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Document 62014CN0530

Case C-530/14 P: Appeal brought on 21 November 2014 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 11 September 2014 in Case T-425/11 Greece v Commission

OJ C 26, 26.1.2015, p. 19–20 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

26.1.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 26/19


Appeal brought on 21 November 2014 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 11 September 2014 in Case T-425/11 Greece v Commission

(Case C-530/14 P)

(2015/C 026/23)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouchagiar and P.J. Loewenthal)

Other party to the proceedings: Hellenic Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

set aside the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 11 September 2014, notified to the Commission on 12 September 2014, in Case Τ-425/11 Greece v Commission (ECLI:EU:T:2014:768);

refer the case back to the General Court for it to rule again;

reserve the costs of these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is based on a single ground: the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied Article 107(1) TFEU in ruling that the contested measure did not provide any advantage for the public casinos. The single ground of appeal advanced by the Commission has three parts.

First, in paragraphs 52 to 58 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court infringed Article 107(1) TFEU in ruling that the public casinos did not enjoy an advantage from the payment of a lower tax for each entering customer on the basis of the contested measure, since the amounts paid represented 80 % of the mandatory entry fees which were charged by both the private and public casinos.

Second, in paragraphs 59 to 68 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court infringed Article 107(1) TFEU in ruling that it was not sufficient for the Commission to define the advantage of the contested measures as direct (de jure) tax discrimination, but that the Commission was obliged to base the existence of an advantage on an economic analysis of the effects of the contested measure.

Third, in paragraphs 74 to 80 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court infringed Article 107(1) TFEU in ruling that (i) the practice of free entry could not confirm the advantage of the contested measure since that measure did not provide any advantage and (ii) before that argument could be effective the Commission was bound to provide evidence that in practice the number of free entries granted was excessively high in comparison with the objectives of the Greek legislation which permitted that practice, so as to be incompatible with the conditions of that national legislation.


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