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Document 62015TN0682

Case T-682/15 P: Appeal brought on 26 November 2015 by Patrick Wanègue against the order of the Civil Service Tribunal of 15 September 2015 in Case F-21/15, Wanègue v Committee of the Regions

OJ C 59, 15.2.2016, p. 24–25 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

15.2.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 59/24


Appeal brought on 26 November 2015 by Patrick Wanègue against the order of the Civil Service Tribunal of 15 September 2015 in Case F-21/15, Wanègue v Committee of the Regions

(Case T-682/15 P)

(2016/C 059/27)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Patrick Wanègue (Dilbeek, Belgium) (represented by M.-A. Lucas, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: Committee of the Regions of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

set aside the order of 15 September 2015 in Case F-21/15 by which the Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) dismissed, as being in part manifestly unfounded in law and in part manifestly inadmissible, the appellant’s action brought on 5 February 2015 against the Committee of the Regions;

rule on the action and grant the appellant the form of order sought in his application;

order the Committee of the Regions to pay the costs of both proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on five pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 51(1) and 53(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal (CST) and of the principle of the equality of the parties in the proceedings, in that the period of two months laid down for lodging the defence, extended by ten days on account of distance, was calculated from the date of service of the notification that the application was in order, and not the date of service of the application, so that the defence lodged by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) was placed on the case file for the proceedings even though it had been lodged out of time; the CST then relied on that defence in order to dismiss the action by way of an order on the basis of Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure, and the appellant was thus deprived of the possibility of applying for judgment by default of the basis of Article 121 of the Rules of Procedure.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging (i) infringement of the principle that the provisions of EU law are to be interpreted having regard to their context and of the obligation to state reasons, in that the CST, in paragraphs 64 to 70 of its order, interpreted Article 56 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union without having regard either to Article 55 of those regulations or to the decisions adopted by the CoR on that basis, and failed to respond to the appellant’s arguments derived from those provisions; and (ii) errors of law, in that the CST thus misinterpreted the scope and purpose of Articles 55 and 56 of the Staff Regulations and Article 3 of Annex VI to those regulations, and Articles 2 and 4 of Decision No 048/03 on the detailed rules for granting flat-rate allowances for overtime worked by certain officials in categories C and D who are required to work overtime on a regular basis (‘Decision No 48/03’).

3.

Third plea in law, alleging (i) infringement of the principles that the provisions of the Staff Regulations are to be interpreted in accordance with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and that Article 31 of the Charter is to be interpreted in accordance with Decision No 48/03; and (ii) infringement of the obligation to state the reasons on which judgments are based and the requirement that pleadings are to be construed in accordance with their actual terms, in that the CST, in paragraphs 71 to 74 of its order, did not have regard to Article 6 of Decision No 48/03 for the purposes of interpreting Article 31(2) of the Charter, failed to respond to the requisite legal standard to the appellant’s arguments based on those provisions, and misinterpreted the subject matter and cause of his action.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging (i) infringement of the requirement that pleadings are to be construed in accordance with their actual terms and of the principle that actions are to be assessed on the basis of the information existing at the time the contested measure was adopted, in that the CST took the view, in paragraph 77 of its order, that the appellant based his arguments, derived from the principle of equal treatment, on the consequences of the contested decision and rejected them in any event on the basis of those consequences; and (ii) infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the principle that the provisions of the Staff Regulations are to be interpreted in accordance with the principle of equality and the principle of equality itself, in that the CST, in paragraphs 77 and 78 to 80 of its order, failed to respond to the requisite legal standard to the appellant’s arguments.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging (i) infringement of the requirement that pleadings are to be construed in accordance with their actual terms and of Article 50(1)(e) of the Rules of Procedure of the CST, in that the CST took the view, in paragraph 82 of its order, that the plea of illegality raised by the appellant was not supported by any arguments, contrary to the requirements of that provision, and was therefore manifestly inadmissible; and (ii) illegality as a consequence of paragraphs 54 to 57 of the order under appeal.


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