EUR-Lex Access to European Union law

Back to EUR-Lex homepage

This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website

Document 61998CJ0164

Sprendimo santrauka

Keywords
Summary

Keywords

1 Culture - Community programmes - MEDIA programme - Funding applications for film distribution - Conditions for eligibility - Discretion of the Commission - Three different distributors must have agreed to exhibit a film - Meaning of `different distributors' - Interpretation - Context and everyday meaning of those terms to be taken into account - The distributors must not have cooperated previously in a substantial and permanent manner

(Council Decision 90/685)

2 Culture - Community programmes - MEDIA programme - Granting of Community aid - Condition - Aid must be compatible with Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 81 EC)

(EC Treaty, Arts 85, 86 and 93 (now Arts 81 EC, 82 EC and 88 EC))

3 Actions for annulment - Jurisdiction of the Community judicature - Interpretation of the statement of reasons for an administrative measure - Limits

(EC Treaty, Art. 173 (now, after amendment, Art. 230 EC) and Art. 174 (now Art. 231 EC))

Summary

1 In the context of the implementation of the action programme to promote the development of the European audiovisual industry (MEDIA), governed by Council Decision 90/685, the guidelines for the body which assists the Commission in the financial implementation of that programme - the European Film Distribution Office (EFDO) - fix the conditions for eligibility for Community funding.

The fact that such EFDO eligibility conditions exist and that they were approved by the Commission is not in itself sufficient to exclude all discretionary power on the part of the Commission as regards assessing whether funding applications are eligible.

As regards applications for funding for the distribution of films, point III.1(a) of the guidelines required that at least three different distributors from at least three different European Union countries, or from countries with which cooperation contracts existed, had to agree to exhibit a film theatrically and submit their applications by the same deadline.

Since those guidelines did not contain any definition of the term `different distributors', the meaning and scope of those terms fall to be determined by reference to the general context in which they are used and their usual meaning in everyday language.

The Court of First Instance therefore properly held that the Commission was entitled to interpret and apply the condition relating to the three different distributors by reference to the objective aims of the MEDIA programme as they emerge from the Commission's communication on audiovisual policy and from Decision 90/685, and thus to require that, for funding applications for the distribution of films to be eligible, they must be submitted by at least three distributors who did not previously cooperate in a substantial and permanent manner.

(see paras 22-27)

2 The same rules of consistency which require the Commission not to authorise State aid at the conclusion of the procedure under Article 93 of the EC Treaty (now Article 88 EC) without verifying that the recipient is not in a position that contravenes Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 81 EC and 82 EC) require that, in the implementation of the MEDIA programme, governed by Council Decision 90/685, Community aid should not be granted to a joint venture without an examination of the latter's compatibility with Article 85 of the Treaty.

(see paras 29, 30)

3 In reviewing the legality of acts under Article 173 of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 EC), the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have jurisdiction in actions brought on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. Article 174 of the EC Treaty (now Article 231 EC) provides that, if the action is well founded, the contested measure must be declared void. The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance cannot under any circumstances substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested measure.

Although, in proceedings for annulment, the Court of First Instance may be led to interpret the reasoning of the contested measure in a manner which differs from that of its author, and even, in certain circumstances, to reject the latter's formal statement of reasons, it cannot do so where there is no material factor to justify such a course of action.

Accordingly, a judgment of the Court of First Instance must be set aside where, because the content of the contested decision was distorted, the Court of First Instance substituted its own reasoning for that of the author of the measure.

(see paras 38, 42, 48-49)

Top