21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/1

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COMMISSION OPINION

of 16 February 2018

relating to the modified plan for the disposal of radioactive waste arising from the Socatri Decontamination and Uranium Recovery Facility located on the Tricastin site in France

(Only the French text is authentic)

(2018/C 65/01)

The assessment below is carried out under the provisions of the Euratom Treaty, without prejudice to any additional assessments to be carried out under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the obligations stemming from it and from secondary legislation (1).

On 30 August 2017, the European Commission received from the Government of France, in accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, General Data relating to the modified plan for the disposal of radioactive waste (2) arising from the Socatri Decontamination and Uranium Recovery Facility.

On the basis of these data and following consultation with the Group of Experts, the Commission has drawn up the following opinion:

1.	The distance from the site to the border of the nearest Member State, in this case Italy, is 170 km.

2.	The modified plan envisages the processing of radioactive substances having enhanced levels of Uranium 235, thus requiring higher regulatory discharge limits for airborne and liquid radioactive effluents.

3.	During normal operating conditions, the modified plan is not liable to cause an exposure of the population of another Member State that would be significant from the point of view of health, in respect of the dose limit laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directives (3).

4.	The planned modifications have no consequences in relation to the unplanned discharges of radioactive substances, which may follow the accident of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data of the existing plan.

In conclusion, the Commission is of the opinion that the implementation of the modified plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form from the Socatri Decontamination and Uranium Recovery facility located on the Tricastin site in France, both in normal operation and in the event of an accident of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, is not liable to result in radioactive contamination, significant from the point of view of health, of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State, in respect of the provisions laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directives.

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(1)  For instance, under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, environmental aspects should be further assessed. Indicatively, the Commission would like to draw attention to the provisions of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU; to Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, as well as to Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora and to Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.

(2)  The disposal of radioactive waste in the meaning of point 1 of Commission Recommendation 2010/635/Euratom of 11 October 2010 on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty (OJ L 279, 23.10.2010, p. 36).

(3)  Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation (OJ L 159, 29.6.1996, p. 1) and Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom (OJ L 13, 17.1.2014, p. 1) with effect from 6 February 2018.

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/3

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.8751 — Bell/Hügli)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2018/C 65/02)

On 7 February 2018, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in German language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

—	in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—	in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32018M8751. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.8753 — HASCO/Magna/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2018/C 65/03)

On 16 February 2018, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

—	in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—	in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32018M8753. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/4

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 19 February 2018

appointing the Chairperson of the Board of Appeal of the Community Plant Variety Office

(2018/C 65/04)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (1), and in particular Article 47(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1)	By Decision of 4 December 2012 (2) the Council renewed the term of office of Mr Paul A.C.E. VAN DER KOOIJ as Chairperson of the Board of Appeal of the Community Plant Variety Office (the ‘Office’).

(2)	The term of office of Mr Paul A.C.E. VAN DER KOOIJ expired on 18 December 2017.

(3)	On 14 December 2017, after obtaining the opinion of the Administrative Council of the Office, the Commission proposed Mr Paul A.C.E. VAN DER KOOIJ, the only shortlisted candidate, for the post of Chairperson of the Board of Appeal of the Office,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   Mr Paul A.C.E. VAN DER KOOIJ is hereby appointed Chairperson of the Board of Appeal of the Community Plant Variety Office (the ‘Office’) for a period of five years.

2.   The term of office of Mr Paul A.C.E. VAN DER KOOIJ shall run from the date on which he takes up his duties. That date shall be agreed between the President and the Administrative Council of the Office.

Article 2

The Chairperson of the Administrative Council of the Office shall be empowered to provide for all the arrangements necessary to implement Article 1.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

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(1)  OJ L 227, 1.9.1994, p. 1.

(2)  Council Decision of 4 December 2012 renewing the term of office of the Chairman of the Board of Appeal of the Community Plant Variety Office (OJ C 378, 8.12.2012, p. 2).

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/6

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Euro exchange rates (1)

20 February 2018

(2018/C 65/05)

1 euro =

	Currency	Exchange rate
USD	US dollar	1,2340
JPY	Japanese yen	132,25
DKK	Danish krone	7,4473
GBP	Pound sterling	0,88168
SEK	Swedish krona	9,9688
CHF	Swiss franc	1,1537
ISK	Iceland króna	124,30
NOK	Norwegian krone	9,6683
BGN	Bulgarian lev	1,9558
CZK	Czech koruna	25,318
HUF	Hungarian forint	311,78
PLN	Polish zloty	4,1467
RON	Romanian leu	4,6636
TRY	Turkish lira	4,6566
AUD	Australian dollar	1,5648
CAD	Canadian dollar	1,5553
HKD	Hong Kong dollar	9,6549
NZD	New Zealand dollar	1,6782
SGD	Singapore dollar	1,6272
KRW	South Korean won	1 323,70
ZAR	South African rand	14,4916
CNY	Chinese yuan renminbi	7,8290
HRK	Croatian kuna	7,4385
IDR	Indonesian rupiah	16 819,73
MYR	Malaysian ringgit	4,8101
PHP	Philippine peso	64,560
RUB	Russian rouble	69,9071
THB	Thai baht	38,883
BRL	Brazilian real	4,0114
MXN	Mexican peso	23,0002
INR	Indian rupee	80,0030

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(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/7

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COMMISSION DECISION

of 31 January 2018

on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission

(2018/C 65/06)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

Whereas:

(1)	The Treaties, in particular Article 17(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, have laid down the essential principles that govern the conduct of Members of the Commission.

(2)

In accordance with these provisions, Members of the Commission are chosen on the ground of their general competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond doubt. They shall be completely independent and neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity, they shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties or the performance of their tasks and they may not engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not.

(3)

Members of the Commission have political responsibility and the Commission is accountable to the European Parliament. According to Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union, political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union. European and national political parties make known the candidates for President of the Commission they support and the candidate's programme in the context of the elections to the European Parliament. The President of the European Commission is elected by the European Parliament on a proposal of the European Council, taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations; and the Commission as a whole is subject to a vote of consent by the European Parliament. This increases the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process in the Union of which Members of the Commission are part.

(4)

When entering upon their duties, Members of the Commission give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits.

(5)

The Code of Conduct for Commissioners of 20 April 2011 (1), which defines and clarifies the obligations applicable to Members and former Members of the Commission, should be revised in order to take account of the experience gained in its application and be up to the high ethical standards that are expected of Members of the Commission.

(6)	It is appropriate that the Code of Conduct applies to the person proposed as candidate for President of the European Commission as well as Commissioners-Designate as regards disclosure of their interests in due time before their hearing in the European Parliament.

(7)	This Code of Conduct should be applied in line with the Rules of Procedure of the Commission (2).

(8)	Members of the Commission are subject to transparency requirements with regard to meetings they hold with organisations or self-employed individuals laid down in the Commission's Decision (3) on that matter.

(9)

Article 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that the Members of the institutions of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of any kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.

(10)	Former Members of the Commission are also bound during the period for which they are entitled to the monthly transitional allowance to make the declarations foreseen in accordance with Article 10(4) of Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300 (4).

(11)	An Independent Ethical Committee should assist the Commission in the application of this Code of Conduct by providing independent advice.

(12)	A Member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests in conformity with Article 17(6) of the Treaty on European Union.

(13)

Members of the Commission no longer fulfilling the conditions required for the performance of their duties or guilty of serious misconduct may be compulsorily retired or deprived of pension rights or other benefits in accordance with Articles 245 and 247 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

(14)	This Code of Conduct should be applied in good faith and with due consideration to the proportionality principle and individual rights.

(15)	This Code of Conduct should replace the Code of Conduct for Commissioners of 20 April 2011 (5).

(16)	The European Parliament was consulted (6) on the revision of the Code of Conduct in conformity with the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (7) and delivered its opinion on 23 January 2018 (8),

HEREBY ADOPTS THIS CODE OF CONDUCT:

Article 1

Scope

This Code of Conduct shall apply to the Members of the Commission and, where explicitly specified, to former Members of the Commission, to the person proposed as candidate for President of the European Commission and to Commissioners-Designate.

Article 2

Principles

1.   Members shall devote themselves fully to the performance of their duties in the general interest of the Union.

2.   Members shall behave and perform their duties with complete independence, integrity, dignity, with loyalty and discretion, in compliance with the rules laid down in the Treaties and as spelled out in this Code of Conduct. They shall observe the highest standards of ethical conduct.

3.   Members have the responsibility to maintain political contacts in view of the accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament and the European electorate and in view of the role of European political parties in the democratic life of the Union.

4.   Members shall act collegially and assume collective responsibility for any decision taken by the Commission.

5.   Members shall respect the dignity of their office and shall not act or express themselves, through whatever medium, in a manner which adversely affects the public perception of their independence, their integrity or the dignity of their office.

6.   Members shall avoid any situation which may give rise to a conflict of interest or which may reasonably be perceived as such. A conflict of interest arises where a personal interest may influence the independent performance of their duties. Personal interests include, but are not limited to, any potential benefit or advantage to Members themselves, their spouses, partners (9) or direct family members. A conflict of interest does not exist where a Member is only concerned as a member of the general public or of a broad class of persons.

7.   Former Members shall respect the obligations arising from their duties that continue to have an effect after their term, in particular the duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits in line with Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the obligations specified in this Code of Conduct.

Article 3

Declaration of interests

1.   Members shall declare any financial or other interests or assets which might create a conflict of interest in the performance of their duties or are otherwise relevant for the performance of the duties. For the purposes of this Article, a Member's interests can include the interests of spouses, partners (10) and minor children. Each Member shall do so by submitting the completed declaration form set out in Annex 1, which sets out all the information that Members are required to declare under this Code, and shall assume responsibility for its content.

2.   The requirements in paragraph (1) shall also apply to the person proposed as candidate for President of the Commission and to Commissioners-Designate who shall submit the declaration to the European Parliament in due time in order to allow the Parliament to examine the declarations.

3.   Declarations shall be re-submitted on an annual basis on 1 January, and in case of a change in the information to be declared during a Member's term of office, a new declaration shall be submitted at the earliest opportunity and at the latest within two months of the change in question.

4.   The declaration shall identify:

(a)

financial interests, including assets and liabilities, that might be considered to be capable of giving rise to a conflict of interest, and in any case where the value of an investment exceeds EUR 10 000. These financial interests may be in the form of a specific financial holding in an entity's capital, in particular, shares, or any other form of financial interest, such as bonds or investment certificates. This obligation applies to financial interests of spouses, partners (11) and minor children where those might be considered to be capable of giving rise to a conflict of interest;

(b)

all activities, professional or otherwise, distinguishing between activities engaged in over the last 10 years which ended before the Member took up office, such as company board member, advisor or consultant, member of a foundation or similar body or of an educational institution, and those functions of an honorary nature and/or attributed for life or functions which are formally suspended by direct effect of the law during the Member's mandate, which are maintained while respecting Article 8(2);

(c)

every entity in which the Member has an interest or in which or for which he or she exercised an activity as specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, except entities in which the Member owns holdings which are managed on an independent basis by a third party, unless they are linked to specific industries like sector or thematic funds. In the case of a foundation or similar body, the purpose of the entity shall be stated;

(d)	membership of associations, political parties, trade unions, non-governmental organisations or other bodies, if their activities, in public or private, are intended to influence the exercise of public functions;

(e)	any property owned either directly or through a real estate company, with the exception of homes reserved for their exclusive use and that of their family;

(f)	the ongoing professional activities of spouses or partners, setting out the nature of the activity, the title of the position held, and if applicable the name of the employer.

5.   Declarations shall be made public in an electronic and machine-readable format.

Article 4

Procedure for conflicts of interest

1.   Members shall recuse themselves from any decision or instruction of a file and from any participation in a discussion, debate or vote in relation to a matter that falls under Article 2(6).

2.   Declarations submitted under Article 3 shall be scrutinised under the authority of the President.

3.   Members shall inform the President of any situation that falls under Article 2(6) as soon as they become aware of it.

4.   The President shall take any measure he considers appropriate, in the light of the information referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) or other available information, if necessary after consultation of the Independent Ethical Committee, such as:

(a)	the reallocation of a file to another Member or to the responsible Vice-President. The President shall inform the President of the European Parliament in due time of any such reallocation;

(b)	the request for the sale or placing in a blind trust of the financial interests referred to in Article 3(4)(a) where these give rise to a conflict of interest in the area of the Member's portfolio responsibilities.

Article 5

Collegiality and discretion

1.   Members shall comply with the duty of loyalty towards the Commission and discretion in discharging their duties. They shall act and express themselves with the restraint that their office requires.

2.   Members shall refrain from disclosing what is said at meetings of the Commission.

3.   Without prejudice to the disciplinary provisions applicable to officials and other agents, Members are responsible for the proper handling and any external transmission by members of their Cabinets of classified documents, of sensitive information or of confidential documents submitted to the College for adoption or information.

4.   Members shall not make any comment that would call into question a decision taken by the Commission or which may harm the Commission's reputation.

Article 6

Specific provisions with regard to the principle of integrity

1.   Members shall manage the material resources of the Commission in a responsible manner. They shall use their Cabinets and the Commission's infrastructure and resources in full compliance with the relevant rules.

2.   Members shall conduct missions in compliance with the rules in the Financial Regulation, the internal rules on the implementation of the general budget of the European Union, the Guide to Missions and the rules set out in Annex 2. A mission is defined as travel in the exercise of his or her duties by a Member away from the Commission's place of work. Free travel offered by third parties must not be accepted unless it is in accordance with diplomatic or courtesy usage or unless the President has authorised it beforehand. For reasons of transparency, the Commission will publish an overview of mission expenses per Member every two months covering all missions undertaken unless publication of this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, defence and military matters, international relations or the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Union or a Member State.

3.   Members shall comply with the rules governing receptions and professional representation in the relevant Commission decision (12)  (13). Expenses not covered by that decision will be paid from the Member's flat rate allowance provided for in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/300.

4.   Members shall not accept any gift with a value of more than EUR 150. When, in accordance with diplomatic and courtesy usage they receive gifts worth more than this amount, they shall hand them over to the Commission's Protocol Department. In case of doubt as to the value of a gift, an evaluation shall be undertaken under the authority of the Director of the Office of Infrastructure and Logistics in Brussels, whose decision on the matter shall be final. The Commission's Protocol Department shall keep a public register of the gifts handed over in accordance with this paragraph which shall identify the donor.

5.   Members shall not accept hospitality, except in accordance with diplomatic and courtesy usage. Attendance upon invitation to any events where Members represent the Commission shall not be considered as hospitality.

6.   Members shall notify the President of any decoration, prize or honour awarded to them. Should a prize include a sum of money or valuables, it should be donated to a charity of their choice; valuable objects can also be handed over to the Protocol Department.

7.   Members shall choose the members of their Cabinets in line with the rules set by the President (14) and on the basis of objective criteria taking into account the demanding nature of the function, the professional profiles requested and the need to establish a relationship based on mutual trust between the Member and the member of Cabinet. Members may not choose spouses, partners and direct family members to form part of their Cabinet.

Article 7

Transparency

1.   Members and their members of Cabinet shall meet only those organisations or self-employed individuals, which are registered in the Transparency Register established pursuant to the Interinstitutional agreement (15) on this matter between the European Parliament and the Commission inasmuch as they fall under its scope.

2.   They shall make public information on such meetings in accordance with the Commission Decision 2014/839/EU, Euratom (16).

Article 8

External activities during term of office

1.   Members shall not exercise any professional activity, gainful or not, or public functions of whatever nature, other than those resulting from the performance of their duties. This paragraph is without prejudice to maintaining functions of an honorary nature and/or attributed for life, or functions which are formally suspended by direct effect of law during the Member's mandate as Commissioner, as long as the independence of the Member is guaranteed.

2.   Members may engage in the following external activities, while respecting Articles 2 and 5:

(a)	giving occasionally unpaid courses in the interests of European integration, provided that the President is duly informed, and other communication activities on areas of European interest;

(b)	publishing a book provided that any royalties in a work published in connection with a Member's functions are paid over to a charity of their choice, and provided that the President is duly informed;

(c)	writing articles, delivering speeches or taking part in conferences provided that either no payment is made or, should a payment be made, it is paid over to a charity of their choice;

(d)

holding honorary unpaid posts in foundations or similar bodies in the political, legal, cultural, artistic, social, sporting or charitable fields or in educational or research establishments, provided that the President is duly informed. ‘Honorary posts’ means posts in which the holder has no management role, no decision-making power and no responsibility or control of the operations of the body in question. The expression ‘foundations or similar bodies’ means not-for-profit establishments or associations which carry out activities in the general interest in the fields referred to in the first sentence. The post must not involve any risk of conflict of interest. Such risk exists in particular when a body receives financing from the EU budget.

Article 9

Participation in national politics during the term of office

1.   Members may participate in national politics as members of national political parties or an organisation of the social partners (such as trade unions) or in a national election campaign, including regional or local elections, provided that this does not compromise their availability for service in the Commission and the priority given to their Commission duties over party commitment. Participation as members of national political parties or an organisation of the social partners includes the holding of honorary or non-executive functions in bodies of the party structure, but excludes management responsibilities. Political contacts in the capacity as Member of the Commission remain unaffected.

2.   Members shall inform the President of their intention to participate in a national, regional or local election campaign and the role they expect to play in the campaign. If they intend to stand for election or otherwise play an active role in the election campaign, they must withdraw from the work of the Commission for the entire period of active implication and at least for the duration of the campaign. In other instances, the President, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, shall decide whether the envisaged participation in the election campaign is compatible with the performance of the Member's duties. Members so withdrawing from the work of the Commission shall be granted ‘unpaid electoral leave’ by the President and may not use the Commission's human or material resources during that period. The President shall duly inform the President of the European Parliament of the granting of this leave and of which Member will take over the relevant responsibilities during the period of leave.

3.   Members shall abstain from making public statements or interventions on behalf of any political party or organisation of the social partners of which they are members, except when standing for election/participating in an election campaign in accordance with paragraph (2). This is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their personal opinions. Members so participating in electoral campaigns shall undertake to refrain from adopting a position in the course of the campaign that would not be in line with the duty of confidentiality or infringe the principle of collegiality.

Article 10

Participation in European politics during the term of office

1.   Members may participate in European politics as members of European political parties or organisations of the social partners at European level provided that this does not compromise their availability for service in the Commission and the priority to be given to their Commission duties over party commitment. Participation as members of European political parties or organisations of the social partners at European level includes the holding of political, honorary or non-executive functions in bodies of the party structure, but excludes management responsibilities. Political contacts in the capacity as Member of the Commission remain unaffected.

2.   Members may participate in electoral campaigns in elections to the European Parliament, including as candidates. They may also be chosen by European political parties as lead candidate (‘Spitzenkandidat’) for the position of President of the Commission.

3.   Members shall inform the President of their intention to participate in an election campaign within the meaning of paragraph (2) and the role they expect to play in the campaign.

4.   The President shall inform the European Parliament in due time whether one or more Members will stand as candidates in electoral campaigns for elections to the European Parliament, as well as of the measures taken to ensure the respect of the principles of independence, integrity and discretion provided by Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and this Code of Conduct.

5.   Members standing as candidates or participating in an electoral campaign within the meaning of paragraph (2) may not use the Commission's human or material resources for activities linked to the electoral campaign.

6.   Members shall abstain from making public statements or interventions on behalf of any European political party of which they are members, except when standing for election or participating in an election campaign in accordance with paragraphs (3) and (4). This is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their personal opinions. Members so participating in electoral campaigns shall undertake to refrain from adopting a position in the course of the campaign that would not be in line with the duty of confidentiality or infringe the principle of collegiality.

Article 11

Post term of office activities

1.   After ceasing to hold office, former Members shall continue to be bound by their duty of integrity and discretion pursuant to Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. They shall continue to be bound by the duties of collegiality and discretion, as laid down in Article 5, with respect to the Commission's decisions and activities during their term of office.

2.   Former Members shall inform the Commission with a minimum of two months' notice of their intention to engage in a professional activity during a period of two years after they have ceased to hold office. For the purposes of the present Code, ‘professional activity’ means any professional activity, whether gainful or not, other than any unpaid activity which has no link with the activities of the European Union and which does not give rise to lobbying or advocacy vis-à-vis the Commission and its services such as:

(a)	charitable or humanitarian activities;

(b)	activities deriving from political, trade unionist and/or philosophical or religious convictions;

(c)	cultural activities;

(d)	the mere management of assets or holdings or personal or family fortune, in a private capacity;

(e)	or comparable activities.

3.   The Commission shall examine the information provided in order to determine whether the nature of the planned activity is compatible with Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and if the planned activity is related to the portfolio of the former Member, it shall decide only after having consulted the Independent Ethical Committee.

Without prejudice to the possibility for the President to seek its opinion in cases of doubt, the Independent Ethical Committee does not need to be consulted where former Members intend to:

(a)	continue to serve the European interest in an Institution or Body of the European Union;

(b)	take up functions in the national civil service of a Member State (at national, regional or local level)

(c)	engage with international organisations or other international bodies dealing with public interests and in which either the EU or one or several of its Member States are represented;

(d)	engage in academic activities;

(e)	engage in one-off activities for a short duration (1 or 2 working days);

(f)	accept honorary appointments.

4.   Former Members shall not lobby (17) Members or their staff on behalf of their own business, that of their employer or client, on matters for which they were responsible within their portfolio for a period of two years after ceasing to hold office.

5.   In the case of a former President, the periods set out in paragraphs (2) and (4) shall be three years.

6.   The duties set out in paragraphs (2) and (4) shall not apply where the former Member is engaging in public office.

7.   Decisions taken under paragraph (3) determining compatibility with Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and related opinions of the Independent Ethical Committee shall be made public with due consideration to the protection of personal data.

Article 12

The Independent Ethical Committee

1.   The Commission hereby establishes an Independent Ethical Committee. On request of the President, the Committee shall advise the Commission on any ethical question related to this Code and provide general recommendations to the Commission on ethical issues relevant under the Code.

2.   The President shall set the time limit within which an opinion shall be given.

3.   Members or former Members concerned shall cooperate fully with the Committee, in particular by providing all the relevant additional information requested. They shall have the possibility to be heard if the Committee considers issuing a negative opinion.

4.   The Committee shall consist of three members selected for their competence, experience, independence and professional qualities. They shall have an impeccable record of professional behaviour as well as experience in high-level functions in European, national or international institutions. The composition of the Committee should reflect experiences in different institutions or functions. The members are appointed by the Commission, on a proposal from the President. They shall sign a declaration on the absence of conflicts of interest. Their term is three years, renewable once. If a member ceases office before the completion of the term, the Commission appoints, on a proposal from the President, a new member for the remainder of the term.

5.   The Committee shall elect a permanent chairperson from among its members. The chairperson convenes meetings further to receiving a request from the President.

6.   The deliberations of the Committee shall be confidential.

7.   Where an opinion is not adopted unanimously, it shall include any dissenting point of view.

8.   The Commission, in accordance with the relevant administrative rules, shall reimburse travel and subsistence expenses for the Committee's meetings, and shall provide secretarial support to the Committee (18).

Article 13

Application of the Code

1.   The President, assisted by the Independent Ethical Committee, shall ensure the proper application of this Code of Conduct.

2.   Members or former Members shall inform the President in a timely manner if they have doubts with regard to the application of this Code before acting on the matter relating to which the doubts arise.

3.   In case of an infringement of this Code of Conduct which does not warrant a referral to the Court of Justice in accordance with Article 245 or 247 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission may decide, taking into account the opinion of the Independent Ethical Committee and on proposal of the President, to express a reprimand and, where appropriate, make it public.

4.   The Commission shall publish annually a report on the application of this Code of Conduct including the work of the Independent Ethical Committee. The reports shall be published on a website dedicated to the application of this Code of Conduct.

Article 14

Entry into force

1.   The present Code of Conduct shall repeal and replace the Code of Conduct of 20 April 2011 and the Decision establishing the ad hoc ethical committee of 21 October 2003 (19). The current Committee and its members shall fulfil the remainder of their mandate under the present Code.

2.   As regards former Members whose term has ended before the entry into force of this decision, Article 11(2) to (6) does not apply. Section 1.2 of the Code of Conduct of 20 April 2011 remains applicable to them.

3.   It shall enter into force on 1 February 2018.

4.   Article 10(2) to (5) shall apply from the date of entry into force of the amended Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission. Until that date, Section 1.1, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the Code of Conduct for Commissioners of 20 April 2011 (20) shall continue to apply to the participation of Members of the Commission in electoral campaigns in elections to the European Parliament.

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(1)  C(2011) 2904.

(2)  C(2000) 3614 of 29 November 2000.

(3)  C(2014) 9051 of 25 November 2014.

(4)  Council Regulation (EU) 2016/300 of 29 February 2016 determining the emoluments of EU high-level public office holders (OJ L 58, 4.3.2016, p. 1).

(5)  C(2011) 2904.

(6)  Letter of the President of the Commission of 13 September 2017 to the President of the Parliament.

(7)  OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47.

(8)  Letter of the President of the European Parliament of 23 January 2018 to the President of the Commission.

(9)  Stable non matrimonial partner as defined in Article 1(2)(c) of Annex VII of the Staff Regulations.

(10)  OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47.

(11)  OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47.

(12)  C(2007) 3494 of 18 July 2007.

(13)  For the use of the College's global envelope, see Annex 2.

(14)  C(2014) 9002 of 1 November 2014.

(15)  Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission of 16 April 2014 on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation (OJ L 277, 19.9.2014, p. 11).

(16)  Commission Decision 2014/839/EU, Euratom of 25 November 2014 on the publication of information on meetings held between Members of the Commission and organisations or self-employed individuals (OJ L 343, 28.11.2014, p. 22).

(17)  All activities falling under the scope of the Transparency Register, see Article 7.

(18)  This is without prejudice to other administrative provisions concerning the status of the members and their rights.

(19)  C(2003) 3750 of 21 October 2003.

(20)  C(2011) 2904.

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/21

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Call for proposals

The European Investment Bank Institute proposes a new EIBURS sponsorship under its Knowledge Programme

(2018/C 65/07)

The Knowledge Programme of the European Investment Bank Institute channels its research grants through different schemes, one of which is:

—	EIBURS, the EIB University Research Sponsorship Programme

EIBURS provides grants to university departments or research centres associated with universities in EU, candidate or potential candidate countries working on research topics of major interest to the Bank. EIBURS sponsorships, of up to EUR 100 000 per year for a period of three years, are awarded through a competitive process to interested university departments or research centres with recognised expertise in the selected area. Successful proposals entail the delivery of a variety of outputs that will be the subject of a contractual agreement with the European Investment Bank.

For the academic year 2018/2019, the EIBURS programme is seeking proposals on a new research theme:

1.   Background to the research topic

The EIB (‘the Bank’) appraises the socioeconomic viability of the projects it invests in mainly through Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) (1). This technique could be portrayed as an extension of the business plan of an investment operation. The business plan focuses on the financial flows of a project. It looks at the financial, or cash, value of expenditures (costs) and revenues (benefits). If the latter are sufficiently higher than the former, the investment adds financial value and is therefore considered a desirable operation in financial terms.

CBA expands on this by broadening the definition of costs and benefits of the project, in two respects. First, it includes all costs and benefits, whether they take the form of financial flows or otherwise. Secondly, it accounts for costs that accrue to all members of society, rather than just those that accrue to the private investor.

This involves looking at many additional items beyond those included in a business plan. Perhaps the most well-known new item among these is ‘externalities’. These are costs or benefits that are not borne by the producers or users of a project, but rather by a third party. Externalities are referred to as positive or negative depending on whether they consist of a benefit or a cost to the third party. A common example of a positive externality consists of knowledge spill-over effects, where a project that invests in research in a given sector of the economy, produces knowledge that also improves productivity in other sectors of the economy. A typical example of a negative externality is environmental pollution. Externalities are therefore benefits or costs that accrue to parties outside the business plan, and which generally do not take the form of financial flows, although they may have financial implications for the third party. So, for example, a positive knowledge externality may lower operating costs in other industries.

Other items considered by CBA and not by the business plan are changes in the value for money (formally measured through the consumer surplus) offered to the consumer. The business plan measures the money element, but leaves out the value element. If a project increases the quality of a product which is nonetheless sold to the public at the same price as before the project, the business plan would ignore the benefit that takes the form of higher quality, and hence value, to the consumer. CBA seeks to capture this change in value. This time it is a benefit to one of the parties in the business plan (the customer), but which escapes the measure of benefit used in a business plan. A much used example is the value that travellers place on savings in travel time resulting from transport projects.

An implication of taking the perspective of all members of society is that CBA must look at certain financial flows differently than a business plan. So, a business plan would treat a subsidy in the same way as a benefit — a cash inflow into the project. CBA recognises that this type of benefit to the producer constitutes a cost to the taxpayer, and hence will treat the subsidy as a transfer from the taxpayer to the private promoter, neither a benefit nor a cost. Likewise, business plans would treat taxes paid as equivalent to a cost – a cash outflow from the project – whereas CBA would treat it as a transfer from the private sector to the State.

Critics of CBA often mention that the technique fails to capture all benefits and costs of a project. In particular, it is often criticised for leaving out what are known in the CBA literature as ‘indirect effects’. These are monetary benefits and costs that the project causes in other markets related to the project – the so-called ‘secondary markets.’ Such effects may be labelled differently in the economic impact literature. Indeed, addressing differences in terminology is part of the remit of the research project proposed here.

CBA methods classify secondary markets into complements and substitutes. A project that consists of improving the productivity of orange growing, thereby reducing the price of oranges, may benefit a complementary industry, such as that of packed orange juice. CBA would not look at the increased sales and profits of the packed orange juice market, thereby arguably leaving part of the benefits of the project out. At the same time, the lower price of oranges would harm the sales of apples, a substitute sector. The lower profits of apple growers are allegedly not looked at in CBA.

In fact, CBA captures all of these effects when the markets for complements and substitutes are undistorted (2). Admittedly markets are often distorted, so CBA risks leaving out some portion of these effects. The pragmatic approach taken in CBA practice is twofold. Firstly, the benefits and costs across the various substitute and complementary markets on aggregate will tend to cancel each other out. Secondly, a project which depends on benefits in secondary markets for its socioeconomic viability is generally a weak project: alternative projects and policies are likely to generate those benefits more effectively. Still, while such a pragmatic approach is generally deemed reasonable, there is certainly a potential flaw in CBA regarding indirect effects.

Critics of CBA also point out that the expenditures associated with a project will trigger multiplier effects throughout the economy, generating profits, tax revenues and employment in other sectors. This effect goes beyond the effects of a project on substitute and complement markets just described, and relates to the actual money expenditures associated with the project. Critics of CBA propose economic impact assessment (EIA) as a complement to CBA, or even as an alternative. But the criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the different nature and objectives of CBA and EIA. CBA is an application of welfare economics to practical decision-making. It looks at all benefits and costs and measures whether one line of action adds value over the alternative line of action, thereby producing an improvement in social welfare. It is geared to decision-making and as such always compares two alternative lines of action in order to embed opportunity costs in the exercise. EIA measures only monetised variables and does not make reference to opportunity costs necessarily. It is primarily a measurement tool. It can be used for decision-making but has a narrower focus than required by welfare economics.

EIA is based on input-output tables, modelling the whole economy by measuring how expenditures in any one sector of the economy impinge upon expenditures in other sectors. It would seem therefore that EIA would address simultaneously the issues of indirect effects and multipliers. But EIA has three characteristics that make it unsuitable as a substitute or even a complement to CBA. These three shortcomings are addressed in turn.

The first of the three characteristics is that EIA assumes that investments are exogenous flows into the economy. This may be an acceptable assumption if one looks at how the project impacts on the economy, or how expenditures related to the project propagate through the economy. But it is not appropriate as a measure of whether the project adds value, i.e. of whether it is a better use of resources than the use that would be given to those resources in the absence of the project. Investment projects are hardly exogenous: they have to be financed by diverting resources from elsewhere in the economy.

Treating projects as endogenous would yield radically different results. At its simplest, the multiplier effects of the oranges project come at the expense of the multiplier effects that would take place in those other sectors where expenditure has to be reduced in order to divert resources to the oranges project.

The second of the three characteristics that distance EIA from CBA is that EIA assumes that prices do not change in the economy and that the availability of resources is virtually endless. EIA is constructed in such a way that, no matter how big a project is relative to the size of the economy, there will always be sufficient resources to implement it without altering prices through the economy. But, in reality, large projects do alter prices, and higher prices of, say, inputs, mean that production in other sectors needs to be cut back.

To address these first two shortcomings of EIA, the academic community has developed computable general equilibrium (CGE) models as a more advanced method of EIA. This technique is fairly elaborate and ultimately consists of modelling the whole economy, including also resource constraints. In so doing, CGE models address the two disadvantages of the traditional EIA discussed so far. Firstly, CGE acknowledges that resources dedicated to an investment project are not exogenous but come at the expense of an alternative use of resources. Secondly, they also address price changes (3). Not surprisingly, a common finding of empirical studies conducted with these models is that multiplier effects are substantially lower than those found by EIA. Moreover, CGE studies show that, depending on the productivity of different sectors and the resource constraints they face, the net effect of a project can be negative on the economy as a whole.

CGE therefore can be seen as a refinement of EIA. It also brings impact analysis closer to CBA. However, CGE still shares the third shortcoming of EIA when compared to CBA, namely that it focuses on flows related to monetary transactions – profits, taxes, salaries, etc. – ignoring many of the variables included in CBA, namely externalities, value for money, etc. This is because CGE studies, like EIA, were designed as a link between project or policy analysis and the macro-economy, the key indicator of macroeconomic performance being national income, or gross domestic product (GDP).

The shortcomings mentioned should not mask the facts that, firstly, CGE offers a richer description of the economy where the project operates and that, secondly, CGE techniques have grown in sophistication. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models address the dynamic behaviour of economies. Projects appraised by CBA can have lives of 20 years or longer, strengthening the relevance of the insights offered by dynamic models. So, for example, the outturns of projects that yield a technological shock to an economy are likely to be better understood through DSGE than through static modelling.

The purpose of this EIBURS proposal would be to address this third shortcoming so as to render the results of impact models compatible with those of CBA. The researchers would put forward the impact assessment method, among those currently used in empirical studies, that shows the best promise of compatibility with CBA, and work to determine that compatibility. This should help users of CBA globally, and the EIB in particular, investigate how accurate CBAs are as a measure to assess the full socioeconomic case for investment projects.

2.   Content of the research project

The research programme would consist of four tasks.

Task 1

The researchers would review the range of impact assessment methods that show the greatest promise of arriving at workable compatibility with CBA. A method should be chosen on the basis of the following criteria:

1.	most importantly, it must have a sound, well-developed, track record of empirical application;

2.	it must be of current relevance to the applied academic literature; and

3.	the researchers must be convinced of the prospects of establishing compatibility with CBA within the time and resource constraints posed by the research project.

Task 2

The second part would consist of developing two impact models that incorporate all the necessary conditions to make them compatible with the value added measures of CBA. One of the models would be for a relatively high-income, efficient, competitive regional economy in the EU. The other would be for a relatively low-income, uncompetitive, high-unemployment economy in the EU. The rationale for modelling two starkly different economies is for the analysis to shed light on whether significantly different results could be expected across types of economic conditions. Poorer regions tend to enjoy broader investment eligibilities from the public sector. It would be relevant to learn whether there are indications that appraisals in poorer regions would merit the extra expense of carrying out an impact study.

The researchers can either design the impact models from scratch or adapt existing models. They would be free to follow any of the two alternatives, so long as the alternative chosen does not compromise the central purpose of the research programme, which is compatibility with CBA.

Adapting impact models to CBA measures would involve working at two levels simultaneously: the ‘real’ and the ‘financial’ side of the economy. Many existing impact models lack a financial sector. Given, more generally, the assumptions made in CBA about the provenance of resources invested in the project and, more specifically, the fact that the EIB plays its role through the financial sector, the impact models developed would need to pay particular attention to the financial side.

On the ‘real’ side, impact models already measure variables like GDP, employment and trade balance. The main modifications envisaged would involve adding elements necessary to compute social benefit, including:

—	capturing changes in consumer surplus across the economy, and

—	incorporating measurement of positive and negative externalities, including also environmental externalities.

On the financial side, the models would accommodate alternative options for raising finance for a project, including:

—	direct taxation,

—	indirect taxation,

—	increase in private savings, and

—	debt raised from international capital markets (see, for example (4)).

A necessary ingredient of Task 2 will be to clarify differences in terminology between the two techniques. For example, CGE makes reference to ‘induced effects’, probably influenced by the terminology in EIA. Such effects do not necessarily have a direct equivalent in CBA, which may capture some elements of the CGE induced effects as indirect effects while treating other elements as multiplier effects, thereby ignoring them.

Task 3

The researchers then would simulate the effect of various types of capital investment project on each of the two economies. The number of projects to be simulated would be decided during the research project. The researchers would suggest the sectors to simulate and to be agreed with the EIB supervisor. Possible candidates include an infrastructure project, a large industrial project and a service sector project in an area such as education, leisure, etc. Each project would be simulated through alternative sources of finance.

Task 4

The researchers would finally assess the extent to which impact assessment results would differ from results conducted by a ‘typical CBA’. The ‘typical CBA’ would focus on the primary market and only on the most important secondary markets. The researchers will draw conclusions and issue recommendations regarding:

(i)	the circumstances under which project appraisals conducted with impact assessment methods are likely to yield results that differ significantly from those found by a CBA; and

(ii)	the circumstances under which the expense and time of commissioning an impact assessment would offer value for money when appraising a project.

3.   Interest of the research project to the EIB

The research topic is central to EIB financing activities. The EIB’s Statute specifies that the EIB should finance investment projects that increase economic productivity (Article 18, 1.b) (5). The Bank uses CBA as its central tool to measure the extent to which an investment increases economic productivity. The research project will contribute to testing the integrity of CBA and to assess whether there are circumstances under which it would be advisable to complement CBA with CGE.

4.   Contribution of the research project to academic research

The impact assessment models currently produced by academic researchers or commissioned by research institutes are improvements upon earlier impact methods. But the purpose of such models remains the same: to measure the net effect of a project or policy on national income, or GDP. National income is an incomplete measure of the output of a country, and hence an imperfect tool to measure total economic productivity, including a social welfare perspective, so that the models are not fully compatible with CBA. GDP measures leave out elements such as improvements in value for money (consumer surplus) and environmental externalities. By adapting impact methods to make them compatible with CBA, the output of the impact methods will become a better measure of the overall effect of an investment project on the productivity and welfare of an economy. Such impact methods could also be used in the appraisal of policies, and not only of investment projects.

To the knowledge of the proponent, such adaptation of impact methods to CBA is not available yet. The research project should therefore help develop new versions of economic models for the socioeconomic appraisal of projects and policies.

Proposals should be submitted in English by 15 April 2018 24:00 (CET). Proposals submitted after this date will not be considered. Proposals should be sent by email to:

Events.EIBInstitute@eib.org

For more exhaustive information on the EIBURS selection process and on the EIB Institute, please visit: http://institute.eib.org/

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(1)  European Investment Bank (2013), The Economic Appraisal of Transport Projects at the EIB. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. (Available online: http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/economic-appraisal-of-investment-projects.htm).

(2)  Just, R.E., Hueth, D.L. and Schmitz, A. (2004), The Welfare Economics of Public Policy: A Practical Approach to Project and Policy Evaluation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

(3)  Hosoe, N., Gasawa, K. and Hashimoto, H. (2010), Textbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modelling: Programming and Simulations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

(4)  Godley, W., and Marc L. (2007), Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

(5)  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (no 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 251) (Available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12016E/PRO/05).

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/26

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.8816 — Goldman Sachs/Centerbridge/Robyg)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2018/C 65/08)

1.

On 14 February 2018, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). This notification concerns the following undertakings: — The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (‘Goldman Sachs’, USA), — Centerbridge Partners, LP (‘Centerbridge’, USA), — Robyg SA (‘Robyg’, Poland). Goldman Sachs and Centerbridge acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of Robyg. The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: —   for Goldman Sachs: global investment banking, securities and investment management, —   for Centerbridge: investment management focused on private equity and distressed investment opportunities, —   for Robyg: indirectly solely controlled by Goldman Sachs, construction and sale of flats and commercial real estate in Poland.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified: M.8816 — Goldman Sachs/Centerbridge/Robyg Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below: Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu Fax +32 22964301 Postal address: European Commission Directorate-General for Competition Merger Registry 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

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21.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/28

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.8793 — Axión/Enagás/Axent)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2018/C 65/09)

1.

On 14 February 2018, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). This notification concerns the following undertakings: — Axión Infraestructuras de Telecomunicaciones, SAU (‘Axión’, Spain), controlled by the AMP Group (Australia), — Enagás, SA (‘Enagás’, Spain), — Axent (Spain) Axión and Enagás acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of Axent. The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: —   for Axión: wholesale technical provision of radio telecommunications infrastructure and carrier networks services for audiovisual broadcasters, public administration and telecom operators, —   for Enagás: gas storage and transmission activities in Spain, —   for Axent: provision of wholesale leased lines services in Spain.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified: M.8793 — Axión/Enagás/Axent Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below: Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu Fax +32 22964301 Postal address: European Commission Directorate-General for Competition Merger Registry 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

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