREC have experience of developing the single market for telecoms and the reduction of roaming charges for mobile phone use abroad. At the workshop the Commission presented some options for improving the price transparency and regulatory oversight in the cross-border delivery market. The wider discussion made it clear that there was a need for greater oversight of the wider postal market.  

Discussions with the Council

On the 14 October 2015 the Commission gave a presentation on the Digital Single Market Cross-Border Parcel initiative to the Joint Working Party on Postal Services and Telecommunications and Information Society. The Commission presented the history of the initiative, and explained that the Digital Single Market initiative to improve price transparency and regulatory oversight was one of a series of measures to improve cross-border parcel delivery, with the quality of service and provision of information also being targeted. Some results from recent surveys and the Commission's consultation were presented and possible options were discussed.

In their interventions several Member States supported the need to develop cross-border e-commerce and improve the quality of delivery services. More detail on the proposed measures was however requested, including on the legal form, evidence base, and the scope of the increase in regulatory oversight.

LinkedIn group on improving parcel delivery in European e-commerce

The LinkedIn group provides an online permanent workshop allowing participants to share practical concerns, learn about solutions that others are developing, and contribute ideas that help achieve a better single market for parcel delivery.



Annex 3 – Practical implications of the initiative for the affected parties

Based on the preferred policy options this annex sets out the practical implications of the initiative for national postal operators, national regulatory authorities, and other operators.

Policy options

To enhance transparency of:

public list prices and public discounts to the general public (option 3a)

inter-post wholesale prices to national postal regulators (option 3c)

To enhance the regulatory powers of postal regulators

Powers to collect data from operators (option 4a)

Powers to enforce market access, where appropriate, to existing networks and infrastructures. (option 4c)

A.National Postal Operators

The key obligation for NPOs would result from options 3a, 3 c and 4a, which requires them to transmit annually (1) public list prices and public discounts and (2) annually inter-post wholesale prices and (3) annually a dataset of basic information to the NRA.

To comply with option 3a, 3c and 4a data should be transmitted on (i) public list prices for 15 domestic and cross-border delivery products (selection is based upon 3 service levels and 3 weights: 500g, 1 kg, and 2 kg for packets, and 2 service levels and 3 weights 1, 2 and 5 kg for parcels) (ii) the inter-post whole sale prices paid and charged to other postal regulators for packets and parcels (iii) information on prices, volumes, turnover, and number of employees.

The NPO would have to gather the data from sources and software tools within the firm and compile and transmit this information in the desired format to the NRA. It is expected that the person assigned for the task would be able to directly retrieve the data at the requested level of aggregation from the firm’s ERP-software (e.g. Oracle , SAP) or from internal departments (eg sales, accountancy,..) without complex computations to be carried out. We can reasonably expect that the requested data is already available for internal company purposes, if not already public and/ or given to the NRA (for example public prices and discounts, information about turnover, volumes and employment within the universal service area etc). We assume that no specific set-up costs are needed to fulfil the obligation and limited manpower at clerk level is needed. The estimated admin burden are respectively 280€, 570€, 430€ per operator for option 3a, 3c, 4a (see annex on admin burden).

Option 4c requires NPOs to provide information on the access agreements to the NRAs. Information to be provided can easily be transmitted to the NRA, therefore workload is limited. The admin burden is estimated at 140€

B.National Regulatory Authorities

The key obligations for NRAs would result from options 3a, 3c and 4a. These options imply NRAs to collect annually:

(1) 15 public prices and discounts for parcel and packet cross border and domestic products from NPOs and sentd them to the European Commission (option 3a)
(
2) inbound and outbound inter-post wholesale prices from the national postal operator (option 3 c).
(3) a dataset of basic information from NPOs and other operators and (option 4 a)

as well as to analyze, and use the collected data to assess the affordability and cost-orientation of prices (option 3a) and option 3c to exchange the terminal dues information to other NPOs upon request.

The data collection for option 3a and 3c results in limited work for the NRAs, as the NPO is requested to transmit the data in a ready-to-use format, easily to disseminate or to be exchanged. Many NRAs will already have this information, at least for USO products. Option 4a may imply more work because the information should be gathered from multiple operators above a certain size (more than 50 employees). The admin burden is estimated respectively at 600 €, 1200 € and 3600€ per NRA.

Options 4 results in more work for NRA’s as it may be assumed that this option would require a professional analysis at every NRA amounting to 80 - 160 man hours (2 - 4 weeks) per year, as well as holding analysis meetings equivalent to 40 man hours per NRA and per year. Admin burden is calculated at 21.700 € per NRA.

For options 4c NRAs would need to assess and enforce access on fair terms and conditions. This is an ad-hoc task. Assuming a man-week of professional analysis from a specialist, admin burden is estimated at 2400 €.

C.Other operators

The key obligation for other operators would result from option 4a, which requires them to transmit annually a dataset of basic information to the NRA, comprising data on types of services offered (e.g. express or other), prices, volumes, turnover and employment. Harmonisation of data requirements would however reduce the admin burdens that some operators face from multiple different data requests.



Annex 4 – Analytical models used in preparing the IA

 

Main Methodological Tool

This IA, in an effort to identify which factors explain price differentials between domestic and cross border packet and parcel prices based its analysis on a linear regression.

In general we obtain a linear econometric model of the following form:

where to are unknown parameters of the model that we estimate based on collected economic data and using an econometric technique; yi is the dependent variable that we are trying to explain; x2i, x3i, until xKi are explanatory variables and ei is the random variable, which represents the “noise” component.

Based on the econometric model and using a sample of data, we can estimate the economic parameters and test hypotheses, to verify the significance of the estimated coefficients. The coefficient represents the intercept of the model. Mathematically it represents the value the dependent variable takes when all of the explanatory variables take the value zero. In many cases this parameter, however, does not have a clear economic interpretation. The other parameters in the model, to , each represent the changes in the value of the dependent variable, given one unit change in an explanatory variable, when all other variables are held constant.

Assumptions and Limitations

Every econometric analysis starts from an economic model, based on theoretical underpinnings. Of course economic theory does not claim to be able to predict the specific behaviour of any one variable, but describes the average behaviour of many observations of that variable. In order to analyse data, the economic model is translated into an econometric model, where we decompose the actual observations of the variable in two components, i.e. the systematic part and the random or the unpredictable component, the random error. This random error takes the factors into account that we may have omitted from the model, and reflects the intrinsic uncertainty in economic activity.

Relative Price Differentials

In our analysis of the price differentials of postal services, we rely on economics to identify observable explanatory variables that can explain the dependent variable, the cross-border price differentials. We perform a cross-sectional analysis, where the cross-border price differentials are explained by both quantitative (e.g. labour cost, density, scale) and qualitative variables (eg. product features, liberalisation stage). The qualitative factors will be taken into account by dummy variables, taking just two values 1 or 0 indicating the presence or absence of a certain characteristic. The explanatory variables specify an econometric model that is thought to explain the independent variable, in this case, relative cross-border price differentials.

This variable is determined by the domestic price (Pi) and the cross border price (Pij) for a delivery service of a certain good sent from country i to country j.

For instance for product k (e.g. parcel of 2 kg) we have the following price differential between the domestic price of country i and the cross-border price to country j:

Price Dataset

To create the dataset of the domestic and cross border prices, the European Commission has collected through its own resources, a dataset of about 12.000 list prices from domestic and cross border parcel (mainly) products. The focus of this data gathering was the public tariffs offered by 25 National Postal Operators (data form national operators form EU28 countries except for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Estonian Post).

The dataset detailed each product by a list of predefined features (track and trace, insurance, proof of delivery, home delivery, VAT rate, weight, and dimension). In this way the model could control for changes in the product specification, and compare, at all times, likes with likes. The University of Rotterdam (faculty of Law and Economics - ELME) was commissioned to validate the dataset and correct it from encoding errors.

The European Commission has commissioned the University of Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, to provide an econometric analysis of the above mentioned dataset 33 . The contractors have refined the dataset by selecting a set of standard and premium 34 parcels and letters in various weights 35 . This selection 36 give a total of 40 products per country (16 letter products and 24 parcel products), or in other words around 500 domestic product references and around 500*24 cross border references 37 .

The University of Saint Louis has ran two separate regressions; one for the letter mail products and one for parcels.

Explanatory Variables

The explanatory variables that were used by the model are:

1.Product characteristics 

The model tried to find to what extent the presence of specific product features (add on services, standard vs. premium products, weight, letters vs. parcels) increases/ or decreases ceteris paribus (letter and parcel) price differentials. To do that the model deploys dummy variables that control for differences in features (eg. “dummy_DomesticTracked, “dummy_Cross-borderTracked, dummy_Parcel” and “dummy_Premium”).

2.Zoning strategies

The explored to what extend the choice of an operator to apply a zoning strategy explains ceteris paribus price differentials. To do that the model deploys dummy variables that control for differences in features (eg. “dummy_DomesticTracked” and “dummy_Cross-borderTracked).

3.Periphery

The model tested as to what extend periphery leads ceteris paribus to higher (letter and parcel) price differentials (“dummy_Periphery 38 , dummy_LargeCountries 39 and dummy_PeripheryNeigbor that measures the effect of neighbouring periphery countries in cross border differentials).

4.Market structure

The model was also interested as to what extend differences in market structure (in specific the degree of competition and the degree of vertical integration) explain relatively higher cross border (letter and parcel) prices, others being equal. To measure those effects the model uses 'dummy_Liberalisation2009' variable and dummy_UKGLS’, dummy_FranceDPD.

5.Distance and demography

The model tested to what extend higher transportation costs (proxied by distance) and higher density in the country of origin or country of destination explain price differentials (others again being equal). In order to take this into account the model uses a dummy to separate neighbouring countries from other countries (‘dummy_Neighbor). It also uses population density data from Eurostat to proxy the demography characteristics in the country of origin and the country of destination.

6.Scale Effect

The model tried to measure as to what extend bilateral e-commerce volume matters in determining (letter and parcel) price differentials. To do this the model uses a bilateral online trade matrix, produced by JRC 40 . To avoid co-linearity problems the model introduces two variables: the relative export share of online trade flows between an outbound and inbound country and the relative import share of online trade between the destination and outbound country. The model verified that the correlation between these two variables is relatively low (21%), and hence including these two variables would not create a multi-collinearity problem.    

7.Cost factor

Since costs are expected to drive prices up the model tried to test as to whether labour costs specifically are positively correlated with higher (letter and parcel) cross border prices. The model deploys 2 variables to measure this effect the variable 'sendingLaborCost' and 'ReceivingLabor Cost', using data from Eurostat.

Results

We attach a copy of the model output that indicates the coefficients of each explanatory variable and their significance levels::

The model estimates separate regressions for letters and parcels by splitting our sample of 13035 observations of cross-border price differentials into letters (5385 observations) and parcels (7650 observations). Tables II and III illustrate the regression results for parcels and letters respectively. The null hypotheses tested is whether the parameters to are significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis is rejected if the calculated test statistic is smaller than the critical value for the chosen significance level. The significance level thus indicates the risk of concluding that the parameter of an explanatory variable is different from zero, when in reality it is not. The analysis uses a significance level of 0,1%, 1% and 5%. Significant coefficients are labelled with ***, ** or *, where *** means a significance level of 0,1%, ** means a significance level of 1% and * means a significance level of 5%. 41  

Table XX. Explaining Relative cross-border price differentials – PARCELS

Explanatory Variable

Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

Significance level

Intercept

10,1252

0,4405

22,9839

***

Dummy Domestic Tracked

-5,4906

0,4308

-12,745

***

Dummy International Tracked

1,0577

0,0616

17,1751

***

Single zone pricing

-0,0446

0,0833

-0,5352

Periphery

1,8653

0,2142

8,7098

***

Large Countries

-0,3343

0,0744

-4,4947

***

Premium

-0,2817

0,0620

-4,5470

***

Dummy 0,5 kg

0,0810

0,0828

0,9772

Dummy 1 kg

0,2971

0,0830

3,5781

***

Dummy 2 kg

0,7142

0,0877

8,1395

***

Dummy 5 kg

1,0775

0,0917

11,7526

***

Dummy 10 kg

1,7487

0,1036

16,8767

***

Dummy Neighbor

-0,3501

0,0752

-4,6585

***

Dummy Periphery and Neighbor

-3,3580

0,4495

-7,4698

***

Dummy Liberalization Year 2009

-0,7271

0,0436

-16,657

***

Domestic Labor Cost

-0,0917

0,0022

-41,208

***

International Labor Cost

0,0032

0,0021

1,5458

Domestic Population Density

-0,0023

0,0001

-21,765

***

International Population Density

-0,0002

0,0001

-1,5114

Online Bilateral Trade Exports

-0,2506

0,3450

-0,7263

Online Bilateral Trade Imports

0,5444

0,3209

1,6964

Dummy France

-1,9621

0,0549

-35,729

***

Dummy UK IPP GLS

0,4658

0,1892

2,4626

*

Dummy UK IPP NonGLS

0,5350

0,2526

2,1181

*

Dummy UK ISP

-5,6971

0,4457

-12,782

***

Degrees of Freedom:

7625

Adjusted R-squared:

0,422

F-statistic

233,7

Table XX. Explaining Relative cross-border price differentials – LETTERS

Explanatory Variable

Estimate

Std. Error

z value

Significance Level

Intercept

3,517

0,058

60,436

***

Dummy Domestic Tracked

-0,572

0,071

-8,025

***

Dummy International Tracked

0,703

0,068

10,383

***

Zoning

0,002

0,054

0,044

Periphery

-0,115

0,091

-1,263

Large Countries

-0,222

0,058

-3,864

***

Premium

-0,502

0,053

-9,429

***

Dummy 0,5 kg

0,204

0,035

5,798

***

Dummy 1 kg

0,598

0,044

13,584

***

Dummy 2 kg

1,405

0,053

26,752

***

Dummy Neighbor

0,204

0,052

3,896

***

Dummy Periphery and Neighbor

-0,241

0,227

-1,060

Dummy Liberalization Year 2009

0,356

0,036

9,921

***

Domestic Labor Cost

-0,087

0,002

-52,950

***

International Labor Cost

0,000

0,001

-0,290

Domestic Population Density

0,001

0,000

10,045

***

International Population Density

0,000

0,000

0,483

Online Bilateral Trade Exports

0,062

0,250

0,248

Online Bilateral Trade Imports

-0,755

0,218

-3,466

***

Dummy France

-0,086

0,043

-2,011

*

Dummy UK

-0,729

0,084

-8,708

***

Degrees of Freedom:

5364

Adjusted R-squared:

0,4851

F-statistic

254,6

Robustness of the model

Given that the data are cross-sectional, we first note that, with an adjusted R-squared for parcels of 42% and an adjusted R-squared for letter of 49%, both regressions give a reasonably good fit of the data. Also, we obtain a better fit for observed cross-border price differentials for letters compared to parcels 42 . . The model controls for multicoleniarity. The model also tries to control for letters and parcels separately since it accepts that many explanatory variables could affect letters and prices differently. Nonetheless many actors affect letters and parcels in the same direction. The results of the analysis were discussed in the context of various meetings with the National Postal Operators. The model results are discussed against the economic theory underpinning its assumptions extensively, in chapter 5 of Annex 5). The results have been examined and found to be consistent with the results of similar studies in the filed i.e.

Civic Consulting for the European Commission, Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and Internet marketing and selling techniques in the retail of goods, 2011

Haller Andreas, Jaag Christian, Trinkner Urs (2013). Termination charges in the international parcel market. In Reforming the Postal Sector in the Face of Electronic Competition. Edited by M. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer, Edward Elgar, pp. 277-293.

Meschi, M., Irving, T. and Gillespie, M., Intra-Community cross-border parcel delivery, FTI Consulting for the European Commission, 2011

Okholm, H. B., Thelle, M. H., Möller, A., Basalisco, B. and Rølmer, S., e-Commerce and,delivery - A study of the state of play of EU parcel markets with particular emphasis on ecommerce, Copenhagen Economics for the European Commission, 2013



Annex 5 – Cross Border delivery market overview

Introduction

This Annex aims to provide a description of the European Courier Express and Parcels markets [hereafter CEP] in general, and the European cross border Courier Express and Parcels markets in particular. In order to do this, we choose to present data from the most recent European studies in this sector, commissioned by the European Commission [hereafter EC], by National Regulatory Authorities [hereafter NRAs], by Postal Operators and associations or research institutions active in this field as well as recent Annual Reports from the largest postal operators.

The market survey also includes data from the annual postal data collection survey 43 launched by the European Commission. The data cover predominantly national postal operators [hereafter NPOs] but also –and to some extent- delivery operators other than the NPOs. We also use raw data from other postal statistical databases [namely UPU 44 , Eurostat 45 and others].

We will summarise the results of two market studies that were commissioned in the course of this Impact Assessment with an aim of analysing the pricing scheme of the cross border CEP products as well as the operational characteristics of the cross border parcel delivery.

We finally present, when appropriate, a summary of the results from the public consultation that was conducted in the course of this Impact Assessment to better inform the analysis with empirical evidence coming from all relevant stakeholders of the CEP environment.

Structure of this Annex

This Annex presents the structure of the E-commerce markets in Europe and provides its links with the delivery markets, which one the focus of this Impact Assessment.

It also describes the economic environment of the European Courier Express and Parcel market. This is followed by a more detailed presentation of the largest CEP markets in Europe [in terms of country territorial coverage], namely Germany, UK, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Belgium. It also presents recent developments that have changed the competitive landscape in this market.

This Annex particularly analyses the basic structure of the cross border segment that is the ultimate focus of this Impact Assessment. It provides an overview of the pricing developments in the CEP markets, as well as of the operational specificities that relate to the various segments of the CEP market.

It touches upon the social and environmental aspects of the CEP market and finally it provides a market outlook, with reference to recent evidence and studies.

Before we begin

In this Annex we will use the term EU CEP market. This refers to delivery services for any collection and delivery of documents and goods provided by any operator (national or private) active in the European Union (EU28) to national and international destinations. It excludes freight and logistics services 46 . However, the definitions related to the CEP markets as well as all estimated figures on important indicators related to this market vary greatly. This is mainly driven by the complexity of the sector, by the different nature of services offered in this market, by the absence of common definitions and by the difficulty in collecting comparable information. To the extent possible, we will provide explanations on the applied definitions that relate to estimates that we will refer to in the course of this presentation. We will present the assumptions taken for the production of the global and EU wide sector figures and we will try to explain the reasons for any conflicting information between studies.

The European E-Commerce Markets

It is clear that the boosting e-commerce activity has been one of the most influential factors that brought about changes in the structure of the CEP markets in Europe as well as globally, and has created new growth potential 47 for the sector. 

E-Commerce Europe 48  believes that the European e-commerce market amounted to € 420 billion in 2015 in value, and grew by 14% compared to 2014. Apex Insight (2015) using compound data from Ecommerce Europe, Eurostat, IMRG, as well as corporate information, estimates that the overall value of internet retailing in 2015 has doubled its size compared to 2009 and is over €370bilion. Europe is the second largest region in the world in terms of e-commerce value right after the Asia Pacific region which is worth more than 580bn Euros in 2015. E Commerce Europe estimate that there are more than 715.000 businesses active online in Europe, which are responsible for the circulation of more than 4 billion parcels annually. IPC 49 (2014) estimates that global e-commerce growth will lead to a 16, 6% annual global increase in revenue at least until 2018, a trend that in Europe will be reaching levels over 12%.

Three European counties account for nearly 60% of the e-commerce total value. As we see from the graph below the distribution of e-commerce activity is quite uneven in Europe. WIK(2014) confirm that the levels of buying and selling online varies considerably between Member States. This demonstrates different levels of development of the e-commerce markets across Europe.

Figure 1 – E-commerce Activity in Europe

 

Although some countries reportedly show low absolute e-commerce turnover, we do see that e-commerce activity overall is rising at impressive annual rates, not only in the developing ecommerce markets but also in the mature ecommerce markets (like the UK for example). The latter demonstrates that there is a hidden growth potential that still remains to be explored.

Figure 2 – E-commerce growth Rates per country

Although at its inception, e-commerce activity was predominantly a domestic business, WIK(2014) report that there is recent evidence that cross border e-commerce is gaining importance in Europe as well as globally. 15% of all European e consumers bought cross border in 2014, which is a significant increase (+25%) compared to 2013. However cross border online purchases still remain small if one compares it with 44% which is the equivalent figure for the online domestic purchases. IPC 50 (2014) estimates that e-commerce activity still remains immature since it accounted to less than 5% of global retail sales in value, in 2013.

Table 1 – cross border share in EU 28

E-commerce Europe concludes that those trends are sufficient to demonstrate that cross border ecommerce could alone be a sufficient driver to influence the development for the ecommerce business around the world. The European Commission estimates that the completion of the Digital Single Market could generate up to €340bn worth of additional growth over ten years and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs. It is estimated that EU consumers could save €11.7bn each year through e-commerce in goods thanks to lower prices and wider choice offered by online shopping 51 .

The links of e-commerce with the CEP delivery markets

Eurostat defines E-commerce as: The sale or purchase of goods or services between businesses whether between businesses, households or private organisations, through electronic transactions conducted via the Internet or other computer mediated networks 52 .

E-commerce Europe 53 defines e-commerce B2C activity as “Any B2C contract regarding the sale of goods and/or services, fully or partly concluded by a technique for distance communication.”

E-commerce markets are highly dependent on the delivery markets when the purchase requires physical delivery to the buyer and/ or allows physical return of the good purchased.

It is also clear that not all e-commerce purchases involving physical goods will lead to actual deliveries. Examples are groceries (supermarkets have naturally their own delivery operations to handle the demand) and two-man delivery (that involves heavy items that are naturally delivered through the freight and logistics sector). Click and Collect type of services bypass parcel statistics as parcels are normally delivered to the retailers distribution network for a direct pick up from the customer 54 .

However, in the cross border ecommerce delivery of physical goods tends to be even more important as overall, consumers seem to be more likely to buy products cross-border goods than services. In a survey among 4,135 European consumers 55 95.5% of experienced cross-border shoppers reported that they had bought a product compared to only 55.8% who reported that they had bought a service.

The figure below according to WIK (2014) provides a simplified illustration of the e-retailers supply chain and indicates the points where delivery requirements are involved in the ecommerce value chain.

Figure 3 – e-retailer's stylised supply chain

The World Bank highlights that the importance of good logistics performance for economic growth is now established 56 . E-commerce activity affects predominantly the B2C segment of the CEP sector, as it will be defined in the sections beelow. Pure B2B e-commerce also exists, but it is highly automated in nature, following perhaps the patterns of traditional B2B logistics operations and certainly without facing the challenges met in B2C e-commerce 57 , described in the section that follows 58 .

The IPC in their global postal industry report of 2014, believe that in the baseline of e-commerce developments postal operators are expected to benefit from the positive ecommerce trends. E-commerce flows in and around Europe should account for 25% of postal revenues in 2025.

The barriers to cross border e-commerce

Delivery related barriers are considered, amongst many others, an obstacle for both e-retailers and consumers, hindering their participation in e-commerce growth, particularly cross-border.

Retailers often complain about a lack of transparency in information about cross border delivery, the lack of inter-operability between the different operators typically involved and the excessive costs of low volume shipments. These problems make it difficult for e-retailers to offer to their final consumers a satisfying e-commerce experience. On cross-border prices, studies show that listed tariffs for cross-border parcel delivery charged by national postal operators are estimated to be two to five times higher than domestic prices 59 . University of St Louis, in a recent study commissioned for the European Commission also confirmed that cross border parcel list prices tend to be almost 5 times as high as their domestic equivalent 60 (for details see chapter 8). A recent Eurobarometer on obstacles to cross border e-commerce, found that out of all companies interviewed who currently do not sell online but are currently trying to do so, 62% find delivery costs an obstacle 61 .

To better interpret those results, one has to take into account that according to Eurostat data it is estimated that although over 296.631 62 enterprises are active in e-commerce and distance selling business in EU28 in 2012 only 220 of those companies are not SMEs.

Figure 4: Number of e-commerce and distance selling business per employment segment: SBS Statistics

Source: Eurostat: Distributive trades by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, G) [sbs_sc_dt_r2]

Figure 5: Average turnover of e-commerce and distance selling business per employment segment: SBS Statistics

Source: Eurostat: Distributive trades by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, G) [sbs_sc_dt_r2], own calculations

Non SMES retailers are often established in well-connected central European countries as illustrated in the map below.

Figure 5a: Where are the 220 non SME online and distance selling e-retailers established?

Source: Eurostat: Distributive trades by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, G) (sbs_sc_dt_r2)

NACE_R2

Retail trade not in stores, stalls or markets

INDIC_SB

Number of enterprises

SIZE_EMP

250 persons employed or more

The recent survey of online consumers on DSM obstacles 63 indicates that indeed concerns with respect to various delivery aspects were amongst the top consumer concerns in relation to purchasing online cross-border (27% high delivery costs, 24% high return shipping costs, 23% long delivery times, 15% non-delivery). Amongst online buyers who reported their most recent problem(s) when purchasing a tangible good/offline service in the last 12 months cross border within the EU, long delivery times (the highest ranked consumer problem overall) was reported by 14% of respondents (by 24% of those shopping outside the EU), while non-delivery and delivery of the wrong product were reported by 13% and 12% of respondents respectively (by 25% and 13% of those shopping outside the EU respectively).

Copenhagen Economics. 64 (2013) found after conducting a survey among 3000 e-shoppers that problems related to delivery are a key reason for not buying online. Delivery related problems are responsible for 68% of the situations where e-shoppers have abandoned their shopping charts before finalizing their order. The primary problem, according to Copenhagen Economics is that e-shoppers face suddenly unexpectedly high delivery costs and that delivery times are considered to be too long. In general e-shoppers have reported dissatisfaction levels at a rate of 38%, fact that could influence their decisions to continue buying online.

ComScore (2014) in a survey conducted on behalf of UPS also highlighted the problems created by the delivery related barriers on the overall e-commerce activity. They also confirmed CE(2013) finding that more than 58% of consumers have abandoned their shopping carts due to high shipping costs and 50% was due to long delivery times. According to ComScore (2014) high shipping costs was the most common reason for abandoning the online purchase 65 .

Copenhagen Economics, in their report on E-commerce and delivery identified three layers of barriers that relate to delivery. A first set of inefficiencies are created by information gaps, in the sense that consumers and e-retailers do not have access to adequate information to inform their decisions on the online transactions (15% of the consumer have abandoned their shopping cars because information was not clear enough). Service gaps are the second problematic area in relation to delivery. Service gaps occur as the service offer from the delivery operators is not meeting users needs, especially as regards convenience of the delivery experience and returns, as well as the affordability of the delivery service. The last set of gaps related to the delivery are performance gaps in the sense that delivery operators and e-retailers do not always manage to fulfil their contractual obligations in terms of quality of service (delivery times, home delivery etc.), problems mainly resulting from operational inefficiencies in the delivery leg.

These barriers have already been highlighted by the European Commission in the Green Paper on an integrated delivery market to boost e-commerce in the EU 66 and in the Commission’s roadmap for completing the single market for parcel delivery 67 . In these documents, the Commission analyses the delivery related obstacles around five areas of potential inefficiency: lack of information, high costs for low volume cross border shipping, delivery services which do not meet the consumer needs, and lack of interoperability between the different delivery operators involved in cross-border delivery. Cross-border delivery has been also identified as a main priority in the Digital Single Market communication published on 6 May 2015 68 .

In the sections that follow we present the CEP sector in Europe, and give emphasis to the B2C and also the cross border segments of the sector as, according to the analysis above, those segments seem to be particularly dependent on and affected by the trends and the dynamics we observe in the e-commerce markets. We nevertheless do not ignore the B2B and the domestic part of the operations, as analysts agree that is still relevant also for both e-commerce operational activities, as well as for today's market reality of delivery operators.

The European Postal Sector

The CEP market is identified as a distinct segment that naturally belongs in the postal and courier activities sector (postal sector for this analysis) 69 . In EU28 in 2011, together with the letter post segment of the market they are responsible for a total of € 94bn of turnover, and 91 billion of shipments 70 and for a total employment that is estimated to reach 1.5m employees 71 .

Between 2007 and 2011 the value of the EU postal sector decreased slightly from EUR 94 billion to EUR 91 billion (now accounting for 0.71% of EU27 GDP). However this decline is mainly caused by the decline in the demand for letter post services. Therefore, according to WIK (2013) 72 , in 2011 it was already the turning point where the structure of the sector had changed. Today the CEP market is responsible for more than half of the postal sector's turnover in Europe.

Figure 6 - Changes in the Composition of the European postal sector (2007 and 2011)

Source: WIK-Consult, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), p163. Based on WIK survey and WIK-Consult and ITA Consulting, Evolution of the European Postal Market since 1997 and AT Kearney, Europe's CEP Market: Growth on New Terms.

According to data from Eurostat 73 , in Europe there are over 296.000 companies active in the postal and courier sector, the vast majority of those being SMEs, with less than 450 companies employing more than 250 persons.

Figure 7: Number of postal and courier companies per employment segment: SBS Statistics

Source: Eurostat: (NACE Rev. 2, h53) [sbs_sc_1b_se_r2], own calculation's

The European CEP Market

There is no commonly agreed definition among researchers for the CEP sector nor is there any standard way for measuring the sector's market size. Relevant market size estimates produce total market sizes ranging from 37-53.5 bn Euros.

A.T. Kearney (2015) 74  estimates the size of the CEP sector to be about 43.1bn Euros. They estimate that the total shipments related to the CEP market in 2011 account to 5.4 bn items 75 . WIK (2013) believes that the sector's market size is considerably less (37bn Euros) 76  in 2011 and that the sector is responsible for a total of 6.5bn shipments. La Poste (Annual Report, 2013) 77 estimates the CEP market to be 42.8bn Euros 78 . Apex Insight (2015) 79 believes that the European parcels market was over €53.5 billion in size in 2014 80 . CE (2013) 81 estimate that the European CEP market in in 2011 was valued at 46bn Euros. BCG 82 (2012) estimates that the total CEP market (domestic European and cross border combined) is 37bn using however data of 2010, and estimated this total to be responsible for the 20% of the global CEP market 83 . According to Apex Insight (2015), in most of the European counties, the parcels markets represents between 0, 3% and 0, 5% of GDP.

Effigy 84 (2013) identifies Germany UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands to be responsible for about 75% of the EU total CEP market (that according to their estimates reaches 42b Euros. The other countries follow with shares below 5%.

Figure 8 – European CEP Market in Value 85

WIK (2013) building up on AT Kearney (2012) estimations, presents the following distribution in the EU:

Figure 9 – Structure of the European Parcel and Express market by Country

Independently of the estimation of the absolute CEP market size (that of course it is largely dependent on the countries participating in the market definition and the scope of products each definition includes), all studies confirm that the total CEP market is experiencing a growth in the last years that ranges from 3.2% 86 - 5.7% 87 in value and 4.8% 88 - 6% 89 in volume. This continuous annual growth helped the market to restore the market size to levels prior to those before economic downturn already in 2010, and as from then, the sector maintains a positive outlook 90 . The three largest countries in terms of CEP turnover remain Germany the UK and France, followed by Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. According to WIK (2013) the Western European countries are responsible for 86% of CEP parcel volumes in the EU. A focused country by country presentation of the largest CEP countries will follow in the next sections.

Apex Insight (2015) reports the following growth rates for the EU28 as well as for the important national markets in the EU.

Figure 10: CAGR for the EU28 between 2009-2014

46.3bn

44.8bn

CAGR 2009-2014

Revenue EUR billion

Source: Apex Insight, European Parcels: Market Insight Report 2015. Key shows CAGR 2009-2014.

The competitive landscape of the European CEP Market

The competitive landscape in the European CEP Market is quite fragmented and largely dependent on the business segment each operator focuses on. More information on which operators serve exactly what segment of the market will follow on the analytical country and operator presentation, in the sections that follow. However, in this introductory chapter, we can already identify the main categories of players (operators) of the European CEP markets:

1) International Integrators (DHL Express, TNT Express, UPS and FedEx): This term is meant to describe those delivery operators that are able to provide time/ day definite domestic and cross border end-to-end 91 delivery services mainly either through an owned (integrated) network or a network where the company has full operational control that (predominantly) uses air freight based transportation systems, but also complimentary ground operations.

2) National Postal operators (NPOs): This term describes the national (former incumbent) postal operators, that are offering letter as well as parcel services- (predominantly but not exclusively) in the country where they are operating (Royal Mail in the UK, La Poste in FR, Deutsche Post in DE, Correos in ES, Poste Italianne in IT etc.). Those companies are typically subject to universal service type of obligations (that are meant to ensure the provision of letter as well as parcel services to a certain quality standards at the national and cross border level). On top of this they often offer additional (value-added) services in their territory and/ or outside;

In the table below, we present the list of the 28 National Postal Operators established in the European Member states as well as in the EEA/ EFTA countries.

Table 2 – National Postal Operators in EU28 and EEA/ EFTA

Company

Country

Website

Österreichische Post AG

Austria

https://www.post.at/

bpost

Belgium

https://www.bpost.be/  

Bulgarian Posts plc

Bulgaria

http://www.bgpost.bg/  

Hrvatska pošta d.d.

Croatia

http://www.posta.hr/  

Cyprus Post

Cyprus

http://www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/postal/dps.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument

Ceská Pošta

Czech Republic

https://www.ceskaposta.cz/en/index  

Eesti Post

Estonia

www.post.ee

Posti Group Corporation

Finland

http://www.posti.com/

La Poste

France

www.laposte.fr

Deutsche Post AG

Germany

https://www.deutschepost.de/de.html  

Hellenic Post - ELTA S.A.

Greece

http://www.elta.gr/en-us/home.aspx  

Magyar Posta

Hungary

https://www.posta.hu/  

Islandspóstur hf

Iceland

http://www.postur.is/en/  

An Post - General Post Office

Ireland

http://www.anpost.ie/AnPost/

Poste Italiane S.p.A.

Italy

http://www.posteitaliane.post/english/index.shtml  

Latvijas Pasts

Latvia

https://www.pasts.lv/en/

Liechtensteinische Post AG

Liechtenstein

https://www.post.li/  

AB Lietuvos paštas

Lithuania

http://www.post.lt/en/  

Post Luxembourg

Luxembourg

https://www.post.lu/en/  

MaltaPost p.l.c.

Malta

http://www.maltapost.com/  

PostNL

Netherlands

http://www.postnl.com/  

Posten Norge AS

Norway

http://www.posten.no/en/  

Poczta Polska

Poland

http://www.poczta-polska.pl/  

CTT - Correios de Portugal, S.A.

Portugal

https://www.ctt.pt/home/index.html  

Poșta Română

Romania

http://www.posta-romana.ro/posta-romana.html  

Slovenská pošta, a. s.

Slovak Republic

http://www.posta.sk/en  

Pošta Slovenije, d.o.o.

Slovenia

http://www.posta.si/  

Correos y Telégrafos S.A.

Spain

http://www.correos.es/ss/Satellite/site/pagina-inicio/info  

PostNord AB

Sweden

http://www.postnord.com/  

Swiss Post

Switzerland

https://www.post.ch/en/private  

Royal Mail Group Ltd.

United Kingdom

http://www.royalmailgroup.com/  

Some of the biggest national postal operators have developed pan-European networks (either predominantly road based: Geopost, a subsidiary of La Poste- FR, GLS a subsidiary of Royal Mail -UK DHL Parcel, a business division of Deutsche Post-DHL -DE- or, predominantly air-freight based: DHL Express, a business division of Deutsche Post DHL- DE). Through these networks those operators are able to offer delivery services in Europe (and sometimes outside Europe).

Other national postal operators have built up regional networks that enable them to offer delivery services in this specific region. PostNord AB –SE&DK, through is business division Posten Logistic, offers services in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. PostNL–NL, offers delivery services directly in Belgium and the Netherlands. CTT Correios –PT, offer services in Portugal and Spain (via its subsidiary Tourline Express) and Eesti Post –EE, offers delivery services in the entire Baltic Region 92 .

Irrespectively of the direct international coverage they are able to offer, all national postal operators offer cross border delivery services within the framework of international or bilateral agreements with other partner national postal operators 93 .

Table below summarises the role of the national postal operator in the overall CEP markets in the EU. According to WIK(2013) the national postal operator accounts on average for about 20% of the corresponding national CEP markets. However this level is explained by their important role in the B2C segment of the mainly domestic market than by their role the B2B business segment (and B2B cross border segment in particular) where express operators draw their market power from.

Table 3 - _ Market Share of Universal Service Providers in Domestic Parcel and Express Markets (2011)

<10% market share

10-20% market share

>20% market share

Bulgarian Post (BG)

Cyprus Post (CY)

ELTA (EL)

Correos (ES)

Polish Post (PL)

CNPR Compania Nationala Posta Româna (RO)

bpost (BE)

Croatian Post (HR)

An Post (IE)

Poste Italiane (IT)

Lithuanian Post (LT)

Latvijas Pasts (LV)

MaltaPost (MT)

Österreichische Post (AT)

Česká pošta (CZ)

Deutsche Post DHL (DE)

PostDanmark/PostNord (DK)

Eesti Post (EE)

Itella (FI)

La Poste (FR)

Magyar Posta (HU)

PostNL (NL)

CTT Correios (PT)

Posten/PostNord (SE)

Slovenian Post (SI)

Slovenska Posta (SK)

Royal Mail Group (UK)

Source: WIK-Consult, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), p239

Although the NPOs where traditionally optimising their business operations to serve the letter mail segment, according to a survey conducted form BCG 94 using IPC data, it is expected that until 2017, the parcel business (after the NPOs having followed a targeted strategy) will outweigh (in terms of value) the letter mail business for most European national operators. From a predominately letter mail delivery business, as from 2107 all national postal operators are highly likely to be transformed into a parcel delivery business 95 .

Figure 11 – Reaching the parcels vs. the mail tipping point

Source: BCG (2012)

3) Express and Courier Operators with predominantly domestic presence: Apart from the operators above, we identify a number of medium-sized CEP operators (eg. Hermes - DE, Yodel – UK, Nightline –IE, MRW –ES etc.), who focus on the domestic and/ or cross border CEP services (but often not via their privately owned cross border delivery network). In addition to this, it needs to be noted that some alternative letter mail providers, traditionally optimising their networks to offer delivery letter mail services (eg. UniPost- ES, Sandd-NL) they are also expanding their business operations to cover parts of the CEP business 96 , exactly as NPOs do, as we explained in the previous paragraph.

4) Alternative business models

Now that e-commerce presents a growing importance, and the need for cheaper B2C Delivery solutions becames more obvious than ever, alternative business modes have been steadily developing integrating the delivery and e-retailer world, with the aim to offer tailor made delivery solutions at prices that are more affordable for both the e-retailer and the final consumer. Parcel consolidators offer an alternative business model to the CEP business. They have wholesale agreements with operators where the parcels originate (often with more than one operator ath the time) and offer to their customers (e-retailers in our case) the most appropriate solution what suites their individual needs. Parcel consolidators are present in the large CEP markets. FTI (2011) reports that they are not present in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Luxembourg. Examples according to CE(2012) are: courier express, BTB Mailflight, IMX, my-ship.it etc., Parcel brokers are offering cheap delivery rates by re-buying slots in bulk and reselling them according to demand. Examples of parcel brokers in the EU are: Interparcel, , Parcelmonkey etc 97 . Fourth Party logistic providers offer to their customers full integration and logistics fulfilment services. Examples according to CE(2012) are PFS Europe, Katoennatie, CEVA Logsitics etc. Software Solution Provides provide e-retailers and delivery operators with software solutions that can improve efficiency, which can include EDI, tracing, labelling, push notifications to recipients etc. Examples of those service providers are MetaPack, GFS, EDI – soft etc 98 .

The competitive landscape of the Global CEP market

The global competitive landscape according to BCG(2012) using however 2010 market data, and excluding the growing DHL Parcel division of Deutsche Post and the equivalent one for Post NL, as well as ColiPost for the domestic FR market, when comparing Europe with the other geographical regions in other parts of the world gives a comparable, though not identical environment. In general, in Europe, National Postal Operators are stronger in their national CEP markets than their foreign counterparts (the global estimate is at 14%, yet in Europe, the figure raises to 25 99 %). Another observation is that in Europe, there is more pluralism, with more operators being active in number (and value) in the various CEP segments creating a complicated, therefore more fragmented, competitive landscape, that what we observe outside Europe.

Figure 12 – the global competitive landscape of the CEP market

Source BCG(2012)



Market Segmentation

As it is often mentioned in related research 100 , it is very difficult (often artificial) to segment the CEP market, given the heterogeneous nature of the sector and the observation that –especially nowadays- customer and product segments are often blurred due to the continuous transformation of the CEP competitive environment to meet the changing consumer preferences that in many instances converge.

Nonetheless, for the sake of the analysis we present segmentation that is relevant for our analysis, following the traditional way to study the CEP market.:

By product

A first criterion for segmentation is per product, which can divide the market into the following segments:

Standard- ordinary parcel services 101  

Ordinary parcels 102 are defined as items normally containing merchandise and sent by a standard/ordinary service, i.e. non-express and non-courier 103 , and are carried by the designated USP or other postal operators. An average delivery time of this service can be 24-72 hours, that can be longer for cross border shipments, however the delivery time is not guaranteed. Those services can be a part of universal service specifications.

Other services

Deferred delivery services: in the boundaries between a typical ordinary parcel and a value added parcel, we can find the deferred parcel product. Usually transferred through a ground based network, a deferred parcel is usually picked up before 6pm for delivery in principle by the next working day before 6 pm for a domestic delivery, however, delivery times are not guaranteed.

Express delivery service:

According to La Poste Annual Report (2013) an express product is picked-up before 6 pm for delivery the next day before noon or 1 pm, in the national territory. This service is subject to various levels of guarantees depending on the operator and on the specific service/ product offered.

According to a report commissioned by the Express Delivery Association for Oxford Economics (2010) the express services include value-added, door-to-door transport and deliveries of next day or time-definite shipments across the globe 104 . Time definite shipments normally incur a transit time of less than 1 day within Europe, and between 2 to 5 days for extra-EU shipments, depending on distance.

According to the Glossary for Postal statistics 105  express services are services featuring, in addition to greater speed and reliability in the collection, distribution, and delivery of items, all or some of the following supplementary facilities: guarantee of delivery by a fixed date; collection from point of origin; personal delivery to addressee; possibility of changing the destination and address in transit; confirmation to sender of receipt of the item dispatched; monitoring and tracking of items dispatched; personalised service for customers and provision of an à la carte service, as and when required. Customers are in principle prepared to pay a higher price for this service. It can contain any postal item (the distinction with freight transportation is made in consideration of the upper limits for parcels).

According to CE (2012) 106 the express segment of the market represents roughly a 14% of deliveries in the total CEP market. It usually focuses on B2B shipments (and notably the international ones). According to AT Kearney 107 (2012), the express segment is normally stronger in countries with poor quality of standard services, in remote areas, as well as in areas with high share of volumes originating from non-EU countries.

Courier services:

A specific categorisation of the CEP market is courier services. According to the DHL Logbook 108 "Courier services transport spontaneously sent shipments that are highly valuable - e.g., watches, jewellery, and high-quality replacement parts. Characteristic features are permanent personal supervision of the shipment and the courier’s access to the shipment at any time in order to make arrangements. Another feature is that couriers provide seamless transport and delivery documentation. The shipments usually weigh an average of 1.5 kilograms. For national shipments, delivery is usually made on the same day or by 10 a.m. on the following day. The market consists of many small companies. Courier services are available both nationally and internationally". Courier services are not necessarily regarded as postal services in some MS and are often excluded from the legal act 109 .

According to ERGP (2015) "Report on the Courier, Express and Parcels Market" most countries in their regulatory framework define weight thresholds to distinguish the postal, the CEP and the freight sector; however these weight steps are not always aligned nor consistent across countries. In addition, the legal definitions of the CEP products -inspired by the regulatory framework of each country- also vary.

By Customer

A second level breakdown for market segmentation is the nature of the sender and recipient. This breaking down the market according to the nature of the parcel flow:

from business to a private individual (B2C);

from business to another business (B2B);

from private individuals to private individuals (C2C);

from private individuals to professionals (C2B).

The segmentation presented above is of course relevant in the sense that the volumes related to specific customer groups as well as the prices each consumer group is likely to pay is closely dependent on the customer category. Other categorisations involve additional breakdowns (like C2G, i.e. citizen to governments, and vice versa) which however are not directly relevant to the analysis with which this Annex is engaged.

According to Effigy Consulting (2013) 110 the B2B vs.B2C balance per country is mapped as follows:

Figure 13- European CEP Market in Value: B2B and B2C overview 111

 

According to La Poste (2014) B2B continues to account for the major share with 70% in relation to B2C in terms of value. According to CE (2012) 112 however, in terms of volumes the picture is reversed: B2B shipments are responsible for nearly 30% of the total shipments in Europe when B2C volumes are about 60% of the total. C2X volumes account for the remainder.

Table 4 - Main alternative operators active in domestic and cross-border B2C delivery

Main alternative operators active in domestic and cross-border B2C delivery

Note:    Only a subset of operators is included in the table. Number of operators in each are potentially larger and/or with limited scope. Multinational operators UPS, DHL, TNT Express, FedEx (Integrators) serve most countries, also for domestic deliveries.

Source:    Copenhagen Economics, NRA questionnaire and desk research

Although within the B2C segment external competition has developed throughout the years, the national postal operator (especially in the largest European CEP markets) continues to play a very important role in this segment. Exploiting the domestic national coverage and the combined delivery networks for letter and parcels in the rural areas (co-production), the former incumbents reach market shares in the B2C segment which exceed 50% in many European countries. Characteristic examples of this observation are Austrian Post, Post NL holds over 70% of the domestic B2C market, Deutsche Post-DE over 50% and French La Poste about 60%. Of course this dominance is not global, and the geographical location plays a role. WIK(2013) observes that although in the western part of Europe, former incumbents are strong in the national B2C market, in the southern and eastern EU countries, not only is the presence of the NPO in the B2C segment small but also that the B2C segment itself is small in relative and absolute terms. CE (2012) estimates that on average the market share of NPOs in the B2C segment is 35% (compared to a total of 27% in the total CEP market). An analytical presentation of the national postal operators' competitive position in the countries' competitive landscape will be presented in the sections that follow. In any event Copenhagen Economics reveal that out of all those shipments, roughly 35% fall under the Universal Service Area where certain requirements apply 113 .

Regarding the type of products the B2C segment covers, it is generally acknowledged that B2C types of deliveries involve the standard (deferred) type of shipments at levels that reach about 90% in total, when the express related deliveries (in the meaning of time definite) in the B2C segment are confined to only 10% of the total 114 .

According to Effigy (2013) the top 10 European operators covering the B2C segment are the following, in terms of value and volume respectively. They either draw their power from the domestic segment and/ or the international segment.

Figure –14 European CEP Market in Value: Top 10 B2C Players across Europe – Relative Size 115

Apex insight (2015) reports that the CEP market leaders are the postal operators of the largest three countries (i.e. Germany France and the UK), including their express subsidiaries. The integrators follow with FedEx being the weakest of all. The total market owned by this leading group accounts for two thirds of the total CEP market in Europe leaving a non-negligible 1/3 to the smaller national operators and the independent carriers.

Statista (2012) reports that the share of the NPOs in the total B2C market reaches a maximum of 10% of the total segment in terms of volumes.

Figure 15: B2C market share of parcel services in Europe (by number of packages delivered in 2011) 116

Source: Statista (2012)

By Geographic Area

On that basis, the geographical segmentation can divide the market into the following areas:

Domestic CEP service

This describes the situation when both the sending operator and the receiving customer (individual or business) are based in the same country (individual or business).

Cross border CEP Service

In this segment one could envisage a further breakdown – relevant for an EU type of analysis- into intra and extra EU. It describes a situation when the sending operator and the final recipient customer (individual or business) are not residing in the same country.

According to CE (2012) 117 cross border deliveries account for 15% of total volumes, 80% of which are shipments within the EU.

The international market is concentrated. According to AT Kearney (2012) 118 the integrators alone (DHL Express, TNT Express, FedEX, and UPS account for 87% of the international express markets), a trend that is likely to continue in view of the announcement of the potential merger between TNT and FedEx 119 . The share of network players in international standard is estimated at 52% in 2012 120 .

Figure 16 – Breakdown of Europe's CEP market by country

 

WIK(2013) 121 also stipulate that although express services only account for one quarter of domestic shipments in cross-border market segments, express accounts for more than half of the shipments.

In small countries cross border parcel & express services are more important than in large countries (e.g. in the Netherlands and Belgium compared to Germany and U.K.).

In terms of volumes, international express shipments, according to WIK(2013) outperformed domestic parcel & express business 122 , although regarding the total CEP market, domestic shipments still account for approximately 70 % of total revenues and approximately 90 % of volume in the total European parcel & express market.

Figure 17 – Domestic vs. cross border parcel and express services (2011)

Cross-border parcel & express services are still dominated by B2B shipments. A.T. Kearney estimated that B2C accounted for more than 90 % of domestic volumes but only 10 % of cross-border volumes in 2010. The B2C segment however is experiencing a tangible and steady growth overall which we will further explore in the sections that follow. However, this relatively low share of cross-border B2C volume reflects the comparatively lower importance of cross-border distance selling (ecommerce + catalogue) compared to its role in national markets 123 , a trend however that it is expected to change if one takes into account the developments in ecommerce activity presented briefly in the introductory chapter of this Annex and explained in the section that follows 124 .



Trends

There is nothing more constant than change and this particularly true for the global CEP markets. In the last years European delivery operators have experienced a constant pressure to transform their operations, to meet the changing consumer needs, to better respond to the pressure for efficiency and technological improvements, and of course to adapt in the global economic and commercial context. In this environment a key role has been playing the take up of ecommerce which created in turn a need for efficient, better, cheaper and more accessible B2C delivery services, both domestically and cross border. The B2C high-cost low-margin cross border parcel, from an unattractive business segment became the focus in the operational transformations of national postal operators and network operators alike.

There are three main observable trends that most analysts highlight in their recent studies on the European CEP (as well as global) markets:

A trend towards transforming business operations to target the B2C segment 

An increase in the demand for cross border CEP delivery services (both B2B and B2C)

An increase in the demand for lower value (standard and/ or deferred) and an equivalent shift of the focus from the express segment of the market equally for the B2B and for the B2C segment.

According to CE (2012) 125 60% of all B2C volumes (and about 2bn items in 2011 126 ) are related to Ecommerce, a percentage that increases to 68% when we zoom in on the best ecommerce performing countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, UK, Germany, and the Netherlands.

According to AT Kearney 127 the cross border segment showed growth figures higher than the domestic CEP one (8% in volume and 6% in revenue vs. 6% in volume and 3% in revenue) between 2009 and 2011. In addition, emerging markets (like the Polish market) show bigger growth rates and growth potentials compared to the more mature CEP ones (UK/ DE/ FR) both domestically as well as internationally.

Figure 18 – Domestic versus International revenue growth by country

Source: AT Keyrney (2013)

In addition, according to the same study, most European countries are experiencing stronger growth in the non-express segment of the market than in the express one (in particular in the domestic segment but also cross border). Cross border B2C shipments are expected to grow by an average of 12% per year (although in 2011 they accounted for only about 10% of the total CEP market in terms of volumes). Network players (FedEx, TNT Express, DHL, UPS) have managed in view of this evolution to rise their combined market share in the international standard (deferred) segment to 52%.

BCG (2012) 128 in their study confirm that the cross border, B2C standard (low cost) part of the market is increasing, being the focus of the strategy of many national postal operators and also alternative delivery operators. As a result, the projected growth in the total value of parcel delivery business attributed to ecommerce only is 7% at a compound average rate, and is estimated to grow until 2020, with the same pace. It is also highlighted that the revenue from relatively higher weight parcels (above 2 kg) is expected to grow in the expense of the revenue generated form parcels below 2kg. WIK (2013) quoting GeoPost related research 129 also states that the B2C segment is expected to grow at higher rates than the B2B segments (6-8% vs. 2% respectively) estimating that by 2020 30% of total B2C parcel trips will be across the borders.

Figure 19 – e-commerce reacted parcel revenue per weight category

Source: BCG (2012)

According to the same analysis, the B2C segment of the market is 25% of the total CEP value [but 56% in terms of volume according to CE (2012)], leaving the remaining 75% of total value to the (still growing) B2B segment (which is less than 30% of the total in terms of volume according to CE (2012 130 ) a segment that still shows growth however at a slower pace (of 4% of annual growth).

The same study shows that the low value B2B segment holds a share of 55% within the total B2B segment. That means that part of the B2B market, traditionally served by the high-value express operations, could instead be served by a slower and lower value but equally reliable delivery service.

Network operators (integrators) have developed their offer of international low(er) value services to reach a combined market share of 52%, as previously stated. BCG (2012) considers that a traditional postal operator business might be better placed to service this "new" low-value B2B segment of the market, due to its network structure and existing product offer.

Effigy (2013) reports that the domestic CEP market has been growing faster in volume (+4.5%) than in value (+3.1%). This is mostly due to the B2C development with a lower profit margin. This effect is even stronger on the International Intra EU segment with a volume growth of +7.2% versus a value growth of 4.6% due to expanding cross-border e-commerce activities (that produce standard/ deferred type of shipments).

Market Response to changing consumer needs

Against this background of continuous ecommerce growth, operators are trying to respond to the changes in the market conditions and in consumer preferences. Total internet retailing nas now reached 400bn in value, showing growth rates of 15% 131 , which create in turn a growing demand for delivery services. According to Ecommerce Europe's statistics, the value of e-commerce in Europe in 2015 accounts for 430bn Euros in Europe and is translated to over 4 billion parcel items annually 132 .

Operators are designing new delivery services and creating innovative strategies to cover the B2C market segment with an aim to improve the delivery experience for the final individual consumers. Two general trends illustrate this trend:

The creation of innovative services and targeted marketing strategies to meet the needs of the B2C segment, especially with respect to the delivery (and return) experience.

A trend towards optimising network operations (through mergers and strategic alliances) on the cross border deferred segment in particular, with an aim to cut down costs.

In the paragraphs below we will be presenting very briefly some illustrative examples of the trends mentioned above:

Innovative Products

UPS launches MyChoice 133  

In 2013 UPS launched the innovative service “My choice” enabling users to stay up to date with proactive Delivery Alerts (text, email, and voice) and to know when parcels will arrive, and in most instances, providing an estimated delivery time. “MyChoice” offers apart from delivery real time information the possibility to reroute the shipment to a new destination or to a UPS delivery point.

DPD launches “Follow My Parcel” 134

With this service DPD is able to provide parcel recipients with a one hour delivery window, notified by SMS and email. It also includes a re-routing option en-route. if the customer prefers to receive the consignment in an alternative delivery date, if they opt for delivery to a nominated neighbour, if they prefer to have the parcel left in a specified place or even collect the parcel from a local DPD Pick up Shop.

Royal Mail & text messaging 135

Royal Mail has launched a free-of-charge mail and SMS delivery notification services to help online retailers keep their shoppers updated on the delivery of their goods to contract customers or on items delivered via tracked services 136 .

Industry Initiative taken by the National Postal Operators

In response to the requirements of the EC Green paper “An integrated parcel delivery market for the growth of e-commerce in the EU”, and also in an attempt to accelerate the development of new services and solutions for cross-border delivery in the context of e-commerce, NPOs (within the collaborative platform of IPC and with Post Europe 137 ), have developed a set of lightweight parcel products and improved delivery services addressing the cross border segment of the market. This project is currently work-in-progress and will be covered separately in this Impact Assessment.

Alternative delivery streams

In an effort to improve delivery experience and provide more convenient solutions to consumer and reduce the instances of unsuccessful delivery, operators elaborated on the concept of alternative delivery streams. In most of the cases operators invest in building delivery networks in their domestic territory although several of them have been expanding in other countries.

DHL’s Packstation network:

This network established by Deutsche post/ DHL provides automated booths for self-service collection of parcels and oversize letters as well as self-service dispatch of parcels 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Packstation started as a pilot project in 2001 and was quickly expanded. By November 2011 there were 2500 Packstation machines in Germany 138 .

Austrian Post's Post24-Station 139  

The Austrian Postal Service introduced a virtually identical service called Post.24-Station in November 2006. In Vienna, Stations have been installed in supermarkets, petrol stations, and post offices that can easily be reached by public transport. WIK (2013) report that in 2010 there were 24 parcel stations in Vienna.

Smartpost’s self-service parcel terminals in Finland 140  

A company called SmartPOST runs a network of self-service parcel terminals in Finland and Estonia. The terminals are located in shopping centres and other public premises. They enable clients to send and receive parcels and pay for them at the collection point.

Network Rail’s Doddle service in the UK

Doddle is a new parcel service with stores based in railway stations and major hubs across Britain. Currently there are 32 train station locations and the number is still growing 141 .

In Post Network of Lockers (Poland)

InPost parcel lockers are currently the biggest network in the world enabling its clients to send and collect parcels 24/7. So far, over 3 500 parcel lockers have been launched in Poland and on global markets 142 .

Homepaq’ and ‘Citypaq’ (Spain)

‘Homepaq’ is a new service rolled put by Correos Group in Spain that aims to provide more convenient parcel delivery services by providing free installation of an automated terminal in resident communities, for sending and receiving packages 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In 2015, Correos intends to install the first ‘Citypaq’ boxes (similar to ‘Homepaq’ boxes but with a greater capacity) in underground and train stations, transport interchanges and other highly frequented public places facilitating the collection of packages.

According to WIK (2013) apart from delivery operators parcel lockers are also being rolled out by several retailers (the most prominent of which being Amazon).

Table 5 - Number of Parcel stations per operator

Amazon: Undisclosed number of parcel locker stations in the UK (2013).

BPM-Luxembourg: 5 parcel locker stations in Luxembourg.

Bpost: Plans to install 150 to 200 parcel locker stations in Belgium (2010).

ByBox: 1,500 parcel locker stations in the UK (2012). Operation of parcel locker stations in the Republic of Ireland, France and the Benelux.

Deutsche Post / DHL: 2,500 parcel locker stations in Germany (2013). 3 parcel lockers as pilot project in Switzerland.

Estonia Post: 22 parcel locker stations in Latvia (29 planned) and 114 in the Baltic states.

Itella: 38 parcel locker stations in Finland (2010).

Kouzelna Almara: 15 parcel locker stations (100 planned by end of 2013) in the Czech Republic.

La Poste: 31 parcel locker stations in France (2010). 3 pilot projects for returns in France (2012)

lnPost: 650 parcel locker stations in Poland. 400 parcel locker stations in Russia. 200 parcel locker stations in the Ukraine. 100 parcel locker stations in in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 170 parcel locker stations in Ireland (in cooperation with Nightline). Plan to install 2,000 parcel locker stations in the UK by the end of 2013.

Norway Post: 42 parcel locker stations in Norway (2010).

P&T Luxembourg: 12 parcel locker stations in Luxembourg.

Post Danmark: 102 parcel locker stations in Denmark (2010). 300 new parcel locker stations planned by end of 2013.

Österreichische Post: 24 parcel locker stations in Vienna (2010).

PostNL: 3 parcel locker stations as test project started in 2012.

Swiss Post: Plan to install 40 parcel locker stations by the end of 2014.

Source: WIK desk research, 2013.

Consigned delivery of GeoPost (France)

According to the Annual Report of LaPost (2014) in January 2014, GeoPost signed an agreement with Neopost ID to set up and operate an automatic and secure consigned delivery network for delivering and returning parcels in France. An initial rollout of 1,500 consignment points has been scheduled up for 2016, followed by the installation of 3,000 consignment points over the longer term. The agreement provides for setting up a joint venture, Packcity France, which will be jointly owned by GeoPost and Neopost, while the consignment points will be operated under the Packcity brand.

DPD Parcel Network in UK

According to IPC Flash Report, DPD will launch a UK parcel shop network with up to 2,500 locations under the PickUp brand in June 2015 to step up its expansion in the fast-growing B2C market, highlighting the companiy's corporate strategy to expand in the Pick Up and drop-off business model that already includes 7,000 outlets in France, 5,000 in Germany and nearly 2,000 in other countries.

PiggyBee 143  

An interesting marketing development is the newly established business model that promises to deliver cross border shipments who travellers willing to transport something to the country of their destination. Collaborative shipping is a newly developed concept that follows the logic of crowdsourcing the impact of which in the structure of the market needs to be further analysied in the future 144 .

Mergers, Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances

The B2C segment of the market, and especially the cross border one, is difficult and costly to serve as it usually demands big network investments that handle low volume shipments (per delivery) in the final mile. Operators respond to the need for network optimisation for capacity on parcel business (and notably in the cross border sector) either by concluding with strategic alliances with affiliate operators, by announcing mergers and acquisitions, or by creating new delivery networks in Europe. Examples of these are provided below.

UPS’s acquisition of Kiala

In an effort to transform operations to meet the needs of the B2C consumer segment, an reposition it brand image from a primarily B2B express logistics provider to a parcel (cross border) business, UPS has acquired Kiala in 2012 – a technological platform that allows customers to choose a convenient retail store as delivery location. The Kiala network is comprised of more than 7,000 “Kiala Points” that handle up to 145,000 parcels per day, with more than 300 retail companies, including H&M, Esprit, and BrandAlley, among others, using its services 145 . Kiala was active in 5 European countries (BE, FR, ES, LU, NL). UPS is now combining Kiala points with its own network and rebranding all outlets as UPS access points.

Cross Border Growth Strategy for DPD and GLS

According to WIK(2013) DPD and GLS, the subsidiaries of La Poste and Royal Mail respectively, offering cross border services through a ground based logistics network, implement a strategy of establishing partnerships with companies already organised at the local level, to be able to utilize a delivery network in the countries wishing to operate in.

GLS partnering with Mondial Relay

Following a similar strategy with UPS, GLS collaborated with Mondial Relay in order to improve their delivery quotes and the delivery experience for the final consumers. Mondial Relay points are on average a 12 minute drive away of all households in France; therefore they offer a wide and valuable B2C network coverage, facilitating the expansion of GLS in their domestic market 146 . Modial relay offers an easy delivery alternative in case of failure of first delivery attempt, reducing delivery costs and increasing efficiency for GLS offering a network of 4300 points collect in 2013. Mondial Relay has collection points also in Belgium. DHL, in order to facilitate their expansion strategy in France, has also concluded in a partnership agreement with Mondial Relay in the end of 2013 147 .

DPD – implementing an organic growth strategy

DPD pursues a growth strategy, according to WIK (2013), by planning a gradual expansion of access points with a focus on emerging parcel markets. DPD Poland took over courier company Siódemka and this acquisition brought DPD to be the leading provider in the country. DPD UK started building Europe’s largest parcel hub in Leicestershire. GeoPost took control of the British logistics provider WinDirect, which allows it to develop its position in the international market with dedicated solutions for e-retailers 148 .

Failed merger of UPS and TNT

In March 2012 UPS and TNT announced their intention to establish a global express and logistics company 149 . The Commission expressed serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. The European Commission finally decided to block the 5.4bn merger on the grounds that it would seriously affect competition in the express small package segment of the markets within the EEA and 15 MS 150 .

FedEx to aquire TNT

Following the failed merger ot TNT with UPS, FedEx has requested EU's approval for its 4,4bn € bid for TNT 151 . FedEx has made strategic investments to strengthen their position in the European market. WIK (2013) report that FedEX has acquired in Tatex-FR and Opek –PL, to build up its own facilities and slightly repositioned its brand image to cover the deferred B2B segment of the market (in response to the changing market needs).

International Strategy of NPOs

In order for national postal operators to organise their international strategies they have the opportunity to conclude (apart from the bilateral agreements briefly described above) international agreements. One opportunity is the e-Parcel Group (EPG), a cooperation of 29 European NPOs plus USPS (the USA counterpart). Another possibility is to directly use the framework of the UPU agreement (which is particularly the case for the cross border services outside the territory of the EU).



Country-Specific CEP Markets

In this section we will present the 8 largest CEP markets in Europe. According to E-Commerce Europe 152 the UK, Germany and France, account for 61% of the total ecommerce sales in Europe. At the same time the Netherlands, Austria, Spain Italy and Poland are also identified as big (or emerging) e-commerce markets. According to Effigy (2013) Germany, the UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands are responsible for about 75% of the EU total CEP market.

WIK(2013) gives the following estimations on the per capita volume distribution in Europe in 2011:

Figure 20 – Parcels per capita in EU28

The international integrators (namely DHL, UPS, TNT Express, FedEx) as well as the main pan-European operators (namely GLS, DPD and Hermes) have been established in nearly all 8 countries of reference. For the purposes of this analysis, however, and since those operators base their business model in offering CEP and logistics services across European and non-European countries, we will analytically present them in section 8 below.

Germany

Market Size

Germany is the largest CEP market in Europe. The volumes generated in the country account for 28% of the European total according to WIK (2013). AT Kearney estimates the figure to be 23% and Effigy (2013) calculates the total at 26% in volume and at 36% in value. According to the same study the market is still growing in value at a rate of around 5% internationally and 4% domestically. According to Deutsche Post Annual Report (2013) the German parcel market increased by nearly 5,1 % compared to the prior year and was estimated to be more than 8 billion Euros. According to Apex insight (2015) the size of the DE market is reflecting its extensive manufacturing base and advanced logistics infrastructure. As in most of the large CEP markets, also for Germany, e-commerce was an important driver of growth, although the size of the market is also linked to the characteristics of the country's economy in general. The volume in the German parcel business rose sharply in 2014, according to the 2014 Annual Report of Deutsche post surpassing the prior-year figure by 7.0%. According to Apex Insight (2015) the German market has a positive outlook with a compound annual growth rate of 2.9% from 2015 to 2019.

Competitive Environment

Deutsche post

Deutsche Post AG is a listed corporation headquartered in Bonn. The company is the provider of the Universal Service Obligation in Germany. In the CEP Market they operate through their Post – eCommerce - Parcel division inside and outside Germany. Outside the country, in particular, the company offers domestic parcel services in other markets and is constantly expanding their portfolio of cross-border parcel and goods shipping services. The main offer with respect to the ecommerce - Parcel segment, as described in Deutsche Post Annual Report, is concentrated on the following product categories: domestic parcel services, cross-border shipment of goods, fulfilment services and special services.

Through their Express division the company offers time-definite courier and express services to business and private customers in more than 220 countries. In the domestic parcel market, Deutsche Post/ DHL holds around 43% of market share in the domestic market (in terms of value). In the European International Express Market DHL Express holds a 41% of market share. The Cross border Markets will be covered in the next sections.

The Group uses two main brands to communicate their products Deutsche post and DHL:

Figure 21 – Brand architecture of Deutsche Post/ DHL

Source: Deutsche Post DHL annual report (2014)

Worldwide online retailing continues to have a positive impact on the company's parcel business. In 2013 revenue in the ecommerce - parcel business unit was €5,6 billion, presenting an increase of 6.5 % compared to the previous year. The volume in the German parcel business rose in 2014, by 7.0 %. Revenue exceeded the 2013 figure by an even wider margin due to changes in the product mix.

Table 6 – Parcel Volumes

Source: Deutsche Post DHL annual report (2014)

The other domestic parcel business in Europe performed equally well, according to the 2014 Annual Report of Deutsche post. The worldwide e-commerce activities continue to expand. Revenue increased in 2013 year, mainly due to the growth identified outside Europe.

Hermes Logistik Gruppe 153  

Hermes Logistik Gruppe (HLG) specializes in the B2C segment of the market offering CEP services in Germany and outside. Due to the fact that the company offers cross national delivery services, we will present it in the section that follows. On the domestic German market however, Hermes Germany has very recently bought a 28.5% stake in start-up Liefer Factory GmbH, which offers same-day and time definite delivery through its Liefery service. The objective was, to expand its portfolio with a same-day delivery option for e-retailers and other shippers. The company's network comprises around 50 metropolitan areas in Germany where more than 2,500 couriers deliver shipments to recipients. Hermes intention is to focus on offering the “Same Day Service powered by Liefery” increasingly to business shippers and online retailers. By the end of 2015, Liefery aims to cover 100 German towns and cities. 154 .

Other Operators

All operators with pan European presence are established in the German Market (namely UPS, GLS, DPD, FedEX and TNT). However we will present their business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

UK

Market Size

According to PWC 155 , in 2012 the UK total (inland) parcel market amounted to about 1.7 billion items. Effigy (2013) estimates that the UK market is about 14% in terms of turnover of the total EU market. According to Effigy (2013) UK's international parcel growth reaches a growth rate of 10% compared to a 5% of domestic growth. B2C and C2C segments represent two thirds of the total CEP market in the UK and these segments are expected to grow at approximately 4.5-5.5% in the medium run 156 . All large European parcel operators have a presence in the UK market in order to profit from its size and growth potential. In this market we also observe a series of interesting developments in relation to delivery (notably the decision of Amazon to pilot its own delivery network).

The UK's e-retail market is one of the largest in the world. It is said to account for 13% of all retail sales fulfilled online and is expected to grow by a further 16% by 2019 157 . Although the UK's e-commerce market is thriving, resulting in tangible growth rates in volumes, we observe a competitive pressure that is transforming the landscape of the delivery business in the country. As we will explain below, some companies have had to transform their operations to meet consumer needs in view of the increasing competition. This pressure is also reflected in some recent e-retailers decisions with respect to the administration of their online retail streams 158 . According to Apex Insight (2015) the UK parcel delivery market is expected to continue to grow in the next 5 years, to exceed 13bn by 2019.

Competitive Environment

Royal Mail plc 159  

Royal Mail plc is UK's national postal operator. Royal Mail, when handling parcels, utilises a composite business model: Royal Mail's core network (UKPIL), ParcelForce Worldwide (a dedicated parcel division) and GLS (RM's subsidiary, which we will cover separately). According to Royal Mail's Annual Report, in 2014, the parcels handled by Royal Mail's network exceed in number 1 billion items (991m handled by the core network and 77m through Parcelforce). This is equal to a 14% share of the total CEP market in Europe, in terms of volumes. In the domestic market, Royal Mail (together with Parcelforce) holds a 52% share (in terms of volume) and 38 % in terms of value 160 . Although total volumes continue to experience a steady growth, revenues from parcels are flat (grew by only 1%) reflecting, according to Royal Mail analysis, a change of mix (towards B2C vs. B2B) and pricing (volumetric based pricing vs. weight based pricing). Out of the 77m parcels handled by ParcelForce, almost 7m ( a rough 10%) cover the international segment. In Europe Royal Mail is present using the brand name GLS. GLS will be covered separately in the sections that follow.

Table 7- Summary trading results, Royal Mail 2014

Source: Royal Mail Annual Report (2014)

Yodel

Yodel is a delivery operator targeting businesses and individuals sending parcels to the UK, Ireland or internationally (Europe and abroad) that weigh up to 25 kg. Similar to GLS, it also operates in the deferred (standard) parcel segment, i.e. international delivery times 3-5 days, times not being guaranteed, and with optional insurance coverage. Yodel was launched in 2010, following the merger of Home Delivery Network Ltd and the domestic B2B and B2C businesses of DHL UK. However, Yodel has been focusing their efforts to integrate the two networks formerly distinct networks. Its £535m annual revenue is split currently into 30% B2B and 70% B2C 161 . It currently cooperates with some of the UK's large retailers (including Amazon, Argos, Boots and Tesco Direct).

Yodel's recent joint venture with Paypoint, Collect+ is a parcel collection, delivery and returns service which is available from 5,800 stores in the UK. The number of Collect+ parcel transactions has risen from 7.7 million in 2012/13 to 13.6 million in 2013/14 to 18.8 million in 2014/15. 162  

CityLink

City Link, a private equity parcel company that has been in the competitive landscape of the UK market since 1969, with the parcels contributing about 60% of its profits and 40% of its revenues was declared bankruptcy on Christmas Day, 2014. The company was at the time going through a period of change, trying to overcome administrative problems initially motivated by the IT incompatibility following the merger with Target Express in 2007. Although the sector and the company experienced a volume growth 163 , they could not cope with the extra costs of dealing with the Christmas deliveries, so the equity holders decided to put the company into administration. A part of their market share was absorbed by Royal Mail Group 164 .

Hermes UK

Hermes as explained above, owned by a DE-based distance selling company (Otto Group), operates in the UK primarily in the B2C segment (e-commerce focused). In 2012 it reportedly handled 165m parcels 165 . As from 2012 the company improved their network capacity (expanding its network of Parcel Shops form 2000 to 3000, including additional hubs) in order to accommodate the increase in volumes and facilitate the consumer needs. Hermes secured a four-year contract extension with the fashion retailer Next in one of the biggest ever home delivery deals in the UK.

UK Mail

UK Mail, one of the competitors of Royal Mail in the traditional letter mail segment, is currently active in four segments: Mail, Parcel, Courier and freight. On the parcel segment, they focus equally on the B2B, B2C segment 166 . The company, originally called Business Post, was founded during a postal strike in 1971.

Whistl

Whistl, is former TNT post UK, is a fully owned subsidiary of PostNL, former TNT Group. In 2011, the group split to form TNT Express and PostNL . TNT Post UK became a subsidiary of PostNL, and was rebranded as Whistl in September 2014. They reportedly handle 60m parcels each year 167 168 169 . 

Amazon Logistics 170

Amazon, the online retailer, currently delivering their parcels in the UK through the networks of Royal Mail, Yodel and Whistl has recently implemented an own-delivery strategy. According to the Financial Times 171 Amazon is believed to have already absorbed 3 % of the UK parcel delivery market, accounting for about 70m parcels annually. According to the 2014 Annual Report of Royal Mail, the growth of e-commerce related delivery market will largely depend on the extent of Amazon's rolling-out of the own-delivery network and its commercial success. The company recently announced a Same day Delivery service (under the brand "Pass my Parcel") 172 utilising a network of delivery locations, using Connect Group (a newspaper distributor). It has recently announced an innovative one-hour delivery service, however available for free only for customers under subscription, and only in a specific postal codes in London Metropolitan area 173 for the moment. Financial Press, published information of the company's intention to take stake in Yodel's capital through an option which offered a considerable discount form Yodel's market value 174 .

Other Operators

All main operators with pan European presence are established in the UK Market (namely UPS, DHL, DPD, Fedex, Hermes and TNT). However we will present the different operator's business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

France

Market Size

According to Effigy (2013) the delivery market in France accounts for 14% in terms of value and 12% in terms of volumes in the European total. According to the same study the CEP market in France grows more internationally than domestically in terms of revenue, however, as in most of the Western Member States, the market has grown in volume in both segments. As in all large CEP markets, all integrators (DHL, FedEx, TNT, UPS) as well as GLS are established in the country and compete with domestic couriers to deliver parcel and express services from, to and within the country in order to profit from its size and growth potentials. The French 175 ecommerce market is the second largest market in Europe, and was expected to grow to 54bn Euros, according to the forecasts of ecommerce Europe of 2013. More recent data show that E-Commerce in France grew by 11% to spending of €57bn in 2014 and is predicted to break through the €60bn barrier in 2015, according to new figures from the country’s e-Commerce association Fevad 176 .

1.1.1.Competitive Environment

La Poste (Coliposte, Chronopost, Geopost, Exapaq)

La Poste is a public limited company responsible for the provision of the Universal Service Obligation in France. Operating since 1984 it was the first (incumbent) postal operator to enter the express market 177 . Currently it operates in the Parcels and Express Markets through the following divisions: ColiPoste, (its Parcels division) and through GeoPost’s Exapaq, Chronopost and Pickup subsidiaries (in the express and pick-up point markets respectively). In the international market the company is present through GeoPost (branded as DPD in most of the cases), a fully-owned subsidiary that operates all parcel and express subsidiaries in Europe and worldwide. Geopost/ DPD division will be covered separately in the sections that follow. The parcels and express segment accounts for about 26% of the groups' revenue and according to the Group's annual Report, the group has collectively handled about 1 billion items in 2014 178 . The results that were published in 2015 claim that the increased revenue generated by the activities in the CEP market offset partially the decline in the Group's profits that were mainly caused by the decline in the letter mail volumes.

Coliposte specialises in delivering parcels within 48 hours to private individuals (BtoC and CtoC segments) in France (domestic), with home delivery services six days a week. It reportedly delivered over 277 million parcels in 2013.

GeoPost implements a combined model: it is primarily positioned on the BtoB express market, but is also expanding on the BtoC segment, to profit from its rapid growth. GeoPost generated revenue of €4.5 billion in 2013; 26% of its revenue is generated in France and 74% outside France. International (incoming or outgoing) parcels account for roughly 20% of GeoPost’s revenue. GeoPost delivered 814 million parcels in 2013, an increase of 12% compared to 2012.

GeoPost operates in the French market via three subsidiaries:

Chronopost International, focuses on premium express services, for parcels both in the BtoB and BtoC segments. Chronopost is the only express service provider offering coverage throughout metropolitan France for next day home delivery before 1:00 p.m. Chronopost delivered 102 million parcels in 2013. International express delivery accounted for 25% of its revenue. The share of BtoC deliveries represented 33% of its flows. It includes the Chrono Relais service.

Exapaq, focuses on express service. Exapaq was founded by 19 independent French freight and express delivery companies in 1995 and was acquired by GeoPost in 2006; the company delivers parcels primarily to the BtoB segment. Exapaq delivered 55 million parcels on behalf of over 100,000 business and private individuals in 2013.

Pickup, experts in PickUp and DropOff delivery: The PickUp and DropOff network in France expanded significantly in 2013, with parcel traffic up between 80 and 100% compared with 2012, and new e-commerce players, who wanted to enable their customers to benefit from this service

La Poste (GeoPost) is structured as follows as regards their parcels operations:

Figure 22 – La Poste's CEP brand architecture and operating division

Source: La Poste Annual report (2014)

Geopost Operations as regards the international segment of the market will be covered analytically in the sections that follow

SNCF Geodis

SNCF Geodis is a French logistics operator, owned by SNCF rail operator delivering parcels in the CEP Market, with a focus on the B2B segment. According to Apex Insight (2015) it holds third place among the parcel delivery companies present in the country. It is an important logistics provider in France and it is ranked among the 4 most important ones in the rest of Europe 179 . It has a direct presence in 67 countries and covers indirectly 160 countries 180 .

Mory Global

Mory Global is an independent company providing a range of transport, logistics and CEP services through a network of 49 branches in France. In 2015 the company published the following information 181 :

49 sites

11 international hubs

1 national hub

11 regional platforms

35,000 daily shipments

According to Apex Insight (2015) the company ceased trading on 30 April 2015 and is currently on liquidation process.

Heppner Transport and Logistics Group 182  

Heppner Transport, a company specialised in logistics, operates as well in the CEP market targeting mainly the B2B segment, in France and internationally, by offering transit times 24-48h throughout France and 24-72 hr internationally. According to Apex insight (2015) the company has one of the biggest networks in France.

Colis Privé

A CEP operator targeting the B2C (ecommerce driven) segment, has reportedly delivered in 2015 over 35 million parcels offering flexible delivery solutions and innovative product offer. Established in 1993, the company now comprises of 2 independent national platforms and 18 regional agencies covering the territory of France 183 . It offers express 24 h and 48 h delivery services using, according to Apex Insight, 1700 subcontracted couriers and a network of lockers. According to Apex Insight and to recent publications in the economic press 184 in 2014 Amazon acquired 25% of Colis Prive.

Other Operators

All main operators with pan European presence are established in the French Market (namely UPS, DHL, GLS, FedEX and TNT). However we will present their business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

1.1.Spain

Market Size

According to Effigy (2013) the Spanish CEP market represents about 5% of the total European total in volume and 8% in value, after France. Although the country presents a non-negligible decline in its domestic CEP market (of about 3%), the Spanish market still grows internationally (about 2%). According to the same study the B2B segment is exceptionally big compared to the B2C segment (91% vs. 9% respectively). As in all big markets, we also observe most of the important delivery providers present in the market, offering domestic and cross border delivery services. E-commerce Europe identifies Spain as one of the main emerging ecommerce markets (with a total turnover attributed to ecommerce of 15 bn Euros in 2014. According to Correos Grupo Annual Report (2014) e-commerce market in Spain represents an 18% annual increase in 2015.

Competitive Environment

Grupo Correos

The Group comprised of four companies: Correos, Chronoexpres (the express division), Nexea and Correos Telecom.

According to the group's Annual Report (2014) the economic recovery in 2014, the growth of’ international activity and the growth in e-commerce reversed the declining trend in the parcel market.at least in terms of volumes. The development of new business models such as private shopping clubs, the launching of online shops by major Spanish companies or public support for the development of the sector, have all contributed to this recent growth. The response of Correos Group in this growth came in 2014, when it branded its parcel service under the name Paq, with five products aimed at responding to customers’ needs in terms of speed and flexibility: ‘Paq 48’ and ‘Paq 72’ provided by Correos, and ‘Paq 10’, ‘Paq 14’ and ‘Paq 24’, supplied by Correos Express. Chronoexpress offers international services, mainly through agreements with other express operators 185 .

(a)Correos Express

Correos Express is the subsidiary of Correos dedicated to advanced express delivery mainly in the Iberian Peninsula, offering time and day definite delivery services. It is responsible for the delivery of the ‘Paq 14’ and ‘Paq 24’ products described above.

MRW 186

MRW is a parcel delivery network that works through franchising. Apart from Spain it maintains operations in Portugal and Andorra and Gibraltar. Apex Insight (2015) reports that it delivers around 50 m parcels per year, and it estimates that it produces revenues of about 140m.

Transporte Integral De Paquetería, S.A. (TIPSA) 187  

TIPSA uses a franchised network to transport and deliver parcels across all regions of Spain, including destinations in Portugal and Andorra. Apex insight reports that it generated revenues if 215million Euros in 2013.

Tourline Express 188

The Portuguese NPO CTT, which owns Tourline Express which has headquarters in Spain and is specialised in courier services.

REDUR 189

REDUR is an operator specialised in e-commerce B2C, B2B, and C2C with headquarters in Spain and deliveries in Portugal and Andorra with its own logistics network.

Unipost 190

Unipost is the private mail operator providing mainly direct letter mail services within Spain and across Spanish borders. However, according to WIK 191 (2013), due to the growing importance of the CEP parcels market in Spain and given the network that the company had already established in the country, the Unipost has lately invested in the parcels segment as well, mainly in the small package segment.

Other Operators

All main operators with pan European presence are established in the Spanish Market (namely UPS, DHL, GLS, FedEX, SEUR (DPD) and TNT). However we will present their business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

Italy

Market Size

According to Effigy (2013) the Italian CEP market accounts for 7% in terms of value and 5% in terms of volume of the European Total. The Italian market, always according to the same study, presents a marginal growth in both the domestic and international segment, of a level of below 2%. The B2B segment is considerably bigger in absolute and relative terms (in relation to other European countries) compared to the B2C segment with the first representing nearly 90% of the market.

Competitive Environment

Poste Italiane

Poste Italiane is the country's national postal operator that holds a non-negligible position in the express delivery and parcels segment of the national market. The business relating to express delivery products to retail and SME customers is offered by Poste Italiane SpA and the segment targeting business customers is offered by its subsidiary SDA Express Courier SpA. The provision of standard parcel services falls under the Universal Service obligation (USO).

Table 8- Universal Service volumes of Poste Italiane

Source: Poste Italianne Group Annual Report (2014)

Poste Italiane, in fact, only uses SDA Express Courier (through Consorzio Logistica Pacchi ScpA) for the distribution of all domestic and international Paccocelere, and Paccocelere J+3 products.

The Italian government has recently announced that about a stake of about 38% would be offered for sale which could raise up to €3.8bn euros, excluding fees and other costs 192 .

Table 9 – CEP Volumes for 2014 for Poste Italiane

(b)SDA Express Courier

Posta Italiane's Subsidiary, SDA Express Courier SpA, contributed positively in the group's results as it grew (according to the Annual Report of 2014) both in revenues and in volumes by 12.8% and 6.1%, respectively, compared with 2013 (deliveries increased by 6.9 million, and revenue by €22.8 million). Those improvements reflect the positive developments in the B2C segment and e-commerce. The international Express Delivery segment also performed well (volumes increased by 2.4 million, and revenue by €7.9 million), benefitting from the partnership agreements with UPS and Network Eurodis.

Table 10 – CEP volumes for SDA Express Courier

Source: Poste Italianne Group Annual Report (2014)

Nexive 193 .

Nexive, the Italian private delivery operator, owned by Post NL, covering 80% of households in the country, is also active in the CEP e-commerce delivery market. According to the company figures Nexive distributed in 2014 more than 750.000 parcels in the country 194 ..

BRT SpA 195  

Bartolini, or BRT SpA, is the Italian express provider, offering CEP services within and outside the country. After its initial expansion that included several European markets it currently serves 25 countries, and implements a strategic partnership together with DPD and EuroExpress Courier services 196 . According to corporate information, it delivers more than 80 million parcels per year, domestically and internationally.

Other Operators

All main operators with pan European presence are established in the Italian Market (namely UPS, DHL, GLS, FedEX, TNT and Hermes). In particular TNT has a strong presence in Italy as, according to Apex Insight (2015) it is one of the company's largest markets for express parcels. However we will present the operator's business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

Netherlands

Market Size

According to Effigy (2013) the Dutch delivery market, independently or the relatively small size of the country's population, is among the 6 biggest in Europe both in volume and in value, accounting for 4% and 5% of the European total respectively. Both segments of the market (domestic and international) are experiencing a moderate growth, although the increase in the international CEP market is more intense, reaching levels of 5% in 2013. Contrary to the situation of Italy and Spain, the B2C segment in the country is more developed (accounting for a total of 37% vs. 63% compared to the B2B segment) illustrating the impact that the developed e-commerce activity exercises in the structure of the sector in the country. According to E-Commerce Europe the Netherlands is the 5th more mature market in Europe, even in absolute terms, with an estimated total market for 10, 5 billion Euros. According to Apex insight (2015) the Dutch market is expected to experience a moderate growth of 2.5% in the coming years.

Competitive Environment

PostNL

Post NL is the National Postal Operator in the Netherlands. The PostNL Group operates mail and parcel networks also in other countries namely in the UK (Whistl), Germany (PostCon), Italy (Nexive) and also cross border (Spring Global Mail). According to corporate information published in the Annual Report of 2014, the PostNL delivered in the Netherlands only over 142 million parcels fact that contributed with over 854 million Euros turnover to the company's bottom line. The company invested in early morning pick-up points, in evening and Sunday delivery, and in launching ‘before 10am’ and ‘before noon’ delivery options for their business customers. As explained in the county's assessment, also for PostNL E-commerce volumes continued to grow strongly in 2014, expanding by around 10 percent. According to the Annual Report fo 2014, B2C parcels volume growth was slightly lower, at between 6 percent and 8 percent, due to a decline in non-e-commerce volumes, digitisation and bundling of shipments. In this changing market environment, PostNL managed to maintain its market share in the B2C market, and grew its B2B market share. In recent press release the company announced a 7,1% increase in their parcels volumes, confirming the positive outlook for year 2015 197 .

TNT Express Netherland B.V.

TNT Express N.V., the Dutch express operator, formerly owned by the national operator (formerly known as TNT Post) is the third largest express delivery operator across Europe, operating in about 200 countries around the world. The split-up of TNT N.V. which was announced in December 2010, took place in May 2011 when TNT Express and PostNL were separately listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Due to the international nature of TNT Express operations, it will be analysed in the next section of this presentation.

Other Operators

All main operators with pan European presence are established in the Dutch Market (namely UPS, DHL, GLS, FedEX DPD and TNT). However we will present their business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

Belgium

Market Size

According to Apex (2015) the Belgian CEP market completes the list of the most important European country segments since it concentrates that altogether are responsible for 75% of the European total parcel volumes and 79% of the total European parcel revenues. According to ecommerce Europe Belgian e-commerce has been rising steadily these past few years. In 2014, there were 6.0 million e-shoppers in Belgium. On average they each spent about €722 online that year, which amounts to a total B2C e-commerce turnover of €4.3bn. This represents an increase of 14.3% in comparison with 2013. Apex Insoght (2015) forecasts a compound average annual growth rate of 3,5% for the Belgian Parcels market until 2019.

Competitive Environment

Bpost

BPost, the Belgian national postal operator is a strong player in the national CEP market. Regarding its share in the CEP market and according to the annual report of 2014, parcels grew by EUR 57.6 million in 2014, to EUR 307.2 million, changes mainly driven by the performance of its international parcels, due to the increase in parcels volumes generated from the universal and the parcels activities from exporting ecommerce activity. In terms of volumes BPost reported that there is an identifiable and solid domestic parcels volumes growth of 7.0%, which was mainly attributable to increased volumes in B2C as a consequence of the further development of e-retailing activities.

To accommodate the needs of ecommerce users, since November 2014 Bpost launched Saturday parcels’ delivery, delivery to parcels lockers, online parcel preparation (labelling, payment) and direct drop-off and pick-up in one of its 1,250 parcel points, hoping to improve the delivery experience for its users. As regards the international activities Bpost has integrated its different operations into one combined structure hoping to better serve the parcels’ distribution needs of the global e-commerce marketplace. The new organisation operates under the brand name “Landmark Global, a Bpost company”.

Landmark Global 198

Bpost owns a subsidiary named Landmark Global, which is the European and international network for its cross-border operations.

PostNL

As explained in the previous section, PostNL through its section PostNL Benelux provides directly parcel delivery services in the Belgium territory using its own private distribution network.

Other Operators

All main operators with pan European presence are established in the Belgian Market (namely UPS, DHL, GLS, FedEX and TNT). However we will present their business model and their basic business information in a separate section that follows.

Poland

Market Size

Poland perhaps is the most interesting country example of the Eastern European countries. Given the size of the country and its nature of economy has managed to be considered among the top seven in size among the European total. Effigy (2013) estimates it to be about 4% in volume (but 2% in value) of the European total. However, the country shows impressive growth rates and growth potentials. The rates presented in Effigy (2013) show a domestic increase of about 8% and an international increase of more than 12%. Those growth potentials are reflected in the report of Ecommerce Europe which indicates Poland as one of the top five emerging ecommerce countries with a total e-commerce related turnover of 5.2 billion Euros in 2013., showing (according to Posta Polczta Annual Report) growth rates of more than 20%. According to a local delivery operator (Inpost), the e-commerce industry in Poland generates about 155m shipments a year, for around PLN 4.4bn (€ 1.06bn) a year in revenue for shipping firms 199 .

Apex Insight (2015) forecasts that the market is expected to experience growth rates above 3% in the coming years.

Figure 23- Poland's e-commerce growth

Source: Poczta Polska Groupo, Annual Reprot (2014)

Competitive Environment

Poczta Polska S.A.

Poczta Polska S.A. is the National Postal Operator in the country. Its primary concern is the provision of postal (letter and parcel) services as well as the provision of domestic courier and EMS international courier services through Pocztex. According to the corporate information published in the Annual Report there has been a 12% increase in sales of parcels and courier shipments serviced by the Poczta Polska S.A., despite slower than expected market growth and greater price pressure from competitors which lowered profit margins. The highest increases were achieved in the case of Pocztex courier shipments (volume growth of 60%). According to the latest annual report the company delivered over 44 million parcels and courier shipments in 2014.

InPost Nowoczesna Poczta sp. z.o.o. 200

As previously described, the company, part of Integer.pl Group, had predominately provided parcel collections via its self-service locker terminals. On the 1/6/2015 it announced that the launching of courier services to deliver parcels either to the door or to parcel lockers across Poland. Services include guaranteed next day delivery before 12pm and 5pm, tracking and a free returns option. InPost claims that its new offerings are particularly suitable for e-commerce retailers, with major Polish e-commerce platform Allegro already on board. InPost said it will be making use of its 8,300 customer service points throughout the country, including 1,300 parcel locker terminals, and 10,000 couriers in providing nationwide courier services. According to corporate information the company's parcel lockers handled in 2014 90% more volume than the year before. 201

K Ex Sp z.o.o 202 .

WIK(2014) report that K-EX is an independent delivery operator providing national mainly delivery services mainly targeting in the express and day definite segment of the market.

Conclusion 203

According to Apex Inside, the Competitive landscape of the EU CEP parcels market can be summarized to the following:

Figure 24- Europe's Competitive Landscape

Source: Apex insight (2015)

Of course, not all operators are equally competing with each other in all segments of the market (as identified in section 3 of this Annex). The higher the degree of segmentation the more different the mapping and the market shares one can identify in each country. However the level of analysis of this Annex does not require additional level of detail on the competitive landscape that has been developing during the recent years.

The Cross Border Segment

Market Size

According to CE (2012) 204 cross border deliveries account for up to 15% of total volumes, 80% of which refer to shipments within the EU. WIK(2013) 205 stipulate cross border shipments account for 30% of total revenues and approximately 10 % of volumes in Europe.

Within this sub-segment we can also identify the standard product/ customer segmentation that applies to the overall CEP market i.e. B2B, B2C, C2X, and standard vs. deferred and express product categories (for definitions see section 4 above).

In this section, we will present the most important operators that we identify in the cross border CEP market and we will briefly present some basic figures on their relative importance in the European CEP total market.

In the express segment of the cross border market there are 4 main players in a combined market share of more than 90% 206 . Other operators who can be considered to offer services in this segment according to a report of Research and Markets (2015) 207 are: Aramex, BTA Transport, Burns Express, Cargo Express Delivery, DPEX Europe, Express Transport, GeoPost (DPD), GLS, Hermes Group, Interlink Express, Manston Express, Transport SDA Express, Simpex Express and Tuffnells Parcels Express. According to AT Kearney, network players (FedEx, TNT Express, UPS and DHL Express) appear to have a have a combined market share of 52% in the international standard (deferred) segment.

Finally all national postal operators are active in the cross border segment of the market, most of them by establishing a collaborative model of cooperation for the fulfilment of the cross border delivery.

Competitive Landscape of the Cross Border Segment

World Wide Integrators

As we described earlier, this term is meant to describe those delivery operators that are committed to provide time/ day definite (express) domestic and cross border end-to-end delivery services mainly through an owned (integrated) network (or a network where they maintain 100% of operational control) that use air freight based transportation systems as well as ground/ sea networks to fulfil international shipping.

1.1.1.1.DHL Express

DHL Express brand is a division of Deutsche Post AG. The Group progressively acquired DHL as global air express service provider from 1998 to 2002 and expanded its presence in the express segment by purchasing other leading logistics companies, e.g. 1999 acquisition of Danzas, 2004/2005 acquisition of a majority stake of Indian express company Blue Dart (75% stake currently held), end of 2005 acquisition of Exel 208 . DHL’s family of divisions offers an portfolio of logistics services ranging from national and international parcel delivery, international express, road, air and ocean transport to industrial supply chain management. With a presence in over 220 countries and territories worldwide, it provides solutions for markets and industries including ecommerce, technology, life sciences and healthcare, energy, automotive and retail. The main product offered by this stream in the CEP segment is International Time definite, Day Definite and Same Day delivery services (targeting mainly business customers). The company is also targeting SMEs by providing custom support and personal services. In 2015 the company published the following statistics:

220 countries and territories

500 airports

3 main global hubs

45,000 Service Points

250 dedicated airplanes

32,800 vehicles

2.5 million customers

In the European Express Market DHL is the most strong express alternative representing 40-50% of the market in value 209 .

Figure 25-International Express Market Share in Europe

Source: Deutsche Post, DHL annual Report (2014)

1.1.1.2.UPS

UPS, the American based provider, which links with its operations around 220 countries in the world, is, according to all estimates, the second largest express provider in the Time Definite Express segment in Europe, following DHL Express. According to Effigy (2013) it holds between 30-40% of the market share in value in 2013, according to Deutsche Post/ DHL Group annual report (2014) it holds 30% of market share.

According to its own annual report (2014) its international package segment represents 22% of the company’s total revenue globally. Europe, the second largest region globally is responsible for roughly half of the international revenues in the package (CEP) segment and it's the main driver for growth.

Figure – 26: UPS Revenue Shares by Segment

Source: UPS annual Report (2014

In the International package (CEP) segment the company offers both express (time definite) and deferred delivery services (day definite). According to UPS Annual Report (2014), several factors provide significant additional opportunities in Europe, including the highly fragmented nature of the market and the fact that exports make up a significant part of Europe’s GDP. The company believes that there is a strong potential for growth in small package exports in Germany, the U.K., France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. To accommodate this strong growth, the company will continue investing in its air hub in Cologne (to develop the capacity to to process 190,000 packages per hour).

Traditionally, as all international integrators, the company was serving the B2B segment of the market. As we already discussed, the company refocused their operations to better serve the B2C e-commerce driven segment of the market. According to Apex Insight (2015) in 2005 when it had established operations in most major markets, it extended its focus to include the larger domestic markets, through acquisitions (for example Lynx in the UK and Stolica in Poland). According to its annual report, UPS is expected to have more than 20,000 locations worldwide to facilitate their customers, who can opt to pick up or drop off their parcels at convenient retail locations. In Europe, the acquisition of Kiala S.A. (rebranded later as UPS Access Point) was intended to serve as a platform to enable e-commerce retailers to offer consumers the option of having goods delivered to a convenient retail location.

(a)Yamato Holdings

Yamato Holdings is the main Japanese operator and a new global player. Its cross-border flows are mainly deferred services and operational between Asian countries, yet it already has presence in the EU. Their express deliveries are performed in agreement with UPS 210 . According to the Statistica database it reaches a global market share of 4% in the total express and courier market in 2014.

TNT Express

TNT Express N.V., the Dutch express operator, formerly owned by the national postal provider (formerly known as TNT Post) is the third largest express delivery operator across Europe, operating in about 200 countries around the world. The split-up of TNT N.V. which was announced in December 2010, took place in May 2011 when TNT Express and PostNL were separately listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.

TNT operates in B2B segment of the market offering services addressed also to the B2C sub segment as well offering day definite and time definite services.

The International Europe segment comprises of all TNT operations in Europe with the exception of the domestic businesses in France, Italy and the United Kingdom. These operations provide TNT with a strong position in the European international express market. According to the Annual report of Deutsche Post/ DHL (2014) the market share in value attributed to TNT Express amounts to 12%.

According to WIK(2013) the failure of UPS and TNT Express merger in 2011 has seriously affected the market position of TNT express, who has been trying to recover ever since. The uncertainty caused about the future of the business environment, has led many customers to switch to DHL Express who say its revenues increased by 9.3% in 2013.

Table 11 – TNT's Express International Performance in 2014

Source: TNT annual Report (2014)

For the time being TNT is implementing a multiannual business strategy (initially called "Deliver!" And later "Outlook") focusing mainly on improving profitability. According to this strategy TNT Express, the company should focus on the areas where it has a strong position and can demonstrate tangible growth, improve efficiency and optimise its administrative structure. Recently TNT and FedEx announced their intention to combine forces. With an announcement on 30/6/2015, FedEx has reportedly requested EU's approval for its 4,4bn Euro bid for TNT 211 .. The case is currently under examination from the European Commission and the Merger Procedure Regulation.

FedEx

FedEx, a global logistics provider, offers an air, ground and sea network to link more than 220 countries and territories around the world. The company provides a broad portfolio of transportation, e-commerce and business services through companies operating independently under the FedEx brand. According to Effigy (2013), FedEx is strong in the B2B segment of the market. As all international integrators, FexEx provides three main product lines: Freight, Ground and Express services. Although FedEx presence is very important worldwide, in Europe its relative market share in the international express category is 10% according to the annual report of Deutsche Post/ DHL 2014. However, the company is determined to increase its presence in the European Market. According to the Annual Report 2014 FedEx Express has opened 100 stations across 11 European countries since 2011.

As we already discussed, FedEx plans to acquire TNT Express, offering a 4,4 bn€ bid in order to profit from the latter’s developed European ground delivery network and strong knowledge of the European market 212 . This strategy is aligned with FedEx intention to strengthen its presence in the European market.

Operators with Pan-European Presence

GLS

GLS is the Royal Mail's Group European parcels business. GLS, founded in 1999, is established as a pan-European parcel network service, offering delivery services in 37 countries. Through acquisitions and partnerships and as well as direct investments the GLS network was created which currently covers directly 18 countries 213 and indirectly (through partners) 214 the rest of the Europe. It covers equally the B2B and the B2C segment, both domestically (within each country where it operates) and internationally (across Europe). It fulfils its deliveries through a road based network, offering deferred (less time sensitive) delivery services.

In 2014 the company reported the following figures:

Table 12 – GLS Facts and Figures

Revenue

1.96 bn. €

Parcel volumes

404 m.

Customers

over 220 000

Employees

about 14 000

Countries covered

37

Hubs

39

Depots

662

Vehicles

about 18 000

Source:

According to the Royal Mail Annual Report (2014) GLS experienced a growth in revenues and in volume (8%), and value (of 7%) balancing the Groups bottom-line in 2015 (estimated figures). According to Apex insight the total parcel volume circulated through the network of GLS was 404 million parcels in 2014.

GeoPost (DPD)

DPD, the international "brand" for Geopost, offers deferred and express services internationally covering Europe and 220 countries around the world. In the deferred segment they offer services with delivery times 1-4 days in Europe, and within 7 days in the rest of the world.

In the Express segment they offer next day delivery in Europe, and express services in the rest of the world. Both segments are served through a range of different products each of which including different characteristics.

GeoPost is operating under the brands "Chronopost" in France and Portugal, "Exapaq" in France, "SEUR" in Spain, "Interlink" and "DPD" in UK and "DPD" in the rest of Europe

According to La Poste Annual Report (2014), GeoPost's broader international strategy aims at copying the company's national strategy, internationally; therefore, it strengthens a road network in Eastern Europe and Asia and develops a network in South-East Asia and in Africa.

DPD reportedly delivers 215 3 million parcels a day which gives a rough estimation of 700m parcels per annum.

Figure 28 – DPD strategic Development

Source: DPD website

DHL Parcel

As we explained above Deutsche Post/ DHL Group provides through their Post - eCommerce - Parcel division, cross border parcel services 216 . Apex Insight (2015) report that in November 2013 Deutsche Post announced their plans to expand their German division beginning with its takeover of its parcel delivery operations in other European Countries. Deutsche Post transferred its existing parcel delivery operations in Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg the Czech Republic and Poland and lately, Austria 217 , from DHL to the Mail and Parcels division. The Mail division which in the past was focusing only to Germany is committed to focus on B2C delivery. Pursuing a 4 year strategy to target growth in the world’s emerging markets and by tapping the global e-commerce boom the company focuses to become the “number one provider” of cross-border logistics for the e-commerce sector on key international trade lanes, and gradually export its German e-commerce parcel “success model” to other countries in Europe, (including Asia and the American continent).

Hermes Logistik Gruppe (HLG)

Hermes Logistik Gruppe (HLG) specializes in the B2C segment of the market offering CEP services in Germany and outside. It operates 14,000 ParcelShops in Germany offers alternative B2C solutions nationwide by relying in convenient opening hours and delivery times. According to the information published on the corporate website one in three B2C parcels in Germany are delivered by the Hermes Logistik Gruppe while the company offers a range of customer-oriented services such as three-hour delivery time slot, text messages for direct deliveries to a ParcelShop, Saturday deliveries, deliveries left with neighbours, holiday storage etc, through an owned information system "Shipping history". The company's network relies on a system of self-employed (life style) local couriers but has also approximately 11.000 employees, including the Hermes OTTO staff 218 .

The company has published in 2015 the following information in their website:

Daily customer contacts > 1 million

Shipments per year > 500 million

Revenue EUR 840 million (net for the fiscal year 2009/10)

6 HUBs

57 subsidiaries

500 depots and local branches

Over 14000 ParcelShops across Germany

Through its subsidiary BorderGuru it helps SMEs and e-retailres to ship their parcels across borders.

Hermes is present in the UK 219 , Austria 220 , France, Italia 221 , Great Britain, and Russia and a partner in Switzerland and Benelux. According to the corporate website, In Hermes UK delivers more than 200 million parcels per year through a network of 5.000 parcel shops and 10.000 self-employed couriers. In Austria the company offers 1.600 packet shops and a nationwide pick up drop off possibility. In Italy it owns a network of more than 1.000 drivers.

National Postal Operators

As we explained National Postal operators are also active in the CEP segment of the market, offering a quite diverse product portfolio, which ranges from a pure ordinary parcel to a more sophisticated service that depending on the Operator could be positioned either on the deferred or the pure express segment of the market.

The volumes and the market shares that each operator possesses depend on the relative strength of the Operator and on its penetration in each segment of the market. National Postal operators of the bigger markets often have stronger market position also in the cross border market segment than smaller ones do.

We now present the data from the Postal Statistics Data base (reference year 2013) 222 and refer to total inbound volumes of parcels circulated by the NPOs as well as the total amount of inbound ordinary (standard) parcels circulated by the NPOs, broken down by country, for year 2013, expressed in 000s.

Table 14 – National Postal Operators, International courier express and parcel by USP under direct or indirect designation - ordinary parcels up to 10/20 kg. in thousands of parcels

geo\time

2012

2013

EU (28 countries)

:

:

Belgium

:

(c)

:

(c)

Bulgaria

83

116

Czech Republic

:

125.2

Denmark

:

:

Germany

:

:

Estonia

91.3

112

Ireland

633

586

Greece

441

441

Spain

:

(c)

:

(c)

France

:

(z)

:

(z)

Croatia

84.6

121.6

Italy

:

:

Cyprus

98.3

95

Latvia

:

:

Lithuania

:

(c)

:

(c)

Luxembourg

:

:

Hungary

71

63.3

Malta

34.6

40

Netherlands

:

(c)

:

(c)

Austria

:

(c)

:

(c)

Poland

1443

1369

Portugal

114.6

33.2

Romania

:

(c)

:

(c)

Slovenia

:

:

Slovakia

:

(c)

:

(c)

Finland

:

(z)

:

(z)

Sweden

:

(c)

:

(c)

United Kingdom

:

(z)

:

(z)

Iceland

:

:

Switzerland

1400

1500

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the

:

2.3

Serbia

23

23

:=not available c=confidential z=not applicable

:

Source of Data:

EU Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW)

Last update:

05.11.2015

Date of extraction:

06 Nov 2015 14:23:35 CET

Hyperlink to the table:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm_grow/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=post_itr_1

General Disclaimer of the EC website:

http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm

Code:

post_itr_1

Source: Postal Statistics Database (2015)

The Universal Postal Union (hereafter UPU) 223 headquartered in Switzerland, part of the United Nations, representing 192 member countries, with its national postal administrations worldwide, publishes a similar database that gives the following information for equally value-added parcels, standard parcels as well as insured parcels (this time broken down by inbound cross border and outbound cross border (expressed in Units):

Table 15 – National Postal Operators, cross border volume performance in 2013, data from UPU's Statistics Database

Administrations

Years

Items

Value

Austria

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Bulgaria (Rep.)

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

16,685.00

Croatia

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

10,612.00

Cyprus

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

73,734.00

Czech Rep.

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

60,898.00

Denmark

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Estonia

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

22,670.00

Finland

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

France

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Germany

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Great Britain

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Greece

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Hungary

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Ireland

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Italy

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

511,078.00

Latvia

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

62,292.00

Lithuania

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

10,585.00

Malta

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

1,550.00

Netherlands

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Poland

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

158,854.00

Portugal

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Romania

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

49,742.00

Slovakia

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

39,929.00

Slovenia

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

52,936.00

Spain

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Sweden

2013

9.2 Number of express items, international service - dispatch

 

Austria

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Bulgaria (Rep.)

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

37,530.00

Croatia

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

68,942.00

Cyprus

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

59,396.00

Czech Rep.

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

68,141.00

Denmark

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Estonia

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

28,291.00

Finland

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

France

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Germany

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Great Britain

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Greece

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Hungary

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Ireland

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Italy

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

1,216,803.00

Latvia

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

56,655.00

Lithuania

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

76,403.00

Malta

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

15,415.00

Netherlands

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Poland

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

120,954.00

Portugal

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Romania

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

58,324.00

Slovakia

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

193,535.00

Slovenia

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

200,847.00

Spain

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Sweden

2013

9.3 Number of express items, international service - receipt

 

Austria

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Bulgaria (Rep.)

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

43,993.00

Croatia

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

18,661.00

Cyprus

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

18,488.00

Czech Rep.

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

218,703.00

Denmark

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Estonia

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

169,831.00

Finland

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

France

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Germany

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Great Britain

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

166,212.00

Greece

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Hungary

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Ireland

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Italy

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

565,690.00

Latvia

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

38,632.00

Lithuania

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

144,689.00

Malta

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

21,264.00

Netherlands

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Poland

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

691,065.00

Portugal

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Romania

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

130,815.00

Slovakia

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

115,913.00

Slovenia

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Spain

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Sweden

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

 

EU 27 estimate

2013

9.5 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - dispatch

23,997,392

Austria

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Bulgaria (Rep.)

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

105,868.00

Croatia

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

120,315.00

Cyprus

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

94,970.00

Czech Rep.

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

125,236.00

Denmark

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Estonia

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

110,778.00

Finland

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

France

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Germany

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Great Britain

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

1,355,356.00

Greece

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Hungary

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Ireland

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Italy

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

165,328.00

Latvia

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

34,553.00

Lithuania

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

63,581.00

Malta

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

39,133.00

Netherlands

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Poland

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

628,091.00

Portugal

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Romania

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

185,268.00

Slovakia

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

142,366.00

Slovenia

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Spain

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Sweden

2013

9.6 Number of ordinary parcels, international service - receipt

 

Austria

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Bulgaria (Rep.)

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

731.00

Croatia

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

6,335.00

Cyprus

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

5.00

Czech Rep.

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

143,059.00

Denmark

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Estonia

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

746.00

Finland

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

France

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Germany

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Great Britain

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Greece

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Hungary

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Ireland

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Italy

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Latvia

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Lithuania

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

2,254.00

Malta

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Netherlands

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Poland

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

35,688.00

Portugal

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Romania

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

6,811.00

Slovakia

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

46,837.00

Slovenia

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

73,687.00

Spain

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Sweden

2013

9.8 Number of insured parcels, international service - dispatch

 

Austria

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Bulgaria (Rep.)

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

10,283.00

Croatia

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

3,575.00

Cyprus

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

45.00

Czech Rep.

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

36,489.00

Denmark

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Estonia

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

1,180.00

Finland

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

France

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Germany

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Great Britain

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Greece

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Hungary

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Ireland

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Italy

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Latvia

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Lithuania

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

1,633.00

Malta

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Netherlands

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Poland

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

13,954.00

Portugal

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Romania

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

5,730.00

Slovakia

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

60,215.00

Slovenia

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

182,853.00

Spain

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Sweden

2013

9.9 Number of insured parcels, international service - receipt

 

Source: UPU statistical database (2015)

Operations

Operationally, the cross border B2C parcel delivery largely depends on the choice of the operator initiating the cross border fulfilment and its level of operational control and ownership over the cross border transaction.

With the possible exception of the 4 main network integrators (DHL Express, UPS, TNT Express, FedEx), who they either have a 100% ownership or full operational control over their cross border network, most of the other cross border delivery providers identified in the previous sections cooperate with other operators to be able to fulfil all legs of the cross border delivery. CE (2012) has identified the following cooperation models for the B2C e=commerce driven cross border delivery:

Table 16- Co-operation models for cross border delivery

Source: Copenhagen Economics 2013

According to CE (2012) the choice of cross-border co-operation model designed by delivery operators to facilitate their cross border deliveries is driven by four main factors: price and quality of delivery, reciprocity, and the presence of own delivery networks. Information on prices and quality of physical delivery and associated data (e.g. information used for cross-border tracking of parcels) are of course decisive for delivery operators’ choice of co-operation partner. Although NPOs often co-operate with each other, they do not always do so if they get better quality and price offers from other operators. According to CE(2012) reciprocity is another factor that to some extent affects the choice of cross-border delivery partners, in the cases that a potential agreement involved the mutual cooperation for the cross border delivery in both directions (operator A distributes the parcels of operator B and vice versa). Finally, the choice of delivery partner is influenced by the presence of the delivery operator in the country of destination of the parcels. One has to note that the cooperation model and its characteristics are dependent on the type of parcel to be sent (packet, parcel, or express product) as in most of the cases there are separate streams to organise each specific delivery. Finally the operational characteristics are dependent on the urgency of the consignment. Time definite (express) and day definite (deferred) or standard parcels are generally handled by different operational streams.

In the sections that follow we will try to shed some light on the operational characteristics of the cross border parcel operations. For this purpose we base our presentation on desk research, on the replies of the public consolation that was conducted in view of this Impact Assessment and on the results of a Study that was commissioned with the aim to explore the cost structure of the cross border delivery and its implication on the price setting and the overall profitability of the cross border products 224 .

Cooperative models for cross border parcel delivery

Integrators value chain model

As all four integrators either own or exercise full control over the infrastructure and the IT systems facilitating the cross border delivery, in this case there is no cooperation model in place, but a single-operator model that is managing the cross border delivery.

In the COMP/M. 6570 merger case of UPS and TNT, the integrator's business model is very briefly described 225 . The operational and information management infrastructure of the integrators is largely developed around the concept of hub and spoke system. It normally involves pick up from the premises of the customer, processing and sorting in the sorting centres and hubs, line haul or air transport (depending on the distance and the time sensitivity of the shipment) to the main hub, transport by trucks and vans in the local hubs sorting and final dispatching (by vans) to the final recipients. The network supporting this operational sequence is single and sophisticated, allowing visibility or even real time traceability. That allows the express segment to offer cross border delivery services of added value to their customers, although at a higher price.

Figure 30- Overview of steps in small package delivery

Source: Further Synergies Submission, p.3, 4-9-2012

NPOs+ NPOs value chain model

The traditional cross border parcel delivery route involves cooperation between 2 domestic national postal operations. FTI(2011) confirms that typically after collection and primary sortation in the originating country the cross border parcels are transported to a hub where they are sorted again according to their place of final destination. From there they are shipped to foreign countries either by air or land. Once in the destination country parcels are collected and again sorted then transported to the appropriate are of the country where they undergo a secondary sortation. They are then transported to the relevant delivery office and from there they are delivered to recipients.

National postal operators that maintain separate operations for parcels and letter markets include Royal Mail, La Poste, TNT and Deutsche Post, Where a National Postal operator does not maintain separate operators for letters and parcels, those products are collected together, but they are sorted separately. Priority products will of course follow the priority stream. Generally speaking parcels and express products are distributed separately from packets.

Figure 31- Cross-border postal pipeline

Source: FTI (2011)

The consultation has confirmed that, at least in the NPO's cross border deliveries, the standard delivery model, as described by FTI (2011) is the most usual way for NPOs to fulfil the cross border delivery. The University of Antwerp (2015) in a study conducted on behalf of the European Commission 226 show that in the case of European Postal Operators, even for cross border destinations as short as 10km away, such as from the Netherlands to Belgium, parcels still need to be loaded from the regional depot to the national sort hubs to be sent later for cross border delivery. However, on the basis of quality and pricing considerations, alternatives or exceptions to the standard delivery model, at least in a subset of countries, do apply.

Most of the cross border transportation itself is outsourced. The motivation for that is not only to reduce the (higher) transportation cost by means of finding cheap(er) providers, but also by means of correcting costs occurred due to trade and network imbalances.

NPOs and foreign subsidiaries or private operators

As previously explained there are exceptions to the standard delivery model, at least for some operators who choose to differentiate their logistical operations either in their entire cross border value chain or at least in some country destinations. For example, some NPOs who operate a parallel international network often use this broader cross border network to facilitate their international operations. Another example of differentiation to the standard model is when instead of contracting the NPO of the destination country, to contract private (alternative) operators in order to perform the cross border delivery. Reasons for this strategy are mainly pricing or QoS considerations of the NPOs of the sending country.

(1)

Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services (98/C 39/02) Official Journal C 039 , 06/02/1998 P. 0002 - 0018

(2)

Commission Decision of 10 August 2010 establishing the European Regulators Group for Postal Services (2010/C 217/07)

(3)

ERGP (13)37 ERGP opinion on cross-border parcel delivery

(4)

The fieldwork was carried out in 2014, i.e. before the entry into force of the ADR Directive (July 2015), which obliges Member States to establish full ADR coverage for disputes covered by the ADR Directive and which involve a trader established in their territory.

(5)

Seventeen countries have a regulatory routing time for parcels.

(6)

Source ERGP (13) (31) Report on the Quality of Service.

(7)

ERGP(14)26 ERGP Opinion on a better understanding of European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery market(s) and the functioning of competition

(8)

Clickstream survey covering only BE and PL, not a representative sample.

(9)

Oxford Economics The Economic Impact of Express Carriers in Europe, 2011, Oxford, UK.

(10)

A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services COM(2011) 942 final

(11)

See Annex 1, Procedural Information, Evidence and Studies for further details of relevant studies.

(12)

The Postal Users Forum is an initiative launched by former Commissioner for the Internal Market, Michel Barnier in 2011. The aim of the Forum is to get feedback from stakeholders (consumers and businesses) on postal services in Europe. The third forum in 2014 (the two previous events took place in 2012 and 2011, respectively), focused on the e-commerce driven parcels market, given its increasing importance as alternative source of growth against the declining traditional letter post

(13)

Defined according to number of employees.

(14)

Question 8 (To which markets do you sell online? Only domestic/ domestic and international/ only international) and Question 9 ( What are your reasons for not selling online to other European countries? Delivery related reason/ any other reason (e.g. payments, language, legislation)).

(15)

Q12 - How do you arrange your cross-border delivery operations?

(16)

Q15 -For cross-border transactions where more than one delivery operator is involved, the method most often used is the standard delivery model which uses the networks of the two national postal operators involved in cross-border delivery, as follows: Does this text describe your standard delivery model for cross-border delivery? " After collection and primary sorting in the originating country, cross-border parcels are transported to across-border hub of the sending national postal operator, where they are sorted again according to their country or place of destination. From here, they are transported to a central hub in the receiving country. Once in the destination country, the parcels are “collected” and sorted by the receiving national postal operator, then transported to the appropriate area of the country where they undergo a secondary sorting. From this secondary sorting point, they are transported to the relevant delivery office and from there, they are delivered to recipients. (FTI, 2013)

Q15b - Do you use alternatives to the standard delivery model?

(17)

Q12 (retailers) which type of cross-border delivery services do you usually offer when selling to other EU/EEA counties? Cheapest delivery service/ Delivery service with track and trace option/ Delivery service with insurance option/ Delivery service with return option/ Other. Multiple answers were possible and for each option retailers were asked to state always/ often/ sometimes/ never.

(18)

Q13 - How satisfied are you with the following delivery features when selling to other European countries? Please rank each answer that applies to you on a scale from 1 to

(19)

Base size for the table is 41-48 retailers who responded to each subsection.

(20)

Q21 Do you receive any price discounts for the packets/parcels you send to other European countries from delivery operators?

(21)

Q6– When buying online how often do you face the following delivery problems?

(22)

Base size for the table is 199-206 consumer responses to each subsection. 70 'other' responses not shown.

(23)

Q7 – How important are the following delivery location options to you when ordering from a web shop? Delivery to a home address/work address/neighbour/post office/relay point (shop offering parcel collection facilities/parcel locker/collect in store (from retailer).

(24)

Q13 - What are the five main obstacles you face when delivering abroad? Please rank only the options you consider as obstacles using a scale from 1-5, where 1 is the most significant obstacle, 2 is the second most significant obstacle, etc.

(25)

Q35 - What are the additional challenges arising from sending and receiving packets / parcels to / from non-EU/EEA-EFTA countries?

(26)

Q22 - Which, if any, of the following improvements to the delivery process would make you more likely to sell online or increase your online sales. Please select the three most important to you. Chart shows the number of responses

(27)

Base size for the chart is the 46 retailers who replied to this question

(28)

Q24 (retailers)- Compared to the prices you currently pay for delivery, what decrease in delivery prices do you think would allow you to substantially increase your sales to other EU/EEA countries?

(29)

Q10 (consumers) - Which, if any, of the following improvements to the delivery process would make you more likely to buy online? Please rank on a scale from 1-5 Where 1 is not at all likely and 5 is very likely.

(30)

Base size for this chart is 203-207 consumer responses to each subsection. 44 'other' responses not shown.

(31)

Q36 (NPOs) –What do you think could improve the quality of intra-EU/EEA-EFTA cross-border parcel delivery services? 

(32)

See the 'Evidence and Studies' section of Annex 1, Procedural Information for further details.

(33)

NPOs that are not covered are CY, EE, LU

(34)

For standard products we try to find the cheapest alternative, that is a product for the residential customers and delivered at home. For premium, following additional characteristics were taken into account Time to delivery < 7 days, Track and Trace, Insurance, Proof of delivery

(35)

For letters : 0,25kg,0, 5 kg,5kg,1kg,2kg

For parcels : 0,25kg, 0,5kg, 1kg,2kg, 5kg,10kg

(36)

When a specific product could not be found in the public list price data of an NPO the dataset considered it as missing.

(37)

A cross border product has as many prices as many destinations this product is offered. Each country is examined for 24 destinations (all EU countries except CY, EE, LU)

(38)

 Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, (Estonia), Greece, Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Croatia

(39)

United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France and Spain.

(40)

JRC technical Report (2015): Institute for Prospective Technological Studies Digital Economy Working Paper (2015-06)

(41)

The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for large samples) and we therefore report the z-value.

(42)

Both regressions explain better cross-border price differentials for letters and parcels separately compared to a regression in which we estimate the regression for letters and parcels jointly but use interaction terms to account for possible differences.

(43)

expected to be published at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/index_en.htm in October 2015

(44)

  http://www.upu.int/en/resources/postal-statistics/query-the-database.html  

(45)

  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat  

(46)

WIK (2013) Main developments in the Postal Sector 2010-2013

Note that freight services naturally involve heavier shipment the handling of which typically requires specific equipment. 31.5 kg is the weight that appears to be an appropriate threshold to distinguish the CEP market from freight as it is the weight that can be handled by one single carrier.

(47)

WIK(2014) Design and development of intiiatives to support the growth of e-commrce via better functioning delivery systems in Europe.

(48)

Ecommerce B2C report, 2015 available at: https://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/facts-figures/free-downloads  

(49)

IPC (2014) Global postal industry Report, p. 93

(50)

IPC(2014) Global Postal Industry Report, p. 93

(51)

Civic Consulting for the European Commission, Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and Internet marketing and selling techniques in the retail of goods, 2011 – the consumer welfare gains from an integrated EU market for e-commerce in goods assuming 15% share of internet retailing was estimated at EUR 204.5 billion per year (EUR 70.4 billion from lower online prices and EUR 134.1 billion from increased choice)

(52)

  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:E-commerce  

(53)

Ecommerce B2C report, 2015

(54)

Apex Insight 2015, p. 25

(55)

 ANEC (2015) "Cross border online shopping within the EU"

(56)

World Bank (2014) "Connecting to Compete 2014: Trade logistics in the global economy"

(57)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p.35

(58)

However, there is another element that needs to be taken into account; IPC (2014) points out that in the traditional segmentation one element is missing. In many cases a B2C transaction might be considered by delivery providers as purely domestic from an operational viewpoint, but it might have a hidden international component that is not always clear and obvious to the logistic partner and the external analyst. A domestic e-retailer might be importing goods form a third country, and sell them in his country. In that sense there are severe implications in the upstream and reverse logistics (from this B2B2C service) affecting the e-commerce value chain and that render the traditional segmentation not fit-for-purpose.

(59)

FTI (2011) Study on intra-community cross-border parcel delivery  

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/2011-parcel-delivery-study_en.pdf  

Copenhagen Economics (2012) Study on the pricing behavior of postal operators and its effect on postal markets

(60)

University of St Louis (2015) "Econometric Study of parcel list prices."

(61)

Eurobarometer (413), 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_413_en.pdf

(62)

Data of 2012, EU28, NACE G47.9 Retail trade not in stores, stalls or markets

(63)

 GfK for the European Commission, Consumer survey identifying the main cross-border obstacles to the DSM and where they matter most, September 2015

(64)

Copenhagen Economics(2013) "A Study for the State of Play of EU Parcel Markets with a particular emphasis on e-commerce)

(65)

ComScore(2014); UPS: a pulse of the online shopper

(66)

COM(2012) 298 final of 29 November 2012 "An integrated parcel delivery market for the growth of e-commerce in the EU" http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0698

(67)

COM(2013)883 final of 16 December 2013 "A roadmap for completing the single market for parcel delivery" http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0886  

(68)

COM(2015) 192 final of 6 May 2015 "A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe" http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/docs/dsm-communication_en.pdf  

(69)

 H53 of NACE Code, for details read: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF/dd5443f5-b886-40e4-920d-9df03590ff91?version=1.0 , page 242

(70)

WIK (2013) Main Developments in the postal Sector 2010-2013

(71)

Estimated figure: Postal statistics database, OXFORD Economics(2011): Impact of Express Carriers in Europe

(72)

WIK (2013) Main Developments in the postal Sector 2010-2013

(73)

Eurostat, Services by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, H-N, S95) [sbs_sc_1b_se_r2]

(74)

AT Kearny (2015) Europe's CEP Markets: Steady growth begins to shift

(75)

The market definition refers to network related traffic in 13 countries (including Russia and Turkey) for shipments up to 2.5 tns (therefore including freight to a certain extend).

(76)

The sector definition is more narrowly defined and limited in the parcel market (up to 31.5 kgr) and also refers to EU28

(77)

La Poste Annual Report (2014)

(78)

Market definition focusing on all CEP products

(79)

Apex Insight (2015) The European CEP market)

(80)

Market definition focuses on European countries, it excludes freight and pallet services and includes domestic and international parcels weighting up to 31,5kgr.

(81)

CE(2013) E-commerce and delivery, estimates are based on a questionnaire based survey as well as on desk research, for more info see p.97 of the report

(82)

BCG(2012) Focus on the future

(83)

Including Express and parcels delivery, weight limit up to 31.5kg/parcel, excluding same-day deliveries

(84)

Effigy (2013) a CEP Market Summary for the European Commission

(85)

This Figure was provided to the Commission by Effigy Consulting which remains the copyright holder. Accordingly, Commission Decision 2011/833/EU on the reuse of Commission documents does not apply to this information. Any requests for reproduction or further distribution should be sent to Effigy Consulting.

(86)

Effigy (2013) a CEP Market Summary for the European Commission

(87)

La Poste Annual Report (2014)

(88)

Effigy (2013) a CEP Market Summary for the European Commission

(89)

AT Kearny (2012) Growth on new terms

(90)

Apex Insight (2015) The European CEP market

(91)

Meaning, offering the entire value chain, from the point of collection to the point of the delivery

(92)

WIK(2013) Main developments in the Postal Sector, 2010-2013, p. 234-235

(93)

Section 10 of this Annex

(94)

BCG(2012) Focus on the future

(95)

This point in time is mentioned as tipping point and it is considered to be achieved when NPOs will domestically achieve 70% market share in B2C (with as much revenue from additional services as revenue from plain delivery) and 10% in B2B

(96)

Asendia (the joint venture of Swiss Post-CH and LaPoste-FR falls under this category (although for the cross border segment, as it offers predominantly international delivery solutions)

(97)

CE(2012) E-commerce and delivery

(98)

More information available at CE(2012) E-commerce and delivery, p.p. 40-42

(99)

WIK gives an estimate at 20% for 2012, CE(2012) states that this figure is 27%

(100)

WIK (2013) main developments on the postal sector 2010-2013

(101)

Glossary for postal statistics, 2014 available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/glossary-postal-statistics-pbET0415666/?CatalogCategoryID=e9gKABstGNMAAAEjQ5EY4e5L

(102)

Basic parcel services without added-value service features

(103)

possibly not even tracked nor traced

(104)

Oxford Economics (2010) The Economic Impact of Express Carriers in Europe

(105)

Glossary 2014, available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/glossary-postal-statistics-pbET0415666/?CatalogCategoryID=e9gKABstGNMAAAEjQ5EY4e5L

(106)

CE(2012) E-commerce and delivery, p. 101

(107)

AT Kearny (2012) Growth on new terms

(108)

DHL Logbook; Discover logistics, in cooperation with Technical University Darmstadt

(109)

ERGP (2015) report on the courier express and parcels segment statistics

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/ergp/index_en.htm

(110)

Effigy (2013) a CEP Market Summary for the European Commission

(111)

This Figure was provided to the Commission by Effigy Consulting which remains the copyright holder. Accordingly, Commission Decision 2011/833/EU on the reuse of Commission documents does not apply to this information. Any requests for reproduction or further distribution should be sent to Effigy Consulting.

(112)

CE(2012) E-commerce and delivery, p. 103

(113)

CE(2012), E-commerce and delivery p. 103

(114)

CE(2012) E-commerce and delivery p. 125

(115)

This Figure was provided to the Commission by Effigy Consulting which remains the copyright holder. Accordingly, Commission Decision 2011/833/EU on the reuse of Commission documents does not apply to this information. Any requests for reproduction or further distribution should be sent to Effigy Consulting.

(116)

  http://www.statista.com/statistics/235412/b2c-market-share-of-parcel-services-in-europe/  

(117)

CE Ecommerce (2012) E-commerce and delivery, p. 104

(118)

Effigy (2013) a CEP Market Summary for the European Commission

(119)

http://postandparcel.info/66800/news/update-tnt-takes-note-of-ecs-phase-ii-review/

(120)

AT Kearney (2012) Europe's CEP market: Growth on new terms

(121)

WIK (2013) Main developments Study (2010-2013)

(122)

AT Kearney (2012) Europe's CEP market: Growth on new terms

(123)

WIK (2013) Main developments in the postal Secotr (2010-2013)

(124)

AT Kearney (2015) : Europe's CEP Markets: Steady Growth begins to shift: Market Outlook p. 6

(125)

P. 121

(126)

FTI(2011) provided that distance selling in general is responsible for 2.3 bn shipments in total

(127)

we note that those estimations include freight operations to some extent

(128)

BCG(2012) Focus on the future

(129)

WIK(2013) Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013) p.223

(130)

P. 103

(131)

Apex(2015)

(132)

about 60% of the total parcel volume in Europe, if one calculate it as a share of the maximum estimated total of the CEP Market (which is 6,5bn, according to WIK (2013))

(133)

  https://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsViewer.page?ConceptType=FactSheets&id=1426321556103-109  

(134)

  http://www.dpd.co.uk/content/products_services/followmyparcel.jsp  

(135)

  http://www.royalmailgroup.com/royal-mail-helps-online-retailers-keep-shoppers-updated-their-deliveries  

(136)

  http://www.royalmailgroup.com/royal-mail-helps-online-retailers-keep-shoppers-updated-their-deliveries  

(137)

  http://www.ipc.be/  

(138)

  http://newsletter.dhl.de/11651/letterView.php?id=111689#124134  

(139)

  https://www.post.at/privat_empfangen_paket_ems_post24.php  

(140)

  http://uus.smartpost.ee/en/why-smartpost  

(141)

  https://www.doddle.it/?v=1  

(142)

  http://www.inpost24.com/en/inpost-lockers/global-reach  

(143)

  http://www.piggybee.com/en/  

(144)

http://siliconvalley.blog.lemonde.fr/2015/06/17/pour-limiter-ses-couts-amazon-testerait-un-uber-de-la-livraison/

(145)

  http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/ups_expands_b2c_presence_with_kiala_acquisition  

(146)

  https://gls-group.eu/EU/en/news-overview/strategic-alliance-in-france  

(147)

  http://postandparcel.info/59384/news/markets/dhl-express-teams-with-mondial-relay-for-french-e-commerce-delivery/  

(148)

  http://www.dpd.com/portal_de/home/news/latest_news/geopost_launches_its_new_brand_identity c

(149)

  http://www.tnt.com/corporate/en/data/press/2012/03/UPS_and_TNT_to_create_a_global_leader_in_the_logistics_industry.html  

(150)

  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-68_en.htm  

(151)

  http://postandparcel.info/65949/news/fedex-requests-eu-approval-for-tnt-bid/  

(152)

  http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/home  

(153)

  https://www.hermesworld.com/int/about-us/hermes-group/hermes-logistik-gruppe-deutschland/  

(154)

  http://www.ipc.be/~/media/documents/public/market-flash/501-600/mf514.pdf

(155)

PWC(2012) "Outlook for UK mail volumes to 2023"

(156)

Royal Mail Annual Report (2014)

(157)

RM Annual Report (2014)

(158)

  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11711534/John-Lewis-to-charge-2-for-click-and-collect.html  

(159)

  http://www.royalmailgroup.com/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%20and%20Accounts%202014-15_0.pdf  

(160)

Annual report (a presentation)

(161)

  http://postandparcel.info/57885/in-depth/yodel-strategies-to-restore-a-reputation/  

(162)

PayPoint, Annual Report for the Year Ending 31 March 2014 and Annual Report for the Year Ending 31 March 2015.

(163)

  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/392e7cd2-90e6-11e4-914a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3edOMlAW1  

(164)

Royal Mail Annual Report (2014)

(165)

  http://postandparcel.info/56588/news/companies/hermes-uk-expects-15-growth-in-parcel-volumes-this-year/  

(166)

  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11711534/John-Lewis-to-charge-2-for-click-and-collect.html  

(167)

  http://www.whistl.co.uk/  

(168)

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistl  

(169)

in May 2015 Whistl announced that it would suspend door-to-door letter mail deliveries in London, Liverpool, and Manchester, and use Royal Mail's final mile delivery service rather than their own

(170)

  http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201382160  

(171)

  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/43878128-5433-11e4-84c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3edOMlAW1  

(172)

  http://www.amazon.co.uk/b?ie=UTF8&node=6544826031  

(173)

  http://postandparcel.info/65961/news/amazon-introduces-prime-now-in-london/  

(174)

  http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/24/amazon-yodel-barclay-brothers-deal  

(175)

  http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/press/western-european-e-commerce-expected-to-reach-173.8-billion-in-2013-10-growth  

(176)

  http://www.ipc.be/~/media/documents/public/market-flash/501-600/mf502.pdf  

(177)

Annual Report (2014)

(178)

  http://postandparcel.info/64098/news/companies/la-poste-profits-down-17-7-geopost-and-banking-limits-decline/  

(179)

  http://www.geodis.com/about-us-@/en/view-1866-category.html/1864  

(180)

  http://postandparcel.info/21363/news/geodis-supports-sncf-takeover-bid/  

(181)

  http://moryglobal.com/en/group/  

(182)

  http://www.heppner.fr/en/  

(183)

Colis Prive (2014): Dossier de Presse

(184)

  http://techcrunch.com/2014/05/01/amazon-takes-a-25-stake-in-colis-prive-to-ramp-up-its-delivery-network-in-france/  

(185)

Apex Insight (2015) European Percels, Market Insight Report

(186)

  http://www.mrw.es/?id=01  

(187)

  http://www.tip-sa.com/  

(188)

http://www.tourlineexpress.com/

(189)

http://www.redur.es/

(190)

  https://www.unipost.es/en/unipost  

(191)

p. 236

(192)

  http://postandparcel.info/68553/news/poste-italiane-ipo-begins/  

(193)

http://www.nexive.it/

(194)

http://postandparcel.info/64051/news/markets/nexive-launches-e-commerce-delivery-service-in-italy/

(195)

  http://www.brt.it/en/index.do  

(196)

  http://postandparcel.info/17704/news/italian-express-company-bartolini-launches-balkan-service/  

(197)

http://www.postnl.nl/en/about-postnl/press-news/press-releases/2015/august/solid-q2-results-outlook-full-year-2015-confirmed.html

(198)

http://landmarkglobal.com/

(199)

http://postandparcel.info/65414/news/companies/polands-inpost-enters-courier-business/

(200)

  http://www.inpostpocztowokurierski.pocztowokurierski.pl/  

(201)

http://postandparcel.info/65414/news/companies/polands-inpost-enters-courier-business/

(202)

  http://www.k-ex.pl/  

(203)

http://www.apex-insight.com/european-parcels-market-growth-continues-with-fedex-and-amazon-making-key-moves/

(204)

CE Ecommerce (2012) E-commerce and delivery, p. 104

(205)

WIK (2013) Main developments Study (2010-2013)

(206)

Deutsche PostDHL Group annual report, 2014

(207)

http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/mw7qrz/express_delivery

(208)

http://www.dpdhl.com/content/dam/dpdhl/presse/mediathek/fact_sheet_dhl_en.pdf

(209)

Effigy(2013), Deutsche Post Annual report (2014) .

(210)

  http://www.kuronekoyamato.co.jp/en/business/international/ups_wwe/  

(211)

  http://postandparcel.info/65949/news/fedex-requests-eu-approval-for-tnt-bid/  

(212)

  http://postandparcel.info/64456/news/fedex-is-gearing-up-for-the-e-commerce-boom/  

(213)

 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

(214)

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom

(215)

  http://www.dpd.com/  

(216)

  http://postandparcel.info/60745/news/companies/deutsche-post-dhl-targets-growth-in-emerging-markets-and-e-commerce/  

(217)

  http://postandparcel.info/67172/news/dhl-to-establish-parcel-network-in-austria/  

(218)

Apex Insight (2015)

(219)

  https://www.myhermes.co.uk/  

(220)

  https://www.myhermes.at/wps/portal/PRIPS_AUT/  

(221)

  https://www.hermesworld.com/int/about-us/hermes-group/hermes-italia/  

(222)

published at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/statistics/index_en.htm  

(223)

  http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/the-upu.html  

(224)

University of Antwerp (2015) Cross Border Parcel Logistics

(225)

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6570_20130130_20610_4241141_EN.pdf

(226)

University of Antwerp (2015) "Cross Border Parcel Logistics"

Top

Brussels, 25.5.2016

SWD(2016) 166 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery services

{COM(2016) 285 final}
{SWD(2016) 167 final}


Annex 5: Cross-border Delivery Market Overview - continued

Private operators and NPO, Private Operators or Integrators

The public consultation has confirmed that private delivery operators who do not maintain a cross border network, or even those how do, are dependent on the network of others in order to meet the customer demand when this exists. Costs related to the cross border operations

According to the University of Antwerp meeting the needs for a B2C cross border parcel delivery requires the mobilisation of an array of resources and the deployment of an operational design that impacts heavily the cost structure of the delivery operator. Those cost drivers depend heavily on:

1) The characteristics of the e-commerce product/ collection arrangement (first and last mile logistics)

2) The behavioural characteristics of the delivery culture in the delivery destination (behavioural effect)

3) The volumes associated with each flow (scale effect) and on the capacity to jointly move letters together with parcels or B2B volumes together with B2C volumes (scope effect)

4) The degree of network optimisation (reach effect)

Figure 31. Generic B2C Cross-border parcels delivery chain

Source: University of Antwerp (2015) Cross Border Parcel Delivery Operations

On the first point the economics of the e-commerce arrangement can vary depending on the agreement each retailer has concluded with the e-retailer. Operational arrangements like collection from the warehouse of the retailer or depot-collect (i.e. the retailer transports the goods to a depot point indicated by the delivery operator) exercise an impact on the costs of the operations and are therefore reflected in the costs of the overall process.

Below a list of cost drivers and a short description on how they can influence the total operation costs of the B2C cross border delivery.

Table 18a. Products typology and cost effects

Cost effect

Delivery time windows

Deferred delivery time

Express delivery

Scheduled collection

On demand collection

Vehicle type (larger load capacity)

Track & Trace

Packaging (air)

Payment on delivery

Receipt signature

Delivery at parcel shop and post office

Delivery lockers

Unattended home delivery

Work place delivery

On the move delivery

?

Green city logistics standards

Hybrid delivery (3D or postposed printing)

Source: University of Antwerp (2015) Cross Border Parcel Delivery Operations

On the second point, the delivery culture in a given country also exercises and impact on the costs related to the operation. If for example delivery to a neighbour or unattended delivery is considered to be acceptable in the national context, this can reduce the % of failures in delivery. Cost simulations show a cost difference of 16% between attended and unattended door to door delivery and about 75% for delivery in a locker. Similar effect has the attitude towards payment-upon-delivery.

The cross border delivery costs can be influenced by the volume of parcels transported in each stage of the delivery chain. The costs per parcel can be low even when the costs per trip are high, if the factor loading increases. This element naturally influences the differences in costs in the rural vs. urban deliveries as well as the differences across countries. Cost simulation show a significant difference in the costs per parcel between urban to urban (1.6 €-3.5 € per parcel) vs. rural to rural delivery (5.4-10€ per parcel). This cost can be moderated if the operator has the capacity to combine parcel flows with the letter mail flows (NPO example of co-production) or with B2B flows (integrators example).

As a last point the degree of network optimisation influences both the per-parcel and per-trip transportation costs. If an operator (or a freight forwarded) is in a position to manage trade imbalances, this offers costs savings potentials that cannot be materialised absent the network optimisation. Costs simulations show a potential of 20-40% of cost reductions in selected trading routes if network optimisation is performed.

Prices

Cross Border Prices

A complete analysis of the cross border CEP parcels market should by no means exclude a presentation of the pricing regime that is applied in this segment of the market.

As we explained in the previous sections of this Annex, in the cross border market we identify a number of companies offering delivery services across Europe. Apart from the international integrators (DHL Express, UPS, TNT Express and FedEx) that mainly offer time definite but also day definite cross border premium delivery services across Europe and beyond European borders, we also identify operators offering pan-European coverage through an owned network and/ or through a series of partnerships with other delivery operators. Those operators offering pan-European coverage (or even regional coverage) mainly focus on the deferred (day definite, times however not being guaranteed) segment of the market however without abstaining from offering guaranteed time and day definite services. A final set of operators active in the cross border segment, is the traditional network of cooperation of the national delivery operators who offer a diversified product portfolio that, as a common denominator, includes standard cross-border parcel delivery services which, from a consumer point of view, is perceived to be as a low value basic parcel service.

A part of this cross border service offered by National Postal Operators is covered by Universal Service Obligations guaranteed by the 2008/6/EC postal directive which refer to a set of 'affordable' postal services of 'specified quality' whose provision has to be ensured by the Member States. Prices of Universal Services must be 'affordable', 'cost oriented', 'transparent' and 'non-discriminatory'.

From an initial analysis of the product specification of the various operators active in the cross border segment of the market one can see that the product (and service offering) is quite diversified. Thousands of different parcel product references, each one enriched with different product characteristics (weight, dimensions, and pairs of destinations) as well as different value added features are offered by tens of delivery operators. This creates a very difficult price setting to analyse.

The European Commission, in the case COMP/M. 6570 – UPS/ TNT Express merger case 1 , concludes that (at least for the purposes of that particular case) express (time definite) and deferred services constitute separate markets, in the sense that operators active predominantly in one of each segment are not directly competing with each other. Therefore for a horizontal price analysis like the one that we will undertake for the purposes of this exercise it would be more relevant if one could include product references that address relevant product segments.

For the purposes of this particular analysis, and as, the focus of this Impact Assessment is the B2C e-commerce related cross border parcel flows, we will mainly focus on the cross border prices of the low-value (deferred and standard) segment of the market and focus on the products that address this segment of the market.

To do this the European Commission has collected and validated a list of about 12 000 list prices from domestic and cross border parcel (mainly) products in order to better understand the cross border parcel price offering in Europe today 2 . The focus of this data gathering was the public tariffs offered by 25 National Postal Operators (data form national operators form EU28 countries except for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Estonian Post). We note that most operators participating in the analysis include in their parcel portfolio express products in addition to the standard and/ or deferred products they offer. For the sake of completeness of the analysis we will cover this segment of the market in the analysis below, to the extent that the availability of information allows us to do so.

From the raw data several price examples showed already significant differences in bilateral pricing of cross-border parcels by some NPOs. It showed also that comparable origin countries may apply different cross-border prices to same destination countries:

Based on the collected data an econometric study has been carried out on a selected group of products. The starting point from this study was the FTI 3 (2011) analysis, who, after studying the packet, parcel, and the express products of 28 national postal operators, confirmed that business that sent low parcel volumes infrequently or reside in the peripheral countries and non-urban areas pay unjustifiably higher prices for their shipments. High prices result in low volumes and less competition create a viscus cycle preventing growth in this segment of the market. The FTI analysis has demonstrated evidence to show that cross border price differentials (i.e. the difference of the list cross border prices vs. a theoretical fair benchmark price level that could relate to the actual costs of the cross border delivery) are on average 40% higher for packets, 55% higher for parcels and 61% higher for express products within the six largest CEP markets (Germany, UK, France the Netherlands, Spain and Italy) and 47% for packets, 65% for parcels and 61% for express within the rest of Europe 4 . This element raises doubts to the underlying cost orientation of prices the national postal operators apply to their cross border products, especially for the countries of the periphery. Factors that were found to explain these observed differentials are scale (i.e. volumes that one operator sends to the other), competition in the country of origin of the parcel mail (the higher the choice for the sender the lower the level of the price), and cross border competition (in cross border flows within the six larges CEP markets, differentials were found to be significantly lower). FTI (2011) concluded that their results seem to suggest that there is market power in the cross border market for small and infrequent senders which partially stems from the ability of national postal operators to maintain high list prices and therefore their ability not to pass cost savings on to customers and to keep high termination rates.

Copenhagen Economics, who provided an analysis of price developments in the postal products (included parcels), have highlighted in their study 5 that parcel prices have increased faster than the inflation. Although volumes of parcels seem to have been increased, parcel prices contrary to what would have been expected did not decrease. Copenhagen Economics found that between 2001 and 2011, real prices for bulk parcels increased by 7 % in Western Europe, whereas prices in Eastern and Southern Europe increased by 57 %. This trend was less pronounced for single piece parcels. Between 2001 and 2011, prices increased by 21 % in Western Europe (three times more than bulk parcels) whereas they increased by 35 % in Southern and Eastern Europe. According to Copenhagen Economics, these figures reflect the fact that the small customers or infrequent senders either have no alternative to the USP, lack relevant information about possible alternatives, or cannot enjoy quantity discounts that are often being offered to large volume customers.

Against this background the European Commission has commissioned the University of Saint-Louis Bruxelles, to provide an econometric analysis of the above mentioned dataset 6 . The dataset consists of standard and premium 7 parcels and letters in various weights 8 . This gives a total of 40 products per country (16 letter products and 24 parcel products). 9

The objective of this analysis was to better understand the size, and causes of the differences between cross-border prices and domestic prices paid by small, infrequent senders when they use the national postal operator to send goods abroad. In particular, the analysis aims at identifying whether published domestic and cross-border prices for parcels and larger letters would be relatively 10 different compared to the domestic equivalent depending on certain product characteristics such as weight, type of product (standard of premium), zoning strategy, and distance to the destination, as well as to investigate the extent to which other explanatory factors such as competitive conditions, scale, real expenditure, labor cost can affect the price differentials.

The study reaches the following conclusions:

1.cross border letter prices are on average about 3.5 times higher than their domestic equivalent and cross border parcel prices are about 5 times higher than their domestic equivalent in all products categories (standard or premium products).

To illustrate this we present an overview of the domestic prices versus their international equivalent for a 2 kg standard and premium letter and parcel. Both prices refer to a residential product which is delivered at home in each country of reference. The cross border price is constructed as a weighted average 11 of all cross prices of an international product delivered into 25 European destinations 12 . All prices refer to published list prices, i.e. net of discounts or volume rebates.

Figure 32 - Domestic and (weighted average) cross-border prices for 2 kg Standard Letters 13 .

Figure 33 -. Domestic and (weighted average) cross-border prices for 2kg Premium Letters.

Figure 14 - Domestic and (weighted average) cross-border prices for 2kg Standard Parcels.

Figure 35 -. Domestic and (weighted average) cross-border prices for 2kg Premium Parcels.



2.Weight has a significant effect on the cross-border price differential. Higher weights lead to higher price differentials. This could be an indication that volume is inversely related to weight, leading to higher unit cross-border costs, and/or lower cross-border competition for heavier products.

3. Interestingly, parcels have, on average, higher cross-border price differentials than letters and premium products have, on average, lower cross-border price differentials. One explanation for that the finding is that premium parcels face historically more competition than in the standard parcel segment, therefore this drives differentials down.

4.    Having one single tariff (one cross border zone) has no significant effect on the relative cross-border price differential neither for letters nor for parcels.

5.The coefficient for parcels between countries in the periphery 14 is positive. That means that smaller and less connected cross-border mail operators charge higher cross-border prices. Larger and highly connected mail markets lead to a reduction of the relative cross-border price benchmark. On the contrary, the "periphery effect" is not proven to be significant for letters, fact that it is normal, as most countries apply a single zone for this segment.

6.Larger well connected cross-border markets 15 may reduce unit costs due to larger volumes, while at the same time leaving room for more competition, again, possibly implying that more competition reduces, ceteris paribus, the benchmark cross-border price differential.. As expected, the coefficient for those countries is negative and very significant, implying that larger and well connected countries set lower cross border prices to each other.

7.There is indirect evidence in favor of the hypothesis that vertical integration decreases cross-border prices. Both dummies for the UK & France show significantly negative sign for all letter and most parcel categories. This could indicate that La Poste and Royal Mail consumers (including UK and French eretailers and foreign buyers) benefit from lower cross border prices for all EU destinations. Another way to interpret this result is that termination rates are not determined in the same way (are higher than) than the transfer prices between the outbound subsidiary and inbound subsidiary of the same operator. Vertically integrated firms have an incentive to set transfer prices on an arm’s length basis (reflecting marginal cost) to maximize joint profits.

8.The "neighboring effect" (i.e. countries which share a common border) affects cross-border parcels prices negatively, ceteris paribus, but letter cross border prices positively. The positive border effect in the letter segment is rather surprising, but it may just indicate that countries with more neighbors have on average higher differentials.

9.Population density of the sending country affects negatively cross border differentials for parcels but not for letters. Population density in the destination country has no significant effect on the cross-border price differential. In other words, lower average variable costs do not seem to have an effect on the termination rates charged by the destination country’s operator.

10.Higher labor costs in the sending country decreases the cross-price differential in a very significant way, which is expected when prices reflect costs: higher unit costs have a proportionally higher impact on domestic prices than on cross-border prices in the sending country.

11.The effect of higher international (destination) labor costs is not significantly different from zero. This could indicate that the receiving country’s operator’s (labor) costs have little influence on the cross-border price and hence do not seem to affect the termination rates. In other words, one may interpret this insignificant coefficient as an indication that termination rates do not fully reflect unit variable costs.

12.The maturity of postal liberalization in a country matters, as it leads statistically to lower cross border price differentials for letters and higher differentials for parcels, implying that there is a strong disciplining effect on domestic letter post products that were not subject to competition until recent years.

13.Bilateral online trade seems to matter only on the ‘import’ side: the higher the sending country’s share of the destination country’s online “imports”, the lower the cross-border price. Higher incoming volume leads to both lower average fixed costs and more competition for this volume in the destination country. There seems to be evidence that the sending operator benefits through lower termination rates, which in return generate lower prices.

Relative price differentials as identified by the study are presented below:

Table 17. Relative cross-border price differentials and zoning strategies: International Standard Letters (ISL)    

Source: Vergote W. Claes A (2015)

Table 18 - Relative cross-border price differentials and zoning strategies: International Premium Letters (IPL)

Source: Vergote W. Claes A (2015)

Table 19- Relative cross-border price differentials and zoning strategies: International Standard Parcels (ISP)

Source: Vergote W. Claes A (2015)

Table 20- Relative cross-border price differentials and zoning strategies: International Premium Parcels (IPP)

Source: Vergote W. Claes A (2015)

Concluding remarks

With respect to relative cross border versus domestic price differentials, The University of Saint-Louis found statistical evidence suggesting that:

Cross border letter prices are on average 3.5 times higher that their domestic equivalent and cross border parcel prices are on average about 5 times higher that their domestic equivalent

Zoning strategies do not affect cross-border price differentials

Parcels lead to higher cross-border price differentials than letters

Premium products to lower differentials than standard products

Weight increases the price differentials

Cross-border price differentials increase in flows between periphery countries and decrease in flows between the six largest Western European countries, as far as parcels are concerned.

There is evidence suggesting that vertical integration seems to decrease price differentials indirectly.

Letter differentials and parcel differentials are explained by different factors, highlighting the differences in the market structure and maturity of competition between the two distinct product segments (scale, density of population, liberalization etc.).

Labor costs in the destination country, although being a large component of the cost structure of the cross border parcel delivery service do not seem to statistically influence cross border differentials, contrary to the domestic leg of the cost structure.

Termination Rates and Termination Agreements

Termination Rates can be defined as the levels of remuneration each operator receives for delivering the international mail of another operator in the country where they are based 16 .

As we identified in the section above, CE 17 (2013) identify 6 collaborative models for cross border delivery: NRO+NPO, NPO + foreign subsidiary, NPO + private courier, Private Operator +NPO or Private Partner and finally Private Operator + Private Operator.

The termination rates are particularly relevant for our analysis in the cases when there are two separate entities .responsible for fulfilling the international delivery, and less relevant when a delivery operator cooperates in order to fulfil the international delivery with an affiliate company or a subsidiary established in the destination country.

The termination rates are analysed briefly in this annex, as they are identified as a distinct and measurable cost element of the cross border delivery value chain that is linked with the cost of the final mile of delivery, the operational characteristics of each type international delivery and of course has implications (direct or indirect) in the final price of the cross border product and/ or in the profitability of the cross border segment. At the same time independent studies have suggested that the remuneration levels of some postal operators is not always reflecting the costs of providing delivery service one to another, which creates in turn some distortive effects in the mail and parcel flows and product balance.

The determination of the remuneration of postal operators involved in the delivery of international mail of postal operators that do not have direct (or indirect – through a subsidiary or an affiliated company) presence in the country of destination, are usually determined via a set of bilateral or multilateral international contractual agreements. The extent to which, the details governing those agreements are publically available depends on the type of agreement. It is not an exaggeration to say that the rules and the actual remuneration levels are kept highly confidential to a large extent and therefore the analysis that will be presented in this chapter will be based on a secondary research of public studies and inevitably cannot be detailed.

Before presenting the type of agreements that are known to govern the remuneration of the delivery operators, we will have to make two points of clarification:

The type of agreement applied is largely dependent on the type of postal product involved in the cross border delivery. An example for that example is the following: Some parcels are sent through the letter mail stream of the national postal operators. There are a number of reasons that can motivate this choice, one of which is the levels of remuneration that will be paid to the partner operator.

Most multinational agreements that will be presented in the sections that follow govern the NPO+NPO type of transaction (according to the CE(2013) classification above) which consists of a non-negligible part of the standard-deferred cross border B2C segment of the market.

Analysis to be added

The Terminal Dues system

The UPU terminal dues system is a two tier system open only to the members of the UPU 18 (in Europe they are the designated national postal operators of all EU28 Member States). It defines the remuneration for the distribution of cross border letter mail for industrialised and developing countries on the basis of a target system and transitional system.

It takes into account a series of parameters such as 19 per item and per kilogram rates, domestic tariffs, incentives for quality and a set of per item and per kilogram caps and floors.

Although amongst the factors that determine the remuneration there is a component of domestic price, according to CE(2013) the caps and floors applied for the target countries are so close to each other that in most of the cases result in a fixed rate, rather than a variable rate (depending on th domestic national price) (per kilogram or per item). Therefore, in this case the UPU system fails to be country specific and is not linked to the actual cost of the last mile transactions.

According to CE (2014) this creates a series to distortions as regards parcels:

The current system of UPU terminal dues increases demand for delivery services covered by the system relative to services outside the system. This leads to excessive use of packet delivery services at the expense of parcel delivery services.

In the cases when terminal dues are set at a level below the cost of last-mile activities, this distorts competition among last-mile operators, that is, service providers who compete for intercity transport, sorting, and delivery of (small packet) mail in the destination country.

The structure of current terminal dues also leads to distortions in mail and trade flows by increasing demand for less efficient cross-border delivery of letter post6 (including packets).

According to CE 20 (2013), 19% of products bought online (and require physical delivery) are shipped as packets (200g-2kg). UPU claims that 80% of e-commerce shipments weigh less than 2 kilos 21 . So, in the absence of any other alternative, they can potentially fall under the UPU terminal dues system (if their dimensions allow them to be regarded as letter mail).

In the case of intra-EEA cross border parcel delivery Europe, however it is unlikely that this remuneration system is highly relevant for our analysis, as in the absence of an equivalent multinational agreement between operators (see REIMS below), bilateral agreements are usually concluded between operators to cover most of the volume exchange between operators. The results of the public consultation confirmed this statement above; although certain operators report that the UPU terminal .dues system is still relevant at least for certain pairs of exchange between countries.

The Inward land rates system

As in the case of UPU Terminal dues systems, the ILS (inward land rates) are rates payable for the delivery of cross border parcels by the designated operator within the meaning of UPU rules 22 . The ILR rate is based on a UPU base rate that is more or less a flat charge per parcel to be delivered including a variable charge per weight step of the consignment. This second leg of the charge is determined unilaterally by the different postal operators and is paid regardless of the Quality of Service, although the system includes some incentives to quality in the form of bonus payments.

The system results to higher remuneration than the cost of the service, therefore (and according to FTI(2011)) could potentially benefit operators that send more cross border parcel mail than what they are called to deliver, by resulting in more (net) revenues. As the ILRs are determined unilaterally by the delivery operators, they also result in higher cross border charges (that are set by the sending operator who are called to cover the costs of the overall transaction) fact that again raises doubts on the cost orientation of the final cross border prices offered to the customer.

However, according to an estimate provided by UPU cross border parcels account for only a small percentage of cross border packages, therefore termination rates for letter post items (UPU terminal dues) has a much greater effect on the market for cross border packages than the terminal dues for parcels (ILR) 23 .

As in the case of terminal dues, also the ILR are widely not used amongst European postal operators, as either other multinational agreements are instead put in place, or because bilateral agreements are considered to be either more flexible or fairer (i.e. more cost oriented). The results of the public consultation confirmed this statement above; although certain operators report that the ILR system is still relevant at least for certain pairs of exchange between countries

The REIMS System

The REIMS termination rates system is an agreement that is effective between postal operators (amongst which some of the largest EU28 national postal operators) for the determination of the remuneration of the cross border delivery services they provide one another.

The formula determining the amount of the remuneration is heavily based on a fraction 24 of the domestic price and it includes incentives for improving the quality of service 25 .

The European Commission adopted a decision in 1999 and another one in 2003 allowing this agreement to come into force 26 , in the light of certain public benefits subject to the condition that any third party could also access the terms and conditions of this agreement. According to IMX CEO, IMX France is the only company benefiting from the favourable conditions of the REIMS agreement (at least until 2011 27 ). The REIMS agreement is kept confidential; therefore no further information can be disclosed and it cannot be verified to what extent the rates resulting from the REIMS agreement are now cost-oriented and non-discriminatory 28 . It is believed that currently all USPs of the EU28 take part in the REIMS agreement apart from the national postal operators of Bulgaria and Romania 29 .

REIMS agreement affects the pricing scheme of the parcel products; to the extent (as in the case of the UPU termination rates) B2C e-commerce parcels are shipped as packets and therefore delivered through the letter mail stream. Again, according to CE, 19% of products bought online (and require physical delivery) are shipped as packets (200g-2kg). UPU claims that 80% of e-commerce shipments weigh less than 2 kilos 30 , and therefore could potentially be shipped as packets through the letter mail stream (if their dimensions allow them to be regarded as letter mail).

The EMS System 31  

The EMS is a platform coordinated by the UPU to offer the possibility for a cross border express premium delivery service in addition to the standard parcel service traditionally exchanged between national postal operators.

An EMS package typically involves priority handling, end to end tracking signature upon delivery and delivery at the home or premises of the recipient. According to FTI(2011) all UPU members, are members of the EMS cooperative but Austria, Denmark France Germany and the Netherlands, who have nonetheless concluded arrangements for an inward EMS delivery service.

The lack of information on contractual terms and conditions of the EMS co-operative and the lack of data related to volumes means that we cannot provide any judgment on the pricing structure resulting from this agreement.

The EPG 32 System

An equivalent to the EMS, the EPG (after Enhanced Parcel Group but currently called the E-Parcel Group) was created in 1996 initially to facilitate the B2B priority shipments between the IPC members. Although it created as a B2B service, it has been expanded to cover all cross border parcels by using an end-to –end tracking system and after sales services.

The EPG are delivery agreements that are based on the traffic profile of each operators, therefore there are higher chances to be reflecting certain delivery and performance standards 33 .

As in the case of the EMS platform, also in the EPG platform, the data related to the volumes, the remuneration formulas and the terms and conditions of the interconnection agreements are all strictly confidential to its members, therefore, we cannot make any judgments on their potential effects in the overall pricing scheme of cross border parcel products.

Bilateral Agreements

As we explained previously, it seems quite likely that in many cases, cross border deliveries are governed by bilateral agreements between postal operators that would contain the terms conditions and remuneration levels of each pair of cross border transaction. This pattern should probably also be followed by non-NPOs that wish to collaborate with other operators to preform cross border deliveries, or by NPOs cooperating with private operators who do not wish to team up with other NPOs for a series of reasons (like quality or price concerns).

Last, but not least, the choice of cross-border delivery partner is affected by the presence of own delivery networks. For example, PostNL is operating own B2C network in Belgium and choses therefore not to co-operate with Bpost. Royal Mail is using their own subsidiary GLS for deliveries in Belgium so there is no use setting up better tracking between Royal Mail and Bpost. The same goes for postal operators’ individual International Mail and Parcels divisions (Bpost International Mail, Asendia, DHL Global Mail etc) 34 .

Contractual arrangements are confidential in nature, but they are more likely to be based on market tested conditions. The general rule is that the sending operator keeps the profits, and the contracts are administered by the signatories themselves 35 . In this case, the negotiating power of each one of the two contracting parties generated by the total mail balance between the two operators might influence the outcome and the conditions set by each specific contract. In theory high sending operators could minimise termination rates (that are otherwise set through multinational agreements) on their benefit. The FTI(2011) report that it is still remaining inconclusive as to what extent reductions from termination rates achieved through bilateral contracts actually are passed on to the cross border prices (that are in fact set by the sending operator) and therefore it still remains inconclusive as to what extent they benefit the final user of the delivery service, especially if it is a small or infrequent user of those services.

Article 13 of the Postal Services Directive sets out the principles to which Member States' universal service providers should follow terminal rates for cross-border services. It requires Member States to apply the principles of cost orientation, remuneration related to quality of service, transparency and non-discrimination in agreements on terminal dues for cross-border postal services transactions.

Conclusions from the consultation

The consultation has shed some light on the actual balance of the cross border pricing arrangements between postal operators who cooperate in order to fulfil and international (intra EEA) cross border delivery for packets and parcels. It is rather the rule than the exception that each operator utilises more than one type of pricing agreements depending on the country that the cross border shipment is addressed and of course the type of the consignment (letters or parcels). It is very common that an operator uses for example at the same time the REIMS agreement the UPU agreement for the distribution of their packets, and the ILR agreements the EPG agreement for the distribution of parcels. Many operators have replied that, at least for the more important counterparts, they have negotiated directly bilateral pricing agreements.

According to the consultation, when it comes to the NPOs, the level of the termination rates is the most significant factor affecting the cross border price setting of the sending operators that responded to this specific question, followed by transportation and handling costs respectively.

2. Sustainable Developments

This chapter provides an overview of social and environmental aspects of the EU CEP market, with emphasis on cross-border parcel delivery, based on recent evidence, studies and reports.

1.1.Social Aspects

As the CEP market is identified as a distinct segment that intrinsically belongs in the Postal Sector 36 (see Introduction), this section will start with a brief contextual overview of recent developments in overall postal employment. This will be followed by a more detailed presentation of key social aspects in the CEP segment, especially in a European cross-border context, where possible.

As regards the methodology in this section, the diversity of employment and working conditions in the CEP sector is difficult to quantify for several reasons: First, because there is no generally agreed and accepted definition of the CEP sector. Secondly, because of lack of reliable employment data for the sub-segments concerned. A quantification of net employment effects in the CEP market is therefore not possible here and our analysis of CEP employment developments is mainly qualitative.

1.1.1.Postal employment

Employment in the postal sector has undergone significant restructuring in recent years impacted by several parallel developments: 37

First, the key economic development driving restructuring is the decreasing letter mail volumes and revenues as a result of e-substitution and changing consumer and business behaviour.

Second, technological advances, especially digitisation, have brought about modernisation, automation of sorting procedures and efficiency improvements with impact on job profiles, tasks and skills needed of postal workers.

Third, postal market opening has created new opportunities, as well as challenges, in a competitive environment for national postal operators and new market entrants which impact on their business models, the provision of services and products, and also on employment. Significant restructuring, including job losses but also job creation, has taken place especially in those Member States that opened their postal markets to competition later. 38

In response to these challenges, many postal operators are taking steps to create a more flexible workforce better adapted to declining letter volumes, while carrying out efficiency enhancement, quality improvement, and cost-optimisation programmes. Measures to reduce delivery costs of the last mile and the outsourcing of postal activities have also had a strong impact on employment. Some USPs have diversified their business activities into new markets and services, creating new employment. In addition, there is a shift in the mix of postal products and services, while the traditional postal core business, the letters business, is decreasing. 39

Overall postal employment, especially USP employment, allocated both in the letter and parcel segment of the market, has decreased as a result of these developments. Based on the most recent data available, overall, postal employment decreased on average by 4.4% in the EU28 between 2012 and 2013 and several universal service providers reduced employment by over 8% over the same period (see figure below). . 40  

Figure 36 - Employment Change in Universal Service Providers between 2012-2013 41

 

Source: European Commission Postal Statistics Database

Nevertheless, despite reductions in the work force, Universal Service Providers continue to employ directly about 1.2 million people. In some Member States the postal operators still have a notable proportion of employment, in particular in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Finland (see figure below). 42  

Figure 37 - Share of Universal Service Providers' domestic employment as percentage of total employment in EU Member States, 2013 43

 

Source: European Commission Postal Statistics Database

Together with the European express industry 44 , which is estimated to directly employ about 272.000 workers 45 , postal sector employment would reach about 1.5 million people in the EU28 making the postal sector one of the largest employers in the EU. 46

1.1.2.CEP employment

In contrast to shrinking letter post markets, the courier, express and parcel market is growing significantly (see Introduction), with a positive impact on employment. The demand for parcel delivery services is linked to strong growth in e-commerce, especially in the B2C segment, to the benefit of employment in the CEP market.

The express industry, which is estimated to support a total of 579,000 jobs (directly, indirectly and through induced employment ) across the EU, provides an illustrative example in this case: 47 The European express operators employ people and use goods and services in each of the countries in which they operate, which creates a ripple effect down the supply chain with direct and indirect economic impacts 48 :

The express industry employs directly over 272,000 people 49 , and through its own activities it generates €10.3 billion of EU GDP. 

Through purchasing goods and services from other European companies, the express industry supports indirectly a further 191,000 European jobs, and generates a further €8.4 billion of GDP to the European economy.

Spending on European goods and services by the above mentioned 463,000 workers, who are either directly or indirectly employed by the express industry, supports a further 116,000 European jobs, so called induced employment, and generates a further €4.7 billion to the EU’s GDP. Based on existing growth rates, the express industry is expected to directly employ 300,000 people by 2020, up by 10 per cent from current levels. 50

The overall net effect on CEP employment from increasing parcel volumes, restructuring, and market opening is however difficult to quantify, because of lack of definition of the CEP sector and unavailability of relevant employment data for the sub-segments. Strong growth in e-retailing indicates that employment in the CEP market can be expected to further grow in the future. An optimistic outlook is supported by a recent survey on European on-line merchants' expectations on future cross-border sales: The e-commerce sector is one of the few European industries that has experienced non-stop double-digit growth. For merchants, there are still plenty of opportunities for growth by expanding into new European markets. Breaking down barriers to cross-border e-commerce in particular could have the potential to create millions of extra jobs by 2020. 51

Type of employment and working conditions

Overall there has been a move towards more flexible employment contracts, for example part-time employment, temporary agency employment or even self-employment. 52 This trend in the postal sector towards non-standard employment contracts is consistent with more general trends towards such flexible forms of employment in the wider economy. The extent and the type of flexible employment in the Member States is determined largely by demand for such contracts but also by national or sectoral social and labour legislation. While such contracts may be appealing to employees seeking flexibility, 'flexible' contracts may also provide less job security and lower wages than permanent full time employees at the universal service provider.

As regards the postal sector specifically, the development is linked to the fact that operators are seeking to reduce costs and to respond to falling letter volumes although some employees may prefer more flexible contracts which enable them to balance work with caring responsibilities. 53 Labour costs form a significant part of most postal operators' costs, more than half in the majority of USPs. This share has declined in some Member States, where automation has increased.

The type and extent of flexible employment conditions differ depending on the players (or employers) active in the B2C and B2B cross-border delivery of products bought on-line. Some countries have many operators of different types, whereas other countries have only the national postal operator and the international integrators. 54 The national postal operators account on average for about 20% of the CEP market, mainly attributed to their focus on the B2C segment, whereas the express operators have a strong market presence in the B2B segment. 55 Four global providers (DHL, FedEx, TNT and UPS), or so called ‘integrators’, are the largest international operators in the European express market, but there are also many alternative operators in this highly competitive sector (see Introduction). 56  

Working conditions and employment relations for similar type of function can differ substantially depending on employer: they are different for persons employed by the national postal service providers, couriers directly employed by a competing service provider, couriers employed by a subcontractor of the service provider, and self-employed drivers without employment contracts.

The average share of part-time employees in USPs has largely remained stable at 20 per cent since 2002, though this average masks differences between Member States. 57 The response to a recent public consultation on cross-border parcel delivery also indicates predominantly standard employment contracts in National Postal Operators (NPOs): All NPOs responding stated that they employed 60% or more of their staff full time outside peak seasons, with several employing all parcel delivery staff full time. The range of staff outsourced varied from none to 100%. Where significant proportions were not outsourced, upwards of 80% were usually employed on permanent, rather than temporary contracts. The policy for managing seasonal peaks in activity included employees doing overtime as well as engaging casual staff, sometimes on fixed term seasonal contracts and outsourcing.  58

In contrast the number of full staff employed outside peak seasons by the other delivery operators responding ranged from 54% to 100% and the proportion of permanent staff ranged from 17% to 100% (for other delivery operators). Temporary staff was the favoured solution by other operators for managing labour needs at peak times.  59

Non-standard employment contracts are already commonly used by other operators, who also use subcontractors and self-employed delivery staff. According to a study on employment and working conditions in the European postal markets, self-employment and the use of subcontractors is widespread, especially in the parcel and express industry. 60 Even though there is a lack of country-wide data, case studies suggest that a significant part of delivery activities are carried out by subcontractors and self-employed individuals, which has consequences for employment and working conditions. Self-employment is often the result of outsourcing in which global players contract service partners for delivery activities. The service-partners in turn hire local self-employed drivers to carry out the delivery tasks. 61

For example, in Germany, many competitors do not use their own delivery personnel but outsource delivery to business partners, in some cases even outsourcing sorting activities. 62

In some cases regulatory measures have been introduced: in the Netherlands the vast majority of mail deliverers at the new competitors were self-employed until government regulations forced the companies to transform at least 80 per cent of the contracts into regular employment relationships. 63  

With self-employment, an increasing proportion of the postal-sector workforce risks being formally excluded from trade union and works-council representation. The problem is not only the difference between former national postal operators and their competitors, but also the increasingly diffuse boundaries of the postal sector and fragmentation of collective agreements. With the expansion of parcels and express services, transport sector companies, with sector-specific labour agreements, have also become active in the distribution of postal items. 64

Wages and working conditions at Universal Service Providers tend to be covered by collective labour agreements and working conditions are strongly regulated in all EU Member States. Collective agreements are however less common for other postal service providers. Where they do not exist new market entrants agree individually on wages and working conditions with employees, though in some Member States such as Austria and Italy, collective labour agreements of neighbouring sectors apply (e.g. transport or trade sector). 65

Nevertheless, for example international integrators apply corporate social responsibility, which includes social benchmarks. The challenge is rather for small subcontractors to implement social minimum standards as higher wages will impact on the labour costs of parcel service providers. 66  

Gender balance of employee profiles depends on the business mix of the operator. In the parcels and express business segment operators tend to have a higher proportion of male employees, for example all international integrators (TNT Express, FedEx, UPS and DHL) have female employee shares below 30%. 67

Social inclusion

Social inclusion is an important aspect of well-functioning delivery services. This implies that certain services are made available to all consumers and users in a Member State, regardless of their geographical location. Especially the last mile of delivery is crucial for social inclusion of rural and remote areas. Evidence suggests that there are important differences in terms of the availability of delivery services between different EU Member States and different regions within the same Member State to the detriment of consumers living in less accessible areas. This imbalance risks jeopardising the potentially positive socio-economic effects of e-commerce, providing access to a wide choice of goods and services for people who would otherwise not benefit from the single market to the same degree. 68  

According to a recent study on parcel delivery issues faced by online shoppers across the UK, which is the biggest national online market in the EU, delivery issues are a particular problem for consumers living in remote and island areas, such as: higher cost for delivery; longer delivery time; no delivery to consumers’ area; free delivery offered but not available, and a reduced number of premium delivery options. The detriment caused by these issues is not confined to online shoppers, online retailers are also missing out on revenue that could be generated from sales in these areas. 69

Another recent study concludes that national postal operators (in Denmark, Finland and Norway) are facing a major challenge to fulfil their universal service obligation in remote and peripheral areas in the future, due to a declining population and decreasing letter mail volumes. 70 E-commerce is growing with more demand for parcel delivery, which will require innovative parcel delivery solutions for remote and peripheral areas. 71  

1.2.Environmental aspects

This section presents an overview of key environmental issues in the EU CEP market and CEP operators' approaches to reduce their carbon footprint and to promote a sustainable environment, with focus on cross-border parcel delivery.

To have an idea of the scale of cross-border parcel deliveries, it is useful to reiterate some key parameters of the CEP market: in EU28 in 2011, together with the letter post segment, the overall CEP market was responsible for a total of 91 billion of shipments (see Introduction). 72

Cross-border courier, parcel and express delivery in the EU, including B2B and B2C, still represent only 15% of total EU shipments. Most parcel and express traffic is domestic with five Member States (Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain) accounting for 70% of the total EU parcel and express market. 73 The European express delivery sector delivered around 269 million intra-EU cross-border shipments, where the shipment’s origin and destination were both within the EU27. 74

Cross-border courier, express and parcel delivery is achieved by using a variety of transport modes: such as, lorries, vans, and aircraft. Rail transport is used by only a few countries, for example Sweden, in cross-border postal services. Where possible, the CEP delivery industry uses surface transport modes. Air transport is only used where there are no other options available to meet same day and next-day delivery requirements. 75

Express delivery companies are also involved in pilot projects investigating the potential use of high-speed trains in express networks, together with the use of electric, bio-ethanol and hybrid cars. For urban distribution, the express industry is aiming at optimising its pick-up and delivery route planning and operating in an efficient way. 76

In Europe, road transport is an important transport mode in cross-border parcel and express delivery, which is reflected in the CEP operators’ environmental policy priorities. Transport logistics is a volume business, where environmental impacts and costs can be reduced through increasing cross-border volumes and parcel flows. As mentioned in the introduction of this annex, freight and logistics services are excluded in this Impact Assessment Report. However given transport's intrinsic part in parcel and express delivery services, this section therefore also refers to transport in the context of environmental sustainability.

CEP operators have an impact on the environment, mainly in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, noise and air pollution, and paper wasting. Most CO2 emissions are the result of using road transport, aviation and heating of buildings. In order to reduce the carbon footprint and to promote a sustainable environment, CEP operators in Europe have undertaken several measures. A review of major CEP operators in Europe shows that all are implementing policies to increasing environmental sustainability and reducing their carbon footprint, especially in road transport, for example:  77  

International Integrators (e.g. DHL, TNT Express, UPS and Fedex): All major integrators have dedicated environmental policies addressing issues, such as energy and carbon efficiency, network optimisation, eco-driving, and increasing environmental awareness among their employees and subcontractors (ex. Deutsche Post DHL "GoGreen Programme", TNT Express Corporate Responsibility Framework, UPS "Committed to More programme", and Fedex "EarthSmart").

National Postal Operators (NPOs): More than half of the NPOs are implementing measures to reduce energy consumption and CO2 emissions, and to improve the performance of the transport fleet by eco-driving schemes and using bio and other alternative fuels. The majority of NPOs are also members of information networks to improve their environmental performance, such as the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Programme, established by PostEurope, and the IPC Environmental Measurement and Monitoring System.

Parcels express and courier operators (eg. Hermes/DE, Yodel/UK, Nightline/IE, MRW/ES etc.): Measures to reduce negative environmental impacts include, for example, reduction of annual trucking miles and fuel consumption, electric vehicle fleet, solar powered facilities, and recycled waste. (Ex. Hermes' Sustainability Programme "We Do!").

Several drivers are pushing the CEP operators to adopt sustainable delivery modes: In addition to regulatory drivers (e.g. compliance with EU regulations on carbon emissions), retailers’ and consumers’ demands for more sustainable delivery options are increasingly becoming a competitiveness driver pushing to act.

For example, Ecommerce Europe is in favour of freight consolidation of capacity between retailers, as it will improve the trucks fill ratio and also reduce the environmental impact of deliveries. 78 Out of 1.62 billion tons of truck emissions in Europe, almost one quarter are caused by trucks running empty, sometimes due to legal requirements. 79

Consumers are also becoming more aware of environmental aspects in their purchasing decisions. Operators are responding to this through greater emphasis on customisation and quality of service, i.e. more convenient, green and flexible parcel delivery services,.

Particular attention is given to the carbon intensity of “last mile deliveries”, i.e. deliveries of goods from local depots to home, especially when there is a home delivery failure and goods have to be redelivered or the recipient has to collect them from a depot. Environmental and economic concerns push the delivery operators and public actors to rethink the supply chain models in urban areas and to establish sustainable urban logistics plans. 80  

According to a German study, delivery services provided by CEP operators for retail and online trade are an indispensable part of sustainable city logistics: they combine deliveries avoiding traffic and contribute to reducing the environmental impact of the last mile. 81  

Complementing green innovations in transportation, enhanced efficiency in warehousing is also crucial to reducing carbon emissions in the delivery network. The savings potential is evident, when considering that up to 80 % of the energy used in warehouses is consumed by electrical lighting. 82

Electric, bio-ethanol and other alternative-fuel vehicles are the main focus of achieving environmental technological progress in the CEP industry. Although good progress has been made, the technology is still not at a stage where it is able to significantly impact the sector’s reliance on fossil fuels, as these vehicles often do not have the necessary range for intermediate and long-range journeys. In addition, national infrastructure in terms of service stations for electric vehicles and the supply of biofuel are not yet available allowing alternative fleets to be operational on an economically viable scale. 83 Responding to these environmental challenges will require long-term investments, building on smart use of existing technologies and collaboration. 84

Outlook

Although European CEP Markets presented continuous growth in the last years; studies do not identify yet clear indications of maturity. European B2C markets are expected to continue to grow and operators are expected to continue focusing their investments to service this segment of the market. At the same time AT Kearny (2015) estimate that international will continue to grow faster than express and also international standard will out pass international express, especially as for neighbouring countries, quality differences between segments are not considered to be significant. Overall AT Kearney (2015), estimates a compound annual average of 7% until 2016 with an equivalent increase of 8% of the international standard segment.

Figure 38 – International market growth 2011-2016 – Forecast

Source: AT Kearney

A potential risk to the growth rates of the B2C related volumes (according to AT Kearney 85 (2015)) could potentially stem from the expected decrease in the e-commerce return rates. As e-retailers aim to minimize returns in an effort to increase efficiency in their logistics operations, this could potentially impact the volumes of the delivery business.

Apex Insight (2015) forecast for the CEP market show a steady CAGR of 4,5% for the CEP Market that would be sufficient to reach the levels of 69bn euros until 2019. At the country level, the report shows that the UK and the Polish national market will continue to grow faster than the rest of the national markets, highlighting the growth potentials still existing in those countries, irrespectively of the steep CEP growth observed in the last years. According to Apex Insight, B2C related deliveries are likely to account for 35% of the total in 2014, illustrating the growing importance of this segment in the overall CEP market. They also highlight that home delivery is still identified as one among consumer's strong preferences therefore the industry investments are likely to concentrate in this area. Apex Insight (2015) comment that it is fair to anticipate mild concentration motivated by the cross border segment especially as large networks seek to fill in their gaps in the domestic markets, therefore a wave of acquisitions might still be changing the competitive landscape in Europe.



Annex 6: Regulatory Framework

Impact Assessment on cross-border parcel delivery

Legal background

Overview

There is no one sector-specific EU legal instrument that explicitly governs the cross-border delivery of all parcels within the EU. However, several provisions of existing EU legislation, in particular for postal services, also cover parcel delivery. EU rules for postal services can therefore be considered as the central EU provisions for parcel delivery services.

At the international level, rules are contained in the Convention establishing the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and in the Acts of the UPU, in particular the latest Parcel Post Regulation adopted by the UPU in 2012 (effective since 1 January 2014).

Other aspects of relevance for parcel delivery are covered by rules on consumer protection, standards, customs, taxation, transport, employment, environmental and competition rules at EU level and trade, customs and aviation rules at international level.

The European postal services legal framework

Directive 97/67/EC on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC and Directive 2008/6/EC (in the following: Postal Services Directive – PSD), contains the core provisions that in part relate to the parcel market.

Postal services according to the PSD involve the clearance, sorting, transport and distribution of postal items 86 ; while transport alone is not to be considered to constitute a postal service 87 . Postal items are items carried by a postal services provider. This includes notably postal parcels containing merchandise with or without commercial value. 88

The PSD obliges the Member States to set up a universal service involving the permanent provision of a postal service of specific quality at all points of the territory of the Member States at affordable prices for all users. 89 It needs to be emphasised that the universal service covers both national and cross border services. 90 It encompasses the clearance, sorting, transport and distribution of postal items up to two kilograms and of postal packages up to 10 kilograms. 91 The weight limit for postal packages may be extended to 20kg by the national postal regulators, a possibility which was applied by some, but not all Member States.

Member States have to ensure that postal parcels received from other Member States and weighting up to 20 kilograms are delivered within their territory, even if not covered by the universal service obligation domestically. 92

The PSD requires Member States to guarantee, as a minimum, the provision of the universal service as specified in its Articles 3 and 5 and establishes the possibility for Member States to designate universal service providers (USP) 93 .

Regarding universal services, the PSD establishes that prices have to be affordable independent of geographical location and that they must be cost-oriented. In this context Member States are explicitly allowed to maintain uniform tariffs for single piece tariff mail, the service most frequently used by consumers, including small and medium-sized enterprises. Member States may also maintain uniform tariffs for some other mail items, such as, for example, newspapers and books, to protect general public interests, such as access to culture, ensuring participation in a democratic society (freedom of press) or regional and social cohesion 94 . Tariffs shall be transparent and non-discriminatory. 95 Likewise, Member States should encourage USP that terminal dues 96 agreed between them shall be fixed in relation to the costs of processing and delivering cross-border mail, in relation to the quality of services and shall be transparent and non-discriminatory. 97  

Quality of the universal service shall focus on routing times, regularity and reliability of services. Annex II of the PSD sets the time limit from deposit of a postal item to delivery (end to end) at date of deposit plus 3 days for 85% and date of deposit plus 5 days for 97% of postal items.

The PSD requires Member States to set up transparent, simple and inexpensive complaint procedures for postal users, not limited to the universal service. 98

A system of national regulatory authorities (NRA) is also established by the PSD. Member States shall designate NRA legally separate and operationally independent from postal operators to ensure compliance with the obligations arising from the PSD. NRA shall establish monitoring and regulatory procedures to ensure the provision of the universal service. 99 Member States shall ensure consultation and cooperation of their NRA with the national competition and consumer protection authorities. 100 Decisions of the NRA have to be subject to review. 101

Postal operators shall provide all the information (including financial information) concerning in particular the universal service to the NRA. Information shall be provided to allow NRA to ensure conformity with provisions of the PSD or decisions made in accordance with the PSD. Furthermore, information shall be submitted for statistical purposes. 102 Information shall be provided on request from the NRA. The NRA in turn shall provide the Commission on request with information received from the postal service providers.

While the PSD concentrates on the universal service, it nevertheless also covers services outside the universal service such as express services 103 . This clearly results already from Article 1 first indent of the PSD and is confirmed in other provisions such as the one in relation to complaints procedures and possible collection of market data from the parcel delivery operators, which provide postal services.

The International legal framework for parcels

The UPU was established in 1874 by 21 mainly European founding member countries. Since then it has developed into a 192 member organisation that has the status of a specialised agency within the UN family. The EU participates as an observer in the UPU bodies. 104 The EU Member States systematically declare that they will apply the Acts adopted at UPU Congresses in accordance with their obligations pursuant to the EU Treaty. 105

The UPU is based on five primary acts binding for its member countries: the Constitution, the General Regulations, the Universal Postal Convention, the Letter Post Regulations and the Parcel Post Regulations. The Convention is renewed periodically at each UPU Congress taking place every 4 years. 106 Within the framework of the UPU an agreement on Postal Payment Services has also been adopted.

The Universal Postal Convention sets out the primary obligations for member countries and designated postal operators in relation to letter post and parcel services. The Parcel Post Regulations cover the provisions specifically for parcel services.

Within the UPU member countries establish designated operators (DO) to operate postal services and to fulfil obligations stemming from the Acts of the UPU. The term DO is not identical with the designation as universal service provider established as one option in Article 4 PSD.

The UPU rules apply only to the DO providing services covered by the UPU. These rules are traditionally applicable to and applied by national postal operators and their legal successors and do not apply to any other parcel delivery operator (e.g. express operators).

The UPU Convention contains several provisions that are mirrored in the PSD such as the obligation to ensure a universal postal service, 107 the scope of the universal service (called “basic services” 108 ) and provisions on terminal dues for postal items up to 2kg and inward land rates for postal parcels up to 31.5 kg. 109  

In addition, the Convention contains provisions on mandatory supplementary services. 110 For parcels, mandatory supplementary services are notably insurance services, cash-on-delivery services, express services, free of charges and fees delivery and fragile and cumbersome parcels. Other additional provisions concern the freedom of transit; postal charges; postal security; personal data processing; postal express services; electronic postal services; customs rules; liability and indemnities; air, land and see rates. The Parcel Post Regulations comprise further detailed provisions on parcel services.

The PSD refers to the UPU in two occasions. Minimum and maximum dimensions for postal items under the European universal service regime are laid down by the UPU. 111 Secondly, regarding the harmonisation of technical standards, the European Committee for Standardisation shall take into account harmonisation measures adopted within the UPU. 112 Respective UPU rules for parcels are stipulated in the Parcel Post Regulations. 113  

Other EU-legislation of relevance for parcel delivery

To an albeit limited degree 114 , the Services Directive 2006/123/EU is applicable to cross-border service provision applying to cross-border parcel delivery services of goods purchased in the context of e-commerce. However, as for aspects regulated by the PSD, the relationship has been clarified in that the latter prevails 115 . It should be pointed out that notably Article 22 of the Services Directive regarding the information on providers and their services requires providers to make available information such as the price of a service and its main features may be of relevance.

The Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU (CRD) enhances the rights of consumers having merchandises delivered by parcel. The CRD applies to contracts concluded between a trader and a consumer 116 and it includes, among others, pre-contractual information requirements for distance and off-premises contracts 117 . Before concluding a contract a consumer must be informed about the total price of the good or services, including all additional delivery, freight or postal charges. The arrangements for payment, delivery, performance and the time by which the trader undertakes to deliver the goods must also be stated. Information must also be provided about the cost of returning the goods in case of withdrawal. A specific requirement is laid down for trading website to indicate clearly at the beginning of the ordering process whether any delivery restrictions apply and which means of payment are accepted 118 . The CRD also clarifies the rights of consumers regarding delivery of the goods, time limits, consequence of late delivery 119 and passing of risk of loss or damage of goods during delivery 120 .

The Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes (ADR Directive) is a relevant instrument in view of the provision from the PSD to develop independent out-of-court schemes for the resolution of disputes between postal service providers and users where users qualify as consumers under Directive 2013/11/EU. The ADR Directive covers disputes concerning contractual obligations stemming from sales contracts or service contracts between a consumer resident in the Union and a trader established in the Union. 121 It aims to ensure that consumers can turn to quality alternative dispute resolution entities for all kinds of contractual disputes that they have with traders no matter what they purchased (excluding disputes regarding health and higher education) and whether they purchased it online or offline, domestically or across borders.

The ADR Directive is complemented by Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (ODR Regulation). This Regulation applies to the out-of-court resolution concerning contractual obligations stemming from online sales or service contracts between a consumer resident in the Union and a trader established in the Union. 122 Based on this Regulation, an EU-wide online platform was established by the European Commission for disputes that arise from online transactions. The platform links all the national Alternative Dispute Resolution entities notified by Member States to the Commission and operates in all EU official languages.

The harmonisation of technical standards for postal services is entrusted to the European Committee for Standardisation. 123 Currently, 39 European Norms (EN), technical specifications (TS) or technical reports (TR) for postal services are published, while 5 more are in the approval phase. The published standards include standards for the measurement of the transit time of end-to end services for priority mail, 124 non-priority mail, 125 bulk mail, 126 for the measurement of complaints and redress procedures 127 for the loss of registered mail and other postal items 128 and for the loss and substantial delay of priority mail. 129 Specifically for parcel services there is a technical report on the measurement of transit times for parcels by the use of a track and trace system 130 and a technical specification in this area is in the approval phase. The Annual Union Work Programme for European Standardisation for 2015 131 defined postal services as one of the strategic priorities. It particularly emphasised in point 2.5. the need to enhanced interoperability of parcel-delivery operations. A fourth standardisation request is currently in elaboration in cooperation with CEN/TC 331.

Regulation 952/2013/EU will be applicable as of 1 May 2016 132 . It establishes the EU Customs Code, which permits special customs procedures for postal services.

In the area of taxation, Article 132(1)(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value contains a VAT exemption for the supply by the public postal services of services other than passenger transport and telecommunications services, and the supply of goods incidental thereto.

Parcel delivery is also closely linked with EU transport policy. According to Article 5 lit a) of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market, the carriage of mail as a universal service does not require a Community licence and is exempt from any carriage authorisation. Safety in the aviation, rail and maritime sectors is the object of detailed EU rules and is followed by the European agencies EASA, ERA and EMSA. A single aviation market is organised notably through Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 133 .

On 9 April 2015, the Commission established the Digital Transport and Logistics Forum. 134 The Forum is addressing problems related with the quality of cross-border delivery services and the interoperability of the various IT systems used by different logistics stakeholders (including for parcel delivery) as well as problems related with information on cross-border delivery services (e.g. services offer and tracking tools). Work of the Forum is based on a number of EU-funded projects. As foreseen in the 2011 Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area 135 , the Commission is supporting in this frame the development of tools for identifying easily available transport services, for tracking goods along the supply chain, and for making the whole supply chain more interoperable. A consultation on e-Freight has been carried out in 2012-2013.

The respect of employment terms and conditions, confidentiality of correspondence, data and environmental protection are, among others, essential requirements listed explicitly in the PSD the guarantee of which allows Member States to impose conditions on the supply of postal services.  136

According to Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, Member States may grant exceptions from the provisions related to crews, driving times, breaks and rest periods laid down in that Regulation to the carriage by "vehicles or combinations of vehicles with a maximum permissible mass not exceeding 7,5 tonnes used to deliver items as part of the universal service within a 100 km radius from the base of the undertaking, and on condition that driving the vehicles does not constitute the driver's main activity.

The European Union has not made any EU-wide commitment to provide market access or national treatment in either the postal or courier services sector. However, there are commitments for courier services for a number of Member States, namely Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic. 137  

Furthermore, EU competition law applies to parcel delivery services. Art 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings and concerted practices aiming at the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Art 102 TFEU sanctions the abuse of dominant positions within the internal market which also applies to the delivery market.

Article 106 TFEU requires Member States not to enact nor maintain in force in case of specific group of undertakings 138 any measure contrary to the Treaties rules, including competition rules. When undertakings are entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, such as for example the universal postal service, they continue to be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, including rules on competition, as long as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance of the particular tasks assigned to them.

Finally, Article 107 TFEU prohibits any State Aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition in so far as it affects trade between Member States. However, aid necessary for an undertaking to perform a service of general economic interest, such as the universal postal service, may be allowed on the basis of Article 106 (2) TFEU as implemented in the 2011 SGEI Package (2011 SGEI Decision 139 or 2011 SGEI Framework 140 depending on the amount of aid).

Other international rules of relevance for parcel delivery

In the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the agreements relating to tradein goods and services, in particular the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are applicable to the delivery of goods by postal and courier services.

Within the framework of GATS, the WTO also uses a classification system 141 which is based on the UN Central Product Classification (CPC). This classification distinguishes between postal and courier services. Postal services related to parcels 142 are described as “services consisting of pick-up, transport and delivery services of parcels and packages, whether for domestic or foreign destinations, as rendered by the national postal administration.” In contrast multi-modal courier services 143 are “services consisting of pick-up, transport and delivery services, whether for domestic or foreign destinations of letters, parcels and packages, rendered by courier and using one or more modes of transport, other than by the national postal administration. These services can be provided by using either self-owned or public transport media.

Apart from rules contained in the UPU Convention, 144 international customs law is laid down in global agreements such as the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Procedures under the World Customs Organisation (WCO). The Convention provides a basic set of rules for customs controls for international shipments and on customs clearance.

International aviation rules such as the Chicago convention from 1944 govern transit and landing rights. Commercial landing rights are usually granted only by way of agreements. The Union is party to some of such agreements. By way of example, reference may be made to the Open Skies Agreement 145 with the USA from 2007, which replaces the bilateral agreements between the USA and the EU Member States. Negotiations for a second phase were opened in May 2008 and concluded with the signature of a second stage Agreement in June 2010. Norway and Iceland acceded to the agreement in 2011.

(1)

  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6570_20130130_20610_4241141_EN.pdf , p.p 42 and onwards

(2)

The validation was performed by the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. The project was under the responsibility of EMLE department [European Master of Lay and Economics].

(3)

Fri(2011) "Study of the intra community parcel delivery

(4)

Those sentimations refert o price data 2011

(5)

CE (2013) "Pricing behaviour of postal operators"

(6)

NPOs that are not covered are CY, EE, LU

(7)

For standard products we try to find the cheapest alternative, that is a product for the residential customers and delivered at home. For premium, following additional characteristics were taken into account Time to delivery < 7 days,Track and Trace,Insurance,Proof of delivery

(8)

For letters : 0,25kg,0, 5 kg,5kg,1kg,2kg

For parcels : 0,25kg, 0,5kg, 1kg,2kg, 5kg,10kg

(9)

When a specific product could not be found in the public list price data of an NPO the dataset considered it as missing.

(10)

, / and = domestic price in country i

(11)

The weights are based on bilateral trade flows between EU countries.

(12)

All EU28 countries, except Estonia, Cyprus and Luxembourg.

(13)

 Due to missing data on the Czech Republic (DSL 2 kg), Malta (DPP 2 kg) and Portugal (ISP 2 kg) we do not illustrate full price data for these countries.

(14)

In the periphery we include Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, (Estonia), Greece, Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Croatia (while not exactly in the periphery Croatia has just recently become a member of the EU). These countries are expected to have lower cross-border volumes which may lead to higher cross-border prices, ceteris paribus. This is especially the case when they send mail items to each other.

(15)

We also include a zone which consists of the largest countries in Western Europe: United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France and Spain. These countries are characterized by high levels of cross-border competition in large markets that are strongly linked.

(16)

Inbound logistics according to Copenhagen Economics (2014) "the economics of terminal dues"

(17)

A study in the state of play of the delivery markets in Europe with a particular emphasis in e-commerce

(18)

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(19)

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(20)

CE(2013) E-commerce and delivery

(21)

http://www.upu.int/en/activities/letter-post-development/about-letter-post-development.html

(22)

FTI(2011)

(23)

WIK(2013) p.113

(24)

In REIMS II agreement this ratio was 80% of the domestic delivery price of a domestic single piece priority letter

(25)

CE(2014) the economics of terminal dues

(26)

COMP/C1/38170

(27)

  http://www.wik.org/fileadmin/Konferenzbeitraege/2011/13th_Koenigswinter_seminar/S2_2_Cayet.pdf  

(28)

WIK(2013) p. 95

(29)

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(30)

Ref needed

(31)

  http://www.upu.int/en/activities/ems/about-ems.html  

(32)

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(33)

FTI (2011)

(34)

CE(2012) E-commerce and delivery

(35)

FTI (2013)

(36)

H53 of NACE Code, see Introduction.

(37)

(2013) WIK report, (2015) PSD Implementation Report, and (2014) IPC Global Postal Industry Report.

(38)

Eurofound, ERM Quarterly, October 2013.

(39)

(2015) PSD Implementation Report , and (2013) WIK report, and (2012) IPC-BCG "Focus on the Future".

(40)

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(41)

Postal Statistics Database 2012-2013. AT, FR, NL, RO confidential, others not presented: missing or not applicable

(42)

EC Postal Statistics (2015).

(43)

AT, FR, NL, RO confidential, others not presented: missing or not applicable

(44)

Includes four leaders of the global express industry (so called international integrators: DHL, FedEx, TNT, UPS) and many other smaller express companies with emphasis on domestic presence. Oxford Economics (2011).

(45)

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(46)

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(49)

Full-time equivalents (in 2010).

(50)

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(51)

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(54)

(2013) WIK Report, p. 118.

(55)

(2013) WIK report.

(56)

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(57)

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(65)

Cf. European Social Dialogue Committee of the Postal Sector 2011, p19.

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(67)

(2014) IPC Global Postal Industry Report, p. 54.

(68)

EP Report, January 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2014-0024+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN

(69)

Consumer Futures”Signed, Sealed…delivered?”, pp. 30, 32. www.consumerfutures.org.uk

(70)

The USO sets the requirements designed to ensure that certain services are made available to all consumers and users in a Member State, regardless of their geographical location, at a specified quality and, taking account of specific national circumstances, at an affordable price. Delivery to remote areas with very difficult access is subject to exemptions from the USO. (COM(2011) 900 final – A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe.)

(71)

  www.pts.se , Stelacon ”Postservice i glesbygd – En nordisk jämförelse”, March 2015.

(72)

WIK (2013) Main Developments Study.

(73)

(2015) PSD Implementation Report of the PSD.

(74)

http://www.euroexpress.org/uploads/ELibrary/EEA_RA2011_LR.pdf

(75)

Idem.

(76)

http://www.euroexpress.org/uploads/ELibrary/EEA_RA2011_LR.pdf

(77)

IPC Sustainability Report 2014, IPC Global Postal Industry Report 2014, Euroexpress Organisation, WIK (2013) Main Developments Study, Express Delivery Company annual reports.

(78)

Ecommerce Europe: e-logistics: A need for integrated European solutions, April 2015.

(79)

Deutsche Post AG – Delivering Tomorrow (2010), and Report on The State of Union Road Transport market (2014) p.5 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/news/com(2014)-222_en.pdf

(80)

LaMiLo, Last Mile Logistics project, www.list.lu/en/project/lamilo/  

International Transport Forum, 2015 Annual Summit, http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/about/IntOrgDocs/Trade-Last%20mile_Summary%20of%20discussion.pdf

(81)

Sustainable City Logistics study, German Parcel and Logistics Association, BIEK, 2015, IPC, March 2015, Market Intelligence.

(82)

Deutsche Post AG – Delivering Tomorrow (2010).

(83)

Deloitte 2014, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Consumer-Business/gx-cb-last-mile.pdf

(84)

Deloitte 2014, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Consumer-Business/gx-cb-last-mile.pdf , 2014 IPC Global Postal Industry Report.

(85)

AT Kearney (2015) Europe's CEP Market: Steady growth begins to shift

(86)

PSD, Art 2, point 1

(87)

See recital 17 of Directive 2008/6/EC.

(88)

PSD, Art 2, point 6

(89)

PSD, Art 3, par 1

(90)

PSD, Art 3, par 7

(91)

PSD, Art 3, par 4

(92)

PSD, Art 3, par 5

(93)

PSD, Art 4

(94)

Recital 38 of Directive 2008/6/EC.

(95)

PSD, Art 12

(96)

Terminal dues are fees that one postal administration owes another postal administration for the cross-border delivery of post items.

(97)

PSD, Art 13, par 1

(98)

PSD, Art 19, par 1

(99)

PSD, Art 22, par 2

(100)

PSD, Art 22, par 1 (2)

(101)

PSD, Art 22, par 3

(102)

PSD, Art 22a, par 1

(103)

PSD, recitals 17-18

(104)

UPU Doha Congress 2012, Resolution C 78/2012

(105)

See for instance Doc 41 Add 10, UPU Congress Acts 2012

(106)

The last UPU Congress took place in Doha in 2012, the next will be held in Turkey in 2016

(107)

UPU Convention (2012), Art 3

(108)

UPU Convention (2012), Art 13

(109)

UPU Convention (2012), Art 29-32

(110)

UPU Convention (2012), Art 14

(111)

PSD, Art 3, par 6

(112)

PSD, Art 20, par 3

(113)

UPU Parcel Post Regulations (2012), RC 115 (size limits); RC 221 (application of standards)

(114)

See, e.g.. Art 17(1)a of the Services Directive

(115)

Recital 58 of Directive 2008/6/EC states "This Directive is consistent with other Community instruments concerning services. In the event of conflict between a provision of this Directive and a provision of another Community instrument, in particular Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, the provisions of this Directive will prevail and will apply in full to the postal sector."

(116)

CRD, Art 3

(117)

CRD, Art 6(1)

(118)

CRD, Art 8(3)

(119)

CRD, Art 18

(120)

CRD, Art 20

(121)

ADR Directive, Art 2 (1)

(122)

ODR Regulation, Art 2 (2)

(123)

PSD, Art 20, par 2

(124)

EN 13850

(125)

EN 14508

(126)

EN 14534

(127)

EN 14012

(128)

EN 14137

(129)

TS 14773

(130)

TR 15472

(131)

COM (2014) 500 final, 30.7.2014.

(132)

 Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92, currently in force, will be repealed by 1 May 2016.

(133)

OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3.–

(134)

C(2015)2259

(135)

COM(2011) 144 final

(136)

PSD, Article 2, point 19 and Article 9

(137)

See the overview of the commitments by WTO Members in Table 2 of Postal and Courier Services. Background Paper by the Secretariat, S/C/W/319, 11 August 2010.

(138)

Public undertakings and undertakings with special or exlusive rights.

(139)

Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertaking entrusted with the operation of SGEI, OJ L 7, 11.01.2012, p. 3

(140)

Communication from the Commission: European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (2011), OJ C 8, 11.01.2012, p. 15.

(141)

WTO Document MTN.GNS/W/120.

(142)

CPC code 75112

(143)

CPC code 75121

(144)

UPU Convention (2012), Art 20

(145)

Decision 2007/339/EC

Top

Brussels, 25.5.2016

SWD(2016) 166 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery services

















Disclaimer: This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission.

{COM(2016) 285 final}
{SWD(2016) 167 final}


EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Brussels, 25.5.2016

SWD(2016) 166 final

PART 1/4

 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery services



{COM(2016) 285 final}

{SWD(2016) 167 final}

Table of Contents

1.    Problem definition    

1.1.    Introduction / Background    

1.2.    The problem that requires action and its size    

1.2.1.    Economic context    

1.2.2.    Legal context    

1.1.1.    The problem: high cross-border delivery (and return) prices for SMEs and individuals are a barrier to cross-border e-commerce    

1.1.1.1.    Scope    

1.1.1.2.    Evidence    

1.1.2.    Driver 1 – Underlying economic factors of the sector    

1.1.2.1.    Driver 1.1 – Low volumes of SMEs decreases their negotiating power and increase delivery costs for delivery operators    

1.1.2.2.    Driver 1.2 – Parcel delivery is a network industry with high fixed costs    

1.1.3.    Driver 2 – Lack of market and price transparency    

1.1.3.1.    Driver 2.1 – Low awareness of market operators and services    

1.1.3.2.    Driver 2.2 Inter operator wholesale pricing agreements are not transparent    

1.1.3.3.    Driver 3 – Ineffective, inconsistent or inexistent regulatory oversight creates obstacles to the single market    

1.1.4.    Driver 4 – High profit margins added to delivery costs by e-retailers    

1.1.5.    Problem tree    

1.2.    Who is affected, in what ways and to what extent?    

1.3.    How would the problem evolve, all things being equal?    

1.4.    Conclusions of the evaluations of the existing policy    

2.    EU right to act    

3.    Objectives    

3.1.    General policy objectives    

3.2.    Specific policy objectives    

3.3.    Consistency with other EU policies and with the Charter for fundamental rights    

4.    Policy options    

4.1.    Option 1: Baseline scenario/ No action    

4.2.    Option 2: Consolidate volumes of small e-retailers    

4.3.    Option 3: Enhance the transparency of prices    

4.4.    Option 4: Enhance regulatory powers and market knowledge of postal national regulatory authorities    

4.5.    Option 5: Regulate cross-border parcel prices    

4.6.    Alternative policy instruments    

5.    Analysis of impacts    

5.1.    Option 1: Baseline scenario/ No policy action    

5.2.    Option 3a: Highlighting the difference between domestic and cross-border prices: publication of prices by the European Commission    

5.3.    Option 3b - Enhancing the transparency of individually negotiated prices between delivery operators and larger e-retailers ("account" customers).    29

5.4.    Option 3c - Enhancing the transparency of inter-operator multilateral wholesale prices ("terminal dues" and similar charges).    30

5.5.    Option 3d - Enhancing the transparency of delivery prices charged by e-retailers    31

5.6.    Option 4a - Enhancing regulatory powers of postal regulators: Powers to collect statistical data from all parcel delivery operators    31

Option 4b – Enhancing regulatory powers of postal regulators: "Ex-ante powers" for national regulators, notification of price increases    32

5.7.    Option 4c - Enhancing regulatory powers of postal regulators: Powers to enforce non-discriminatory access to NPOs' cross-border wholesale prices and cross-border network agreements    33

5.8.    Administrative Burden Calculation    33

5.9.    Social, economic and environmental impacts    35

6.    Comparison of options and summary of overall impact    35

6.1.    Comparison in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence    35

6.2.    Choice of legal instrument    38

6.3.    Preferred option / Justification for no preferred option    40

6.4.    Subsidiarity and proportionality of the preferred option    42

6.5.    Cumulative impacts and synergies    43

6.6.    Summary of impacts of preferred options on stakeholders    45

6.7.    Summary of impacts on small and medium sized enterprises    47

6.8.    EU budget    47

6.9.    Summary of social impacts of preferred options    47

6.10.    Summary of administrative burden impacts of preferred options    48

6.11.    Summary of environmental impacts of preferred options    48

6.12.    Summary of impacts on third countries    48

6.13.    Coherence with other proposals    48

7.    Monitoring and evaluation    49

7.1.    Operational objectives and monitoring indicators for the preferred option    49

ANNEX 1: Procedural information    

51

ANNEX 2: Stakeholder consultation    

73

ANNEX 3: Practical implications of the initiative for the affected parties    

91

ANNEX 4: Analytical models used in preparing the IA    

93

ANNEX 5: Cross-border delivery market overview    

98

ANNEX 6: Regulatory framework    

195

ANNEX 7: Problem analysis

203

ANNEX 8: Description of policy options and comparison of policy options (tables)

223

ANNEX 9: Assessment of administrative burden costs of the different policy options

236

ANNEX 10: Commission's 2013 Roadmap Assessment    

241

ANNEX 11: Ex-post evaluation of the existing regulatory framework    

251

ANNEX 12: Monitoring and evaluation    

283

ANNEX 13: Glossary of terms used in the IA    

285

1.Problem definition

1.1.Introduction / Background

Making the single market fit for the digital age is one of the ten key priorities for the Juncker Commission. It's estimated that EU consumers could save €11.7bn each year thanks to the lower prices and wider choice offered by online shopping 1 . Yet only 16% of consumers bought online from other EU countries in 2015, while 47% did so in their own country 2 . Well over three quarters (84%) of online sales in 2014 came from the country in which the company was located 3 . Improving online access to digital goods and services is therefore one of the three pillars of the Digital Single Market Strategy. 4  

Problems repeatedly identified with cross-border parcel delivery include high prices, low quality of service and lack of information. Actions to address them have already been proposed by the Commission both in the 2012 Green Paper 5 and in the 2013 Roadmap 6 , but some barriers persist and continue to be highlighted in many studies, including those carried out after the adoption of the Roadmap, in particular in the context of the Digital Single Market Strategy. 7

The Roadmap set out actions to improve the quality, availability and affordability of cross-border parcel delivery services, and the transparency of information about the services on offer. It defined an eighteen month period for the assessment of industry-led initiatives, ending in June 2015 after which progress would be assessed 8 . Examples of industry-led action include National Postal Operators (NPOs) planned improvements to the quality of cross-border services including better tracing of shipments and increased interoperability. E-retailers' associations have developed European Trustmarks for online shopping 9 and committed to improve information about delivery to e-retailers 10 . The Commission is monitoring implementation by industry and an assessment of progress shows that while measures implemented have had a limited positive impact on the availability and quality of cross-border offers, complementary measures are needed in the areas of price transparency and enhanced regulatory oversight. The current Impact Assessment therefore focuses on the analysis of these two areas 11 .

For the purpose of this Impact Assessment (IA) parcels are defined as items addressed in the final form in which they are to be carried by a parcel service provider and which are not items of correspondence, including items weighing up to 31.5kg. 12 See the Glossary for further definitions used in this impact assessment.

1.2.The problem that requires action and its size

1.2.1.Economic context

The European courier, express and parcel market (CEP market) is estimated to be worth between EUR 37 and EUR 53.5 billion 13 . B2C represents around 60% of volumes but around 30% of revenues 14 and e-commerce has intensified the competition in the B2C delivery market 15 . The market has grown in recent years, with estimates ranging from a 3.2% 16 to 5.7% 17 increase in value and between 4.8% 18 and 6% 19 increase in volume. It remains very concentrated however, with five Member States 20 with developed e-commerce markets accounting for 75% 21 of the total EU CEP market. Western countries account for 86% of the total EU parcel market volumes, southern countries account for 11% and eastern countries have a 3% share 22 .

There are a number of different types of delivery operator active in the CEP sector, such as NPOs, international express carriers/integrators, couriers with predominantly domestic presence, consolidators and parcel brokers. New business models are also emerging, for example drawing on the principles of the collaborative economy and crowdsourcing. Only a few operators have a Europe-wide (or even worldwide) network so many operators need to partner with others for cross-border transactions.

Domestic parcel markets account for approximately 70% of total revenues and approximately 90% of volume of the total parcel and express markets 23 . NPOs account for about 20% of their domestic CEP market 24 , with domestic competition within Europe coming mainly from parcel carriers established in several Member States, such as Hermes, DHL, GLS, GeoPost and TNT, as well as other local parcel providers. European international competition is mainly between UPS, DHL, TNT, FedEx and Geopost, and of course NPOs. 25 Many of these carriers are express carriers, who traditionally focussed on the B2B market. Others are focused on the less time-definite (deferred) market segment. According to La Poste (2014) B2B continues to account for the major share (70%) in relation to B2C in terms of value. According to Copenhagen Economics (2013) 26 however, in terms of volumes the picture is reversed: B2B shipments are responsible for nearly 30% of the total shipments in Europe when B2C volumes are about 60% of the total. In general NPOs’ market share in the whole CEP European market is estimated to be around 27% 27 , increasing to 35% when considering the B2C segment alone. For a list of the main operators by country see Annex 5.

NPOs are however the parcel operator that small senders or senders in remote and peripheral areas use because competition focusses on larger customers. 28 In the UK, a well-developed e-commerce market, one survey found that 63% of small online UK retailers used the NPO (or its express subsidiary). 29 An estimated 35% of the total shipments handled by NPOs fall under the universal service area, 30 which represents about 5-8% of the e-commerce market 31 .

Different types of operator tend to have different types of pricing structure, and there are also differences between letters (i.e. packets) and parcels. Most national postal operators publish their prices for single piece items on their websites. This IA refers to such prices as 'public list prices'. Discounts may also be available as both published percentages of these public list prices for customers with intermediate volumes and larger customers may be offered negotiated discounted prices that depend on the specific situation of the customer. Prices for operators other than NPOs are less likely to be published, and greater use is made of (individually) negotiated prices, in part due to other delivery operators and especially integrators having a larger market share in the B2B market, and being used far less by customers or SMEs wanting only to send single items occasionally.

The econometric study (based on list prices) 32 concluded that NPOs almost always use single zone pricing for letters, i.e. they charge the same rate to send a letter from the domestic market to any country in the EU, but that for parcels, on the other hand, international price discrimination (i.e. charging different prices for different countries) is much more common 33 . While some NPOs still use only single zone pricing, other NPOs charge different cross-border prices for (almost) every destination country (as is the case in Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) 34 . Evidence from the European Commission's data collection shows that price discrimination is applied more commonly for premium parcels than for standard international parcels.

For more details on the cross-border parcel delivery market, see Annex 5.

1.2.2.Legal context

There is no sector-specific EU legal instrument that explicitly governs the cross-border delivery of all parcels, but parcel delivery providers are affected by relevant laws concerning transport and logistics, data and consumer protection, competition, urban planning, market surveillance, VAT, working conditions, and, in case of external trade, by customs, security and international law, as well as the Postal Services Directive (for greater detail, see Annex 6). The inconsistencies of how some legal provisions apply to some operators, but not to others who offer similar services, has been noted by the European Regulator's Group for Postal Services (ERGP) 35 and the Express Industry Association 36 .

The focus of the Postal Service Directive (PSD) 37  was de facto letter mail, which until at least 2007 was responsible for over half the postal and express sector's revenues 38 and until 2013 the delivery of over 70% of letters could be the subject of a monopoly by the universal service provider in a number of Member States. However parcels, unlike letters were never part of the postal monopoly previously held by NPOs and, as parcel delivery has become increasingly important for e-commerce, it has become apparent that the absence of an effective regulatory framework for parcel markets is once cause of the problems identified in this Impact Assessment.

E-commerce driven B2C parcel deliveries are a relatively recent phenomenon. It was not an aim of the PSD to address parcel delivery over and above a very basic guarantee (i.e. a basic universal service obligation) so that all citizens should be able to send and receive parcels. These were essentially "C2C" (consumer-to-consumer) parcels, handed over in a postal office. In addition to these C2C-focussed parcel services, some NPOs also provided business to business (B2B) parcel services, often through subsidiaries and competing with private parcel carriers and courier services. The PSD sought not to distort this competition through comprehensive regulation of the parcel sector, but did extend the scope of some regulatory activity beyond the universal service, for example by extending the scope of the collection of statistical data and the requirement to have complaints handling mechanisms to all postal service providers 39 . There are however differences in how Member States have defined “postal service providers” leading to inconsistencies in the statistical data that is collected (Article 22a) and the level of oversight national regulatory authorities for postal services (NRAs) have of the parcel market.

The boundaries between different types of operator and product are becoming increasingly blurred. Smaller, lighter e-commerce items (often called packets) may be treated operationally as letters, rather than parcels: according to UPU statistics, an estimated 80% of mail items generated by e-commerce today weigh under 2 kilogrammes and are in general processed in the letter-post mail stream. 40 Operators who traditionally focussed on the B2B markets (in particular express operators) are developing their B2C services, some of which compete with those within the scope of the universal service obligation (USO) (for postal services).

The core regulatory principles in the PSD (Article 12) of affordability, cost-orientation, transparency and non-discrimination are only applicable to parcels (and letters) that fall within the scope of the USO and NRAs should ensure that tariffs for USO services are line with these principles. NRAs however focus more on domestic markets than they do on cross-border ones, including when ensuring the affordability and cost-orientation of services within the USO 41 , and for cross-border services cost-orientation of terminal dues is only required to be “encouraged”.

The PSD requires each Member State to have an independent NRA who is entrusted with the regulatory functions falling within the scope of the PSD 42 and who have a particular responsibility to ensure compliance with the PSD's obligations. They may also be entrusted with overseeing competition rules in the postal sector. To facilitate cooperation between NRAs at the European level, the European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) was established in 2010. 43 The ERGP facilitates consultation, coordination and cooperation between the NRAs and serves as a body for reflection and discussion and advises the Commission. The ERGP does not have a mandate to enforce the PSD for cross-border services.

The precise scope of the USO also differs between Member States. The level of service of USO parcels, for example whether track and trace are included, and the quantity i.e. whether bulk or only single piece parcels are within its scope, legitimately varies between Member States. There is therefore no consistent definition of “a USO parcel” Rather there are a range of characteristics that indicate a parcel is a USO parcel, for example a slower service (i.e. not an express parcel with a fast, specified delivery date) and one that may have no or limited additional features such as track and trace, although registered parcels form part of the USO (Article 5, PSD).

Differences in how the PSD has been implemented give rise to differences in the legal mandate of NRAs and to a fragmentation of regulatory oversight of the parcel delivery market.

1.1.1.The problem: high cross-border delivery (and return) prices for SMEs and individuals are a barrier to cross-border e-commerce

1.1.1.1.Scope

There are many reasons for the slow development of cross-border e-commerce addressed by the Digital Single Market Strategy, for example the complexity of consumer protection and contract laws, different VAT regimes and denial of access to customers based in other Member States. Many of the problems linked to parcel delivery services, for example insufficient information about the services available and the lower quality of cross-border services are derived from the lack of interoperability between delivery operators, in particular NPOs, are already being addressed by projects linked to the 2013 Roadmap (see Annex 10).

Consequently, this initiative is a flanking complementary measure as the problem of high delivery prices persists since there are still many instances of cross-border prices that are prohibitively high. The focus of this impact assessment is therefore on greater price transparency and enhanced regulatory oversight, as well as the promotion of competition, since these have been identified as ways of addressing the problem of high cross-border delivery (and return) prices for small volume senders, which are in most cases, but not exclusively SMEs and individuals. The four most important groups of drivers are:

a.Underlying economic factors of the sector

b.Lack of market and price transparency

c.Ineffective, inconsistent or non-existent regulatory oversight

d.High profit margins added to delivery costs by e-retailers

To assess the full impact of this initiative it is important however to bear in mind that it remains part of a wider package of measures to improve cross-border parcel delivery and e-commerce more widely (see section 1.4 and the baseline scenario).

1.1.1.2.Evidence

Average list retail cross-border prices from NPOs are two to six times higher than the comparable prices for domestic delivery 44 . Recent research for the European Commission shows that list prices for cross-border delivery from NPOs are on average 3.5 times higher than their domestic equivalent for letters and about 5 times higher for parcels. 45

Figure 1: Examples of Domestic and Cross-border Prices for a 2 kg standard parcel 46

Source: Econometric Study on cross border prices, University of St. Louis (2015), Price data May-July 2015.

While some additional costs do arise from specific cross-border factors such as extra handling and transport costs, some cross-border prices charged by NPOs appear unreasonably high in relation to the domestic prices, even when other factors such as the negotiating power of different operators and consumers' willingness to pay are taken into account.  47  For example, FTI analysis showed that the difference between (public) cross-border prices and a theoretical fair benchmark price level that could relate to the actual costs of the cross-border delivery are on average 40% higher for packets, 55% higher for parcels and 61% higher for express products within the six largest CEP markets and 47% for packets, 65% for parcels and 61% for express within the rest of Europe. 48  Integrators charge prices that are comparatively higher than the prices for ordinary (i.e. non express) parcel delivery services as they offer additional services such as time-definite delivery and cross-border track and trace, enabled by their integrated networks.

High delivery prices prevent e-retailers from selling more online, especially smaller SMEs who lack the volumes needed to negotiate significantly cheaper prices with delivery operators. On average 37% of retailers selling online cite the higher costs of cross border delivery to be an important obstacle to the development of cross border sales 49 . Smaller firms and those who export less are more affected than larger firms. Further analysis 50 of these results shows whereas 13% of large firms declare that delivery concerns are considered to be an obstacle when selling cross border, in the small and medium-sized segment these proportions reach a rate of 42% and 39% respectively. The proportion of firms that are not growing and declare delivery is very important is higher by 10 percentage points (pp) than the proportion of firms that show a positive sales trend. Firms that are exporting low volumes tend to declare more systematically that delivery concerns are very important than firms that are exporting larger volumes from online sales. 51

High prices also prevent consumers from buying more online from other Member States. As well as complaints of high prices, several studies have found that high delivery prices are the main reason for abandoning a shopping cart. 52 Both consumers and e-retailers located in remote and peripheral areas are at a particular disadvantage as they may rely on e-commerce to access a wider range of goods. Some retailers and delivery operators levy surcharges on delivery to remote areas for example DHL charge EUR 20.00 (or EUR 0.30/kg if higher) for remote area delivery or collection in Finland. 53 UPS charges 30% more to send from Amsterdam to Den Burg (Island Texel) than from Rotterdam to Amsterdam 54 . While the NPO (as the universal service provider) is required to deliver throughout each Member State, if there is no real competitive pressure there is little incentive to reduce prices. To the extent that such areas depend on the USO, it is even more important that operators providing this service charge do not charge prohibitive prices. 55

1.1.2.Driver 1 – Underlying economic factors of the sector

1.1.2.1.Driver 1.1 – Low volumes of SMEs decreases their negotiating power and increase delivery costs for delivery operators

The cross-border parcel delivery market is a two-tier market 56 , with large senders benefitting from lower delivery prices - especially in countries where volumes are high - and low volume infrequent senders (i.e. SMEs and consumers) facing higher prices and few (if any) alternatives to the NPOs, especially in peripheral countries and outside urban areas. 57 This limits SMEs' competiveness in cross-border e-commerce. That SMEs and low volume senders are likely to be more price sensitive, with less negotiating power and are therefore more vulnerable can also be observed in a recent decision of the French Autorité de la concurrence that fined 20 delivery companies, including Chronopost/Exapaq (now known as DPD France (La Poste Group)), DHL Express France, FedEx Express France and GLS France for coordinating on annual prices increases and fined 15 companies on a common method for passing on the costs of a 'diesel surcharge'. SMEs suffered most from these practices as, unlike the operators' largest clients, they lacked negotiating power that would have enabled them to reject, or at least renegotiate, the price increases. 58

Low volumes generate a higher cost per unit and these small senders lack the negotiating power of large retailers (whose high volumes and predictable shipment profile can contribute to reducing delivery operators' fixed costs). Furthermore, when consumers are responsible for returning unwanted purchases themselves (i.e. exercising their right to withdraw from the contract), they often pay the list price for the delivery of an individual item, which are higher than the discounted prices larger e-retailers receive.

Infrequent low volume senders, especially those located in remote/peripheral areas, often rely on NPOs 59 (which are required by the universal service obligation to collect and deliver throughout their territories), and such sellers pay the NPOs’ public list prices (or public discounts based on these prices). The possibilities of switching to alternative delivery operators are limited for many low volume customers and those in remote and peripheral areas. There might be other delivery operators present in the national delivery markets (typically more than three in most Member States 60 ), nevertheless they mostly target higher volume customer segments, by providing delivery services tailored for bigger volumes, while applying comparatively high prices for single piece shipments and surcharges in remote areas. While platforms allow smaller retailers to reach a wider audience (and potentially benefit from cheaper delivery rates), at the same time they can act as a disincentive for SMEs to seek out other delivery services and for delivery operators to target smaller e-retailers. Platforms are also themselves commercial enterprises who require remuneration for the services they provide.

Furthermore, a certain degree of customer inertia is observed that further reduces SMEs' power to negotiate: SMEs and final customers may be reluctant to use delivery options other than the NPO due to switching costs (high search costs) and lack of trust and of information about the quality of the delivery service provided by alternative providers 61 .

1.1.2.2.Driver 1.2 – Parcel delivery is a network industry with high fixed costs

As in any other network industry, business models of nationwide and cross-border delivery operators are based on high fixed costs and large economies of scale and scope which limit the possibilities for geographically large market entry.  62 Fixed costs are higher for: parcels (compared to packets) due to network optimisations and final mile delivery; for express services 63 (compared to deferred) due to higher investments in transport modes, hubs, automation and more efficient processed focused on speed; and for B2C (compared to B2B), due to more costly final delivery/failed deliveries 64   65 . In addition, NPOs’ parcel networks, based on an established ground domestic network and covering the whole territory (including rural and remote areas), are usually optimised for domestic flows and not for cross-border flows, given that 85% of the total flows are domestic 66 . To the extent that e-commerce items are sent as 'letters' or 'packets', NPOs are able to benefit from the infrastructure that was developed while letter delivery was still part of the postal monopoly.

Deliveries in rural, remote and peripheral areas also entail higher fixed costs, typically linked to lower population density and sometimes more difficult geographic access. 67  Cost simulations 68 show that the B2C cross border parcel delivery cost might induce EUR 1.6-3.6 costs per parcel in an urban to urban scenario up to EUR 5.4-10 in an extreme rural to rural scenario. Almost one third (27%) of all B2C shipments in the EU are in rural areas, reaching almost fifty percent in certain groups of countries 69 . Users in these areas may be served only by the NPO (as the universal service provider (USP)), or if there are other operators that deliver surcharges are likely to be applied.

Existing competition is concentrated in certain segments 70 . Generally, the cross-border CEP market, which represents about 30% of the revenues and 9% of the volumes of the total CEP market, 71 is a highly concentrated segment, although the level of concentration varies across customer segments 72 . The University of Antwerp has characterised the European parcel market as a tight oligopoly at a European scale 73 , acknowledging however that more competition can be identified locally. Competition is concentrated where revenues are higher, such as (traditionally) the B2B segments, areas of higher population density and, more recently, high volume B2C segments (e.g. competition at the regional level 74 ).

The significant investments 75 needed to develop one's own cross-border network may deter some operators, limiting market entry, particularly in the low volume segment and in peripheral and remote areas. Thus, high prices may also reflect weak competitive pressure in specific segments of the cross-border delivery market resulting from limited market entry 76 . This underlines the importance of third party access to existing networks and infrastructures in order to facilitate competition (see driver 2.2 and options 3c and 4c).

1.1.3.Driver 2 – Lack of market and price transparency

1.1.3.1.Driver 2.1 – Low awareness of market operators and services

The cross-border market is a diverse and complex one, with different operators offering many differing services and prices depending on weight, size or format as well as destination, value added features, number of items, etc. This heterogeneity makes delivery services hard to compare across operators (where alternative are available), both in terms of quality and price, especially when not all prices are published.

Both e-retailers and e-shoppers therefore have trouble finding the most suitable delivery service due to difficulties in accessing comparable information about delivery (incurring high search costs) and base their decisions on imperfect information, resulting in sub-optimal choices, also in finding best international business partners, especially for cross-border delivery. 77  There is no single point of information concerning delivery services throughout the EU that allows users to compare delivery services from various operators. The lack of knowledge and information also limits the ability of e-retailers and consumers to switch between operators and to find better offers, creating market inefficiencies and limiting competitive pressure in the market. For example one in five e-retailers say they are aware of only one delivery operator, though the average number of alternatives is three to four operators 78 . E-retailers therefore declare that there is need for more information in order to increase transparency, which will decrease costs and lead to quality improvements 79 .

Regulators without knowledge of the operators that are active in a particular segment of the market and statistical information (and in absence of concrete complaints to the relevant competition authority and/or postal regulator) 80 are unable to properly monitor the parcel markets and identify potential market failures or regulatory or competition concerns. This is in part due to differences in how the PSD has been implemented and an increasingly complex B2C market, which has led to a situation where “the remit of many NRAs does not currently expand to all substitutable products and services in the parcels sector”  81 and "many NRAs do not have full oversight over a wider spectrum of e-commerce cross border parcels which may be provided by operators that are not postal service providers in certain jurisdictions" 82 .

1.1.3.2.Driver 2.2 Inter operator wholesale pricing agreements are not transparent 83

When the initiating delivery operator has no commercial presence in the country of destination, it will need to partner with a delivery operator in the destination country. Typically, the delivery operator in the country of origin will pay a fee to the destination operator for receiving the item and delivering it to the recipient. The fee is an inter-operator wholesale price which is the result of a contractual agreement (bilateral or multilateral) between two or more delivery operators (e.g. REIMS 84 for intra-EU letter mail) or of international agreements (e.g. Universal Postal Union 85 (UPU) agreements 86 ). The mechanism for establishing the fees charged by one operator to another is not transparent, as the terms and conditions are not public, and, with the exception of the UPU, these fees are not publicly available. Only NPOs can be members of the UPU.

The Commission required the REIMS II agreement to include the provision that non-discriminatory access to REIMS terms and conditions would be provided to third parties. 87 Third party operators claim however that access to REIMS conditions is virtually impossible for operators other than NPOs. 88 Lack of access to different types of by third party operators creates distortions in the cross-border market as not all operators can benefit from the system.

The scale of volumes exchanged between delivery operators affects the bargaining power of operators 89 , 90 . Thus, some operators, especially from large (export) markets with large volume flows may have more bargaining power than operators in small volume countries, creating imbalances in negotiations between operators. Studies suggest that this is the case for letters as higher average fixed costs (proxied by online import shares) in the destination country seem to decrease termination rates for the sending operator resulting in lower cross-border prices 91 , 92 . It should be noted though, that letters weighing up to 2kg (so-called packets) are widely used for smaller e-commerce transactions.  93 Studies also point out that labour costs in the destination country cannot explain differences in NPOs cross-border prices, suggesting that either termination rates are not reflecting the true costs of last mile delivery, or that the potential gains from lower delivery costs are not passed on to the final price charged to the final user 94 .

1.1.3.3.Driver 3 – Ineffective, inconsistent or inexistent regulatory oversight creates obstacles to the single market

The regulatory diversification and fragmentation in the sector translates into additional administrative burdens, compliance costs and inefficiencies for delivery operators who operate cross-border and creates barriers to the single market 95   96 . Divergent national legal frameworks and the differences in how the PSD has been implemented at a national level, stemming in part from the lack of clear definitions,  97  hinder effective regulatory oversight of the cross-border market. There is also an impact on consumers and retailers as different delivery operators are subject to different complaints handling regimes 98 and delivery prices reflect additional costs stemming from regulatory fragmentation. 

A joint BEREC/ ERGP report recently concluded that "NRAs need the appropriate regulatory powers to intervene and … such powers do not seem to be present in all Member States, mainly due to the differences in interpretation of what is or not a postal services". 99 Many NRAs therefore have a limited mandate to monitor the cross-border parcel market.

The ERGP has observed differences between NRAs in the level of monitoring and type of data collected on the parcel market and noted that comprehensive information to understand the functioning of the parcel market and possible competition problems in it could be useful 100 . At present information is often restricted to parcel markets that fall under the universal service obligation 101 and a substantive number of NRAs lack adequate information on the wider parcel market, especially for operators using alternative business models, making it more difficult to assess the extent of and address effectively any market failures. This includes countries like Germany, France, the UK and Sweden, whereas several regulators in Eastern and Southern Europe have more far-reaching data gathering powers. Data on the parcel and express segment of the postal market beyond services that form part of universal service is far less comprehensive and reliable for delivery operators other than the NPO 102 , 103 .

While Article 12 of the PSD sets out the principles 104 that are applicable to the universal service (and should apply to cross-border products within the scope of the universal service 105 ) Article 13 of the PSD sets out the general specific principles for intra-Community cross-border mail, which is a part of the universal service. It requires Member States to encourage, rather than oblige, universal service providers to apply the principles of cost orientation, remuneration related to quality of service, transparency and non-discrimination in agreements on inter-operator wholesale prices for cross-border postal services transactions. As Article 13 only requires encouragement to apply certain principles, it cannot be properly enforced and action cannot be taken against Member States whose universal service providers appear by and large not to apply the principles of Article 13. This may therefore be one of the possible reasons for high prices for cross-border parcel delivery that are part of universal services: the ERGP has also found that "cross-border prices for European parcels delivery may be higher than what would be justified by cost differences related to domestic prices" 106 .

Other research confirms this, suggesting that some of the agreements used by designated universal service providers in the EU are not in line with the spirit of Article 13 of the PSD: one study concluded that no Member State could affirm with credibility that it was fully implementing Article 13, particularly if one understood the Article as requiring, rather than merely encouraging the application of certain principles 107 . Evidence also shows NRAs monitor their USP's 108  application of these principles far less closely for cross-border prices than they do for domestic ones, especially letters. 109 Regulators in six Member States do not collect data on the parcel market or collect data concerning a limited part of the market only. In addition, five NRAs have limited power to collect data on some of the parcel delivery segments or have no legal basis to collect the data.

Furthermore, NRAs need adequate enforcement powers, including being able to ensure third-party access to NPOs' cross-border networks. Allowing smaller operators to use NPOs' cross-border networks and benefit from their economies of scale would encourage market entry and competition and also reduce the fixed costs NPOs incur.

1.1.4.Driver 4 – High profit margins added to delivery costs by e-retailers

Delivery prices charged to consumers by retailers do not always reflect the prices delivery operators charge to retailers because some retailers mark up the delivery prices that are charged by delivery operators. The price the consumer pays for 'delivery' (as stated on the retailer's website) may therefore be significantly higher than the price the retailers pay, but the consumer thinks it is the delivery element that is expensive. Several retailers acknowledged in their responses to the public consultation that they charge consumers more for delivery than they pay themselves 110 . Furthermore, the prices that consumers pay for delivery may not fall if delivery operators lower their prices as consumers are dependent on e-retailer making a corresponding reduction in their delivery charges. 111 Research for the Consumer Council (Northern Ireland) noted that only half of online retailers offer the same delivery service across the UK, and when free delivery is not available to Northern Ireland destinations, consumers pay up to £10 for delivery (to Northern Ireland). "Free delivery" offers do on the other hand, lower the price customers pay for delivery and large retailers who are charged lower prices for delivery may choose to pass on these savings to their customers.

1.1.5.Problem tree

The following figure summarizes the main drivers and problem described above.

Figure 2: Problem tree

Annex 7 contains a more detailed description of all the drivers.

1.2.Who is affected, in what ways and to what extent?

The problems identified above impact particularly individual consumers and smaller e-retailers, who traditionally send lower volumes, but also Member States at both national and EU level.

Individual consumers

Consumers repeatedly state that the high cost of deliveries and returns are a barrier to buying more online from retailers outside their own Member State. One survey of online consumers found that high delivery costs (27%), high return shipping costs (24%) and long delivery times (23%) were the top three consumer concerns about purchasing products online cross-border 112 . These concerns were repeated in the Commission's 2015 public consultation 113 where individual consumers reported the main reason to have abandoned online purchase was the high delivery price, followed by too slow delivery. Many surveys have also found that high delivery prices are the main reason for an abandoned shopping cart 114 and that a reduction in delivery prices would encourage consumers to shop more online. 115  

Furthermore, consumers in periphery countries seem to have higher level of concerns regarding delivery than consumers located in more central European countries 116 . Respondents from Greece (38%), Poland (36%) and Malta (36%) express the highest level of concerns when it comes to high delivery costs. High return shipping costs are most frequently mentioned by respondents from Ireland (32%), Poland (31%), Greece, and Spain (29%). High delivery prices reduces the willingness of consumers to buy online, as do trust issues, especially for tangible goods due to the expected difficulties in getting reimbursed when unwanted products are returned. 117

 Retailers

For many companies customer requests for international sales are the catalyst for beginning to export. In a recent study, in four out of the seven markets surveyed, SMEs said the most important driver for starting to export was customer requests (34% of companies reported that requests from new customers were the source of the first export sale). 118 Therefore, to help smaller e-retailers respond to occasional customer request from other Member States, an acceptable price to ship an individual item cross-border is important.

Delivery prices are therefore a barrier that is holding back companies from exporting goods purchased online 119 . The lower the volumes of online related exports of European companies the more they are likely to be concerned about delivery costs. The lesser the number of countries an online retailer is exporting into the higher his delivery concerns. For retailers, the high price of cross-border delivery is also consistently shown to be one of the top barriers to cross-border e-commerce. For example a 2015 survey found price is the most prevalent barrier for 51% of manufacturing and retail (including wholesale) companies selling online cross-border 120 . Other factors most likely to be mentioned as problems by companies selling online are expensive returns (42%), or the high cost of resolving complaints and disputes cross-border (41%). Features not related to delivery reported in the same survey included uncertainty about the rules that needed to be followed (37% already selling/63% trying or considering selling); the cost or complexity of foreign taxation (38%/54%); and a lack of language skills (39%/ 48%). In another survey 37% of retailers who sell online mentioned the higher costs of cross-border delivery compared to domestic delivery as an important obstacle for the development of their online sales to other EU countries, increasing to over 50% in four Member States 121 . Dissatisfaction with delivery prices was also confirmed in the public consultation of the Commission: over one third of retailers indicated they were dissatisfied with delivery prices to other EU countries. 122 For a quarter of the retailers that replied to the public consultation, cross-border delivery costs represent 25% or more of their e-commerce turnover, this figure was 13% for the domestic delivery cost. Furthermore, large discrepancies can be observed between countries in the public cross-border and domestic prices that sending NPOs 123 and other delivery operators 124 charge. In some markets the cross-border prices seem to be unreasonably high, even when the additional cross-border costs are taken into consideration, and clearly act as an obstacle for local e-retailers considering sending an individual shipment to another EU-country. See section 1.1.1.2 and Annex 5 for examples of price discrepancies.

The Commission aims to support an inclusive Digital Single Market with digital services that are available across the EU. Nevertheless, consumers and retailers in rural, remote and peripheral areas are likely to be less well served by delivery operators than their urban counterparts. More than one quarter (27.6%) of the EU28’s population live in regions classified as being predominantly rural. 125 The University of St. Louis 126 highlights that when it comes to cross-border prices, country size and volumes matter: larger and well connected mail markets charge lower cross-border prices to each other, in contrast to countries on the periphery. Domestic population density also plays a role for letter mail, notably more densely populated Member States tend to have smaller differences between domestic and cross-border prices. Higher shares of import volumes in the destination country for letters tend to result in relatively lower cross prices for the sending country. Finally countries that do not share a common border tend to charge higher prices to each other compared neighbouring countries, and this difference is not explained by the relative transportation cost (proxied by distance).

High prices are compounded by a lack of information about the operators who are active in the different national markets. For these reasons, many retailers might decide not to sell cross-border online, or they might decide to limit their cross-border online sales to a group of countries.

Delivery operators

High prices limit demand, which may increase average fixed costs for NPOs who are required by the USO to serve a nationwide network. Some other delivery operators complain that lack of access to NPOs’ terminal rates and networks restricts the development of competition and increases prices.

Delivery operators, especially those with lower brand recognition, are also affected by lack of market and price transparency in the sense that users (in particular individual consumer and smaller e-retailers) may not be aware of their services or of their existence in the market.

Member States and overall society

Due to limited regulatory mandates and blurred areas in terms of regulatory framework, NRAs are faced with difficulties in terms of market monitoring and regulation of the parcel market. 127 Given the increasing importance of e-commerce related parcels for all delivery operators (and especially for NPOs as letter volumes decline, by 4.85% between 2012 and 2013 128 ) and the need to ensure a single market in cross border parcel delivery, an improved market monitoring would enable (i) developments in the market to be monitored and (ii) assessments of whether the regulatory principles (affordability, cost orientation, non-discrimination, and transparency) are being implemented for USO or similar parcels.

Consumer welfare gains are expected from increased online choice and lower prices. It has been estimated that consumers could save €11.7 billion per year thanks to lower prices and wider choice offered by online shopping. 129 Moreover, the completion of a Digital Single Market could generate up to €340bn worth of additional growth over ten years and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs over the course of this Commission 130 .

1.3.How would the problem evolve, all things being equal?

The Commission encourages self-regulation and solutions of problems provided by the market. Existing policy initiatives would continue under the baseline scenario, in particular to improve the quality of and information about cross-border delivery services, resulting from the 2013 Roadmap 131 and 2012 Green Paper on cross-border parcel delivery 132 . In light of these policy objectives, NPOs committed to improving the quality of cross-border delivery services, for example improved track and trace, through a programme named "interconnect". While the timings for the introduction of these services have not all been confirmed, in the medium term they should improve cross-border labelling, returns, track and trace and options for delivery location. A complaints handling procedure has already been introduced under this programme. 133 To improve the availability of information, the Commission is supporting an information platform about delivery services through COSME funding and EMOTA and E-commerce Europe have introduced trustmarks for e-retailers which include delivery criteria. Such developments are likely to address some of the information deficits regarding delivery services and options, though only to the extent that a choice of retailers and delivery operators are available, as well as quality issues which are outside the scope of this IA.

The third aim of the 2013 Roadmap, namely the affordability of cross-border services throughout the EU (and in particular for individual consumers and SMEs), has not been specifically addressed by self-regulatory action or market developments to date, despite the Roadmap setting an 18 month deadline for action which ended in June 2015. The initiatives that are being implemented are unlikely to have a significant impact on the affordability of cross-border delivery services for low volume senders. There has been no indication that improved interoperability is expected to lead to a reduction in the difference in price between cross-border and domestic services.

While even in the absence of additional policy initiatives e-commerce is expected to grow, market-led developments focus on the most commercially attractive parts of the (delivery) market, where the return on investment is likely to be highest. One study estimates internet retailing will continue to grow in Europe reaching EUR 700bn by 2019 (an increase of 85% from 2014). Germany and the UK (followed by France and the other large e-commerce economies) will contribute to this growth. B2C deliveries are expected account for over one third of the overall delivery market in 2019 and market exit and concentration is anticipated, in an effort to rationalise operations and improve load capacity. 134

In addition to the current postal and parcel operators (including the express industry), other economic operators are likely to enter this market, or to expand business practices that are already being tested today that reduce their costs. For example large online platforms have been trying to bridge the gap between e-retailers and their customers themselves (e.g. by installing parcel locker stations in densely populated areas, by offering consolidation services for small platform members, by establishing co-operations with the collaborative economy for last-mile delivery, by investing in new technologies such as drones, etc.). Parcel brokerage services are emerging but mainly in mature, high volume countries (that allow them a viable business model). These developments should increase choice for retailers and customers as well as the competitive pressure on traditional delivery operators, given the high price sensitivity of online consumers.

Competition would however develop mainly for large volume flows – i.e. for larger e-retailers (who create economies of scale due to high volumes in the first in the first and last mile), and for densely populated areas (which create economies of scale due to high volumes on the last mile). It is much more questionable, by contrast, to what extent small e-retailers that occasionally ship to customers abroad as well as sellers and buyers located in more peripheral regions of individual Member States and of the EU, would be able to benefit from these market-driven developments.

Evidence from a study 135 shows that in larger and highly connected markets cross-border prices are comparably lower, relative to comparable domestic prices. The study also found evidence that cross-border parcel prices tend to be higher for peripheral countries sending to other peripheral countries in the EU (with the exception of neighbouring countries in the periphery of the EU which apply large discounts to each other). Furthermore the study found that cross-border prices are relatively higher (than domestic prices) for standard parcels, than for premium parcels as competition is more intense in the latter segment.

The complexity and fragmentation of the regulatory framework would be likely to continue without further action, creating barriers to the single market and cross-border e-commerce. Although the 2013 Roadmap already invited Member States to extend the mandate and tasks of regulators to (cross-border) parcel deliveries, no widespread changes have since been observed as a result of the Roadmap. The existing level of regulatory oversight of cross-border delivery would therefore most likely remain, with postal regulators across Europe continuing to focus almost exclusively on domestic letter services, as provided by the incumbent postal operators. In this light, it seems highly uncertain that relying on self-regulatory actions could solve the problems of affordability, enhanced regulatory oversight and network access, to the extent that this is at all possible through enforcement of the PSD given the lack of progress since the publication of the Roadmap in 2013. Better enforcement of the PSD as it stands would also not achieve the objective of affordability as the principles set out in Article 13 such as cost-orientation must only be encouraged (not required) and given that the relevant provisions of PSD apply only to small portion of low-volume originated "universal service" parcels.

1.4.Conclusions of the evaluations of the existing policy

Annex 11 presents the results of a retrospective evaluation of the existing regulatory framework, i.e. the PSD. Overall, while the Directive's core policy objectives have been attained with respect to letters, on the parcel markets, the direct effects of the PSD have been fairly limited. First, differences and /or ambiguity in definitions lead to problems with regulatory oversight and the enforcement of relevant provisions. As a result, the PSD has been implemented in a variety of different ways with varying regulatory practices as a consequence. While this is consistent with subsidiarity and the principles of a framework directive, it leads to fragmentation and hinders the development of the single market both in terms of e-commerce and the provision of delivery services 136 .

Second, there are gaps in the Postal Services Directive that stem from its original focus on letters. Only 5-8% of e-commerce shipments fall within the scope of the USO 137 , and there are differences between countries in what are classified as USO parcels, for example some (but not all) Member States include bulk parcels and some parcels that are tracked are within the scope of the USO. A large majority of parcel services have evolved in a competitive environment – which was characterized by the emergence of new customer needs (of a B2C nature), arising from the steady growth of (cross-border) e-commerce. The ERGP has noted that "European domestic or cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery is very likely wider than the definition of postal services provided by the Directive”. NRAs responsibilities may only cover part of parcel delivery services and again the scope of their powers vary (for example express parcels may or may not be in the remit of NRAs and in some cases NRAs only or principally have competencies for universal services parcels). 138

Third, the PSD gives a wide margin of discretion to Member States. As set out under Driver 3, many NRAs focus on the domestic letter market. Even if their mandate goes beyond universal service parcels, other operators may challenge NRAs' enforcement of the Directive (and national law), for example regarding the provision of information (Article 22a), or by claiming that certain parcel delivery services are not postal services. 139 The ERGP's 2015 report found evidence that in some cases there are different legal provisions that could apply, or be claimed to apply, to a single operator for the same issues and that could arguably be incompatible with one another. 140 The provisions applicable specifically to the cost-orientation of cross-border universal services (i.e. Article 13 of the PSD), require that Member States encourage the cost-orientation of cross-border terminal rates within the universal service obligation, rather than obliging it as a matter of principle (as this is the case for domestic universal service prices) 141 . To the extent that Article 12 applies, it may conflict with arrangements between NPOs on terminal dues for cross-border services which do not respect the (non-mandatory) principles contained in Article 13. In any event, Article 12 extends only to the USO, leaving some services commonly used for cross-border e-commerce outside its scope. NRAs also lack the information about the costs of cross-border delivery, including the wholesale prices charged between operators that would enable them to properly assess whether cross-border services are affordable.

Combined these features mean that changes to the EU legislative framework are needed as improved implementation and enforcement of the PSD would be unlikely to result in the desired improvements in regulatory oversight and affordable prices for individuals and SMEs. A joint BEREC/ ERGP opinion found that "NRAs need the appropriate regulatory powers to intervene and that such powers do not seem to be present in all Member States mainly due to the differences in interpretation of what is or is not a postal service under the Postal Directive. 142 Furthermore NRAs often have no authority to delineate product markets based on competition law principles. 143  

2.EU right to act

According to the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 TEU, action at EU level may only be taken if the envisaged aims cannot be achieved sufficiently by Member States alone and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed actions, be better achieved by the EU. The preceding analysis has set out problems with high cross-border delivery prices for SME retailers and individual consumers, especially those in periphery and remote areas and therefore the need for improved price transparency and regulatory oversight in cross-border delivery markets. The Commission noted the need for additional information on parcel markets in the 2013 Roadmap, but despite the self-regulatory initiative there is still a lack of statistical information on the parcel market across the EU and many cross-border parcel prices remain high.

Cross-border delivery services are by definition offered outside the national market. Given that National Regulatory Authorities have their mandates focussed on their national markets, with limited (if any) power over the cross-border market, and no dedicated mechanisms for the oversight of transactions involving multiple operators, a key issue is the cross-border nature of the delivery where no single NRA is able to solve the problem on its own. Therefore, problems of cross-border regulatory oversight stemming mainly from regulatory fragmentation across the EU and from insufficient powers NRAs can by definition not be tackled at a national level, nor can cross-border terminal rates. Given the internal market dimension of the problems illustrated above, the relevant objectives (strengthening of regulatory oversight, transparency) cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States alone. The most striking example of this is the fact that in some Member States regulatory oversight is severely limited to certain parts of the postal sector while in others the whole sector (letters and parcels beyond the USO) is subject to oversight; these problems are further aggravated in the cross-border dimension. Therefore, inaction or action by Member States alone is likely to result in more fragmentation due to different approaches or interpretations of the current regulatory framework unequal levels of consumer (individuals and retailers) protection across the EU. National responses risk being ineffective as no Member State alone can act on cross-border areas, such as is the case of delivery across the EU and cooperation between NRAs concerning the application of pricing principles to cross-border delivery services, both letters and parcels, is simply inexistent. Without EU action, the identified problems will continue to lead to consumer detriment. Therefore, any further actions in the field of cross-border delivery can be best achieved by a common effort. Accordingly, EU action appears appropriate in light of the principle of subsidiarity.

3.Objectives

3.1. General policy objectives

This initiative is a part of the first pillar of the Digital Single Market strategy aiming to promote e-commerce and deliver better online access for consumers and businesses across Europe. It also complements existing initiatives to improve the quality and accessibility of cross-border parcel delivery. The general policy objectives of this initiative are:

To promote growth and jobs.

To enhance consumer welfare.

To enhance social and territorial cohesion.

On growth and jobs: Better and more affordable cross-border delivery services have been identified as a barrier to the further growth of cross-border e-commerce. Increasing e-commerce would create growth and jobs in two areas: Retailers could sell (grow, employ) more, especially smaller retailers that are targeted by this initiative. The resulting growth in cross-border shipments would mean more business (growth and jobs) for delivery operators.

On consumer welfare: The main advantages for consumers of e-commerce are more choice, lower prices and more convenience. This initiative aims to ensure the cross-border delivery market work effectively so that all businesses and citizens have access to high quality delivery services, reducing prices for smaller retailers and individual consumers in particular. The latter aspect should also allow more small retailers to offer their goods cross-border at more competitive prices, which would further enhance the choice available to consumers.

On social and territorial cohesion: E-commerce is particularly beneficial in areas where alternative shopping opportunities are scarce (e.g. in rural or peripheral regions). Both sellers and buyers located in such regions currently often face higher prices (due to lower volumes or surcharges for remote and rural areas) and a lack of choice of delivery operators. The objective of having an "inclusive" DSM is linked to the need for adequate and affordable services of general economic interest, including accessible parcel delivery services, across the entire EU territory to ensure social inclusion.

3.2. Specific policy objectives

The problem chapter identified four groups of drivers that collectively lead to the main problem, i.e. high prices for cross-border delivery and returns.

The aims of this initiative to make sure that (a) markets work as efficiently as possible by making regulatory oversight of cross-border parcel markets more effective and encouraging competition; and (b) ensuring that all business and citizens (retailers and consumers) benefit from better and more affordable delivery services even if they are "vulnerable" (in terms of size or location) by improving price transparency to create downward pressure on prohibitively high prices . The intermediate objectives therefore are:

To promote competition and market efficiency

To improve the affordability (i.e. lower price) of parcel delivery, especially for vulnerable users

The following chart illustrates the links between the various objectives identified above.

Figure 3: Objectives of the Initiative

3.3. Consistency with other EU policies and with the Charter for fundamental rights

The objectives are fully in line with the Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy for Europe 144 which identified the need for affordable high-quality cross-border delivery as an important contribution to improve the "access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe". Promoting growth and jobs is in line with the Europe 2020 strategy, and is an objective of the DSM Strategy. Finally the PSD, under which letter and parcel services within the scope of the universal service are treated as Services of General Economic Interest (SGEIs), stresses the importance of the postal sector for economic, social and territorial cohesion. The proposals are also in line with the objectives of EU consumer policy and recent legislation facilitating consumers' engagement in cross-border e-commerce such as the Consumer Rights Directive, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive and the Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution Directives (see section 6.13).

The proposed initiative and its objectives is also consistent with EU SME policy as set by the Small Business Act (SBA), in particular principle VII on helping SMEs to benefit more from the opportunities offered by the Single Market. Due to their lack of bargaining power, SMEs are the most affected as they face high delivery prices for low volume cross-border shipments. This limits SMEs' competiveness in cross-border e-commerce given that their growth opportunities are dependent on a seamless EU delivery market. In this context, the proposed parcel initiative would contribute to existing commitments under the Small Business Act.

It is also in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental of Rights, in particular Article 36 145 , which provides that the Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union. Improving the availability and affordability of cross-border delivery services will be beneficial especially for e-retailers and consumers located in rural or peripheral areas. Moreover, any improvements in the cross-border delivery market might also have further positive spill-overs on the domestic delivery market for vulnerable users.

4.Policy options

Several options can be considered to address the problem identified and achieve the set objectives. The full description of the options is presented in Annex 8 on the policy options. While the fundamental economics underlying this sector remain a fact, the content options below show different ways in which the resulting problems could at least be alleviated. Most of the options could be applied as a package (e.g. "consolidation of volumes" and "enhancing the transparency of public list prices"), rather than being mutually exclusive.

4.1.Option 1: Baseline scenario/ No action

No further action is taken at EU level. Member States, NRAs, delivery operators and other stakeholders would still be likely to continue existing projects linked to the 2013 Roadmap, including the Interconnect programme to improve the interoperability and quality of cross-border delivery services, the development of trustmarks, standards and the information platform supported by COSME. Markets would be the main driver of change and new entrants and most of the potential developments driven by the industry would continue to focus on the commercially attractive parts of the delivery market, leaving aside the least profitable segments of the market (small e-retailers as well as sellers and buyers located in more peripheral regions). It is unlikely that Member States would take actions to enhance regulatory oversight, given that existing instruments, namely the 2013 Roadmap, have not led to improvements in the competence of NRAs to collect relevant market data or have at their disposal regulatory tools which would allow them to ensure the affordability of cross-border parcel services. (See section 1.3 and 1.4 for additional information.)

4.2.Option 2: Consolidate volumes of small e-retailers

This would ensure that small and irregular volumes generated by SME e-retailers could be consolidated by a centralised platform, for example developed by the industry or trans-national organisations. By consolidating small volumes into bigger ones, and taking advantage of economies of scale, such a platform would be able to provide volume discounts and therefore lower prices for smaller senders than the ones they would face on the basis of their individual volumes alone. However, after the judgement in C340/13, under the PSD volume discounts may be recognised only at the senders’ level (not the consolidator using the intermediary or proxy discounts), thereby making this option less relevant or even irrelevant at times. 146

In certain EU markets (such as the well-developed UK e-commerce market), such intermediation services are already offered by consolidators or parcel brokers 147 and some e-commerce platforms have been starting to offer consolidation services to the SME sellers on their platforms (but, again, only in a limited number of Member States so far and focussed on the largest markets 148 ). In the wider EU markets, however, such services are underdeveloped, and they may also be unknown to many SME e-retailers. Larger e-commerce platforms (notably Amazon) act as a competitor to other delivery operators.

An information platform is being supported through funding from the COSME Programme (EC), as awarded in early 2016. It is expected that at least in the medium term, a consolidation option for participating SMEs, including for cross-border shipments could be provided by the platform as well as information.

The current impact assessment will therefore not propose further initiatives to be taken in the field of consolidation as these are expected to be addressed by the information platform supported by COSME funding and market forces.

4.3.Option 3: Enhance the transparency of prices

Option 3a – Highlighting the difference between domestic and cross-border prices: publication of prices by the European Commission

The European Commission would publish a selection of NPOs' prices on a dedicated section on the Commission's EUROPA website covering all Member States to facilitate comparisons of domestic and cross-border prices 149 . Prices would be collected from NPOs by NRAs once a year, who would forward the data to the European Commission. NRAs would also be required to assess the affordability and cost-orientation of these prices and publish their assessments (non-confidential versions), as well as sharing them with the Commission and national competition authorities. Prices would be published for 15 domestic and cross-border delivery services per NPO, including a selection of weights (500g, 1kg and 2kg for letters, 1kg, 2kg and 5kg for parcels) 150 and levels of quality (standard, registered and track and trace). Products selected could fall within the universal service obligation in at least some Member States, or may be interchangeable with universal service products. 151  Express services would not be included. Prices would be required from NPOs only as the operator most likely to be used by individual consumers and small e-retailers and they are already required to provide parcel services with affordable, transparent and cost-oriented prices under the universal service obligation (though do so only for domestic services) 152 . Other operators would however be able to request voluntarily request the inclusion of their prices, provided that services were comparable (e.g. delivery throughout the destination country to the home or premises of the addressee).

Option 3b - Enhancing the transparency of individually negotiated prices between all delivery operators and larger e-retailers ("account" customers).

All delivery operators would be required to communicate individually negotiated prices agreed with their account customers (usually commercially confidential information) to the NRA once a year. All delivery operators would be covered as for many negotiated prices cover a higher percentage of their volumes than published prices. The prices would not be published (for commercial and competition reasons) but instead NRAs would be required to judge on whether cross-border parcel delivery services are reasonably priced for the market as a whole.

Option 3c - Enhancing the transparency of inter-operator wholesale prices ("terminal dues" and similar charges).

NPOs would be required to communicate once a year to NRAs the inter-operator wholesale prices (also referred to as terminal rates (i.e. the payments from the originating universal service provider to the destination universal service provider for the costs of transport, sorting and distribution of cross-border items in the destination Member State) they charge. NRAs would to be able to request this information for other NPOs from other NRAs, subject to the general rules on protection of data and confidentiality. Only NPOs would be covered as these are the only operators who have such multilateral agreements and, for the reasons set out above, are the only type of operator whose prices would be assessed for affordability. As these wholesale prices are sometimes the results of commercial negotiations between NPOs, this information would be treated as commercially confidential information and not published, but NRAs would be required to take wholesale prices into consideration, because they are one of the determinants of the cost of cross-border delivery, in order to assess the affordability cross-border prices.

Option 3d - Enhancing the transparency of delivery prices charged by e-retailers

E-retailers would be required to disclose on their websites the prices that e-retailers themselves pay to (all) delivery operators as well as the delivery price they charge to the final consumers. This would apply individually to each product and delivery location so differences in the delivery mark up (or down) would be clear, although there could be exemptions for smaller e-retailers in order to minimise administrative burdens on the smallest firms.

4.4.Option 4: Enhance regulatory powers and market knowledge of postal national regulatory authorities

This group of sub options would provide more regulatory powers for NRAs. 153

Option 4a - Powers to collect statistical data from all parcel delivery operators.

This option would give NRAs a clear mandate to collect data for statistical purposes to monitor developments in domestic and cross-border parcel markets. All parcel delivery providers would be required to submit the following information once, and subsequently inform the operator of changes: the name of the provider, its legal status and form, registration number, VAT number, whether the provider is registered in a trade or similar register, the geographical address of the establishment and a contact person; the nature of the services offered by the provider;and conditions of sale including a description of the complaints procedure. On a yearly basis all delivery operators would be required submit the following data to the NRA: annual turnover in parcel delivery services broken down in national parcels, incoming and outgoing cross-border parcels; number of persons employed (including total number of persons who work for the service provider on matters related to parcel delivery); and the number of domestic, incoming and outgoing parcels. Statistics would be published by the European Commission.

Option 4b - "Ex-ante powers" for national regulators in a cross-border context: notification of price changes

This option would require all delivery operators to notify NRAs one month in advance of changing their published cross-border prices. NRAs would not be required to examine the prices, and if no response from the NRA was received within one month the operator would be able to introduce the price change. The NRA would be able to take issue with the prices on the basis of information about costs, volumes, revenues etc.

Option 4c - Powers to enforce market access, where appropriate, to NPO's cross-border multilateral wholesale remuneration agreements and cross-border services

This option would reinforce non-discrimination by requiring NPOs to meet all reasonable requests for access to multilateral agreements on terminal rates, such as terminal-dues type agreements, by third party parcel delivery service providers. Access to cross-border services should include network elements and associated facilities, relevant services, and information systems necessary for the provision of cross border parcel delivery services, and in particular services linked to the nterconnect programme. To ensure non-discriminatory access, NRAs would be give the powers to require NPOs to publish a reference offer (and impose changes to it) because NPOs would be able to charge for access to their cross-border services. NPOs receiving an access request and providers requesting access would be required to negotiate in good faith. Only NPOs would be included as through the USO they have the obligation to provide postal services throughout their territory (and hence have large networks associated with national coverage).

4.5.Option 5: Regulate cross-border parcel prices

This would directly introduce the regulation of cross-border parcel prices within the EU, as the regulations on international roaming have progressively limited the maximum tariff that can be charged for intra EU voice, SMS and data services, and from 15 June 2017 roaming charges will cease to exist 154 . Price caps would be introduced for cross-border parcel delivery which could be a simple mechanisms (e.g. solely based on distance ) or a more advanced models that would take into account the actual cost of cross-border delivery (for example reflecting additional transport costs and domestic price levels).

There are however substantial differences between the postal and telecoms markets. Most mobile phone contracts are chosen based on domestic use, while cross-border parcel services are likely to be purchased without reference to the domestic offer. Cost differences for postal services are much greater than for telecoms due to the impact of geography, population density, labour, delivery and transport. Furthermore the potential items that would have to be scoped are far more complex than the products subject to the roaming regulation. Historically the market for international roaming services was less competitive than the postal one with weaker consumer pressure. 155  

Direct price regulation risks distorting competition in a complex market environment particularly given the current lack of knowledge of the cross-border parcel market. 156 Restricting direct price regulation to universal service products might also create distortions given the differences in the scope and features of USO products between Member States, and the growth of B2C services provided by other operators (though not always throughout a country or throughout the EU). Finally it would be disproportionate and contrary to better regulation principles to conclude that direct price regulation is the optimal solution to the failure of self-regulation to eliminate prohibitive cross-border delivery prices.

For these reasons, the current impact assessment will discard the option of further initiatives to be taken in the field of price regulation.

4.6.Alternative policy instruments

For the implementation of the retained options identified above, the following policy instruments will be explored further. (See also section 6.2 for the preferred instrument).

a)Improve the implementation of the current framework (i.e. the PSD). This would include providing clear guidance on how certain Articles of the PSD should be used to strengthen regulatory oversight for cross-border parcel deliveries (e.g. Article 22a for data collection, Articles 12 and 13 for clarifying the principles of affordability, transparency and cost-orientation for cross-border delivery of universal services, and Article 11a regarding access to the postal infrastructure).

b)Issue a Recommendation to Member States to strengthen regulatory oversight, based on the current regulatory framework (or beyond, where the PSD so allows).

c)Legally binding instruments, in order to clarify certain definitions, ensure affordability and strengthen the powers and tasks of national regulatory authorities. The main sub-options are:

A revision of the Postal Services Directive.

A self-standing Directive.

A self-standing Regulation.

5.Analysis of impacts

5.1.Option 1: Baseline scenario/ No policy action

Without further action at the EU level e-commerce would still be expected to grow although most, if not all, market developments would focus on the most profitable segments of the market, i.e. where volumes are higher. This would leave behind smaller customers and those in remote and peripheral areas who are less attractive for other parcel operators, despite the overall expected growth in e-commerce. Given the economics of scale involved in cross-border (and nationwide) parcel networks, it is unlikely that sufficient competition would emerge to the extent necessary to make prices more affordable, at least in the short to medium term and in the absence of access requirements (such as option 4c). High prices for cross-border shipments reduce e-retailers desire to sell aboard, and this low level of demand also makes market entry less appealing. Even in the well-developed UK market, surcharges and higher costs (as well as other delivery problems) are more common in remote and rural areas, where consumers are also more likely to be reliant on e-commerce. 157 Amazon's one hour "Prime Now" and same day delivery services are available in selected cities only. 158  

Member States would be unlikely to improve regulatory oversight of their parcel markets so market knowledge and regulatory requirements would vary between Member States leading to fragmentation of the single market and complexity for cross-border operators.

Initiatives following the Commission's 2013 Roadmap 159 would be likely to continue. While the quality of cross-border services is expected to increase, in particular through standardisation work and the Interconnect programme, improvements in interoperability introduced so far have not yet led to price reductions and operators would be unlikely to pass on cost reductions to customers in the absence of competitive (or other) pressure. COSME funding for the information platform would also continue, which would improve SMEs’ access to information about the delivery options available to them and hence facilitate more informed choices and a better offer for their customers. If the platform develops a consolidation capability, SMEs could also benefit from lower prices, as would their customers (assuming the savings were passed on). Trustmarks developed by the e-commerce industry are also expected to continue, boosting consumers’ confidence when shopping online in other Member States.

The baseline scenario (no intervention) was supported by the majority of delivery operators in their responses to the public consultation. Many stated that the delivery market was already competitive and there was no need for additional regulation that could stifle innovation and risk undermining the universal service.

On the contrary, Member States who responded to the consultation often noted the problem of a lack of clarity in the applicable legal regimes and the need for regulators to have better data on the market. As do many surveys, responses from consumers and e-retailers showed that many retailers and consumers find that the cost of cross-border delivery is still an obstacle to buying more online from other Member States, indicating a need for additional action (see Annexes 1 and 2 for further details).

5.2.Option 3a: Highlighting the difference between domestic and cross-border prices: publication of prices by the European Commission

Publishing a selection of domestic and cross-border prices charged by different postal operators would clearly show which operators had less affordable prices, relative to others. Combined with an NRAs’ assessments of affordability, based mainly on cost factors, there would be a 'naming and shaming effect' which would create pressure on NPOs with unreasonably high cross-border prices to make prices more affordable for the products within scope. Sending the report on affordability to consumer bodies and national competition authorities (if not the NRA) would highlight the findings to those charged with representing consumer needs and ensuring competition, and encourage further pressure to reduce (unaffordable) prices. Furthermore transparency of prices will raise awareness among users and operators whereby users will more actively look for lower priced parcel services. An increase in competitive pressure would be likely to lead to price reductions to protect market share.

A dedicated section on the Commission's EUROPA website hosted by the Commission would have the benefit of a centralised website showing the price differences across the EU, making them more prominent and transparent. Moreover collecting prices directly from NPOs (via NRAs) would help ensure prices were comparable, uncontested and therefore make the website more credible. Given that USO and similar prices are already public, no adverse anti-competitive impacts are expected, but the search costs involved in obtaining the prices would be significantly reduced.

This option would mostly affect NPOs where cross-border prices for ordinary parcels are significantly higher than domestic ones and which cannot be justified by additional costs. The impact on such NPOs' profitability would however be minimal given that USO or similar 160 international packets (letters) and parcels are a small part of an NPO's volumes as many e-retailers are likely to be account customers who already pay lower prices through negotiated tariffs outside the scope of the USO. Likewise, any impact on wages or working conditions, prices for other postal products and services and requests for additional funding for the universal service are expected to be marginal and therefore a need for additional public subsidies is not expected. NPOs might however benefit from higher delivery volumes if demand increases as prices decrease, and from any publicity of affordable prices. No impact is expected in those NPOs where cross-border delivery prices are already relatively low and on NPOs' express services or other subsidiaries, whose prices would not be included in the scope of the measure. For these reasons a negative impact on the competitive position of NPOs is not expected.

Other delivery operators and new operators might enter the market if they believed they could offer cross-border services more cheaply than the NPOs' prices. They would also voluntarily be able to have their prices included on the website, providing they were comparable.

Individual consumers and e-retailers would benefit mainly through price reductions brought about by ‘naming and shaming’ especially where current cross-border delivery prices are currently prohibitively high. They could also be encouraged to seek out other operators who might offer more competitive prices as one centralised website would highlight these differences more clearly than the availability of prices on individual NPOs’ websites These impacts would be more prevalent where neighbouring countries offer cheaper delivery services (for example an e-retailer could create a warehouse in another country or take parcels directly to the operator there to benefit from lower prices), although a link to the COMSE website could also help individual consumers and retailers to seek out the most suitable offer (from any participating delivery provider).

E-commerce associations participating in the public consultation confirmed support for more transparency on prices. Consumer organisations also supported measures to improve price transparency and to address the high problem of cross-border delivery 161 . Most delivery operators, on the other hand, did not see any need for additional regulation, including increased price transparency.

Sharing information about prices between NRAs would help NRAs make assessments of the affordability of cross-border prices. Under the proposal, NRAs would have guidance about the factors to take into account when assessing affordability, including the domestic tariffs for equivalent services, multilateral wholesale prices (terminal rates) and any application of a uniform tariff.

The administrative burden is estimated to be 4 000€ annually for all EU NPOs in total and 44 000€ annually for all EU NRAs in total. This option is retained.

5.3.Option 3b - Enhancing the transparency of individually negotiated prices between delivery operators and larger e-retailers ("account" customers).

This option would allow regulators to undertake a better assessment of the: (i) actual discounts given to large e-retailers compared to small ones and non-account customers (public list prices), (ii) profit margins in each of the segments and (iii) proportion of e-retailers that benefit from these individually negotiated prices. Above all NRAs would have information that would allow them to benchmark and assess the affordability and cost-orientation of all prices (e.g. the links between volumes and discounts and other cost determinants) and ensure non-discrimination between different users.

This option would however be disproportionate as the costs of delivery operators’ related to the provision of information and of the NRAs' assessment of the large number of individually negotiated contracts would be high, if the number of operators to which this option applied was not limited to a small number of operators. More importantly the high cost would not be justified by potential benefits (i.e. lower prices) as this market segment (i.e. commercially negotiated discounts) has not been identified as being particularly problematic in terms of affordability. Delivery operators did not generally support the extension of regulatory oversight in their responses to the consultation and e-retailers, while usually supportive of the proposed measures, have specified that negotiated prices should remain confidential. 162  

If this option was limited to the ten largest delivery operators in each Member State, plus the NPO, the administrative burden is estimated to be around 50 000€ annually for all EU NRAs in total and 179 000€ for all the delivery operators combined. The admin burden would be higher if more delivery operators were within scope.

This option is discarded because it might not have an impact on the prices paid by individuals and small retailers, it was not supported by stakeholders and the costs could be high.

5.4.Option 3c - Enhancing the transparency of inter-operator multilateral wholesale prices ("terminal dues" and similar charges).

This option would give NRAs knowledge of inter-operator multilateral wholesale prices and enable NRAs to assess whether USO or similar cross-border prices are affordable, based partly on the cost of delivery (option 3a) and whether other delivery operators are charged in a non-discriminatory way (if combined with option 4c). The availability of such information is also a prerequisite for NRAs to judge the merits of any complaint by (alternative) operators about lack of access to terminal dues. Knowledge of NPO's terminal rates would also enable NRAs to assess whether terminal dues are in line with the principles set out in Article 13 of the Postal Services Directive, namely fixed in relation to costs; related to the quality of service and transparent and non-discriminatory.

The option would also exercise a deterrent effect on NPOs who might otherwise be tempted to charge higher wholesale prices that would discriminate between operators. In addition, NPOs with low bargaining power could benefit if this option resulted in a decrease of the wholesale price charged by NPOs with higher bargaining power. Other delivery operators, including SMEs, would benefit from a reduction in rates combined with access to NPOs’ networks (4c). This option would therefore contribute to greater market efficiency, further developments of competition and affordability of prices.

Retailers and consumers would also benefit from such a reduction in prices and increase in competition, providing that cost savings are passed on by delivery operators.

In the public consultation smaller NPOs, although greater regulatory oversight was not generally their preferred policy option, stated that if there were to be greater oversight they gave more support for regulatory oversight related to cost –orientation and transparency of inter-operator wholesale prices than larger NPOs who have subsidiaries and/or greater negotiating power. The disclosure and accessibility of wholesale prices option was supported by many alternative delivery operators 163 .

The administrative burden costs for NRAs is estimated at a maximum 31 000€ annually in total. The administrative burden on NPOs would be 8 000€ annually in total. This option should be retained.

5.5.Option 3d - Enhancing the transparency of delivery prices charged by e-retailers

This option would enhance transparency of the delivery prices charged by e-retailers so that individual consumers could clearly see if e-retailers charge more or less than they pay delivery operators.

On one hand this would show consumers when retailers are charging more for delivery than they pay themselves and therefore lead to downward pressure on delivery prices charged by retailers who are unable to justify their mark-up. There is however a risk that the prices of products themselves could be increased to offset any reduction in delivery charges and/or free delivery offers would be withdrawn. On the other hand, revealing the actual cost of delivery could deter both retailers from selling cross-border and some consumers from purchasing online if they believed that the mark-ups were too high. It would also be highly intrusive for e-retailers for whom delivery costs are one input among many others.

Some NPOs support increased transparency of retailers' delivery prices as the prices paid by consumers ultimately depend on e-retailers, not delivery operators. 164 Some NPOs note that the prices they charge e-retailers are lower than the delivery price e-retailers charge consumers.

E-retailers would face a significant administrative burden, including sharing confidential information from all individually negotiated prices. Even limiting the policy to the largest 10% of e-retailers would result in estimated costs of over EUR 2 million in total per year. 

Overall this option would be disproportionate as the costs would outweigh the benefits. It would also be intrusive for retailers. For these reasons this option should be discarded.

5.6.Option 4a - Enhancing regulatory powers of postal regulators: Powers to collect statistical data from all parcel delivery operators

This option would clarify NRAs’ responsibilities and powers to collect data covering the parcel market and would define the data that should be collected. This would enhance regulators' market knowledge and make regulatory oversight more effective. The definition of the parcel market would also be clarified in the legal instrument to enable the collection of data on a consistent basis.

NRAs would benefit from clarity about the delivery operators to which their powers would apply. NRAs would use the information received for several purposes such as (i) analysis, statistics and reporting; (ii) monitoring (e.g. market developments); (iii) identification of regulatory concerns; and (iv) monitoring and reinforcement of the regulatory principles (e.g. enforce market access and cost orientation). This would enable NRAs to monitor structural changes in the market.

There is widespread support for greater clarity in NRA powers relating to the delivery market. 165 Some NPOs responding to the public consultation supported the idea that, if any regulatory oversight, this should focus on all operators in the market (most preferred regulatory option). While there was no support for additional oversight from alternative operators, express operators have noted that the differences in NRAs powers to collect data and the different data they collect can impose administrative burdens. These burdens and fragmentation should be reduced by standardised data collection of a consistent minimal set of market information.

In order to limit administrative burden on SMEs which operate in the delivery market, those with less than 50 employees would be exempted from this requirement. This would reduce the administrative burden on regulators as well as small delivery operators. There would be a minimal impact on the overall effectiveness of the option as the integrators and the three largest NPO groups have a market share of over two thirds of the European parcel market. 166 With this exemption, the administrative burden for NRAs is estimated at a maximum of 80 000€ annually as some NRAs already collect this information and so would face only limited additional costs. All delivery operators would have a yearly additional administrative burden of 4 000€ annually for all NPOs in total and 170 000€ in total for other delivery operators combined. This option should be retained.

Option 4b – Enhancing regulatory powers of postal regulators: "Ex-ante powers" for national regulators, notification of price increases

NRAs would be able to challenge price changes by all operators, which could bring about a reduction in published prices offered by any operator judged to be unreasonably high.

On the other hand there would be greater regulatory uncertainty for all delivery operators, potentially deterring investment and innovation. Delivery operators might also chose to use more negotiated prices (and fewer published ones) which would sidestep the notification requirement yet incur additional costs (through the need to negotiate prices). This might also increase search costs for retailers.

In its 2014 opinion for the Commission", the ERGP noted that it is "not aware of any factor that would make ex-ante regulation of the markets to which European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery belongs uniformly necessary at this stage". 167 Therefore if NRAs were given additional ex-ante powers (rather than an obligation) they would be unlikely to use them, given they see no need for the increased regulatory (and administrative) burden. Support from delivery operators would also be extremely unlikely, although consumers and retailers should welcome any corresponding reduction in prices.

The administrative burden is estimated to be 4 000€ annually in total for NPOs (as they are already subject to ex-ante regulation and 149 000€ in total per year for all other delivery operators. Additional costs for NRAs are estimated at around 250 000€ annually. The option is not proportionate and could distort the market so this option should be discarded.

5.7.Option 4c - Enhancing regulatory powers of postal regulators: Powers to enforce non-discriminatory access to NPOs' cross-border wholesale prices and cross-border network agreements

This option would enhance competition in the cross-border delivery market by facilitating market entry and limiting potential adverse effects of market power and network size. It would therefore allow delivery operators to offer lower cross-border prices 168 . Only access to NPO’s cross-border network agreements would be required as through the USO they have nationwide networks, in part linked to their former status of national postal monopolies. Although NPOs could face more competition, they could benefit from increased volumes and revenue charging other operators for the use of their networks which could lower average fixed costs. It could also help safeguard employment. 

Alternative delivery operators and particularly, small private operators would benefit from improved market and network access. Lower market entry barriers should stimulate the emergence of new business models and innovation and these delivery operators would be able to be more cost efficient (by using existing infrastructure) and potentially pass on cost savings to the final users (individual consumers and e-retailers). Access to wholesale cross-border pricing agreements should lower costs, especially if coupled with powers for NRAs to enforce access. 169 Encouraging competition should reduce so this option would benefit individual consumers and e-retailers as they would have a wider range of cheaper delivery options.    

NPOs would see a limited increase in administrative burden costs of an estimated 4 000€ annually for all NPOs in total. NRAs would face an additional cost of 66 000€ annually to investigate complaints. The option is retained along with 3c.

5.8.Administrative Burden Calculation

The following table provides a summary of the estimated administrative burden and compliance costs (€ per year, rounded, for delivery operators with under 50 employees). The calculated administrative burdens include the estimated cost of staff time devoted to complete the activities required and draw on the European Commission's experience of the production of postal statistics. The labour costs involved are quantified (monetary estimates) on the basis of the EU "Standard Cost Model" 170 . The calculation is done with the help of the "EU database on Administrative Burdens", which sets a standardised wage rate per hour depending on the staff category concerned. For options 3 and 4 the calculations are based on the assumption of 28 NPOs and NRAs and, where applicable, a number of other cross-border EU operators meeting a relevant threshold condition. A summary table of all administration burden costs per option and per main stakeholder affected is presented at the end of this section. For further details please see Annex 9 171 .

Once the actual tasks of options have been agreed, the amounts of the estimated administrative burden and compliance costs will depend on the number of hours deemed necessary for the tasks, as well as on the costs per hour. As mentioned above, the working time estimations are based on the European Commission's best available knowledge about the potential workload. As concerns cost per hour, the relevant Standard Cost Model allows for staff to be specified according to nine levels of qualification. This has a direct effect on labour costs, and therefore on the administrative burden calculations. We have characterised staff at either "clerk" level, for more routine data collection and reporting, or at "professional" level, for tasks that involve analysis and guidance at operator or NRA level. The Standard Cost Model used sets the standardized hourly wage level for "clerks" at 18.20 EUR, and for "professionals" at 32.10 EUR.

There is however some uncertainty about which category of staff is relevant, as well as about the workload needed. To the extent that the actual costs deviate from the Standard Cost Model calculations, the uncertainty would likely emanate from workload assumptions, rather than from staff categorization. In particular, the professional analysis needed at NRA level could in individual cases deviate from the schematic costs indicated here, where our calculations must be based on estimated averages.

According to the estimates, options 3a and 3c would create the least administrative burden, while options 3d and 4b would create the most administrative burden. For NRAs the least burdensome options would be 3a, 3c and 3d, while for NPOs would be option 3a, 3d and 4b. Options 3b and 4a and 4b would be the most burdensome for other delivery operators. A more detailed description of the administrative burden per option can be found in Annex 9.

Table 1: Summary of administration burden costs

Estimated cost NPOs (€)

Estimated workload NPOs

Estimated cost NRAs (€)

Estimated workload NRAs

Estimated cost other operators (€)

Frequency

Sum (€)

Option 3a

4 000 (around 150 per operator)

1 man-day (at clerk level)

44 000 (around 1 600 per NRA)

2 man-days (at clerk level) + 5 man-days of analysis (at professional level).

-

Annually

48 000

Option 3b

16 000 (around 600 per operator)

4 man-days (at clerk level)

50 000 (around 1 8000 per NRA)

7 man-days (at clerk level) + 3 man-days of analysis (at professional level).

163 000

(around 600 per operator)

Annually

230 000

Option 3c

8 000 (around 300 per operator)

2 man-days (at clerk level)

31 000 (around 1 100 per NRA)

4 man-days (at clerk level) + 2 man-days of analysis (at professional level).

Annually

39 000

Option 3d

E-retailers: Over 2 million (around 70 per e-retailer)

Annually

Over 2 million

Option 4a

4 000 (around 150 per operator)

1 man-day (at clerk level)

80 000 (around 2900 per NRA)

3 man-weeks (around 2 weeks at clerk level and around 1 week at professional level)

170 000

(estimated work-load: 8 hours at clerk level)

(around 150 per operator)

Annually

280 000

Option4b

4 000 (around 140 per operator)

1 man-days (at clerk level)

252 000 (around 9000 per NRA)

7 man-weeks (at professional level)

149 000 (estimated workload: 7 hours (at clerk level) (around 140 per operator)

Ad hoc

405 000

Option 4c

4 000 (around 140 per operator)

1 man-day (at clerk level)

66 000 (around 2400 per NRA)

2 man-weeks at professional and clerk level.

-

Ad hoc

70 000

5.9.Social, economic and environmental impacts

None of the options has a specific social and environmental impact as the impacts are similar for all options. In general, all the options have the following social and environmental effects:

Social and economic impacts: on the one hand, increased e-commerce demand for goods and cross-border delivery due to improved affordability of cross-border delivery prices would have a positive impact on economic growth and jobs, as more customers will be willing to buy cross-border goods online and more e-retailers will be willing to sell cross-border online or able to sell more. Increased demand for delivery services should also create more jobs for delivery operators. More choice for consumers and lower prices, which would particularly benefit those in remote or peripheral areas, would lead to an increase in consumer welfare.

Environmental impacts: increased e-commerce demand for goods will increase the amount of cross-border deliveries. Negative impacts could arise, for example pollution from air or road transport, and congestion. However, if a downward pressure on prices and larger volumes leads to optimisation of delivery operators' logistics processes (e.g. final mile solutions, fleet choice, more efficient long haul transport, sustainably city logistics 172 ) the environmental cost per parcel could be reduced and negative impacts minimised. See also section 6.11.

6.Comparison of options and summary of overall impact

6.1.Comparison in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence

The policy options presented are not mutually exclusive and would be more effective combined as a package, complementing the other initiatives to address problems with cross-border delivery and e-commerce that are outside the scope of this impact assessment. The tables below provide an overview of the analysis in section 4, which sets out for each policy option the expected impact per stakeholder group, whether the option would contribute to the objectives and whether it would be proportionate.

Table 2: Effectiveness and efficiency of the policy options on objectives

Effectiveness in achieving the objectives below

Efficiency (cost

effectiveness) in

achieving

listed objectives

Proportionality) in

achieving

listed objectives

Objectives⇒

Policy options⇓

Render regulatory oversight more effective

Enhance market and price transparency

1. Baseline scenario / No action

0

0

0

0

3. To enhance the transparency of prices

3.a – NPO Public list prices

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

✓✓

✓✓✓

3.b -Individually negotiated prices

✓✓

✓✓

✗✗✗

✗✗✗

3.c - Inter-NPO wholesale prices

✓✓✓

✓✓

✓✓

3.d - Delivery prices paid by e-retailers.

✓✓✓

✗✗✗

✗✗✗

4 - To enhance the regulatory powers of NRAs

4.a - To collect statistical data from all delivery operators

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

4.b - "Ex-ante powers" for all delivery operators

✓✓

✓✓

✗✗✗

4.c –To enforce access to NPOs’ cross-border pricing agreements and networks

✓✓✓

✓✓

✓✓

Impact on effectiveness and efficiency compared to the situation today,

✓✓✓(Strong and positive– ✓✓ (Moderate and positive) – ✓ (Weak and positive) - ✗✗✗(Strong and negative) – ✗✗(Moderate and negative) – ✗ (Weak and negative ) – ≈ marginal or neutral - ? uncertain; n.a. not applicable. 0 no impact.

Option 1 (baseline scenario) assumes actions by stakeholders in the cross-border markets, as a follow-up of the 2013 Roadmap 173 , would continue. No substantial changes have been observed since the Roadmap's adoption 174 in the areas of regulatory oversight or affordability of cross-border parcel delivery (see section 4.1 and Annex 10) and is it unlikely the status quo would change in the absence of further EU-level action. Option 1 would therefore be ineffective in the two main objectives of rendering regulatory oversight more effective and enhancing market and price transparency (particularly for SMEs and individuals) so the options has been rated as "0" meaning no impact. See section 1.3 and 1.4 for further details.

Options 3a, b c, and d would all have a positive impact on regulatory oversight, with 3a and 3c having the strongest impact as they would give regulators information about the affordability of products directly relevant to the aims of the proposal: 3b is less effective as regulators would have additional data on the bulk parcel market which is likely to be competitive and 3d would not directly affect regulatory oversight. Options 3a and 3d would have the strongest positive impact on price transparency through making prices (and in the case of 3d, costs) available to the public. 3b and 3d would have only a moderate impact as those prices would be disclosed to NRAs only. 3b and 3d would impose significant administrative burdens, and therefore have a strong negative effect. 3c would have a weak negative impact if implemented in isolation, given the associated administrative burden. 3a would impose small burdens (a moderate positive impact) and in terms of proportionality would have a strong positive impact on objectives, while imposing small administrative burdens. 3c would impose higher administrative burdens and prices would not be public so the impact would be moderately positive. Options 3b and option 3d would significantly increase administrative costs and not address the key issue (i.e. the high price charges to small senders) so would have a strong, negative impact in the proportionality assessment.

Option 4a and 4c would both strongly positively impact regulatory oversight as they wold give regulators new powers. 4b would be less effective as the powers would extend to parts of the market which are likely to be competitive. 4a would give regulators market data and therefore improve strongly improve transparency, 4b would have a more moderate impact and 4c would have an uncertain impact as it would not directly affect transparency. 4a would impose burdens on all operators, so although the impact would be strong, the overall cost efficiency would be weak - although exempting the smallest operators would give the option a strong positive contribution. 4b would impose weak negative burdens, and the need for such measures has not been demonstrated it would have a strong disproportionate impact. 4c would achieve a moderate positive balance between the administrative burdens and achievement of the objectives.

.

Table 3: Effects of the policy options for stakeholders

Stakeholders⇒

Policy options⇓

Consumers

Retailers (SMEs)

NPOs

Other delivery operators

NRAs

1. Baseline scenario / No action

0

0

0

0

0

3. To enhance the transparency of prices

3.a – NPO Public list prices

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

3.b -Individually negotiated prices

✗✗✗

✗✗

✗✗✗

3.c - Inter-NPO wholesale prices

3.d - Delivery prices paid by e-retailers.

✓✓

✗✗✗

✓✓

✓✓

4 - To enhance the regulatory powers of NRAs

4.a - To collect statistical data from all parcel delivery operators

✓✓✓

4.b - "Ex-ante powers" covering all parcel delivery operators

✓✓

✓✓

✗✗✗

✗✗✗

4.c – To enforce access to NPOs’ cross-border pricing agreements and networks

✓✓

✓✓✓

Impact on effectiveness and efficiency compared to the situation today,

✓✓✓(Strong and positive – ✓✓ (Moderate and positive) – ✓ (Weak and positive contribution) - ✗✗✗(Strong and negative) – ✗✗(Moderate and negative) – ✗ (Weak and negative contribution – ≈ marginal or neutral - ? uncertain; n.a. not applicable. 0 no impact

Most options would have a strong positive effect on consumers and retailers (particularly SMEs) as they should lead to more transparent and affordable prices. 3a in particular would highlight where parcel delivery services were not affordable and therefore encourage consumers and retailers to seek out a better deal. This would be most effective if combined with the greater threat of market entry that option 4c would create. Consumers and small e-retailers, plus those in remote and peripheral areas would benefit more from 3a as at present they are more likely to pay high prices and/or depend on the NPO through the USO, instead of individually negotiating prices (3b). All options would potentially lead to more cross-border e-commerce and therefore more cross-border delivery. Option 3d would have a strong negative impact on e-retailers as it would force them to disclose the price they pay to parcel operators as well as the price they charge to consumers (although it could have a moderate positive impact on consumers) and 3b could have a negative impact on (larger) e-retailers as commercially negotiated agreements with delivery operators would be disclosed to NRAs. 3c would have a weak positive impact on both groups as the impact would be indirect.

NPOs would be the most affected delivery operators as some options are only addressed to them (3a, 3c and 4c), although offering lower prices could improve their competitive positions. Options 3b would be the most burdensome (strong negative impact) as it would require NPOs to provide information on confidential information on all individually prices, although options 3a, 3c and 4a also would entail some additional administrative costs (weak negative impacts). Option 4c could have a small positive effect to NPOs if it would translate into higher volumes and the possibility of optimising certain routes due to more delivery operators accessing NPOs’ networks, but this would be dependent on the demand from other operators so overall the impact would be uncertain.

Other delivery operators would face additional administrative costs from options 3b (moderate negative impact) and 4b in particular, which due to administrative burdens and regulatory uncertainty would have a strong negative impact. 4a would entail additional costs, though the impact is only judged to be weakly negative as it would bring benefits though the standardisation of information requests. Delivery operators who lack network size would benefit from option 4c if they wish to have access to networks and infrastructures of the NPOs so it would have a weak positive impact. This option could benefit start-ups in particular.

Option 3d would have a moderately positive impact on all delivery operators as it would show their prices to e-retailers, and any additional mark-up charged by e-retailers.

NRAs would be positively affected by all options to the extent that these would allow them to gain more market knowledge and more regulatory powers, although there would be administrative costs involved which is why overall 3b, 3d and 4b would be likely to have negative impacts. The option which would affect NRAs more positively would be 4a, as it would clarify their legal powers and the parcel delivery providers to which they apply. Option 4c would have an uncertain impact as the extent to which NRAs would be required to intervene in the propose reference offers is unknown. Options 3c would have a weak positive effect for NRAs.

6.2.Choice of legal instrument

As set out in section 4.7, there are several legal and non-legal instruments that could theoretically be used.

Improving the enforcement of the current legal framework would not have an impact on affordability as Member States are only required to encourage cost-orientation for cross-border services within the USO (and which differ between Member States) but as it has been shown (section 1.4), Member States have not implemented and enforced this requirement of PSD and NRAs lack the underlying data to make assessments of the true cost of cross-border services. Regulatory oversight would not change as the PSD permits substantial variation in the information that is provided to NRAs and the Commission by different parcel delivery operators, as well as allowing for relatively wide freedom for Member States to define sector specific regulatory tasks depending on their national circumstances.

Improving the implementation of the current legal framework through guidance would be unlikely to have an impact as there has been no significant improvement in affordability and regulatory oversight since the Roadmap was published in 2013 (see the assessment of a recommendation below). Additional guidance would be unlikely to have an impact on these areas and guidance could also lead to additional fragmentation through different implementation at the national level. Furthermore, changing how the Directive is implemented would require some Member States to amend their laws which would take time and create additional legislative and administrative burdens, as well as leading to further variation at the national level, and not overcome the permissible differences in implementation that give rise to some of the shortcomings in the cross-border parcel market.

Improved enforcement of competition law would also be unlikely to address structural issues in the market, such as the lack of supply for small senders, and given its ex-post approach, would not be able to protect consumers and e-retailers from unreasonably high prices from the outset. The ERGP has found no evidence of any competition problem in the sector 175 nor is Commission aware of any specific competition concern in this area in the Member States (with the exception of recent decision of the Autorité de la Concurrence). 176  

A Recommendation to Member States would also be unlikely to have an impact given the Roadmap (which was a Recommendation in all but name) did not improve regulatory oversight and price transparency and affordability. To choose a nonbinding instrument for the core issues of regulatory oversight and transparency does not seem appropriate. First, it would not guarantee adequate and coherent implementation 177 . Second, Member States may express the same reluctance to act as shown until now, or be prevented from taking action by the existence of contravening national provisions and a lack of domestic political will to amend and/or abolish them. Third, a general non-binding instrument would also leave a very broad discretion to Member States, NRAs and market operators as to whether and how to intervene, if at all. Considering the limited results of previous self-regulatory initiatives and non-binding approaches in relation to the issues identified as crucial 178 , the outcome of a non-binding approach seems likely to be very limited or non-existent.

The Postal Services Directive does not address the issues at stake to an adequate degree (see Annex 11). While a revision of the PSD could extend the scope of the universal services to cover cross-border parcels more comprehensively, a revision of the PSD would require analysis far beyond the parcel sector. As the number of letters declines, any revision of the PSD would require monitoring and analysis of the changes in the market and the needs of users including a prospective analysis of the impact of the substantive changes on the sustainability of the universal service. Amending the PSD would also take time as a consensus would need to be reached about the future of EU letter and parcel services and the revised Directive would need to then be implemented in Member States, creating additional administrative burdens. In its 2015 Report on the Application of the Postal Services Directive the Commission concluded there was no need at this stage to change the Directive.

A self-standing Directive could focus on the parcel market and would allow for more flexibility in implementation at national level. This would however risk not addressing sufficiently the problems resulting from fragmentation and divergent application of national laws as Member States would have a degree of discretion over implementation.

A Regulation, as a directly binding legal instrument would guarantee that the policy options are swiftly and consistently introduced in all 28 Member States in a way that can be enforced and further regulatory fragmentation avoided. Targeted and specific harmonised measures would also ensure a high degree of legal security to the advantage of all operators on the market and the regulation could build on and support, insofar as cross border parcel delivery services are concerned, the rules provided for by Directive 97/67/EC 179 . A Regulation can be considered to be the most appropriate method for achieving the desired result, in particular in fields with complex technical features as the ones present here, and would minimise the administrative burden linked to transposition for Member States, while preventing any further regulatory fragmentation that could result from other legal instruments.

A targeted and specific Regulation on cross-border parcel services that complements the existing framework in particular as regards regulatory oversight and transparency of parcel services is thus the preferred instrument. This is the more true as the issues at stake need be addressed without delay because of the fast evolution in the Digital Single Market. In order to achieve tangible results in a narrow timeframe only a specific Regulation that should be adopted rapidly and that does not require national implementing measures and a transposition period seems to constitute an appropriate and efficient instrument.

Costs faced by delivery operators (one-off, administrative burden and recurring implementation/compliance costs) would be similar to those incurred under a recommendation or self-regulation, if properly applied.

6.3.Preferred option / Justification for no preferred option

The initiative aims to improve implementation and enforcement of the existing legislative framework, and will fill regulatory gaps arising from the fact that the Postal Service Directive was not conceived with e-commerce cross-border B2C parcel deliveries in mind.

As a starting point, the national regulatory authorities will be strengthened through:

A clear legal mandate to carry out regulatory oversight of the cross-border parcel markets, and to properly enforce the provisions of the new parcel regulation, in particular a requirement to assess the affordability of a set of cross-border parcel services.

A clear definition of the scope of the markets concerned (in terms of the parcel services covered) and of the parcel delivery operators providing such services.

The provision of basic information by all delivery operators (above a certain threshold), and additional information by national postal operators to facilitate the enforcement of regulatory principles such as affordability, cost orientation or non-discrimination (in the area of access to networks and infrastructures).

Clear competences in terms of enforcing access to cross-border NPO remuneration agreements and services as appropriate, therefore encouraging competition.

This will allow the national regulatory authorities:

To properly monitor the evolution and functioning of the cross-border parcel markets, gather appropriate statistics, observe evolving market trends (e.g. market shares of existing and new operators), and observe the behaviour of operators (in terms of pricing, access, and other factors affecting competition).

To assess and, where necessary, to enforce the compliance by national postal operators with the regulatory principles of affordability, cost orientation and non-discrimination as laid down in the Postal Service Directive and in the new parcel Regulation.

Market and price transparency will be enhanced at several junctures:

Through more complete statistical information about the entire cross-border parcel markets, national regulatory authorities and the European Commission will have much greater knowledge of the state-of-play and evolution of competition in those fast-changing markets (which will also inform the review envisaged two years after the adoption of the Regulation).

All market participants will benefit from (non-sensitive parts of) this knowledge through the annual publication by the European Commission of parcel statistics and market trends.

The wider public (including retailers and consumers) will be informed of the development of public list prices through the publication of these prices on a website, which is expected to affect the pricing policy of those operators that currently charge prices well above the industry average, but may also directly inform (SME) retailers when deciding on the location of their warehouse(s).

As a result of increased transparency and regulatory oversight, the initiative is expected to:

Make the cross-border parcel markets more efficient, by reducing the current information deficits for NRAs and market participants (who would be enabled to make more efficient choices), and enforcing currently non-enforcable sector-specific regulatory principles (e.g. affordability; cost orientation; non-discrimination).

Improve the availability and affordability of cross-border parcel services in particular for "vulnerable users" which, due to the low volumes that they generate (as SMEs or individual consumers, in particular those located in the periphery), are not currently targeted by delivery operators who focus on more profitable market segments.

All of this will complement – and will be complemented by – all the other, market-based initiatives that have been triggered by the 2013 Parcel Roadmap, such as the Interconnect Programme of the National Postal Operators, the retailers' information platform co-funded under the COSME Programme, work in the field of standardisation, etc.



Figure 4: Scope and main effects of preferred policy options:

Table 4: Preferred package of policy options

Policy options

To whom it will apply

To enhance transparency of:

public list prices (option 3a)

NPOs - USO and similar products

NPO’s wholesale prices (option 3c)

NPOs

To enhance the regulatory powers of postal regulators

Powers to collect statistical data from all operators (option 4a)

All delivery operators

Powers to enforce market access, where appropriate, to cross-border networks and price agreements. (option 4c)

NPOs

6.4.Subsidiarity and proportionality of the preferred option

The options proposed by this initiative for are proportionate as they are limited and primarily target the segments of the market (i.e. public list prices) where there is evidence that competition does not appear to be exercising a downward pressure on prices in some markets and self-regulation has had no impact. Delivery operators with fewer than 50 employees will be exempted to minimise administrative burdens on the smallest firms, and for those who are within the scope of the measure, a regulation will bring additional legal certainty and harmonisation across the EU. Effectiveness and efficiency are described in section 3.1.

The options respect subsidiarity as not only has self-regulation not led to changes in regulatory oversight, price transparency and affordability, but cross-border delivery by its very nature, involves delivery services in more than one Member State. Furthermore, to the extent that NRAs will need information about the terminal rates that 'their' NPO charges from other EU NRAs, action at Member State level alone is not adequate and action at the EU level avoids regulatory fragmentation 180 .

6.5.Cumulative impacts and synergies

Taken together, the preferred package of policy options will improve price transparency and strengthen national regulatory authorities so that they can carry out effective supervision of the cross-border parcel delivery market and enforce relevant regulations. Non-legislative measures set out in the 2013 Roadmap have not resulted in the affordability of the cross-border parcel delivery services or statistical information that covers all parcel delivery providers and the current legal framework (the Postal Services Directive) has been implemented in various ways using different definitions. This prevents the compilation of comparable statistical data at EU level and the effective monitoring of cross-border parcel markets by national regulatory authorities. New legislative measures are therefore necessary.

The dedicated section on the Commission's EUROPA website showing NPOs' domestic and cross-border prices (option 3a), will improve price transparency by bringing together, for the first time on a comparable basis, the domestic and cross-border prices for all NPOs in the EU. NRAs will be legally required to assess the affordability of these prices and be given the powers needed to obtain the data necessary to assess prices in of cross-border delivery services (i.e. option 3c concerning terminal rates). The assessments will be published 181 . Taken together, the measures will highlight NPOs whose cross-border prices appear to be unreasonably high and are judged to unaffordable by NRAs, therefore putting pressure on these NPOs to reduce unreasonably high prices. New companies may also be encouraged to enter the cross-border delivery market or to expand existing operations, which will increase the amount of competition and put downward pressure on prices, especially unreasonably high ones (where operators can make higher –than reasonable- profits). Market entry will also be made easier by requirements for third party access to be granted to cross-border networks and multilateral agreements on terminal rates. Combined the measures will create competitive, regulatory and public pressure for lower prices, making cross-border delivery cheaper for small senders.

The preferred package of policy options will benefit smaller senders more, as they have neither the financial means nor the time to buy or gather this kind of information, and it will enable them to leverage this public market knowledge to obtain better conditions and prices. Furthermore, price transparency will enable regulators, NPOs and users for the first time to benchmark prices across the EU, and to detect seemingly unreasonably high cross-border list prices. If for a given country it appears that cross border (or domestic prices) are unreasonably high the relevant NRA, strengthened by additional powers such as transparency of terminal rates, will be in a better position to monitor and understand potential causes. NPOs will be more aware of pricing practices of other incumbents and will be more cautious on potential pitfalls of unreasonably high prices.

Softer measures such as scoreboards and press releases highlighting certain behaviour can be effective in bringing about change. The European Commission publishes several scoreboards each year (including the Single Market Scoreboard 182 , the Digital Agenda Scoreboard 183 , and the Innovation Scoreboard 184 ). Each scoreboard is accompanied by country reports which assess each country's performance and potential improvements and press releases are used to communicate progress to the wider public. These scoreboards have often led to improvements. For example, evidence from the Single Market Scoreboard shows a notable reduction of the transposition deficits of Members States: since this Scoreboard's launch in 1997 transposition deficits in the EU declined to 0.7% from 6.3% in 1997. Anecdotal evidence shows that countries with performance issues receive media attention, leading to pressure on policy makers to improve the performance. When the European Commission published the results of the Econometric Study on Cross Border Prices 185 it was reported in many countries, including Spain, where the press focussed on Spain being the third most expensive country in the EU from which to send parcels abroad. 186  

As well as the requirement for regulators to assess the affordability and cost-orientation of a selection of cross-border prices, regulatory oversight will be enhanced through clearer powers to collect statistical data from all postal operators (4a) and NRAs will be able to enforce access to cross-border networks and price agreements (4c). A new legal basis is needed as some NRAs do not have the authority to collect data from all parcel delivery providers 187 . Several Member States, in their responses to the Commission's public consultation, stated that a clarification of definitions would be helpful and that it would be helpful if statistics on parcels covered all operators and not only the universal service provider or operators classified as "postal" companies. 188 Improved data collection on a harmonised basis would improve market monitoring by NRAs, enable the creation of statistics and reduce fragmentation 189 . Given the changing nature of the postal services, accurate and regular statistical data are critical so that NRAs can effectively measure developments.

The impact of requiring NPOs to offer third party access to multilateral remuneration agreements or cross-border networks will ultimately depend the extent to which new third party operators are encouraged to enter the market. Nevertheless, given that other operators have requested that such access provisions are codified, competition will increase (either by having operators entering the delivery markets or by expanding existing operations). This should encourage operators to be more efficient and contribute to downward pressure on prices. To the extent that other operators make use of NPOs' cross-border networks, NPOs' fixed costs will be reduced, also helping to make cross-border prices less prohibitive. This could benefit remote and peripheral areas in particular 190 .

The cumulative effects of the proposed Regulation will need to be seen together with actions stemming from existing policy initiatives, in particular improved interoperability between NPOs; the information platform supported by COSME funding; the standardisation work; and development of trustmarks. Taken together and combined with other developments linked to the Roadmap, these actions should improve the affordability, availability and accessibility of cross-border delivery services, and build on other Digital Single Market measures that aim to encourage e-retailers to sell more to other Member States and consumers to buy more from them.

6.6.Summary of impacts of preferred options on stakeholders

Individual consumers would benefit from increased price transparency and a lowering of barriers to market entry as combined there would be downwards pressure on unreasonably high prices. Lower delivery prices would encourage consumers to shop more online cross-border, which would give them a wider choice of goods at cheaper prices. According to a study conducted by the JRC 191 , removing delivery concerns relating to price is highly likely to increase cross border e-commerce by 4.3 percentage points (pp). This alone should impact positively increase household consumption by 2 307 million Euros (0.03%) and the Real National Income by 2 372 million Euros (0.02%).  Those effects are mainly driven by the estimated decline in the overall consumer prices by a factor of 0.03% and from the subsequent increase in the overall exports that is able to balance the negative effect in the output of the retail sector.

Consumers and e-retailers will benefit in Member States where prices are currently higher than for comparable countries. For example on the basis of the prices in Figure 1, the prices for sending a 2kg parcel to Austria from Denmark (€36.86) and Sweden (€38.48) would be likely to reduce more than prices in Finland (€26.30) - although the price of sending a parcel from Austria to any of these countries is only €14.09. Similarly the prices to send from Spain should decline more than France, and in Slovakia more than Poland.

Retailers (particularly SMEs) would sell more if cross-border delivery prices were lower as this would increase consumer demand and ultimately, contribute to creating jobs and growth for small and medium-sized enterprises, especially e-retailers. Overall, removing delivery cost concerns would increase the number of firms selling online across borders by 6.2 pp and the volume of online trade by 5 pp. Medium sized firms would be especially benefited by the removal of delivery cost concerns, as this would influence their decision to engage in selling cross border at a rate of 20pp. 192 The impact would be greater in peripheral Member States where it is estimated that removing concerns about cross-border delivery costs would increase the number of firms selling online across the border in the periphery 193 by 11 pp. Companies located in the middle zone 194  would enlarge their sales by 7 pp provided that cross border delivery obstacles on costs would be removed. The University of Antwerp, after performing cost simulations on selected trading routes has identifying cost saving potentials stemming from network optimisation with the aim to moderate trade balances that range from 23 to 44%. 195 If more parcel delivery operators enter the market, e-retailers will benefit from a greater choice of their delivery provider, and the information platform supported by COSME funding will make it easier for retailers to find out about the parcel delivery options available.

Delivery operators: the main impact for parcel delivery operators would be the need to provide a small about of information to the NRAs (for those who do not already do so) though they would benefit from a standardised format. The smallest operators would be exempted. All delivery operators would be able to benefit from access to NPOs cross-border networks and multilateral agreements on terminal rates, including NPOs (see below), and other delivery operators would face lower barriers to market entry. (For more details about impacts on SME delivery operators please see section 6.7 on impacts on SMEs).

NPOs would be required to submit information to NRAs and their domestic and cross-border prices would be published on Commission' s EUROPA website. These prices are already public so their publication is not expected to encourage any anti-competitive behaviour (although making then prices comparable would have a positive impact on other stakeholders). NPOs would also be required to grant access to terminal rates and their networks as envisaged in existing multilateral agreements (to the extent this is not already covered by the requirements of the PSD and contractually agreed provisions, such as for example the REIMS agreement). Any additional administrative burden of the data requirements on NPOs would be small given that NPOs already supply data to NRAs, covering at a minimum the universal service area. Furthermore conveying parcels for other operators as a result of option 4c could reduce NPOs' average fixed costs, thereby improving the competitive position of NPOs, and have wider social benefits by helping to sustain networks and employment in rural and remote areas. As explained above, downward pressure on NPOs' prices is expected primarily in Member States where prices are higher than in other, comparable, Member States. Moreover, given NPOs' higher market share amongst individuals and small businesses, showing that their prices are affordable could in fact improve perceptions of their competitiveness with other operators, and lead to a higher demand for their services.

NRAs would benefit from clearer legal definitions and strengthened legal powers to monitor the parcel market and to request data from all parcel operators. The precise impact would however differ between Member States as some NRAs already collect data from parcel delivery providers other than the NRA. Some NRAs already monitor their parcel markets, especially in eastern and southern Member States, although the information obtained is unlikely to be comparable and in most cases insufficient for statistical purposes, not least as different definitions are used. In many Western Member States the parcel markets are simply not visible from a regulatory or statistical point of view, and these are the largest parcel markets in terms of size and turnover, and are responsible for higher volumes domestically and also cross-border. NRAs already assess the affordability and cost orientation of a selection of (domestic) USO services, so they are familiar with the concepts and the possible methodologies that can be used to make such assessments will be able to draw on existing expertise. Methodologies might include considering the position of vulnerable consumers and SMEs, benchmarking and the number of hours that need to be worked to pay for a particular postal item. Cost-orientation is usually assessed using accounting documents supplied by NPOs. 196 NRAs might also face additional administrative work if they needed to evaluate NPOs' reference offers for access and impose changes.

Member States would face costs for introducing the policy options and for monitoring compliance, depending on the instrument chosen. Recital 47 of the Third Postal Services Directive requires that NRAs should be provided with all necessary resources for the performance of their tasks.

See section 4 for additional analysis of each of the policy options on the various stakeholder groups.

6.7.Summary of impacts on small and medium sized enterprises

The proposal would affect two types of SMEs: SMEs offering delivery services and SME retailers.

To minimise the burden on the smallest delivery operators, SMEs with under 50 employees would be completely exempted from the requirements imposed by the preferred package of policy options. This would exempt 98.6% the majority of SME delivery operators with a minimal impact on the policy as a small number of large operators are responsible for the majority of the volumes 197 , 198 . An estimated 744 SME delivery operators would be required to provide information to the regulators.

The competitiveness of the SME retailers would improve as price transparency should make delivery services more affordable and give them a greater choice of delivery operators. Improving delivery services for SMEs would help them benefit from their growth potential that currently reach an annual rate of 18% 199 . 

6.8.EU budget

This proposal has no implication for the budget of the EU or those of EU agencies.

6.9.Summary of social impacts of preferred options

The preferred policy options would directly enhance price transparency through easier access to price data which could help SME e-retailers and individuals to make more informed choices. Indirectly, lower delivery prices resulting from enhanced price transparency, could enhance users' access to parcel delivery services. Improved access to affordable cross-border parcel delivery services is important especially for vulnerable groups, i.e. small e-retailers and consumers located in rural and peripheral regions, as these services will enhance the e-retailers' and consumers' capacity to fully participate in the internal market and benefit from economic opportunities. This is in line with the DSM commitment to create a more inclusive digital society.

To the extent that the preferred policy options contribute to increased e-commerce, delivery and logistics related jobs are more likely to be created than to be reduced. Reductions in price by NPOs are expected to have a marginal impact on working conditions given the small percentage of parcels that are sent using public list prices. To the extent that lower prices and access by other operators increases demand for NPO’s services, there would be a positive impact on employment, which is expected to secure jobs in rural and remote areas in particular.

6.10.Summary of administrative burden impacts of preferred options

The table below provides a view of the total administrative burden costs for individual preferred options. The methodology, assumptions and calculation of administrative burden are explained in annex 9. See also detailed table 1 in section 5.12.

Table 5: Overview of administrative burden costs of the preferred package

Options

Option 3a

Option 3c

Option 4a

Option 4c

TOTAL of preferred package

Sum (€ per year, rounded)

48 000

39 000

280 000

70 000

437 000

6.11.Summary of environmental impacts of preferred options

More cross-border deliveries could lead to increased road transport with possible negative impacts on the environment (e.g. air and noise pollution, vehicle emissions). However all major CEP operators in Europe are implementing environmental sustainability policies to reduce their carbon footprint, especially in road transport, where future progress in environmental sustainability will depend on long-term investments in smart technologies and cooperation. On the other hand, if more e-commerce contributes to fewer individual car journeys and fuller vans or lorries (who would be making the journey anyway), negative effects would be mitigated.

Regarding positive impacts, enhanced market efficiency may, due to increased price transparency, indirectly contribute to the consolidation of volumes. Logistics is a volume business and the optimisation of freight pooling, especially between SME e-retailers, will also improve the use of trucks' capacity and thereby reduce the environmental impact.

6.12.Summary of impacts on third countries

The envisaged package of this initiative would not lead to discrimination against delivery operators from third countries willing to offer services in the EU, as they would also need to comply with the same rules.

We expect the preferred package of options to put downward pressure on delivery prices. In that sense, the European delivery markets would therefore become more attractive and competitive, which in turn would decrease the final cost of sending parcels cross border within the EU.

6.13.Coherence with other proposals

The preferred package of options is overall coherent with the Digital Single Market strategy 200 and proposals announced by it, such as tackling unjustified geodiscrimination and other forms of discrimination based on residence or nationality 201 and further harmonised consumer contract rules for online and other distance sales of goods and the supply of digital content (which has been tabled by the Commission last 9 December 2015) and the review of the Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation. The Single Market Strategy 202 announced a European agenda for the collaborative economy.

Furthermore, the package is also coherent with the EU Small Business Act 203 , which promotes SMEs' growth by improving the business environment and cutting red tape. The proposed measures could facilitate market access, both for SME retailers and delivery operators. The Fifth Report to the European Parliament and Council on the Application of the Postal Services Directive 204 noted the Commission's concerns about the cross-border parcel delivery market. 

European consumers benefit, as from 13 June 2014, from the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive (hereafter: CRD), which significantly enhances, among others, information and transparency in the area of online shopping. This concerns notably the elimination of hidden charges and price transparency for distance and off-premises contracts; better refund rights (e.g. where applicable reimbursement of delivery costs in case of a withdrawal) and clear information requirements concerning the costs of returning purchased items in case of a withdrawal. Furthermore, in February 2016 the Commission established an EU-wide online dispute resolution platform (ODR platform), which allows consumers and traders to solve their disputes without going to court, in a quick, inexpensive and simple way. One of the main objectives of the ODR platform is to encourage cross-border e-commerce. 

7.Monitoring and evaluation

The set of indicators below aim to measure the extent to which this Intervention will succeed in meeting the objectives defined in Section 3 of this Impact Assessment.

In line with the DSM Strategy, this proposal could provide for an interim and final evaluation of this policy framework utilising, amongst others, the set of indicators specified below. This evaluation would be carried out by the European Commission and would take place two years after the proposed instrument enters into force in its interim stage, and every two years thereafter. The evaluation could assess the effectiveness of this specific instrument against its overall market and policy objectives, and include a summary of the monitoring of cross-border parcel prices. The parallel initiatives that are currently being developed by the industry (such as the interconnect programme from the NPOs or the information platform supported by the COSME framework Programme) in alignment with the objectives set by the Roadmap on parcel delivery 205 would also be assessed in these evaluation.

7.1. Operational objectives and monitoring indicators for the preferred option

The operational objectives pursued by the preferred policy option, are:

To improve the affordability of parcel delivery, especially for vulnerable users

To promote competition and market efficiency, by empowering regulators to monitor cross-border parcels markets

We present a set of appropriate indicators directly, measuring the outputs of the initiative,

Related to Regulatory Oversight

1. Number of countries who communicate data on parcels of high statistical value for the annual postal statistical exercise of DG GROW [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries, data on parcel services providers, parcel volumes, parcel turnover, employment and price].

Related to Access

2. Number of requests to access postal infrastructure (network or termination agreements) rejected by postal incumbents by country [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries]

and indirectly, the intended market outcomes of the initiative:

Related to Affordability

3. Price trends on standard and premium cross border packet and parcel products [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries]. Price data and intelligence will be retrieved a) from the price comparison website and b) from cross border prices analyses conducted by the NRAs, in the light of the Initiative.

3a. Evolution of differences between domestic and cross border prices [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries]. Price data and methodology according to the methodology deployed by the University of St Louis "Econometric study on cross border prices"

Related to the development of competition

4. Number of operators entering/ exiting the domestic and cross border CEP markets [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries].

5. Market concentration in the domestic and cross border CEP market segment [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries].

Related to developments of E-Commerce

6. Total domestic and intra EU parcel flows and parcel volume trends [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries]

6a. Total domestic and intra EU parcel flows and parcel volume trends [scope: peripheral countries 206 ]

7. Trends on domestic and cross border B2C Ecommerce and ecommerce usage per country [scope: EU28 + EEA/ EFTA countries, all pairs of destinations]

8. Importance of delivery related concerns in consumer perception as to why not selling / buying cross border, satisfaction on value for money [scope: e-retailers and consumers, EU28 + EEA/ EFTA]

8a. Importance of delivery related concerns in consumer perception as to why not selling / buying cross border, satisfaction on value for money [scope: SME e-retailers and consumers in peripheral countries 207 , EU28 + EEA/ EFTA]

A summary of the feasibility and proportionality of the proposed indicators is found in Annex 12.

(1)

Civic Consulting for the European Commission, Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and Internet marketing and selling techniques in the retail of goods, 2011 – the consumer welfare gains from an integrated EU market for e-commerce in goods assuming 15% share of internet retailing was estimated at EUR 204.5 billion per year (EUR 70.4 billion from lower online prices and EUR 134.1 billion from increased choice)

(2)

Data from Eurostat Community Survey on ICT usage in households and by individuals, 2015 (isoc_ec_ibuy)

(3)

Flash Eurobarometer 413

(4)

COM(2015) 192 final

(5)

COM(2012) 698 final hereafter “the 2012 Green Paper”

(6)

COM(2013) 886 final, hereafter “the 2013 Roadmap”

(7)

See Annexes 1 and 2 for further details about the evidence base for this impact assessment.

(8)

For further details on all the actions in the Roadmap and the Commission's assessment of progress to date see Annex 10.

(9)

EMOTA, European Trust Mark for online shopping launched today Commissioner Jourova welcomes initiative to provide confidence to European consumer, 1 July 2015, http://www.emota.eu/#!publications/c1351  

For information about the E-commerce Europe trustmark see http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/trustmark

(10)

E-commerce Europe, Ecommerce Europe takes initiative for better parcel delivery, 23/04/2015, http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/press/2015/ecommerce-europe-takes-initiative-for-better-parcel-delivery  

(11)

For more information on the wider problems, please see Annex 7 on problem analysis and Annex 10 with assessed progress against the Roadmap's objectives.

(12)

E-commerce parcels contain goods ordered online and delivered to the consumer with the exception of groceries (supermarkets have naturally their own delivery operations to handle the demand) and two man delivery (that involves heavy items that are naturally delivered through the freight and logistics sector). Click and Collect type of services may also opt out form the parcel statistics as parcels are normally delivered to the retailers distribution network for a direct pick up from the customer.

(13)

Annex 5 on Market Overview

(14)

Annex 5 on Market Overview. Copenhagen Economics (2012) and Effigy (2013).

(15)

Okholm, H. B. et al., e-Commerce and delivery - A study of the state of play of EU parcel markets with particular emphasis on e-commerce, Copenhagen Economics for the European Commission, 2013

(16)

Effigy (2013) – Annex 5 on Market overview

(17)

La Poste Annual report (2014) – Annex Marker overview

(18)

Effigy (2013) – Annex 5 on Market overview

(19)

AT Kearney (2012) - – Annex 5 on Market overview

(20)

UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain

(21)

Effigy (2013) - Annex Market Overview,

(22)

WIK (2013) Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013) pg 387

(23)

WIK (2013), pg 237

(24)

WIK(2013),p 234-234 – Annex 5 Market Overview

(25)

Boston Consulting Group (2012). See Annex 5 for further details.

(26)

Copenhagen Economics (2013) , p. 103

(27)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p.105. E-commerce and delivery, estimates are based on a questionnaire based survey as well as on desk research, for more info see p.97 of the report

(28)

FTI (2011) Intra-Community cross-border parcel delivery

(29)

http://www.royalmailgroup.com/small-online-retailers-look-beyond-europe-boost-exports-2016

(30)

Copenhagen Economics (2013)

(31)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p. 1

(32)

Econometric Study on cross border prices, University of St. Louis (2015)

(33)

 Domestic price discrimination for parcels is more an exception, we could observe from the data collection on parcel prices that domestic price discrimination occurred for Spain, Portugal, Greece.

(34)

 Example of zoning strategies for a 2 kg International Standard Parcel item shows that 10 countries apply 1 single EU tariff, 7 apply two EU tariffs, and another 7 three EU tariff. Latvia applied 14 different tariffs for shipments in the EU. Romania and Lithuania apply full price discrimination.

(35)

ERGP (15) 28 and (14) 26

(36)

EEA consultation response

(37)

Directive 97/67/EC as modified by Directive 2002/39/EC and most recently by Directive 2008/6/EC - OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14–25; OJ L 176, 5.7.2002, p. 21–25, OJ L 52, 27.2.2008, p. 3–20.

(38)

WIK (2013)

(39)

ERGP/BEREC (2015) See drivers 2.1 and 3, section 1.5 and Annex 11 for further details.

(40)

  http://www.upu.int/en/activities/letter-post-development/about-letter-post-development.html  

(41)

WIK (2013)

(42)

PSD Article 2 (18)

(43)

See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/ergp/index_en.htm  

(44)

WIK (2010), Study on the External dimension of the EU postal acquis; FTI (2011); Copenhagen Economics (2013); Postal statistics 2012/2013 - Domestic and cross-border list prices shown are prices for 2Kg standard delivery services, so that we compare like with like.

(45)

University Saint-Louis (2015) Econometric study on cross-border prices

(46)

Further examples are in Annex 5 and here: http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14741/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native

(47)

Copenhagen Economics (2013) p. 110; 112. For other operators this analysis has not been made.

(48)

FTI (2011). The six largest markets are Germany, UK, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy.

(49)

EU28 Flash Eurobarometer 396: Retailers' Attitudes Towards Cross Border Trade and Consumer Protection, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/FLASH/surveyKy/2032

(50)

 Duch-Brown, N. and Cardona, M. (2016), Delivery costs and cross-border e-commerce in the EU Digital Single Market, JRC/IPTS Digital Economy Working Paper. https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC101030.pdf

(51)

Duch-Brown, N. and Cardona, M. (2016)

(52)

UPS, Pulse of the Online Shopper, responses to Commission's 2015 public consultation

(53)

DHL applies "Remote Area" surcharges for international and domestic shipments to remote areas. Prices accessed 1/12/15 http://www.dhl.fi/en/express/shipping/shipping_advice/shipping_to_remote.html

(54)

For UPS extended and remote area surcharges see link below (accessed 1/12/15) https://www.ups.com/content/be/en/shipping/cost/zones/area_surcharge.html?srch_pos=2&srch_phr=surcharge .

(55)

Especially since the costs implications of the simulations above become more moderate if the operator has the opportunity to combine the costs of parcel delivery with letter mail delivery –as in the cases of NPO (example of co-production)

(56)

FTI (2011), pg 6

(57)

WIK (2014) Initiatives to support the growth of e-commerce via better functioning parcel delivery systems, Consumer Focus Scotland (2012) Effective parcel delivery in the online era, What consumers in Scotland need

(58)

Decision 15-5-19 of 15 December 2015, http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/avisdec.php?numero=15-D-19

(59)

FTI(2011), p156. A 2015 study by Citizens Advice Scotland found that 10% of retailers excluded some part of the Scottish Islands and that businesses in rural areas and smaller businesses were more likely to rely on the universal services provider. Surcharges for Highlands consumers had risen by 17.6% (10% adjusting for inflation) and by 15.8% (or 8.3% in real terms) for islands consumers since 2012. http://www.cas.org.uk/system/files/publications/the_postcode_penalty_-_the_distance_travelled.pdf

(60)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p. 23,118

(61)

FTI (2011), p106; Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg180

(62)

Localised market entry, for example local courier services is easier. Fixed costs are incurred through vehicles, sorting facilities, tracking systems, post offices/shops and employees

(63)

The express segment accounts for about 14% of the total EU CEP market and usually refers to B2B shipments (Copenhagen Economics (2013), p.101). Express is usually stronger in countries with poor quality of service standards, in remote areas, as well as in areas with high share of volumes originating from non-EU countries. (AT Kearney(2012) - Annex Market overview)

(64)

On average 17.3% of home deliveries fail at the first attempt because the recipients are not at home increasing delivery costs. (Copenhagen Economics (2013), p.207); Blackbay estimates that the cost of failed first delivery attempts in the UK amounts to 1 billion Euro (corresponding to an average failed delivery attempt of 12.4%) (Blackbay (2012), p.13)

(65)

Cost simulations in the B2C cross border delivery performed by the University of Antwerp (2015) show that for every 100 units of transportation costs, attended home delivery is responsible for 75 units of costs.

(66)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p. 193. This optimisation to domestic flows may explain why in most cases, delivery to another city across the border may not take place along the shortest route, but may require a longer time (e.g. transport to national hub, followed by transport to foreign hub and only then transport to the final destination) and additional costs.

(67)

Citizens Advice Scotland (2012) and (2015).

(68)

University of Antwerp (2015): Cross Border Parcel Logistics, simulation in selected trading routes

(69)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p.360

(70)

Almost 90 percent of cross-border volumes are delivered by NPOs or multinational integrators; Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg 27-28.

(71)

Effigy (2013)

(72)

WIK (2013), pg 241

(73)

Concentration level more than 75%

(74)

University of Antwerp (2015) p. 11

(75)

C(2013) 431 Commission decision of 30.01.2013, case no COMP/M.6570 – UPS/TNT Express, p40

(76)

The higher the number of competitors in the country of destination in a specific segment, the higher the possibility for the operator in the country of origin to obtain discounts from tendering out deliveries, which can be reflected in the final delivery price. FTI (2011)

(77)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg 185

(78)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg 186

(79)

E-commerce Europe, Analysis of the survey "Barriers to Growth", June 2015, p. 15

(80)

See Copenhagen Economics, (2010) for a list of (postal) NRAs that have competition powers.

(81)

ERGP (15)28 ERGP 2015 report to the European Commission on Legal regimes applicable to European domestic or cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery.

(82)

BEREC/ERGP (2015) Price transparency and regulatory oversight of cross-border parcels delivery, taking into account possible regulatory insights from the electronic communications sector. Joint BEREC/ERGP opinion p16

(83)

This driver mainly concerns NPOs who need to interconnect their network with the network of other NPOs in the destination country and therefore pay a fee for the delivery in the final destination. This fee is the termination rate/inter operator tariffs /wholesale tariffs.

(84)

The Remuneration of Mandatory Deliveries of Cross-Border Mails is a voluntary multilateral agreement between postal operators setting out rules for calculation of terminal dues, i.e. the remuneration that postal operators pay each other for the delivery of incoming cross-border mail (applicable to mail items, such as letters and packets up to 2 kg)

(85)

The United Nations' specialised agency for the postal sector

(86)

Annex 5, chapter 10

(87)

See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2004_1_25.pdf, Official Journal L 275 , 26/10/1999 P. 0017 – 0031, Official Journal of the European Union, C 94, 23 April 2003, Case COMP/C/38.170 and WIK-Consult, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), p 94 and 95 for further background.

(88)

FFPI consultation response

(89)

This is also discussed in Copenhagen Economics (2013), p.107

(90)

FTI (2011), p.11, 206, 217

(91)

Université Saint-Louis,(2015)

(92)

FTI (2011), p.10-11

(93)

According to UPU statistics, an estimated 80% of mail items generated by e-commerce today weigh under 2 kilogrammes and are processed in the letter-post mail stream.

(94)

University of Saint Louis (2015), ERGP (14) 26

(95)

EEA Express carriers fully committed to efficient parcel delivery for the Digital Single Market, 6 May 2015

(96)

EEA’s observations on the fragmentation of the Postal market, April 2015, http://www.euroexpress.org/uploads/ELibrary/Working%20paper%20on%20Postal%20issues_final.pdf  

(97)

ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(98)

Consumer Council for Northern Ireland noted in their consultation response that "only a small proportion pof cross-border postal delivery is subject to the various obligations under the universal service obligations of each Member State. It is therefore vital that consumers are protected through other means, be they driven by competition and innovation, industry standards or light touch regulation. "

(99)

Joint BEREC/ ERGP Opinion, Price transparency and regulatory oversight of cross-border parcels delivery taking into account possible regulatory insights from the electronic communications sector, (ERGP (15) 32)

(100)

ERGP (14) (26) ERGP Opinion on a better understanding of European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery market(s) and the functioning of competition., ERGP (13) 37 ERGP Opinion on cross-border parcel delivery

(101)

ERGP (14) (26) ERGP Opinion on a better understanding of European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery market(s) and the functioning of competition., ERGP (13) 37 ERGP Opinion on cross-border parcel delivery and ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(102)

ERGP report (2014) "European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery 2014 ERGP opinion to the European Commission On a better understanding of European cross-border e- commerce parcels delivery markets and the functioning of competition on these markets"

(103)

Source: European Commission Postal Statistics Database/ Postal statistics survey 2014; ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(104)

Affordability, cost-orientation, non-discrimination and transparency of prices

(105)

See Article 3(7) of the Postal Services Directive.

(106)

ERGP (14)26 European Regulators Group for Postal Services Opinion on a better understanding of European e-commerce parcel delivery 2014

(107)

WIK, WIK-Consult, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), WIK, External dimension of the postal acquis (2010), Copenhagen Economics, The economics of terminal dues, (2014)

(108)

Universal service providers

(109)

WIK-Consult, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), p93

(110)

Retailer question 19b

(111)

PostEuop's response to the 2015 public consultation on cross-border delivery made this point. Citizens Advice and Citizens Advice Scotland acknowledged that mark ups exit, though stated they are not a rationale for price caps as mark-ups are present throughout the supply chain.

(112)

European Commission, Consumer survey identifying the main cross-border obstacles to the DSM and where they matter most, September 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/obstacles_dsm/index_en.htm ; In addition, the survey of online consumers showed that amongst those who experienced problems, the most common problem with tangible goods and offline services purchased online outside one's own country was long delivery time (14% inside the EU and 24% outside the EU). 

(113)

Public consultation on cross-border parcel delivery which run from 6 May to 5 August 2015.

(114)

Copenhagen Economics (2013) found that delivery problems were a key reason for not buying online and were responsible for 68% of abandoned shopping carts. The main cause of abandonment was delivery charges that shoppers felt to be two high, UPS' Pulse of the Online Shopper 2015

(115)

 Special Eurobarometer 398 Internal Market Report; the most popular improvements which would encourage shoppers to buy abroad were cheaper delivery prices (19%), track and trace (11%) an easier returns process (11%); European Commission's 2015 public consultation

(116)

 Provision of two online consumer surveys as support and evidence base to a Commission study:

Identifying the main cross-border obstacles to the Digital Single Market and where they matter most

Final report , GFK Belgium, September 2015, p. 191

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/obstacles_dsm/docs/21.09_dsm_final_report.pdf

(117)

Idem, p 198 (Results based on a regression analysis to explore which factors strongly impact respondents’ decision to purchase tangible goods, offline services and digital content cross-border)

(118)

UPS (2015) 2015 European SME Exporting Insights Study

(119)

Duch-Brown, N. and Cardona, M. (2016)

(120)

European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 413, 2015

(121)

Flash Eurobarometer 396, Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection, September 2015, p 13. The four Member States where the cost of delivery was found to be particularly important as an obstacle were Romania, Spain, Portugal and Slovakia. More than 50% of retailers who sell online in Spain, Portugal and Romania also mentioned higher transport costs due to geographic distance as an important obstacle to developing online sales in other EU countries.

(122)

European Commission 2015 public consultation on cross-border parcel delivery

(123)

University St Louis (2015), Copenhagen Economics (2013)

(124)

Copenhagen Economics (2013) found that NPO prices for a 2kg cross-border (ordinary) parcel are lower than prices charged by non-NPOs. EC analysis shows that DPD's prices have a similar relationship to domestic delivery prices as do NPOs.

(125)

Eurostat regional yearbooks 2015

(126)

University of St. Louis (2015)

(127)

See Driver 3 for further details.

(128)

On average letter volumes for the EU28 declines by 4.85% between 2012 and 2013. COM(2015) 568 final

(129)

Civic Consulting for the European Commission, Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and Internet marketing and selling techniques in the retail of goods, 2011 – the consumer welfare gains from an integrated EU market for e-commerce in goods assuming 15% share of internet retailing was estimated at EUR 204.5 billion per year (EUR 70.4 billion from lower online prices and EUR 134.1 billion from increased choice)

(130)

European Commission, 'Why we need a digital single market' factsheet http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/docs/dsm-factsheet_en.pdf

(131)

COM (2013) 886

(132)

COM (2012) 698

(133)

See Annex 10 for further information on the Roadmap and an assessment of progress against its objectives.

(134)

Apex Insight, (2014)

(135)

University Saint-Louis (2015)

(136)

ERGP (15) 28

(137)

Copenhagen Economics (2013)

(138)

ERGP (15) 28 ERGP 2015 report to the European Commission on legal regimes applicable to European domestic or cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery

(139)

Ofcom note in their 2015 Monitoring Report that DHL are challenging their collection of parcel market data.

(140)

ERGP (15) 28

(141)

See to that end second indent of Article 12 PSD.

(142)

ERGP/BEREC (2015)

(143)

ERGP/BEREC (2015)

(144)

COM(2015) 192 final

(145)

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/2014_annual_charter_report_en.pdf

(146)

In its judgment of 11 February 2015 (C-340/13) the CJEU stated that a model based on quantity discounts per sender is allowed under Article 12, fifth indent of the Directive and that bulk mailers and consolidators are not in comparable situations as regards the objectives pursued by the system of quantity discounts per sender.

(147)

E.g. Companies such as ParcelBroker, GFS .

(148)

  http://www.lsa-conso.fr/ebay-lance-sa-plate-forme-d-expedition-de-colis-a-prix-negocie,219591  

(149)

Note that this option does not seek to provide information to e-retailers about the fully range of cross-border delivery services available as this will be the purpose of information platform supported by COSME.

(150)

5kg would be the maximum weight as most e-commerce shipments are under 5kg. "Letters" thicker than 2cm would be included as well as parcels and "letters" are used for smaller e-commerce shipments and can fit through a letter box.

(151)

Registered services are required by the universal service obligation but not all Member States offer standard or track and trace services. There would be no requirement to introduce new services as prices would only be required for services actually on offer.

(152)

Some of the services with value added features might fall outside the scope of the universal service obligation though be provided by the NPO.

(153)

See section 1.2.1 of the Impact Assessment for a summary of the legal context and Annex 6 on the Regulatory Framework for further details.

(154)

Regulations 2015/2120 , 531/2012 544/2009 and 717/2007

(155)

BEREC/ERGP (2015) p13

(156)

The Citizens Advice/Citizens Advice Scotland response to the public consultation stated that price caps were not appropriate and could prove discriminatory and distort the development of competition. BEUC advocated more price transparency and a monitoring scheme. Neither E-commerce Europe nor EMOTA advocated price regulation.

(157)

Consumer Futures (2013) Signed, sealed…delivered? Research into parcel delivery issues in remote locations

(158)

https://www.amazon.co.uk/b?ie=UTF8&node=5782509031

(159)

COM(2013) 886 final

(160)

The transparency would apply to the prices for 'individual 'or single piece items, i.e. the prices paid by individuals and SMEs who do not have the volumes to qualify for discounts. To the extent that some public discounts are also based on the list prices, there could also be a small impact on these prices (assuming no change in the relative discount percentage).USO accounts for only 5-8% of parcel volumes.

(161)

For example BEUC and Consumer Council for Northern Ireland.

(162)

EMOTA stated in their consultation response that while they were in favour of measures to improve price transparency and regulatory oversight, providing that "the volumes and services negotiated between sellers and postal operators should remain confidential and the two parties should be able to negotiate individual contracts."

(163)

For example the Free and Fair Post Initiative (FFPI) in its response to the public consultation on cross-border delivery stated that distortions arose from the inability to access cross-border rates resulting from agreements between NPOs was problematic and the opening up of such agreements to other operators would motivate all operators to reduce costs.

(164)

See for example Post Europ's response to the public consultation.

(165)

ERGP/BEREC (2015), consultation.

(166)

Apex Insight (2015)

(167)

ERGP (2014) Opinion to the European Commission on a better understanding of European cross-border e- commerce parcels delivery markets and the functioning of competition on these markets ERGP opinion http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ergp/docs/documentation/2014/ergp-14-26-opinion-parcels-delivery-fin_en.pdf (page 32)

(168)

The Free and Fair Post Initiative noted in its response the potential 'access' measures have to reduce costs. They also requested that the Interconnect agreement should not represent an opportunity for NPOs to extend any existing monopoly power.

(169)

The REIMS V agreement already requires access but alternative operators claim that it is not available in practice.

(170)

http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/admin_burden/scm_en.htm

(171)

Assessment of administrative burden of different policy options

(172)

Annex market overview p. 91,92,93

(173)

COM (2013) 886 final

(174)

COM (2013) 886 final

(175)

ERGP (14) 26

(176)

Decision 15-5-19 of 15 December 2015,

(177)

ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcel segments statistics, ERGP, September 2015

(178)

There has been little evidence of progress on price transparency and affordability and increased regulatory oversight since the publication of the Roadmap in 2013 (COM(2013) 886 final)

(179)

For example NRAs taking different approaches that impose larger burdens on operators who would need to comply with significantly different data requests in each country in which they operate.

(180)

 Confidentiality requirements will be taken into consideration

(181)

  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/

(182)

http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/digital-agenda-scoreboard

(183)

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards/index_en.htm

(184)

University St Louis (2015)

(185)

http://www.euractiv.es/noticias/Espana_es_el_tercer_pais_mas_caro_de_la_UE_para_enviar_un_paquete_al_extranjero-11119.html

(186)

ERGP/BEREC (2015)

(187)

Responses are available here http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8169

(188)

ERGP/BEREC (2015)

(189)

 Third party access to multilateral remuneration agreement has been in the past subject to REIMS decision of the Commission. The Commission considered that the REIMS agreement constituted a restriction of competition falling within the scope of Article 81(1) (Article 53(1) of the EEA Treaty) because it collectively established a common level of terminal dues expressed as a percentage of the domestic tariff in the receiving country. At the same time the Commission found that the REIMS agreement fulfilled the four cumulative criteria required for exemption under Article 81(3) EC (Article 53(3) of the EEA Treaty), subject to certain conditions, one of these being ensuring third party access to the agreement itself.

See notably recital 62 and Annex to the Commission decision (available here http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003XC0423%2801%29&from=EN)

(190)

Duch-Brown, N. and Cardona, M. (2016)

(191)

Duch-Brown, N. and Cardona, M. (2016)

(192)

Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Greece, UK, Estonia, Spain, Bulgaria, Sweden

(193)

Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, France, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia

(194)

University of Antwerp (2015)

(195)

ERGP (14) 22 ERGP report on tariff regulation in a context of declining volumes

(196)

98.6% of the number of SMEs active in the delivery market as, according to Eurostat data of 2012, 53.935 enterprises in total employ 49 employees or less in EU28

(197)

Eurostat, Services by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, H-N, S95) [sbs_sc_1b_se_r2]

(198)

Eurostat (isoc_bde15dec) and (isoc_ec_evaln2) . According to Eurostat data, it is estimated that about 83 133 m € of turnover is generated in the total online and distance selling business by SMEs only, in 2012 in EU28. E-commerce Europe estimates that the online sector overall exceeds 368 700 m €.

(199)

COM(2015) 192 final

(200)

Under the public consultation on geo-blocking, 83.5% of the customers who replied considered that geodiscrimination is not justified when cross border delivery is easily accessible and the customer is prepared to pay additional shipping costs (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-geo-blocking-and-other-geographically-based-restrictions-when-shopping-and)

(201)

COM (2015) 550 final

(202)

The Small Business Act for Europe http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/small-business-act/index_en.htm

(203)

COM (2015) 207 final

(204)

  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0886&from=EN  

(205)

Definition of periphery from the Cross Border Pricing Study of the University of Saint Louis (Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania Croatia, Greece Bulgaria Romania, Malta, and Cyprus)

(206)

Definition of periphery from the Cross Border Pricing Study of the University of Saint Louis (Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania Croatia, Greece Bulgaria Romania, Malta, and Cyprus) 

Top

Brussels, 25.5.2016

SWD(2016) 166 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery services

{COM(2016) 285 final}
{SWD(2016) 167 final}


Annex 7: Problem analysis

1.1.The problems

1.1.1.Problem 1: High cross-border delivery (and return) prices for SMEs and individuals

Several aspects may be drivers behind the identified problem of high level of cross-border (and return) prices. This annex will analyse them in the section below.

1.1.1.1.Driver1 – Underlying economic factors of the sector

1.1.1.1.1.Driver 1.1 - Low volumes of SMEs decreases their negotiation power and increase delivery costs for delivery operators

High prices are commonly attributed to low volumes and lack of bargaining power by infrequent low volume senders, typically SMEs and individual consumers.

Shipping profiles (volumes, shape and size), frequency and predictability of dispatch (how many times per day, week, month), and the degree of shipping preparation done by the sender (SMEs, large retailers or individual customer) are all important criteria on which delivery operators base themselves to provide discounts, as they help them reduce risks and therefore costs. The more delivery operators know about their customer profile, the more predictable this profile is, and the higher the volumes, the lower the unit costs of delivery operators will be. Infrequent, low-volume senders (such as individual consumers, micro enterprises or low volume SMEs) are the most affected as they difficultly can provide certainty to delivery operators on these criteria. High frequent volumes that correspond to certain formats and shapes, and to a predictable traffic profile are less costly and have a lower unit cost. Large senders normally correspond to these characteristics and thus contribute to reducing delivery operators' fixed costs. For this reason they are usually charged lower delivery prices. On the contrary, low volumes generate a higher cost per unit. Unlike large retailers, volumes from SMEs are generally low and not as commercially attractive for delivery operators, as unit costs are higher than for customers with higher volumes. Therefore, the cross-border parcel delivery market is characterised by a two-tier market 1 , with large senders facing lower delivery prices and low volume infrequent senders facing higher prices. The same argument of low volumes applies to returns, which usually are single piece and in low volumes because only a small share of deliveries is returned and individuals may be responsible for returning the item themselves. This means that unit costs are higher. According to IMRG, the cost of processing returns might be more than twelve times the cost of delivering a parcel 2 .

Although in most Member States there are typically more than three delivery operators 3 in both domestic and cross-border delivery, this does not mean that they all provide the delivery service e-retailers need (e.g. a simple, cheap, traceable and reliable delivery) to all customer segments. As small, infrequent senders have an unpredictable traffic which has a large impact on collection costs, they are very costly for integrator type of operators to serve and are therefore charged high prices for delivery services. Thus competition, both in terms of delivery options and of number of competitors within each option, increases as demand for large, frequent volumes of cross-border parcel shipments increases.

Pricing of delivery operators depends not only of the costs they bear in the market but also on the elasticity of demand they face from their customers (and different customer segments) regarding their products. Elasticity of demand depends on the available alternatives, and the fewer the alternatives there are (or are perceived by the customers), the higher the ability of the operator to charge higher prices. As observed in a study by Copenhagen Economics on "Pricing behaviour of postal operators" 4 demand for single piece parcel demand is likely to be less elastic than demand for single piece letter mail due to fewer possibilities of substitution. On the other hand SMEs with low infrequent volumes may be willing to accept paying a higher delivery price as long as their profit margin is not largely affected by these costs when they really need to send a packet or parcel abroad, as elasticity of demand may be low for infrequent low-volume senders. Large retailers have access to more choice from delivery operators and competition (more delivery services substitutes) and may therefore have higher elasticity of demand than smaller retailers. In the same study Copenhagen Economics states "The possibility for national postal operators to raise cross-border intra-EU mail prices more than domestic mail prices can be explained by the lower elasticity of demand for cross-border intra-EU mail. The low elasticity may, in turn, be affected by several factors. For example, lack of developed competition in the cross-border mail market may make mailers less sensitive to price increases. Low price sensitivity may be enhanced by an infrequent use of cross-border mail. In general, individuals sending only few cross-border mail items per year are not very sensitive towards price increases since the consumption of cross-border mail services only makes up a very small part of their household budget." 5  Although this analysis refers to cross-border single piece mail items, a similar analogy can be drawn for cross-border single piece parcels (B2C) as compared to bulk parcels (parcels sent in large volumes).

Facing low volumes and a limited number of suppliers, SMEs are in a weaker position to negotiate lower tariffs for both domestic and cross-border delivery and thus have less bargaining power than large retailers. The French Autorité de la concurrence found 20 delivery companies guilty of collusion between competitors regarding annual prices increases and 15 companies guilty of a common method for passing on the costs of a 'diesel surcharge'. SMEs suffered most from these practices as, unlike the operators' largest clients, they lacked negotiating power that would have enabled them to reject, or at least renegotiate, the price increases. 6

Due to the combination of the above mentioned factors, delivery operators may define pricing strategies where they may lose profit margins on large retailers that are cross-subsidised by prices charged to SME customers.

1.1.1.1.2.Driver 1.2 - Parcel delivery is a network industry with high fixed costs

The delivery industry is a network industry with large economies of scale and scope. The larger the density of the network, the lower the unit costs of the provision of the service for delivery operators. Market entry will be reduced where there are fewer chances of economies of scale through high volumes. In addition to high fixed costs, operators willing to enter the delivery market also face other barriers such as the strong national postal operator brand recognition, lack of knowledge of alternative delivery operators and lack of trust in small operators. It is important to differentiate this network industry business model from a courier business model type, focusing on local delivery and B2B niche segments, where entry costs are significantly lower. In this case, operators willing to enter the market mainly need to invest in a few vehicles and drivers who also are responsible to collect and deliver the items. We are not focusing on those in our analysis.

In general, market entry will also be dependent on the different market segments within the CEP sector, such as:

a.Domestic versus cross-border

National postal operators have an established ground network, with extensive territorial coverage in their domestic markets and sunk investment costs that have been made throughout the years. They provide delivery throughout the territory, including rural and remote areas, which represent the most costly areas and higher unit costs. Delivery operators often highlight the need for constant investment in their networks, from vehicles and transport modes to sorting facilities, machines and IT systems. Delivery is also a labour intensive industry and labour costs account for more than half of the total costs of most of the NPOs 7 . Processes have also become ever more automated, as operators have invested in modern technology. Since the 1990s, in a context of letter volume mail growth and postal reform that lead to full market opening and the adoption of the Postal Services Directive, operators have been making large investments in the traditional postal network in order to modernise its letter mail services . Network design was nevertheless traditionally optimised for domestic letter traffic, the dominant geographic and product segments, and not for cross-border or for parcel delivery. In addition, NPOs parcel networks are usually optimised for domestic flows and not for cross-border flows, given that 85% of the total flows are domestic 8 . This is why in most cases, delivery to another city across the border may not take place along the shortest route, but may require a longer time (e.g. transport to national hub, followed by transport to foreign hub and only then transport to the final destination) and additional costs.

However, the financial crisis and e-substitution changed the postal and parcel market structure with the letter segment declining and the parcel segment increasing its importance in terms of value (while letter post was worth 56% of the total postal sector value in 2007 it was worth 48% in 2011, with the parcel share increasing from 44% to 52%) 9 E-commerce growth has been increasing the size of the parcel segment, particularly the B2C segment which is expected to continue growing at higher rates than the B2B segments. (6-8% vs 2% respectively), estimating that by 2030 30% of total parcel flows will be cross-border 10 .

Switching from a domestic to a cross-border network would require either the development of one’s own network, which is costly and lengthy, or the use of commercial agreements with sub-contractors or partners in other countries 11 and subcontracting of transportation operation to freight forwarders 12 . Achieving a cross-border density of network is therefore more complex than setting up a domestic one. The larger the geographical coverage, the bigger the investments in fixed costs, in operations management and in regulatory compliance. In addition, in order to cover the extensive investments in a cross-border network, significant volumes would be needed.

Some of the biggest NPOs have expanded their domestic network across borders to extend their geographical coverage, by creating pan-European 13 or regional 14 networks: they created subsidiaries in other MS that enable them to offer delivery services in those countries as well as a more integrated cross-border solution. In the destination country these operators either use their own operations or sub-contract to a third party for the final delivery.

Integrators traditionally operate in the international CEP market, primarily focusing on the B2B and express segments. They have the competitive advantage of having an integrated network, comprising transport modes (e.g airplanes and trucks), and hubs that enable them to transfer traffic from one country to the other in one or two days and offer speed and reliability to their traditional B2B customers. Their traditional "time certain" business model implies high sunk costs resulting from their extensive networks, which makes entry in this segment more difficult. According to a survey from Copenhagen Economics, integrators have a share of about 50% of all cross-border e-commerce 15 .

The cross-border CEP market accounts represent about 30 percent of the revenues and 9% of the volumes of the total CEP market. Generally it is a highly concentrated segment, although the level of concentration varies across customer segments 16 . Almost 90 percent of cross-border volumes are delivered by NPOs or multinational integrators 17 and in many countries market concentration of domestic CEP is high, with the top three competitors having a combined market share of more than 60 percent (revenues) 18 . In a few other countries, market concentration is lower and therefore there is more competition 19 . Operators who wish to enter the cross-border market and particularly the B2C parcel market may therefore be faced with existing competition in that segment of the market at the same time as they may face significant investments of building a new network (and associated costs) or may have difficulties in accessing existing ones that are long established in the market. In order to use the existing parcel networks, new entrants will need to negotiate terms and conditions of access with long established operators in the market and may obtain conditions that are commercially unattractive to enter or stay in the market.

b.Rural versus urban

Delivering in urban areas where volumes and population density are higher than in rural areas means lower unit costs. In urban areas, many NPOs who deliver both letters and parcels have set differentiated operations for each of these products segments. As parcels in most cases do not fit in letter boxes and may take more storage space when transporting to the final delivery destination, operators have established a dedicated network for parcels that allows more flexibility. This consists of different machines to read parcels in sorting centres, vehicles to transport the parcels, different routes and different personnel.

Almost one third (27%) of all B2C shipments in the EU are in rural areas, reaching almost fifty percent in certain group of countries 20 . Delivery in rural and remote areas is typically more costly, linked to lower population density and sometimes more difficult geographic access. Cost simulations performed by the University of Antwerp in selected trading routes show that the B2C cross border parcel delivery cost might induce € 1,6-3.6 costs per parcel in an urban to urban scenario and up to 5,4-10 € in an extreme rural to rural scenario. As universal service providers, NPOs are obliged to cover all territory and are therefore the operators who are present in these areas. They have a minimum five day delivery obligation stemming from the Postal Services Directive. In rural and remote areas the co-existence of separate networks is too costly and operators use therefore the same network to collect, sort and deliver both parcels and letters (a model delivery operators call co-production). Postmen, who traditionally deliver letters, also deliver parcels. According to the rural to rural delivery costs can be moderated as the national postal operators have the capacity to combine parcel flows with the letter mail flows (NPO example of co-production). Replicating a network in these areas is highly costly and there are few operators who enter these geographic segments of the market. Most delivery operators who wish to provide the final mile in these areas usually engage in commercial arrangements with either local operators (where they exist) or the NPOs.

c.Packet versus parcel

This distinction is mostly relevant for NPOs or delivery operators who are active in both the letter and the parcel market. Different types of investments are needed for the traditional postal network (where packets are treated) and the parcel network. Packets follow the normal letter stream of NPOs. Parcels' handling need different IT systems, collection and sorting centres processes and delivery routes than letters, especially if operators are serving the whole postal and parcel market (deferred and express, B2C and B2B, large and small senders, domestic and cross-border). Parcel networks are built to maximise the scale around the network and make it more efficient.

Fixed costs are higher for parcels (compared to packets) due to network optimisations and final mile delivery and for for express services 21 (compared to deferred) due to higher investments in transport modes, hubs, automation and more efficient processed focused on speed. On average the price difference between a packet and a parcel for NPOs is 65%, reaching 80% in countries which have a lower cross-border domestic performance 22 .

d.Single piece versus bulk

Due to economies of scale in parcel delivery, unit costs of bulk parcels are significantly lower than of single piece parcels, which are often reflected in the final prices. Large senders are the most profitable segment of the market, where already a few operators are competing. Copenhagen Economics reports that on average prices for bulk parcels are 18% lower than for single piece parcel 23 . However, in a group of countries with good domestic and cross-border e-commerce performance discounts for bulk parcels is almost 50% for cross-border shipments to the most expensive countries. They suggest that in countries with competitive pressure NPOs have more incentives to reduce their price-cost margins for cross-border bulk parcel delivery than for domestic ones 24 . Prospects of high margins in the segment of large senders of parcels are thus declining and high network investment costs to serve low volume infrequent users may deter new entrants to come in the parcel market. Integrators are also present in bulk segments.

Competition for large senders is therefore increasing as national operators are entering each other's market by setting up subsidiaries that target CEP segment and customers. On the other hand, consolidators and parcel brokers are entering a few markets 25 where there are large volumes that they can consolidate, prepare and inject directly into the postal pipeline of cross-border delivery. They have wholesale agreements with operators in the country from where the parcels originate.

In addition, if NPOs use cross-subsidies to bring prices below costs for certain segments preventing market entry, it also may lead in the long run to fewer choices for customers and higher prices 26 . This may leave the low volume infrequent senders segment facing limited competition from different delivery operators, with consequences on the level of quality of service and prices.

e.B2C/C2C versus B2B

NPOs have traditionally been providing services to all segments of the market, with a focus on C2C and B2C. On average the market share of NPOs in the B2C segment is 35%, higher than in the total CEP market (27%). 27 They have the advantage of having the domestic territorial coverage. However, most NPOs, depending on the cross-border destination, may need to engage in agreements with other delivery operators in the destination country.

B2B is the most profitable segment as it very predictable, high value (be in volumes or in unit value), and collection and final delivery costs are relatively low since delivery operators can pick it up and deliver the shipments at the business premises of the sender and the receiver. On the contrary the B2C segment is more costly to serve, mostly due to costly collection (when applied) and failed deliveries, which translate into extra transport, delivery and handling costs. According to Copenhagen Economics 28 , on average 17.3% of home deliveries fail at the first attempt because the recipients are not home increasing delivery costs,

Blackbay estimates that the cost of failed first delivery attempts in the UK amounts to 1 billion Euro (corresponding to an average failed delivery attempt of 12.4%) 29 As integrators are traditionally focused on B2B and urban areas, senders or receivers who live in remote or peripheral areas might not be served at all or be served with a reduced quality of service by integrators. However, with the growth of e-commerce, integrators are adapting their business models and investing in their collection and delivery network and processes in order to focus on B2C business as well. For integrators the B2C market is a new challenge that translates into the need for a wider territorial coverage and last mile delivery to end consumer, which is more costly.

The take up of e-commerce has created the need for more efficient, cheaper and more accessible B2C delivery services. It is attracting the attention of all delivery operators – national postal operators, integrators and alternative delivery operators. The B2C segment accounts for about 60% of total CEP volumes and 30% of total CEP value. The domestic B2B segment is the most competitive segment and where national postal operators usually report lower market shares than in the B2C and C2C segments 30 . However, with e-commerce growth, competition in the B2C segment is increasing as traditional B2B delivery operators are extending their activities in that segment.

f.Express versus deferred parcels

The express segment accounts for about 14% of the total EU CEP market and usually refers to B2B shipments 31 . Express is usually stronger in countries with poor quality of service standards, in remote areas, as well as in areas with high share of volumes originating from non-EU countries 32 . Express services have usually a next day guaranteed/committed delivery while deferred parcel delivery has a delivery time of two or more days 33 . These services normally respond to a very specific customer need (time certainty, urgency of delivery) and in general have limited price sensitivity (only a minority would react to a price increase by changing to deferred delivery services 34 ). Customers are willing to pay higher prices for this reliable service.

Express and deferred services are often organised differently. In order to provide the speed and predictability of service, delivery operators offering express services often need to invest in transport modes, more automated treatment centres (to sort more quickly in hubs), hubs or more tailored made processes. Although for short distances road transport can still be a solution for express delivery, long destinations may only be able to be reached with this time certainty by air. Integrators have invested in their own air network that enables them to reach any European destination overnight. They also may use road transport for short distances, using for example vans instead of big trucks. Subsidiaries of NPOs and other pan European operators such as DPD and GLS, may also be able to offer some express services using road (for short distances) or airline capacity (for longer distances). This has implications in the reliability of the service they can offer and in the costs resulting from the negotiations with airline companies.

Investments in express networks are therefore very high and a significant barrier to entry in this market segment.

To conclude, limited market entry may be the result of high network costs, leading to weak competitive pressure in specific segments of the cross-border delivery market and to high prices . The higher the number of competitors in the country of destination in a specific segment, the higher the possibility for the operator in the country of origin to obtain discounts from tendering out deliveries, which can be reflected in the final delivery price 35 .

1.1.1.2.Driver 2 – Lack of market and price transparency

1.1.1.2.1.Driver 2.1 – Low awareness of market operators and services

Information is crucial both for e-shoppers when buying online and for e-retailers when deciding which delivery service to choose. For consumers, unclear information or lack of information about delivery services are often mentioned as a reason for e-shoppers to abandon online shopping. Furthermore, access to information about delivery options and deliver operators is key for e-retailers in order to decide which delivery service to use. However, the significant about of time required to find out able different delivery options and prices, leads to lack of trust and knowledge about the quality of service, often preventing e-shoppers and e-retailers from using alternative delivery operators.

a.Diversity and complexity of delivery offer

Delivery services are complex services, based on different dimensions such as weight, size or format. In addition there is a degree of heterogeneity and diversity of the offers depending on the destination, type of product, value added features, number of items, etc. Delivery information is often difficult and costly to obtain, indicating e-retailers experience high search costs. Delivery operators sometimes provide complex and non-transparent information to e-retailers, making comparison of information across delivery operators more difficult for e-retailers. An example of this complexity and non-transparency are the prices offered by delivery operators, often based on several parameters such as a combination of weight, size and volumes of the consignments, as well as the degree of work-sharing 36 . E-retailers find it difficult to compare prices and quality of service across operators and thus, to take a decision on the best offer by delivery operators. Delivery information is heterogeneous, fragmented and managed by each delivery operator separately. Practices of operators vary in the information tools they provide e.g. brochures, price and product information on webpages, downloadable pdf pricelists, price calculation tools. Some operators offer a combination of information tools to their customers, others only offer a quote on the basis of certain parameters.

E-retailers have difficulties in finding delivery operators who provide the service they need: a simple, reliable and cheap delivery service. They could choose to combine serval offers from different delivery operators in order to offer a wider choice of delivery services to their customers. Nevertheless, integrating these different services increases costs to e-retailers. Evidence shows that the cost and complexity of having commercial relations with multiple operators and the risks of losing volume discounts are important reasons for e-retailers to choose to engage with one operator only. E-retailers want to offer their customers easy, cheap and reliable shipping services (e.g. track-and-trace, on time delivery). E-retailers therefore, declare that there is need for more easily useable information in order to make better choices that will contribute to decrease costs and to quality improvements.

b.Dynamic fast changing market

B2C e-commerce is a dynamic and fast changing market. As more products are being sold online, different needs in terms of delivery may materialise. All types of operators (NPOs, integrators, etc.) are slowly adapting their business models to this growing segment and hoping to profit from this growth rate. They need to be attentive to changing customer needs, both from the e-retailers side and from the e-shopper side, and develop matching delivery solutions.

In a recent UK survey 37 , lack of pre-purchase information was seen amongst the reasons frustrating online shoppers: it does not allow them to make the right delivery choice and leads them to abandon their basket because the right options are either not available or additional delivery costs are too high. Another point of frustration is in-transit delivery information, as the ability to anticipate when the order will arrive and defer or divert to a time or place more convenient is valued by 85% of respondents. In another survey 38 58% of shoppers from six European countries say they have abandoned a cart due to lengthy delivery times or no date being given, while 52% of shoppers prefer to see the expected date of arrival in the cart. Delivery speed (information) was the fourth most important factor (behind product information, reputation, and product selection) when comparing retailers prior to selecting where to shop. In another survey conducted by Worldpay 39 in 2012, the number one reason for abandoning a online shopping cart was the presentation of unexpected costs, mentioned by 56% of the respondents. In the European Commission recent public consultation to consumers 81% of the 213 respondents indicated they had abandoned an online purchase in the last twelve months because of concerns about delivery. A better understanding of the information about delivery would also help e-retailers to provide their online consumers with the information they need to make their decisions.

Evidence shows that the need for information has become ever more important. If delivery operators do not follow the needs of their users (e-retailers and e-shoppers), the former will not be able to provide the adequate information to both e-retailers and e-shoppers.

Some actions have been put in place in order to improve transparency of information in the cross-border parcel delivery market. The Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) has established common rules to improve information provided by e-retailers and to reduce search costs for e-shoppers. Particularly on delivery, the CRD requires the e-retailer to provide information to consumers on: (i) total price, including taxes and delivery costs; (ii) payment, time and delivery options; (iii) right of withdrawal; (iv) cost of returning goods. The CRD also requires traders to reimburse all payments received from the consumer, including the costs of delivery in case of his withdrawal from the distance or off-premises contract.

Furthermore, as a complement to the CRD, EMOTA has launched in July 2015 a European trustmark ensuring compliance with criteria that cover, amongst others: transparent information about the e-retailer, the product, the pricing (including delivery), delivery times, delivery according to the specifications and timing indicated to the customer and clear returns process and prompt reimbursement. E-commerce Europe have also launched a pan-European trustmark. Although national trustmarks already existed they were mostly circumscribed to the domestic borders and provide different levels of guarantees and protection to consumers. A European trustmark provides an enhanced cross-border coordination of trustmarks, increased legal certainty and credibility and broader cross-border recognition amongst consumers.

In order to improve information transparency in this market, the Commission has also published a call for proposals under the COSME programme, with the intention of granting € 360,000 to support the establishment of an information platform. This platform aims at providing retailers with information on the type of services provided by various delivery operators in different markets, as well as on the characteristics of those markets.

These actions will contribute to increased information transparency for the e-shopper and can help reducing search costs and information asymmetries regarding delivery, and therefore improve trust in delivery and e-commerce.

Lack of market transparency also affects NRAs, as without the right information on delivery operators in the market NRAs can neither properly execute their monitoring task in the cross border parcel delivery market nor properly enforce current regulatory principles enshirened in the Postal Services Directive.

1.1.1.2.2.Driver 2.2 - Inter-operator wholesale prices are not transparent

a.Cross border delivery pipeline involves extra costs

The cross- border pipeline contains more steps than the domestic network. In a traditional pipeline, where two or more delivery operators need to interconnect, after collection and primary sortation, cross-border parcels are transported to a cross-border hub where they are again sorted according to the country and place of destination 40 . They will be then transported to the destination country by land or by air and handed to the destination operator. In the destination country the operator will receive the parcels and sort them before they will be transported to regional centres where parcels undergo a secondary sortation. They are then transported again to the delivery office close to the destination before being delivered to the final consumer. Non-integrated operators need to purchase final delivery in the country of destination from an operator who is active there.

Fig 1 – Cross-border delivery traditional pipeline

Source: FTI(2011)

Although the sending operator avoids the costs of last mile delivery in a cross-border operation, it faces additional costs from:

Preparing the parcels to send cross-border, including sorting and administrative process of transferring the parcels to another operator. This may include further administrative requirements for cross-border products such as border checks, transport documentation, security procedures to comply with security regulation, customs procedures (if origin/destination is outside the EU) or VAT procedures.

Transporting the parcels to hand them to the destination operator (either by air or by land)

Paying a fee to the destination operator for the final delivery in the country of destination

On the other hand, the destination operator will bear any relabeling costs needed, cost related to data management, primary and secondary sortation costs after having received the cross-border flows from the sending operator and the last mile delivery costs of the cross-border pipeline.

Cross-border pipelines from subsidiaries and integrators have fewer steps and are much leaner. The costs split will be different than the one from the traditional NPOs pipeline.

Figure 2 – NPOs subsidiaries cross-border network            Fig 3- Integrators' cross-border network

Source: FTI(2011)

Cross-border delivery of goods is a more complex process than domestic delivery, particularly if more than one delivery operator is involved. Delivery handled by two or more operators always implies conciliation of different cost structures, cost efficiency and the interconnection of different networks. Inter-operator wholesale prices paid between the operators involved is supposed to reflect these cost differences, although there is no public information available to test if it does or not. At the same time it is an important part of the overall cross-border costs for NPOS.

Delivery operators who don’t have a presence or network in the destination country need to pay the operator in the destination country for delivery to the recipient of the parcel. This payment is supposed to cover the costs of the country of destination delivery operator to receive the items from the initiating delivery operator at the border, as well as sortation, transport and delivery to the final recipient.

The mechanism for establishing the fees charged by one operator to another is not transparent, as neither the terms and conditions, nor the inter-operators wholesale prices (except for UPU) are publicly available. There are several types of agreements that can be used between the parts for packet and parcels.

b.Types of international agreements

As members of the Universal Postal Union 41 , national postal operators comply with a set of rules on tariffs for packets (terminal dues or inter-operator wholesale prices) or parcels (inward land rates – ILR), which, as some studies suggest, do not reflect the real costs incurred 42 . Under the target system of UPU, terminal dues should be aligned with 70 percent of the domestic tariff for a priority letter post item of comparable weight. However, the system has not fully implemented this principle and only in 1 out of 28 target countries the terminal dues are aligned with the 70 percent domestic postage rate. In 25 countries the terminal dues charged are actually established by a price cap and in 2 countries by a price floor 43 . The ILR pricing system is twofold: The total termination charge is composed of a base rate and a bonus which rewards the supply of defined services with a markup on the base rate. The base rate is either calculated as 71.4% of a country’s ILR taken at 2004 levels (plus any inflation-linked adjustment) or set to the “global minimum base rate” at 2.85 SDR per parcel plus 0.28 SDR per kg..In addition to the base rate, a DO(designated operator) can qualify for additional bonus payments of between 5% and 40% of the base rate when meeting certain quality criteria such as the provision of track and trace, home delivery, fulfilling delivery standards or the usage of the common internet-based inquiry system . Studies find that the ILR rates in some countries are excessive compared to domestic parcel price : values for the ILR inbound rates of up to 347% of domestic parcel prices are reported (see eg UPU, 2010). Trinker et al provide additional evidence that the current ILR termination system is too limited in its accounting for quality 44 .

Furthermore, delivery operators can engage in bilateral agreements or multilateral agreements such as REIMS 45 , Express Mail Service (EMS) 46 or E-Parcel Group (EPG) 47 . Most EU universal service providers are parties to the REIMS V agreement, which sets inter-operator wholesale prices among European operators, and came into force in 2012. 48 On 23 October 2003 the Commission adopted a decision under EU competition rules, notably Article 81 EC Treaty (now Article 101 TFEU), prolonging for an additional five years the exemption of the REIMS II agreement under EU competition rules subject to a condition that non-discriminatory access to REIMS terms and conditions would be provided to third parties. 49 Following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 50 and modernisation of EU competition rules, the parties to an agreement have to ensure its compliance with EU competition rules ("self-assessment" mechanism). The current REIMS V agreement sets that the inter-operator wholesale prices applied to the core system for priority mail items are a fixed percentage of the receiving party's domestic tariff excluding VAT (with some exceptions) 51 . The inter-operator wholesale prices paid through REIMS also take into account penalties for not complying with quality of service standards.

c.Lack of level playing field

The UPU system creates distortions in the market that are estimated by WIK to be about one third of the value of the market 52 , with the actual terminal dues rate set by the target system ranging from an overpayment of 17 percent to an underpayment of 41 percent 53 . It creates as well net winners (low or average cost countries that export more mail than they import) and net losers (high cost countries that import more mail than they export 54 . The amount that each NPO (designated operator) wins or loses in the traffic exchanged depends on factors such as the relative costs levels of the NPOs involved, the imbalances in the volumes exchanged, the relation between actual costs and the terminal dues rate and in differences in the composition (e.g. weights and shapes) and preparation (e.g. sorting) of the type of mail exchanged 55 . This results in a transfer of money between some NPOs within the UPU system which may be distortive if consumers are affected (e.g. via increased taxes).

In addition, some anecdotal evidence points to the fact that UPU agreements are regarded by some NPOs as legally established default rates in the absence of alternative agreements, affecting negotiations of bilateral agreements 56 . The originating NPO has all the incentives to remain using the below cost UPU terminal rates, instead of switching to a more cost-oriented type of agreement. In case this situation materialises it creates difficulties for NPOs in high costs Member States who wish to align the inter-operator wholesale prices to their much higher domestic costs. 57  

Only national postal operators can join international agreements such as EPG or UPU's terminal dues or ILR. Alternative operators have therefore no access to these agreements and cannot pay the same fees that may be more advantageous for NPOs participating in the system. Non NPOs have thus, a competitive disadvantage as they may pay a higher price for the last mile delivery in the destination country. According to a study by Copenhagen Economics 58 , the UPU terminal dues system creates distortions both in the last-mile and first-mile handling of cross-border delivery, as an efficient delivery operator cannot compete with the NPO for the last mile given that it does not have access to the terminal dues system.

The same study 59 also indicates that the terminal dues may also disproportionately increase demand for delivery services covered by the system, such as packets as the rates that operators charge each other for the transport of packets (which are classified as letters) are lower than for parcels. This is particularly relevant for e-commerce and low weight shipments that can be sent either as packets or parcels. Another distortion introduced by the UPU system is the possibility of excessive cross-border traffic in relation to domestic traffic, in the event terminal dues are too low (cross-border prices disproportionally low compared to domestic prices), leading some senders to ship from other countries instead of domestically or some shoppers to buy cross-border online instead of domestic online. Finally, the terminal dues system may incentivize excessive cross-border traffic from countries with particularly low terminal dues (mostly transition countries within the UPU system 60 ) to other countries (typically target countries within the UPU system 61 ).

The UPU system is therefore a discriminatory system, as it not only discriminates towards third party operators (non NPOs) but also between NPOs participating in the system.

In relation to other types of agreements, third party operators also indicate access issues; for example, they say access to REIMS conditions is virtually impossible for other operators than NPOs, although in theory access is open. According to evidence to date there is only one private operator currently accessing REIMS 62 .

This situation creates distortions in the cross-border market, as neither all operators can benefit from the system nor is the system reflective of the true domestic delivery costs. Terminal dues that are not aligned with domestic rates can harm the transparency and the competitiveness of the cross-border market and harm the market equilibrium as prices may be higher, quality lower and innovation reduced.

d.Inter-operator wholesale prices are affected by the bargaining power of operators and savings may not be passed on to consumers

The type of agreement used and the fees applied may depend on the type of operator with whom there will be interconnection and on the cost structure of that operator, the type of items (packets or parcels) to be delivered, the scale of the cross-border operations and the bargaining power of both operators. For instances, costs associated with packets and parcels are usually different as they entail different processes and generally use different networks (packets use the letter network and parcels use a dedicated parcel network), except in rural areas where operators (mostly NPOs) use co-production. This should also be reflected both in the domestic costs and in the termination rate charged.

Volumes and frequency of shipments have an impact on a delivery operator's costs. The higher the volume and the more regular they are, the lower the unit cost. The same economic principle applies between operators from different countries exchanging traffic flows. The more frequent and larger the proportion of cross-border parcel volumes sent from sending operator in country A to the destination operator in country B, the lower the unit costs of processing these volumes. The larger the volumes of the sending operator and its proportion of cross-border flows in the destination operator 63 , the larger the bargaining power of the sending operator towards the destination operator as unit costs will be lower. This is expected to be reflected in a lower termination rate 64 charged by the destination operator to the sending operator. If these savings are reproduced in the sending operator' prices then consumers in country A will face lower cross-border prices as well. Thus, some operators, especially from large (export) markets with large volume flows may have more bargaining power than operators in small volume countries. This may create imbalances in the negotiation of inter-operator wholesale prices between operators. A recent econometric study commissioned by the EC 65 found indications that online import shares in the destination country seem to decrease inter-operator wholesale prices for the sending operator and this is reflected in the cross border price. This implies that some NPOs are in a better position to negotiate.

However a lower termination rate does not necessarily translate in lower prices for consumers. On the one hand, the sending operator can decide not to pass the costs savings to the final customers and therefore the final cross-border price, instead of being proportionate to the terminal rate paid, might remain higher. On the other hand, even if the destination operator in country B faces lower unit costs from volumes received from the sending operator in country A, the former may decide to keep this savings and charge a higher termination rate. In this case, prices would remain high as well.

An indication for this is that labour costs in the destination country, which are a tangible part of the costs of the cross border delivery, do not seem to statistically influence cross border prices 66 . In addition to that according to research from FTI (2011) found final cross-border prices observed do not reflect savings from lower inter-operator wholesale prices originated by scale (high volumes) savings. This implies that either the sending operator is not reflecting possible lower inter-operator wholesale prices on their final prices or the operator in the destination country is not reflecting their costs savings on the termination rate charged to the sending operator. We would need information on terminal rates to assess which of these two scenarios is in place. This information is however publicly unavailable.

Finally, differing degrees of competition and market power in the home and cross-border market may result in higher prices as it may affect the bargaining power of operators willing to interconnect. FTI concludes in its study that high domestic competition however, does not necessarily translate in lower cross-border public prices, especially if competition in the cross-border market is limited, since delivery operators are able to separate the effects of domestic competition from the cross-border market, indicating the possible existence of market power 67 . Where cross-border competition is higher however, the differential between domestic prices and cross-border prices are lower.

In peripheral regions or countries, where there is low population density and low parcel flows, the delivery alternative operator may need to interconnect with the designated delivery operator (NPO), which may be the only delivery operator present in those areas. Once again, the bargaining power of both operators will determine the level of fees and conditions that will affect the cross-border delivery operation.

Inter-operator wholesale prices paid between operators add to the potential high costs of cross-border delivery and returns. Operators using their end to end network (such as integrators) or using their subsidiaries for cross-border delivery bypass these inter-operator wholesale prices as their networks are integrated. As part of a larger group they may charge internal prices, set bilateral agreements or other sort of pricing scheme for the service of delivering in a certain destination country. This information is not publicly available. However, the University of Saint-Louis study on cross-border prices 68 found strong evidence that vertical integration (e.g. integrated networks) decreases cross-border prices in the sending country. Vertically integrated firms have an incentive to set transfer prices on an arm’s length basis (reflecting marginal cost) to maximize joint profits.

1.1.1.3.Driver 3 – Ineffective, inconsistent or inexistent regulatory oversight creates obstacles to the single market

1.1.1.3.1.Driver 3.1 - NRAs have insufficient regulatory powers

A joint BEREC/ ERGP report recently concluded that "NRAs need the appropriate regulatory powers to intervene and … such powers do not seem to be present in all Member States, mainly due to the differences in interpretation of what is or not a postal services". 69 Only a very few postal national regulatory authorities (NRAs) focus their responsibilities also on cross-border delivery markets and have a limited mandate to monitor the cross-border parcel segment 70 . Historically NRAs have focussed on the domestic letter market (that was dominated by universal service providers) rather than the parcel market which has a larger number of operators and has been perceived to be more competitive. Regarding the implementation of tariff regulation principles for universal service obligation, the ERGP concludes that there are heterogeneous practices across the Member States. For example tests on affordability and cost orientation are not practiced in all Member States, with 8 countries mentioning they do no test it; methodologies used also differ from one country to the other. Furthermore, almost half of the countries do not define criteria for price transparency. Most NRAs have however put in place ex-ante or ex-post measurements to assess whether prices are non-discriminatory 71 . Thus, even for the domestic market we observe a wide heterogeneity of approaches in terms of application of tariff principles.

Currently, information on the delivery market is fragmented and only partly available to national postal regulatory authorities due to limited mandates. While there is already a general collection of information on basic parcel delivery offers in most Member States, based on Article 22a of the Directive, this does not currently provide a broad picture of the full postal market. Some regulators have confirmed that they do not/ cannot comprehensively collect data on parcels. 72 Some of the restrictions to collect data on the CEP market mentioned by NRAs are the need to have a clear purpose to collect the data, the limited power to collect data on some of the CEP segments or the inexistence of legal basis to collect data 73 .

The ERGP, in its reports on the cross-border parcel delivery market 74 concluded that there was no need for a full market analysis or a collection of information based on full formal definition of the market and found no indication of a competition problem that it believed could best be dealt with by ex-ante regulation. However, they concluded that having comprehensive information to understand the functioning of the parcel market and possible competition problems in it could be useful.

Given the increasing importance of e-commerce related parcels for all postal operators and the need to ensure a single market in cross border parcel delivery, an improved market monitoring would contribute to show developments in the market, assess whether the principles of the directive (cost orientation, non-discrimination, transparency) are being implemented for USO services, and ensure effective competition, for example by identifying market and regulatory concerns. Enforcement powers must also include being able to require third-party access to the network of the NPO. Allowing smaller operators to use NPOs' networks and benefit from their economies of scale would encourage market entry and competition.

Fruthermore the essence of Article 13 of the Postal Services Directive seem thus to be that Member States need only to encourage USPs to apply the principles of the Directive in setting their inter-operator wholesale prices. Research shows 75 that only 28 percent of NRAs collect information about the inter-operator wholesale prices charged by NPOs for processing and delivery of incoming cross-border parcels (compared to 36 percent that collect this information for letters). Forty percent indicate they collect information about the costs of processing and delivering incoming cross-border letters and parcels.

1.1.1.3.2.Driver 3.2 - Regulatory fragmentation increases compliance costs of delivery operators and hinders regulatory oversight

The regulatory landscape of the parcel delivery markets is highly fragmented. Procedures and conditions in parcel markets are quite distinct, with different sets of national legislation and regulatory tasks across the EU-28.

For delivery operators this regulatory diversification and fragmentation in the sector translates into additional administrative burden for those delivery operators who operate cross-border and need to comply with the different rules in place both at the EU and Member States level. According to the European Express Association, this relates to the diversity of regulatory regimes, procedures and conditions to provide delivery services across Member States, and to differences between Member States in road transport policies across Europe (e.g. road charging systems, cabotage rules, administrative requirements)  76 . This affects particularly those operators who operate in several Member States and face different rules: It affects integrators, pan European operators, and NPOs with subsidiaries in other Member States. The need to comply with the different regulatory regimes increases inefficiencies as well as compliance costs for delivery operators, adding fragmentation to the single market.

E-retailers on the other hand, are also affected by this regulatory fragmentation and divergence as it may increase the delivery prices they face from operators.

The multitude of regulatory frameworks affecting the parcel delivery market, as described in the legal context section (Annexes 6 and 11) also hinders regulatory oversight in this sector, making the work of postal NRAs more difficult when it comes to market monitoring and regulation. There are therefore blurring regulatory competence areas in the parcel delivery market that impact the regulatory activities of the NRAs, a situation that has been acknowledged by the ERGP 77 . In addition, the growth in e-commerce and B2C delivery has brought some new players in the delivery market, specially targeting the most profitable segments (e.g. business with large volumes of shipments) who occasionally argue they are not active in the postal market and thus are not under the scrutiny of postal national regulatory authorities.

The Postal Services Directive regulates packets and parcels (up to 10Kg or 20Kg depending on the Member States) falling under the scope of the universal service, which represents only a small share of the total parcel delivery market (5-8% of the total CEP market 78 ). It does however, not cover the largest share of parcels that are originating from e-commerce.

Definitions of universal service parcels are usually related to standard items subject to regulatory/ legal definition (as it is defined in the Postal Services Directive and transposed on the national legislations). On the other hand, CEP definitions beyond the universal service, when they exist, are often unclear and heterogeneous across Member States 79 . This lack of clear definitions not only of the scope of the universal service but also of other products and segments in the delivery market, hampers the NRAs regulatory tasks on market monitoring.

Finally, the boundaries of the CEP sector is another important issue for regulatory authorities of Member States where a maximum weight limit was not introduced for postal parcels (e.g. Portugal, Spain, etc.). Those NRAs face difficulties in distinguishing transport and freight services from the parcel delivery markets. The existence of this blurred regulatory area in these Member States poses problems to NRAs who wish to monitor operators active in transporting and delivering parcels in those markets but where a few operators argue they are active in the transport sector instead 80 .

1.1.1.3.3.Driver 4 – High profit margins added to delivery costs by e-retailers

Delivery prices charged to consumers by retailers do not always reflect the prices delivery operators charge to retailers because some retailers mark up the delivery prices that are charged by delivery operators. The price the consumer pays for 'delivery' (as stated on the retailer's website) may therefore be significantly higher than the price the retailers pay, but the consumer thinks it is the delivery element that is expensive. Several retailers acknowledged in their responses to the public consultation that they charge consumers more for delivery than they pay themselves 81 . Furthermore, the prices that consumers pay for delivery may not fall if delivery operators lower their prices as consumers are dependent on e-retailer making a corresponding reduction in their delivery charges. 82 Research for the Consumer Council (Northern Ireland) noted that only half of online retailer offer the same delivery service across the UK, and when free delivery is not available to Northern Ireland destinations, consumers pay up to £10 for delivery (to Northern Ireland).

1.2.Summary of problem tree:



Annex 8: Description of policy options and comparison of policy options (tables)

1.Policy options

1.1.Option 1: Baseline scenario/ No action

Without any further policy initiative, the main driver for change will be market forces, in that growing e-commerce flows would continue to provide incentives for delivery operators to compete for the B2C market segment in particular. Some actions to the 2013 Roadmap are also likely to continue, in particular improving the quality of cross-border services and the provision of information to consumers and retailers about the delivery services on offer.

The Interconnect Programme of the national postal operators has been designed to improve the quality of service (e.g. through improved track-and-trace capabilities), by using common procedures for cross-border services (e.g. through harmonised labelling standards, complaints handling).

Plans to establish an information platform (supported by COSME funding) is likely to address some of the information deficits in the market (e.g. by providing smaller e-retailers with a better understanding of the delivery options available to them). If properly designed, the platform could also help to promote new business opportunities and enhance competition between delivery operators, and, consequently, lead to lower prices.

In addition to the current postal and parcel operators (including the express industry), other economic operators are likely to enter this market, or to expand business practices that are already being tested today. For example large online platforms have been trying to bridge (at least partially) the gap between e-retailers and their customers themselves (e.g. by installing parcel locker stations in densely populated areas, by offering consolidation services for small platform members, by establishing co-operations with the collaborative economy for last-mile delivery, by investing in new technologies such as drones, etc.).

This will increase choice for retailers and customers as well as the competitive pressure on traditional delivery operators, given the high price sensitivity of online consumers. It may, however, also increase the complexity and fragmentation of the regulatory framework, potentially raising issues where operators providing comparable services will be governed by different legal frameworks, and, as a consequence, not subject to the same levels of regulatory oversight.

Most of the above developments will continue to focus on the commercially attractive parts of the (delivery) market, where the return on investment can be considered highest. This implies that most of the pro-competitive effects will manifest themselves for large volume flows – i.e. for larger e-retailers (who create economies of scale due to high volumes on the first mile), and for densely populated areas (which create economies of scale due to high volumes on the last mile). It is much more questionable, by contrast, to what extent small e-retailers and individual consumer, especially sellers and buyers located in more peripheral regions will be able to benefit from these developments.

Given the importance of size and scale in the logistics business, which becomes even more relevant in a trans-European (i.e. cross-border) context, one can also expect a considerable extent of concentration on the side of delivery operators. This is bound to increase already existing entry barriers for potential competitors, and make it even harder for ill-equipped regulatory bodies to investigate and intervene in case of competition concerns.

With regard to regulatory oversight, postal regulators across Europe currently focus almost exclusively on domestic letter services, as provided by the incumbent postal operators. The 2013 Roadmap already invited Member States to extend the mandate and tasks of regulators to (cross-border) parcel deliveries, but no changes have been observed since as a result of the Roadmap. It is hence more than doubtful that, in the absence of another EU-level initiative, Member States would reconsider their positions.

There have also been no indications that the affordability of cross-border services is improving for individuals and SMEs.

1.2. Alternative policy approaches

The main problem to be tackled by this initiative relates to the high prices charged for cross-border delivery and returns where low volumes are concerned. The importance of "volumes" and scale leads to a situation where "size matters" (both for e-retailers and delivery operators), and "trade imbalances" play a role where market entry barriers are high, where (partial) access to the networks or infrastructure of competitors may be important, and where there is a strong economic incentive for all competitors to focus on profitable market segments. All of this leads to a reduced choice of options and higher prices for small and infrequent senders of parcels (i.e. small e-retailers).

While the fundamental economics underlying this sector can hardly be changed, the content options below show different ways in which the resulting problems could at least be alleviated. Not all of these options are necessarily "mutually exclusive" – some of them could, at least in theory, be applied as a package (e.g. "consolidation of volumes" and "price transparency"). Also, some of the more "advanced" options (such as "enhance regulatory tools") would build on some of the more "basic" ones (such as "enhance market knowledge") – hence could not be implemented in isolation.

For each of the options below, a number of technical sub-options will be presented (but, for the sake of readability, analysed in greater detail at a later stage). The "option of changing nothing" has already been described in Section 4.1 above.

1.2.1.Option 2: Consolidate volumes of small e-retailers

As the small and irregular volumes generated by SME e-retailers are the single most important driver behind the problems observed, the most immediate impact could be expected from any initiative that promotes the consolidation of volumes from a number of smaller e-retailers. Such services already exist, but only in the largest EU markets 83 . However, after the judgement in C-340/13, under the PSD volume discounts may be recognised only at the sender’ level (not at the consolidator using intermediary or proxy discounts), reducing the potential impact of this option.

The information platform which is currently being developed is expected to address this issue, at least in the medium term, by helping to share good practice, and by offering a consolidation option for participating SMEs, including for cross-border shipments. This work stream will be supported through funding from the COSME Programme.

For these reasons, the current impact assessment will discard the option of further initiatives to be taken in the field of consolidation.

1.2.2.Option 3: Enhance the transparency of prices

Option 3a - Enhancing the transparency of public list prices and public discounts.

Though public list prices (not sensitive or confidential prices) are already in public domain often on the website of the delivery operator, they are not easily accessible or comparable. Sometimes they are difficult to find on website of the operator and due to different names and characteristics are often difficult for users to compare. Ideally, this option would make the information on public prices (and discounts) of around 15 USO or similar services from all EU national postal operators freely available and easily accessible in a standardised form to all EU e-retailers and consumers, through a centralised pan-European website. NRAs would also be required to assess the affordability and cost-orientation of these prices and to send their assessments to the Commission NRAs and national competition authorities and national consumer authorities.

Operational sub-options

Transparency of public prices would be provided directly towards the users (consumers and e-retailers)

The information would be disclosed to the general public and not be restricted to specific organisations only, such as the National postal regulators or public institutions. This would provide benefits for the target group as it highlighting relatively higher prices might encourage users (consumers and smaller e-retailers) to seek out a better deal.

The publishing and management of the EU cross-border delivery public prices information would preferably be provided on a centralised website by a pan European institution or organisation in a standardised form

Publication of public prices by operators on their own websites aloneseems insufficient, since we are aiming for “easy comparability” between different operators. Therefore, the publication through a centralised European website would ensure independence, avoid conflict of interests and reduce searching costs for users. The information would be freely available in a standardised form. Such an institution would bring more credibility to the published information and would ensure comparability.

Collection of public prices information would be undertaken at national level by National postal regulators and communicated to the organisation responsible for managing and publishing the intra-EU public price information.

Regulators would collect this information on a regular basis from NPOs. Consequently they would have access to a comparable set of public prices which could facilitate both identifying competition concerns and market inefficiencies and enforcing regulatory principles under the Postal Services Directive. Collecting the data from NPOs via NRAs would ensure comparability and therefore credibility.

The frequency of public price information collection would be on an annual basis

Frequency options could include the collection of prices on monthly/quarterly/bi-annually or annually basis. As published prices are most likely to be changed annually, price collection on an annual basis would achieve the objective of transparency and accuracy and at the same time ensure that the costs of data collection are proportionate. The higher the frequency of price information collection would be the higher the costs. For this reason, we would aim at limiting the periodic price collection to once a year in order to reduce administrative burden both to operators and to regulators.

Transparency of public prices requirement would preferably focus on a selected group of categories of delivery services, based on features such as type of product (letter, packet, parcel), weight or format, extra options (e.g. track and trace, insurance), delivery time

There are numerous cross-border delivery services with different characteristics. Publishing public prices of all delivery services available in a comparison website would be very burdensome and costly for delivery operators (which would need to provide the information) and for regulators (which would need to collect and process the information). In addition, it would create complexity for users – consumers and retailers – when trying to compare such a large amount of services. A wider range of products would be therefore, disproportionate. For transparency and comparison purposes, information collection of a pre-selected group of USO or similar delivery services (excluding express) is preferable, ensuring that they are relevant for users and for e-commerce use. To establish a reasonable and relevant overview, we would suggest collecting prices on data for two categories: packets and parcels. For each of those categories, price data would be collected on 3 weights: 500g, 1 kg, and 2 kg for packets, and 1, 2 and 5 kg for parcels. Furthermore, a differentiation should be made between various service levels, namely the cheapest alternative or tracked delivery (for parcels), or the cheapest alternative, registered or tracked delivery (for packets). This would in total involve 15 types of product. Information would be collected for flows between all EU Member States.

Transparency of public prices requirement would be limited to the National postal operators.

Each Member State has a National postal operator which is the designated (or defacto) postal operator for the delivery of universal postal service and has full national territorial coverage, covering all segments of the market. It is the operator which by default covers the remote and peripheral areas and social disadvantaged users. This could indirectly lead to more pressure for transparency of prices of other operators in the market. Enhancing transparency of public prices to all delivery operators in the cross-border market would be too cumbersome and would create disproportioned costs for all delivery operators (including SMEs) and for regulators. Furthermore information about the range and prices of cross-border delivery services provided by all delivery operators will be provided in the information platform supported by COSME.

NRA Assessment of affordability

NRAS would be required to assess NPOs prices for affordability and cost-orientation (as they already do for domestic products, especially letters). Sending the assessment to national competition authorities would encourage closer cooperation and enable better enforcement of competition policy,.

The combined 'name and shame' effect of the price comparison website, alongside the NRAs’ assessments of affordability would create pressure on NPOs with excessive cross-border prices to make prices more affordable.

Option 3b - Enhancing the transparency of individually negotiated prices between delivery operators and larger e-retailers ("account" customers).

These prices concern the largest portion of current e-commerce transactions, and are a result of individual sending characteristics and negotiating power. Individually negotiated prices are related to high volume senders, which are the most profitable segment of the delivery market and therefore the one where more competition exists.

The large retailers part of the market is subject to the highest competitive pressure, as it is the most profitable segment of the market; market forces are therefore considered to be the prime response. Trying to increase transparency in this segment would not only be very difficult (because of the infinite number of individual circumstances), but also disproportionate as it would interfere with sensitive business and pricing information deemed confidential by operators.

Option 3c - Enhancing the transparency of inter-post wholesale prices ("terminal dues" and similar charges).

Where two postal operators jointly perform a delivery transaction, the sending post pays the receiving post for last-mile delivery on the latter's territory. As discussed in the problem definition section, these prices are meant to be in line with certain regulatory principles of the PSD, such as the principle of cost-orientation, transparency and non-discrimination. However inter-operator wholesale prices are not transparent. Only the delivery operators involved in a specific delivery flow are aware of the inter-operator wholesale prices applied, even if this is a crucial element for the total costs of cross-border delivery. This lack of transparency also makes it difficult to assess whether the other principles are being complied with 84 or whether market power (between large and small operators) is a potential issue. Although for competition reasons, this information should not be made publicly available, disclosing these prices to NRAs would enable them to assess the cost orientation of the selected services (see option 3a).

Operational sub-options

Transparency of inter-post wholesale prices would be restricted to National postal regulators 

Inter-post wholesale prices are confidential information resulting from business agreements. However, due to its importance, regulatory bodies should be required to have access to this information for transparency purposes so that they may be able to identify market inefficiencies concerns deriving from these wholesale prices. As confidential business information, at this stage it should not be required that this information would be made publicly available and disclosed to the markets.

Collection of Inter-post wholesale prices information would be undertaken at national level by National postal regulators and part of their monitoring tasks

Regulators would collect this information on a regular basis. Consequently they would have access to this information which is an important part of the cross-border delivery costs of a sending operators and a source of revenue for the receiving operators. This would facilitate assessing prices, identifying market inefficiencies and enforcing regulatory principles under the Postal Services Directive.

The frequency of public price information collection would be on a periodic basis (bi-annual or annual basis)

Frequency could be aligned with the frequency of collection of public prices in order to build on synergies and limit data collection process costs.

Transparency of inter-post wholesale requirement would apply both for inbound    and outbound cross-border delivery

In addition, as terminal dues depend on specific flows, information both on (i) what are the terminal dues applied by the NPO when delivering in its national territory (inbound) and on (ii) what are the terminal dues paid by the NPO when sending cross-border parcels (taking into account that it depends on the destination country) (outbound) would be important for the regulators. Only in this case, would regulators have enough transparency to access whether the regulatory principles are being complied with or whether market power is a potential issue.

Transparency of inter-post prices requirement would be limited to the National postal operators.

National postal operators need to pay each other an interconnection rate for the delivery of cross-border delivery services in each other's national market, when they don't have a delivery network in the country of destination. As national postal operators are often the designated universal service provider, covering their whole domestic geographical territory, due to the universal service obligation, it is the default operator when others are not.

Option 3d - Enhancing the transparency of delivery prices charged by e-retailers, i.e. the extent to which the delivery price they charge to the final consumers reflects the prices that retailers themselves pay to delivery operators.

Delivery operators often claim that high delivery charges (by e-retailers) are not reflecting their own pricing systems, in the sense that retailers often charge their customers much more for delivery than they themselves pay to delivery operators. Anecdotal evidence confirms the claim by delivery operators that retailers often charge their customers higher delivery charges than the ones they pay to delivery operators.

This option would require that e-retailers disclose to what extent and why the delivery price they charge to the final consumers reflects the prices that e-retailers themselves pay to delivery operators. This would provide consumers with more information about delivery charges and regulators with information on possible discrepancies between the price charged by the e-retailer and the price charged by the delivery operators.

However, for the reasons given below, we suggest that this option is discarded.

Requiring information in this area would be highly intrusive, forcing retailers to publicly justify their pricing policy (and thus sharing sensitive information with their competitors);

If a consumer does not like the price of a given retailer, he can use another retailer offering a similar product (online or offline); however, if a small retailer in a peripheral region cannot afford the prices asked by the national postal operators, he may not find any alternative operator serving him (see essential facility doctrine);

Delivery prices charged by e-retailers go beyond the delivery network infrastructure which is the focus of this initiative.

1.3.Option 4: Enhance regulatory powers of postal regulators

National postal regulators can perform their tasks only if they are provided with a clear legal basis for their activities, a clear mandate outlining their tasks, as well as the independence and financial and human resources required to carry out these tasks. The following options (not necessarily mutually exclusive) could be envisaged:

Option 4a - Powers to collect data from operators.

As discussed in the problem definition section, national postal regulators often have little information about the existence and/or activities and/or behaviour of parcel delivery operators, especially in a cross-border context. The objective would therefore be to empower regulatory authorities in a way that they can properly monitor how competition unfolds on their markets, and on cross-border markets. The information collected should be essential for regulators to perform effective oversight. The process should be organised in the most efficient way, so as to keep administrative burdens imposed on operators and regulators at a minimum. A very basic set of information should be made available by operators. At the very least, information on the existence of the operator should be provided (e.g. through a notification requirement for any operator providing parcel delivery services into any given Member State).

National postal regulators often don't have neither data nor the power to collect data from operators, making their monitoring task more difficult to implement. In possession of market data they can assess the level of competition in the market and any potential competition concerns that may arise as well as compliance with certain regulatory principles. For this reason this option should be retained.

Delivery operators would be requested to notify their presence in the market and would be requested to provide basic information on a yearly basis

Some regulators acknowledge they do not have the means to verify who is acting on the cross-border delivery market. Delivery operators should be requested to inform about their activities in the delivery market to the regulators. In addition, basic information such as information on types of services provided (e.g. express versus deferred), information on prices, volumes, turnover and employment, would also be provided by the delivery operators on a periodic basis. In order to reduce administrative burden, the frequency should be reduced to once a year. A threshold could be imposed under which reporting requirements to the regulators would be dismissed to limit the burden on the smallest firms. The threshold could be based either on turnover or on size. However, there are wide variations in the level of turnover across Member States, due to the different sizes of the economies and the sectors in each Member State, which would make a decision on turnover complicated. A threshold based on the size of the SME is more proportionate and relevant in order to apply it consistently at an EU level. It is estimated there are 54.679 SMEs in the delivery sector within the EU-28 85 . By exempting SMEs with less than 49 employees it would excluding 99% of the total SMEs in the sector. Those SMEs who would be affected by the package (744 firms, corresponding to 1% of the total SMEs in the delivery market) would face administrative burden costs related to the need to provide information to the regulators. In total there almost 1200 delivery operators in the EU-28 would be affected by this option, from which 744 SMEs (still accounting for about 63% of the delivery operators affected in this market by this option).

The purpose of the data collection exercise could be: (i) statistical reporting (e.g. on evolution of cross-border deliveries); (ii) monitoring of the market (e.g. market share, affordability of USO products, overall pricing trends); (iii) monitoring and reinforcement of the regulatory principles (e.g. access to networks and infrastructure); (iv) identification of shortcomings and market inefficiencies. If NRAs would have concerns about possible market inefficiencies this may trigger inquires within the scope of competition law by the relevant national competition authorities.

Option 4b - "Ex-ante powers" for national regulators, notification of price increases.

This option would require all delivery operators to notify NRAs one month in advance of changing their published cross-border prices. NRAs would not be required to examine the prices, and if no response from the NRA was received within one month the operator would be able to introduce the price change. The NRA would be able to take issue with the prices on the basis of information about costs, volumes, revenues etc.

Option 4c - Powers to enforce market access, where appropriate, to NPOs' multilateral cross-border wholesale remuneration agreements and cross-border services

NPOs would be required to grant third party access based on fair terms and conditions (which is not synonym to "for free") to their multilateral agreements on terminal rates and to their cross-border networks by publishing a reference offer.

Multilateral remuneration agreements such as terminal-dues type agreements, REIMS, etc.

Such access is already required under EU competition law – in that this was one of the conditions for DG COMP to stop requesting for ex-ante notification of the so-called REIMS agreements (fixing inter-post termination rates). However, for lack of transparency (and formal complaints by competitors), this requirement has never been enforced. Yet again, operators are more likely to comply if they know they are being monitored

Other cross-border agreements amongst NPOs such as the interconnect programme (e.g. participation in the common tracking system, in the common barcodes used by the incumbents).

There are concerns that the reinforced cooperation, under the interconnect programme, between incumbent operators might have anti-competitive effects. Already the Roadmap asked for "open systems" and "non-discriminatory" access for other operators. For this reason it is important to give the powers to regulators to enforce market access in these cases.

This option would ensure that all delivery operators in the same situation have access to same terms and conditions when accessing the cross-border networks and multilateral remuneration agreements of NPOs. NPOs would also be required to ensure that their tariffs are non-discriminatory. This principle is already enshrined in the PSD for the universal postal service (e.g. when it comes to access to networks or postal infrastructures). Moreover, to the extent that non-discriminatory access to agreements delivery terms and conditions such as REIMS is already required under EU competition law, this principle could be reinforced and/or when it comes to specific access issues (e.g. access to terminal dues, access to the interconnect programme of the national postal operators). This option should be combined with option 5c.

1.4.Option 5: Regulate cross-border parcel prices

This would directly introduce the regulation of cross-border parcel prices within the EU, as the regulations on international roaming have progressively limited the maximum tariff that can be charged for intra EU voice, SMS and data services, and from 15 June 2017 roaming charges will cease to exist 86 . Price caps would be introduced for cross-border parcel delivery which could be a simple mechanisms (e.g. solely based on distance ) or a more advanced models that would take into account the actual cost of cross-border delivery (for example reflecting additional transport costs and domestic price levels).

There are however substantial differences between the postal and telecoms markets. Most mobile phone contracts are chosen based on domestic use, while cross-border parcel services are likely to be purchased without reference to the domestic offer. Cost differences for postal services are much greater than for telecoms due to the impact of geography, population density, labour, delivery and transport. Furthermore the potential items that would have to be scoped are far more complex than the products subject to the roaming regulation. Historically the market for international roaming services was less competitive than the postal one with weaker consumer pressure. 87  

Direct price regulation risks distorting competition in a complex market environment particularly given the current lack of knowledge of the cross-border parcel market. 88 Restricting direct price regulation to universal service products might also create distortions given the differences in the scope and features of USO products between Member States, and the growth of B2C services provided by other operators (though not always throughout a country or throughout the EU). Finally it would be disproportionate and contrary to better regulation principles to conclude that direct price regulation is the optimal solution to the failure of self-regulation to eliminate prohibitive cross-border delivery prices.

2.Comparison of policy options



1.5.Overview of the effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality of the different policy options

Effectiveness in achieving the objectives below

Efficiency (cost

effectiveness) in

achieving

listed objectives

Proportionality) in

achieving

listed objectives

Objectives⇒

Policy options⇓

Render regulatory oversight more effective

Enhance market and price transparency

1. Baseline scenario / No action

0

0

0

N/A

3. To enhance the transparency of prices

3.a – NPO Public list prices and public discounts

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

✓✓

✓✓✓

3.b -Individually negotiated prices between delivery operators and larger e-retailers

✓✓

✓✓

✗✗✗

✗✗✗

3.c - Inter-NPO wholesale prices ("terminal dues" etc).

✓✓✓

✓✓

✓✓

3.d - Delivery prices charged by e-retailers.

✓✓✓

✗✗✗

✗✗✗

4 - To enhance the regulatory powers of NRAs

4.a - Powers to collect data from operators

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

4.b - Ex-ante powers, notification of prices changes

✓✓

✓✓

✗✗✗

4.c – Powers to enforce market access to cross-border agreements

✓✓✓

✓✓

✓✓

Impact on effectiveness and efficiency compared to the situation today,

✓✓✓(Strong) – ✓✓ (Moderate) – ✓ (Weak) positive contribution - ✗✗✗(Strong) – ✗✗(Moderate) – ✗ (Weak) negative contribution – ≈ marginal / neutral contribution - ? uncertain; n.a. not applicable

0 no impact

.

Option 3a would strongly improve the transparency of cross-border prices by comparing the domestic and cross-border prices for a selection of USO or similar products on one website for all Member States. Regulatory oversight would be improved as NRAs would be required to make assessments of the affordability and cost-orientation of these prices. While the website might help this by showing prices for other operators, to have a greater impact this option should be combined with 3c which would give NRAs further information with which to assess costs. The option would cover NPOs only to ensure comparability between USO or similar services, though other operators offering comparable services could also request for their prices to be included, The option would be proportionate as the products would be limited to a set of USO or similar products commonly used for e-commerce and the information would be easily accessible (as the prices would be public) and only requested once a year. It would be moderately efficient in achieving the objectives as while it would improve price transparency and regulatory oversight (with the aim of reducing excessive cross-border parcel prices), it would not be as effective as price regulation in lowering prices.

Option 3b would also make regulatory oversight and price transparency of negotiated prices more effective though to a lesser extent as information would only be available to NRAs, not to then general public. It would also not affect the prices which are the focus of this IA, namely the prices paid by consumers and small businesses, therefore making it inefficient at achieving the objective of the policy. It would be disproportionate given the large number of prices involved.

Option 3c would make NPOs inter-operator prices transparent (though to NRAs only) and therefore improve regulatory oversight. It would be proportionate, but the provision of the information alone would not be efficient in achieving the objective if it was not combined with the assessment of affordability contained in 3a.

Option 3d would have a small impact on regulatory oversight, as the publication of the prices paid by e-retailers would indirectly inform NRAs of what NPOs (and other operators) were charging customers. It would however not be proportionate as a large number of e-retailers would be required to publicly provide information about the costs of one of their inputs, and if the scope were limited to larger e-retailers to reduce administrative burdens, it is likely that negotiated prices would be disclosed (as larger e-retailers are unlikely to pay public list prices), making this option ineffective in achieving the aims of the policy. Publishing negotiated prices would also have a negative commercial impact on the e-retailers concerned and their delivery operators.

Option 4a would have a strong positive impact on regulatory oversight as NRAs would have information about all delivery operators (with at least 50 employees or operating in more than one Member State). Market transparency would be greatly improved through the publication of this statistical information. This option would be proportionate as the smallest delivery operators would be exempted and the information that larger delivery operators would be limited to core market information, and by standardising this information throughout the EU regulatory fragmentation would be reduced, The option would be efficient at achieving the objectives, but the efficiency would be limited by the high overall cost (though the impact on individual operators would be small.

Option 4b would have a moderate positive impact on price transparency and regulatory oversight as NRAs would have information about all operators’ price changes before they were implemented. It would however not be proportionate as it would limit delivery operators commercial flexibility and it would therefore not be efficient, also as there would be no specific requirement for each price change to be judged on affordability and cost-orientation. If explicit approval was required for each price change, the result would essentially be price regulation.

Option 4c would make regulatory oversight more effective as NPOs would be required to enforce access (by other delivery operators) to their cross-border pricing agreements and services such as the Interconnect programme. It would efficiently achieve the objectives and be moderately proportionate as NRAs would only need to act on the basis of complaints or dissatisfaction with reference offers. .

Overall options 3a, b c, and d would all be effective, though option 3b and option 3d would significantly increase administrative costs. Option 3d would affect only retailers' surcharges, not high prices charged by delivery operators. Option 4a would contribute most to the objective of enhancing regulatory oversight 89  and administrative costs would not be too burdensome. Option 4b and 4c also achieve more effective regulatory oversight, but 4b involves significant administrative costs for NRAs and delivery operators so it would not be efficient or proportionate. Administration costs for 4c (as an ad hoc measure) would be limited, though efficiency would depend on other delivery operators requesting access.



1.6.Overview of effects of the policy options for stakeholders

Stakeholders⇒

Policy options⇓

Consumers

Retailers (SMEs)

NPOs

Other delivery operators

NRAs

1. Baseline scenario / No action

0

0

0

0

0

3. To enhance the transparency of prices

3.a – NPO Public list prices and public discounts

✓✓✓

✓✓✓

3.b -Individually negotiated prices between delivery operators and larger e-retailers

✗✗✗

✗✗

✗✗✗

3.c - Inter-NPO wholesale prices ("terminal dues" etc).

3.d - Delivery prices charged by e-retailers.

✓✓

✗✗✗

✓✓

✓✓

4 - To enhance the regulatory powers of NRAs

4.a - Powers to collect data from operators

✓✓✓

4.b - Ex-ante powers, notification of price changes

✓✓

✓✓

✗✗✗

✗✗✗

4.c – Powers to enforce market access to cross-border agreements

✓✓

✓✓✓

Impact on effectiveness and efficiency compared to the situation today,

✓✓✓(Strong) – ✓✓ (Moderate) – ✓ (Weak) positive contribution - ✗✗✗(Strong) – ✗✗(Moderate) – ✗ (Weak) negative contribution – ≈ marginal / neutral contribution - ? uncertain; n.a. not applicable.

Option 3a would have a positive effect on consumers and retailers in Member States where prices are currenlty high (compared to similar countries) as there would be pressure for prices to decrease. As NPOs prices for USO services (or similar) would be included, they would face a weak negative impact (as such prices are in any case already public) and there would be a neutral impact on other delivery operators as they would not be included in this option. There would be a small positive impact on NRAs as they would have clarification about their need to assess the affordabiltiy and cost-orientaion of cross-border prices, through there would also be clarity about the services within scope. There would however be additional work involved.

Option 3b would have an uncertain impact on consumers as while they do not pay negotiated prices, they could benefit from a reduction in the prices charged by e-retailers (assuming that cost savings are passed on). Retailers would benefit from a reduction in negotiated prices (assuming there was one) but they have stated they do not belive that individually negotiated pricing agreements should be subject to regulatory oversight. There would be a negative commerical and practical impact on NPOs and other delivery operators through the discloure of these prices and the work involved in sending them to the NRA. NRAs would face a significant additional workload through the need to asess the prices.

Option 3c would have a small positive impact on consumers and eretailers, if it lead to lower prices, although they would not be directly impacted by this option. There would be a weak negative impact on NPOs who would be required to disclose the prices to NRAs, who would benefit from a small positive impact through being made aware of these prices. As they would not be concerned by this option, the impact on other delivery operators would be neutral.

Option 4a would have a neutral impact on consumers, who would not be affected by this option. There would be a weak indireect positive impact on retailers, assuming that greater regulatory oversight would provide them with better, cheaper delivery services. There would be a weak negative impact on NPOs and other delivery operators who would be required to provide data, though they might also benefit from a standardised format across the EU. There would be a strong positive impact on NRAs as they would benefit legal clarity about their ability to oversee cross-border parcel markets and the ability to collect statistical data covering the parcel market.

Option 4b would have a positive impact on consumers and eretailers as the option might result in fewer and smaller price increases. There would be a strong negative impact on all delivery operators as the would be required to wait before introducing price chanegs which might also be queried by the NRA. There would be a weak negative impact on NRAs as they would receive additional data (for which they do not currenlty see the need).

Option 4c would have a moderately positive impact on consumers and a stronger impact on eretailers who would benefit from a wider choice of operators (assuming other opertors do request access to NPOs’ cross-border services and price agreements). There would be a neutral impact on NPOs as the need to grant access would be balanced by additional volume could reduce fixed costs. Other delivery opertors would therefore benefit. The impact on NRAs would be marginal as they would only need to act in the event of complaints.

Overall, consumers and eretailers would be most positively affected by options 3a, 4b and 4c. Consumers would also benefit from option 3d, although this would have a strong negative impact on e-retailers. All delviery operators would, on the other hand, benefit most from option 3d. They would be most negatively affected by options 3b and 4b. NRAs would benefit most from 4a.



Annex 9: Assessment of administrative burden costs of the different policy options

Introduction and methodology

Administrative and compliance costs have been analysed for each measure separately. Administrative costs are defined as “the costs incurred by enterprises, the voluntary sector, public authorities and citizens in meeting legal obligations to provide information on their action or production, either to public authorities or to private parties”. 90 The Commission's Standard Cost Model was used to calculate administrative cost for businesses and public authorities for options 3, and 4. .The calculations are based on the assumption of 28 NPOs and, where applicable, a number of other cross-border EU operators meeting a relevant threshold condition.

All estimates of workload resulting from the various options are based on the Commission services' own reasoned judgment and experience of statistical data collection and publication.

Significant burdens are quantified (monetary estimates) on the basis of the EU "Standard Cost Model". The Core equation of the Standard Cost Model is a straightforward product of price (Tariff x Time) and quantity (Number of operators or regulators x Frequency). The calculation is done with the help of the "EU database on Administrative Burdens", which sets a standardized wage rate per hour depending on the staff category concerned. The resulting cost estimates should be seen as a broad indication of the relative costs when comparing options, and not as a measure of exact costs.

Options 3 a)-d) and 4a) would constitute administrative burden, whereas options 4 b-c would mainly include implementation and enforcement costs for regulators. The same standard cost model is used for all these costs.

In cases where "other operators" (not only NPOs) are concerned, it is assumed that only companies with at least 50 employees are included, in order to explicitly avoid administrative burden on the smallest companies. Option 3b is an exception to this, as in that case on average 10 operators per MS would have negotiated prices with e-retailers.

It should be noted that the administrative costs are likely to be higher in the first year, as this will include some staff training, creating templates etc. Some reduction of such costs may be expected from the second year onwards.

Option 3 a) Enhancing the transparency of public list prices and public discounts

As this measure concerns price data that is already publicly available, it would impose only a limited additional burden on NPOs and NRAs. Only NPOs (not other operators) would be included. To establish a reasonable and relevant overview, we would suggest collecting prices on data for two categories; packets and parcels. For each of those categories, price data would be collected on 3 weights: 500g, 1 kg, and 2 kg for packets, and 1, 2 and 5 kg for parcels. Furthermore, a differentiation should be made between various service levels, namely the cheapest alternative or tracked delivery (for parcels), or the cheapest alternative, registered or tracked delivery (for packets). Information would be collected for flows between all EU members. The information would be published on a dedicated European web site.

For the purpose of administrative burden calculation, we assume that the prices are compiled and published annually on a a dedicated section on the Commission's EUROPA website. This would require a work effort relating mainly to compilation of readily available information. Based on the assumption that the option would require clerk staff to spend around 1 man-day annually compiling and organising the data, the cost would amount to around 4 000 € for NPOs. Some NRAs already perform tests for affordability and cost-orientation for domestic services within the USO, but it is estimated that a streamlined analysis across all NRAs would mean a work load for compilation at NRA level estimated at about twice as high as at NPOs, given the need to assemble and analyse data. In addition, about one work-week of professional analysis would be needed at NRA level, to evaluate the affordability and cost-orientation of prices. This means the administrative burden for NRAs would amount to around 44 000 €.

Option 3b Enhancing the transparency of individually negotiated prices between delivery operators and larger e-retailers ("account" customers)

The tasks under this option would be similar to option 3a, as all delivery operators would normally have this price data available. However, since more data is involved (i.e. one price per individually negotiated contract), the administrative burden for NPOs would be higher than in option 3a. The workload may be estimated at around 4 work-days, which would mean around 16 000 € (around 600 € per operator). In addition, other operators would be included in this option, but to limit the scope (and impact of administrative costs for delivery operators and NRAs), only the major operators (10 operators per Member State) would be included. With this restriction, for other operators the administrative burden would be 163 000 (around 600 per operator), so in total 179 000€ for all delivery operators combined. For NRAs, the administrative burden relating to data compilation is also likely to be more cumbersome than in 3a. The administrative burden for NRAs could be estimated at around 50 000 €, assuming information is collected annually and that around 7 man-days will be needed only for managing the large data sets that are likely to be involved and around 3 man-days for analysis of all prices.

Option 3 c) Enhancing the transparency of inter-post wholesale prices ("terminal dues" and similar charges).

The work related to this option amounts to information sharing and is therefore very similar to what is described in option 3 a) above. The tasks, and resources required, for NRAs and NPOs are similar to the ones above. Each NPO would report how much all other NPOs are charged for delivery into its distribution network, as well as how much they themselves are charged by other NPOs. In practice, this means communicating the algorithm used for calculating terminal dues for each of the other 27 NPOs concerned. The information should be aimed at NRAs to inform the assessment of affordability and would not be published. At NPO level, the added administrative burden amounts to compiling and submitting already available information, and at NRA level, the added administrative burden amounts to receiving, organising and analysing this data, as well as some analysis. The workload is estimated to be marginally smaller for NPOs than in option 3a), as it would normally involve reporting on fewer variables. Thus, given an estimated workload of around 2 man-days, the administrative burden for NPOs could be quantified at around 8 000 €. The cost for NRAs would be around 31 000 €, based on a workload of roughly 4 man-days (i.e. a higher workload than for NPOs) for data compilation, and 2 man-days of analysis.

Option 3d) Enhancing the transparency of delivery prices charged by e-retailers

Even assuming that all delivery operators with 50 employees or more and only the largest 10% of e-retailers would be included, the administrative burden would be significant. As stated elsewhere in this IA, according to Eurostat data it may be estimated that over 296 000 enterprises were active in e-commerce and distance selling business in EU28 in 2012. Around 220 of those companies are not SMEs. Depending on the threshold that may be established for e-retailers to be included, it may be assumed that 10% of all e-retailers could be of relevant size. This would mean that around 30 000 e-retailers would be included. Assuming that relevant data is readily available and that half a man-day would be needed to compile and submit the data, given the number of companies concerned, it would still amount to an estimated administrative burden of over 2 000 000 € for e-retailers only.

Option 4) Enhanced regulatory powers of postal regulators

Option 4a) power to collect data 

Information should be gathered on the types of services offered (e.g. express or other), as well as the prices, volumes, turnover and employment of individual operators. For operators, we assume that this would imply a workload of around 1 man-day annually, as data would be readily available at operator level, but still require a fair amount of administration work.

In addition to NPOs, only delivery operators with 50 or more employees should be included in this information obligation. Eurostat data indicates that this would concern around 1 200 delivery operators. 91 Given the same workload for "other operators" as for NPOs (one man-day), the administrative burden for this scenario would be around 170 000 € for "other operators" (companies with 50 or more employees), and around 4 000 € for NPOs. As to administrative burden on NRAs, DG GROW's experience suggests that while in some countries the NRAs adequately cover their national parcel markets, in others, the parcel markets are simply not visible from a regulatory or even from statistical point of view. If all operators with 50 or more employees are included, the administrative burden on NRAs may be assumed on average to be around 1 man-week of professional analysis, and a considerable effort at clerk-level (around 2 man-weeks), given the number of operators concerned. An average figure is used based on the other overall estimate of the workload, though in reality some NRAs would face lower costs as they already collect some data covering parcel operators whereas other NRAs would probably incur a higher cost, for example is data collection is currently limited to a small number of USO services. Overall, the burden on NRAs would be about 80 000€.

Option 4 b) Ex ante powers for national regulators

For delivery operators, it is assumed that option 4b would involve similar work to option 3a as many only change their published prices annually. Assuming, however, that all delivery operators (not only NPOs) are relevant (while, as in 4a, assuming that only operators with over 50 employees – i.e. around 1200 – would be concerned), the estimated administrative burden on these (NPOs and other operators) would be around 150 000 €. As operators would be required to notify the NRA of any price change one month in advance of implementation, the workload at operators' level may be estimated at less than one man-day annually.

For NRAs, the cost would be related to analysis in addition to collection of data. It may be assumed that far-reaching analysis could be required, in particular as a number of NRAs would likely wish to evaluate the situation in detail with regular intervals, possibly in co-operation with National Competition Authorities. While the number of competition law cases is of course difficult to predict 92 , it may be assumed that the analytical burden could be heavy in this option. Against this background, the estimated costs would be around 250 000 € (assuming around on average 7 extra working weeks of analysis and administration). It should be noted that much of the NRA administrative burden under 4a (data collection) would need to be added to this, as such information gathering is needed for the regulatory powers under option 4 b.

Option 4c) Enforce market access

This option would concern only NPOs, not other operators. The administrative burden on NPOs is estimated to be similar to option 3a (involving around one man-day, as it would largely be a matter of providing information). For NRAs, the work would involve ad hoc analysis of reference offers. While there is little empirical evidence on the number of complaints in this area, the Commission estimates that the NRA burden may be around 66 000 €. While an NRA involved in a complex complaint might face a much higher burden, others might not be required to assess any cases. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that on average 2 man-weeks of professional analysis would be needed for each EU NRA for calculation purposes, though in reality the administrative burden would likely differ significantly between NRAs.

Estimated administrative burden and compliance costs (€ per year, rounded)

Estimated cost NPOs

Estimated workload NPOs

Estimated cost NRAs

Estimated workload NRAs

Estimated cost other operators

Frequency

Sum

Option 3a

4 000 (around 150 per operator)

1 man-day (at clerk level)

44 000 (around 1 600 per NRA)

2 man-days (at clerk level) + 5 man-days of analysis (at professional level).

-

Annually

48 000

Option 3b

16 000 (around 600 per operator)

4 man-days (at clerk level)

50 000 (around 1 8000 per NRA)

7 man-days (at clerk level) + 3 man-days of analysis (at professional level).

163 000

(around 600 per operator)

Annually

230 000

Option 3c

8 000 (around 300 per operator)

2 man-days (at clerk level)

31 000 (around 1 100 per NRA)

4 man-days (at clerk level) + 2 man-days of analysis (at professional level).

Annually

39 000

Option 3d

E-retailers: Over 2 Million (around 70 per e-retailer)€

Annually

Over 2 Million

Option 4a

4 000 (around 150 per operator)

1 man-day (at clerk level)

80 000 (around 2900 per NRA)

3 man-weeks (around 2 weeks at clerk level and around 1 week at professional level)

170 000

(estimated work-load: 8 hours at clerk level)

(around 150 per operator)

Annually

280 000

Option4b

4 000 (around 140 per operator)

1 man-days (at clerk level)

252 000 (around 9000 per NRA)

7 man-weeks (at professional level)

149 000

(estimated workload: 7 hours (at clerk level)

(around 140 per operator)

Ad hoc

405 000

Option 4c

4 000 (around 140 per operator)

1 man-day (at clerk level)

66 000 (around 2400 per NRA)

2 man-weeks at professional and clerk level.

-

Ad hoc

70 000



Annex 10: Commission’s 2013 Roadmap assessment

Introduction

This Annex provides an update of the actions that address issues identified by the Commission Communication, "A roadmap for completing the single market for parcel delivery Build trust in delivery services and encourage online sales" 93 ( hereafter 'the Roadmap'), adopted by the Commission in December 2013. Many of the initiatives responding to the Roadmap were still being developed in June 2015, when the 18 month 'deadline' following the Roadmap's publication ended in and during the period of the Commission's public consultation in 2015 (which ran from May to August). It is therefore premature to conduct a full evaluation of whether the objectives set out in the Roadmap have been met, so instead this annex sets out progress that has been made as regards the actions set out in the Roadmap, along with a preliminary assessment of whether this might meet the needs of users or whether further measures are needed.

Summary of the Roadmap and Stakeholder Consultation

Following the consensus on the issues and the types of action that was needed following the 2012 Green Paper, 'An integrated parcel delivery market for the growth of e-commerce in the EU' 94 , the Roadmap set out a series of actions for postal operators, e-retailers, Member States (including national regulatory authorities) and the Commission in order to provide e-retailers and consumers with an increase in high-quality, accessible and affordable cross-border parcel delivery services.

Responses to the 2012 Green Paper consultation had expressed a preference for industry driven measures and most responses had also stated that they felt the existing regulatory framework was fit for purpose. The actions contained in the Roadmap were therefore largely of a self regulatory nature, but with the Commission closely monitoring progress and taking stock after 18 months to assess whether additional measures were needed, given the increasing importance of e-commerce to the European economy.

The actions in the Roadmap fell under three main objectives:

Increased transparency and information for all actors along the e-commerce value chain

Improved availability, quality and affordability of delivery solutions

Enhanced complaint handling and redress mechanisms for consumers

During the course of the Roadmap, the Commission hosted several major workshops to bring together delivery operators and e-retailers to assess developments, including an assessment workshop on 29 June 2015, 18 months after the Roadmap's publication. This workshop brought together delivery operators, e-retailers, consumer representative, regulators and Member States to discuss the progress that had been made and the problems that persisted in cross-border delivery markets. Delivery operators presented the services on offer to e-retailers, and e-retailers spoke about developments in returns solutions, an e-logistics information platform and a trustmark. In April 2015 Vice President Ansip and Commissioner Bieńkowska met the Chief Executives of 21 national postal operators to stress the importance of making rapid progress to improve the quality and price of cross border services, and the former Commissioner for the Internal Market, Michel Barnier, met postal operators in June and September 2014. The Commission services have also held regular meetings at a technical level.

A Linkedin group, Improve parcel delivery in European e-commerce, was also created to act as a permanent online workshop to share views and ideas, whether about practical concerns with parcel delivery or to put forward solutions. The 2014 Postal User Forum focussed on parcel delivery, and the Commission's work in this area was also presented at the May 2015 European Social Dialogue Committee for the Postal Sector. Discussions have also taken place in the Postal Directive Committee and the E-commerce Expert Group, as well as the Council Working Party in October 2015. The 2015 open public consultation provided further evidence of the obstacles that e-retailers and consumers face when selling to/buying from other Member States and the improvement they would most like to see. For further details please see the Annexes on Evidence and Studies and Stakeholder Consultation.

Objective 1: Increased transparency and information for all actors along the e-commerce value chain

Action 1: Improve information for consumers on the characteristics and costs of different delivery and return solutions offered on the websites of e-retailers.

Surveys have shown that that a lack of information about (high) delivery costs, (long) delivery times and returns procedures are responsible for a significant share of abandoned online purchases 95 . E-retailers, including their representative organisations, were therefore asked to provide easily understandable information on delivery and return options, potentially including a code of conduct, trustmarks and customer feedback options. The Commission committed to arranging meetings with e-retailers and consumer representatives to support this work.

One of the options that was tested in the 2014 study 96 (requested by the European Commission) of initiatives to support e-commerce through better functioning parcel delivery services was trustmarks. Trustmarks aim to improve consumer confidence that certain standards are being met and are particularly important for SMEs who may lack the financial and technical capabilities of larger retailers to advertise product features to consumers. Research undertaken as part of the study showed there were many trustmarks for e-retailers, and most European countries in fact had several, though at least one member state did not have any comparable ones for e-commerce. Instead of creating a new EU wide trust mark the study therefore recommended work to improve existing trustmarks, by requiring more information about delivery elements (such as status or tracking services) to be made available, given that the importance of delivery information for consumers and the fact that it was not part of many existing trustmark standards. The study also suggested an umbrella certification process and that European initiatives could be particularly helpful for potential cross-border customers who might lack awareness of trustmarks outside their own country and for e-retailers to reach out to customers without going through multiple certification processes in different Member States.

The European Multi Channel and Online Trade Association (EMOTA) formally launched a European Trustmark for e-commerce in Barcelona in March 2014. The EMOTA scheme is based on a co-accreditation model, where websites will display their own (domestic) trustmark(s) in addition to an EMOTA logo/trustmark to show harmonised accreditation criteria have been met. 10 national trustmark schemes are participating and there are over 5,000 accredited online shops. The accreditation criteria include: a code of conduct with a high level of consumer protection, such as required information about prices, availability, delivery and returns; an accreditation process; compliant monitoring; alternative dispute resolution (ADR) schemes; and enforcement and sanctions. 97  

E-commerce Europe, who represent 16 national e-commerce association and over 25,000 companies selling products and/or services online to consumers in Europe, have also developed a pan-European trustmark for the e-commerce sector. The aim is to increase cross-border e-commerce through improved protection for consumers and merchants by establishing one European set of rules which is clearly communicated. This trustmark was rolled out in 11 countries on 30 September 2015 and over 10,000 online shops certified by a national association can join.

Likewise, some individual companies are developing their own standards. Google, for example, offers a certification programme for online shops, though its requirements are less stringent and the information it provides is focused on delivery and customer response times.

The Consumer Rights Directive adopted on 23 October 2011 (2011/83/EU) includes pre-contractual information requirements for distance and off-premises contracts. Amongst other things, before concluding a contract a consumer must now be informed about the total price of the good or services, including all additional delivery or postal charges (or where those charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact that such additional charges may be payable). The arrangements for payment, delivery, performance and the time by which the trader undertakes to deliver the goods, as well as any delivery restrictions that apply must also be stated. Information must also be provided about the cost of returning the goods. The DG Justice Guidance Document concerning Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council provided further clarification, among others, about information requirements, delivery, withdrawal rights and returns. 98 The European Commission also launched campaigns throughout 2014 to raise the awareness of European consumers about their rights (including the rights laid down by the Consumer Rights Directive) in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Portugal. In 2015 the consumer awareness raising campaign was extended to six more Member States, namely the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.

Furthermore, the open public consultation on parcel delivery indicated that consumers find locating information about delivery services on retailers websites far less problematic that obtaining certain delivery features (such as a specified time and day) or obtaining low prices or free delivery. Clearer information about delivery options and prices was however cited by nearly three quarters of consumers who responded as a something that would make them very likely or likely to buy more online. Some responses to the consultation noted the role that trustmarks and the Consumer Rights Directive could play in increasing information and consumer confidence in online purchases.

Assessment: No further action needed.

Existing initiatives from e-commerce associations to create trustmarks should encourage e-retailers to provide consumers with even better information about delivery and returns options, and give consumers even greater confidence to buy online from other Member States. The involvement of the representative bodies should also help raise awareness of the trustmarks among e-retailers, the use of existing trustmarks as a basis should also help recognition by consumers.

Furthermore, since the Roadmap was adopted, Member States should have transposed the Consumer Rights Directive. E-retailers throughout the EU are therefore now required to provide consumers with information about delivery and returns options and charges.

Action 2: Improve information for e-retailers on the delivery services available to them

Many e-retailers, in particular SMEs, lack information about the different delivery options that are available to them. Research has often shown a need for more neutral and transparent information on service availability as exiting tools fail to provide a comprehensive and up to date service. This is particularly true for cross border services. Poor information for SMEs also restricts choices for customers if the result is fewer delivery options, acting in a disincentive to purchase from that particular e-retailer.

To combat these issues, another option that was tested in the 2014 study 99 was an information platform on delivery services. The study recommended that the Commission should support the development of such information platforms and that public authorities might need to consider promoting or funding them. Therefore in July 2015 the European Commission launched a call for proposals for an information platform on parcel delivery services, supported by COSME funding. The objective was to seek proposals for the creation and maintenance of a web information platform for e-retailers to provide them with information about the different options for parcel delivery available to them, including for cross border deliveries.

E-commerce Europe, a European e-commerce trade association, have previously recommended the development of an e-logistics information platform to help e-retailers, particularly smaller ones, to find out about the range of delivery services on offer and help them understand different markets. The e-logistics platform would provide information such as legal requirements which impact logistics (customs, recycling); delivery and market intelligence, including local delivery habits and preferences (e.g. cash on delivery); quality of service and satisfaction data; and include a matchmaking and marketplace feature to help e-retailers find the most relevant suppliers. To reduce costs there would also be a feature that would allow e-retailers to combine their volumes and therefore negotiate better discounts with delivery operators, both for first mile freight forwarding and last mile delivery.

As part of a campaign to stimulate digital entrepreneurship, the European Commission has published '10 things to know when doing business online'. 100 This includes information about delivery services such as the different types of delivery operator, national and European requirements, customers' delivery rights, liability for loss or damage and how to deal with complaints.

The 2015 open public consultation indicated that information from delivery operators about their delivery options and prices is less of a problem for e-retailers than obtaining satisfactory delivery features and prices. Indications are however that e-retailers may not be well informed about the range of options available to them, for example on discounts, and that more choice of delivery operators would help e-retailers increase their online sales.

Assessment: No further action needed until existing initiatives have been introduced and evaluated. There is still a lack of comprehensive information for e-retailers about the different types of cross-border delivery services available to them. However, when it is introduced, the e-logistics platform should have a positive impact on the information available to e-retailers, helping them to make more informed choices and obtain better deals. The Commission will monitor the number of delivery operators and e-retailers using the platform and the evolution of prices of basic parcel products.

Action 3: Increased transparency on (cross border) delivery markets, delivery services and quality standards on the basis of the Postal Services Directive.

The Postal Services Directive (Article 22a) requires Member States to ensure postal service providers provide all the information national regulatory authorities require to ensure conformity with the Directive or for clearly defined statistical purposes. The Article is not limited to products or services falling within the scope of the universal service, nor to universal service providers. Given the growing importance of e-commerce, it is particularly important that such information covers the parcels market outside the universal service area, as well as within it, and includes cross-border as well as domestic data.

Following Eurostat's decision to stop collecting postal statistics, this role was taken over by the Postal statistics team in the Directorate General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs in 2014. The first set of statistics was collected in conjunction with the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in 2014 and published in the Report on the Application of the Postal Services Directive and on the Commission's website in October 2015. The exercise showed that the collection of market data by NRAs is not uniforms and is not necessarily considered an aim of regulation or a key duty by NRAs in all member states. NRAs have a strong focus on services within the scope of the USO and data on the wider parcel and express segments of the market is far less reliable. In some instances this is due to the NRA's (legal) mandate, it others it appears to be the result of resource constraints, or market data being a low priority.

The Commission has asked the European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) to assess and provide opinions on the [functioning] of the cross –border parcel delivery market. They have also noted discrepancies in the definitions used and the data collected by NRAs. 101 NRA's data collection models are centred on letter post markets and that there is much less data available on parcels  102 and for example, many NRAs do not know which operators are active in the parcel market. Many NRAs have a limited mandate to cover parcels: few have the legal power to collect data on all substitutable parcel delivery offers. Although not necessarily proof of a lack of oversight (and could indeed indicate a very well-functioning market) when asked only four NRAs had undertaken legal or regulatory proceedings against a cross-border parcels provider. An ERGP Report on core indicators for monitoring the European postal market is planned for the end of 2015.

The ERGP report on Quality of Service and End User Satisfaction 103 found that 13 Member states measured transit time for parcels, whereas all measures the transit time of priority mail. Six Member States set a D+1 quality of service target for parcels, compared to almost every Member State for D+1 letter post, though a further 11 countries have a slower regulatory target for transit time. 104 For those countries that do measure the transit time of parcels, different methodologies are used. For parcels a minority of Member States are able to take corrective action if the universal services provider fails to meet specified standards for parcels. Again, this is asymmetric to the regulation of letters, where most Member States are able to take action to address the failure to meet targets. 105 The ERGP has continued its work on cross-border parcel delivery for e-commerce purposes in 2015 though the identification of different legal regimes (national or European) that may apply to European domestic or cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery and of any specific provisions that may be in conflict with each other, in order to identify inconsistencies, redundant regulation or possible aspects of primacy. The ERGP has also conducted further work on end-user satisfaction and monitoring of market outcomes in 2015.

The Commission also published a study in 2014 examining initiatives that could improve transparency and therefore encourage cross border delivery. A summary of WIK-Consult's Design and Development of initiatives to support the growth of e-commerce via better functioning parcel delivery systems in Europe is provided in the Evidence Section of the Annex on Procedural Requirements. Many of the initiatives it assessed, namely umbrella trustmarks, an information platform on delivery services, interoperability of cross-border delivery operations and measurement of transit time are being taken forwards and are assessed elsewhere in this annex. The information platform will also include information on prices and quality of service, akin to the content suggested for the e-commerce scoreboard.

Assessment: Further measures are needed. There has been little improvement to date in the quality of data available for the EU parcel market and it continues to fall short of the transparency on the overall parcel delivery market that was envisaged by the Roadmap. This means that regulators may be unable to ascertain possible anticompetitive behaviour. (See problem definition for further details).

Regarding information for e-retailers and consumers, the information platform will also include information on prices and quality of service, akin to the content suggested for the e-commerce scoreboard.

Objective II: Improving the availability, quality and affordability of delivery solutions.

Action 4: Promote enhanced interoperability of parcel delivery operators to support efficient cross-border trade

Interoperability is a particular issue for cross-border (rather than domestic) ecommerce and is one of the drivers of higher costs and lower quality of service. Traditionally international operators (integrators) have been focussed on the B2B market, rather than B2C or C2C. Two trends have been identified in how this is being addressed: innovative delivery and return solutions, targeted at smaller retailers in particular and cooperation between delivery operators. The latter may however not be based on open interfaces, restricting the delivery operators who can use them, yet on the other hand competition rules limit the level of cooperation to prevent market abuse. In their responses to the public consultation many national postal operators stated that improved interoperability was the main feature that would improve the cross-border delivery services on offer.

Following the 2012 Green Paper, the national postal operators in conjunction with the International Post Corporation and Post Europe agreed to work together to improve the interoperability of their national postal networks. Their e-commerce "Interconnect" programme covers five themes: delivery choice, returns solutions, tracking, labelling and customer service. Progress on these themes is set out in this annex and the operator's final status report also forms part of this impact assessment.

As part of the 'Interconnect' programme, EU national postal operators have committed to make at least two locations available for cross-border deliveries to improve delivery choice and convenience. These options, such as delivery to parcel lockers and post offices as well as home delivery will make it easier for consumers to receive parcels at convenient locations and reduce failed delivery (therefore also reducing operators' costs). Customers will be able to make this choice at the point of purchase, and some will also be able to change their initial decision after the item has been dispatched but before the first delivery attempt is made, for example if the customer will no longer be at home or passing a particular pick up point on the delivery day. Some of these options are already available for cross-border parcel services, though others will not be introduced until mid-2016, even where options are already available for domestic deliveries. Around three quarters of the consumers who responded to the open public consultation stated that being able to choose the place where the goods will be delivered would encourage them to buy more online.

Returns are being addressed through the "common return platform" which will enable e-retailers to offer a priority pre-paid postage label for cross-border returns, either pre-printed or at the request of the buyer. The return will be able to be tracked through either the website of the e-retailer or the delivery operator. All EU national postal operators have agreed to accept (and return to the country of origin) parcels with this label, as part of the 'industry initiative'. Most will be offering the service to e-retailers in their country by the end of 2016, although there are several exceptions where the service will not be available due to a lack of demand from e-retailers. Over half of the e-retailers responding to the open public consultation stated they were very unsatisfied or not satisfied with the availability of affordable return solutions. Affordable returns processes were mentioned by over three quarters of consumers who responded as something that would encourage them to shop more online.

Lightweight track and trace services are also due to be introduced, based on RFID technology for packets and parcels up to 2kg. Another new barcode data standard for track and trace (EMSEVT3) is also being rolled out and due to be available in most Member States by the end of 2015. Customers will be able to access track and trace information through the website of the e-retailer or delivery operator. The open public consultation indicated that in general e-retailers are satisfied with track and trace capability (over half who responded to the question were either satisfied or very satisfied. Nevertheless, over half of the consumers who responded stated that better track and trace capability would make them buy more online, although this was not the highest priority area. Consumers (and e-retailers) will be able to track their shipments on the websites of e-retailer or postal operators by using an IT tool.

Harmonised labels have been developed to facilitate cross-border exchange and to eliminate the cost of re-labelling, improve track and trace ability and reduce transit times, therefore improving the quality of service. Recognition of the design by the Universal Postal Union and European Committee on Standardisation is also being sought. The use of open standards is important as e-retailers are keen for delivery operators to use common standards, in order to make it easier for e-retailers to work with different operators who currently use different systems.

One of the six priorities in the annual Union work programme for European Standardisation for 2015 was postal services. The Commission aims to issue a standardisation request concerning the specific features of parcel delivery services in 2016 and is also considering whether a request for the revision of any existing European standards is needed. 106 The importance of open standards and infrastructure was also highlighted in the Roadmap, in workshops with stakeholders and in responses to the 2015 public consultation.

The price of cross-border delivery does however continue to act as an obstacle to greater cross border e-commerce. The areas for improvement that retailers said would make them most likely to sell online or increase sales to other countries were related to prices, namely 'if prices for cross-border delivery were cheaper than they currently are' and 'if prices for cross-border delivery were comparable to domestic prices'. 107 Smaller companies were particularly likely to be unsatisfied with the price of delivery services. Nearly two thirds of consumers who responded to the open public consultation stated that lower prices for cross-border delivery and free delivery were "very likely" to make them buy more online. These were the two most popular improvements for consumers. 

Assessment: No further action is needed on interoperability at present, pending the reaction of consumers and e-retailers to products/services being developed. Track and trace, options for delivery locations and returns are frequently cited by consumers and e-retailers as features that would encourage them to buy or sell more online to or from other Member States. These views were repeated at the Roadmap Evaluation workshop held in June 2015, and in the open public consultation, though the products will need to be brought to market and actually used by e-retailers and consumers before a final judgement is made. E-retailers have called for greater clarity about the improvements postal operators are developing, particular regarding timings, and that consultation with e-retailers forms a part of product development. E-retailers also want postal operators to use open and compatible standards that can be used by all postal operators. The Commission will continue to monitor implementation and whether the new services are based on open standards and infrastructure. An evaluation of the Roadmap will be conducted alongside a review of the initiative on price transparency and regulatory oversight, which could take place two years after the instrument enters into force and four years in its final stage.

 

Further action is however needed on affordability. Progress in this area has been slower than improvements to the quality of service. Commission research shows that prices for cross-border delivery are often two to five times higher than domestic prices. Progress on affordability has been far slower. Surveys continue to show that the price of cross-border shipments poses a problem for consumer and e-retailers, in particular smaller e-retailers who do not have the volumes to negotiate substantial discounts. Measures to increase the price transparency and through that the affordability of cross-border delivery services are the focus of the current initiative.

Objective III: Improving complaint handling and redress mechanisms for consumers

Action 5: Enhance consumer protection to help consumers solve cross-border disputes

In 2013, nearly 40% of consumers indicated that problems with delivery were preventing them from shopping online 108 and both consumers and e-retailers complained that product returns and resolving complaints across borders were more problematic than for domestic purchases and sales 109 . Complaints handling by postal operators was the third least satisfactory aspect of European cross border delivery services for e-retailers responding to the open public consultation. 110 The Postal Services Directive Article 19 does however require that Member States ensure that transparent, simple, inexpensive procedures are made available by all postal service providers (as well as the universal service provider) for dealing with postal users complaints. All Member States have done this and most have appointed another competent national authority such as an ombudsman to review complaints that are not satisfactorily resolved.

Cross-border quality of service complaints were assessed in the ERGP's 2014 Report on Quality of Service and End User Satisfaction. 111 Around half the NRAs in EU Member States have data on cross-border complaints, at least for the universal service provider, though a small number of Member States also included other postal service providers. Complaints about cross-border services appeared to have grown in most instances .

As an aspect of the "Interconnect" programme, national postal operators introduced a common protocol of cross-border complaints handling in June 2015. The customer service centres of all the EU28 national postal operators 112 are linked through a web based system with fixed procedures and an initial response target of two days, though for more complex inquires the customer is notified and the target extended to ten days.

In June 2013 the EU legislator adopted a Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and a Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR). The new legislation on ADR and ODR allows consumers and traders to solve their disputes without going to court, in a quick, inexpensive and simple way, which will encourage cross-border e-commerce. In February 2016 an EU wide ODR platform was established by the European Commission for disputes that arise from online transactions. The platform links all the national alternative dispute resolution entities notified by the Member States and operates in all official EU languages.  

Assessment: No further action needed. Specific action to improve the way in which complains are dealt with, notably the common complaints handling protocol, ought to help cross-border customer service when things go wrong, but evidence is needed to show that this service is working in practice and having a positive impact on the perceptions of cross-border buyers and sellers. Measures to simply the cross-border returns process, as part of the 'industry initiative' common returns platform (see action 4 for details) should also help give online shoppers assurance that they can easily return unwanted products – though the cost of returns may still be a barrier.



Annex 11: Ex-post evaluation of the existing regulatory Framework

Retrospective evaluation of the existing regulatory framework
(i.e. the Postal Services Directive)

Table of Contents

1.    Purpose and Scope of this Annex

2.    Ex-post evaluation of the Postal Services Directive

2.1 The Evaluand – the Postal Services Directive

2.1.1 The problems tackled by the Postal Services Directive

2.1.2 The objectives pursued by EU postal reform, and its "intervention logic"

2.1.3 The provisions of the Postal Services Directive affecting the parcel markets

2.2 Methodology and evidence base

2.3 Evaluation of the Postal Services Directive (with a special focus on parcels)

2.3.1 The effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework

2.3.1.1 To what extent has the PSD contributed to enhancing competition in the postal and parcel markets?

2.3.1.2 To what extent has the PSD contributed to securing the continuous provision of "universal postal services" across the EU territory?

2.3.1.3 To what extent has the PSD contributed to improving the quality of postal services provided to business and citizens?

2.3.1.4 To what extent has the PSD contributed to enhancing regulatory oversight by national regulatory authorities (NRAs), with a view to ensuring that competition takes place on a level playing field?

2.3.2 The efficiency of the existing regulatory framework

2.3.3 The relevance of the existing regulatory framework

2.3.4 The coherence of the existing regulatory framework

3. Summary and conclusions



1) Purpose and scope of this Annex

On 19 May 2015, the Commission adopted its Better Regulation Agenda 113 , which stresses that major policies should be continuously assessed and evaluated over their lifetime to ensure they stay fit for purpose. More specifically, the Evaluation Guidelines adopted on the same day emphasised that policy preparation should be supported by both retrospective performance evaluations and forward looking impact assessments.

Annex 1 already described the fact-finding process that has fed this (forward-looking) impact assessment, listing all data sources that have been used for this report (e.g. studies, consultations, surveys, workshops, etc). This annex, focuses on those elements that could be expected from a retrospective evaluation exercise, the purpose of which is to provide evidence-based judgements of the extent to which an intervention has been effective and efficient, relevant given the needs and its objectives, coherent both internally and with other EU policy interventions and achieved EU added-value.

However, the challenge of this annex is that there had never been a targeted "legislative instrument on cross-border parcel deliveries" which could now be tested for its effectiveness, efficiency and relevance. The most relevant sector-specific regulatory framework affecting the parcel sector is the Postal Service Directive (PSD) – the focus of which had been on letter mail.  114 With e-commerce driven B2C parcel deliveries being a fairly recent phenomenon, the PSD had not meant to address parcel delivery over and above a very basic guarantee (i.e. a basic universal service obligation) that all citizens should be able to send and receive parcels. These were essentially "C2C" (citizen-to-citizen) parcels, handed over in a postal office. At that time, today's needs in terms of affordable, convenient and high-quality B2C parcel deliveries simply did not exist, and hence were not part of the PSD's "intervention logic" (see further below for details).

Outside the very limited scope of "USO parcels" sent from citizen to citizen, the "parcel market" had traditionally been ruled by market forces, as parcels had never been covered by the old "postal monopoly" (= reserved area).

Indeed, this impact assessment largely tries to make the case that the absence of an effective regulatory framework for parcel markets has been a key driver behind the quality and pricing problems identified (see problem definition of the main body of the impact assessment report), and evidence supporting this claim is being presented throughout the report.



The present Annex examines the Postal Service Directive from three perspectives:

To what extent has the Directive proven successful concerning the overall letter and parcel markets, given the significant changes affecting these markets in the past few years?

To what extent have those provisions of the Directive which do affect the parcel markets proven to be effective in the light of today's e-commerce needs?

To what extent has the absence of more targeted parcel-related provisions in the Postal Service Directive proven to be problematic in addressing today's needs?

2) Ex-post evaluation of the Postal Services Directive

2.1 The evaluand – the Postal Services Directive

In this section, we are describing the subject of this evaluation - the Postal Services Directive as last amended in 2008 - more closely. What problems did it mean to address at the time of its adoption? What objectives did it mean to attain, and how (i.e. its "intervention logic")? To what extent did it cover parcels?

2.1.1 The problems tackled by the Postal Services Directive

In line with international practice, postal services had for a long time been provided in the EU Member States by a postal service provider enjoying monopolistic rights (referred to as the "reserved area"). The process of liberalising the EU postal markets was set in motion by a Green Paper in 1992, and gradually implemented through three Directives, adopted in 1997, 2002 and 2008.

While this process has to be seen in the wider context of the creation of the Single Market, therefore with a clear cross-border dimension, the main problems to be tackled were probably more of a domestic nature:

·Most national operators were highly inefficient and unprofitable, thus requiring systematic support from taxpayers' money.

·The lack of customer orientation resulted in poor quality service rendered to the users of postal services (i.e. business and citizens).

The main focus at that time clearly was on letters, and postal services were considered to be the most important medium of communication (except for the telephone).

2.1.2 The objectives pursued by EU postal reform, and its "intervention logic"

In order to improve the efficiency (and thus viability/sustainability) and customer orientation (and thus quality) of postal service providers, the introduction of competition was considered the most promising remedy. However, two main risks had been identified, which needed to be catered for:


·The risk that not all users (citizens) would benefit in the same way from a more market-based approach. As purely market oriented operators would naturally concentrate on the "profitable segments" of the market, there was a risk that business or citizens located in peripheral or otherwise geographically challenged areas might not receive the same level of service than those residing in more densely populated areas. In order to ensure territorial and social cohesion, and in the light of the key function of letters as a means of communication, the objectives of "ubiquity" and "affordability" (which had already been part of postal policy for a long time) were recognised as important counterparts to the above-mentioned objectives relating to "efficiency/sustainability" and "quality".

·The risk that competition between incumbents and market entrants may not unfold in a fair and efficient manner. The postal market is a scale-driven business, depending on large networks which are both capital and labour intense. Market entry is therefore difficult and may require a staged approach, requiring for instance (fair) access to (parts of) existing networks. The gradual introduction of competition in a scale-driven business affected from trade imbalances that is expected to provide essential services to the entire population required certain safeguards for both incumbents and market entrants:

oMarket entrants needed to be supported in the light of the market power enjoyed by the incumbents, e.g. by being given access to the latters' networks or infrastructures, by mechanisms that prevent undue cross-subsidisation by universal service providers between USO and non-USO services, etc.

oIncumbents needed to be protected from excessive "cherry picking" by new entrants, which might not only focus on profitable market segments (which could be expected from a purely market-driven operator), but do that in a way that neglects all standards that the incumbent would be legally required to meet. The main fear raised at the time was that market entrants might attempt to compete mainly on the basis of lower social and employment standards offered to their employees.

The Postal Services Directive therefore pursued the following main policy objectives:

Gradually opening up the letter markets to competition, so as to enhance the efficiency of operators and improve the price of quality of services rendered to users.

Ensuring the continued provision of a minimum universal service, and provide for options of financing that service if it creates an unfair burden on the universal service provider.

Ensuring that the competition between private operators and universal service providers takes place in a fair and transparent manner.

Ensuring proper enforcement of this legal framework through national regulatory authorities.

The way in which the above objectives and risks were translated into legal provisions is illustrated in the following intervention logic:

Explanatory comments:

Inputs (legal provisions)

1.Core provisions aimed to open up the letter markets for competition. Gradual phasing out of the so-called reserved area (= monopoly). Additional provisions (in terms of "access" rules") making it easier for potential market entrants to enter a market characterised by the need to build up and maintain large networks (which are labour and capital intense). Rather than building up complete networks from scratch, entrants can focus on some parts of the chain only, while using the incumbent's network for the parts they cannot cover themselves.

2.Core provisions aimed to protect the legitimate interests of incumbent operators and society at large on the one hand and those of market entrants on the other hand. Authorisation procedures based on "essential requirements" are largely meant to avoid undue "cherry picking" by new entrants, by ensuring that they meet certain minimum standards, e.g. in terms of service quality, or social and employment standards. On the other hand, new market entrants are inter alia protected by certain rules (e.g. on accounting, transparency) that aim to reduce the risk of cross-subsidisation by incumbent operators between USO and non-USO services.


3.Core provisions aimed to ensure that a minimum level of universal services are provided in an affordable way at a minimum frequency and quality across the territory, and that those serviced can be financed if the universal service provider suffers from excessive costs.

4.Core provisions ensuring effective oversight of the sector, with national postal regulators ensuring that the provisions of the Directive are met.

Outputs

More competition, in that an increasing number of operators enter the previously monopolised areas. However, as a result of the safeguards under inputs 2 and 4 above, all competitors would have to observe certain rules of the game.

Results

As a result of enhanced competition, all operators (but the former incumbents in particular) are expected to become more efficient, customer oriented and hence profitable.

As a result of the designation of a universal service provider, with the ensuing rights and obligations, the provision of good and affordable services to the entire population should be ensured.

Impacts

Sustainability. With the former incumbents becoming more efficient and profitable, the overall cost of providing universal service to the entire population should be reduced. As a result, taxpayers would have to bear a reduced burden.

Quality. On the one hand, competition between incumbents and entrants should result in more innovation, both in terms of processes and products, and hence improve the quality of service rendered to customers. On the other hand, the minimum quality requirements imposed on the universal service provider would equally ensure good quality of USO services.

Affordability. On the one hand, competition should exercise a downward pressure on prices (in particular for business customers). On the other hand, the powers given to postal regulators in enforcing the Directives' provisions inter alia aim to ensure the affordability of USO products (e.g. for priority letter mail).

Ubiquity. While new entrants are unlikely to cover the whole territory, the USO-related provisions of the Directive ensure that all business and citizens, whatever their location, will receive minimum universal service.



2.1.3 The provisions of the Postal Services Directive affecting the parcel markets

As explained in the previous section, the PSD, while focusing on letter markets, directly or indirectly also concerns the parcel markets. Looking at the PSD intervention logic again, the boxes in shading indicate which parts of it appear particularly relevant for parcels as well:

In contrast to the letter markets, no specific problems for parcels had been identified at the time. Parcels had never been part of the postal monopoly, and a number of postal and parcel operators aimed to satisfy the needs emerging on the market. In a very simplistic way, one could say that:

Incumbent postal operators served the (fairly limited) needs of citizens for C2C over-the-counter parcels, as part of their much broader universal service obligation. (This is why the USO-specific parts of the above intervention logic have been highlighted.)

A number of incumbent postal operators were also active on the B2B parcel markets, either with standard (i.e. "deferred") or express parcel services.

Integrated express carriers (such as DHL, TNT, UPS or FEDEX) provided domestic and international express and courier services on the B2B markets.

A number of private parcel carriers (other than the incumbents or the express carriers) provided domestic or international B2B parcel services, mainly of a standard/deferred nature.



The main relevance of the Postal Service Directive therefore resided in the fact that:

Citizens should continue to benefit from basic USO parcel services, but provided by more efficient and customer-oriented universal service providers.

Such basic USO parcel services should also be of a good quality and affordable if provided cross-border, i.e. between Member States.

Competition on the parcel markets should not be distorted by undue cross-subsidisation by incumbent postal operators between their USO/letter activities and their activities on the (largely) unregulated parcel markets (which is why the Directive's provisions concerning regulatory oversight in principle covered the entire postal and parcel markets).

The last bullet point is particularly relevant in that postal incumbent operators not only provide a wide range of services (going well below parcels), but also compete with a wide range of postal and non-postal operators. The boundaries between these services are changing constantly, with some of them getting increasingly blurred. The following chart aims to illustrate this point in a very simplified manner:

Only a small fraction of parcels delivered by universal service providers would actually qualify as "USO parcels", and very often, operators could not even be able to quantify this part of their business, in that operational flows do not distinguish between "USO" and "non-USO" parcels. "Packets" are meant to describe those parcels which, due to their size and weight, are operationally treated like letters. The scope of the USO for letters/mail varies greatly from country to country (and, as a consequence, the dividing line between "USO letters/mail" and "other letters/mail services"): Some Member States only include single-piece letters in the scope of the USO, other Member States include bulk mail, direct mail, or even newspapers in that scope."Non-postal services" typically include financial services.

This complexity obviously renders it very difficult for national regulatory authorities to monitor the nature and impact of domestic and cross-border parcel competition, as many different operators provide different parcel-related services which are rarely defined in a comparable manner. 115

Taking into account the differences in the legal framework as far as the postal and parcel markets are concerned, the intervention logic for parcels can be amended as follows:

In contrast to the letter markets, where "competition" had to be introduced in a monopolistic environment through legislative means (i.e. removal of the reserved area, access requirements, etc.), competition has always been the most important driver to meet the needs of users in terms of quality and price. The parcel USO-related provisions in the PSD were only meant to be a safeguard to ensure ubiquity of service.

Below, the most relevant provisions of the PSD affecting parcel delivery are described in more detail:

The scope of the universal service obligation as far as parcels are concerned

Article 3(4) stipulates that the universal service obligation at least needs to include the clearance, sorting, transport and distribution of "postal items up to two kilograms" and of "postal packages up to 10 kilograms" (the latter of which can be increased by Member States to "any weight not exceeding 20 kilograms"). It should be noted that the term "postal items" is defined in Article 2(6) as including postal parcels, and that all universal services cover both national and cross-border services (Article 3(7)).

This means that the universal service provider needs to permanently provide such services "of specified quality at all points in their territory at affordable prices for all users" (Article 3(1)), "not less than five working days a week" (Article 3(3)).

With regard to the notions of postal items, postal parcels and postal packages, it should also be noted that these services are not defined in a homogeneous way across the EU territory, nor do the operational processes of operators necessarily clearly distinguish between them. Parcels below 2 kilograms are often operationally treated like letters, as long as they stay within certain size dimensions (e.g. fit into letter boxes): they therefore follow the "letter flow", e.g. in terms of sorting and final delivery. This implies that a number of rules and processes that actually meant to target letters only also practically cover a (largely unknown) number of (small) parcels. These may fall, for instance, also under the provisions on "terminal dues" for postal items up to 2kg contained in the UPU Convention, and therefore affect the prices that operators can charge one another for the delivery of such items.

It is important to note as well that the minimum universal service obligation relates to "single-piece" items, i.e. individual items entrusted to operators over the counter (although certain Member States have deliberately also included bulk parcels into the universal service obligation). The logic of the PSD had been to ensure that each citizen benefits from the existence of such services, wherever they live, and that such services are affordable to them. The main service concerned would therefore have been the "C2C" parcel, not least because "B2C" parcels had not been a relevant category prior to the rise of e-commerce. B2B parcels were typically provided outside the scope of the USO, usually containing added-value features (such as tracking) that would go beyond "minimum USO quality standards", and predominantly by express operators.

Tariff principles and transparency of accounts

A clear distinction is made between services "forming part of the universal services", and those that do not:

Article 12 stipulates that, within the USO, "prices shall be affordable" and must be such that "all users, independent of geographical location […] have access to the service provided". "Prices shall [also] be cost-oriented", although a uniform tariff can be provided "throughout their national territory and/or cross border", if the public interest so requires. In addition, tariffs "shall be transparent and non-discriminatory". These principles therefore apply directly to those parcel services that are covered by the USO (see above).

According to Article 14, the universal service providers have to keep separate accounts in order to clearly distinguish between services which are part of the USO and those which are not.

Article 13 states that universal service providers should be encouraged to respect the following principles in their agreements on terminal dues for intra-Community cross-border mail: the principle that terminal dues are fixed in relation to the costs of processing and delivering incoming cross-border mail, and the principle that such dues be transparent and non-discriminatory. ("Terminal dues" are defined in Article 2(15) as the remuneration for the distribution of incoming "postal items" – which in turn inter alia comprise parcels).

The scope of regulatory oversight as far as parcels are concerned

The national regulatory authorities, to be designated under Article 22(1), "shall have as a particular task ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from this Directive", i.e. also those relating to parcels.

Under Article 22a, "postal service providers" (i.e. not only the universal service provider) shall provide information (e.g. financial information, information concerning the provision of the USO) to the national regulators. The purpose of this is to allow regulators to ensure conformity with the provisions of the Directive, and to provide information for clearly defined statistical purposes.

The possibility for parcels to be covered by "essential requirements"

Under Article 9(1), Member States "may" introduce general authorisations also "for services which fall outside the scope of the universal service" (i.e. also for parcel services not covered under the USO, and also those provide by non-universal service providers), to the extent this is necessary to comply with the essential requirements defined in Article 2(19).

Complaints handling mechanisms

According to Article 19(1), Member States shall ensure that "all postal service providers" (i.e. also those providing parcel services) have transparent, simple and inexpensive user-complaints handling procedures in place. Where users qualify as consumers under Directive 2013/11/EU they also have access to the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms established under the ADR Directive. 116



2.2 Methodology and evaluation questions

An evaluation typically aim to assess the degree of success of a given policy intervention (e.g. a piece of legislation, an expenditure programme), and it aims to answer the question as to whether that intervention could be improved (or should be discontinued).

The single most important independent study informing this annex – the WIK study on the "main developments in the postal sector (2010-2013)" – had been deliberately designed in a way that allows us to assess the (continued) relevance of the PSD in the light of changing markets and consumer needs. 117 For this reason, the study provides valuable insights into the question as to whether the PSD is still "fit for purpose" in a more and more digitised world, in which letters are being substituted by digital forms of communication (e.g. e-mails, social media, e-invoicing, e-government solutions), whereas e-merchants and consumers increasingly ask for better, more affordable and more convenient (cross-border) parcel deliveries in order to fulfil online e-commerce purchases.

Based on the outcome of the WIK study – enriched by other data sources of an evaluative nature (such as relevant ERGP reports) – this annex will address a series of questions falling under the standard evaluation categories of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and coherence.

The questions that will be further examined in sections 2.3.1-2.3.4 below are:

Effectiveness. To what extent has the PSD been successful in meeting objectives such as:

oEnhancing competition in the postal markets, with a view to increasing the efficiency, profitability and customer orientation of postal operators;

oSecuring the continuous provision of "universal postal services" across the EU territory;

oImproving the quality of service provided to business and citizens;

oEnhancing regulatory oversight by national regulatory authorities, with a view to ensuring that competition takes place on a level playing field.

Efficiency. To what extent has the PSD been an appropriate framework to secure these universal postal services at acceptable costs to society?

Relevance. To what extent is the PSD still relevant in the light of changing technologies as well as user and consumer needs (e.g. e-substitution, e-commerce).

Coherence. To what extent is the PSD in line with policies and market developments taking place in the areas typically covered by the "Digital Single Market"?

The WIK study provides all the relevant answers as far as the "wider postal and parcel markets" are concerned. With regard to "parcel-specific" (i.e. e-commerce related) issues, however, we will have to interpret these concepts rather creatively, in that the regulatory framework in place (i.e. the PSD) had never been designed to meet the needs of sellers and buyers engaged in e-commerce. This will come out clearly when are going to examine the "relevance" and "coherence" criteria.

That said, also the findings in the areas of "effectiveness" and "efficiency" are not irrelevant from a parcel-specific perspective. For instance:

If postal operators have indeed become more efficient, profitable and customer oriented, this will obviously also benefit their (new) customers of parcel services.

If postal operators have indeed proven capable of providing universal service all over their territories, this also means that citizens are able to obtain parcels wherever they live.

There is a grey zone between letters and parcels, in that light-weight parcels that fit into a letter box would often be treated by operators as letters in operational terms. For instance, they would be sorted in letter-sorting centres, and delivered by the postman who also delivers ordinary letters. This means that all parcels falling under this category would automatically benefit from all improvements that postal operators may have achieved in the efficiency, quality or price of letter deliveries.

2.3 Evaluation of the Postal Services Directive (with a special focus on parcels)

2.3.1 The effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework

2.3.1.1 To what extent has the PSD contributed to enhancing competition in the postal and parcel markets?

Competition in declining letter markets remains very limited

In spite of the gradual elimination of the reserved area, competition in the letter markets emerged only to a very limited extent, and it has been concentrated in a few countries only. The WIK study observes that "declining mail volumes discourage new entrants and potential investors, particularly in Western and Southern Member States. Only in few Member States (DE, ES, HR, NL, IT, SE) have competitors been able to achieve market shares above 10 per cent. Even in these Member States, profitability of new entrants appears marginal, and their market shares appear to stagnate. In some Eastern Member States (notably BG, HR, PL), more robust competition is emerging, a process that has developed over the course of the whole postal reform process. This development is important because competition promotes the growth of these relatively underdeveloped mail markets." 118

The impact of this development on the (cross-border) parcel markets is limited, in that parcels had never been part of the reserved area.

Restrictive regulatory practices have contributed to low levels of competition

The WIK study repeatedly stresses that regulatory practices have slowed down market opening, and potentially or de facto restricted competition. This is confirmed by frequent complaints addressed to the European Commission.

For instance, in some cases authorisation conditions imposed on alternative postal operators (e.g. relating to quality, availability and performance) "protect the universal service provider from competition to some degree". In addition, "non-discriminatory access to the postal infrastructure is proceeding more quickly in some Member States than in others" and "special tariffs for universal services are not generally transparent and non-discriminatory". Most importantly, however, the "unequal application of VAT to postal services undermines full market opening". 119

Once again, private parcel operators do not appear to have been affected by this.

The narrower the scope of the universal service obligation, the better for competition

As the Postal Service Directive only sets minimum standards, Member States enjoy considerable freedom in the definition of the scope of the USO. In this regard, the WIK study observes that "the range of services denominated as universal services has substantial implications for compliance with the Directive in other respects. The broader the range of services included in the universal service, the broader the responsibility of the Member State to ensure cost-orientation, non-discrimination, transparency, service quality, etc., and the more difficult it becomes to reconcile regulation with the objective of full market opening". 120

This has potential implications on the extent to which various parcel operators benefit from a level-playing field. Services falling under the scope of the universal service obligation are also exempted from VAT (see above). This may be relevant in particular for those Member States that have included bulk parcels to the scope of the USO.  121

Parcel markets are characterised by much more competition than letter markets

While basic parcel services had always been contained in the scope of the USO of postal operators, parcels had never been part of the "reserved area" (i.e. covered by the postal monopoly). According to the WIK study, the decision to exclude parcels from the monopoly has proven useful: "Since parcel and express services were never subject to national monopolies, they are generally more competitive than letter post markets. In the past, private parcel and express operators at local, regional, or global levels developed high quality, innovative, and customised delivery services focused mostly on B2B shipments." 122  

In other words, competition has resulted in good B2B parcel delivery services, while its ability to provide equally good B2C services – which are at the heart of e-commerce – yet needs to be demonstrated. The universal service providers (USPs) are considered to "have a first mover advantage in B2C delivery due to their dense nationwide access and delivery networks. USPs also enjoy cost advantages since they combine parcel and mail delivery, at least in rural areas". 123 That said, the continuous growth in the B2C market also "attracts private operators. In the more mature Western countries (DE, FR, UK), specialised parcel operators, often founded by large mail order companies, offer low priced delivery of B2C delivery services. B2B parcel operators are also entering the B2C market increasingly. In particular, they are venturing into many Southern and Eastern Member States that lack a mail ordering tradition." 124

However, as illustrated in detail in Section 1.3.1 of the main report, market entry is not easy in a sector driven by economies of scale. Parcel delivery requires extensive networks, which are both labour and capital intense. The most difficult and expensive part of parcel delivery lies in the so-called "last mile", requiring extensive geographical coverage. The last mile delivery of parcels is even more costly than that of letters. First, the much bigger dimensions and weights of parcels requires more (storage) space and larger vehicles. Second, as parcels usually cannot be put into letter boxes if the recipient is not at home, second if not third delivery attempts might be needed.

Customs laws do not apply in the same way to all postal operators

Concerned that customs rules and procedures might distort competition among designated postal operators and their private competitors, the WIK study recommends that "the EU should move towards a more equal application of EU customs laws towards all postal operators and all postal items imported into or exported from the EU, but it should do so in stages that take into account fully, competitive fairness, the practical capabilities of foreign postal operators, and the relative importance of different trade flows". 125

Universal Service Providers are also designated operators under the UPU (i.e. the Universal Postal Union), and are as such subject to a range of rights and obligations. For instance, they are legally obliged to deliver (mail and) parcels coming from other countries' designated operators (at rates that have been capped by the UPU), but also benefit from certain advantages – compared to non-UPU operators – in terms of customs procedures.

Employment in the sector is undergoing significant change

The WIK study identifies constant decline in traditional employment in USPs, mainly "driven by efficiency programmes, increased automation, and volume declines". By contrast, "new employment has emerged in the growing parcel and express business", as well as by new entrants in the letter segment, "in the few Member States where there is noticeable competition in end-to-end delivery of letter post" 126

The WIK study also identifies a clear trend towards increased flexibility of employment contracts, with increasing use of temporary and part-time contracts, partially by national postal operators, but even more so "by new entrants in the letter market and subcontractors in parcel delivery". 127

Given that the "overall employment trends in the sector are unclear because there is insufficient data on sector employment", the WIK study considers it useful for postal regulators to gather employment data more systematically: "NRAs should be encouraged, and given authority, to collect employment data for the whole sector regularly". 128

Conclusion:

The PSD key objective of creating more competition in the letter markets has been achieved to a limited extent – and in a few Member States – only. This has partly been due to the constant decline in letter volumes, which has made market entry for potential investors less attractive, and partly to regulatory practices that created considerable administrative or legal hurdles for potential market entrants. At the same time, competition in the parcel market has intensified. However, this phenomenon appears to be unrelated to the implementation of the PSD, which has attributed little importance to the provision of parcel services. Competition in parcel markets has grown as a result of growing e-commerce. These developments have also had a clear effect on employment levels and forms: While employment in the letter segment is in decline, additional jobs have been created in the parcel markets (though often taking the form of sub-contracting).



2.3.1.2 To what extent has the PSD contributed to securing the continuous provision of "universal postal services" across the EU territory?

Universal postal services are provided for all citizens of the EU

The WIK study clearly states that "all Member States ensure a sufficient range of services to meet the minimum requirements for universal service established by the Postal Directive. Hence, all Member States have fully implemented the Directive is this respect". 129 The type of services covered by the universal service obligation differs however greatly in that "the range of services included in the universal service obligation varies among Member States from single-piece items only to all types of postal services". 130

For parcels, this implies that citizens are in principle able to engage in e-commerce transactions, wherever they live. However, according to a number of surveys and studies (see main report), many citizens are unsatisfied with the prices that they have to pay for cross-border parcel shipments and returns.

This has also been confirmed by the public consultation launched in May 2015, where (more than 200) consumers identified price as the main obstacle to more cross-border purchases:

Q10 (consumers)- Which, if any, of the following improvements to the delivery process would make you more likely to buy online? Please rank on a scale from 1-5 131


Conclusion:

The PSD has been successful in securing the provision of universal letter and parcel services across the EU territory. For parcels this means that, in principle, all merchants and all consumers can send and receive parcels to fulfil an e-commerce transaction. However, the universal service provision on parcels only secures the provision of very basic parcel services, and does not appear to meet the expectations of senders and receivers in terms of quality (e.g. track-and-trace), speed or price, especially cross-border – expectations that had not existed when the Postal Services Directive(s) was/were designed.

2.3.1.3 To what extent has the PSD contributed to improving the quality of postal services provided to business and citizens?

National postal operators provide very reliable letter post services

The WIK study confirmed that postal operators have made substantial progress in improving the transit time performance of letters. 132 As a result, "despite declining volumes, letter post services are still highly reliable in almost all Member States. The vast majority of letters are still delivered the next working day (‘D+1’). However, progress in transit time, for both domestic and cross-border services, remains limited in some Eastern and Southern Member States". 133

This has direct implications for those parcels that follow the letter stream, i.e. those that normally fit into letter boxes. If indeed they do, this also addresses the issue of failed first deliveries.

The quality and affordability of (cross-border) parcel services falls short of expectations

This point has not explicitly been addressed by the WIK study, but a wide range of sources have been quoted throughout the impact assessment to underpin this observation. To mention one source, by means of example, a recent study carried out by Copenhagen Economics 134 identifies services that "do not seem to be available from delivery operators". For domestic deliveries (especially in less mature e-commerce markets), "this seems to be the case with respect to e.g. return options and more convenient delivery times. […] We also observe that many services are only available in part of the country". For cross-border deliveries, "we find that delivery operators to a lesser extent offer value added services such as electronic notification of delivery and tracking of parcels, as well as certain return options. The availability of services is in general better for domestic delivery than for cross-border delivery. This leads to service gaps for e-shoppers, notably when comparing domestic and cross-border offerings." Copenhagen Economics adds that "an important finding from our research is that too high delivery prices are a key concern for both e-shoppers and e-retailers". 135

A recent Eurobarometer on obstacles to cross border e-commerce found that out of all companies interviewed who currently do not sell online but are currently trying to do so, 62% find delivery costs an obstacle. 136

Conclusion:

The PSD has clearly improved the quality and reliability of letter services, in particularly those of a cross-border nature. At the same time, the affordability of such services was maintained. As for parcels, the PSD had not anticipated the types of services that the parties to an e-commerce transaction would expect, and did not contain any provisions to secure anything more than a basic C2C parcel service. Such basic services would neither be particularly fast, nor would they be tracked, nor did the PSD anticipate the need for additional last-mile delivery options over and above home delivery. Also, the returning of a parcel would have been considered an exceptional “incident” (e.g. because of a wrong address), whereas returns are an intrinsic part of the e-commerce business model (e.g. when up to 50% of clothing or footwear items are expected to be returned by customers). While these features had not been considered relevant for domestic parcel markets, they had even less been anticipated for cross-border transactions. Parcel delivery was almost exclusively a B2B transaction, and largely dominated by the express industry.

In other words, the PSD has certainly not contributed to improving the quality of cross-border parcel deliveries – but it had also never meant to do that.

2.3.1.4 To what extent has the PSD contributed to enhancing regulatory oversight by national regulatory authorities (NRAs), with a view to ensuring that competition takes place on a level playing field?

The powers and resources of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) vary greatly across the EU

The WIK study concludes that the powers needed by NRAs to ensure compliance with the Postal Services Directive vary significantly: "Most NRAs report adequate authority to collect data and market statistics. In fact, however, data collection remains incomplete and poorly coordinated among Member States. Furthermore, only about one-third of NRAs can levy significant fines (1 per cent of revenue or more) or issue remedial orders and seek court enforcement." 137

Not only the powers given to the NRAs vary greatly, but also the resources – in terms of staffing, expertise and financial means – needed for the performance of their tasks: "Resources of the NRAs vary widely among the Member States, even in comparably sized postal markets. Up to 13 Member States may need to consider providing their NRAs additional resources to ensure full and effective implementation of the Postal Directive." 138

This factual finding has also been confirmed by various documents produced by the ERGP.

The powers of national regulatory authorities are often limited to universal service provision

The WIK study repeatedly argues that the scope and practical application of those provisions of the PSD that are intended to ensure fair competition on the postal markets should not be restricted to the services covered by the universal service obligation: "Provisions in the Postal Directive which are intended to protect fair competition should apply to postal services outside the universal service area." This applies in particular to the provisions of the PSD that require "market dominant USPs to provide transparent and non-discriminatory access to special tariffs, […] to maintain regulatory accounts, [and] to provide transparent and non-discriminatory access to the postal infrastructure."  139

In order to strengthen the powers of regulatory authorities to safeguard fair competition, the WIK study further recommends that "Member States should ensure that NRAs have adequate authority to prevent USPs that are market dominant in the provision of non-universal postal services from using anti-competitive means to eliminate lawful competition". 140

This is of course of great relevance to the parcel markets. As outlined in Section 2.1.3, USPs provide a wide range of USO and non-USO services, and they compete with a large number of private operators, specialising in letter, parcel or non-postal activities.

National regulatory authorities pay little attention to cross-border B2C parcel markets

The WIK study points to the fact that the risk of anti-competitive behaviour appears higher in some segments of the postal sector than in others. Enhanced regulatory vigilance should be focused on parcels, on B2C markets and on cross-border services. 141

The absence of regulatory focus on the (cross-border) parcel markets was also acknowledged in a recent ERGP opinion: "Many NRAs have a limited mandate to monitor the cross-border parcels segment, and full market analysis is rarely used by postal regulators". 142

Data on parcels markets are not collected systematically

WIK notes that, "overall, there is no consensus about the size of the European parcel and express market due to different market definitions, especially regarding the weight limit of shipments and the service characteristics. […] Many regulatory authorities have not provided any market information because, most probably, they do not systematically collect data on domestic and cross-border parcel & express services. To get more reliable data on these markets that are also comparable over time it is necessary to develop a consistent methodology and define clear responsibilities for data collection". 143

The WIK study therefore concludes that the "collection of data in the postal sector appears inadequate to the needs of the EU. Although the Third Postal Directive obliged postal operators to provide compliance and statistical data to NRAs, it did not explicitly oblige NRAs to collect the data nor ensure the comparability of data collected from different Member States." 144  

The regular collection of standardised data is considered "necessary to identify which policies are working and which are not. […] The policy challenges raised by the rapid growth of e-commerce and parcel markets present but one obvious current example of the need for better data". WIK therefore recommends that "NRAs should be obliged to collect a minimum level of compliance and statistical data from both USPs and other postal operators, according to categories defined at EU level (and notably including parcel data". 145

The lack of understanding of cross-border parcel markets was also acknowledged in the recent ERGP opinion: "It was generally accepted that the market(s) concerned were not well known and that it could be useful to look further (in a limited fashion) at them to better understand them and to ensure they do develop effectively of their own accord". 146 The ERGP opinion adds that "only three NRAs indicate that they have the legal power to collect data on all substitutable parcels delivery offers, as determined by regular, formal, competition law type market analysis, regardless of the provider. The NRAs are those of Finland, Germany and Malta." 147

All of this evidence suggests that more data on the EU cross-border parcel markets should be collected. The above ERGP opinion, however, also stresses the need for proportionality: "Any new data collection exercise would need to fall within the scope of existing missions and be necessary and proportionate or, for example, result from a need identified by the appropriate bodies (such as the EC and/ or member states) to extend NRAs’ current missions (with the data collection still remaining proportionate)". 148


UPU-based terminal dues are not aligned with EU regulatory principles

According to the WIK study, "NRAs have not ensured that terminal dues for cross-border universal services are consistent with the principles of the Postal Directive". It argues that "under Article 13, Member States are ‘encouraged’ to ensure that prices for delivery of intra-EU/EEA universal services are cost-oriented, transparent, and non-discriminatory. […] Nonetheless, it seems that NRAs have not implemented the principles of Article 13. No NRA ensures terminal dues relating to cross-border universal service are transparent or cost-oriented. In most or all Member States, the USP charges rates for the delivery of similar postal items which discriminate based on (1) whether the postal item is a domestic or intra-EU postal item and/or (2) which EU/EEA Member State originates the mail. […] The terminal dues rates established by the UPU are not related to actual costs and not aligned to domestic postage rates. The resulting distortions benefit low cost, postal exporting countries at the expense of high cost importing countries. The UPU terminal dues system, where applied, appears to create substantial distortions in trade between Member States and in trade with other industrialised countries such as the United States." 149

WIK concludes that several UPU provisions "do not absolutely prohibit competition, they protect each designated operator in its national territory by making it more difficult for foreign designated operators and private postal operators to compete in the supply of outbound cross-border postal services." 150

It should be noted, though, that terminal dues do not always "protect" designated operators. On the contrary, when receiving mail from developing countries (as defined under the UPU), they may well have to accept terminal dues that are well below their own cost for delivering that mail in their territories. China, for instance, ships an increasing number of packets to Europe (i.e. below 2kg), resulting from e-commerce purchases of EU citizens.

The principles of cost orientation and price transparency are not applied in a rigorous and harmonised way

In addition to the specific terminal dues issue referred to above, the WIK study generally deplores that Member States apply the principle of cost-orientation quite differently. This is considered important because "apart from affordability which aims at ensuring access for all users to postal services, this principle aims at ensuring that prices are neither excessive, i.e. harmful to customers nor predatory, i.e. harmful to competition". 151

WIK also points out that NRAs "seem to have no common approach upon ensuring transparency of prices, required by Art. 12 fourth indent of the Postal Directive. Twelve Member States and CH have not defined any criteria for transparency. However, the majority of these thirteen countries ensure transparency in practice, mainly by requiring the USP to publish prices. This practice is in line with CERP’s recommendation to oblige USPs to publish prices and service conditions to ensure transparency and non-discrimination. The exceptions are HU, NL and CH where thus neither transparency criteria are defined nor any special measures are taken by NRAs to ensure transparency". 152

As far as cross-border parcel delivery is concerned, NRAs have so far not aimed at ensuring compliance by operators with the principles of cost orientation (Article 13) and transparency.

Conclusion:

The main focus of the PSD was on the provision of letter services, and in particular on those falling within the scope of the universal service. As a consequence, also the focus of regulatory oversight was placed on the universal service provider (USP), and on the universal services provided by the USP. Last but not least, the focus was placed on domestic markets, as Member States are mainly interested in the provision of good services to their own citizens – and it is fair to say that the very low volumes of cross-border mail seems to justify that choice. Alternative postal operators (i.e. operators other than the USP) have usually been on the radar of regulators only when they started to compete with the USPs on services that fell within the scope of the universal obligation – so as to protect the USP from excessive cherry picking by alternative operators, and the latter from anti-competitive practices by the USPs.

Some of the provisions and principles of the PSD also cover parcel services (as far as universal parcel services are concerned) and postal service providers operating outside the universal service (e.g. parcel companies providing deferred or express parcel services). However, very few Member States chose to fully exploit the possibility of widening regulatory oversight (including basic data collection) to cover all parcel services – simply because parcel services had not been considered particularly sensitive or important prior to the emergence of e-commerce. For the same reason, some of the parcel-related provisions of the PSD are also quite vague (e.g. by “encouraging” the cost-orientation for cross-border (USO) parcels, rather than mandating it – with the result that we have not found any evidence that would suggest that the principles of affordability and cost-orientation are being seriously considered, let alone enforced. Also terminal dues/rates – especially those resulting from the UPU – are neither in line with the PSD’s regulatory principles, nor are they known to most regulatory authorities.

As a result of all of this, many national regulatory authorities currently lack the legal basis, resources and mandate to carry out effective oversight of cross-border parcel markets.

2.3.2 The efficiency of the existing regulatory framework

To what extent has the PSD been an appropriate framework to secure these universal postal services at acceptable costs to society?

Maintaining the service levels laid down in the PSD reduces the viability of postal operators

The WIK study concludes that, declining letter volumes, combined with minimum universal service requirements, have led to declining profit margins of operators: "Mail operations are characterised by a high share of fixed costs. The profitability of USPs’ mail operations has been adversely affected by a continuous and substantial decline in the mail volume. Based on a stylised model, we show that as volumes decline cost savings are less significant than losses in volume and revenue. Thus, profits of postal operators decrease more than proportionally. Reduced profitability, or losses, are to be expected in all Member States where volumes decline most. Even worse, the less the initial volume per capita, the greater the effect on profitability. Even though many USPs have struggled to render their cost base more flexible, universal service requirements (e.g., a minimum delivery frequency) constrain options. […] Profit margins of USPs from traditional mail delivery services have broadly declined since 2010". 153

As a result, "requiring Member States to guarantee levels of universal postal services that were considered essential in 1997 risks over-investment in postal services. Member States will be subsidizing an older communications technology to the detriment of newer communications technologies. We believe that the definition of universal service must move away from the one-size-fits-all-and-always-will approach reflected in the current Directive. Member States will need greater discretion in determining the scope of the USO." 154

Several national studies on the needs of users of postal services (e.g. carried out recently in Italy and Denmark) seem to suggest that citizens are increasingly ready to accept that letters are collected and delivered on less than five days per week. By contrast, when it comes to parcel delivery – needed to fulfil e-commerce purchases – all recent surveys suggest high expectations by customers concerning price and convenience (e.g. in terms of alternative delivery options, flexible delivery windows, delivery on Saturdays, etc.). 155

The maintenance of current USO levels increasingly requires state aid funding

The WIK study confirms that Member States increasingly need to resort to state aid to ensure the continued provision of universal service as defined in the PSD: "The Commission adopted [several] state aid decisions relating to the postal sector in several Member States. Most state aid cases dealt with public service compensation for providing universal services." 156 While the PSD allowed for different mechanisms to compensate a USP for the part of the net cost of the USO deemed "unfair" (e.g. through the creation of a compensation fund), "Member States that provide financial support for universal services do so almost exclusively using general tax revenues rather than compensation funds". 157

Conclusion:

The PSD has defined minimum levels of universal service which are increasingly difficult to maintain, in particular in those Member States that are most affected by e-substitution. With declining volumes, postal operators – confronted with a high proportion of fixed costs (including labour) – are faced with constantly rising unit costs. As a result, more and more USPs are turning to their governments for state aid.

As for parcels, the constantly rising expectations of merchants and consumers with regard to quality, convenience and price require postal operators who wish to benefit from this growth market to invest in new products, processes and services. To the extent that scarce resources partially have to be earmarked for the provision of the letter mail services legally required under the PSD, the PSD may have a constraining effect on the further development of (cross-border) parcel services.

2.3.3 The relevance of the existing regulatory framework

To what extent is the PSD still relevant in the light of changing technologies as well as user and consumer needs (e.g. e-substitution, e-commerce)?

The postal markets have changed drastically over the past 20 years

Like many other sources, the WIK study confirms that "the economic and social role of postal services has been changing rapidly and fundamentally over the last two decades. In the most industrialized countries, paper-based communications are in steep decline while demand for parcel delivery services is rising steadily with continuing development of e-commerce, just-in-time production techniques, and global supply chains." The Postal Directive "was developed at the beginning of this period and reflected the goals and requirements of the postal sector in the 12 Member States of the European Union as it existed in early 1990s. While the benefits for the postal sector in the course of postal reform to date are evident, it is already apparent that many of the premises underlying the Postal Directive must be reconsidered in light of the rapid development of postal markets and the expansion of the EU from 12 to 28 Member States. Moreover, there are no signs that the postal sector has stopped changing. On the contrary, it seems most probable that the EU postal sector in 2035 will far different from today". 158  

WIK therefore concludes that "the postal sector has changed so much since 1997, the year the Postal Directive was adopted, that it is time for policy makers to think again about the basic architecture of postal regulation in the EU". 159

The current regulatory framework is challenged by changing market conditions

With regard to the scope of the universal service, the WIK study observes that "in 1997 the original Postal Directive established minimum conditions for universal postal service based on what was considered to be the minimum appropriate level of service at the time. Economic research underlying the Directive reflected the state of postal services in the EU-12 Member States in 1988, when the average annual volume of postal items per capita was 243. Since 1997 the EU has expanded to include 13 new Member States in which the demand for postal services is only about one-fifth that of the EU-12 Member States in 1988. In almost all Member States, letter post volumes are falling. At the extreme, Denmark in 2012 had only about one-quarter as many letter post items as in it did in 1988". 160

WIK therefore recommends that the EU should "adopt a more flexible definition of universal service at the EU level while continuing to oblige Member States to ensure universal postal service according to EU-wide principles. [Such] EU-wide principles could include affordability and ubiquity while allowing Member States to adapt parameters such as service quality (or related delivery frequency) to the needs of users". 161

It should be noted, however, that any review of the current regulatory framework would need to be prepared with utmost care. While the economic arguments put forward in this Annex are quite compelling, the postal sector still performs a vital function in terms of social and territorial cohesion and inclusion. The speed and extent of e-substitution differs widely among Member States, and so do the needs, preferences and behaviours of their citizens.

Conclusion:

The PSD has been developed and revised against the background of the user needs and means of communication dominant at the turn of the century. Prior to the emergence of e-mail and social media, letters had always been the predominant form of (remote) communication, and parcel services were mainly used in a B2B (wholesaler-to-retailer) context. However, given the wide discrepancies between individual Member States (e.g. in terms of e-substitution, broadband penetration, e-literacy, etc.), a rebalancing of the current framework would have to be prepared with the utmost care.

2.3.4 The coherence of the existing regulatory framework

To what extent is the PSD in line with policies and market developments taking place in other areas, in particular those covered by the "Digital Single Market"?

The digitalisation process is both a challenge and a chance for the postal sector

As outlined further above, the links between the postal sector and the "digital economy" are two-fold. On the one hand there is the e-substitution effect, which results in rapidly declining letter volumes in particular in those countries with well advanced electronic communications markets: "Countries with well-developed letter post markets experienced the strongest decline, particularly where electronic communications are most developed. Denmark and the Netherlands have been most affected by ‘e-substitution’ so far". 162  

The fact that the Nordic Member States face the steepest decline is not only due to the quality of their electronic communications networks and the e-literacy of their citizens and business, but also shows the strong effect of initiatives in the area of e-government: "The Danish example also highlights that if the government forms the ‘wave-breaker’ for digital communication the e-substitution process accelerates. As soon as the critical mass of consumers is used to communicate electronically for official purposes more traditional companies also jump on the bandwagon. In contrast, it is less likely that single companies (even large ones) take over the role of a ‘wave-breaker’ to ‘re-educate’ people". 163

E-substitution has also been found to limit the strategic options of postal operators in ensuring financial sustainability of the provision of universal postal services, in that "price increases" do not seem to be a viable way forward: "Although price increases immediately improve revenues, the downside is that price increases also affect demand. Businesses who are typically more price sensitive than private customers might be more inclined to switch to electronic communication. Price increases therefore might further accelerate e-substitution. Stimulating customers to switch may be especially dangerous as customers that already switched are unlikely to ever come back to the letter mail communication". 164

To sustain e-commerce growth and their own profitability, postal operators are to invest in better parcel services

On the other hand, postal operators benefit from growing demand for parcels. Domestically, "B2C parcel volumes are highest in high income Member States with a tradition of mail ordering". 165 However, "consumers increasingly order goods [also] from other countries, predominantly from countries with similar language and culture" 166 . But given that the traditional focus of national postal operators had been on domestic letter services, "cross-border [parcel] shipments are still dominated by B2B parcel and express operators". 167

In response to the Commission's Roadmap on cross-border parcel delivery, the national postal carriers have made considerable efforts to increase the quality of cross-border deliveries, e.g. by investing in seamless track-and-trace solutions, facilitating product returns, enhancing the choice of customers for last-mile delivery, or by linking up their customer call centres. Also the other parcel and express operators keep innovating to improve their B2C offering. The future will show whether they manage to meet the fast rising expectations of consumers.

Conclusion:

The PSD has always been relevant in terms of ensuring that business and citizens, wherever they are located on the EU territory, have access to basic communication services. The postal policy framework had been developed prior to the digital transformation process, which not only created powerful substitutes to letters as a means of communication, but also created new needs in terms of fulfilment of remote e-commerce purchases. The PSD had not been designed with these needs in mind, and only very marginally provides answers to the (new) issues that have arisen.

3) Summary and conclusions

The impact that the Postal Services Directive has had on letter and parcel markets respectively, is summarised in two charts below, based on the intervention logics presented in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.



As far as the letter markets are concerned, the situation can be summarised as follows:

Overall, the Directive's policy objectives have been attained. Customer orientation and quality of letter services have improved (e.g. the speed of cross-border deliveries of priority mail). All Member States have managed to ensure a very good level of universal service, both in terms of affordability and ubiquity.

All of this obviously also benefits the USP's parcel operations, either directly (when small parcels follow the letter stream) or indirectly (in that more efficient and customer-focused postal operators are bound to benefit from an improved reputation when sellers or buyers choose between alternative parcel service providers). However, in the light of the specific expectations of the sellers and buyers engaged in a (cross-border) e-commerce transaction, the PSD has not had any effect on improving the quality, convenience or affordability of cross-border B2C parcel deliveries.

The main external factor affecting the letter market has without doubt been the ongoing e-substitution process. Its effects on the above chart are twofold:

First, e-substitution (= competition coming from alternative forms of communication) has forced postal operators to become more efficient (e.g. through modernisation and restructuring). The pressure from other media has probably much more important than the (originally expected) pressure from new market entrants (= more competition) in the letter business. As a result, most postal operators have become much more profitable as in the past.

Second, e-substitution has put great pressure on the sustainability of the USO, in that constantly declining letter volumes drive up unit costs. This adverse effect has been offsetting the positive effect mentioned above in an increasing number of Member States.

As far as the parcel markets are concerned, the situation is as follows:

On the parcel markets, the direct effect of the PSD has been fairly limited, in that only a very small part of all (cross-border) parcel deliveries can be considered as "USO parcels" in the narrower sense. And even where such USO parcels were provided, they did not necessarily meet the needs of users in terms of quality or price. All other parcel services have evolved in a competitive environment.

The main external factor affecting the market in the past decade has been e-commerce. E-commerce has not only led to the birth and rapid growth of a new market segment (i.e. domestic as well as cross-border B2C parcels), it has also led to constantly rising expectations by users in terms of quality, price and convenience. While the letter business is very much driven by the "sender" (e.g. large banks deciding to send out statements to all of their customers), the B2C parcel business depends primarily on the "recipient" (i.e. the final customer ordering something on the internet).

The competition among the growing number of B2C delivery service providers has so far focused on the profitable parts of the markets – i.e. those involving large and predictable volumes. Users of those services (i.e. large retailers) are clearly benefiting from improvements both in terms of quality and affordability (also for cross-border shipments). However, those customers that are unable to generate high volumes (i.e. SME retailers, SMEs and consumers located in peripheral areas) claim that they do not obtain adequate value for money, in particular in a cross-border context. This “market failure” has not been successfully addressed by the PSD, because it had never been conceived with these problems and objectives in mind.

At least, the universal service obligation enshrined in the Postal Services Directive has ensured that those more vulnerable users are able to benefit from e-commerce at all – even though they would arguable sell and buy online much more if the prices they pay were lower. The current high over-the-counter prices for cross-border shipments are not currently under significant pressure from delivery operators other than the USPs, because low-volume and high-cost shipments are not sufficiently economically attractive.

Although the Postal Services Directive in principle covered cross-border parcels (as long as they fall under the USO), and although principles such as cost-orientation and affordability apply as well, the PSD has so far not been able to cater for the needs of those that are currently not well served by market forces alone. The main reason for this is that – prior to the emergence of e-commerce – parcels had not been at the center of attention when the PSD was adopted and implemented.



Annex 12: Monitoring and Evaluation

Feasibility/ Proportionality Analysis of the proposed indicators

Indicator

Unit of Measurement

Explanation

Underlying Data

Baseline &

Frequency of measurement

1.

number

Broken down by type of information

Annual statistical exercise of DG GROW

Feasibility analysis: (in place/ adjustments might be needed)

31/12/2015

annual

2.

number

Broken down by type of access request and by country

NRA registry

31/12/2015

annual

3.

% of diff.

Broken down by type of product

Shared Website data manager:

NRA Reports

Feasibility analysis: (NOT in place/ website to be developed throughout the implementation process; no additional data requirements added by this indicator

NRA reports will follow the Requirements set by the initiative)

31/12/2015

biannual

4.

number

Broken down by domestic cross border

Postal Statistics Database

Feasibility analysis: (no additional data requirements; process already in place, adjustments might be needed)

31/12/2015

annual

5.

HHI index

/

S= actual or estimated  168 market share of a delivery operator

NRA market analysis:

Feasibility analysis: (no additional data requirements; process already in place, adjustments might be needed)

31/12/2015

annual

6.

Number and % respectively

-Broken down by domestic vs. cross border

-Intra EU inbound and outbound

Postal Statistics Database

Feasibility analysis: (process already in place, adjustments might be needed)

31/12/2015

annual

6a.

Number and % respectively

-Broken down by domestic vs. cross border

-Intra EU inbound and outbound

Postal Statistics Database

Feasibility analysis: (process already in place, adjustments might be needed)

31/12/2015

annual

7.

%

Eurostat Information society statistics ,

Feasibility analysis: (already in place)

Main Tables:

Information society statistics (t_isoc), in particular:

Policy indicators (t_isoc_pi)

Individuals using the internet for ordering goods or services from other EU countries (tin00003)

E-commerce by individuals and enterprises (t_isoc_ec)

Value of purchases and sales by Internet and/or networks other than Internet (isoc_ec_evaln2)

31/12/2015

annual

8.

%

1) Eurobarometer Surveys

Feasibility analysis: (on demand)

2) Eurostat E-commerce survey

Feasibility analysis: (already in place):

indicator:

Obstacles that limit/prevent the enterprise from selling via a website (obstacles related to logistics) (isoc_ec_wsobs_n2)

31/12/2015

Every 2 years

8a.

%

1) Eurobarometer Surveys

Feasibility analysis: (on demand)

2) Eurostat E-commerce survey

Feasibility analysis: (already in place):

indicator:

Obstacles that limit/prevent the enterprise from selling via a website (obstacles related to logistics) (isoc_ec_wsobs_n2)

31/12/2015

Every 2 years



Annex 13: Glossary of terms used in the IA

Name

Description

Alternative operators

Delivery operators other than the national postal operators offering postal and parcel services

B2B

Business-to-business. B2B e-commerce identifies trade transactions between businesses taking place via the internet. B2B post identifies postal flows between businesses

B2C

Business-to-consumer. B2C e-commerce identifies trade transactions from businesses to consumers taking place via the internet. B2C post identifies postal flows from businesses to consumers

Base rate

A part of the ILR system (for definition of Inward Land Rate system see below), which comprises a flat charge for any parcel delivered, and then a variable fee that increases in proportion of the weight of the parcel delivered

Bonus payment

A part of the ILR system, specifically an additional amount of compensation on top of the base rate which can be earned by the receiving country’s postal operator if it provides a particular level of delivery service

Business consumer

A user of postal services who is a business

C2C

Consumer-to-consumer. C2C e-commerce identifies trade transactions between consumers taking place via the internet. C2C post identifies postal flows between consumers

CEN

European Committee for Standardization

CEP

Courier, express and parcel market

Consolidator

A firm providing preparation of mail/parcels, which are injected into the delivery operator’s mail / parcel pipeline

COSME

COSME is the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises running from 2014 - 2020 with a planned budget of EUR 2.3 billion. COSME will support SMEs in the following areas: Facilitating access to finance, Supporting internationalisation and access to markets, Creating an environment favourable to competitiveness, Encouraging an entrepreneurial culture. COSME is a programme implementing the Small Business Act (SBA) which reflects the Commission’s political will to recognise the central role of SMEs in the EU economy.

Designated USP

Designated universal service provider. The postal operator that has the remit of fulfilling the universal service obligation based on entrustment. The designated USP is the only provider who commits to providing nationwide coverage of basic letter and parcel delivery (as identified in universal service requirements). The designated USP is normally the former monopolist

Digital Single Market (DSM)

A single market where citizens, individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

EC

European Commission

E-commerce

All purchases and sales made via websites or automated data exchanges, excluding normal e-mail messages that are manually typed. 169 In effect, the e-commerce market is one where goods or services are purchased online

EMS

Express Mail Service. A priority mail service provided by designated postal operators who are members of the Universal Postal Union. The EMS is regulated by the EMS Cooperative, whose members are designated postal operators within the meaning of Article 2 of the Universal Postal Union Convention that joined the cooperative

End consumer

A user of postal services who is an individual

EPG

Enhanced Parcel Group. Comprises 27 postal operators who agree to deliver their parcels through an integrated delivery network and commit to provide a high quality of customer service 170

E-retailer

A firm selling goods or services online

ERGP

European Regulators Group for Postal Services, a group established in August 2010, which aims to strengthen cooperation between independent national postal regulatory authorities

EU

European Union

Express carrier

Delivery operator providing value added, door-to-door transport and next day or time-definite shipments.

Express product

A postal item (which can be either a packet or a parcel in terms of its dimensions) for which customers pay a premium for faster delivery service and/or other sophisticated services. Express products may be given priority in operators’ networks, or separate express designated delivery pipelines may exist, to reduce delivery times

Freight Forwarder

A firm acting as an expert in supply chain management, organising shipments by contracting with carriers to move cargo without moving the goods itself.

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

ILR

Inward Land Rate. A system of payment between parcel postal operators for the delivery of incoming parcels. ILRs apply only between designated operators within the meaning of Article 2 of the UPU convention. To ensure that the payment for the delivery of parcels s linked to the quality of service provided, in 2006 the Postal Operators Council approved a system of bonus payments for the provision of parcels service features added to a base rate. 171 Participating members may chose to enter agreements other than the ILR, such as the EPG or bilateral agreements

Integrator (also global integrators/multinational integrators)

Multi-national delivery operator with world-wide presence, providing time-defined delivery through its owned integrated network or through a network where he has full operational control.

Interconnect programme

An IT system put in place by national postal operators in conjunction with the International Post Corporation and Post Europ to improve the interoperability of their national postal networks. The "Interconnect" programme covers five themes: delivery choice, returns solutions, tracking, labelling and customer service.

Inter-operator wholesale prices

The prices that delivery operators charge each other for the transport, sorting, and delivery of cross-border parcel items in the destination country. (see also terminal dues)

Large enterprise

A large enterprise is a business which employs more than 250 people, and which has a turnover of over €50m

Letter post (mail)

Under the Universal Postal Convention, “letter post” is the international postal service for the conveyance of letters, postcards, printed papers, and small packets weighing up to 2 kg (with some exceptions).

The UPU defines “letter post” as including letters and postcards, printed papers, and small packets. Letter post is also defined is also classified by format as including “small letters”(P), with a maximum weight of 100 grams (3.5 oz.) and maximum dimensions of 165 x 245 x 5 mm (6.50 x 9.6 x 0.2 in.); “large letters” (G), also called “flats”, with a maximum weight of 500 grams (17.6 oz.) and maximum dimensions of 305 x 381 x 20 mm (12.0 x 15.0 x 0.8 in.); and “bulky letters” (E), also referred to as “small packets” with a maximum weight of 2 kg (4.4 lbs.) and maximum combined dimensions of 900 mm (35.4 in.)

Logistics intermediary

A specialised firm supplying software solutions or logistics services to firms willing to outsource logistics functions

Long haul transportation

Terminal-to-terminal freight movements in transportation. Such long distance moves are distinguished from local freight movements" (Source: http://www.universalcargo.com/logistics-glossary ) 

Micro enterprise

The EC 172 defines micro enterprises as those businesses having less than 10 employees and a turnover of €2m or less

MS

Member States. The 28 members of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the UK

National postal operator (also incumbent)

The former state monopoly, or a universal service provider (the USP), which is the operator in most Member States that has been designated under Article 4 of the Second Postal Directive as the national USP, for the entire national territory

Online brokers

Web brokerage services that offer discounted rates to deliver parcels cross-border, available to individual shippers (different to consolidators in that brokers do not perform the shipment themselves). Typically, brokers buy delivery slots in bulk from operators reselling them.

Packages

A generic term encompassing the postal item categories of packs, parcels and express products

Packet

A postal item that is of a similar size to a letter, but that marginally breaches the traditional letter format size dimensions’. Packets have a maximum weight limit of 2kg.

“Packet” or “small packet” is loosely but customarily equated with “bulky letters” (E) and thus refers to any letter post item that cannot be classified as a “small letter” (P) or a “large letter” (G). The maximum weight of packets may be increased to 5 kg (11.0 lbs.) by agreement between postal operators. Packets are often used to deliver bulky items, such as small e-commerce items, which do not fit into a standard letter envelope.

Parcel

A postal item with higher weight and size restrictions than a packet. Parcels can typically weight up to 20 or 30kg, and can be of a much larger dimension. Parcel delivery, or “parcel post” service in UPU terminology, is used when the item to be sent does not fit within the requirements for letter post services or when the sender requires a value added service that is not available for letter post items. Parcels can thus be both small and large in size and weigh both more and less than letter post items. It should be noted that the outbound services of a national postal operator do not necessarily incorporate UPU terminology or correspond one to one with the underlying UPU packet and parcel services.

Parcel broker

Firm reselling delivery capacity bought in bulk from integrators, national postal operators, and couriers, taking a commission for each parcel booking made

Parcel operator

A company which offers day-certain and parcel delivery services where delivery times are not being guaranteed either domestically and/or cross-border. Parcel operators include the subsidiaries of national postal operators and other private companies.

Postal Services Directive

PSD. Directive 97/67/EC as modified by Directive 2002/39/EC and most recently by Directive 2008/6/EC - OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14–25; OJ L 176, 5.7.2002, p. 21–25, OJ L 52, 27.2.2008, p. 3–20 (Comprises the First Postal Directive, the Second Postal Directive and the Third Postal Directive)

Postal item

A generic term encompassing the categories of packs, parcels and express products

Postal user

Any consumer of postal products. Postal users can be business consumers or end consumers of postal services

REIMS

The Remuneration of Mandatory Deliveries of Cross-Border Mails (REIMS) is a voluntary multilateral agreement between postal operators setting out rules for calculation of terminal dues, i.e. the remuneration that postal operators pay each other for the delivery of incoming cross-border mail (applicable to mail items, such as letters and packets up to 2 kg)

Return

The reverse of delivery to the final customer. When a consumer sends back a good that s/he purchased online to the e-retailer.

Small customers

A consumer of postal products (either an individual or a business), who only uses products occasionally (no more than a few items at a time, and no more than a few dispatches a month)

Small enterprise

The EC 173 defines small enterprises as those businesses having less than 50 employees and a turnover of €10m or less

SME

Small and medium enterprises. The EC 174 defines SMEs as those businesses having less than 250 employees and a turnover of €50m or less.

Terminal dues

System used by the Universal Postal Union (UPU) to govern payments between designated postal operators for the transport, sorting, and delivery of cross-border letter post items in the destination country.

Third party operator

A delivery firm that provides service to its customers of outsourced (or "Third Party") delivery services for part, or all of their supply chain management functions.

Track-and-trace

A characteristic of the logistical process where a customer can follow each stage of their item’s progress, from posting, to delivery. It typically involves affixing a barcode or radio frequency identification device (RFID) to the postal item, which sends information to a central database on the items position

UPU

Universal Postal Union. A specialised agency of the United Nations, comprising 191 member countries and interacting with postal sector players in an advisory and mediating role as well as collecting certain postal sector data 175

USO

Universal Service Obligation. The scope of services of general economic interest (SGEI) in the postal sector that is present in each MS. The entrustment of USO commits the designated USP to provide countrywide services, so that all consumers and businesses have access to a basic set of postal services. The products covered by the USO vary by country, but tend to include basic packet, and parcel products (i.e. products without added characteristics such as track-and-trace), and to exclude express products. Right of access to postal services for users. A minimum range of services of specified quality must be provided in all EU countries at affordable prices for the benefit of all users, irrespective of their geographical location;

USP

Universal Service Provider.

VAT

Value added tax. It is a general, broadly based consumption tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. It is a consumption tax because it is borne by the final consumer. It is not a charge on business 176



(1)

FTI (2011), pg 6    

(2)

CE (2013), p. 207

(3)

Okholm, H. B. et al., e-Commerce and delivery - A study of the state of play of EU parcel markets with particular emphasis on e-commerce, Copenhagen Economics for the European Commission, 2013

(4)

Okholm, H. B. et al., Pricing behaviour of postal operators, Copenhagen Economics for the European Commission, 2012

(5)

Copenhagen Economics (2012),p.36

(6)

http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=607&id_article=2679

(7)

 Cost simulations in the B2C cross border delivery performed by the University of Antwerp show that for every 100 units of total transportation costs, attended home delivery (final mile) is responsible for 75 units of costs.

(8)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p. 193

(9)

WIK (2013), p.163

(10)

WIK (2013), p.

(11)

C(2013) 431 Commission decision of 30.01.2013, case no COMP/M.6570 – UPS/TNT Express, p40

(12)

Universtiy of Antwerp (2015) cross border parcel logistics

(13)

La Poste (Geopost); Royal Mail (GLS); Deutsche Post (DHL) – Annex Market Overview

(14)

PostNord AB (Sweden and Denmark); Post NL (Belgium and Netherlands); CTT Correios (Portugal and Spain); Omniva (Baltic region) – Annex Market Overview

(15)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg 20

(16)

WIK (2013), pg 241

(17)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg 28

(18)

AT, BE, CH, CY, EE, EL, FR, FK, FI, HR, HU, LT, MT, NO, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK- WIK (2013), pg 237

(19)

DE, UK, IT, BG, RO – WIK (2013), pg 237

(20)

CE(2013), p.360

(21)

The express segment accounts for about 14% of the total EU CEP market and usually refers to B2B shipments (CE (2013), p.101). Express is usually stronger in countries with poor quality of service standards, in remote areas, as well as in areas with high share of volumes originating from non-EU countries. (AT Kearney(2012) - Annex Market overview)

(22)

CE(2013),p.108

(23)

CE (2013), p.106

(24)

CE(2013), p. 107 (those countries are: FI, FR, DE, DK, NL, SE, UK. On the contrary in countries of group 2 (AT, BE, CY, EL, ES, IT, LU, MT, PT) large senders will have bigger discounts for domestic bulk parcels than for cross-border ones.

(25)

Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK - FTI (2011)

(26)

FTI (2011)

(27)

CE (2012), p.105

(28)

CE (2013), p.207

(29)

Blackbay (2012), p.13

(30)

WIK (2013), pg 241

(31)

CE (2013), p.101

(32)

AT Kearney(2012) - Annex Market overview

(33)

C(2013) 431 final, Case No. COMP/M.6570 – UPS/TNT Express, p.43

(34)

C(2013) 431 final, Case No. COMP/M.6570 – UPS/TNT Express, p.44

(35)

FTI (2011)

(36)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg 185

(37)

IMRG UK Consumer Home Delivery Review 2015

(38)

UPS Pulse of the online shopper, ComScore, March 2015

(39)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), pg184-185

(40)

FTI(2011) pg.97

(41)

The United Nations' specialised agency for the postal sector

(42)

 Campbell, J. I. Jr et al., Study on the External Dimension of the EU Postal Acquis, WIK-Consult for the European Commission, 2010; Copenhagen Economics, The Economics of Terminal Dues, 2014

(43)

Campbell, J. I. Jr et al., Study on the External Dimension of the EU Postal Acquis, WIK-Consult for the European Commission, 2010, p.127

(44)

Termination Charges in The International Parcel Market

(45)

The Remuneration of Mandatory Deliveries of Cross-Border Mails is a voluntary multilateral agreement between postal operators setting out rules for calculation of terminal dues, i.e. the remuneration that postal operators pay each other for the delivery of incoming cross-border mail (applicable to mail items, such as letters and packets up to 2 kg)

(46)

EMS is an international postal Express Mail Service for documents and merchandise, offered by postal operators of the Universal Postal Union (UPU)

(47)

The EPG is made up of 31 postal parcel operators committed to deliver their priority parcel products through an integrated delivery network. The network uses a track-and-trace system and an automated customer service system linking each postal operator’s call centres to ensure stable and reliable quality of service for their customers.

(48)

http://www.ipc.be/en/operational-services/intercompany_pricing/reims_v

(49)

See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2004_1_25.pdf , Official Journal L 275 , 26/10/1999 P. 0017 – 0031, Official Journal of the European Union, C 94, 23 April 2003, Case COMP/C/38.170 and WIK-Consult, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), p 94 and 95 for further background.

(50)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25.

(51)

REIMS V Agreement, 2012

(52)

WIK (2013), p.101

(53)

WIK (2010), p. 127

(54)

WIK (2013), p.102 – net winners: LU, PT, UK, NL, ES, DE, EL, and net losers: IT, NO, FI, DK, BE, AT, IE, SE, CH

(55)

WIK (2010), p.131

(56)

DE, ES, FI, HU, LT, PT, IS use UPU as default rates. WIK (2013), p.95

(57)

WIK (2013), pg 95

(58)

Okholm, H.B. et al., The Economics of terminal dues, Copenhagen Economics, 2014, p. 12

(59)

Okholm, H.B. et al., The Economics of terminal dues, Copenhagen Economics, 2014, p. 12

(60)

Usually those in developing countries

(61)

Usually those in industrialised countries

(62)

Okholm, H.B. et al., The Economics of terminal dues, Copenhagen Economics, 2014, p. 22

(63)

FTI (2011)

(64)

Tariffs charged by the delivery operator in the destination county to cover the delivery to the final destination of cross-border flow.

(65)

Universite Saint-Louis, Econometric study on cross-border prices (2015, forthcoming): on average, operators from countries that have an important online import share in the destination country have a lower cross-border differential and had lower cross-border prices.

(66)

University of Saint Louis (2015)

(67)

FTI (2011), p.11, 217

(68)

Universite Saint-Louis, Econometric study on cross-border prices (2015 , forthcoming)

(69)

Joint BEREC/ ERGP Opinion, Price transparency and regulatory oversight of cross-border parcels delivyer taking into account possible regulatory insights from the electronic communications sector (ERGP (15) 32)

(70)

ERGP report (2014) "European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery 2014 ERGP opinion to the European Commission On a better understanding of European cross-border e- commerce parcels delivery markets and the functioning of competition on these markets"

(71)

ERGP report (November 2014), "ERGP report on tariff regulation in a context o declining volumes", p11-13

(72)

Postal statistics survey 2014 and ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(73)

ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(74)

ERGP (14) (26) ERGP Opinion on a better understanding of European cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery market(s) and the functioning of competition., ERGP (13) 37 ERGP Opinion on cross-border parcel delivery

(75)

Okholm, H. B. et al, Study of the state of play of EU parcel markets with particular emphasis on e-commerce, 2013, p.200

(76)

EEA Express carriers fully committed to efficient parcel delivery for the Digital Single Market, 6 May 2015, response to the 2015 public consutlation

(77)

ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(78)

CE(2013), p.197

(79)

ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(80)

ERGP (2015), "ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcels segments statistics"

(81)

Retailer question 19b

(82)

PostEuop's response to the 2015 public consultation on cross-border delivery made this point. Citizens Advice and Citizens Advice Scotland acknowledged that mark ups exit, though stated they are not a rationale for price caps as mark-ups are present throughout the supply chain.

(83)

UK, FR, DE

(84)

It should be noted that both the sending and the receiving operator usually have enough market power to be price setters. This may lead to "double marginalization" of their customers (i.e. retailers), leading to higher prices than would be the case if the whole cross-border delivery was undertaken by one single (integrated) operator.

(85)

Eurostat, Services by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, H-N, S95) [sbs_sc_1b_se_r2]

(86)

Regulations 2015/2120 , 531/2012 544/2009 and 717/2007

(87)

BEREC/ERGP (2015) p13

(88)

The Citizens Advice/Citizens Advice Scotland response to the public consultation stated that price caps were not appropriate and could prove discriminatory and distort the development of competition. BEUC advocated more price transparency and a monitoring scheme. Neither E-commerce Europe nor EMOTA advocated price regulation.

(89)

ERGP internal report on the courier, express and parcel segments statistics, ERGP, September 2015

(90)

Commission impact assessment Guidelines.

(91)

NACE H53.

(92)

WIK (2013) indicates around 20 ongoing cases over 2009-2013.

(93)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2013:0886:FIN

(94)

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2012/parcel-delivery/121129_green-paper-parcel-delivery_en.pdf

(95)

Copenhagen Economics (2013) E-commerce and delivery p154. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/20130715_ce_e-commerce-and-delivery-final-report_en.pdf

(96)

WIK (2014) Design and development of initiatives to support the growth of e-commerce via better functioning parcel delivery systems in Europe

(97)

http://europeantrustmark.eu/

(98)

   http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/crd_guidance_en.pdf

(99)

WIK (2014) Design and development of initiatives to support the growth of e-commerce via better functioning parcel delivery systems in Europe

(100)

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/watify/selling-online?language=en

(101)

ERGP (15) 28 Legal Regimes applicable to European Domestic or cross-border e-commerce parcels delivery -

(102)

ERGP (14) 26 Opinion on Parcel Delivery

(103)

ERGP (14)(24) Report on Quality of Service and end-user satisfaction

(104)

Seventeen countries have a regulatory routing time for parcels.

(105)

Source ERGP (13) (31) Report on the Quality of Service.

(106)

COM (2014) 500 final European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee The annual Union work programme for European standardisation for 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-500-EN-F1-1.Pdf

(107)

Q22 - Which, if any, of the following improvements to the delivery process would make you more likely to sell online or increase your online sales. Please select the three most important to you. Chart shows the number of responses

(108)

Special Eurobarometer 398 Internal Market

(109)

Flash Eurobarometer 413: Companies Engaged in Online Activities; European Commission Consumer Study, Identifying the Main Cross Border Obstacles to the Digital Single Market; and discussions with stakeholders.

(110)

Q13 (retailers) - How satisfied are you with the following delivery features when selling to other European countries?

(111)

ERGP (14) 24 ERGP Report 2014 on the Quality of Service and End-User Satisfaction

(112)

The Global Customer Service System is in fact used by 182 national postal operators globally.

(113)

COM(2015) 215 final

(114)

It should be noted that the Commission adopted, on xxxx, an Application Report based on Article 23 of the Directive, which covered the broader postal and parcel markets (with a clear focus on letters). This annex reproduces its key findings, while looking specifically into evaluative information collected on provisions affecting the parcel markets.

(115)

The above chart is a strong simplification of reality, in that many other economic operators are active on the parcel markets as well, including carriers, freight forwarders and other transport companies, parcel brokers and consolidators, the retailers' own delivery infrastructures, etc.

(116)

Directive 2013/11/EU of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes.

(117)

The study, prepared for the European Commission, bases itself on an extensive survey of all stakeholders, interviews with key stakeholders, an economic model analysing the effects of terminal dues, and economic model quantifying the effects of declines in postal volumes, expert panels and extensive desk research.

(118)

WIK study, Executive Summary p. x

(119)

WIK study, p. ii-iii

(120)

WIK study, p. 131

(121)

WIK study, p. 129

(122)

WIK study, p. xii

(123)

WIK study, p. 32

(124)

WIK study, p. 32

(125)

WIK study, p. 343

(126)

WIK study, p. xiii

(127)

WIK study, p. xiii

(128)

WIK study, p. xiii and 344

(129)

WIK study, p. 131

(130)

WIK study, p. vi

(131)

Base size for this chart is 203-207 consumer responses to each subsection. 44 'other' responses not shown.

(132)

WIK study, p. 210

(133)

WIK study, p. xi

(134)

Copenhagen Economics, "E-commerce and delivery: a study of the state of play of EU parcel markets with particular emphasis on e-commerce", July 2013

(135)

Copenhagen Economics (2013), p. 26-27

(136)

Eurobarometer (413), 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_413_en.pdf

(137)

WIK study, p. ii

(138)

WIK study, p. ii

(139)

WIK study, p. 341

(140)

WIK study, p. 340

(141)

WIK study, p. 340

(142)

2014 ERGP opinion to the European Commission on a better understanding of European cross-border e- commerce parcels delivery markets and the functioning of competition on these markets, p. 5

(143)

WIK study, p. 223

(144)

WIK study, p. 39

(145)

WIK study, p. 40

(146)

2014 ERGP opinion, p. 4

(147)

2014 ERGP opinion, p. 22

(148)

2014 ERGP opinion, p. 26

(149)

WIK study, p. 5

(150)

WIK study, p. vi

(151)

WIK study, p. 138

(152)

WIK study, p. 139

(153)

WIK study, p. x

(154)

WIK study, p. xv

(155)

For evidence substantiating this observation, see other parts of this impact assessment.

(156)

WIK study, p. iv

(157)

WIK study, p. vii

(158)

WIK study, p. xiv

(159)

WIK study, p. 339

(160)

WIK study, p. xv

(161)

WIK study, p. 339

(162)

WIK study, p. ix

(163)

WIK study, p. 177

(164)

WIK study, p. 297

(165)

WIK study, p. xii

(166)

WIK study, p. xi

(167)

WIK study, p. xi

(168)

In the cases NRAs cannot cover 100% of their markets

(169)

Eurostat news release – Information and Communication Technologies: “E-commerce accounted for 12% of enterprises’ turnover in the EU in 2008”, 12 2010 – 19 January 2010, page 4.

(170)

  http://www.ipc.be/en/Services/EPG.aspx .

(171)

  http://www.upu.int/en/activities/parcels/inward-land-rates/about-inward-land-rates.html .

(172)

  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm .

(173)

  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm .

(174)

  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm ..

(175)

  http://www.upu.int/en.html .

(176)

  http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/index_en.htm . – EC website.

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