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Document 62014CN0566

Case C-566/14 P: Appeal brought on 9 December 2014 by Jean-Charles Marchiani against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 10 October 2014 in Case T-479/13 Marchiani v Parliament

OJ C 34, 2.2.2015, p. 18–19 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

2.2.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/18


Appeal brought on 9 December 2014 by Jean-Charles Marchiani against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 10 October 2014 in Case T-479/13 Marchiani v Parliament

(Case C-566/14 P)

(2015/C 034/20)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Jean-Charles Marchiani (represented by: C.-S. Marchiani, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

Set aside the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 10 October 2014 in Case T-479/13 Jean-Charles Marchiani v European Parliament.

Pleas and main arguments

In support of his appeal, the appellant raises five grounds of appeal.

Firstly, he believes that the General Court erred in law in refusing to apply to him the texts implementing the Statute for Members of the European Parliament. The decision of 4 July 2013 was taken following proceedings which were irregular since they ran counter to the decision of the European Parliament Bureau of 19 May and 9 July 2008 implementing the Statute for Members of the European Parliament. In addition, that decision was adopted, more generally, in breach of the adversarial principle and the principle of respect for the rights of the defence.

Secondly, the General Court erred in law and vitiated its reasoning by a contradiction in the grounds by referring to the PEAM Rules to validate the contested decision of 4 July 2013. On the one hand, the decision of 4 July 2013 is the result of an incorrect application of the PEAM Rules, repealed in 2009. On the other, the General Court, which initially referred to those PEAM Rules, then abandoned all reference to them in the course of the proceedings, putting forward as the sole legal basis the Financial Regulation of the European Union published in 2012.

Thirdly, the appellant complains that the General Court erred in law by making him alone bear the burden of proof.

Fourthly, the General Court committed a gross breach of the principle of impartial treatment required of all authorities of the European Union in the exercise of their tasks. The General Court failed entirely to take account of the political functions previously exercised by the Secretary-General of the European Parliament, the author of the contested decision.

Finally, the appellant complains that the General Court erred in law by accepting that the decision of 4 July 2013 rules on sums the recovery of which is in any event time-barred. The appellant thus submits that the failure by the General Court to have regard to the rules of limitation led to an infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity of Community acts, the principle of legitimate expectations and an infringement of the reasonable time principle.


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